The estimate provides a comprehensive analysis of how U.S. intelligence officials viewed nuclear proliferation risks during a critical phase of the Cold War. It evaluates which countries possessed the technical, financial, and industrial capabilities to develop nuclear weapons, as well as the strategic motivations that might drive such decisions. The document identifies a group of nations considered capable of pursuing nuclear weapons programs and assesses their relative timelines and likelihood of success, while emphasizing that political and security considerations would ultimately play a greater role than purely technical limitations.

In outlining the broader implications, the estimate concludes that while the spread of nuclear weapons was becoming increasingly feasible due to the wider availability of materials and expertise, it was unlikely to dramatically shift the global balance of power in the near term. Instead, the primary impact would be political and psychological, introducing new uncertainties into international relations, increasing the complexity of alliance structures, and raising the risk that regional conflicts could escalate. The assessment also highlights concerns about accidental detonations, miscalculations, and the pressures that emerging nuclear capabilities could place on both allies and adversaries.

As a historical intelligence product, the re-released estimate offers insight into how U.S. analysts evaluated one of the most pressing strategic issues of the era. The updated version, with reduced redactions, provides a clearer view into those assessments while preserving the document’s original conclusions about the challenges and consequences of nuclear proliferation.

###

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MDR Case EOM-2021-00021 Release Package [32 Pages, 4.7MB]

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The post Cold War Nuclear Assessment Re-Released with Fewer Redactions After Five-Year Review first appeared on The Black Vault.

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Operational Suitability Test of the LABS Computer – 19 November 1953 [58 Pages, 10.2MB]

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The post Operational Suitability Test of the LABS Computer – 19 November 1953 first appeared on The Black Vault.

It is especially noteworthy that he calls attention once more to the huge nuclear arsenals still maintained, and at great cost, by the United States and Russia. He makes yet another plea for the Russian Duma to ratify START-2. Even without START-2, he points out that the Russian arsenal will shrink. Yet, if proliferation continues, Dr. Rogov notes that Russia might have to make a costly new effort to rebuild its strategic nuclear forces.

For the American reader, it is worth noting that Dr. Rogov published these views first for the Russian audience. The Center for Naval Analyses’ publication of his views is meant to continue the building of bridges to reconcile Russian and American strategic thinking. After the learning experiences of the Cold War, we found we could understand each other quite well. Now–as the Russian economy staggers from crisis to crisis, as Russians turn inward, and as the United States is diverted elsewhere–there is a danger that our strategic perspectives will diverge. We need to take every opportunity to ensure that this doesn’t happen.

Document Archive

Nuclear Weapons in the Multipolar World, October 1998 [37 Pages, 1.3MB]

FOIA Release Letter

The post Nuclear Weapons in the Multipolar World, October 1998 first appeared on The Black Vault.

The Black Vault filed a FOIA request for this report on September 28, 2016, and it was not released until October 28, 2022. The redacted version is below:

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Evaluation of DoD Nuclear Enterprise Governance (DODIG-2016-25) [62 Pages, 13MB]

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The post Evaluation of DoD Nuclear Enterprise Governance (DODIG-2016-25) first appeared on The Black Vault.

“There are many misconceptions about nuclear weapons effects and a potential post nuclear detonation battlefield environment.

In this video, LTC James Gifford, Ph.D. removes the myths associated with nuclear detonations, to help prepare military forces to fight in and through a post nuclear detonation environment if the need arises.”

Video Player

The post Nuclear Weapons Effects 101 Presentation by LTC James Gifford, Ph.D. – August 2022 first appeared on The Black Vault.

The monograph reviews the current status of both the Russian and Chinese arsenals and lists the programs that are being undertaken to modernize and improve their respective nuclear capabilities. Both nations are taking significant steps to preserve and improve their nuclear strike capability.

The proliferation of nuclear weapons technology, fissile material. and ballistic missiles in the third world is an emerging threat to national security interests, The lack of appropriate security measures during the on-going dismantling of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal presents an opportunity for “rogue” states and terrorist organizations to readily obtain the materials to produce their own nuclear weapons.

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The Nuclear Threat in the Post Cold-War Era, May 1995 [51 Pages, 2.2MB]

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The post The Nuclear Threat in the Post Cold-War Era, May 1995 first appeared on The Black Vault.

Although I likely will never adequately explain how difficult this document was to track down, The Black Vault began the journey in August of 2014. The request was bounced around and transferred to numerous agencies, which included the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), the Department of State, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the U.S. Army, the Department of Energy (DOE), the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the U.S. Air Force, and the U.S. Navy.

The journey lasted until until March 9, 2022, when finally the DTRA released the document, surprisingly, in full.

Out of more than 10,000 FOIA requests filed, this was likely in the top 5 most problematic and frustrating. It took more than 10 FOIA case numbers eventually filed throughout 8 different agencies and military branches.

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TM4-1, Glossary of Nuclear Weapons Material and Related Terms [229 Pages, 1.1MB]

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The post TM4-1, Glossary of Nuclear Weapons Material and Related Terms first appeared on The Black Vault.

Emissions From Reactions in Nuclear Weapons, 29 June 1963 [85 Pages, 10.2MB]

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The post Emissions From Reactions in Nuclear Weapons, 29 June 1963 first appeared on The Black Vault.

According to the Objectives:

“We reviewed DOD OIG reports issued from September 30, 2010, to June 18, 2015, in order to summarize the key observations and recommendations.”

“We summarized 10 reports issued by the 000 Office of Inspector General from September 30,2010, to June 18, 2015, that contained findings on aspects of the nuclear enterprise. Weaknesses identified in the nuclear enterprise include: planning and coordination, guidance, requirements, manning and training, budget or funding priority, and logistics and parts issues. Chart 1 depicts the number of reports having findings in the specified category. Note that the reports had more than one weakness area identified.”

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Summary of Nuclear Enterprise Weaknesses Identified in DoD OIG reports Issued from September 30, 2010 to June 18, 2015 [37 Pages, 12.5MB]

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The post Summary of Nuclear Enterprise Weaknesses Identified in DoD OIG reports Issued from September 30, 2010 to June 18, 2015 first appeared on The Black Vault.

On 21 January 1968, an aircraft accident involving a United States Air Force (USAF) B-52 bomber occurred near Thule Air Base in the Danish territory of Greenland. The aircraft was carrying four hydrogen bombs on a Cold War”Chrome Dome” alert mission over Baffin Bay when a cabin fire forced the crew to abandon the aircraft before they could carry out an emergency landing at Thule Air Base. Six crew members ejected safely, but one who did not have an ejection seat was killed while trying to bail out. The bomber crashed onto sea ice in North Star Bay, Greenland, causing the conventional explosives aboard to detonate and the nuclear payload to rupture and disperse, which resulted in radioactive contamination.

The United States and Denmark launched an intensive clean-up and recovery operation, but the secondary stage of one of the nuclear weapons could not be accounted for after the operation completed. USAF Strategic Air Command “Chrome Dome” operations were discontinued immediately after the accident, which highlighted the safety and political risks of the missions. Safety procedures were reviewed and more stable explosives were developed for use in nuclear weapons. (Description of event courtesy of Wikipedia)

Declassified Documents

Department of the Air Force

•  USAF FOIA Response, April 25, 2018 [2 Pages, 0.3MB]
  • “Thule Nuclear Weapons Accident DOSE Evaluation Report” dated April 2001 [48 Pages, 0.6MB]
  • PROJECT CRESTED ICE – USAF B-52 Accident at Thule, Greenland, 21 January 1968 [214 Pages, 5.5MB]
  • USAF Nuclear Safety, Volume 65 (Part 2) Special Edition – Jan/Feb/March 1970, No.1 [100 Pages, 16.6MB]
  • Thule Photographs, 72dpi Thumbnails[11 Pages, 3.0MB]
  • Search for Personal Information – Thule Nuclear Weapons Accident, November 8, 2017 [6 Pages, 3.0MB]
  • USAF FOIA Reading Room Printout Regarding Palomares, Spain and Thule Air Base Nuclear Accidents [2 Pages, 0.5MB]
  • Response to Freedom of Information Act for Records Related to Project Crested Ice, 22 November 2017 [12 Pages, 0.7MB]

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

 CIA Documents on the 1968 B-52 Crash [247 Pages, 47MB]

National Security Agency (NSA)

 NSA Documents on the 1968 B-52 Crash [21 Pages, 6.2MB]

 Full FOIA Case File for the above [40 Pages, 15MB]

The post 1968 Thule Air Base B-52 Crash with 4 Hydrogen Bombs On Board first appeared on The Black Vault.

In late summer of 1958, the United States Navy Task Force 88 (TF 88) conducted one of the U.S.’s most expeditiously planned and executed nuclear tests operations, codenamed ARGUS, when it conducted three high-altitude nuclear tests in the south Atlantic Ocean. Operation Argus was unique among U.S. atmospheric nuclear test operations in that its main objective was neither for diagnostic tests of a weapons design nor for effects tests for military systems. Instead Operation Argus was conducted to establish a proof of theory that a very high-altitude nuclear detonation could produce phenomena of potentially significant military importance by interfering with communications and weapons performance. When the Eisenhower Administration subsequently released the occurrence of these tests to the public in the spring of 1959, it was hailed as the “greatest scientific experiment ever conducted.”

The Argus nuclear tests grew out an idea conceived of by Lawrence Livermore physicist Nicholas Christofilos. In late 1957 and early 1958, Christofilos examined the possibility that a nuclear detonation at an extremely high altitude would create an artificial radiation belt in the upper regions of the Earth’s atmosphere. Naturally occurring belts of electrically charged particles above the Earth had just been discovered by Explorer I, the first satellite launched by the United States in early 1958. These particles, named the Van Allen belts, in honor of the man who directed the experiment that discovered them, consist of high-energy electrons and protons ejected from great solar flares that are trapped in the Earth’s geomagnetic field.

Livermore’s Christofilos theorized that a nuclear detonation several hundred miles above the Earth could produce a shell of trapped radiation in the upper atmosphere, orientated along the Earth’s magnetic field, like the Van Allen belts. The theory was of extreme interest to the United States government, particularly the Department of Defense, for the possible effects that an artificially created radiation belt might have on its defense systems, including degradation of radio and radar transmission and damage or destruction to ICBM warheads entering the belt.

Soon after Christofilos published his findings, the President’s Science Advisory Committee convened a working group at the Livermore Laboratory to discuss the military implications. With the looming possibility of an atmospheric nuclear test moratorium that Fall, the group recommended that a test of the theory be conducted as soon as possible. As such, in April 1958, the decision was made to proceed with Operation Argus as a major national undertaking, under the direction of former Livermore Director Herb York, then chief scientist for the new Advanced Research Projects Agency of the DOD.

On Aug. 27, 1958, just five months from inception to execution, Navy Task Force 88, consisting of nine ships and approximately 4,500 crew, launched the first Argus shot (Argus I) via missile from the USS Norton Sound. Over the span of 11 days, two more nuclear tests, Argus II (August 30) and Argus III (September 6) were launched from the Norton Sound.

In order to first monitor and assess natural background radiation, and then monitor the effects of the Argus test series, the Explorer IV satellite was launched on July 26, 1958. On Aug. 10, Explorer V was also launched, but it failed to achieve orbit. The failure, however, did not affect the mission, as Explorer IV continued to function and supply adequate data during each phase of the operation. In addition, sounding rockets were fired to backup and supplement the satellite data.

More than 40 ground stations throughout the world tracked and/or monitored telemetry of Explorer IV. The combined data from Explorer IV, the sounding rockets, and from surface stations all confirmed the presence of the effects predicted by Nicholas Christofilos – that the detonation of a nuclear device at a sufficiently high altitude could indeed produce a shell of electrons surrounding the Earth and that the radiation could degrade the reception and transmission of radar signals. The readings on the trapped electrons made possible the plotting out by actual measurement what had been only conjecture – the form and shape of the shell. Within this shell, the trapped electrons traveled vast distances and followed the magnetic field pattern in spiral motions out to altitudes of more than 4, 000 miles.

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Operation Argus Document, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), 30 April 1982 Report Date [142 Pages, 5MB]

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Additional Information

The post Operation Argus – High-Altitude Nuclear Detonations in 1958 first appeared on The Black Vault.

In the 1970s, a series of nine papers were created by the U.S. Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency. These papers were a set of information documents on topics associated with nuclear weapons. They were designed for use by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) school instructors and major command staff officers.

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 Nuclear Notes Number 1 – The Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP), June 1974 [22 Pages, 6.0MB]

Nuclear Notes Number 2: The Army Nuclear Survivability Program, (revised) January 1980 [13 Pages, 1MB]

Nuclear Notes Number 3: The New Nuclear Radiation Casualty Criteria. May 1975 [10 Pages, 1MB]

Nuclear Notes Number 4: Nuclear Blackout of Tactical Communications, August 1976 [27 Pages, 1.3MB]

Nuclear Notes Number 5: Rainout, A Primer on Nuclear Weapons Capabilities, December 1976 [11 Pages, 1MB]

Nuclear Notes Number 6: A Primer on Nuclear Weapons Capabilities, June 1977 [15 Pages, 6MB]

Nuclear Notes Number 7: Collateral Damage, April 1978 [18 Pages, 1.2MB]

Nuclear Notes Number 8: Armored Vehicle Shielding Against Radiation, May 1979 [16 Pages, 1.1MB]

Nuclear Notes Number 9: Nuclear Weapons Effects Mitigation Techniques, June 1982 [46 Pages, 2.4MB]

The post The “Nuclear Notes” Papers, Published by the U.S. Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency, 1970s-1980s first appeared on The Black Vault.

General Leslie Groves, head of the Manhattan Engineer District, in late 1944 commissioned a multi-volume history of the Manhattan Project called the Manhattan District History. Prepared by multiple authors under the general editorship of Gavin Hadden, a longtime civil employee of the Army Corps of Engineers, the classified history was “intended to describe, in simple terms, easily understood by the average reader, just what the Manhattan District did, and how, when, and where.” The volumes record the Manhattan Project’s activities and achievements in research, design, construction, operation, and administration, assembling a vast amount of information in a systematic, readily available form. The Manhattan District History contains extensive annotations, statistical tables, charts, engineering drawings, maps, photographs, and detailed indices. Only a handful of copies of the history were prepared. The Department of Energy’s Office of History and Heritage Resources is custodian of one of these copies.

The history is arranged in thirty-six volumes grouped in eight books. Some of the volumes were further divided into stand-alone chapters. Several of the volumes and stand-alone chapters were never security classified. Many of the volumes and chapters were declassified at various times and were available to the public on microfilm. Approximately a third of the volumes, or parts of volumes, remain classified.

The Office of Classification and the Office of History and Heritage Resources, in collaboration with the Department’s Office of Science and Technical Information, have committed to making available full-text on this OpenNet website the entire thirty-six volume Manhattan District History. Unclassified and declassified volumes will be scanned and posted as available. Classified volumes will be declassified with redactions, i.e., still classified terms, phrases, sentences, and paragraphs will be removed and the remaining unclassified parts made available to the public. The volumes will be posted incrementally as review and processing is completed.

Following is a listing of the books, volumes, and stand-alone chapters of the Manhattan District History. Links to pdf copies are provided for those volumes and chapters that currently are available.

Document Archive

[ 13,904 Pages Total ]

The post Manhattan District History, Written Circa Late 1940s first appeared on The Black Vault.

On June 3, 1980, U.S. Command posts received a warning that the Soviet Union had launched a nuclear strike. It is believed that multiple launch crews for Minuteman missiles were given launch warnings, and bomber crews began manning their aircraft. What was bizarre, however, which clued operators in to it was a false alarm, is that there screens were showing 2, 0, then 200 incoming missiles. It turned out to be a faulty computer chip error which caused the panic, but it solidified the very short amount of time that the President has to make a retaliatory strike decision.

Originally, I filed a FOIA request to multiple agencies, most of which denied documents existed.  Then, the Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff responded that documents may exist at the National Archives.

My request was refiled there, and nearly two years later, I received a small amount of records pertaining to the incident. Another year thereafter, I received a second response from the National Archives, which were the final documents pertaining to this request. Both releases are available below.

They are available below.

Document Archive

 False Nuclear Attack Warning: June 3, 1980 – NARA Release #1 – [24 Pages, 5.8MB]

 False Nuclear Attack Warning: June 3, 1980 – NARA Release #2 – [14 Pages, 8.9MB]

The post False Nuclear Attack Warning: June 3, 1980 first appeared on The Black Vault.

The following document was created in 1991 regarding the reduction of the nuclear weapons arsenal.

I requested an MDR as the last review was from a 2013 case, however, the actual review was done in 2016.  So, they would not conduct another Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR).  Ironically, the time requirement (2 years) was only weeks away, so when I got their response, it was already time for another review.

So, I requested another MDR on 4/20/18, and will post the results, when available.

For now, you can find the 2016 release below.

Document Archive

 Reducing the United States Nuclear Arsenal, September 28, 1991 [33 Pages, 3.8MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/dod/18-M-0748.pdf

The post Reducing the United States Nuclear Arsenal, September 28, 1991 first appeared on The Black Vault.

Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, we have witnessed the dissolution of an empire having over 40,000 nuclear weapons, over a thousand metric tons of nuclear materials, vast quantities of chemical and biological weapons materials, and thousands of missiles. This Cold War arsenal is spread across I I time zones and lacks the Cold War infrastructure that provided the control and financing necessary to assure that chains of command remain intact and nuclear weapons and materials remain securely beyond the reach of terrorists and weapons-proliferating states. This problem is compounded by the existence of thousands of weapons scientists who, not always having the resources necessary to adequately care for their families, may be tempted to sell their expertise to countries of proliferation concern.

In order to assess the Department of Energy’s part of current U.S. efforts to deal with this critical situation, in February 2000 Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson asked former Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker and former White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler to co-chair a bipartisan task force to review and assess DOE’s nonproliferation programs in Russia and to make recommendations for their improvement. After nine months of careful examination of current DOE programs
and consideration of related nonproliferation policies and programs of the U.S. Government, the Task Force reached the following conclusions and recommendations.

To continue reading, reference the .pdf below:

Document Archive

 A Report Card on the Department of Energy’s Nonproliferation Programs with Russia, dated January 10, 2001 – by Howard Baker, Lloyd Cutler [86 Pages, 2.9MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/doe/HQ-2017-00673-F.pdf

The post A Report Card on the Department of Energy’s Nonproliferation Programs with Russia, dated January 10, 2001 – by Howard Baker, Lloyd Cutler first appeared on The Black Vault.

The Nuclear Weapon Characteristics Handbook, dated September 1990, was first requested in June of 2009, and it was not until February of 2017 that it was finally released. Nearly EIGHT years passed from the point of requesting, to actually receiving the below document.

The following was written by A. Nareth as an introduction to the document found below:

For more than forty years, deterrence has been the cornerstone of US defense policy, consisting of a stockpile of nuclear weapons and the missiles} aircraft, and artillery to deliver them. Sandia National Laboratories’ special mission, as part of the Department of Energy, is to ensure that nuclear warheads meet the highest standards of operational capability, reliability, safety, and control.

With this review, we discuss Sandia’s role in weaponizing nuclear explosives, the historical development of the stockpile and our monitoring and evaluation activities. We include a discussion of the important safety and use control aspects of nuclear warhead engineering. Our net assessment concludes that today’s stockpile is effective and reliable but that important work remains to be done to make it as safe and secure as evolving technologies permit.

In its history, the stockpile has been shaped by strategic doctrine that has evolved from massive retaliation to flexible response as the intemational situation warranted. Until recent years, arms control and strategic defense have not been major components of strategic design because of technical limitations. Today it is dear that deterrence, as represented by the stockpile, will be bolstered by new aspects of national security policy that are now technically or politically viable.

It is fair to assume that the stockpile will not grow; indeed, it is quite possible that new arms reduction agreements may reduce the number and types of weapons deployed. However, the responsibilities associated with maintaining a competent nuclear weapon arsenal will continue to be formidable. Its deterrent value must be sustained. Safety is of paramount importance: a single accident involving a nuclear explosion or dispersal of nuclear material would be a catastrophe, and could badly damage or terminate public support for a nuclear deterrent. In addition, we will continue to pursue improvements in command and control: the President must have flexible, exclusive, and unencumbered command of our nuclear forces.

Ensuring quality effort and product is a major initiative for the Laboratories. Quality is conformance to requirements … in the case of nuclear weapons, ensuring quality means meeting requirements of performance, schedule, and cost. We are striving to improve our designs and the manufacturing procedures for the nuclear weapons complex so that we do meet these goals, and we will increase our efforts to streamline some of these processes.

One aspect of nuclear weapon quality that is of particular concern is reliability. Assessing nuclear weapon reliability is an evolving process. Our assessments are updated through periodic laboratory and flight testing of samples of each weapon in the stockpile- a process allowing us to see the effects of new technologies and more demanding requirements. We recognize that smaller and safer weapons, and those with greater military capabilities, may be less reliable if we are not vigilant throughout each weapon’s lifetime- through development, production, deployment, and retirement. I am personally committed to continuous improvement of quality to ensure that reliability is high and is in balance with safety and control.

The stockpile of the first forty years of the nuclear age was designed during a cold war. During the next forty years it must be designed to foster stability, nonproliferation, and peace. I believe our policy makers may begin to think of the stockpile not in terms of deterring war, but in terms of maintaining peace. Modern weapons must be militarily appropriate, safe, secure, and survivable. A “peacetime stockpile” must offer an appropriate level of deterrence and fit with arms control, verification, strategic defense, and conventional force strategy as part of an integrated national security posture.

Declassified Document

 Nuclear Weapon Characteristics Handbook, September 1990 [90 Pages, 18.5MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/nnsa/NuclearWeaponsCharacteristicHandbook.pdf

The post Nuclear Weapon Characteristics Handbook, September 1990 first appeared on The Black Vault.

The Tybee Island B-47 crash was an incident on February 5, 1958, in which the United States Air Force lost a 7,600-pound (3,400 kg) Mark 15 nuclear bomb in the waters off Tybee Island near Savannah, Georgia, United States.

During a practice exercise, an F-86 fighter plane collided with the B-47 bomber carrying the bomb. To protect the aircrew from a possible detonation in the event of a crash, the bomb was jettisoned. Following several unsuccessful searches, the bomb was presumed lost somewhere in Wassaw Sound off the shores of Tybee Island.

The B-47 bomber was on a simulated combat mission from Homestead Air Force Base in Florida. It was carrying a single 7,600-pound (3,400 kg) bomb. At about 2:00 AM, an F-86 fighter collided with the B-47. The F-86 crashed, after the pilot ejected from the plane. The damaged B-47 remained airborne, plummeting 18,000 feet (5,500 m) from flight level 380 (38,000 feet (12,000 m)) when Major Richardson regained flight control.

The crew requested permission to jettison the bomb, in order to reduce weight and prevent the bomb from exploding during an emergency landing. Permission was granted, and the bomb was jettisoned at 7,200 feet (2,200 m) while the bomber was traveling at about 200 knots (370 km/h). The crew did not see an explosion when the bomb struck the sea. They managed to land the B-47 safely at the nearest base, Hunter Air Force Base. The pilot, Colonel Howard Richardson, was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross after this incident.

Declassified Documents

 B-47B/F-86L Aircraft Mishap Report, 5 February 1958 2000 Release [154 Pages, 64.7MB]

 B-47B/F-86L Aircraft Mishap Report, 5 February 1958 2017 Release [142 Pages, 65.3MB] – Originally I requested a Mandatory Declassified Review (MDR) on this document, and they asked if I would submit a FOIA instead. I agreed, with the stipulation the record would be reviewed in its entirety for release.  In February of 2017, I received the documents with the exemptions properly cited this time, however, I received a document MORE redacted than originally released in 2000!

The post B-47B/F-86L Aircraft Mishap Report, 5 February 1958 first appeared on The Black Vault.

This report contains an assessment of the state-of-the-art of modeling and analysis for civil preparedness and management of the post-attack U.S. *economy. This evaluation was derived from a large volume of related literature. A selected, annotated bibliography of over 100 entries follows a state-of-the-art assessment.

Literature areas reviewed included historical disasters, industry studies, post-attack viability, survival and economic recovery, and civil defense, both U.S. and Soviet. Some literature on modeling methods was researched. Modeling methods covered were input/output, econometrics, optimization and system dynamics.

Analysis of the literature and current state-of-the-art revealed several key management aspects of the post-attack economy. These aspects were resource allocation and distribution, energy, information, communication, command and control (C3), finance, social and behavioral response, and government authority. Most of these managerial aspects were found to have been neither thoroughly analyzed nor specifically modeled.

Assessing modeling needs, available modeling methods, and deficiencies in the state-of-the-art led to a recommendation for further development of system dynamics models for management of U.S. post-attack economic recovery. System dynamics is suggested because of its flexibility, potential scope, an capabilities for handling non-linearities, dynamic effects, on soft items such as social and behavioral responses.

Critical issues recommended for further investigation include: analysis of the use of information, communications, command and control (C3) systems in the post-attack survival and economic recovery management; incorporation of the impacts of mobilization and national security requirements on post-attack U.S. economic recovery; consideration of multiple regions with varying damage levels: analysis of social and behavioral factors; and evaluation of alternative civil preparedness policies. Taken together, these recommendations point toward analysis and development of a comprehensive but not cumbersome model for the assessment of alternative policies for civil preparedness and post-attack U.S. economic recovery.

Declassified Documents

 Civil Preparedness and Post-Attack U.S. Economic Recovery: A State-of-the-Art Assessment and Selected Annotated Bibliography, Volume 1, October 1979 [341 Pages, 14.7MB] – This report contains an assessment of the state-of-the-art of modeling and analysis for civil preparedness and management of the post-attack U.S. economy. This evaluation was derived from a large volume of related literature. A selected annotated bibliography of over 100 entries follows a state-of-the-art assessment.

 Managing the U.S. Economy in a Post-Attack Environment: A System Dynamics Model of Viability, Volume 2, November 1979 [77 Pages, 3.2MB] – The primary objective of this study is to determine if post-attack viability (or collapse) is automatic for a given system, or if management actions can influence the outcome. In investigating this problem, the approach focuses on exploring the structure of a post-attack system for instabilities, identifying the processes that could lead to collapse, and then evaluating if and how alternative post-attack management policies can mitigate the effects of those instabilities.

Options for Accelerating Economic Recovery after Nuclear Attack. Volume 3, July 1979 [122 Pages, 5.92MB] – The United States may fail to exploit to the fullest its potential for economic recovery following a nuclear attack because failures in post-attack management in both the political and the economic sectors. This report looks at possible adjustments in our continually evolving peacetime management systems, adjustments which might contribute substantially to post-attack recovery at little peacetime cost. The post-attack considerations addressed include making government more effective in bringing about economic recovery and, very importantly, making sure that government continues as government, i.e., that we do not sink into anarchy. Five broad categories of adjustments are discussed.

The post Three Volume, 1979 FEMA Study, about the Economic Recovery following a Nuclear Attack first appeared on The Black Vault.

A nuclear weapon is an explosive device that derives its destructive force from nuclear reactions, either fission or a combination of fission and fusion. Both reactions release vast quantities of energy from relatively small amounts of matter; a modern thermonuclear weapon weighing little more than a thousand kilograms can produce an explosion comparable to the detonation of more than a billion kilograms of conventional high explosive.

Even small nuclear devices can devastate a city. Nuclear weapons are considered weapons of mass destruction, and their use and control has been a major aspect of international policy since their debut.

A Search for Confined Fireballs in the Atmosphere [35 Pages, 722k]

Air Force Search & Recovery Assessment of the 1958 Savannah, GA B-47 Accident [13 Pages]

Annual Report on the Restricted Data Program: Calendar Year 2000 [35 Pages]

Department of Defense Plan for Integrating National Guard and Reserve Component Support for Response to Attacks Using Weapons of Mass Destruction

Effects of Nuclear Attack on Freight Transportation Systems: Interactions and Comparisons Among Modes [54 pages, 2.85MB] – The operations and equipment used in transferring vehicle loads between two vehicles or between a vehicle and a terminal are examined for seven different classes of cargo. For each of these classes, the usual method of load transfer is discussed, and expedient methods that could be used in a postattack situation are suggested. St. Louis, Missouri is used to illustrate the problem of moving cargo through a damaged area after a nuclear attack. Several alternative methods of moving cargo via multiple transportation modes are analyzed, and a simple procedure for determining the minimum-time route among the alternatives is proposed. The transportation resources required to deliver the minimum supplies for survivor support in the St. Louis area are analyzed for different mixes of trains and trucks and for movements of the supplies over a range of distances. A general summary of the vulnerability of each transportation mode to nuclear attack is provided, and the remedial actions that might be taken in the preattack period to enhance postattack capability are discussed.

 Emissions from Reactions in Nuclear Weapons, 29 June 1963 [ 87 Pages, 2.30MB ] – This paper treats the emissions from the reactions occurring in nuclear weapons, specifically the neutrons and electrons emitted during the course of a nuclear explosion.

Federal Response to a Domestic Nuclear Attack (Counterproliferation Papers, Future Warfare Series, Number 46)[36 pages, 300 KB] – The United States government needs to plan for and prepare against terrorist attacks. Terrorism, when combined with weapons of mass destruction, increases the planning complexity. In the event of a nuclear terrorist attack, the government will need to conduct consequence management in the affected areas, govern the non-affected areas, and prevent future attacks. This paper examines what actions, following a nuclear terrorist attack on domestic soil, produce the broadest and deepest results and what options the President has to address such a national emergency. The federal government must address the national effects caused by the attack itself as well as the anticipated results caused by communities enacting protective measures at the detriment of their neighbors. To produce the list of coordinated actions and options, this paper uses a scenario where a terrorist loads a 10-kiloton (kt) weapon into a truck, drives it to the nation’s capital, and detonates it. After detonation, the government must attempt to mitigate the weapon’s real and perceived effects. A review of the mitigating responses reveals that some actions are nearly impossible without prior planning and coordination. Additionally, the government must operate within a framework of constitutionally granted authorities. Continuity of government is assumed sufficient to exercise command and control and is beyond the scope of this paper. It is also beyond the scope of this paper to present more than a cursory overview of preventing a subsequent attack.

Facts About Fallout [8 Pages]

Fireball Yields [31 Pages] – This document took just about 11 years to obtain! The original request was filed in December of 1996, and the document finally arrived in November of 2007.

Information on DOE’s Requirements for Protecting and Controlling Classified Documents [8 Pages]

Initial Nuclear Radiation From Low Yield Fission Weapons [44 Pages]

Iraq: Nuclear and Missile Proliferation [28 Pages]

Letter P.T. Cullen dated 4/22/49 [2 Pages]

The Local Environment Resulting from a Massive Nuclear Attack on Whiteman Air Force Base, 1980 [54 Pages, 2.02MB] – The study examines the potential blast and fallout damage that would be sustained by the 15 counties surrounding the Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri following a nuclear attack against the associated Minuteman missile silos. The study also provides recommendations concerning the shelters that would be required to protect the population of these 15 counties from blast effects and heavy fallout. The study was performed in consonance with the new emphasis that FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) is giving to nuclear civil protection in counterforce areas. It is intended to be a prototype for analyses of areas containing other U.S. counterforce targets, notably the other five Minuteman wings, the Titan missiles, the Strategic Air Command bases, and the strategic submarine bases.

The Manhattan Project: Making the Atomic Bomb [76 Pages]

Medical Consequences of Nuclear Warfare [122 Pages] – The dramatic technological, social, and economic progress of the twentieth century has yet toprevent the use of armed conflict to resolve political differences among nations. As those of usin military medicine prepare to support our forces into the next century, we must continually beready for the many challenges presented by modern warfare.

Nuclear Attack on U.S. Space-Based Assets [140 Pages]

Nuclear Crash: The U.S. Economy After Small Nuclear Attacks [179 Pages]

Nuclear Deterrence [87 Pages]

Nuclear South Asia [71 Pages]

Operations Charioteer, Musketeer, Touchstone, Cornerstone, Aqueduct, Sculpin and Julin [494 Pages]

OPERATION CROSSROADS. FAILURES OF MASTS, YARDARMS, BOOMS AND RIGGING [218 Pages]

OPERATION CROSSROADS. U.S.S. INDEPENDENCE (CVL22) TEST ABLE. VOLUME 1 [405 Pages]

OPERATION CROSSROADS. TESTS ABLE AND BAKER [193 Pages]

 Civil Preparedness and Post-Attack U.S. Economic Recovery: A State-of-the-Art Assessment and Selected Annotated Bibliography, Volume 1, October 1979 [341 Pages, 14.7MB] – This report contains an assessment of the state-of-the-art of modeling and analysis for civil preparedness and management of
the post-attack U.S. economy. This evaluation was derived from a large volume of related literature. A selected annotated bibliography of over 100 entries follows a state-of-the-art assessment.

 Managing the U.S. Economy in a Post-Attack Environment: A System Dynamics Model of Viability, Volume 2, November 1979 [77 Pages, 3.2MB] – The primary objective of this study is to determine if post-attack viability (or collapse) is automatic for a given system, or if management actions can influence the outcome. In investigating this problem, the approach focuses on exploring the structure of a post-attack system for instabilities, identifying the processes that could lead to collapse, and then evaluating if and how alternative post-attack management policies can mitigate the effects of those instabilities.

Options for Accelerating Economic Recovery after Nuclear Attack. Volume 3, July 1979 [122 Pages, 5.92MB] – The United States may fail to exploit to the fullest its potential for economic recovery following a nuclear attack because failures in post-attack management in both the political and the economic sectors. This report looks at possible adjustments in our continually evolving peacetime management systems, adjustments which might contribute substantially to post-attack recovery at little peacetime cost. The post-attack considerations addressed include making government more effective in bringing about economic recovery and, very importantly, making sure that government continues as government, i.e., that we do not sink into anarchy. Five broad categories of adjustments are discussed.

Personnel Casualty Study, July 1968 [318 Pages, 11.3MB] – This investigation has resulted in the development of a computer code (SEP – Shelter Evaluation Program) which predicts casualties of personnel when subjected to the initial effects of a nuclear weapon. Conditions for both sheltered and unsheltered personnel were considered. Available casualty data were analyzed and functional relationships between casualty and appropriate weapon effects were approximated. Analytic models relating the weapon effects to these casualty functions were also developed for SEP Code. A validation of the code was performed using existing Hiroshima data. Finally, results are presented for a range of construction and weapon parameters to illustrate how SEP Code may be easily utilized to study shelter effectiveness in terms of added survivors.

Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (8/23/1974)

Radioactivity Fall-Out and Radex Plots [55 Pages]

Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Preventing and Defending Against Clandestine Nuclear Attack[59 Pages, 1.1MB] – The DSB addressed this threat in previous studies conducted in 1997 (also chaired by Richard Wagner) and 1999/2000 (chaired by Roger Hagengruber). Much has changed since then. The 11 Sept. 2001 attacks demonstrated the intent of terrorists to inflict massive damage. Nuclear proliferation has proceeded apace, with North Korea and Iran achieving nuclear weapon capability or coming closer to it, and it could spread further. The United States is engaged in a war against terrorism, and DoD is beginning to devote significant effort to combating WMD. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has been established. Thinking about the threat of clandestine nuclear attack has changed, and some efforts to explore defenses have begun. However, one thing has not changed: little has actually been done against the threat of clandestine nuclear attack. The DSB Summer Study on Transnational Threats (1997) first developed the ambitious idea of a very large, multi-element, global, layered civil/military system of systems of scope sufficient to have some prospect of effectively thwarting this threat. There was little resonance with this vision (outside of the Task Forces in 1997 and 2000), but since then, and especially since the attacks of 11 Sept. 2001, it has begun to be discussed more widely. This report will revisit such a national/global system, largely as context for the main focus of the Task Force: DoD’s roles and capabilities. Following briefings from many government agencies and subject matter experts, the Task Force arrived at its basic findings and recommendations in early 2003. Since then, those results have been discussed in over 40 meetings within DoD and elsewhere, leading to certain refinements. This report reflects the outcomes of that process and weaves together viewgraphs used in the discussions with elaborating text.

The Threat of Inadvertent Nuclear War in South Asia [103 Pages]

United States Nuclear Tests, July 1945 through September 1992 [182 Pages]

Vulnerabilities of Social Structures: Studies of Social Dimensions of Nuclear Attack [768 Pages, 39.1 MB] – Possible patterns of social effects and societal vulnerabilities which would result from nuclear attack on the United States are surveyed through analyses of the social sciences. The analyses are centered on the various ways in which social structure and social institutions may be considered to be vulnerable to nuclear attack. A monograph is presented on the general problems of societal analysis posed by attempts to study the vulnerabilities of social structure to nuclear attack. The central theme is that levels of behavioral ordering beyond the individual — particularly social institutional and social organizational processes — set the dimensions for the social effects of attack. Five essays report on particular domains of social effects which may result from nuclear attack and on particular methodological problems which must be solved in the study of social effects. Topics considered include individual- human and social psychological dimensions of nuclear attack, demographic effects and population recovery problems, economic recovery after nuclear war, political-administrative dimensions of nuclear attack, and the use of especially the comparative method of social analysis as a tool for developing knowledge about societal vulnerability. A number of ways are traced in which the social dimensions and domains of nuclear attack indicate problems for planners and administrators. The fundamental problem of social planning to reduce societal vulnerability is to understand and control the unfolding of what can be conceived as characteristic, time-dependent, sequentially ordered progressions of social attack effects.

The Warsaw Pact Short-Warning Nuclear Attack: How Viable an Option? 1979 [58 Pages, 3.31MB] – NATO bases its theater doctrine on the assumptions that any Warsaw Pact attack will be preceeded by considerable warning time and that initial hostilities will be in a conventional mode. In this paper the author assesses the viability of the opposing scenario: a Warsaw Pact short-warning attack with nuclear weapons employed from the start. The author concludes that Soviet open source documents indicate that NATO is preparing to fight the wrong first battle of the next war.

Wartime Missile Strike Intelligence: An Indirect Bomb Damage Assessment System

The post Records on Nuclear Weapons & Attacks first appeared on The Black Vault.

NNSA receives its authority for the responsibility for all weapon and weapon-related functions from 50 USC 2402, Chapter 41.

DOE/NNSA and DoD cooperate in the development, production, and maintenance of nuclear weapons. Figure 1.1-1 illustrates DOE/NNSA/DoD organizational interrelationships. The basic document that establishes the interrelationships between the two agencies is “An Agreement Between the AEC and the DoD for the Development, Production, and Standardization of Atomic Weapons,” dated March 21, 1953. This is commonly referred to as the “1953 Agreement.” It was updated on September 5, 1984, by the “Supplement to the 1953 Agreement for the Development, Production, and Standardization of Atomic Weapons Between the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense.” The supplement delineates the functions of DOE/NNSA and DoD during joint feasibility studies for nuclear weapons (Phase 2), design definition and cost studies (Phase 2A), and development engineering (Phase 3). The 1953 Agreement was updated again in
1990 and supersedes the 1953 version.

Numerous Memoranda of Understanding (MOU), Memoranda of Agreement (MOA), and supplements provide additional guidance to agencies involved in the weapon development programs. Most of these are identified in a document titled “An Overview of DOE/DoD Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) and Memorandums of Agreement (MOA) Relating to Nuclear Weapons Development, Production, and Stockpile.”

In general, DOE/NNSA is responsible for designing, developing, producing, updating, and dismantling nuclear warheads, nuclear weapon trainers, and ancillary equipment, while DoD is responsible for designing, developing, and producing, and dismantling the weapon delivery system.

Declassified Manual

 National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Development and Production Manual (D & P) [665 Pages, 9.7MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/nnsa/17-00004-M.pdf

The post National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Development and Production Manual (D & P) first appeared on The Black Vault.

While sifting through thousands of different pages of documents, I found references to some previously, never-before-released (that I saw) documents about nuclear accidents.

I have always been fascinated by the topic, ever since I saw the 1996 film Broken Arrow.  Yes, I know, a bit cheesy, but I was 15 when it came out – and I was just about to start The Black Vault. I was fascinated to learn, that Broken Arrow was a real term, and in fact, nuclear accidents have plagued American history. So,  when I saw these documents existed, I had to get them!

It took quite a few years – and my FOIA requests bounced around from a few offices. I had to refile to the NNSA in 2015, and in September of 2016, finally received them, declassified.

Declassified Documents

 FOIA Response Letter, Dated September 15, 2016 [3 Pages, 1.1MB]

 History of Accidents Involving Nuclear Materials, May 2, 1971 [5 Pages, 1.8MB]

 Summary of Air Force Nuclear Accidents, February 6, 1968 [4 Pages, 2.2MB]

 History of Accidents Involving Nuclear Materials, May 25, 1966 [8 Pages, 19.9MB]

The post Summaries of Nuclear Weapon and Material Accidents – Department of Energy – National Nuclear Security Administration first appeared on The Black Vault.

Since 1970, various corporations and public agencies in the United States have received extortion messages involving nuclear devices, materials, and facilities. Further, although the United States has enjoyed relative freedom from terrorism, internally, other countries have had to cope with increasing terrorist activities, including attacks on nuclear facilities. In 1974, the Energy Research and Development Administration established the Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) to help deal with deal with peacetime nuclear accidents and address the technical, behavioral, and operational problems generated by nuclear extortion threats. NEST is now under the jurisdiction of the Department of Energy (DOE) .

Among the thorniest problems is deciding if a threat is credible and, thus, merits deployment of NEST. Then, once the decision to deploy is made, NEST must assist FBI efforts to locate the threatening substance or device and the extortionists, and possibly negotiate with them. In 1977, DOE and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) funded a project that brought together specialists from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, Syracuse Research Corporation, and The Rand Corporation. Under the technical direction of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, t~is project has developed
an operational capability to assess the credibility of nuclear threat messages. This assessment provides the basis for deployment decisions and the initial operational guidance for the NEST team after deployment.

The Report

 Using Stylistic Analysis to Assess Threat Messages, October 1985 [66 Pages, 8.5MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/nuclear/usingstylisticanalysis.pdf

The post Using Stylistic Analysis to Assess Threat Messages, October 1985 first appeared on The Black Vault.

Mr. Andrew Ghazee of the AFMC Restoration Office, requested that AFRLIHEST conduct an archival search, review, and analysis of existing records for the 1948 through 1970 time frame to determine the potential for the residual presence of BW/CW agents, munitions, and training devices at AFMC bases and related sites. This action was in response to a tasking received from AF/ILEVR in September 1997. In order to accomplish this research, AFRLIHEST contracted with STI under AF contract F41624-97 -D-6002 to examine any plans, records, and reports that may indicate the presence of BW/CW materiel on AFMC bases and related  sites during this time period.

Archival records and unit histories of the identified installations were reviewed at the base historian’s offices. Environmental reclamation officers and individuals at the Treaty Offices at each base were contacted for any information they may have on previous reclamations and studies.

The Defense Technical Information Center’s on-line technical reports data base was searched for relevant data.

Links to the Army Chemical Corps BW/CW program were identified and investigated. If necessary, the Edgewood Arsenal and Fort Detrick historians were contacted. Transfer of BW/CW materiel by the Army Technical Escort Unit was tracked as records permit. An assessment was made for the discovery potential of BW/CW materiel on the base as a result of the BW/CW program. A report was written for each installation; this final report consists of a compilation of all individual base reports.

Declassified Document

 Report of Investigation: The Presence of Biological and Chemical Warfare Materiel at AFMC Bases within the United States, June 2000 [235 Pages, 12.7MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/dtic/2016-03986-F.pdf

The post Report of Investigation: The Presence of Biological and Chemical Warfare Materiel at AFMC Bases within the United States, June 2000 first appeared on The Black Vault.

A “broken arrow” is an accidental event that involves nuclear weapons or nuclear components but which does not create the risk of nuclear war, known as a Broken Arrow in United States military terminology.

Below are documents obtained under the FOIA regarding Broken Arrow incidents.

Declassified Documents

 DoD Instruction 7730.12, “Notification Procedures for Accidents and Significant Incidents Involving Nuclear Weapons, Reactors and Radioactive Materials” [7 Pages, 1.16mb]

 Summary of Navy Nuclear Weapon Accidents (1975, 1976, and 1977 Supplement) [2 Pages, 0.2MB] – This is a bizarre story, and one of the most frustrating situations since I started The Black Vault.  I requested this document in 2009. I fought for a fee waiver, and was GRANTED that fee waiver, which means – I convinced them to waive all fees and declassify this document to me.  It took until March of 2015, for them to tell me AFTER they GRANTED my fee waiver, and they would review the document for declassification; they shredded it.  It’s gone from history, for good.

B-58 Accident, 1964

Remedial Action and Final Radiological Status, 1964 B-58 Accident Site [92 Pages]

General Reports

 ARGX-87 Accident Response Group Exercise, 1987: A Broken Arrow mini exercise [20 Pages, 2.27mb]

 Safety Study – Prime Nuclear Airlift Force (PNAF) Missions Involving the Use of C-130 and C-141 Aircraft [36 Pages, 1.9mb]

 Wartime Missile Strike Intelligence: An Indirect Bomb Damage Assessment System, July 1965 [75 Pages, 5MB]

The post Broken Arrow Incidents first appeared on The Black Vault.