The 35-page responsive record was provided by the CIA in response to a Freedom of Information Act request filed by The Black Vault with the agency in August 2013. In its July 6, 2026, final response, the CIA said it had located the document in its “database of previously-released records” after determining that an earlier FOIA request had sought records on the same subject.

Searches conducted for this article, however, did not locate the complete document in the CIA’s online Electronic Reading Room or elsewhere through conventional web searches. Some portions may therefore be newly accessible online through this release, although that cannot be fully established. What can be established is that this newly obtained package brings together internal records showing how that information was prepared, cleared and organized for public disclosure.

CIA Withholds Records About What Happened to Bin Laden’s Body

The FOIA request contained two separate items. While the CIA released a previously processed record (at least, in part) responsive to the second, it refused to release records responsive to the first.

Item 1 sought:

“All documents pertaining to the capture of Osama Bin Laden’s body, and all documents pertaining to what happened with Bin Laden’s body after his capture — up to the point of his burial into the ocean.”

The request separately sought records concerning meetings about whether the media should be told of bin Laden’s death.

In its July 6, 2026, final response, the CIA said it conducted a review concerning Item 1 and determined that responsive records existed, but that they would not be released:

“With regard to Item 1, after a thorough review of your request, we determined that responsive records, should any exist, would be contained in operational files.”

The CIA cited the CIA Information Act, 50 U.S.C. § 3141, which exempts certain CIA operational files from the search, review, publication and disclosure requirements of FOIA. The agency therefore stated:

“This determination is not subject to an administrative appeal.”

It should be noted that the CIA did not confirm that responsive records concerning the handling of bin Laden’s body exist. Instead, it said that “should any exist,” they would be contained within operational files exempted from ordinary FOIA processing.

As a result, the newly released package does not provide the records specifically requested concerning the handling of bin Laden’s remains through his burial at sea. The CIA instead declined to search or process that portion of the request under the CIA Information Act.

Panetta Sought Rapid Declassification for the Public Rollout

The package begins with a May 1, 2011, memorandum from CIA Director Leon Panetta concerning a request for declassification “in preparation for Counterterrorism Compound Rollout.”

Panetta wrote that materials had been assembled at the president’s request:

“At the President’s request, we have prepared materials for the public roll-out of the 1 May 2011 counterterrorism operation against a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan.”

The memorandum identifies the material prepared for release as three graphics, a document containing talking points for a background briefing, and another containing questions and answers for use during that briefing.

The three graphics were described as a current image of the Abbottabad compound, an imagery-based line drawing, and a comparison showing the compound neighborhood before construction and after it had been built.

Panetta’s memorandum also makes clear that the government was working on an extremely compressed schedule. He requested that the documents be declassified “on an expedited basis” for use by the interagency.

Clapper Authorized Use of Intelligence Imagery

The next record documents another part of that process.

A memorandum to the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency concerns the “Declassification of Imagery Products.” It bears the signature of then-Director of National Intelligence James Clapper and is dated May 1, 2011.

Clapper authorized:

“the use of these half-meter resolution products, as well as any text or other intelligence information derived from this imagery, in an UNCLASSIFIED manner for the public roll-out.”

The memorandum says Clapper had reviewed the imagery-based products prepared at the request of the White House.

That authorization was followed by the compound imagery itself: a detailed illustration identifying walls, gates, opaque windows and the trash-burning location; a 2011 overhead image; a preconstruction/postconstruction comparison; and an image of the compound in 2005.

Those images are not newly revealed.

The Defense Department distributed the Abbottabad graphics during its May 2, 2011 background briefing. A contemporaneous copy of the Defense Department material identifies the individual files as the Pakistan map, the 2005 Abbottabad compound image, preconstruction and postconstruction imagery, a 2011 image and the compound illustration.

The National Security Archive later collected the material as part of its Zero Dark Thirty File, identifying the imagery as National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency satellite images and the conceptual compound illustration as a Defense Department release. The Defense Intelligence Agency also continues to make the compound illustration publicly available.

Those earlier releases provide the likely public origin for at least the imagery contained in the newly obtained CIA package.

Internal Talking Points Were Explicitly “Written to Be Declassified”

Following the imagery is a nine-page document titled:

“Talking Points for Background Briefing (with USMIL references)”

Immediately underneath is an unusual parenthetical instruction:

“(written to be declassified)”

The document is dated May 1, 2011.

The talking points divide the presentation among the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, the CIA director and the CIA deputy director.

The opening script states:

“As you heard, the President ordered a raid today against an al Qaeda compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan.”

It describes the intelligence operation as the product of years of work and says:

“Our intelligence and military professionals did a superb job. They deserve tremendous credit for serving justice to Osama Bin Laden.”

The proposed CIA director’s portion emphasizes the interagency intelligence effort:

“This military operation was the culmination of years of careful and highly advanced intelligence work.”

It specifically identifies officers from CIA, NGA and NSA as having worked “very hard as a team to analyze and pinpoint this compound.”

The Intelligence Case for the Compound

The proposed remarks for the CIA deputy director go deeper into the intelligence trail that led to Abbottabad.

The talking points state that detainee reporting after September 11 identified individuals who may have provided direct support to bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, and that one courier drew particular attention.

According to the document:

“Detainees also identified this man as one of the few al Qaeda couriers trusted by Bin Laden.”

The document says intelligence officers eventually identified the courier’s real name and, approximately two years before the raid, identified an area in Pakistan where he and his brother operated. In August 2010, according to the prepared briefing:

“we found their residence — a compound in Abbottabad, a town about 35 miles north of Islamabad.”

The talking points then walk through characteristics that had raised suspicion: the compound’s size, unusually high walls, privacy barriers, lack of telephone or Internet service and the occupants’ practice of burning their trash.

But the prepared language also acknowledged a fundamental uncertainty.

After discussing the intelligence assessments, the document states:

“No other candidate fit the bill as well as Bin Laden.”

It then says the intelligence community’s conclusion was “twofold”: analysts had high confidence that a high-value target was being harbored there, while assessing that there was a “strong probability” that the individual was bin Laden.

An Extensive Q&A Anticipated Difficult Questions

Perhaps the most noteworthy portion of the release is a lengthy, 14-page section titled “Questions and Answers,” also explicitly marked “(written to be declassified).”

It amounts to a prepared government response book covering questions officials expected to face following the raid.

Among them:

“How confident were you that Bin Laden was there?”

The prepared answer distinguished between confidence that the compound contained a high-value terrorist target and confidence that the individual was bin Laden.

Another asks:

“Why didn’t the US trust the Pakistanis enough to share the intelligence with them?”

The prepared response states:

“The United States shared our very sensitive intelligence with no one until this very tightly held in our own government.”

It then says that decision was made to protect intelligence and ensure the operation’s success.

The document also anticipated questions about detainee interrogation.

One asks whether the reporting came from anyone held at a black site or subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques. Another specifically asks whether detainees at Guantanamo provided information leading to bin Laden’s location.

For both, the prepared response declines to discuss the specific sources but says reporting from “a wide variety of sources — independently verified — helped lead us to this location.”

Questions About the Raid — and Answers Officials Were Not Prepared to Give

The Q&A also demonstrates where officials intended to draw the line publicly.

Asked what unit conducted the raid, the prepared answer says only that it was “a small team of highly-skilled operators.”

Asked how many troops were involved:

“I can’t be specific. It was a small team.”

Asked where the operation was launched from:

“For operational reasons, I cannot share that information with you.”

Asked how long U.S. forces were in Pakistan:

“I cannot get into that level of detail with you.”

The document says U.S. forces had left Pakistan after the operation and states that the mission objective, as directed by the president, was:

“To kill or capture Osama Bin Laden.”

Other anticipated questions addressed whether anyone was captured, how bin Laden was identified, what happened to his remains, U.S. casualties and whether similar operations could be conducted in Pakistan in the future.

Officials Prepared for Questions About Why Bin Laden Was Killed

The briefing book specifically anticipated:

“Why kill rather than capture?”

The proposed answer was concise:

“There was a firefight when our team arrived.”

Another question addressed why the president authorized the operation despite not knowing with certainty that bin Laden was inside.

The prepared response acknowledged that uncertainty:

“We couldn’t wait for absolute proof that might never come, nor could we risk the possibility that he might relocate.”

It characterized the decision as one involving risks the president was willing to take.

The document also anticipated questions about whether bin Laden’s death would alter U.S. counterterrorism policy, the search for Ayman al-Zawahiri, relations with Pakistan, Afghanistan policy and the possibility of retaliatory attacks.

Public Affairs Guidance Shows the Intended Government Message

The final substantive section is titled “Public Affairs Guidance for the Interagency,” again followed by:

“(written to be declassified)”

Its “Toplines” present a condensed version of the message agencies were expected to use publicly.

It states that President Obama had authorized “a unilateral raid” against the Abbottabad compound and describes the operation as the culmination of intelligence work led by CIA with support from partners across the Intelligence Community.

The guidance also contains sections headed “Impact of Bin Laden’s Death on al Qaeda,” “On the Intelligence Case,” “On the Operation,” “On US-Pakistan Relations,” and “Possible Retaliation by al Qaeda.”

Much of that information closely parallels what government officials said publicly in the immediate aftermath of the raid.

A May 2, 2011, Defense Department background briefing, for example, discussed the compound’s walls, privacy barriers, burned trash, lack of a conventional profile and approximately $1 million assessed value while presenting the government-released imagery.

The National Security Archive subsequently preserved extensive material concerning the government’s public account of the raid, including White House briefings and the NGA compound imagery.

What the Release Adds

The significance of the CIA release is therefore not that every fact or image inside it is new.

Much of the substantive account of the Abbottabad operation became public immediately after bin Laden’s death, and the imagery included in the CIA file can be traced to the government’s May 2011 public rollout.

What the newly obtained package adds is a more complete view of the internal machinery behind that rollout.

The records document Panetta’s request for expedited declassification, Clapper’s authorization permitting intelligence imagery and information derived from it to be used in an unclassified setting, the proposed division of talking points among senior officials, an extensive list of anticipated questions and prepared answers, and interagency public-affairs guidance.

They also preserve material in its internal form, which includes passages explicitly labeled “written to be declassified”, rather than simply the public statements that ultimately emerged from the briefings.

The document itself was approved for release on August 22, 2017, and the CIA told The Black Vault in 2026 that it located the material among its previously released records, but searches have not located this complete CIA package in the agency’s Electronic Reading Room or elsewhere online, leaving open the possibility that at least portions of the internal package are now becoming readily available online for the first time. That possibility cannot presently be confirmed.

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The post CIA Release Reveals Internal Bin Laden Raid Talking Points, Q&A and Declassification Records first appeared on The Black Vault.

The document, titled Inspection Report of the DCI Counterterrorist Center, Directorate of Operations, was completed in August 2001. An earlier version was approved for release to the public on July 26, 2010.

The Black Vault requested a new Mandatory Declassification Review of the report on January 8, 2019. In a July 6, 2026 final response, the CIA said it had completed that re-review and “determined that additional information can be released.” The agency said remaining deletions were being maintained under Executive Order 13526 and statutory protections incorporated through FOIA Exemption (b)(3).

A comparison of the two versions confirms that the new release does contain additional information. Much of it consists of statistics, organizational details and fuller passages that were only partially visible, or completely removed, in the 2010 copy. Numerous operational details, program names, personnel figures and other information remain classified.

New Details on the Center’s Growth

One of the clearest additions appears in the report’s executive summary.

The 2010 version stated that Counterterrorist Center resources had increased over five years, but the actual personnel and budget figures were removed. It also withheld part of the description of the operations that those resources supported.

The newly released version fills in those figures:

“CTC’s resources have steadily increased over the last five years, with personnel growing by 74 percent during that period and the budget more than doubling.”

The report adds that the Center’s resources permitted it to support “operations against terrorists and liaison relationships that DO area divisions otherwise could not fund.”

Those figures provide additional context for the CIA’s counterterrorism buildup before the September 11 attacks.

More of the Pre-9/11 Analytic Problems Are Now Public

Some of the more notable newly released material concerns the pressures facing CIA analysts responsible for terrorism intelligence.

The earlier version disclosed that analysts were concerned about the constant state of crisis and lacked sufficient time for warning and predictive analysis. But a substantial passage immediately following that discussion was withheld. The 2010 copy moved almost directly from the discussion of analysts trying to “get ahead of the target” to a Directorate of Operations response.

The 2026 release now fills in much of that missing section.

According to the newly disclosed text, following the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Africa, CTC management commissioned a review of the Center’s finished intelligence concerning Usama Bin Ladin and possible improvements in analytic tradecraft.

The report states that the earlier study found:

“significant strides in intelligence reporting, analysis, and the application of tradecraft principles”

but nevertheless recommended that management deliberately set aside analysts for research. It also found that an “eruption of reporting, much of it unreliable,” combined with a “dramatic growth in customer taskings,” hindered CTC’s ability to conduct in-depth research on Bin Ladin and his organization.

The Inspector General reported that 18 months later, those conditions persisted and the analytic group remained “largely reactive despite the infusion of more analytic resources.”

Analysts Were Spending Large Amounts of Time Supporting Operations

Other newly available figures provide a clearer picture of how CTC’s analytic resources were being used.

The 2010 version disclosed that the Center’s Assessments and Information Group, or AIG, provided terrorism analysis, but removed several organizational and staffing details.

The new release states that AIG had expanded from two regional branches, one covering the Middle East and another covering the “rest of the world”, to five branches, with increased attention to Bin Ladin’s network and weapons of mass destruction.

Even after that expansion, however, AIG accounted for only “14 percent of staff officers or only 7 percent of the total CTC workforce.”

Another previously withheld figure shows that analysts estimated they devoted between 30 and 50 percent of their time to counterterrorism operations support, including targeting and planning connected with “penetrations, recruitments, renditions, and disruptions.”

Information Overload and Translation Backlogs

The new release also restores substantially more information about a problem that runs through the report: the volume of intelligence coming into the Center.

The newly disclosed executive-summary language says CTC had to cope with “information overload,” sometimes generated by successful operations against terrorist cells. Officers said they attempted to scan and prioritize material for immediate action, but the report noted that operational demands did not allow the Center to exploit everything it collected.

A later section now identifies the CIA’s Language Exploitation Branch as the unit principally responsible for translating clandestinely acquired foreign-language material.

The 2010 release left most of that page blank or reduced it to isolated fragments.

The 2026 version provides considerably more detail. It states that much of the material was poor-quality audio and could contain accented speech, slang or particular dialects. Translators triaged large quantities of information looking for threat indicators, but:

“the translators cannot process all of the information quickly, and several interviewees expressed concern about what they might be missing.”

The report adds that material from some large operations could take “months or longer to process fully.”

New Numbers on Reporting, Staffing and Funding

Several smaller redactions were also removed.

The new version says the percentage of disseminated CTC reports rated “good” or better increased from 44 percent in 1998 to 48 percent in 1999. Those figures were absent from the earlier release.

It also reveals that threat reporting accounted for 12 percent of all CTC reports disseminated in 2000. Senior officials described the rapid dissemination of all threat information as a “zero threshold” approach, while customers sought additional context and analysis.

On personnel, the newly released report says 40 percent of survey respondents believed their work unit lacked sufficient personnel to accomplish its mission.

And in a discussion of funding, the CIA Inspector General reported that the additional costs associated with the millennium counterterrorism surge consumed an estimated 15 percent of CTC’s fiscal year 2000 budget. The extra expenditures occurred during the first quarter, while reserve funds did not arrive until May and supplemental funding followed in August. Interviewees characterized the period as a “rollercoaster” year.

A Fuller Document, But Significant Redactions Remain

The new release does not fundamentally rewrite what was already known from the 2010 document. Large portions of sensitive operational material remain withheld, including program names, specific overseas activities, personnel numbers, operational locations and sections concerning particular counterterrorism programs.

But the comparison shows that the Mandatory Declassification Review did produce meaningful additional disclosure, as the new version provides a more complete contemporary account of the pressures inside the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center immediately before September 11: rapidly expanding resources, analysts pulled heavily into operational support, difficulties conducting long-term research on Bin Ladin, information overload, translation backlogs and staffing concerns.

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The post New CIA Release Reveals More About Counterterrorism Problems Before 9/11 first appeared on The Black Vault.

The records concern the Advanced Naval Vehicles Concepts Evaluation, or ANVCE, Project, a Navy study begun in 1975 to help shape research and development for the 1980–2000 period. The project ultimately examined nine broad vehicle concepts through more than 200 studies, tests and experiments. Volume 1 states that candidate vehicles were judged against three basic requirements: they had to “be technically feasible,” “have military value,” and “be affordable.”

The Navy released the records September 23, 2026, in response to a FOIA request filed by The Black Vault in September 2023. According to the response, the Navy located Volumes 1, 2 and 3, along with the appendices to Volume 4, consisting of 939 pages in all. The Navy said the Volume 3 appendices and the main Volume 4 report were still being digitized for later review and release, meaning the current production is not yet the complete ANVCE collection.

Portions remain withheld under FOIA Exemption (b)(1), covering information the Navy says remains properly classified concerning “operations and military plans, weapons systems, and operations,” as well as Exemption (b)(6) for personal privacy.

Volume 1 Was Already Public — The Significance Is in the Detailed Volumes

Volume 1, the ANVCE summary, is not newly public. A copy has circulated publicly online for years; a searchable copy remains hosted by the International Hydrofoil Society.

The same appears that it cannot be said about every page of Volumes 2 through 4. Individual ANVCE technical studies and information about the program have long been publicly accessible, including contemporary technical literature, and former ANVCE technical director Peter J. Mantle devoted a chapter of his 2015 book High-Speed Marine Craft to the project.

Per the report, the Navy considered Volume 2 the centerpiece of the project.

A January 7, 1980, Navy promulgation letter included with the newly released records states:

“These results are the most important products from the ANVCE project.”

According to that letter, Volume 2 drew on 165 separate analyses, surveys and experiments consuming 70 percent of the project’s total budget. Nine generic concepts produced 23 “point designs” which included 13 surface vehicles and 10 air vehicles, plus baseline and existing designs used for comparison.

A Navy Study of What Might Come Next

ANVCE grew out of Defense Department concerns over advanced naval vehicle development in the mid-1970s.

According to Volume 1, guidance from the Director of Defense Research and Engineering instructed the Navy to:

“Conduct R&D and studies necessary to evaluate the technical and military potential and costs of other ANV concepts which offer possible alternatives to the SES.”

The study formally examined air-cushion vehicles, hydrofoils, planing craft, surface-effect ships, small-waterplane-area twin-hull ships, air-loiter aircraft, lighter-than-air vehicles, sea-loiter aircraft and wing-in-ground-effect vehicles.

This was not simply an exercise in drawing futuristic vehicles. The Navy developed engineering-level “point designs,” subjected concepts to technical analysis, estimated their acquisition and life-cycle costs, and attempted to determine how their characteristics would matter against a projected future military threat.

Volume 1 describes Volume 2 as the technical feasibility assessment, Volume 3 as the cost analysis, and Volume 4 as the military mission analysis.

And among the concepts examined in detail, one stands out.

A 560-Ton Nuclear-Powered Aircraft Designed to Stay on Station for 15 Days

Volume 2 offers extensive details on the A/L(N) – a nuclear-powered “air loiter” aircraft.

The Navy was examining how to move beyond the endurance limitations of conventional maritime patrol aircraft. Volume 2 states that the project explored technology that might increase airborne loiter time “to at least a day, or perhaps 15 or more days.”

The study considered supercritical wings, laminar-flow control, advanced composite structures, advanced turbofan and turboprop engines, liquid-hydrogen fuel and lightweight nuclear propulsion, or LWNP.

The nuclear design was substantial: 560 tonnes gross weight, an 88-tonne payload, 407-knot cruise speed, 35,000-foot maximum altitude, 1,600-nautical-mile radius of action and 15 days on station, according to Table IV-3 of Volume 2.

The report makes a statement about what nuclear propulsion theoretically offered:

“Other than crew limits, there is no discernible limit to the endurance of the nuclear-powered aircraft.”

ANVCE selected a 15-day configuration as its nuclear point design.

The technical description went considerably beyond simply proposing a “nuclear airplane.” The aircraft used a high-wing, T-tail configuration with a three-deck fuselage. Volume 2 describes its reactor as a helium-cooled, graphite-moderated epithermal reactor with a liquid-metal sodium-potassium, or NaK, secondary loop. Four dual-mode high-bypass-ratio turbofans were mounted beneath the wings.

The report states:

“For safety reasons, JP-5 fuel is used for takeoffs and landings.”

It also says that “much of the element fabrication” was based upon technology developed for NERVA, the U.S. nuclear-rocket program.

There is an important qualification.

ANVCE did not demonstrate that the lightweight nuclear propulsion system actually worked. The report explicitly states that the project did not conduct an in-depth technical feasibility analysis of LWNP. Instead, it assumed such a system could be made technically feasible and then studied how it could be incorporated into an aircraft.

That distinction is critical when describing the design.

Even with that caveat, ANVCE concluded:

“a practical air loiter aircraft with a time on station of a day or, if LWNP is used, 4-15 days is feasible.”

That was a projection based on the technology assumptions available to the study—not evidence that such an aircraft was subsequently constructed or operated.

Nuclear Power Was Also Considered for a High-Speed Surface-Effect Carrier

Nuclear propulsion was not confined to aircraft.

Volume 2 also examined an SES CVN, a nuclear-powered surface-effect ship concept. The idea emerged from a fundamental problem the study identified in high-speed ships: combining very high speed with long endurance required enormous amounts of fuel.

ANVCE first developed a conventionally powered surface-effect carrier design with a gross weight of 11,165 tonnes, approximately 2,040 tonnes of payload, and a maximum sustained speed of 58 knots in Sea State 3.

The report noted that even this design presented formidable engineering challenges, including transmitting approximately 360,000 horsepower to its propulsion and lift systems.

To explore whether nuclear power could overcome the endurance problem, the project developed the SES CVN using the same assumed lightweight nuclear propulsion technology.

Again, the Navy inserted an explicit warning into the report:

“The ANVCE Project did not extensively explore the technology of LWNP; the feasibility of LWNP was assumed.”

The significance of these designs is therefore not that the Navy secretly possessed operational nuclear aircraft or exotic nuclear-powered surface-effect ships. The documents establish something narrower but concrete: Navy engineers incorporated lightweight nuclear propulsion assumptions into detailed feasibility-level naval vehicle designs and then carried those designs into broader cost and mission studies.

Ships Designed for More Than 80 Knots

Surface-effect ships were among the most ambitious high-speed concepts examined.

Volume 2 describes a planned 3,000-tonne-class SES incorporating multiple new technologies into a ship capable of more than 80 knots. But the report is notable for its caution as much as its ambition.

The Navy warned that such a vehicle would be “exploring new performance boundaries” and that “there is risk involved.”

It recommended:

“severely restrict the operating envelope to no more than 50 kt in any sea state until all engineering tests in that portion of the planned operating envelope are complete”

and proposed studying a 50-knot alternative to determine whether the extra speed was worth its cost.

That tension runs throughout ANVCE: extraordinary speed was technically attractive, but the study repeatedly tested whether the military payoff justified the engineering complexity and expense.

Hydrofoils: 70 to 80 Knots

The hydrofoil analysis similarly looked beyond then-current operational speeds.

After operation of a 50-knot PHM-class hydrofoil, the report recommended experimenting with variable-geometry foils that could potentially provide:

“a dash capability of 70-80 kt.”

The Navy believed that such performance should be evaluated under real operating conditions rather than accepted solely from theoretical analysis.

ANVCE also concluded that hydrofoils in the 1,000- to 2,000-tonne class deserved further exploration, while larger 2,000- to 3,000-tonne versions brought greater technical risk and higher costs.

A “Supercritical” Hull for Rough-Water Speed

The records also detail work on an unconventional planing-ship configuration described as a supercritical hull.

Traditional hard-chine planing hulls encountered increasingly severe power and seakeeping limitations as ships grew larger. ANVCE reported that its supercritical configuration offered the possibility of approximately 50-knot operation in rough seas while substantially reducing hull pounding.

Importantly, this was not only theoretical modeling. Volume 2 states:

“Its seakeeping advantages were verified by model tests within the ANVCE Project.”

The report recommended additional development, particularly to determine whether sufficient internal payload volume could be incorporated without losing the hull’s hydrodynamic advantages.

Separate ANVCE technical work on planing craft was already part of the historical public record, including an assessment describing the feasibility of open-ocean planing craft approaching the 1,000-ton range.

Wing-in-Ground-Effect Vehicles That Could Hover

Another major area was the wing-in-ground-effect, or WIG, vehicle—a craft intended to exploit the aerodynamic lift created when a wing operates close to a surface.

The concept studied by ANVCE could blur the distinction between aircraft, ship and hovercraft.

One configuration used pressurized air beneath the wing. Volume 2 states:

“This scheme gives the WIG vehicle a hovering capability, enabling it to operate over land as well as water.”

The same airflow could inflate flexible end plates for rough-water operation. With the skirts retracted, the vehicle could travel at high speed in calmer conditions, while another configuration could temporarily climb out of ground effect.

The Navy did not claim to have solved the WIG problem.

The study identified unresolved questions involving rough-water vulnerability, pitch stability and high-speed maneuverability. It specifically found that the WIG vehicle was “not very maneuverable at high speed” and could need to climb out of ground effect to execute tighter turns.

Its conclusion was continued research, not deployment.

Giant Airships Return to the Drawing Board

ANVCE also reconsidered lighter-than-air vehicles decades after rigid airships such as the Navy’s Akron and Macon.

Two major configurations were examined: fully air-buoyant, or FAB, and semi-air-buoyant, or SAB.

The project analyzed FAB vehicles with payloads between 50,000 and 150,000 pounds, maximum speeds of roughly 80–100 knots and endurance of up to 15 days.

But scale quickly became a problem.

For approximately 50-tonne multimission payloads, Volume 2 found that the fully buoyant vehicle became so large that ground handling and storage were impractical. Gusting winds also produced forces that raised concerns about precision landing.

Despite those limitations, the Navy concluded that smaller airships still had potential for maritime surveillance and recommended studying vehicles with internal volumes of roughly 1 million to 3 million cubic feet for antisubmarine-warfare surveillance.

A semi-buoyant design examined by ANVCE reached a projected dash speed of 150 knots, although the report acknowledged that the underlying aerodynamic-lift technology was insufficiently developed to produce highly reliable designs.

SWATH Ships: Less Spectacular, More Practical

Not every concept was based on extreme speed.

ANVCE viewed the small-waterplane-area twin-hull, or SWATH, ship as a comparatively modest departure from existing ship technology.

Its advantage was stability.

Volume 2 states:

“The steady platform feature of the small SWATH ship provides it with the seakeeping characteristics of a large ship.”

That made SWATH attractive as an escort and as a platform for helicopters and vertical/short-takeoff-and-landing aircraft.

The Navy recommended further design work in approximately the 1,000- to 3,000-tonne range and even proposed investigating towed fuel pods to extend range.

Volume 3: Putting a Price on the Future

Volume 3 is substantially less visually dramatic than the technical evaluation, but it was essential to ANVCE’s purpose.

The Navy attempted to put fundamentally different ships and aircraft onto a common cost basis rather than judging advanced concepts solely by performance.

The volume calculates development, procurement, operating and support expenses across a 15-year life-cycle period, which the study selected because 15 years represented the shortest service life among the advanced vehicles being examined.

The report states:

“Life-cycle costs were derived to provide an estimate of the total cost to develop, procure, and operate each of the point design vehicles over a 15-year period.”

Costs were generally expressed in fiscal-year 1977 dollars.

The analysis covered considerably more than purchase price: development, production, facilities, initial spare parts, repair parts, ordnance, personnel and operating support were incorporated into the methodology.

That cost discipline sometimes undercut the appeal of more exotic concepts. ANVCE’s broader findings repeatedly caution that increasing performance did not automatically produce enough military value to justify the corresponding expense.

Volume 3 ultimately recommended that the Navy develop better standardized cost reporting and continue refining its life-cycle-cost model.

The Release Is Still Incomplete

The September 2026 release is substantial, but it does not close the FOIA case.

The Navy says it found 939 pages comprising Volumes 1, 2 and 3 and the Volume 4 appendices, while the Volume 3 appendices and pats of Volume 4 itself remain under digitization and review.

Volume 4 may prove especially important because the project documentation describes it as the analysis that matched the advanced vehicles against a projected “Circa 2000” threat environment and attempted to identify which platform characteristics actually mattered in combat. Volume 1 says the methodology traced projected threats through potential tactical, weapon and sensor counters to the vehicle attributes that supported those responses. AdvancedNavalVehiclesConceptsEv…

Until that volume and the remaining Volume 3 appendices are released, the record remains incomplete.

What the present release already provides, however, is a detailed look at a Navy trying to answer a difficult question at the end of the 1970s: not merely what kinds of futuristic ships and aircraft could theoretically be designed, but which ones could be engineered, paid for and given a defensible military purpose.

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Document Archive

FOIA Request DON-2023-004852 Response Letter [2 Pages, 0.6MB]

Volume 1: Summary [77 Pages, 5MB]

Volume 2: Technical Evaluation [616 Pages, 32.3MB]

Volume 3: Cost Analysis [87 Pages, 6MB]

Volume 4: Appendices A, B & C [162 Pages, 6MB]

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In the months and years that followed, the circumstances surrounding Benghazi became the subject of extensive investigations by the State Department, FBI, intelligence community and multiple congressional committees. Those inquiries examined separate but overlapping questions, including security conditions before the attack, requests and arrangements for protecting U.S. personnel, intelligence concerning extremist activity, the U.S. government’s response while the attacks were underway, and the public explanation of what had occurred. The State Department’s Accountability Review Board ultimately issued 29 recommendations, 24 of them unclassified, addressing diplomatic security and the protection of personnel at high-risk posts. The Department stated that it accepted all of the Board’s recommendations.

The Black Vault’s Benghazi archive brings together records obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, government releases, congressional investigations and other document collections so researchers can examine the underlying record directly. A substantial portion of the archive concerns one of the central questions raised after the attack: what information the U.S. government possessed about threats in Benghazi and the surrounding region before September 11, 2012. The collection includes FOIA responses and records from the Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, FBI, CIA and National Security Agency. Some requests produced released records, while others identified responsive material that remained classified or otherwise withheld. The NSA collection, for example, contains internal government communications concerning the developing situation during the attack, while other agency responses document records that were located but withheld from public disclosure.

The archive also documents how information about Benghazi was communicated inside the government and presented publicly after the attack. Included are the State Department’s September 2012 “Rapid Response: Hot Topics” newsletters, records concerning FBI interviews of survivors, White House emails, and several collections tracing the development and revision of the government’s Benghazi “talking points.” Among these are records released by the White House as well as approximately 100 pages obtained by The Black Vault from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence containing communications involving the intelligence community, State Department, CIA and other officials. Taken together, these records allow researchers to compare successive drafts and communications rather than relying solely on later descriptions of how the government’s public account developed.

Additional material addresses security at the Benghazi facilities and the physical aftermath of the attack. The archive includes officially released photographs from the attack scene and a 130-page State Department collection concerning Blue Mountain Group, the security contractor that provided local guards at the Special Mission compound. Other FBI and intelligence-agency FOIA responses illustrate the limits of the public record: in several instances agencies acknowledged locating responsive records concerning threats or warnings but withheld some or all of the underlying material under FOIA exemptions involving classified national-security information, statutory protections or law-enforcement proceedings. Those responses are preserved alongside the released records so that the scope of what remains unavailable is also part of the archive.

Finally, the collection includes material from the congressional investigations that followed Benghazi, including the report of the House Select Committee on the Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi, released in June 2016. That investigation examined events preceding the attack, the military and civilian response on September 11 and 12, and government communications afterward. Because Benghazi generated years of political dispute and competing claims about responsibility, intelligence, security and the government’s public statements, the purpose of this archive is not to resolve those disputes for the reader. The document index below instead preserves the available primary records, FOIA responses, investigative material and related releases so they can be reviewed directly and compared against the claims that have surrounded the attack.

Document Archive

The following are documents received under the FOIA regarding Benghazi. I still have MULTIPLE requests still open and being processed, and they will be made available here when I get them.

Did the U.S. Government receive warnings of a threat on 9/11/12?  

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

DIA Response for Records – Records Released, January 21, 2022- [9 Pages, 0.6MB]

FOIA-00437-2012 Case File – NSA Release – These were administrative files released in regards to the above case. The DIA is also processing the request for the same, and those files will be added to the site, when available.

Department of Defense (DoD)

DoD Response for Records – Original Denial, 2013 – [2 Pages, 0.6MB]

DoD Response for Records – Records Released, 2019 – [52 Pages, 0.6MB] Note: The records were obtained electronically, and they were this compressed upon receipt (looking blurry and of poor quality.)

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

 FBI Response to FOIA request for all warnings / threats of terrorism on or around 9/11/12 [5 Pages, 1MB] – The FBI found 72 pages of responsive records to this search, but each of them were classified and exempt from release.  Could these pages potentially show the Obama Administration was negligent and ignored warnings of a terrorist attack on 9/11/12?

 FBI Response to FOIA request for all warnings / threats of terrorism on or around 9/11/12, on documents originating with a “Other Government Agency” [3 Pages, 0.2MB] – The FBI had sent 4 pages to a “Other Government Agency” that was responsible for the documents. They determined that these, as well, were entirely classified and exempt from release.

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

 CIA Response to FOIA request for all warnings / threats of terrorism on or around 9/11/12 [2 Pages, 0.2MB] – The CIA responded on behalf of the Department of State, when they found multiple pages responsive to my request.  The CIA says that each document is classified, and exempt from release.

 CIA Response to Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) request for all warnings / threats of terrorism on or around 9/11/12 [1 Page, 0.2MB] – After four years from the above case, I requested a Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) request of all the files found, but previously exempt, in 2014. Yet again, the CIA denied access to the files.

National Security Agency (NSA)

 NSA Response to FOIA request for all warnings / threats of terrorism on or around 9/11/12 [ 70 Pages, 6.1MB ] – This request took more than 5 years to complete. The keys (to me) to this specific release are, first, I got the official internal messages sent updating on the situation, many sent while Ambassador Stevens was not even found or his whereabouts known. Second, there is a “declassified” Top Secret briefing from April of 2012. This must contain information about the situation in and around Benghazi, but the question about this briefing, is why is it STILL so classified since much of the situation and CIA presence became known when the attack took place? The reasons why are cited as FOIA Exemption (b)(1) having to deal with national security information and (b)(3) information exempted by statute.

Related FOIA Documents

DoD Response for Records [2 Pages, 0.6mb]

 State Department “Rapid Response: Hot Topics” Newsletter for the month of September 2012 [ 37 Pages, 1.6MB ] – These newsletters are issued daily by the State Department, and circulated internally. I requested the entire month of September 2012 to show the days leading up to and following the Benghazi attack.

 FBI Response to FOIA request for all transcripts from interviews with Benghazi survivors [4 Pages, 2.35MB] –

Benghazi “Talking Point” Timeline revisions [8 Pages, 1.7mb] – This document, released by ABC News, shows the different versions of the “talking points” relating to Benghazi. There is a drastic change over the course of 12 revisions.

 Benghazi “Talking Point” Revision — Emails from the White House, released April 2014 [113 Pages, 43.76mb] – These records come from my friends over at Judicial Watch, who do great work obtaining hard to get documents.  To quote FoxNews on their release, “Newly released emails on the Benghazi terror attack suggest a senior White House aide played a central role in preparing former U.N. ambassador Susan Rice for her controversial Sunday show appearances — where she wrongly blamed protests over an Internet video.”

Benghazi “Talking Point” Revision — Emails from the DNI, State Dept. CIA and others [100 Pages, 36.71mb] – These pages were released to The Black Vault from the Director of National Intelligence in a request for all emails pertaining to the “talking points” and how they were revised behind the scenes before Susan Rice and others used them in the days after the attack.  Very interesting to see what went into it, and how they knew from the start the bullet point about it being over a protest would be an issue.  You will also see where the information about the “warnings” given PRIOR to 9/11/12, along with the terrorist ties, were completely cut out of the final version.

Benghazi Attack Scene Photos [8 Pages, 1.6mb] – Thanks to my friends over at Judicial Watch, photos from the scene of the Benghazi attack were released under the FOIA after originally being deemed classified, and exempt from disclosure under FOIA exemption (b)(7). These are the first photos to have been officially released from the scene of the Benghazi attack.

 FBI Response for Benghazi “threats” towards the consulate, or to the US on or around 9/11/12 [3 Pages, 1.02MB] – In a search for records relating to a threat towards either the United States, or the Benghazi consulate, I filed a FOIA request to the FBI for records relating to anything that may indicate we had prior knowledge that an attack was imminent around 9/11/12.  The response? FOIA exemption (b)(7) – law enforcement information, which if released, would interfere with an ongoing proceeding.

White House Releases Emails Regarding Benghazi [100 Pages, 29.12mb] – On 5/15/2013, The White House released 100 pages of emails regarding the ‘talking points’ that would be discussed in the days that followed the attack in Benghazi.  Up until this date, the White House refused to release them to congressional investigators.

 Blue Mountain Group (BMG) Security Firm Repeatedly Abandoned Their Posts in Benghazi due to “fear” for their safety [ 130 Pages, 39.28MB ] – On September 10th, 2014, Judicial Watch announced that it had obtained 130 pages of new State Department documents revealing that local security guards working for Blue Mountain Group (BMG), the firm hired to protect the U.S. Special Mission in Benghazi, repeatedly abandoned their posts “out of fear of their safety” in the months leading up to the deadly terrorist attack on the special mission compound. Source and special thanks: Judicial Watch

Report of the Select Committee on the Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi

Published 6/28/2016

Washington, D.C. – Select Committee on Benghazi Chairman Trey Gowdy (SC-04) released the following statement after the committee’s Majority released a mark of its investigative report:

“Chris Stevens, Sean Smith, Glen Doherty and Tyrone Woods were heroes who gave their lives in service to our country. Their bravery and the courageous actions of so many others on the ground that night should be honored.

“When the Select Committee was formed, I promised to conduct this investigation in a manner worthy of the American people’s respect, and worthy of the memory of those who died. That is exactly what my colleagues and I have done.

“Now, I simply ask the American people to read this report for themselves, look at the evidence we have collected, and reach their own conclusions. You can read this report in less time than our fellow citizens were taking fire and fighting for their lives on the rooftops and in the streets of Benghazi.”

The committee’s proposed report is just over 800 pages long and is comprised of five primary sections and 12 appendices. It details relevant events in 2011 and 2012.

The following facts are among the many new revelations in Part I:

• Despite President Obama and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta’s clear orders to deploy military assets, nothing was sent to Benghazi, and nothing was en route to Libya at the time the last two Americans were killed almost 8 hours after the attacks began. [pg. 141]

• With Ambassador Stevens missing, the White House convened a roughly two-hour meeting at 7:30 PM, which resulted in action items focused on a YouTube video, and others containing the phrases “[i]f any deployment is made,” and “Libya must agree to any deployment,” and “[w]ill not deploy until order comes to go to either Tripoli or Benghazi.” [pg. 115]

• The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff typically would have participated in the White House meeting, but did not attend because he went home to host a dinner party for foreign dignitaries. [pg. 107]

• A Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST) sat on a plane in Rota, Spain, for three hours, and changed in and out of their uniforms four times. [pg. 154]

• None of the relevant military forces met their required deployment timelines. [pg. 150]

• The Libyan forces that evacuated Americans from the CIA Annex to the Benghazi airport was not affiliated with any of the militias the CIA or State Department had developed a relationship with during the prior 18 months. Instead, it was comprised of former Qadhafi loyalists who the U.S. had helped remove from power during the Libyan revolution. [pg. 144]

Rep. Mike Pompeo (KS-04) released the following statement regarding these findings:

“We expect our government to make every effort to save the lives of Americans who serve in harm’s way. That did not happen in Benghazi. Politics were put ahead of the lives of Americans, and while the administration had made excuses and blamed the challenges posed by time and distance, the truth is that they did not try.”

Rep. Martha Roby (AL-02) released the following statement regarding these findings:

“Our committee’s insistence on additional information about the military’s response to the Benghazi attacks was met with strong opposition from the Defense Department, and now we know why. Instead of attempting to hide deficiencies in our posture and performance, it’s my hope our report will help ensure we fix what went wrong so that a tragedy like this never happens again.” 

The following facts are among the many new revelations in Part II:

• Five of the 10 action items from the 7:30 PM White House meeting referenced the video, but no direct link or solid evidence existed connecting the attacks in Benghazi and the video at the time the meeting took place. The State Department senior officials at the meeting had access to eyewitness accounts to the attack in real time. The Diplomatic Security Command Center was in direct contact with the Diplomatic Security Agents on the ground in Benghazi and sent out multiple updates about the situation, including a “Terrorism Event Notification.” The State Department Watch Center had also notified Jake Sullivan and Cheryl Mills that it had set up a direct telephone line to Tripoli. There was no mention of the video from the agents on the ground. Greg Hicks—one of the last people to talk to Chris Stevens before he died—said there was virtually no discussion about the video in Libya leading up to the attacks. [pg. 28]

• The morning after the attacks, the National Security Council’s Deputy Spokesperson sent an email to nearly two dozen people from the White House, Defense Department, State Department, and intelligence community, stating: “Both the President and Secretary Clinton released statements this morning. … Please refer to those for any comments for the time being. To ensure we are all in sync on messaging for the rest of the day, Ben Rhodes will host a conference call for USG communicators on this chain at 9:15 ET today.” [pg. 39]

• Minutes before the President delivered his speech in the Rose Garden, Jake Sullivan wrote in an email to Ben Rhodes and others: “There was not really much violence in Egypt. And we are not saying that the violence in Libya erupted ‘over inflammatory videos.’” [pg. 44]

• According to Susan Rice, both Ben Rhodes and David Plouffe prepared her for her appearances on the Sunday morning talk shows following the attacks. Nobody from the FBI, Department of Defense, or CIA participated in her prep call. While Rhodes testified Plouffe would “normally” appear on the Sunday show prep calls, Rice testified she did not recall Plouffe being on prior calls and did not understand why he was on the call in this instance. [pg.98]

• On the Sunday shows, Susan Rice stated the FBI had “already begun looking at all sorts of evidence” and “FBI has a lead in this investigation.” But on Monday, the Deputy Director, Office of Maghreb Affairs sent an email stating: “McDonough apparently told the SVTS [Secure Video Teleconference] group today that everyone was required to ‘shut their pieholes’ about the Benghazi attack in light of the FBI investigation, due to start tomorrow.” [pg. 135]

• After Susan Rice’s Sunday show appearances, Jake Sullivan assured the Secretary of the State that Rice “wasn’t asked about whether we had any intel. But she did make clear our view that this started spontaneously and then evolved.” [pg. 128]

• Susan Rice’s comments on the Sunday talk shows were met with shock and disbelief by State Department employees in Washington. The Senior Libya Desk Officer, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, State Department, wrote: “I think Rice was off the reservation on this one.” The Deputy Director, Office of Press and Public Diplomacy, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, State Department, responded: “Off the reservation on five networks!” The Senior Advisor for Strategic Communications, Bureau of Near East Affairs, State Department, wrote: “WH [White House] very worried about the politics. This was all their doing.” [pg. 132]

• The CIA’s September 13, 2012, intelligence assessment was rife with errors. On the first page, there is a single mention of “the early stages of the protest” buried in one of the bullet points. The article cited to support the mention of a protest in this instance was actually from September 4. In other words, the analysts used an article from a full week before the attacks to support the premise that a protest had occurred just prior to the attack on September 11. [pg. 47]

• A headline on the following page of the CIA’s September 13 intelligence assessment stated “Extremists Capitalized on Benghazi Protests,” but nothing in the actual text box supports that title. As it turns out, the title of the text box was supposed to be “Extremists Capitalized on Cairo Protests.” That small but vital difference—from Cairo to Benghazi—had major implications in how people in the administration were able to message the attacks. [pg. 52]

Rep. Jim Jordan (OH-04) released the following statement regarding these findings:

“Obama Administration officials, including the Secretary of State, learned almost in real time that the attack in Benghazi was a terrorist attack. Rather than tell the American people the truth, the administration told one story privately and a different story publicly.”

Rep. Peter Roskam (IL-06) released the following statement regarding these findings:

“In the days and weeks after the attacks, the White House worked to pin all of the blame for their misleading and incorrect statements on officials within the intelligence community, but in reality, political operatives like Ben Rhodes and David Plouffe were spinning the false narrative and prepping Susan Rice for her interviews.”

The following facts are among the many new revelations in Part III:

• During deliberations within the State Department about whether and how to intervene in Libya in March 2011, Jake Sullivan listed the first goal as “avoid[ing]a failed state, particularly one in which al-Qaeda and other extremists might take safe haven.” [pg. 9]

• The administration’s policy of no boots on the ground shaped the type of military assistance provided to State Department personnel in Libya. The Executive Secretariats for both the Defense Department and State Department exchanged communications outlining the diplomatic capacity in which the Defense Department SST security team members would serve, which included wearing civilian clothes so as not to offend the Libyans. [pg. 60]

• When the State Department’s presence in Benghazi was extended in December 2012, senior officials from the Bureau of Diplomatic Security were excluded from the discussion. [pg. 74]

• In February 2012, the lead Diplomatic Security Agent at Embassy Tripoli informed his counterpart in Benghazi that more DS agents would not be provided by decision makers, because “substantive reporting” was not Benghazi’s purpose. [pg. 77]

• Emails indicate senior State Department officials, including Cheryl Mills, Jake Sullivan, and Huma Abedin were preparing for a trip by the Secretary of State to Libya in October 2012. According to testimony, Chris Stevens wanted to have a “deliverable” for the Secretary for her trip to Libya, and that “deliverable” would be making the Mission in Benghazi a permanent Consulate. [pg. 96]

• In August 2012—roughly a month before the Benghazi attacks—security on the ground worsened significantly. Ambassador Stevens initially planned to travel to Benghazi in early August, but cancelled the trip “primarily for Ramadan/security reasons.” [pg. 99]

• Former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta bluntly told the committee “an intelligence failure” occurred with respect to Benghazi. Former CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell also acknowledged multiple times an intelligence failure did in fact occur prior to the Benghazi attacks. [pg. 129]

Rep. Susan Brooks (IN-05) released the following statement regarding these findings:

“President Obama has said his worst mistake was ‘failing to plan for the day after … intervening in Libya.’ As a result of this ‘lead from behind’ foreign policy, the Libyan people were forced to make the dismal trade of the tyranny of Qadhafi for the terror of ISIS, Al-Qaeda and others. Although the State Department considered Libya a grave risk to American diplomats in 2011 and 2012, our people remained in a largely unprotected, unofficial facility that one diplomatic security agent the committee interviewed characterized as ‘a suicide mission.’”

Rep. Lynn Westmoreland (GA-03) released the following statement regarding these findings:

“One of the most concerning parts of the State Department’s policy in Libya was its reliance upon the militias of an unstable nation to protect our men and women in Benghazi. These were by no means forces that could adequately protect Americans on the ground, and the State Department knew it. But the appearance of no boots on the ground was more important to the administration.”

Part IV of the report reveals new information about the Select Committee’s requests and subpoenas seeking documents and witnesses regarding Benghazi and Libya, and details what the Obama administration provided to Congress, what it is still withholding, and how its serial delays hindered the committee’s efforts to uncover the truth.

Part V proposes 25 recommendations for the Pentagon, State Department, Intelligence Community, and Congress aimed at strengthening security for American personnel serving abroad and doing everything possible to ensure something like Benghazi never happens again, and if it does, that we are better prepared to respond.

The Select Committee intends to convene a bipartisan markup to discuss and vote on the proposed report on July 8, 2016. All members of the committee will have the opportunity to offer changes in a manner consistent with the rules of the House.

 Read the Report [853 Pages, 10.7MB]

Honoring Courage, Improving Security and Fighting the Exploitation of a Tragedy

Published June 2016

As the report states, “The Democratic Members of the Benghazi Select Committee submit this report in honor of the memories of Ambassador Christopher Stevens, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and Glen Doherty; the other extraordinary heroes in Benghazi and Tripoli who risked life and limb to help their fellow Americans; and the men and women of the Defense Department, State Department, and Intelligence Community who serve the United States every day around the world.”

Why can’t our elected officials work together? Why can’t they do an unbiased investigation into ANY event, including Benghazi?  Regardless of the answers, this report is included here for reference and fairness.

 Read the Report [344 Pages, 4.3MB]

U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

Published 11/21/2014

The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (“HPSCI” or “the Committee”) conducted a comprehensive and exhaustive investigation into the tragic attacks against two U.S. facilities in Benghazi, Libya on September 11-12, 2012. The nearly two-year investigation focused on the activities of the Intelligence Community (“IC”) before, during, and after the attacks. During the course of thousands of hours of detailed investigation, HPSCI reviewed thousands of pages of intelligence assessments, cables, notes, and emails; held 20 Committee events and hearings; and conducted detailed interviews with senior intelligence officials and eyewitnesses to the attacks, including eight security personnel on the ground in Benghazi that night.

 Read the Report [37 Pages, 2.5MB]

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Releases Report on DOD Response to Benghazi

Published 2/11/2014

WASHINGTON – The House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations released a comprehensive report today evaluating the response of the Department of Defense (DOD) to the terrorist attack in Benghazi, Libya on September 11, 2012. Read the Report

To undertake the committee’s review, Chairman Howard P. “Buck” McKeon directed the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations to work alongside the full committee. As a result, this report expresses the views of Chairman McKeon, Vice Chairman Mac Thornberry, Rep. Martha Roby (who was the chairman of the Oversight and Investigations subcommittee until December 2013), and the five majority members of that subcommittee.

To date, committee staff has reviewed thousands of pages of written material (including classified emails and situation reports) made available by DOD. Staff has also held three classified staff briefings, and two classified interviews. Members have participated in two open hearings, and seven additional classified briefings. In undertaking this work, the committee has met with and received information from military personnel in the entire chain of command in connection with Benghazi: from those on the ground at the time of the attack to the nation’s senior-most uniformed leader.

While the committee’s inquiry continues, the majority members believe that information gathered to date reaffirm the relevant findings in the Interim Progress Report for the Members of the Republican Conference on the Events Surrounding the September 11, 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi, Libya issued in April 2013 by the five committees with jurisdiction in the U.S. House of Representatives.

Based on its activities undertaken since the release of that report, majority members make the six findings listed below:

 Read the Report [31 Pages, 0.4MB]

Documents about the Benghazi Aftermath

The following are documents received under the FOIA regarding Benghazi, and the aftermath in the days, weeks and months after the attack.

• Correspondence Between Office of the Director of National Intelligence and Members of Congress, 09/01/2012 – 12/31/2012, Released March 2015 [47 Pages, 17.3MB]
• Director of National Intelligence E-Mails Regarding Benghazi, Released December of 2015 [26 Pages, 3.5MB] – After being told there were no documents relating to my request for correspondence to or from the consulate in Benghazi. After appealing their decision, I was asked to withdraw it, and they would do another search for responsive records. As a result, there were responsive records, and they were redacted and released. This is another example of being told one thing, but after pushing and exercising my appeal rights, there is another picture that unfolds.  FOIA Case Processing Notes, [18 Pages, 6MB]
• A Trainee Demand Analysis for the Expansion of the Marine Corps Embassy Security Group, March 2013, Master’s Thesis [95 Pages, 4.54mb] – On September 11, 2012, the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya, was attacked, resulting in the death of four United States citizens, including Ambassador Christopher Stevens. Prior to Bengazi, the Marine Corps Embassy Security Group (MCESG) held a total strength of about 1,400 Marines, of which 1,196 were Marine Security Guards (MSG). In response to the deadly attack, Congress authorized 1,000 new MSGs through the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act, creating additional protection for U.S. diplomatic facilities worldwide. This thesis examines the growth requirements needed to support MCESG’s expansion demands to produce MSGs at maximum capacity in the coming three to four years. The study analyzes trainee demands, proposing a methodology to assist MCESG operation personnel plans for expansion and future force sustainment. The proposed methodology is founded on an Excel-based analytical approach that relies heavily on simulation and is interfaced through a Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) UserForm. The model is easily manipulated, as operational needs dictate. Once developed, VBA UserForm is a simple and effective tool that can assist planners in standardizing procedures at the operational level. Research-based analysis indicates that the proposed methodology could yield significant savings in terms of manpower and training requirements for MCESG.
• CTC Sentinel – Volume 6, Issue 2, February 2013 [25 Pages, 1.51MB] – Islamist Militant Groups in Post-Qadhafi Libya.

Declassified Transcripts of Benghazi Briefings Released

January 13th, 2014 – The House Armed Services Committee today released a series of recently declassified transcripts of briefings on the September 11th 2012 attack on Americans in Benghazi, Libya. The briefings were conducted by the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations then chaired by Rep. Martha Roby (R-AL), though they were open to all members of the Committee and attended by Members off the Committee. The briefings, which took place over the course of several months, were part of the Committee’s examination of the actions of the military chain of command before, during, and after the attack. A report summarizing the conclusion of the HASC Oversight & Investigations majority Members draw from these briefings is expected to be released later this week.

•  Transcript #1

  1_Briefing transcript (redacted), “DOD’s preparation for the terrorist attacks in Benghazi,” (Part I, Session I, DOD), May 21, 2013.pdf (3.7 MBs)

•  Transcript #2

  2_Briefing transcript (redacted), “DOD’s preparation for the terrorist attacks in Benghazi,” (Part I, Session II DOD), May 21, 2013.pdf (642.4 KBs)

•  Transcript #3

  3_Briefing transcript (redacted), “DOD’s preparation for the terrorist attacks in Benghazi,” (Part II, AFRICOM), June 26, 2013.pdf (9.2 MBs)

•  Transcript #4

  4_Briefing transcript (redacted), “DOD’s preparation for the terrorist attacks in Benghazi,” (Part III, Colonel Bristol), July 31, 2013.pdf (10.8 MBs)

•  Transcript #5

  5_Hearing transcript, “DOD’s posture for September 11, 2013,” (Part IV, Force Posture), September 19, 2013.pdf (691.9 KBs)

•  Transcript #6

  6_Briefing transcript (redacted), “DOD’s force posture in anticipation of September 11, 2012,” (Part V, General Dempsey), October 10, 2013.pdf (2.3 MBs)

Progress Report on Benghazi Terror Attack Investigation

Last year, Speaker John Boehner asked the House committees on Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, Intelligence, Judiciary, and Oversight & Government Reform to investigate the terrorist attack in Benghazi, Libya that killed four Americans. On 4/23/13, these five committees released their progress report, which outlines their findings and the next steps in the investigation.

• Progress Report on Benghazi Terror Attack Investigation [46 Pages, 0.99mb]

Timeline of Documents and Events Relating to the Benghazi Attack

1. 8/27/12 – Travel Warning, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Bureau of Consular Affairs, in regards to Libya [2 Pages, 113kb] – Specifically mentions Benghazi with increased violence.
2. 9/11/12 – Statement on the Attack in Benghazi, Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, Department of State [1 Page, 90kb] – Blames internet video for attack. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”
3. 9/12/12 – Statement by the President on the Attack in Benghazi [1 Page, 96kb] – Written Statement released by the President. No mention of video. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”
4. 9/12/12 – Statement by the President on the Attack in Benghazi, Rose Garden Speech [Video] – No mention of “terror” or “terrorism” in relation to Benghazi. Says “No acts of terror will ever shake the resolve on this great nation…” at the end of the speech, however, he was speaking about the 9/11/01 attacks, and his visits to victims and family members.
5. 9/12/12 – Remarks on the Deaths of American Personnel in Benghazi, Libya, Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, Department of State [3 Pages, 90kb] – The video of this speech, is below in the Video Archive. Blames internet video for attack. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”
6. 9/12/12 – Press Statement on the Deaths of American Personnel in Benghazi, Libya, Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, Department of State [2 Pages, 101kb]-
   Blames internet video for attack. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”
7. 9/12/12 – Remarks on the Deaths of American Personnel in Benghazi, Libya, Susan Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations , U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Department of State [3 Pages, 98kb] –Blames internet video for attack. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”
8. 9/12/12 – Briefing by Senior Administration Officials to Update Recent Events in Libya [3 Pages, 98kb] – Will not answer if internet video was cause of attack. Will not answer if there is a “terrorism” link.
9. 9/13/12 – State Department Daily Press Briefing [21 Pages, 180kb] – Confirms blaming internet video for attack. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”
10. 9/13/12 – Statement on the Deaths of Tyrone S. Woods and Glen A. Doherty in Benghazi, Libya, Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, Department of State [2 Pages, 101kb]- No mention of video. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”
11. 9/14/12 – Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney [17 Pages, 166kb] Blames internet video as attack. Denies any “concrete evidence” of a “terror” link that would show “[the attack]to not being in response to the film.”
12. 9/14/12 – Remarks at the Transfer of Remains Ceremony to Honor Those Lost in Attacks in Benghazi, Libya, Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State [3 Pages, 99kb] Blames internet video as attack. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”
13. 9/14/12 – Remarks at the Transfer of Remains Ceremony to Honor Those Lost in Attacks in Benghazi, Libya, President Barack Obama [2 Pages, 125kb]- No mention of video. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”
14. 10/09/12 – Background Briefing on Libya [13 Pages, 140kb]-
    Said video was not their conclusion for attack..No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”
15. 10/10/12 – On-The-Record Briefing by Under Secretary Kennedy [4 Pages, 110kb] – WATCH VIDEO – No mention of video. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”
16. 10/12/12 – Hearing on Benghazi Security Issues, Testimony Before the House Oversight Subcommittee, Patrick Kennedy, Under Secretary for Management [4 Pages, 108kb]- No mention of video. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”
17. 10/12/12 – Hearing on Benghazi Security Issues, Testimony Before the House Oversight Subcommittee, Charlene Lamb, Deputy Assistant, Secretary of State [8 Pages, 124kb] – No mention of video. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”
18. 10/12/12 – Hearing on Benghazi Security Issues, Prepared Statement Before the House Oversight Subcommittee, Eric Allan Nordstrom, Regional Security Officer, Tripoli, Libya from September 21, 2011-July 26, 2012 [12 Pages, 191kb]-
    No mention of video. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”
19. 10/15/12 – Interview With Margaret Brennan of CBS, Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State [4 Pages, 108kb] -No mention of video. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”
20. 11/09/12 – Daily Press Briefing, Victoria Nuland, Spokesperson [19 Pages, 190kb]- No mention of video. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”

Flashing Red: A Special Report on the Terrorist Attack At Benghazi (Official Senate Report)

1. Flashing Red: A Special Report on the Terrorist Attack At Benghazi [31 Pages, 0.4mb] – While our country spent September 11, 2012, remembering the terrorist attacks that took place 11 years earlier, brave Americans posted at U.S. government facilities in Benghazi, Libya, were fighting for their lives against a terrorist assault. When the fight ended, U.S. Ambassador to Libya John C. (Chris) Stevens and three other Americans were dead and U.S. facilities in Benghazi were left in ruin. We must remember the sacrifice that these selfless public servants made to support the struggle for freedom in Libya and to improve our own national security. While we mourn their deaths, it is also crucial that we learn from how they died. By examining the circumstances of the attack in Benghazi on September 11th, we hope to gain a better understanding of what went wrong and what we must do now to ensure better protection for American diplomatic personnel who must sometimes operate in dangerous places abroad.

Historical government records, detailing the highly volatile situation in Libya and Benghazi

1.  America Strikes Back, April 1987 [44 Pages, 16.53mb] – After repeated warnings from the United States government, elements of the U.S. Sixth Fleet and the USAF bombed targets in and around the Libyan cities of Benghazi and Tripoli on 14 April 1986. The attack came in retaliation to several Libyan sponsored terrorist attacks on U.S. concerns in the weeks preceding. This paper examines the effects of the bombing as a deterrent of future terrorist attacks and further examines current and projected U.S. counterterrorist policies.
2. Conflict with Libya: Use of Military Force Against Terrorism, 8 Feb 1994 [30 Pages, 1.1mb] – The United States attack on Libya on April 15, 1986 was the culmination of a series of developments in U.S. foreign policy and military strategy intended to combat international terrorism. It was the culmination of the U.S. attempt to use both non- military and military methods to combat terrorism. This paper examines the use of military force as an appropriate means to combat terrorism. In particular, the 1986 conflict with Libya is examined concentrating on the following aspects: whether operational level objectives contributed to achievement of strategic goals; and the use of military force as an effective instrument in the war against terrorism. This paper concludes that the use of military force (along with the European non- military responses) was an effective instrument in the war against terrorism as measured by the decrease in Libyan sponsored attacks from 1986 to 1991. However, the U.S. attack on Libya is still an isolated event and does not provide a sufficient basis for a doctrine of military retaliation against terrorism.
3. Deterring Libya: The Strategic Culture of Muammar Qaddafi, October 2000 [31 Pages, 0.2mb] – In September of 1969, Muammar al-Qaddafi then a virtually unknown army officer in his late twenties rose to the leadership of Libya. Armed with a vision of Arab unity and anti-colonialism, he led a small group of his fellow officers who called themselves the Free Officers Movement. In a virtually bloodless coup, they ousted the aging (and absent) King Idris Al-Sanusi and established Libya as a republic. During the 30 years since, Qaddafi has emerged as a charismatic and complicated leader. Considered by Westerners to be bizarre and irrational, he has been branded a terrorist and a rogue. Among some of his fellow Arabs, he is praised as a virulent anti-Zionist and anti-imperialist, while others condemn him as a plotter and an adventurer whose zealous pursuit of Arab, African, and Islamic unity has only resulted in destabilization. Qaddafi remarked in 1976 that atomic weapons will be like traditional ones, possessed by every state according to its potential. We will have our share of this new weapon. In 1987 Reuters quoted him as saying: The Arabs must possess the atom bomb to defend themselves, until their numbers reach one thousand million and they learn to desalinate water and until they liberate Palestine. 1 Qaddafi places little faith in his armed forces and dreads a repeat of the 1986 U.S. air strikes against Tripoli and Benghazi. Reflecting on the air strikes, Qaddafi has wistfully spoken of possessing a ballistic missile capability that could threaten New York.2 Few state leaders have expressed such single-minded determination to obtain chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. This determination, coupled with Qaddafi s long-term association with terrorism, has caused grave concern among other nations especially the United States and Israel.
4. Libya: A Future Arab Democracy [43 Pages, 0.6mb] – Libya has overthrown its long time dictator Muammar Gadhafi with the aid of both Western and Arab militaries. The United States acted under the authority of U.N. mandate 1973 as part of a broad coalition of both NATO and Arab Nations primarily in a supporting role. In Libya, as in its neighbors Egypt and Tunisia, the successful revolution has now established transitional governments who’s effectiveness is yet to be determined. Unlike other Arab nations, Libya possesses a combination of vast oil reserves, a small and balanced population, and a relatively high education level in its citizens. These factors all bode well for the establishment of a lasting representative government. If successful, Libya can not only secure its borders, and deny safe haven to terrorism as is the declared interest of the United States, but also serve as a positive economic and political influence on the region. Egypt remains the most significant and strategic nation in the region, but the benefits of a successful Libya and the relatively low cost at which it may be achieved should not be overlooked.
5. Libya: Unrest and US Policy [43 Pages, 0.7mb] – Over 40 years ago, Muammar al Qadhafi led a revolt against the Libyan monarchy in the name of nationalism, self-determination, and popular sovereignty. Opposition groups citing the same principles are now revolting against Qadhafi to bring an end to the authoritarian political system he has controlled in Libya for the last four decades. The Libyan government’s use of force against civilians and opposition forces seeking Qadhafi’s overthrow sparked an international outcry and led the United Nations Security Council to adopt Resolution 1973, which authorizes “all necessary measures” to protect Libyan civilians. The United States military is participating in Operation Unified Protector, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military operation to enforce the resolution. Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and other partner governments also are participating. Qadhafi and his supporters have described the uprising as a foreign and Islamist conspiracy and are attempting to outlast their opponents. Qadhafi remains defiant amid continuing coalition air strikes, and his forces continue to attack opposition-held areas. Some opposition figures have formed an Interim Transitional National Council (ITNC), which claims to represent all areas of the country. They seek foreign political recognition and material support.
6. A Nation at the Periphery: Libyan Regionalism Revisited [43 Pages, 0.6mb] – This article places the current Libyan conflict in historical perspective by focusing on the dynamics between the country’s two main regions (Tripolitania and Cyrenaica) during key moments of the 20th century. Particular attention is given to the different way each of the two regions approached the early period of Italian colonialism, from 1911 to 1923. The paper shows that historical relations between the two regions are characterized by both independence and interdependence and that this pattern is reemerging as the country transitions to a new era.
7. Personnel Recovery: Strategic Importance and Impact, December 2012 [31 Pages, 0.6mb] – The breaking news from countless media venues in March 2011 was captivating and compelling: while taking part in coalition operations in Libya, a US Air Force F-15E, call sign Bolar 34 had gone down east of Benghazi. The two crew members had ejected into a chaotic battle between the despotic Libyan regime and opposition forces supported by the coalition. As our nation prayed for the two Airmen, President Barack Obama heard a briefing on the event and monitored the situation as rescue forces from a US Marine task force in the area and opposition ground forces quickly dashed in to recover both men. In many ways, this heartwarming story resembled accounts of other rescues performed in earlier conflicts. The saga of Bolar 34 joined the lore of rescue missions that grace the proud history of our nation.

The post Benghazi Attack, 9/11/2012 first appeared on The Black Vault.

The request was submitted on June 1, 2009, and sought a specific Cold War-era report related to anti-satellite weapons policy. The filing requested:

“a copy of document entitled Analysis and Perspectives on ASAT Arms Control, report number AAC-TR-19501/81, dated December, 1981, with AD Number C951399.”

According to the final response issued by the Department of Defense, the request was received by the Office of the Secretary of War/Joint Staff FOIA Requester Service Center on July 1, 2009. The agency’s closing letter, dated May 5, 2026, formally ended the case. No processing timeline, interim correspondence, or explanation for the length of time between submission and final response is included in the released documents.

Despite the extended duration, the agency confirmed that records were located, which totaled 80 pages.

Those 80 pages, however, were withheld in full. The determination cites multiple exemptions under 5 U.S.C. § 552, including classified national security information, intelligence sources and methods, weapons-related data, diplomatic sensitivities, and vulnerabilities tied to national defense systems. The response specifies that the material remains classified under Executive Order 13526 and references statutory protections including 50 U.S.C. § 3024(h) and provisions of the Atomic Energy Act.

The denial was issued with input from multiple offices and officials across defense and intelligence agencies, including personnel associated with nuclear deterrence policy, DARPA, the Joint Staff, the Department of State, and the Defense Intelligence Agency, each acting in a capacity as an Initial Denial Authority. The breadth of involvement reflects the sensitivity attributed to the subject matter of the requested report.

The agency further stated that it applied the “foreseeable harm standard” in reviewing the records, concluding that release would pose risks to national security and related interests. No portions of the document were released in redacted form, and no segregable material was identified for disclosure.

The response letter formally closed the case and advised of the right to appeal within 90 days.

The case represents a rare example of a FOIA request spanning nearly two decades from submission to final determination. While the existence of responsive records was confirmed, the complete withholding of all 80 pages leaves the contents of the requested 1981 report undisclosed. The available documentation does not provide further detail on the report’s substance beyond its title and classification status.

The Black Vault has filed an appeal, along with filed a request to see the FOIA case processing notes and correspondence (beyond that with this article’s author) generated during the request. Those results will be posted, when available.

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The post 17-Year FOIA Request Ends With Total Withholding, Marking Longest Case in The Black Vault’s History first appeared on The Black Vault.

One FBI report dated June 11, 1984 states:

“At approximately 1:55 a.m., April 20, 1984, an improvised explosive device detonated in the reception area of Building 101, the Officers’ Club, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.”

The same report notes:

“The building was unoccupied at the time, and there were no injuries.”

The investigation was opened under federal jurisdiction due to the use of an explosive device and the possibility of involvement by “terrorist or revolutionary groups.”

Claims of Responsibility

The file documents multiple communications claiming responsibility for the bombing. According to FBI reporting:

“Shortly after the blast, two calls were received; one each at the Washington Post newspaper and the United Press International which claimed responsibility for the bombing.”

One call relayed a recorded message:

“The caller stated that there had been a bombing at the Washington Navy Yard… in support of independence for Puerto Rico… [and]that the FALN was claiming responsibility.”

A separate message referenced a different group:

“The tape recorded message stated something to the effect that the Guerrilla Resistance Movement… bombed the Washington Navy Yard… against United States imperialism in the Caribbean and Central America.”

Mailed Communiqués

The FBI file includes extensive documentation of letters believed to be associated with the group “Red Guerrilla Resistance.” These letters were mailed to various organizations and media outlets and often traced back to the same return address.

An April 30, 1984 interview states:

“She received… pieces of mail, believed to be RED GUERRILLA RESISTANCE communiques, claiming responsibility for the bombing of the WASHINGTON NAVY YARD (WNY) Officers’ Club on April 20, 1984.”

Multiple envelopes were sent to organizations including media outlets and advocacy groups, with a recurring return address:

“840 Barnaby Street, S.E., Apartment #23, Washington, D.C. 20032.”

However, the file notes a key inconsistency:

“There is no apartment #23 at 840 Barnaby Street, S.E., Washington, D.C.”

Additional records show repeated receipt of returned mail bearing the same address, reinforcing its use across multiple communications.

Witness Interviews and Leads

The file contains numerous witness interviews from employees and patrons present at the Officers’ Club prior to the bombing. These include descriptions of unidentified individuals (“Unsubs”) and composite sketches generated during the investigation.

One interview describes a suspicious individual observed the night before the explosion:

“This individual seemed to be deep in thought, gave the appearance of being unfriendly and appeared as though he might be waiting for someone else to arrive.”

Despite these efforts, the investigation encountered significant limitations. A summary states:

“Completed leads to date have met with very limited success and have not identified the perpetrators of the bombing.”

Investigative Scope and Coordination

The case involved coordination between multiple agencies, including:

“The Metropolitan Police Department, United States Secret Service, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, and Naval District of Washington Police.”

The FBI also worked jointly with the Naval Investigative Service (NIS), issuing a unified report to avoid duplication of investigative efforts.

Status Reflected in the File

The documents indicate that, at the time of reporting, the case remained unresolved. The identity of those responsible for the bombing was not determined within the materials released, and investigative leads had not produced definitive results.

Redactions are present throughout the file, particularly in names, identifying details, and portions of investigative analysis, limiting full visibility into certain aspects of the case.

The full release can be seen below.

###

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FBI Released Files [190 Pages, 15.1MB]

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The post Newly Released FBI File Details 1984 Washington Navy Yard Bombing Investigation first appeared on The Black Vault.

The estimate provides a comprehensive analysis of how U.S. intelligence officials viewed nuclear proliferation risks during a critical phase of the Cold War. It evaluates which countries possessed the technical, financial, and industrial capabilities to develop nuclear weapons, as well as the strategic motivations that might drive such decisions. The document identifies a group of nations considered capable of pursuing nuclear weapons programs and assesses their relative timelines and likelihood of success, while emphasizing that political and security considerations would ultimately play a greater role than purely technical limitations.

In outlining the broader implications, the estimate concludes that while the spread of nuclear weapons was becoming increasingly feasible due to the wider availability of materials and expertise, it was unlikely to dramatically shift the global balance of power in the near term. Instead, the primary impact would be political and psychological, introducing new uncertainties into international relations, increasing the complexity of alliance structures, and raising the risk that regional conflicts could escalate. The assessment also highlights concerns about accidental detonations, miscalculations, and the pressures that emerging nuclear capabilities could place on both allies and adversaries.

As a historical intelligence product, the re-released estimate offers insight into how U.S. analysts evaluated one of the most pressing strategic issues of the era. The updated version, with reduced redactions, provides a clearer view into those assessments while preserving the document’s original conclusions about the challenges and consequences of nuclear proliferation.

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MDR Case EOM-2021-00021 Release Package [32 Pages, 4.7MB]

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The post Cold War Nuclear Assessment Re-Released with Fewer Redactions After Five-Year Review first appeared on The Black Vault.

According to the document, NIGHT TRAIN 84 was designed as a major biennial nuclear war exercise that included elements from previous exercises such as “GLOBAL SHIELD,” “AMALGAM CHIEF,” and FEMA’s “REX 84 ALPHA.” The exercise aimed to simulate coordinated responses to a global nuclear conflict, with live flying and the use of strategic weapon systems incorporated into the exercise play. The scenario was directly shaped by Cold War tensions and modeled on large-scale Soviet exercises reviewed in June 1982.

“The exercise is designed with two four-day phases,” the document states, “on the pre and trans-attack period… A 24-hour administrative break will simulate 15 days of survival and recovery activity. Phase II will begin on Day 6 of the exercise and will concentrate on activities in the post-nuclear attack period.”

A primary objective was to test U.S. continuity of government plans following a nuclear exchange, as well as strategic and tactical military responses. “National participation is anticipated because of the desire to evaluate post-nuclear attack continuity of government plans,” the briefing notes.

The simulated scenario begins with escalating global tensions, including Soviet inroads in the Caribbean, discovery of Soviet SA-5 missile site construction in Cuba, and Soviet opportunism in Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and Iran. The exercise projects events such as open civil war in Iran, increased Soviet military aid and presence in various regions, and NATO’s heightened military readiness in response to Soviet exercises perceived as cover for mobilization.

By 5 April 1984, the exercise posits that “Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces attacked in Central Europe and Turkish Thrace,” with chemical and nuclear weapons employed on 6 April in an attempt to break NATO resistance. The scenario culminates in “Soviet nuclear counterforce attacks against the United States and follow-on theater nuclear strikes on NATO” on 8 April.

In the wake of these simulated attacks, the United States shifted focus to survival and recovery operations during a compressed 15-day period. The exercise outlined that “unified and specified commands will operate at reduced strength from alternate command locations during this phase and will concentrate on reconstitution of their commands and redirection of their forces.” A major emphasis was placed on ensuring coordination between surviving national command authorities (NCA), reconstituted federal agencies, and state governments, with the Commander-in-Chief Readiness Command (CINCRED) playing a central role in civil defense support. This phase was described as “a first step toward defining, developing and evaluating procedures for coping with events which might occur in the aftermath of nuclear war,” highlighting the complexities of maintaining command connectivity and stabilizing the nation following a large-scale nuclear strike.

Meanwhile, the document describes the grim aftermath facing the Soviet Union. “While most of the Soviet and elements of Warsaw Pact leadership survived the U.S. retaliatory strike, they were not able to reconstitute their strategic arsenal as quickly as had been expected… Restoration of key production and services was inhibited by popular unwillingness to return to contaminated areas.”

The exercise also envisioned significant civil unrest within the Soviet bloc and a turn toward diplomatic resolution. “Faced with these problems, Soviet leaders began to seek a political solution to the crisis,” with both sides agreeing on a ceasefire in the European theater after 15 days.

Throughout, the document emphasizes the importance of testing the interaction between surviving national command authorities (NCA), reconstituted government agencies, and state governments. The scenario aimed to “provide study and better understanding of the complex issues involved in the trans- and post-nuclear attack periods.”

Portions of the document remain redacted, withheld under FOIA exemptions including 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) for information classified in the interest of national security and 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) under 50 U.S.C. 3605, protecting NSA functions and information.

The release of this document comes at a time when global tensions echo some of the very scenarios envisioned in NIGHT TRAIN 84. Today, Iran remains a focal point of international security concerns, with ongoing disputes over its nuclear program, regional influence, and relations with the United States and its allies. The fictional civil war and foreign interventions in Iran portrayed in the exercise underscore the enduring strategic significance of the region, as well as the risks posed by instability there.

Moreover, the exercise’s emphasis on rapid escalation, chemical and nuclear weapons use, and the struggle to maintain continuity of government after a large-scale nuclear exchange serves as a stark reminder of the catastrophic consequences that could arise from modern conflicts spiraling out of control. As nuclear-armed states continue to navigate strained relations, the lessons and planning embedded in Cold War exercises like NIGHT TRAIN 84 remain relevant, highlighting the need for diplomacy, crisis management, and updated continuity plans in an increasingly unpredictable world.

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Exercise Night Train 84 Briefing, August 1983 [24 Pages, 5.5MB]

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The post DoD Releases Previously Unseen Document Detailing “NIGHT TRAIN 84” Nuclear War Exercise Scenario first appeared on The Black Vault.

Volume I: System Overview and Technical Design

Volume I outlines the complete system and its major components:

• Core Structure: The TEMPS system simulates a high-altitude nuclear EMP by using a horizontally mounted cylindrical wire cage antenna (30 feet in diameter, 1000 feet long) supported up to 20 meters above ground on a dielectric, guyed tower system. This is described as “a free standing guyed system to minimize site preparation and disturbance… fabricated from dielectric material… for high voltage insulation and for minimum disturbance of the EM fields produced”.

• Pulse Generator: At the heart of the system is a bilateral Marx generator connected to peaking capacitors. These components produce a high-voltage pulse, described as greater than 6 MV with an 8-nanosecond rise time and a 300-nanosecond decay time. This pulse results in a radiated field exceeding 50 kV/m at 50 meters from the antenna.

• Antenna Design: The antenna includes a biconical high-frequency launcher and a “late time antenna” section that behaves like a rod-to-plane transmission line, with matched resistive terminations at each end to minimize reflections. The wire cage configuration, consisting of 36 wires, was selected to optimize weight, wind loading, and electrical performance.

• Field Testing: Testing occurred both at Camp Parks, California, and later at the Harry Diamond Laboratories site in Woodbridge, Virginia. Measurements confirmed expected performance characteristics including output pulse fidelity, rise time, and field strength uniformityADA013620.

Volume II: Appendices and Supporting Data

Volume II supplements the main report with detailed appendices:

• Appendix A: Covers experimental modeling of antenna configurations and interactions with real ground, conducted by Stanford Research Institute. It evaluates tradeoffs between antenna impedance, reflection coefficients, and field uniformity. It concludes that a constant-impedance, cylindrical wire cage antenna with matched resistive loads offers the best performance over varying heights and site conditions.

• Appendix B–G: Address component development and testing:

  • Capacitor and Marx generator switch testing

  • Evaluation of wire-wound resistors and their suitability under high-voltage pulse stress

  • Development and failure modes of various peaking capacitor configurations (e.g., solid dielectric, gas-graded, liquid-graded)

  • Inductance, prepulse, and jitter measurements critical for timing precision and waveform integrityADA013621

Together, the volumes document a high-fidelity, transportable EMP simulation system designed to replicate the effects of nuclear-induced electromagnetic pulses for vulnerability testing of military electronics. The design prioritizes transportability, precise pulse characteristics, and minimized interference from support structures.

Document Archive

TEMPS (Transportable EMP Simulator) Final Report. Volume 1 [234 Pages, 9.7MB]

TEMPS (Transportable EMP Simulator) Final Report. Volume 2 [221 Pages, 7.6MB]

The post TEMPS (Transportable Electromagnetic Pulse Simulator) Final Reports, 1973 first appeared on The Black Vault.

A document released from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), obtained under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) by The Black Vault, outlines a detailed vision of advanced, nonconventional energy sources intended to power the U.S. military’s “future soldier.” Originally classified and now released with redactions, the 2009 report titled Technology Forecast: Nonconventional Energy Sources for the Future Soldier (DAR 8-350-09) offers an in-depth assessment of technologies expected to reshape battlefield power generation by 2030.

According to the report, “compact, efficient, lightweight, and long-lasting energy technologies are emerging as a force multiplier in military affairs.” The analysis identifies a growing need for portable power sources capable of meeting the increasing energy demands of soldiers operating a wide array of electronics – from communications systems to wearable sensors.

The DIA describes a plausible 2030 conflict scenario in which soldiers rely on an array of innovative technologies: “Small, nonthermal nuclear batteries continuously recharge their conventional batteries while performing their missions. Soldiers’ uniforms are embedded with piezoelectric fibers and nanoantennas that convert motion and body heat into electrical power.”

In this future environment, soldiers could deploy wind-harvesting devices while resting, receive wireless power from vehicles during transit, and recharge simply by leaving backpacks inside tents embedded with nanoantenna solar collectors. Thermoelectric generators on vehicles would recycle engine heat into electricity. Base camps would feature “motion and chemical sensors powered by small fuel cells containing bacteria” that operate for years without maintenance.

While the report evaluates a wide range of experimental energy systems, it emphasizes the promise of microturbine generators, noting that they have the “potential to produce 10 times more power than today’s best lithium-ion batteries of the same weight.” Other technologies surveyed include betavoltaic nuclear batteries, microbial fuel cells, thermoelectric generators, piezoelectric devices, and even speculative concepts like zero-point energy.

A technology summary table shows betavoltaics with the highest theoretical energy density – 131,400 watt-hours per kilogram – followed by microturbines at 1,500 W·h/kg. Lithium-ion batteries, by comparison, are rated at 150 W·h/kg. However, the report cautions that some technologies, such as antimatter-based power sources, remain impractical within the next 25 years.

The analysis is based almost entirely on open-source intelligence and includes an international review of research efforts. Nations such as China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Russia are actively pursuing advancements in these areas. The report notes that China’s research into betavoltaic batteries “appears to follow U.S. initiatives in the field,” while South Korea is developing piezoelectric systems for sensor networks. The U.S. leads in nanowire piezoelectric research, primarily through the Georgia Institute of Technology, though the report acknowledges that Georgia Tech “is actively working with several Chinese and Taiwan universities.”

Despite global activity, the DIA judged “with high confidence that the United States maintains technological superiority in the technologies reviewed and should continue to dominate for the next 5 to 10 years.” However, it also warned that dual-use energy technologies with commercial or humanitarian applications such as solar cells, microbial fuel cells, and wind power, “will probably be developed and incorporated into military systems more quickly and at less cost than will technologies lacking such applications.”

The report concludes by exploring associated concepts such as wireless power transmission and the Casimir effect in nanoelectromechanical systems. Wireless power, it says, could enable soldiers to recharge gear simply by being near a transmitting source “independent of the geometry of the surrounding space and… not affected when objects obstruct the line of sight.”

Redactions throughout the document invoke FOIA Exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(6), with information withheld for reasons including national security classification under Executive Order 13526, protection of intelligence sources and methods under 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i), and safeguarding agency functions under 10 U.S.C. § 424.

The full document is now archived on The Black Vault below.

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Technology Forecast: Nonconventional Energy Sources for the Future Soldier [14 Pages, 3MB]

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The post Future Battlefield Energy: 2009 DIA Report Examines Nonconventional Power Sources for U.S. Troops first appeared on The Black Vault.

The document, issued in response to a FOIA request, catalogs hundreds of videotapes covering a wide range of topics related to lie detection, psychology, interrogation techniques, and legal considerations.

The archive includes both instructional content and topical case studies, many of which were used as part of DoDPI’s formal curriculum. Among the entries are:

• “The DeLorean Polygraph”

• “Satanic Rituals”

• “Child Sexual Abuse Course: Inmate Panel”

• “The Massey Triad”

• “Countermeasures in Polygraph”

• “Trial of Serial Killer Jeffrey Dahmer”

Other entries range from psychological theory to courtroom procedures and even news segments covering high-profile espionage cases and polygraph-related controversy.

The bibliography reflects the depth of material used in official government training during the late 20th century and provides a unique snapshot of how the polygraph was perceived and taught within the Department of Defense at the time.

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The post DOD Polygraph Institute 1999 Audiovisual Training Archive first appeared on The Black Vault.

 Declassified Terrorist FBI Files

Ali Hasan Al-Majid Al-Tikriti (Chemical Ali) – [ 53 Pages, 3.64MB ] – Ali Hassan Abd al-Majid al-Tikriti (November 1941 – 25 January 2010) was a Ba’athist Iraqi Defense Minister, Interior Minister, military commander and chief of the Iraqi Intelligence Service. He was also the governor of annexed Kuwait, during the Persian Gulf War. A first cousin of former Ba’athist Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, he became notorious in the 1980s and 1990s for his role in the Iraqi government’s campaigns against internal opposition forces, namely the ethnic Kurdish rebels of the north, and the Shia religious dissidents of the south. Repressive measures included deportations and mass killings; al-Majid was dubbed “Chemical Ali” by Iraqis for his use of chemical weapons in attacks against the Kurds.

Berg, Nicholas – FBI Release #1-4 – [749 Pages, 119MB] – Nicholas Evan Berg (April 2, 1978 – May 7, 2004) was an American freelance radio-tower repairman and businessman who traveled to Iraq after the U.S.-led invasion to seek work rebuilding communication infrastructure. While in Iraq, he was abducted by militants associated with al-Qaeda and later executed in a widely publicized beheading video, which was released online in May 2004. His death became a focal point of controversy and debate, particularly regarding U.S. foreign policy, the security of American civilians abroad, and the treatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib, which some speculated was a factor in his killing. Berg’s tragic murder highlighted the dangers faced by civilians in conflict zones and the growing influence of terrorist propaganda through digital media.

Bin Laden, Osama – FBI Release #1 – [19 Pages, 1.03MB] Bin Laden, Osama – FBI Release #2 – [107 Pages, 13.1MB]Usama (or Osama) Bin Laden, founder of the al Qaeda terrorist organization, was born in Saudi Arabia in 1957. On March 10, 1984, Bin Laden and others killed two German nationals. On March 16, 1998, authorities in Tripoli issued an arrest warrant for him for murder and illegal possession of firearms. Bin Laden was also wanted for the August 1998 bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. He was killed by U.S. forces in May 2011.  This release consists of material that predates the 9/11 attacks.

Black September – [ 47 Pages, 4.54MB ] – The Black September Organization (BSO) was a Palestinian terrorist organization, founded in 1970. It was responsible for the kidnapping and murder of eleven Israeli athletes and officials, and the fatal shooting of a West German policeman, during the 1972 Summer Olympics in Munich, their most publicized event. These events lead to the creation of permanent, professional, and military-trained counter-terrorism forces of major European countries, like GSG9 or GIGN, or the reorganization and specialization of already standing units to such a group, like the Special Air Service of the UK.

Khalifa, Mohammed – [ 729 Pages, 28.91MB ] – Mohammad Jamal Khalifa Mohammad Jamal Khalifa (1957-2007), brother-in-law of Usama bin Laden, was arrested in the U.S. in December 1994 on immigration charges. Khalifa was deported to Jordan in June 1995 and later released by Jordanian authorities. This release consists of investigative files from the FBI’s San Francisco and New York offices concerning his arrest and ties to terrorist financing investigations between the years 1994 and 2003.

FBI’s Terrorist Photo Album – The Terrorist Photo Album was established in 1973. A request went out to the field offices requesting photos and biographic data on individuals that would be included in the album. The biographic data was to include name, akas, current residence, current employment, date and place of birth, marital status, alien status along with INS number, fingerprints if available, physical description and any other pertinent data. When the album was completed, it was distributed to each office. The field offices were expected to keep the information up to date. In 1989, the Terrorist Photo Album was discontinued.

Guantanamo (GTMO) [244 Pages, 9.1MB] – Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) Special Inquiry In 2004, the FBI initiated a special inquiry investigation into whether Bureau personnel had witnessed “any aggressive mistreatment, interrogations, or interview techniques” of detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba by representatives of the military, law enforcement, or the FBI. This release consists of responses to an FBI Office of General Counsel request to Bureau personnel assigned to Guantanamo Bay between September 11, 2001 and September 2004. There were no documented incidents of mistreatment involving FBI personnel.

Smuggling of Atomic Bombs into the United States –  [2,792 Pages, 153.7MB] – The is a very large file, which I have combined into a single .pdf. Not all sections have been released/obtained from the FBI (yet) but additional FOIA requests are still pending, and I will update this file, when they come available. The original files were obtained via a CD-ROM, in the form of a multi-page .tif file. These are very difficult (and archaic) to use, so I converted them to a .pdf.

The post FBI Files: Terrorism first appeared on The Black Vault.

The report is divided into four parts:

1. ALA-17 Flare Tests: Examines the effectiveness of deploying one to three flares as decoys. The tests demonstrated successful missile decoying under most conditions, with a few exceptions.
2. C-130 Susceptibility: Analyzes the vulnerability of C-130 aircraft to ground-launched infrared-guided missiles during low-level flight. It was feasible to achieve missile lock-on at low offsets from the launch site, though larger offsets posed challenges.
3. QRC-399 Countermeasures: Evaluates the QRC-399 equipment’s ability to disrupt missile guidance systems. A high jamming-to-signal ratio was critical for success, particularly against the more agile ATOLL missile.
4. Infrared Radiometry: Assesses the effectiveness of airborne countermeasures and measures infrared emissions from target aircraft, providing insights into decoy probabilities and radiant intensities.

The findings contribute to understanding infrared countermeasure technologies and air-to-air and ground-to-air missile vulnerabilities.

Document Archive

HAVE CARGO Captive Flight Tests, Phase III, Volume IV [154 Pages, 53MB]

The post HAVE CARGO Captive Flight Tests, Phase III, Volume IV – August 1974 first appeared on The Black Vault.

Revolutionary Concept for Unmanned Swarms

The most intriguing aspect of the report is the emphasis on the vessel’s ability to deploy “mass swarms” of UAVs. According to the document, the mothership is designed to handle up to 100 small fixed-wing UAVs, such as the Swift Killer Bee (KB4) and the Insitu Integrator, and ensure continuous surveillance through simultaneous operations. This swarm capability allows the mothership to cover extensive areas for intelligence gathering, anti-submarine warfare, search and rescue, and combat surveillance missions. The concept positions UAV swarms as a viable alternative to traditional manned aircraft, highlighting benefits in terms of reduced human risk, cost savings, and extended operational endurance.

The report states, “The US Navy is currently reevaluating its approach to combat surveillance by modeling the effectiveness of a UAV swarm and may conclude that a swarm is indeed the most effective strategy.”

Innovative Launch and Recovery Systems

The report details an intricate launch and recovery mechanism designed for efficiency and reliability. Fixed-wing UAVs will be launched using a compressed air system adapted from existing land-based models, positioned on the vessel’s top deck to avoid challenges like bow slamming in rough seas. This configuration allows for the rapid deployment of a 50-UAV swarm within approximately 35 minutes using six launchers. “The top-mounted configuration was chosen because the final hull arrangement has a suitably long flight deck, which is low relative to the waterline,” the report explains.

Equally noteworthy is the recovery system. The mothership utilizes catch nets that deploy from the flight deck, ensuring the safe recovery of UAVs even in challenging sea conditions (up to sea state 5). This feature allows continuous aerial surveillance, as the first swarm can be retrieved while a second swarm is deployed, providing round-the-clock operational capability. The report clarifies, “Safety and reliability were important objectives in the design of the recovery system; however, the same timeliness required for launching UAVs was not as important for recovery since the UAVs can stay airborne for up to 24 hours.”

Multi-Mission Flexibility

Aside from UAVs, the mothership concept is also designed to support larger rotorcraft UAVs like the Boeing A-160 Hummingbird and the Northrop Grumman MQ-8 Fire Scout. The vessel can accommodate up to 12 of these larger UAVs, alongside five SH-60 Seahawk helicopters. The design features multiple helicopter landing pads, enabling the simultaneous launch and recovery of manned and unmanned rotorcraft, thus enhancing the ship’s versatility in various mission profiles.

To enable such extensive UAV and rotorcraft operations, the vessel is designed with a monohull structure, inspired by the LPD-17 hull form. This design choice was guided by considerations of stability, operational efficiency, and deck space, although future designs may explore alternative hull forms such as SWATH or trimaran for improved seakeeping.

Propulsion and Operational Endurance

The UAV Mothership is engineered for long-range operations, boasting an electric propulsion system that provides a sustained speed of 22 knots and a range of 4,500 nautical miles. This system is powered by four Wartsila diesel generators, with energy distributed across the vessel to ensure redundancy and resilience. Notably, the propulsion setup includes hybrid contra-rotating pods, which offer better maneuverability and efficiency than conventional propeller systems. The report explains, “Naval tests have proven this system to be 6 to 15 percent more efficient than conventional types of propulsion. This form of propulsion is also very attractive because of redundancy and the low-speed maneuverability provided by the steerable pods.”

Developmental Risks and Future Exploration

The concept is not without its challenges. The report identifies several areas that require further research and development to ensure operational feasibility. For instance, the top-mounted recovery nets’ performance in rough sea conditions, as well as the reliability of fixed-wing UAV operations aboard the mothership, need to be extensively tested. Additionally, the use of podded propulsion systems, which are uncommon in current U.S. Navy vessels, poses challenges related to noise and magnetic signature reduction.

Another key concern is the assumption that Boeing’s A-160 Hummingbird can be modified with folding rotors for compact storage, a feature not present in the current design. “Additional analysis would need to be conducted into fields such as noise and magnetic signature reduction for pods to fulfill the mission of a US Naval combatant,” the report states, emphasizing the need for continued developmental efforts.

The original 2009 design may have been just a starting point, but it set the stage for a future where unmanned aerial systems dominate the skies above naval fleets. While the basic principles of the mothership concept remain relevant, one can only imagine how much more potent this platform would be today, leveraging cutting-edge technology that has since emerged. The 2009 vision of a UAV mothership was ambitious, but the technological advances of the past decade suggest that the U.S. Navy could now bring this concept to life in ways that were barely imaginable at the time.

Document Archive

UAV Mothership, NSWCCD-CISD–2009/004 July 2009 [42 Pages, 1.6MB]

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The post Navy’s 2009 “UAV Mothership” Concept: A Platform for Future Unmanned Aerial Operations first appeared on The Black Vault.

Exemption (b)(2) is often cited to protect sensitive information related to internal rules, processes, and management of an agency, particularly when disclosure would risk circumvention of those rules. In the original release of the document, these redactions appeared throughout, obscuring details of how JPOTF headquarters operate during psychological operations (PSYOP), including its organizational structure, training methodology, and mission-related tasks.

The 2016 re-review of the document resulted in a full release with no redactions. This version, now available for download below, includes significant information previously withheld. The document, titled “Joint Psychological Operations Task Force Headquarters Master Training Guide,” provides comprehensive guidance for military leaders on training and organizing PSYOP units.

One of the most significant sections now fully visible is the description of how JPOTF integrates with other military components. For example, the document now reveals that the JPOTF coordinates closely with Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and various intelligence agencies to conduct strategic, operational, and tactical PSYOP. It emphasizes the importance of intelligence, communications systems, and psychological analysis in crafting effective operations designed to influence foreign groups and governments.

In addition, sections dealing with command relationships and operational procedures for PSYOP missions were initially obscured but are now fully visible. The 2024 release includes details about the approval process for PSYOP, which must be authorized by the National Command Authorities or, in some cases, delegated to combatant commanders. The newly available text also outlines specific mission objectives for different types of PSYOP operations, such as influencing adversary military tactics and undermining hostile leadership morale.

The FOIA release letter noted that the Joint Psychological Operations Task Force Headquarters Master Training Guide was officially cancelled on January 26, 2004, and no subsequent version has replaced it. While this document is no longer in use, it is likely that other, more detailed PSYOP training manuals exist, which the public has yet to access. These could provide even greater insight into modern psychological operations and their evolving tactics.

Despite being no longer on the books, the release of this training manual provides a clearer view of how JPOTF units are trained and deployed, offering additional insight into aspects of U.S. military operations that were previously redacted. The details about psychological warfare techniques, organization, and strategic objectives, now available in full, offer a more complete understanding of these operations for public examination.

For those interested, the full unredacted document, FOIA case 16-F-1727, can be viewed below.

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Document Archive

FOIA Victory: Full Disclosure of Military Psychological Operations Training Document [331 Pages, 67MB]

The post FOIA Victory: Full Disclosure of Military Psychological Operations Training Document first appeared on The Black Vault.

Psychological Operations (PSYOPs) are strategic efforts used by military and governmental organizations to influence the perceptions, emotions, and behavior of foreign populations, governments, organizations, or individuals. The primary goal of PSYOPs is to shape attitudes and decision-making in ways that align with the objectives of the originating force, typically to gain an advantage in conflicts or operations without direct military engagement.

PSYOPs can take many forms, including propaganda campaigns, dissemination of information or misinformation, and psychological tactics designed to weaken enemy morale, create confusion, or bolster support among allies or neutral parties. These operations may involve a variety of communication channels such as radio, television, social media, leaflets, and face-to-face interactions.

While traditionally used in times of war or conflict to sway the opinions of enemy forces or civilians, PSYOPs can also be employed in peacetime for diplomatic or political purposes, such as countering terrorism, shaping public opinion, or supporting humanitarian missions. Ultimately, PSYOPs aim to influence a target audience to behave in a manner favorable to the goals of the country or organization conducting the operation, often through psychological or emotional appeals rather than physical force.

 Guide to Psychological Warfare Records in Departmental Records Branch, October 1951 [184 Pages, 10.42MB]

Document Archive

 The Creation and Dissemination of All Forms of Information in Support of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in Time of Military Conflict [63 Pages]

 Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations [66 Pages]

 “Final Draft, Executive Summary, Volume 3 – Psychological Operations – 75 , Special Warfare – 75 , Basic Derivative Study (BDS) [38 pages, 5.34mb]

Joint Psychological Operations Task Force Headquarters Master Training Guide – This manual provides a descriptive, performance-oriented training guide to assist leaders in training their units and guiding the functions of the joint psychological operations task force (JP01F) headquarters (HQ) in actual operations.

 Overt Psychological Operations – DoD Directive S-3321.1 [8 Pages, 1.28mb]

 Psychological Effects of U.S. Air Operations in Four Wars, 1941-1991. Lessons for U.S. Commanders [243 Pages]

 PSYOP Operations in the 21st Century [38 Pages]

 United States Special Operations Command Security Classification Guide for the Psychological Operations Planning and Analysis System (POPAS) [28 Pages, 1.19MB]

 WAR.COM: The Internet and Psychological Operations [30 Pages]

The post Psychological Operations first appeared on The Black Vault.

The Dyna-Soar was developed by Boeing and resembled a small, winged aircraft with heat-resistant materials to withstand the intense heat of re-entry into Earth’s atmosphere. It was designed to be launched atop a powerful booster rocket, like the Titan III, and then maneuver in space before returning to Earth. Unlike traditional capsules of the time, the Dyna-Soar’s design allowed it to land on a runway, giving it unique versatility.

Despite its innovative design, the Dyna-Soar faced numerous challenges, including technical difficulties, high costs, and a lack of a clear mission as NASA’s focus shifted towards manned lunar exploration. In 1963, after spending over $660 million on the project, the U.S. government canceled the Dyna-Soar, favoring other space endeavors such as the Gemini program.

Though it never flew, the Dyna-Soar was an important step in aerospace development. Its concept influenced later spaceplane designs, including the Space Shuttle, highlighting the early vision of reusable spacecraft that would come to shape the future of human spaceflight.

Document Archive

Strangled Infant: The Boeing X-20A Dyna-Soar by Clarence Geiger, Date Unknown [214 Pages, 4MB]

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The post Boeing X-20 “Dyna-Soar” first appeared on The Black Vault.

The directive was signed and implemented by William H. Taft IV, who served as the Deputy Secretary of Defense under President Ronald Reagan. Taft, a prominent figure in defense and legal circles, was known for his role in shaping U.S. military policy during the Cold War era. His tenure included significant contributions to the strategic doctrines that governed the use of weapons of mass destruction.

According to the document release, which took more than four years to get completed, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) initially had no objections to releasing the directive in full. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff intervened, resulting in specific portions being redacted. The redactions were made under Executive Order 13526, 3.3(b)(5), which protects information that could potentially reveal active U.S. military war plans or operational elements of past plans that remain relevant.

The release of this document provides insight into U.S. chemical weapons policy during a critical period in the late 20th century. The directive explicitly details the U.S. strategy to deter the use of chemical, toxin, and biological weapons by maintaining military capabilities to retaliate effectively. It states, “The U.S. reservation to the Geneva Protocol of 1925… allows for retaliation with chemical weapons against a violator if chemical, toxin, or biological weapons are used against U.S. allies even if U.S. forces are not directly attacked.”

The directive also outlines the procedures for the deployment and employment of chemical weapons, emphasizing the importance of maintaining readiness and survivability of chemical-capable forces. For instance, it asserts that “Chemical weapons shall be employed only against suitable tactical targets of military value,” and underscores that the use of such weapons in response to enemy chemical attacks requires the approval of the President of the United States.

The redacted portions also would have seemed to have added more important context when it comes to the use of chemical weapons. For example:

In this particular portion above, you can see that the redacted portions outline the intended damage caused by a retaliatory chemical weapon strike. The paragraph later talks about the want to inflict “at least” but the next portion is redacted.

Another section talks about the “maximum effectiveness” of chemical capabilities, but the opening remarks are fully redacted.

The MDR process, which led to the release of this document, allows for the declassification of government records in response to a specific request. The Black Vault utilized this process to obtain the directive, shedding light on a piece of Cold War history that had remained hidden for decades.

The document is available below for download.

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Document Archive

 Release of the 1987 DoD Directive S-3145.2: Chemical Weapons Policy [10 Pages, 2MB]

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The post Release of the 1987 DoD Directive S-3145.2: Chemical Weapons Policy first appeared on The Black Vault.

BZ is a white crystalline powder that is odorless and tasteless. It can be disseminated as an aerosol or in liquid form. The agent works by blocking the action of acetylcholine, a neurotransmitter involved in the transmission of nerve impulses in the brain. Specifically, BZ acts as an antagonist at muscarinic acetylcholine receptors, leading to a disruption of various bodily functions and cognitive processes.

Exposure to BZ can result in a range of symptoms, typically appearing within 30 minutes to a few hours after exposure and lasting for up to several days. Common symptoms include:

Cognitive Impairment: Severe confusion, disorientation, and difficulty concentrating.
Hallucinations: Visual and auditory hallucinations are common, often vivid and disturbing.
Physical Effects: Dilated pupils, dry mouth, elevated body temperature, tachycardia (rapid heart rate), and flushed skin.
Behavioral Changes: Agitation, aggressive behavior, and inability to perform coordinated tasks.

Research into BZ began in the 1950s, with the United States and several other countries exploring its potential as a non-lethal incapacitating agent. During the Cold War, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union conducted extensive research into BZ and similar compounds, considering their use in various tactical scenarios.

BZ was considered for use in a range of military operations, including:

Crowd Control: To incapacitate large groups of people without causing permanent injury.
Hostage Rescue: To subdue captors and rescue hostages with minimal risk of death.
Battlefield Scenarios: To disable enemy troops, making them unable to fight or operate equipment effectively.

The U.S. military conducted numerous tests involving BZ, often using volunteer soldiers to study its effects and potential applications. The most notable testing program was conducted at Edgewood Arsenal in Maryland, where service members were exposed to various chemical agents, including BZ. These tests raised significant ethical concerns, particularly regarding informed consent and the long-term health effects on participants.

Today, BZ is considered a controlled substance under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which prohibits its use in warfare. The research and development of BZ as a weapon have largely ceased, and existing stockpiles have been destroyed or repurposed for non-military research. However, BZ remains a topic of interest in toxicology and pharmacology due to its unique effects on the human body.

Document Archive

BZ Psychochemical War Agents – Russ Kick Collection (FOIA release with two reports) – [31 Pages, 5.3MB]

Clinical and Military Medical Aspects of Psychopoisons – Russ Kick Collection (FOIA release with two reports) – [31 Pages, 5.3MB]

Determination of Trace Quantities of BZ (3-Quinuclidinyl Benzilate) in Air and Water [27 Pages]

Evaluation of Analytical Methods of the Determination of BZ [54 Pages]

Test Reports for Agent BZ Detonation Tests [134 Pages]

Toxicological studies on Effects of BZ on animals, and also Supercritical fluid application for the analysis of Lewisite (L) and 3-Quinuclidinyl Benzilate (BZ) [27 Pages]

The post Biological Agent: BZ first appeared on The Black Vault.

Security Summaries are comprehensive reports compiled by the FAA that encapsulate the security-related events, incidents, and measures taken within a specified period. These summaries are designed to provide a high-level overview of the security landscape in the aviation sector, highlighting trends, notable incidents, and responses to security threats.

Key elements typically included in Security Summaries are:

• Incident Reports: A detailed account of security incidents, including unauthorized access attempts, security breaches, and any suspicious activities detected at airports and other aviation facilities.
• Response Actions: Information on the actions taken by security personnel and authorities in response to the reported incidents, including any preventative measures implemented to mitigate future risks.
• Security Assessments: Evaluations of the current security protocols and their effectiveness, identifying any vulnerabilities and recommending improvements.

Below you will find archived releases by the FAA of these documents.

Document Archive

Security Summaries and Security Summary Memoranda: FAA’s Northwest Mountain Region – 1998, 1999 and 2000 [916 Pages, 103MB]

The post Security Summaries and Security Summary Memoranda: FAA’s Northwest Mountain Region first appeared on The Black Vault.

The SHEPARD program, described as an “X-prime” initiative, aims to advance the development of long-endurance aircraft by integrating emerging technologies to reduce system-level risks. “The idea behind a DARPA X-prime program is to take emerging technologies and burn down system-level integration risks to quickly mature a new missionized long endurance aircraft design that can be fielded quickly,” stated Steve Komadina, the SHEPARD program manager. “The SHEPARD program is maturing a specific propulsion architecture and power class as an exemplar of potential benefits for the Department of Defense.”

The SHEPARD program leverages the series hybrid electric architecture and components from the previous AFRL/IARPA Great Horned Owl (GHO) project. The initiative is a collaborative effort, involving members from the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), the Office of Naval Research (ONR), and various military personnel.

Northrop Grumman Corporation’s Aeronautics Systems sector, based in Redondo Beach, CA, serves as the prime contractor for the SHEPARD program. Key contributors include Scaled Composites, LLC, Cornerstone Research Group, Inc., Brayton Energy, LLC, PC Krause and Associates, and EaglePicher Technologies, LLC.

The XRQ-73 is categorized as a Group 3 UAS, with an approximate weight of 1,250 pounds. The first flight of the XRQ-73 is anticipated by the end of 2024, marking a crucial step in advancing the capabilities of hybrid-electric aircraft within the Department of Defense.

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The post DARPA Announces Newest X-plane: XRQ-73 first appeared on The Black Vault.

Below, you will find related documents and programs.

B-36 Peacemaker Parasite Aircraft System

The B-36 Parasite Aircraft System was an innovative military aviation project developed during the Cold War era, involving the integration of smaller, secondary aircraft (parasites) with a larger host aircraft (the B-36 Peacemaker bomber). The primary purpose of this system was to enhance the operational range and capabilities of the host aircraft by utilizing parasite fighters for various missions, including reconnaissance, interception, and escort.

Capabilities of B-36 Parasite Systems, May 1953 [64 Pages, 1.71MB]

Operational Suitability Test of the RB-36/F-84 Parasite Aircraft System (Phase I), April 1953 [102 Pages, 21.9MB]

Project FICON

Project FICON (Fighter Conveyor), developed by the United States Air Force during the early 1950s, was an experimental initiative aimed at integrating a fighter aircraft with a strategic bomber to enhance its defensive and reconnaissance capabilities. The project primarily involved the B-36 Peacemaker bomber carrying and deploying an RF-84K Thunderflash, a reconnaissance variant of the F-84 Thunderjet. Utilizing a specially designed trapeze mechanism, the RF-84K could be launched and retrieved mid-air, allowing the B-36 to conduct long-range missions while the parasite fighter provided additional protection and conducted reconnaissance operations. Although the project demonstrated some operational potential, technical challenges and the advent of more advanced air refueling techniques eventually led to its discontinuation.

FICON Progress Report, 15 February 1954 [30 Pages, 3.72mb]

Description of Parasite System Utilizing Convair B-36 Carrier [88 Pages, 15.5mb]

Project TOM-TOM

Project TOM-TOM was an experimental program undertaken by the United States Air Force in the early 1950s to explore the feasibility of using wingtip coupling between aircraft. The project aimed to connect two F-84 Thunderjet fighters to the wingtips of a B-29 Superfortress bomber, effectively creating a composite aircraft system. This configuration was intended to extend the range of the fighter aircraft by allowing them to ride along with the bomber until needed for combat or reconnaissance missions. The coupling mechanism allowed for the transfer of fuel and navigation data, enhancing the operational capabilities of the fighters. However, Project TOM-TOM faced significant technical difficulties, including aerodynamic instability and the complexity of in-flight coupling and decoupling, ultimately leading to the project’s abandonment in favor of more practical air refueling techniques.

Project TOM-TOM Summary Report, 30 December 1957 [169 Pages, 15.79mb]

Micro-Fighter/Airborne Aircraft Carrier Concept

The Micro-Fighter/Airborne Aircraft Carrier concept is a visionary military aviation strategy that envisions a large aircraft, such as a bomber or transport plane, serving as a flying aircraft carrier for smaller, agile micro-fighters. These micro-fighters would be housed within the larger aircraft and deployed mid-air to conduct various missions, including air superiority, reconnaissance, and ground attack. This concept aims to enhance the strategic flexibility and reach of military operations by allowing rapid deployment and recovery of fighters in combat zones, far from traditional airbases. The airborne aircraft carrier could provide fuel, maintenance, and logistical support to the micro-fighters, significantly extending their operational range and effectiveness. Despite the innovative potential, the concept faces substantial technical and logistical challenges, such as the development of reliable launch and recovery systems and ensuring the structural integrity and safety of the host aircraft during operations.

Investigation of a Micro-Fighter/Airborne Aircraft Carrier Concept. Volume 1 [78 Pages, 10.2MB]

The post Parasite Aircraft first appeared on The Black Vault.

Introduced in the early 1950s, the Bell X-5 was instrumental in exploring the aerodynamic implications of variable-sweep wing designs. The primary aim was to assess how different wing configurations affected performance during various phases of flight, such as takeoff, cruise, and landing. The X-5 had a range of sweep from 20 degrees to 60 degrees. This adjustability showcased a significant advancement in aviation technology, suggesting that aircraft could be designed to perform optimally at both high speeds and slow speeds without compromising on stability or control.

The X-5 was powered by an Allison J35 turbojet engine, which provided the necessary thrust to explore high-speed performance. Measuring just over 33 feet in length and with a wingspan that varied depending on the sweep of its wings, the X-5 was relatively compact. Its design included a traditional tailplane and a bubble canopy that offered pilots excellent visibility.

During its operational lifetime, the Bell X-5 provided invaluable data that informed the development of several later aircraft with variable geometry wings, most notably the General Dynamics F-111 and the Grumman F-14 Tomcat. Both of these aircraft utilized technology that had been directly evolved from the experiments conducted with the X-5. The ability to alter wing sweep in flight allowed these aircraft to excel at high-speed intercepts and provide considerable fuel efficiency during longer, slower missions.

However, the X-5 was not without challenges. It demonstrated the complexity and potential dangers of variable-sweep wing technology. On several occasions, issues with the wing sweep mechanism led to accidents, including one fatal crash. These incidents underscored the importance of rigorous testing and refinement of the technology.

Despite these challenges, the Bell X-5 marks a significant chapter in aviation history. It was a critical step forward in the exploration of wing geometries and their effects on aircraft performance. The lessons learned from the X-5’s testing phase have echoed throughout aircraft design principles for decades, proving that its contributions to aerospace engineering and technology were both profound and enduring. The Bell X-5 not only tested the boundaries of aviation technology but also set the stage for future innovations that continue to influence the aerospace industry today.

Document Archive

 The Bell X-5 Research Plane, Date Unknown [65 Pages, 23MB] – My father, John Greenewald, Sr., got these documents from Edwards AFB. My grandfather, R.E. Greenewald, worked on the Bell X-5. Also included in this PDF is an article entitled “Swing Wing, The Bell X-5” from 1993.

 Flight Test, Research Airplane, Rocket Propelled, High Speed – Report No. 58-947-010 [67 Pages, 23MB] – My father, John Greenewald, Sr., got these documents (also included is a document on the Bell X-1) from Edwards AFB. My grandfather, R.E. Greenewald, worked on both aircraft.

 The Bell X-5 Research Aircraft, 27 July 1989 [67 Pages, 42MB]

The post Bell X-5 first appeared on The Black Vault.

The following article is archived from a press release by DARPA. It is archived here for research purposes.

The Manta Ray prototype uncrewed underwater vehicle (UUV) built by performer Northrop Grumman completed full-scale, in-water testing off the coast of Southern California in February and March 2024. Testing demonstrated at-sea hydrodynamic performance, including submerged operations using all the vehicle’s modes of propulsion and steering: buoyancy, propellers, and control surfaces.

“Our successful, full-scale Manta Ray testing validates the vehicle’s readiness to advance toward real-world operations after being rapidly assembled in the field from modular subsections,” said Dr. Kyle Woerner, DARPA program manager for Manta Ray. “The combination of cross-country modular transportation, in-field assembly, and subsequent deployment demonstrates a first-of-kind capability for an extra-large UUV.”

Northrop Grumman shipped the Manta Ray prototype in subsections from the build location in Maryland to its test location in California. The demonstrated ease of shipping and assembly supports the possibility of rapid deployment throughout the world without crowding valuable pier space at naval facilities.

“Shipping the vehicle directly to its intended area of operation conserves energy that the vehicle would otherwise expend during transit,” said Woerner. “Once deployed, the vehicle uses efficient, buoyancy-driven gliding to move through the water. The craft is designed with several payload bays of multiple sizes and types to enable a wide variety of naval mission sets.”

The post Manta Ray UUV Prototype Completes In-Water Testing first appeared on The Black Vault.

The National Guard Bureau (NGB) plays a critical role in the defense and security of the United States. As a joint activity of the Department of Defense, the NGB serves as the channel of communication between the Departments of the Army and Air Force and the states. A recent transition book provides a comprehensive overview of the NGB’s mission, functions, initiatives, and operational aspects. Here’s a closer look at the key contents of the document.

Mission and Functions

The NGB’s mission is to ensure that units and members of the Army National Guard (ARNG) and Air National Guard (ANG) are trained and equipped to support federal and state missions. The document outlines the NGB’s functions, including implementing Department of Defense guidance, prescribing training requirements, and monitoring the organization and operation of National Guard units.

Transition Initiatives and Actions

The transition book discusses various initiatives aimed at enhancing the National Guard’s capabilities. These include efforts to adapt to domestic challenges in the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives (CBRN) Response Enterprise, the role of the Council of Governors in advising on National Guard matters, and the development of cyber capabilities to defend against threats.

Programs and Partnerships

The document highlights the National Guard’s Counterdrug Program, which supports law enforcement agencies in combating drug trafficking and use. It also details the State Partnership Program, which builds security cooperation relationships between the National Guard and foreign countries.

Strategic Planning and Budget Oversight

An important aspect of the transition book is the outline of the National Guard’s strategic planning and budget oversight. The development of a National Guard Strategy is underway to provide direction in a rapidly evolving threat environment. The document also covers budgetary aspects for the ARNG and ANG, including funding issues and highlights.

Operational Readiness

The NGB’s Continuity of Operations (COOP) Plan is briefly mentioned, emphasizing the importance of maintaining operational readiness in the face of emergencies. The plan is classified and available upon request.

Conclusion

The National Guard Bureau’s transition book offers valuable insights into the organization’s mission, functions, and initiatives. As the NGB continues to adapt to changing threats and fiscal realities, this document serves as a guide for strategic direction and operational readiness. The National Guard remains a vital component of the Total Force, ready to support and defend the nation in combat and in support of civil authorities.

Document Archive

National Guard Bureau Transition Book, Date Unknown [43 Pages, 6.69MB]

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