General Leslie Groves, head of the Manhattan Engineer District, in late 1944 commissioned a multi-volume history of the Manhattan Project called the Manhattan District History. Prepared by multiple authors under the general editorship of Gavin Hadden, a longtime civil employee of the Army Corps of Engineers, the classified history was “intended to describe, in simple terms, easily understood by the average reader, just what the Manhattan District did, and how, when, and where.” The volumes record the Manhattan Project’s activities and achievements in research, design, construction, operation, and administration, assembling a vast amount of information in a systematic, readily available form. The Manhattan District History contains extensive annotations, statistical tables, charts, engineering drawings, maps, photographs, and detailed indices. Only a handful of copies of the history were prepared. The Department of Energy’s Office of History and Heritage Resources is custodian of one of these copies.

The history is arranged in thirty-six volumes grouped in eight books. Some of the volumes were further divided into stand-alone chapters. Several of the volumes and stand-alone chapters were never security classified. Many of the volumes and chapters were declassified at various times and were available to the public on microfilm. Approximately a third of the volumes, or parts of volumes, remain classified.

The Office of Classification and the Office of History and Heritage Resources, in collaboration with the Department’s Office of Science and Technical Information, have committed to making available full-text on this OpenNet website the entire thirty-six volume Manhattan District History. Unclassified and declassified volumes will be scanned and posted as available. Classified volumes will be declassified with redactions, i.e., still classified terms, phrases, sentences, and paragraphs will be removed and the remaining unclassified parts made available to the public. The volumes will be posted incrementally as review and processing is completed.

Following is a listing of the books, volumes, and stand-alone chapters of the Manhattan District History. Links to pdf copies are provided for those volumes and chapters that currently are available.

Document Archive

[ 13,904 Pages Total ]

The post Manhattan District History, Written Circa Late 1940s first appeared on The Black Vault.

The objectives of this audit were to evaluate: (1) the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) controls over weapons, munitions, and explosives; (2) the FBI’s compliance with policies governing weapons, munitions, and explosives; and (3) the accuracy of the FBI’s weapons, munitions, and explosives inventories.

The audit covers the FBI’s weapons, munitions, and explosives inventories from fiscal year (FY) 2016 through November 2019. To accomplish our objectives, we interviewed FBI personnel; evaluated FBI policies governing weapons, munitions, and explosives; analyzed select data fields in the firearms inventory database; and reviewed firearm and explosives purchases. We also reviewed documentation related to firearms that were reported as lost or stolen during the scope of our audit to determine whether the FBI took appropriate action. Finally, we assessed compliance with FBI policy and conducted physical inventories at 15 FBI sites.

Document Archive

Audit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Controls over Weapons, Munitions, and Explosives, March 2020 [41 Pages, 4.6MB]

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The post Audit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Controls over Weapons, Munitions, and Explosives, March 2020 first appeared on The Black Vault.

Background

This document was originally denied IN FULL under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) case 2014-STFO-030 (DHS). Here is the FOIA Log reference to my case, showing multiple FOIA exemptions and the fact the document was denied in full:

Although I appealed that decision, it was never processed and I only discovered that years later when asking for an update to the appeal.

I filed again in 2018, and was pleased to have received the document nearly in full, and rather quickly.

The document is now available below. It is my belief this document has never been released to the public before, and the only citations found online were to the FOIA Case log of my case above.

Document Archive

 Chemical Agent Fact Book, May 2010 [222 Pages, 34.5MB]

The post Chemical Agent Fact Book, May 2010 first appeared on The Black Vault.

Explanation and prediction of military R&D in the USSR requires consideration of the system as a whole. Only in context can one make sense of the array of specific strengths and weaknesses found in any undertaking as complex as the way a country acquires its weapons. Although it may approach being a cliche to note the existence of national assymetries and the problems they introduce into analysis, nevertheless they are only infrequently taken into account. In this paper the author is concerned explicitly with how Soviet institutions, constraints, incentives, and values influence the process of Soviet weapons design. The central theme is that these processes strongly affect outcomes over the medium term future.

The Document

 The Process of Soviet Weapons Design, March 1978 [45 Pages, 5.9MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/dtic/2011-43.pdf

The post The Process of Soviet Weapons Design, March 1978 first appeared on The Black Vault.

Although this document has been released prior to my Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) request, there has been quite a bit more released (ie: no longer redacted).

I requested this in October of 2016, and received this reviewed copy on 30 May 2017.

According to the document:

Before and during World War II, the Germans had developed a variety of missile systems. At the end of the war, they stood alone in the numbers and complexity of these systems. Some were used during the war with varying degrees of effectiveness; others were evolving when the war ended. Many of these missile systems, and the scientists who had developed them, were acquired by the Soviets after the war, permitting the USSR to quickly establish its own missile program.

At first the Soviets attempted to keep the missile-related facilities intact on German soil, using German scientists to the maximum extent possible while Soviet counterparts were gaining familiarity in a new field. Later, the Germans, and most of the missile-related facilities, were sent to the USSR, where work continued under Soviet control.

The V-2, a German rocket used operationally late in the war, was the system most extensively studied and emulated by the Soviets. It was the first such missile tested in the USSR, inaugurating the opening in 1947 of the Soviet Union’s first missile test range at Kapustin Yar. Reflections of its design were seen years later in the evolving Soviet missile program. Other missiles, and missile-related systems and subsystems, also fell into Soviet hands after the war; they too provided the Soviets with technology and hardware that would serve them well in later years.

By 1953, most of the Germans had departed the USSR, and subsequent developments were by and large the result of indigenous Soviet programs planned, engineered, developed, and produced by Soviet personnel. In 1957, the USSR successfully tested its first ICBM, and by the early 1960s it had available a variety of ballistic missiles, from short-range ones to those capable of· covering intercontinental distances. By this time, three additional major test ranges were operational or evolving, and the Soviets had launched earth satellites into orbit. They had also successfully conducted planetary probes, and they had launched the first man into space.

By the early 1970s, further significant developments had occurred in the Soviet. missile effort. By this time, the Soviet Union had a major land-based ballistic missile force in being, capable of achieving ranges up to 7,000 nautical miles or more. Refinements in guidance and control systems saw missile accuracy improve steadily. Yields of nuclear warheads of deployed missiles varied up to 25 megatons. Multiple reentry vehicles, penetration aids, and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles had evolved or were evolving by this time. Hardened, dispersed silos had come into widespread use, and mobile missile systems, mainly for tactical use, had been deployed in large numbers.

In the early 1970s, tests began of newer-generation missiles, further enhancing the Soviet Union’s capabilities in this area. Incorporating refinements in a number of significant areas, these newer missiles, coupled with the older ones, provide the Soviet Union with an effective weapons mix. Thus, from the early German assistance, from technology gleaned from Western sources, and through its own efforts, it can be seen that the USSR progressed steadily throughout -the years in the missile field, culminating in its advanced systems of today. Just as the Soviets were embarking on a new and unfamiliar field in these early years, so did the Sigint establishment find itself faced with a new and unfamiliar . problem. Organizations had to be built from nothing; personnel had to be trained; facilities and systems had to be developed; and a fragmented effort had to be streamlined and centralized.

To further complicate the problem, · the main inter.est of the U.S. Comint establishment after World War II concerned ·communications signals, in particular those transmitted in the HF band and below. Equipment, systems, and facilities were not available to adequately handle telemetry signals – from fast-moving missiles propagated in higher frequency bands.

Declassified Document

 The Soviet Land-Based Ballistic Missile Program, 1945-1972: An Historical Overview, 1973 [136 Pages, 15.8MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/nsa/sovietmissileprogram.pdf

The post The Soviet Land-Based Ballistic Missile Program, 1945-1972: An Historical Overview, 1973 first appeared on The Black Vault.

Cost as a Factor in Soviet Weapons Decisionmaking [9 Pages, 610KB] – Intuitively, one believes that cost ought to be a significant decisionmaking factor in the Soviet weapons acquisition process. If that is indeed true, then DoD decisionmakers should be quite interested in when, how, and to what extent cost shapes the outcome of the Soviet weapons acquisition process. However, interest alone is not enough. There must also be sufficient data available about the role that cost plays in the process. With these perspectives in mind, the authors undertook this project, under IDA’s Independent Research Program, aimed at: (1) ascertaining whether DoD officials were in fact interested in the impact of cost in shaping Soviet weapons choices, and, if so, where this concern might play in the U.S. decisionmaking process; as well as (2) identifying potential data to address DoD’s concerns. The project was limited to about six man-weeks of effort (split between two analysts). Hence, the results are necessarily modest. Nevertheless, this preliminary investigation revealed that there is interest in the topic and that data are available to address several significant issues.

Indications of a Soviet Particle Beam Weapon Program. I. High-Current Electron-Beam Propagation in Air [51 Pages, 7.6MB] – The note is the first in a series investigating, on the basis of evidence in Soviet open-source technical publications, the possible existence of a Soviet military program to develop charged-particle beam weapons and the probable history of such a program.

Indications of a Soviet Particle Beam Weapon Program. II. Pulsed Power Closing Switches, August 1981 [101 Pages, 2.5MB] – The note is the first in a series investigating, on the basis of evidence in Soviet open-source technical publications, the possible existence of a Soviet military program to develop charged-particle beam weapons and the probable history of such a program.

More Powerful than the Hyperboloid, 6 December 1967 [9 Pages, 610KB] – Many pre-World War II Soviet publications carried articles on the so- called death rays. More often than not, these articles, based largely on non-Soviet data, were pure science fiction. The few serious articles referred to deadly weapons using heat rays. The concept of weaponry changed drastically with the advent of lasers, which emit stimulated rather than thermal radiation. Mention is made of the use of lasers in multichannel communication systems, ranging of planetary surfaces, metallurgy, plasma diagnostics, biology, medicine, etc. The article also reviews Soviet contributions to the development of the laser.

Perestroika and Change in Soviet Weapons Acquisition [110 Pages, 6.0MB] – This report reviews two major issues. The first is the application of defense industry resources to civilian uses–commonly called conversion. This review places the ongoing process in a broader economic, organizational, and political context. However, since the process continues to unfold, often in unplanned ways, some guidelines are given for evaluating the shifting picture of Soviet behavior. The second issue involves the effects of contemporary weapons technology and complexity on the ability of the Soviet Union to design, develop, and produce military systems that meet the requirements of the military.

Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition [61 Pages, 1.34MB] – The principal actors in Soviet science and weapons acquisition include the nine military-production ministries; the Ministry of Defense; the military and civilian science sectors; and two coordinating agencies–the powerful Military-Industrial Commission (VPK), and the State Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT). The military science, sector is defined as comprising the research institutes of the military-production ministries, and institutes directly subordinated to the Defense Ministry and the military services. The civilian science sector consists of the USSR Academy of Sciences, its Siberian Division, and the regional academies of sciences; the research component of the higher educational institutions; and the research establishments of the civilian production ministries. Soviet science organizations are marked by their separation–by administration, stage of R&D, and scientific field.

 Soviet View of Laser Weapons, April 26, 1974 [10 Pages, 6.1MB]

Soviet Weapon-System Acquisition [91 Pages, 6.1MB] – The Soviet Union has built the largest peacetime military establishment in history, a force whose size dwarfs any military establishment in the West. Only the combined efforts of the collective Western alliance can approach the Soviets’ armament effort. The Soviet Union, in support of its military goals, has dedicated a larger share of its natural and industrial resources year after year to the production of military weapons than has any other country in peacetime. Research was undertaken to ascertain if the Soviet methodology of transitioning a weapon into production and subsequent manufacturing management differed significantly from United States practice and, if so, whether there were aspects of the Soviet methodology that could be usefully applied in managing U.S. weapons in the production/engineering and deployment to manufacturing stages. The document also reviews Soviet policies for logistical support of equipment.

Soviet Weapons Development and the Scientific Community, 31 Jan 1985 [36 Pages, 1.9MB] – Topics include: Development of the Soviet T-34 Tank, Organizations in Soviet Weapons R/D and Science, Soviet Weapons Acquisition Process, Characteristics of Soviet Weapon Design, Science Ties to the Soviet Military, Types of Linkages between Science and the Military, Nature of Scientific Support, and The Three Components of Soviet Military R/D.

The post Former Soviet Union Advanced Weaponry first appeared on The Black Vault.

This document (without a title when I learned of it) appears in the DTIC Classified Document list. It was dated 1939, and did not think it would be this hard to get it declassified.

I was forced to appeal the decision to entirely withhold the document, and after my appeal was processed, I received the record partially redacted.

Hard to believe that this record could be so classified, as it was written when Adolf Hitler was still in power of Nazi Germany.

Declassified Document

 Report on Test of Bombs, Chemical, 100-LB, T6E1, Lots E-3685-127 and E-3685-128, December 15, 1939 [52 Pages, 11.3MB]

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The post Report on Test of Bombs, Chemical, 100-LB, T6E1, Lots E-3685-127 and E-3685-128, December 15, 1939 first appeared on The Black Vault.

A nuclear weapon is an explosive device that derives its destructive force from nuclear reactions, either fission or a combination of fission and fusion. Both reactions release vast quantities of energy from relatively small amounts of matter; a modern thermonuclear weapon weighing little more than a thousand kilograms can produce an explosion comparable to the detonation of more than a billion kilograms of conventional high explosive.

Even small nuclear devices can devastate a city. Nuclear weapons are considered weapons of mass destruction, and their use and control has been a major aspect of international policy since their debut.

A Search for Confined Fireballs in the Atmosphere [35 Pages, 722k]

Air Force Search & Recovery Assessment of the 1958 Savannah, GA B-47 Accident [13 Pages]

Annual Report on the Restricted Data Program: Calendar Year 2000 [35 Pages]

Department of Defense Plan for Integrating National Guard and Reserve Component Support for Response to Attacks Using Weapons of Mass Destruction

Effects of Nuclear Attack on Freight Transportation Systems: Interactions and Comparisons Among Modes [54 pages, 2.85MB] – The operations and equipment used in transferring vehicle loads between two vehicles or between a vehicle and a terminal are examined for seven different classes of cargo. For each of these classes, the usual method of load transfer is discussed, and expedient methods that could be used in a postattack situation are suggested. St. Louis, Missouri is used to illustrate the problem of moving cargo through a damaged area after a nuclear attack. Several alternative methods of moving cargo via multiple transportation modes are analyzed, and a simple procedure for determining the minimum-time route among the alternatives is proposed. The transportation resources required to deliver the minimum supplies for survivor support in the St. Louis area are analyzed for different mixes of trains and trucks and for movements of the supplies over a range of distances. A general summary of the vulnerability of each transportation mode to nuclear attack is provided, and the remedial actions that might be taken in the preattack period to enhance postattack capability are discussed.

 Emissions from Reactions in Nuclear Weapons, 29 June 1963 [ 87 Pages, 2.30MB ] – This paper treats the emissions from the reactions occurring in nuclear weapons, specifically the neutrons and electrons emitted during the course of a nuclear explosion.

Federal Response to a Domestic Nuclear Attack (Counterproliferation Papers, Future Warfare Series, Number 46)[36 pages, 300 KB] – The United States government needs to plan for and prepare against terrorist attacks. Terrorism, when combined with weapons of mass destruction, increases the planning complexity. In the event of a nuclear terrorist attack, the government will need to conduct consequence management in the affected areas, govern the non-affected areas, and prevent future attacks. This paper examines what actions, following a nuclear terrorist attack on domestic soil, produce the broadest and deepest results and what options the President has to address such a national emergency. The federal government must address the national effects caused by the attack itself as well as the anticipated results caused by communities enacting protective measures at the detriment of their neighbors. To produce the list of coordinated actions and options, this paper uses a scenario where a terrorist loads a 10-kiloton (kt) weapon into a truck, drives it to the nation’s capital, and detonates it. After detonation, the government must attempt to mitigate the weapon’s real and perceived effects. A review of the mitigating responses reveals that some actions are nearly impossible without prior planning and coordination. Additionally, the government must operate within a framework of constitutionally granted authorities. Continuity of government is assumed sufficient to exercise command and control and is beyond the scope of this paper. It is also beyond the scope of this paper to present more than a cursory overview of preventing a subsequent attack.

Facts About Fallout [8 Pages]

Fireball Yields [31 Pages] – This document took just about 11 years to obtain! The original request was filed in December of 1996, and the document finally arrived in November of 2007.

Information on DOE’s Requirements for Protecting and Controlling Classified Documents [8 Pages]

Initial Nuclear Radiation From Low Yield Fission Weapons [44 Pages]

Iraq: Nuclear and Missile Proliferation [28 Pages]

Letter P.T. Cullen dated 4/22/49 [2 Pages]

The Local Environment Resulting from a Massive Nuclear Attack on Whiteman Air Force Base, 1980 [54 Pages, 2.02MB] – The study examines the potential blast and fallout damage that would be sustained by the 15 counties surrounding the Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri following a nuclear attack against the associated Minuteman missile silos. The study also provides recommendations concerning the shelters that would be required to protect the population of these 15 counties from blast effects and heavy fallout. The study was performed in consonance with the new emphasis that FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) is giving to nuclear civil protection in counterforce areas. It is intended to be a prototype for analyses of areas containing other U.S. counterforce targets, notably the other five Minuteman wings, the Titan missiles, the Strategic Air Command bases, and the strategic submarine bases.

The Manhattan Project: Making the Atomic Bomb [76 Pages]

Medical Consequences of Nuclear Warfare [122 Pages] – The dramatic technological, social, and economic progress of the twentieth century has yet toprevent the use of armed conflict to resolve political differences among nations. As those of usin military medicine prepare to support our forces into the next century, we must continually beready for the many challenges presented by modern warfare.

Nuclear Attack on U.S. Space-Based Assets [140 Pages]

Nuclear Crash: The U.S. Economy After Small Nuclear Attacks [179 Pages]

Nuclear Deterrence [87 Pages]

Nuclear South Asia [71 Pages]

Operations Charioteer, Musketeer, Touchstone, Cornerstone, Aqueduct, Sculpin and Julin [494 Pages]

OPERATION CROSSROADS. FAILURES OF MASTS, YARDARMS, BOOMS AND RIGGING [218 Pages]

OPERATION CROSSROADS. U.S.S. INDEPENDENCE (CVL22) TEST ABLE. VOLUME 1 [405 Pages]

OPERATION CROSSROADS. TESTS ABLE AND BAKER [193 Pages]

 Civil Preparedness and Post-Attack U.S. Economic Recovery: A State-of-the-Art Assessment and Selected Annotated Bibliography, Volume 1, October 1979 [341 Pages, 14.7MB] – This report contains an assessment of the state-of-the-art of modeling and analysis for civil preparedness and management of
the post-attack U.S. economy. This evaluation was derived from a large volume of related literature. A selected annotated bibliography of over 100 entries follows a state-of-the-art assessment.

 Managing the U.S. Economy in a Post-Attack Environment: A System Dynamics Model of Viability, Volume 2, November 1979 [77 Pages, 3.2MB] – The primary objective of this study is to determine if post-attack viability (or collapse) is automatic for a given system, or if management actions can influence the outcome. In investigating this problem, the approach focuses on exploring the structure of a post-attack system for instabilities, identifying the processes that could lead to collapse, and then evaluating if and how alternative post-attack management policies can mitigate the effects of those instabilities.

Options for Accelerating Economic Recovery after Nuclear Attack. Volume 3, July 1979 [122 Pages, 5.92MB] – The United States may fail to exploit to the fullest its potential for economic recovery following a nuclear attack because failures in post-attack management in both the political and the economic sectors. This report looks at possible adjustments in our continually evolving peacetime management systems, adjustments which might contribute substantially to post-attack recovery at little peacetime cost. The post-attack considerations addressed include making government more effective in bringing about economic recovery and, very importantly, making sure that government continues as government, i.e., that we do not sink into anarchy. Five broad categories of adjustments are discussed.

Personnel Casualty Study, July 1968 [318 Pages, 11.3MB] – This investigation has resulted in the development of a computer code (SEP – Shelter Evaluation Program) which predicts casualties of personnel when subjected to the initial effects of a nuclear weapon. Conditions for both sheltered and unsheltered personnel were considered. Available casualty data were analyzed and functional relationships between casualty and appropriate weapon effects were approximated. Analytic models relating the weapon effects to these casualty functions were also developed for SEP Code. A validation of the code was performed using existing Hiroshima data. Finally, results are presented for a range of construction and weapon parameters to illustrate how SEP Code may be easily utilized to study shelter effectiveness in terms of added survivors.

Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (8/23/1974)

Radioactivity Fall-Out and Radex Plots [55 Pages]

Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Preventing and Defending Against Clandestine Nuclear Attack[59 Pages, 1.1MB] – The DSB addressed this threat in previous studies conducted in 1997 (also chaired by Richard Wagner) and 1999/2000 (chaired by Roger Hagengruber). Much has changed since then. The 11 Sept. 2001 attacks demonstrated the intent of terrorists to inflict massive damage. Nuclear proliferation has proceeded apace, with North Korea and Iran achieving nuclear weapon capability or coming closer to it, and it could spread further. The United States is engaged in a war against terrorism, and DoD is beginning to devote significant effort to combating WMD. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has been established. Thinking about the threat of clandestine nuclear attack has changed, and some efforts to explore defenses have begun. However, one thing has not changed: little has actually been done against the threat of clandestine nuclear attack. The DSB Summer Study on Transnational Threats (1997) first developed the ambitious idea of a very large, multi-element, global, layered civil/military system of systems of scope sufficient to have some prospect of effectively thwarting this threat. There was little resonance with this vision (outside of the Task Forces in 1997 and 2000), but since then, and especially since the attacks of 11 Sept. 2001, it has begun to be discussed more widely. This report will revisit such a national/global system, largely as context for the main focus of the Task Force: DoD’s roles and capabilities. Following briefings from many government agencies and subject matter experts, the Task Force arrived at its basic findings and recommendations in early 2003. Since then, those results have been discussed in over 40 meetings within DoD and elsewhere, leading to certain refinements. This report reflects the outcomes of that process and weaves together viewgraphs used in the discussions with elaborating text.

The Threat of Inadvertent Nuclear War in South Asia [103 Pages]

United States Nuclear Tests, July 1945 through September 1992 [182 Pages]

Vulnerabilities of Social Structures: Studies of Social Dimensions of Nuclear Attack [768 Pages, 39.1 MB] – Possible patterns of social effects and societal vulnerabilities which would result from nuclear attack on the United States are surveyed through analyses of the social sciences. The analyses are centered on the various ways in which social structure and social institutions may be considered to be vulnerable to nuclear attack. A monograph is presented on the general problems of societal analysis posed by attempts to study the vulnerabilities of social structure to nuclear attack. The central theme is that levels of behavioral ordering beyond the individual — particularly social institutional and social organizational processes — set the dimensions for the social effects of attack. Five essays report on particular domains of social effects which may result from nuclear attack and on particular methodological problems which must be solved in the study of social effects. Topics considered include individual- human and social psychological dimensions of nuclear attack, demographic effects and population recovery problems, economic recovery after nuclear war, political-administrative dimensions of nuclear attack, and the use of especially the comparative method of social analysis as a tool for developing knowledge about societal vulnerability. A number of ways are traced in which the social dimensions and domains of nuclear attack indicate problems for planners and administrators. The fundamental problem of social planning to reduce societal vulnerability is to understand and control the unfolding of what can be conceived as characteristic, time-dependent, sequentially ordered progressions of social attack effects.

The Warsaw Pact Short-Warning Nuclear Attack: How Viable an Option? 1979 [58 Pages, 3.31MB] – NATO bases its theater doctrine on the assumptions that any Warsaw Pact attack will be preceeded by considerable warning time and that initial hostilities will be in a conventional mode. In this paper the author assesses the viability of the opposing scenario: a Warsaw Pact short-warning attack with nuclear weapons employed from the start. The author concludes that Soviet open source documents indicate that NATO is preparing to fight the wrong first battle of the next war.

Wartime Missile Strike Intelligence: An Indirect Bomb Damage Assessment System

The post Records on Nuclear Weapons & Attacks first appeared on The Black Vault.

Browning Machine Gun Caliber .50 Field Manual [244 Pages]

Can the U.S. Air Force Weaponize Space? [46 Pages]

Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study (DAWMS) [30 Pages]

Environmental Assessment of the BMDO Cooperative-Engagement-Capability/PATRIOT Interoperability Test [88 Pages]

High Energy Laser Weapons Systems Applications [232 Pages]

Improving Fuel Efficiency of Weapon Platforms [130 Pages]

Investigations of Pulsed-Train Plasmoid Weapons [52 Pages]

Laser Technology (Selected Articles) [49 Pages]

Small-Caliber Ammunition ID Guide Volume 1 – Small Arms Cartridges up to 15mm [445 Pages]

Small-Caliber Ammunition ID Guide Volume 2

Space Based Laser Support [509 Pages]

Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Clearance, Active Range UXO Clearance, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Programs [47 Pages]

The post Various Documents and Reports on Weapons first appeared on The Black Vault.

On August 5-6, 2010, experts gathered for a workshop sponsored by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office (DTRA-ASCO), to discuss the preconditions, causes, and predictive indicators associated with terrorist innovation in weapons of mass effect (WMEs).1 They presented their research findings on seven historical and contemporary cases of terrorist innovation, ranging from airplane hijackings by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) to the current threat emanating from Al-Qaeda’s mass casualty attacks.

These case studies generated a number of generalizations about what motivates innovation, how terrorists come to innovate, and whether it is possible to anticipate innovations in WME terrorism.

Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect: Preconditions, Causes, and Predictive Indicators, October 2012 [211 Pages, 5.96mb]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/terrorism/a556986.pdf

The post Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect: Preconditions, Causes, and Predictive Indicators first appeared on The Black Vault.

Below are the recently declassified reports to the President regarding Nuclear Weapons Surety.

 Nuclear Weapons Surety Report, Annual Report to the President, 1985 [36 Pages, 16mb]

 Nuclear Weapons Surety Report, Annual Report to the President, 1986 [42 Pages, 21mb]

 Nuclear Weapons Surety Report, Annual Report to the President, 1987 [46 Pages, 21mb]

 Nuclear Weapons Surety Report, Annual Report to the President, 1988 [72 Pages, 2.72mb]

 Nuclear Weapons Surety Report, Annual Report to the President, 1989 [46 Pages, 0.8mb]

 Nuclear Accident Response Capability Listing, March 1995 [150 Pages, 22.1mb]

The post Nuclear Weapons Surety Reports first appeared on The Black Vault.

More than 4,000 tons of shells exploded near a military testing ground some 40 kilometers from the city of Orenburg in Central Russia, prompting the mass evacuation of two nearby towns.

Those 4,000 tons included 1,379 tons of 100mm shells, 400 tons of air bombs and 2,300 tons of 280mm reactive shells, the head of the military investigative committee announced.

Witnesses recorded video of a massive plume of smoke rising into the air shortly after the explosions. Local residents said that the blasts were powerful enough to rattle windows dozens of kilometers away from the epicenter.

Declassified Documents

All documents from EUCOM [4 Pages, 0.6 MB] – Although mostly blacked out from “non-responsive” expemptions, this shows what is available, along with photos.

All documents from the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency [6 Pages, 0.9 MB]

The post 4,000 tons of shells explode in Central Russia, October 2012 first appeared on The Black Vault.