This is part of the document’s introduction, one of the few pieces actually released:

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Chemical Warfare Capability of Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya – July 1985 [9 Pages, 0.8MB]

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The post Chemical Warfare Capability of Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya – July 1985 first appeared on The Black Vault.

The post Iran’s Tactical Ballistic Missile Strike on Al-Asad Airbase, Iraq – January 8, 2020 first appeared on The Black Vault.

This Memorandum examines the degree to which chemical warfare (CW) in the Iran-Iraq conflict has been effective and discusses the factors driving decisions to develop and use chemical weapons.

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Impact and Implications of Chemical Weapons Use in the Iran-Iraq War, April 1988 [27 Pages, 16MB] – This document is highlighted where new information was released from my MDR request. The previous release was in 2010. The Black Vault’s release below was in March 2020.

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The post Impact and Implications of Chemical Weapons Use in the Iran-Iraq War, April 1988 first appeared on The Black Vault.

At the request of the Director of Policy Planning at the Department of State, this. 6.2(d) Intelligence Community Assessment (lCA) examines the internal dynamics of Iraq that will frame the challenges for whatever government succeeds the regime of Saddam Husayn. It discusses the main political, economic, humanitarian, and security issues inside Iraq that are likely to demand attention during approximately the first three to five years after Saddam departs. In particular, it looks at the prospects for representative government in Iraq and at the ethnic, tribal, and religious forces that will affect its development.

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Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq, January 2003 [39 Pages, 22MB]

The post Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq, January 2003 first appeared on The Black Vault.

The USS Stark incident occurred during the Iran–Iraq War on 17 May 1987, when an Iraqi jet aircraft fired missiles at the American frigate USS Stark. 37 United States Navy personnel were killed and 21 were injured.

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Department of the Navy, Office of the Judge Advocate General Documents [57 Pages, 2.8MB]

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During the war in Iraq that began in March 2003, personnel of the United States Army and the Central Intelligence Agency committed a series of human rights violations against detainees in the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. These violations included physical and sexual abuse, torture, rape, sodomy, and murder.  The abuses came to widespread public attention with the publication of photographs of the abuse by CBS News in April 2004. The incidents received widespread condemnation both within the United States and abroad, although the soldiers received support from some conservative media within the United States.

The administration of George W. Bush asserted that these were isolated incidents, not indicative of general U.S. policy. This was disputed by humanitarian organizations such as the Red Cross, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch. These organizations stated that the abuses at Abu Ghraib were not isolated incidents, but were part of a wider pattern of torture and brutal treatment at American overseas detention centers, including those in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay. Several scholars stated that the abuses constituted state-sanctioned crimes.

The United States Department of Defense removed seventeen soldiers and officers from duty, and eleven soldiers were charged with dereliction of duty, maltreatment, aggravated assault and battery. Between May 2004 and March 2006, these soldiers were convicted in courts-martial, sentenced to military prison, and dishonorably discharged from service. Two soldiers, Specialist Charles Graner and PFC Lynndie England, were sentenced to ten and three years in prison, respectively. Brigadier General Janis Karpinski, the commanding officer of all detention facilities in Iraq, was reprimanded and demoted to the rank of colonel. Several more military personnel who were accused of perpetrating or authorizing the measures, including many of higher rank, were not prosecuted. It is reported that most inmates were innocent of the crimes they were accused of and were simply detained due to them being in the wrong place at the wrong time.

Documents popularly known as the Torture Memos came to light a few years later. These documents, prepared shortly before the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States Department of Justice, authorized certain enhanced interrogation techniques, generally held to involve torture of foreign detainees. The memoranda also argued that international humanitarian laws, such as the Geneva Conventions, did not apply to American interrogators overseas. Several subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decisions, including Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006), have overturned Bush administration policy, and ruled that Geneva Conventions apply.

Many of the torture techniques used were developed at Guantánamo detention centre, including prolonged isolation; the frequent flier program, a sleep deprivation program whereby people were moved from cell to cell every few hours so they couldn’t sleep for days, weeks, even months, short-shackling in painful positions; nudity; extreme use of heat and cold; the use of loud music and noise and preying on phobias.

Document Archive

The Taguba Report

The Taguba Report (May 2004) is the common name of an official Army Regulation 15-6 military inquiry conducted in 2004 into the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse by United States military forces in Iraq.

In his Findings of Fact, Major General Taguba wrote:

“That between October and December 2003, at the Abu Ghraib Confinement Facility (BCCF), numerous incidents of sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses were inflicted on several detainees. This systemic and illegal abuse of detainees was intentionally perpetrated by several members of the military police guard force (372nd Military Police Company, 320th Military Police Battalion, 800th MP Brigade), in Tier (section) 1-A of the Abu Ghraib Prison (BCCF). The allegations of abuse were substantiated by detailed witness statements (ANNEX 26) and the discovery of extremely graphic photographic evidence…In addition to the aforementioned crimes, there were also abuses committed by members of the 325th MI Battalion, 205th MI Brigade, and Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC). Specifically, on 24 November 2003, [name redacted], 205th MI Brigade, sought to degrade a detainee by having him strip and returned to cell naked. (ANNEXES 26 and 53)”.

The Taguba Report [3,367 Pages] – PDF 1 | PDF 2 | PDF 3 | PDF 4 | PDF 5 | PDF 6

The Taguba Report – Annexes (Partial release)

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Documents

 Records pertaining to: FBI’s Abu Ghraib Investigation of its agents and their potential knowledge of what happened inside the prison FBI Release #1 [56 Pages, 20.9MB]

 Records pertaining to: FBI’s Abu Ghraib Investigation of its agents and their potential knowledge of what happened inside the prison FBI Release #2 [4 Pages, 0.6MB]

Donald Rumsfeld Visit to Abu Ghraib

On May 13, 2004, then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld visited Abu Ghraib prison.  He stated during this time that whomever was responsible for the atrocities at the prison, would be brought to justice.

Intrigued by the event, I was interested in documents relating to this. So, on May 18, 2004, I requested all documents from the Department of Defense, related to Rumsfeld’s visit.

I did not know it then, but I would wait more than 11 YEARS for the documents to be reviewed and released.  But, what I also did not realize, was that it would be another 15 MONTHS before I would find out that the DOD sent my response to the wrong address.

I did check in from time to time asking for updates relating to my request. However, I never got any updates. When I finally stopped asking, and requested the FOIA Case Processing notes on September 14, 2016, I was contacted by the DOD with the following note:

Good morning Mr. Greenewald,

We have received your request for the case processing notes for 04-F-1563. I was concerned by your statement that you never received a response, particularly because I recall signing this case. It was one of our ten oldest last year so I remember it fairly well.

We did close you request in June of 2015, however, it appears your final response was mailed to the incorrect address. The AO for the case will send you a copy of the response letter and the responsive documents electronically.

Please accept our apologies and let me know if we can do anything else for you on this matter.

Thankfully, the office at the DOD sent me the responsive documents electronically (now available below). And by looking at their letter — they sent these records to the Associated Press (AP) in June of 2015.  I am glad I kept pushing for answers – or I would’ve been a REALLY old man before I figured out what happened.

Although not the longest I have waited for documents to come, it’s up there. But what is strange, is why would it take so long? There were only 12 pages that required review. That is almost 1 YEAR PER PAGE by the time I got the documents in my hands. In addition, the redactions are all (b)(6) exemptions, which means they are names or it’s information redacted that is an invasion of personal privacy, if released. Those are pretty easy to determine, and should not take a year per page for review.

I also obtained the case processing notes, and once I did, there were excessive (b)(5) redactions. I appealed that, and received a second release two years later. All the records are available below.

Declassified DOD Documents

Donald Rumsfeld Visit to Abu Ghraib Documents [15 Pages, 2.7MB]

FOIA Case 04-F-1563 Processing Notes (Post-Appeal Release) [42 Pages, 5.9MB] – Since the case took 11+ years to process, it’s always interesting to see the progression of how the documents were handled and ultimately declassified. I appealed the release below, based on the fact I got excessive (b)(5) exemptions. They released a bit more of the case processing notes, based on that appeal. This is the post-appeal response.

FOIA Case 04-F-1563 Processing Notes (Original Release) [45 Pages, 12.1MB] – This is the original release of case processing notes. I appealed this released, and two years later, received the above link. This released is archived here for reference.

The post Abu Ghraib Prison Scandal first appeared on The Black Vault.

The National Intelligence Estimate is the work product of about six intelligence agencies that pulled together all the information with regards to the weapons of mass destruction program of Saddam Hussein. It is titled “Iraq’s Continuing Programs For Weapons of Mass Destruction.” And in this document it is the key judgments they have made about the WMD program, current to the time October 2002 timeframe when originally released.

There were two version created, an unclassified and a classified version. See below for various releases, including my Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) requests to get the document further declassified.

Document Archive

Unclassified Version

 Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002 (Unclassified Version) [27 Pages, 0.7MB] –  This document was released publicly, however, there was a classified version which the CIA conveniently did not include during the processing of this FOIA request. I then filed for a copy (and Mandatory Declassification Review [MDR]) for the other version and after a few months, received a much less redacted version of the record than was previously declassified in 2004.

Classified Version

 Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002 (Classified Version) December 2018 Release (Highlighted new information from previous release) – [97 Pages, 38.9MB] –  A Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) was completed in late December of 2018, and released to The Black Vault during the same month.

 Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002 (Classified Version) January 2015 Release – [98 Pages, 2.84MB] –  A Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) was completed in late December of 2014, and released to The Black Vault in January of 2015.

The post Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002 first appeared on The Black Vault.

The fifth president of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, was internationally known for his use of chemical weapons in the 1980s against Iranian and Kurdish civilians during and after the Iran–Iraq War. In the 1980s he pursued an extensive biological weapons program and a nuclear weapons program, though no nuclear bomb was built.

President Bush said that the biggest regret of his presidency was “the intelligence failure” in Iraq, while the Senate Intelligence Committee found in 2008 that his administration “misrepresented the intelligence and the threat from Iraq”. A key CIA informant in Iraq admitted that he lied about his allegations, “then watched in shock as it was used to justify the war”.

The following is a list of documents pertaining to Iraq & Weapons of Mass Destriction (WMDs).

Document Archive

 Iraq: Chemical Weapons Continue to be Recovered, April 4, 2006 – After 2018 MDR Review on 9 May 2018 – [ 22 Pages, 2.3MB ] – This assessment provides an overview of the chemical munitions recovered in Iraq since May 2004 and examines the possible location and ramifications of residual pre-1991 Gulf War Iraqi chemical weapons. This first link is the 2018 release after an MDR review I requested in the same year.  Sadly, a few redaction citations changed, and very little changed in the report, however, they did declassify the existence of the Single 152-mm Binary Sarin Cannon Projectile, which was classified in the previous release. (See below for 2014 release).

 Iraq: Chemical Weapons Continue to be Recovered, April 4, 2006 – Previous 2014 Release on 21 August 2014 – [ 23 Pages, 0.7MB ]

 Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD’s – 30 September 2004 [ 248 Pages ]

 Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002 (Unclassified Version) [27 Pages, 0.7MB] –  This document was released publicly, however, there was a classified version which the CIA conveniently did not include during the processing of this FOIA request. I then filed for a copy (and Mandatory Declassification Review [MDR]) for the other version and after a few months, received a much less redacted version of the record than was previously declassified in 2004.

 Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002 (Classified Version) [98 Pages, 0.7MB] –  A Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) was completed in late December of 2014, and released to The Black Vault in January of 2015.

End of WMD Search – Iraq Survey Group Report

The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) was a fact-finding mission sent by the multinational force in Iraq after the 2003 invasion of Iraq to find the weapons of mass destruction alleged to be possessed by Iraq that had been the main ostensible reason for the invasion. Its final report is commonly referred to as the Duelfer Report. It consisted of a 1,400-member international team organized by the Pentagon and Central Intelligence Agency to hunt for the alleged stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and biological agents, and any supporting research programs and infrastructure that could be used to develop WMD.

Click here to read the Duelfer report’s key findings (pdf)

Click here to read Vol. 1 of the report (pdf)

Click here to read Vol. 2 (pdf)

Click here to read Vol. 3 (pdf)

The post Iraq & Weapons of Mass Destruction first appeared on The Black Vault.

The DoD OIG conducted this audit, the third in a series of audits on property accountability in support of OIR, to determine whether the Army had effective controls for processing and transferring ITEF equipment to the Iraqi government. The audit found that Army commands documented procedures for processing and transferring ITEF equipment to the Iraqi government. However, the 1st Theater Sustainment Command did not have effective controls to maintain complete visibility and accountability of the ITEF equipment in Kuwait and Iraq prior to transfer to the Iraqi government, and could not provide complete data for the quantity and dollar value of equipment on hand, including rolling stock and ammunition. As a result, the 1st Theater Sustainment Command did not have accurate, up-to-date records on the quantity and location of ITEF equipment on hand in Kuwait and Iraq, and did not have effective controls because it did not use centralized systems to maintain visibility and accountability of ITEF equipment. Instead, the 1st Theater Sustainment Command relied on multiple spreadsheets developed by different commands in both Kuwait and Iraq to provide it with visibility and accountability of equipment and did not consistently account for equipment in Iraq.

The DoD OIG recommended that the Commander, 1st Theater Sustainment Command, use automated systems to account for and provide complete visibility of ITEF equipment. The Command agreed with the recommendation and initiated steps to implement corrective actions.

Objective

The document states the objective of this investigation as:

We determined whether the Army had effective controls for processing and transferring Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF) equipment to the Government of Iraq.

This is the third in a series of audits on property accountability in support of Operation Inherent Resolve. ITEF, created by the FY 2015 National Defense Authorization Act, assists the Government of Iraq to combat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Examples of ITEF equipment provided to the Government of Iraq include body armor, navigation sets, magazine pouches, ambulances, and cargo trucks.

The Army’s 1st Theater Sustainment Command (1st TSC) maintains visibility and property accountability of ITEF equipment until transferred to the Government of Iraq.

Findings

Army commands documented procedures for processing and transferring ITEF equipment to the Government of Iraq. For example, the 1st TSC developed a standard operating procedure that includes step-by-step instructions for processing and transferring ITEF equipment. However, the 1st TSC did not have effective controls to maintain complete visibility and accountability of ITEF equipment in Kuwait and Iraq prior to transfer to the Government of Iraq.

Equipment visibility provides users with equipment location, movement, and status. Army Regulation 735-5 states that all property acquired by the Army will be continuously accounted for from the time of acquisition until the ultimate consumption or disposal of the property.

However, the 1st TSC could not provide complete data for the quantity and dollar value of equipment on hand, including rolling stock and ammunition. Rolling stock refers to vehicles. Examples include Mine Clearance Systems, ambulances, and wrecker trucks. 

The 1st TSC did not have effective controls because it did not use centralized systems to maintain visibility and accountability of ITEF equipment. Instead, the 1st TSC relied on multiple spreadsheets developed by different commands in both Kuwait and Iraq to provide it with visibility and accountability of equipment and did not consistently account for equipment in Iraq.

As a result, the 1st TSC did not have accurate, up-to-date records on the quantity and location of ITEF equipment on hand in Kuwait and Iraq. Accurate, up-to-date records of equipment on hand in Kuwait and Iraq are critical for filling equipment requests. The process to contact multiple commands and reference multiple spreadsheets to determine equipment quantities and location could delay the fulfillment of a request or delay the development of future requests. In addition, not having accurate records of equipment on hand could result in duplicate equipment requests. Further, the use of manually populated spreadsheets increased the risk for human-error when inputting and updating equipment data.

Document Archive

 The Army Did Not Implement Effective Controls To Maintain Visibility and Accountability of Iraq Train and Equip Fund Equipment, September 14, 2016 [27 Pages, 2.9MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/dod/DODIG-2016-00799.pdf

The post The Army Did Not Implement Effective Controls To Maintain Visibility and Accountability of Iraq Train and Equip Fund Equipment, September 14, 2016 first appeared on The Black Vault.

Niger/Iraq Uranium Story and Joe Wilson, 7/7/03 [534 Kb]

Niger/Iraq Uranium Meeting CIA, 2/19/02 [206 Kb]

Niger: Taking Another Hard Look at GON Uranium Sales, 7/19/02 [359 Kb]

Niger: President Tandja Tells DCINC Niger’s Uranium is Secure, 2/24/02 [319 Kb]

Niger: Sale of Uranium to Iraq Is Unlikely, 3/1/02 [306 Kb]

Niger – Sale of Uranium to Iraq Is Unlikely, 3/1/02 [95 Kb]

The post NIGER/IRAQ Uranium Story and Ambassador Joe Wilson first appeared on The Black Vault.

Avoiding a Second Bay of Pigs: Lessons Relevant to the Liberation of Iraq [22 Pages]

Lessons Learned: The Iran-Iraq War [134 Pages] – Political, strategic and tactical aspects of the war

Lessons Learned by the Saudi Arabian National Guard [39 Pages] – Suggestions, advice and tips for successful desert tactical operations

Measuring the Security and Stability in Iraq [48 Pages]

Senate Intelligence Report (521 Pages)

Senate Intelligence Report – Conclusions Only (30 Pages)

Soviet Intelligence on Iraq (4 Pages)

Strategic Implications for U.S. Policy in IRAQ: What Now? [39 Pages]

United Nations Sanctions Against Iraq and Iraq’s Current Military Status [66 Pages]

Weapons of Mass Destruction: U.N. Confronts Significant Challenges in Implementing Sanctions against Iraq [47 Pages]

The post Misc Documents on Iraq & Afghanistan first appeared on The Black Vault.

A Report Bibliography, Keyword: “Operation Southern Watch” from the DTIC (Word Document [.doc]) [22 Pages, 261 KB] – Responsive documents from a request I filed from the DIA.

The Effect of Operational Deployments on Army Reserve Component Attrition Rates and Its Strategic Implications[55 Pages, 205 KB] – This monograph will assess the effects of operational deployments on Army Reserve Component attrition rate and its strategic implications for the U.S. Army. It will challenge the belief that the current use of the Army Reserve Component in peace time operational deployments is having a negative effect on its attrition rate. Following the end of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm the United States’ military began a dramatic down sizing of its active and reserve forces. By the end of 1993, the U.S. Army had been reduced from its late 1980s size of eighteen combat divisions to only ten combat divisions. As the draw down of military forces continued the number of operational deployments increased for the active Army. Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo were added to the active Army’s already crowded plate that included the Multinational Force and Observes in the Sinai Peninsula and Operation Southern Watch in Southwest Asia. It became apparent that the active Army required assistance with these additional missions or risk a degradation of its unit readiness and morale. As a result of this dilemma, the decision was made to activate units and personnel of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve to support on-going deployments. This monograph reviews the findings of four studies conducted to determine the effects of operational deployments on the U.S. military. In addition, the attrition rate for the Army National Guard and Army Reserve is reviewed, to include high demand units, in order to determine linkages between the increased use of the reserve component and corresponding attrition.

Modern Air Occupation Strategy Case Study: Operation Southern Watch [34 Pages, 196 KB] – At approximately 8:15 a.m. Eastern Standard Time today, British Royal Air Force GR-1 “Tornado” aircraft enforcing the Southern No-Fly Zone struck an Iraqi military radar site approximately 15 miles south of Al Basrah near Ash Shuaybah. The strikes were in response to two Iraqi violations of the Southern No-Fly Zone and aircraft illuminations by Iraqi surface-to-air missile sites & Coalition air and naval forces are responsible for enforcing the no-fly zones over Iraq and UNmandated maritime sanctions. At the same time, these forces continuously assess the level of threat posed by the Iraqi forces and take actions that are necessary to reduce these threats and to defend themselves & Since Desert Fox, Saddam Hussein has significantly increased the threat to our pilots and air crews patrolling the no-fly zones through his rhetoric and actions. Iraq has announced its intent to bring down a coalition aircraft, and in fact has issued a bounty to Iraqi military personnel for a successful engagement. Despite repeated warnings, Iraqi actions and intentions pose serious threats to our coalition forces and friends in the region. Our actions today are an appropriate response to these threats and are in support of UN mandates. Today, British Royal Air Force, US Navy and US Air Force combat aircraft, including B-2 bombers flown from the United States, halted columns of Iraqi tanks moving toward the Kuwaiti border. This Iraqi movement of troops was in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 949. Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE, and Oman have condemned Iraq’s provocative actions and have pledged to support Kuwait with ground and air forces. The United States and Britain are presently mobilizing additional air and ground reinforcements, but are awaiting consultation with Coalition partners before deploying these forces.

Network Centric Operations (NCO) Case Study: Task Force 50 During Operation ENDURING FREEDOM [33 Pages, 261 KB] – The United States Ship (USS) Carl Vinson (CVN-70) battle group, commanded by Rear Admiral (RADM) (now retired) Thomas E. Zelibor, departed its home port in Bremerton, Washington, on July 23, 2001, ready for a scheduled deployment in support of Operation SOUTHERN WATCH in the Arabian Gulf. On September 11, 2001, the same day that the battle group reached the North Arabian Sea, the al-Qaeda terrorist network attacked the Pentagon, the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, and crashed a plane into a rural Pennsylvania field. Over the next several months, the battle group would undertake combat activities it had not planned for and would work in a joint and combined environment fighting the war on terror during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF). RADM Zelibor, having seen the power of network centric warfare (NCW) firsthand during the Global 2000 wargame, implemented transformational practices that changed the very nature of command and control (C2) within his command. He saw the need for a more efficient and effective way of conducting daily activities. He sought to change the way those in his command could get information and react to that information by reducing the amount of time needed to prepare briefs (that were outdated as soon as they were created) and by introducing the idea of adding time for staff planning. Under RADM Zelibor’s guidance, the sailors and staff were able to transform daily operations and work together more efficiently to achieve their mission. RADM Zelibor’s task force grew by orders of magnitude after the September 11 attacks, the sailors and staff were so successful at streamlining the daily operational process that they were able to make distinct changes that allowed them to experience a shared understanding of the battlespace, to collaborate, and to develop mission objectives more quickly.

The No-Fly Zones In Iraq: Air Occupation [116 Pages, 4.02 MB] – The end of the Persian Gulf War was followed by the establishment of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT and Operation SOUTHERN WATCH. Both of these operations have no-fly zones as their centerpieces. These first no-fly zones have already been followed by a no-fly zone in the former Yugoslavia. Given the current willingness in the U.S. to use airpower, and specifically no-fly zones in conflict resolution, further analysis is warranted. This thesis examines the use of no-fly zones in Iraq to accomplish the strategic goals of occupation. A historical comparison of these no-fly zones and the post-World War II occupations of Germany and Japan is used to measure, compare, and contrast these post-war actions. The subjective analysis of the no- fly zones is the basis for determining if they accomplish the strategic objectives of occupation. The historical analysis conducted in this research shows that the use of no- fly zones accomplishes both components of occupation, holding and controlling. Therefore, this thesis concludes that the use of no-fly zones accomplishes the strategic goals of occupation.

The Strategic Failure of Operation Southern Watch and the Need for a New Coalition Based Strategy [30 Pages, 1.44 MB] – The credibility and effectiveness of no-fly zones have been very contentious issues. Operation Southern Watch has been operating for over eight years, in an effort to change the behavior of the Iraqi regime. Politicians and military leaders praise the effects that the operation has supposedly had in achieving U.S. national policy. Yet, while the tactical results of this operation may appear measurably successful, it is having adverse effects at the strategic level. While politicians laud the success of national policy, asserting that the region is better off than before the Gulf War, military leaders focus narrowly on measurable results of the current military mission, such as no-fly zone violations. Both groups tend to avoid the discussion of recent trends that demonstrates the weakening resolve of the coalition to demand continued compliance with United Nations resolutions by fraq. Operation Southern Watch is a strategic failure that is leading to the demise of the Desert Storm coalition. A new strategy should be developed that will be acceptable to all coalition nations. All of the elements of power must be integrated into this strategy. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) should consider contributions from inter-agency organizations when developing a new course of action. The CENTCOM staff needs to develop a course of action that will ensure the support and participation of all coalition members for the long-term. Measures of effectiveness must be developed that will determine the effects that a course of action will have on the most important element of Gulf strategy – the coalition. While demonstrations of overwhelming military power may keep Saddam Hussein contained for the short-term, only a firmly united coalition will demonstrate the resolve necessary to guarantee long-term regional stability.

The post Operation Southern Watch first appeared on The Black Vault.

The first major foreign crisis for the United States after the end of the Cold War presented itself in August 1990. Saddam Hussein, the dictator of Iraq, ordered his army across the border into tiny Kuwait. This was no ordinary act of aggression. Iraq’s army was well equipped. The United States had provided massive military aid to Iraq during their eight-year war with Iran, giving them the fourth largest army in the world.

Kuwait was a major supplier of oil to the United States. The Iraqi takeover posed an immediate threat to neighboring Saudi Arabia, another major exporter of oil. If Saudi Arabia fell to Saddam, Iraq would control one-fifth of the world’s oil supply. All eyes were on the White House, waiting for a response. President Bush, who succeeded President Reagan, stated simply: “This will not stand.”

In the last months of 1990, the United States participated in the defense of Saudi Arabia in a deployment known as Operation Desert Shield. Over 500,000 American troops were placed in Saudi Arabia in case of an Iraqi attack on the Saudis. The U.S. further sought multilateral support in the United Nations Security Council. Traditionally, Iraq was an ally of the Soviet Union, who held a veto power over any potential UN military action. Looking westward for support for their dramatic internal changes, the USSR did not block the American plan. The UN condemned Iraq and helped form a coalition to fight Saddam militarily.

Bush, remembering the lessons of Vietnam, sought public support as well. Although there were scant opponents of the conflict, the vast majority of Americans and a narrow majority of the Congress supported the President’s actions. When all the forces were in place, the United States issued an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein: leave Kuwait by January 15,1991 or face a full attack by the multinational force.

January 15 came and went with no response from the Iraqis. The next night Desert Shield became Desert Storm. Bombing sorties pummeled Iraq’s military targets for the next several weeks. On many days there were over 2500 such missions. Iraq responded by launching Scud missiles at American military barracks in Saudi Arabia and Israel. Attacking Israel was a stratagem to persuade all the neighboring Arab nations to join the Iraqi cause. After intense diplomatic pressure and negotiation, the Arab nations remained in opposition to Iraq.

On February 24, the ground war began. Although the bombing lasted for weeks, American ground troops declared Kuwait liberated just 100 hours after the ground attack was initiated. American foot soldiers moved through Kuwait and entered southern Iraq. This posed a dilemma for the United States. The military objectives were complete, but Saddam, the perpetrator of the rape of Kuwait, was still ruling Iraq from Baghdad. President Bush feared that the allies would not support the occupation of Baghdad. Concerns were raised that if Saddam’s regime were toppled, the entire nation could disintegrate into a civil war. Soon Iraq agreed to terms for a ceasefire, and the conflict subsided.

The above is Copyright ©2008-2012 ushistory.org, owned by the Independence Hall Association in Philadelphia, founded 1942.

Charting the Storm: DMA’s Role in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 10 Feb 1992 – 21 Feb 1993 [36 Pages, 1.33 MB] – The increasing importance of geographic intelligence to the Joint Force Commander is illustrated by the cartographic support of the Defense Mapping Agency during operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. This paper was done to illustrate the impact that the availability or non-availability of cartographic support plays in modern military operations. The scope of this paper was limited to DMA’s aeronautical, topographic, and hydrographic support, which directly influenced the course of both operations. The increased dependency on these products was directly related to the increased sophistication of modern weapon systems. This was further compounded by the non- traditional requirement areas in the post U.S.S.R. world. To future Joint Force Commanders, these products can serve either as a force multiplier, operational constraint–depending upon their availability…. Cartography, Intelligence, Desert Storm.

Compressing the Levels of War: Operation Desert Storm and Operation Allied Force Case Study, 15 May 2001 [30 Pages, 0.3 MB] – Advances in information and communications technology are combining with the CNN effect to blur the distinction between the strategic, the operational and the tactical level of command. The strategic level of command frequently reaches down through the operational level of command, placing restraints on the operational commander’s selection of possible courses of action or limitations on the tactical level of command. The tactical level of command is similarly affected by these same phenomena such that tactical actions may have immediate and strategic ramifications. While there are measures the operational commander may take to mitigate the occurrence of these effects, it ultimately remains up to the operational commander to become adept at integrating the strategic level of command with the tactical level of command and producing the effects required to meet the assigned political objectives.

Costs of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm: A Burden Sharing Perspectiv, December 1991 [111 Pages, 3.86 MB] – This thesis analyzes burden sharing issues of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Explanations of economic principles including public goods theory, disproportionality, free-riding, marginalism, and opportunity cost provide a common base of knowledge necessary for an intelligent discussion of burden sharing in defense alliances. The thesis concentrates on the problems associated with quantifying benefits, costs and equity issues in multilateral force actions like Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. In particular, it analyzes the Persian Gulf oil supply security benefit and evaluates the efficacy of various oil benefit measures. Current cost estimates and cost reports focus on legitimizing supplemental funding. They do not capture all of the incremental costs appropriate for burden sharing. This thesis examines the critical difference between incremental burden sharing costs and the costs that were reported to satisfy congressional budget deliberation. Recommendations focus on ways for the U.S. to implement the financial lessons learned from Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm to be more prepared for similar burden sharing arrangements in the future.

Disease and Non-Battle Injuries among Navy and Marine Corps Personnel during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm [24 Pages, 1.27 MB] – This study describes types and frequencies of Diseases and Non-Battle Injuries (DNBI) that occurred in a sample population of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps personnel deployed to Saudi Arabia during the Persian Gulf War. Data were collected at two U.S. Navy mobile field hospitals set up in northern Saudi Arabia during the seven months of Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm. A Medical Encounter Data Sheet (MEDS) was used to capture pertinent medical information during individual patient visits. The MEDS form is a modified version of an instrument used in earlier studies of DNBI during peacetime. Completed MEDS forms were forwarded to the Naval Health Research Center in San Diego, where they were coded and the data entered into a computer file for analysis. Frequencies were computed for each of the major illness and injury categories defined in the International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision (ICD-9). The highest number of visits were for ‘Injuries and Poisonings’ followed by ‘Diseases of the Respiratory System.’ These findings are consistent with earlier studies of DNBI among U.S. Navy and Marine Corps personnel under peacetime conditions. The MEDS form proved useful as a means of documenting medical treatment information from deployed units. Operation Desert Shield Documenting Medical Treatment, Operation Desert Storm, Medical Encounter Data Sheet, Disease and Non-Battle Injuries, Persian Gulf War.

Military Review: Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, September 1991 [119 Pages, 9.07 MB]

Operation Desert Storm and the Theories of B.H. Liddell Hart, 8 Nov 1991 [13 Pages, 0.5 MB] – Operation Desert Storm lasted little more than a thousand hours, but the lessons it holds for strategists will be remembered as long as there are military historians who chronicle the glories of the Armed Forces of the United States. Operation Desert Storm will be remembered by many historians as a classic example of the use of the indirect approach, and as a further validation of the theories of Sir Basil Liddell Hart. Liddell Hart, who saw a generation of British, French, and German soldiers meet a bloody and pointless end at the battles of the Somme and elsewhere on the Western Front in World War I, is generally remembered as the strategist who inspired the great generals of tank warfare in World War II. General George S. Patton, for example, said that Liddell Hart’s books on strategy had nourished him for 20 years. Generals Guderian and Rommel called themselves his pupils. Consciously or unconsciously, Liddell Hart’s strategic teachings were reflected equally well in Operation Desert Storm, and in the decisions made by American commanders in the field, in the Pentagon, and in the White House. The core of Liddell Hart’s strategic theory boils down to 10 maxims. This paper analyzes the conduct of Operation Desert Storm in terms of each of these maxims, and assesses how closely actual operations paralleled Liddell Hart’s theories. Emphasis will be placed on military strategy at the operational level (or the strategic level, as Liddell Hart calls it), but some mention also will be made of the political, economic, and diplomatic decisions that dictated the terms of battle, which Liddell Hart assigns to “Grand Strategy.”

Operation Desert Storm: Evaluation of the Air Campaign, 12 Jun 1997 [240 Pages, 13.1 MB] – This report is the unclassified version of a classified report that we issued in July 1996 on the Operation Desert Storm air Campaign. The Department of Defense (DoD) reevaluated the security classification of the original report, and as a result, about 85 percent of the material originally determined to be classified has subsequently been determined to be unclassified and is presented in this report. The data and findings in this report address (1) the use and performance of aircraft, munitions, and missiles employed during the air campaign; (2) the validity of DOD and manufacturer claims about weapon systems’ performance, particularly those systems utilizing advanced technology; (3) the relationship between cost and performance of weapon systems; and (4) the extent that Desert Storm air campaign objectives were met.

Operation Desert Storm. Questions Remain on Possible Exposure to Reproductive Toxicants, August 1994 [39 Pages, 2.56 MB] – Since their return from deployment in the Persian Gulf war, many U.S. troops have complained of health problems that they believe result from their service in the gulf region. Research has shown that U.S. troops were exposed before, during, and after the war to a variety of substances that are potentially hazardous. These include occupational hazards (such as the extensive use of diesel fuel as a sand suppressant in and around encampments, the burning of human waste with fuel oil, the presence of fuel in shower water, and the drying of sleeping bags with leaded vehicle exhaust), infectious diseases (most prominently leishmaniasis), prophylactic agents (to protect against chemical and biological weapons), depleted uranium (contained in certain ammunition and in the fragments of exploded rounds embedded in casualties), pesticides and insect repellents, possible chemical warfare agents, and a large variety of compounds contained in the extensive smoke from the oil-well fires that enveloped the region at the end of the war. Some veterans of the Persian Gulf war believe that exposure to these elements had harmful effects on not only their own health but also on the health of their spouses and children. There are also concerns about various reproductive problems and about the incidence of birth defects thought to be abnormally high among offspring born to Persian Gulf veterans. This latter subject is the focus of this report.

United States Air Force Fighter Support in Operation Desert Storm, 1995 [122 Pages, 4.88 MB] – Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm were characterized by unanticipated levels of demands for U.S. Air Force (USAF) fighter logistics materials and services-sometimes high, sometimes low, but seldom what was predicted during peacetime planning. Peacetime predictions about the required kinds, quantities, and locations of critical logistics resources were frequently wrong-often substantially. In this report, we discuss logistics Support to USAF fighter aircraft in Operation Desert Storm. We review the ability of the logistics system to satisfy fighter units’ needs for aircraft components, electronic countermeasures, and Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night (LANTIRN) pods, and for munitions during the conflict. Where that performance varied from expected or officially planned levels in either a positive or negative way, we sought to identify the underlying causes. From those findings, we draw inferences for the future logistics system, especially in light of post-Cold War changes in the global threat, USAF missions, force size, and future budgets. This report should be of interest to logistics policymakers, wartime planners, and logistics analysts, because it challenges widely held assumptions about wartime support to fighters. Not only do we question the validity of analysts extrapolating peacetime demand experience into wartime predictions, but we observe that the logistics system for fighters performed best when logistics managers on the scene developed ad hoc processes to supplant standard processes and resource plans. Finally, we indicate the need for more-flexible resources and structures in future USAF logistics policies and plans.

The Role of the Media in The Operational Deception Plan for Operation Desert Storm, April 1992 [78  Pages, 2.53 MB] – This monograph examines the operational deception plan used in Operation Desert Storm from 17 January to 28 February 1991 in relation to U.S. Army deception doctrine. Using the deception plan from Operation Overlord in World War II to illustrate the deception framework, the monograph analyzes the operational deception plan from Operation Desert Storm. The author contends that the deception plan was successful because it synchronized air, naval, and ground unit efforts toward deceiving the enemy. General Schwarzkopf, commander of Central Command, credited the deception plan with helping establish the conditions for success by keeping the Iraqi forces focused on the wrong locations for the ground campaign.

United States Army Reserve in Operation Desert Storm. Individual Manpower Mobilization: The Army Reserve Personnel Center, 30 Nov 1992 [66 Pages, 3.62 MB] – This is one in a series of monographs describing and assessing the role of the United States Army Reserve in winning the war in the Persian Gulf. This report on the mobilization of individuals to augment the Total Force details the contributions made by Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs), Individual Ready Reservists (IRRs) and retirees. It tells the story of mobilizing this vast pool of personnel, its management by the Army Reserve Personnel Center and the problems associated with such a mammoth challenge. It is a story of Total Army success in meeting the needs for trained and ready soldiers. Recommendations for employment of these mobilization assets in any future contingency action are offered.

The Wrong Target: The Problem of Mistargeting Resulting in Fratricide and Civilian Casualties, 13 May 2007 [76 Pages, 375 KB] – Despite a considerable effort since Operation Desert Storm, the Services have yet to reduce the likelihood of mistargeting–the engagement of friendly forces and noncombatants by friendly fire. Mistargeting has always occurred but has historically received little scrutiny. The numbers of mistargeting casualties have gone down dramatically since World War II, but the rate has gone up. When tactical mistargeting occurs today, the effects can be enormous, particularly given modern global media. There are thousands of U.S. military entities that potentially require Combat identification (CID) as well as coalition partners and neutrals. CID of aircraft and ships has historically received proportionally more attention compared to ground units, which suffer the greatest cost of mistargeting. Despite impressive technological advances, there is currently no universal system for positive identification of friendly forces or hostile targets. U.S. and coalition forces are increasingly reliant on the accuracy of information to locate and positively identify targets. Aircraft are more dependent on external sources for precise targeting data, and weapons are increasingly being dropped “on coordinates” provided by off-board sensors and sources, increasing the risk of mistargeting. Modern precision weapon capabilities have outpaced the military’s ability to differentiate positively between friend, neutral, and foe, and to locate desired targets precisely. A serious, long-term, joint approach to enabling aircrews to distinguish the enemy from friends and noncombatants is possible and must be pursued.

The post Operation Desert Storm first appeared on The Black Vault.

The five volumes of the document, linked below, documents the history of the Saddam regime.

The Institute for Defense Analyses produced the report under contract for the command as part of the broader Iraqi Perspectives Project.

The Iraqi Perspectives Project examines operational and strategic insights and lessons from the perspective of former senior Iraqi decision-makers through the analysis of primary source material such as interviews and captured regime documents.

The study’s authors completed the report after screening more than 600,000 captured documents including several hundred hours of audio and video files archived by U.S. Department of Defense.

Volume 1 [45.90mb, 95 Pages]

Volume 2 [22.96mb, 560 Pages]

Volume 3 [33.89mb, 448 Pages]

Volume 4 [38.68mb, 456 Pages]

Volume 5 [42.63mb, 470 Pages]

Other Captured Documents

The following is a list of documents that were captured from Iraq and later translated by the military.

Al-Qa’ida Bylaws

Al-Qa’ida Constitutional Charter

Al-Qa’ida Employment Contract

Al-Qa’ida Goals and Structure

Al-Qa’ida Staff Count Public Appointments

Al Adl Letter

Biography of Ayman Al-Zawahiri

Book by Mustafa Hamid

Call to Jihad Against the Syrian Regime

Camp Acceptance Requirements

Condolence Letter

Criticism of Abu Al-Bara’a

Criticism of Sheikh Bin Baz

A Response to Accusations Against Sheikh Albani

Five Letters to the Africa Corps

Get the Idolaters Out of Arab Island

Interior Organization

Lessons Learned from the Jihad Ordeal in Syria

Letter of Threat to Americans

Letter from Qusay Hussein concerning Kuwaiti POWs being used as human shields – This is a letter from Qusay Saddam Hussein directing the transfer of 448 Kuwaiti prisoners to essential Ministries, radio and television buildings, and Military Industrial Commissions to be used as human shields during the expected US attack on Iraq.

Letter to Pakistani Scholars from bin Laden

Letters from bin Laden

Letter to Aba Khalid from bin Laden

Letter to Mullah Mohammed ‘Omar from bin Laden

A Memo to Sheikh Abu Abdullah

Open Letter to King Fahd from bin Laden

Political Speculation

A Response to Accusations Against Sheikh Albani

Rumors of Iraqi and Saudi volunteers to fight against the US in Afghanistan – Fedayeen Saddam received news of a rumor that 3,000 volunteers from Iraq and Saudi Arabia had traveled to Afghanistan to fight with the Mujahideen against the US. This letter is a request to investigate the rumor to determine whether it is true.

A Short Report on the Trip from Nairobi

Status of Jihad

Thoughts About Security of Principal Squads

Usage of Special Equipment

Various Admin Documents and Questions

Captured Documents during Operation Iraqi Freedom – Originals Only – No Translations. Summaries are compliments of Ft. Leavenworth, United States Army

Document: AFGP-2002-000100 – This document contains a flyer addressed to all Arab immigrants. The flyer lists the Islamic Emirate officials’ names that would assist the Arab immigrants in entering the Emirate.

Document: CMPC-2003-001488 – No Summary Provided

Document: CMPC-2003-005934 – The first page of this two-page file contains a list of a number pieces of equipment needed for detonation of explosive materials. It appears that they are giving time schedules for preparation of specific numbers of various devices.

Document: ISGZ-2004-027808 – Correspondence among various governmental offices regarding the French law for funding and financing election campaigns. The original French text of the law translated into Arabic, referring to the rules of the authority to regulate the financing.

Document: ISGZ-2004-028947 – This 2 page document includes a memo from the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS)(M6), to all general managers of the departments. It addresses the U.N. inspection team’s intention of uncovering detailed information about departments’ symbols.

Document: CMPC-2003-006430 – This file contains document relevant to the Mukhabarat or Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), it explains the structure of the IIS

Document: ISGZ-2004-019920.pdf – 2002 Iraqi Intelligence Correspondence concerning the presence of al-Qaida Members in Iraq. Correspondence between IRS members

The post The Iraqi Perspectives Project — Saddam and Terrorism first appeared on The Black Vault.