According to the document, NIGHT TRAIN 84 was designed as a major biennial nuclear war exercise that included elements from previous exercises such as “GLOBAL SHIELD,” “AMALGAM CHIEF,” and FEMA’s “REX 84 ALPHA.” The exercise aimed to simulate coordinated responses to a global nuclear conflict, with live flying and the use of strategic weapon systems incorporated into the exercise play. The scenario was directly shaped by Cold War tensions and modeled on large-scale Soviet exercises reviewed in June 1982.

“The exercise is designed with two four-day phases,” the document states, “on the pre and trans-attack period… A 24-hour administrative break will simulate 15 days of survival and recovery activity. Phase II will begin on Day 6 of the exercise and will concentrate on activities in the post-nuclear attack period.”

A primary objective was to test U.S. continuity of government plans following a nuclear exchange, as well as strategic and tactical military responses. “National participation is anticipated because of the desire to evaluate post-nuclear attack continuity of government plans,” the briefing notes.

The simulated scenario begins with escalating global tensions, including Soviet inroads in the Caribbean, discovery of Soviet SA-5 missile site construction in Cuba, and Soviet opportunism in Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and Iran. The exercise projects events such as open civil war in Iran, increased Soviet military aid and presence in various regions, and NATO’s heightened military readiness in response to Soviet exercises perceived as cover for mobilization.

By 5 April 1984, the exercise posits that “Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces attacked in Central Europe and Turkish Thrace,” with chemical and nuclear weapons employed on 6 April in an attempt to break NATO resistance. The scenario culminates in “Soviet nuclear counterforce attacks against the United States and follow-on theater nuclear strikes on NATO” on 8 April.

In the wake of these simulated attacks, the United States shifted focus to survival and recovery operations during a compressed 15-day period. The exercise outlined that “unified and specified commands will operate at reduced strength from alternate command locations during this phase and will concentrate on reconstitution of their commands and redirection of their forces.” A major emphasis was placed on ensuring coordination between surviving national command authorities (NCA), reconstituted federal agencies, and state governments, with the Commander-in-Chief Readiness Command (CINCRED) playing a central role in civil defense support. This phase was described as “a first step toward defining, developing and evaluating procedures for coping with events which might occur in the aftermath of nuclear war,” highlighting the complexities of maintaining command connectivity and stabilizing the nation following a large-scale nuclear strike.

Meanwhile, the document describes the grim aftermath facing the Soviet Union. “While most of the Soviet and elements of Warsaw Pact leadership survived the U.S. retaliatory strike, they were not able to reconstitute their strategic arsenal as quickly as had been expected… Restoration of key production and services was inhibited by popular unwillingness to return to contaminated areas.”

The exercise also envisioned significant civil unrest within the Soviet bloc and a turn toward diplomatic resolution. “Faced with these problems, Soviet leaders began to seek a political solution to the crisis,” with both sides agreeing on a ceasefire in the European theater after 15 days.

Throughout, the document emphasizes the importance of testing the interaction between surviving national command authorities (NCA), reconstituted government agencies, and state governments. The scenario aimed to “provide study and better understanding of the complex issues involved in the trans- and post-nuclear attack periods.”

Portions of the document remain redacted, withheld under FOIA exemptions including 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) for information classified in the interest of national security and 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) under 50 U.S.C. 3605, protecting NSA functions and information.

The release of this document comes at a time when global tensions echo some of the very scenarios envisioned in NIGHT TRAIN 84. Today, Iran remains a focal point of international security concerns, with ongoing disputes over its nuclear program, regional influence, and relations with the United States and its allies. The fictional civil war and foreign interventions in Iran portrayed in the exercise underscore the enduring strategic significance of the region, as well as the risks posed by instability there.

Moreover, the exercise’s emphasis on rapid escalation, chemical and nuclear weapons use, and the struggle to maintain continuity of government after a large-scale nuclear exchange serves as a stark reminder of the catastrophic consequences that could arise from modern conflicts spiraling out of control. As nuclear-armed states continue to navigate strained relations, the lessons and planning embedded in Cold War exercises like NIGHT TRAIN 84 remain relevant, highlighting the need for diplomacy, crisis management, and updated continuity plans in an increasingly unpredictable world.

###

Document Archive

Exercise Night Train 84 Briefing, August 1983 [24 Pages, 5.5MB]

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The post DoD Releases Previously Unseen Document Detailing “NIGHT TRAIN 84” Nuclear War Exercise Scenario first appeared on The Black Vault.

The DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (or DOD Dictionary) sets forth standard US military and associated terminology to encompass the joint activity of the Armed Forces of the United States. These military and associated terms, together with their definitions, constitute approved Department of Defense (DOD) terminology for general use by all DOD components.

This publication supplements standard English-language dictionaries and standardizes military and associated terminology to improve communication and mutual understanding within DOD, with other US Government departments and agencies, and among the United States and its allies.

This publication applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Services, the Joint Staff, combatant commands, DOD agencies, and all other DOD components. It is the primary terminology source when preparing correspondence, to include policy, strategy, doctrine, and planning documents. Criteria for inclusion of terminology in the DOD Dictionary is enumerated in Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5025.12, Standardization of Military and Associated Terminology, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 5705.01, Standardization of Military and Associated Terminology.

DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

Current as of May 2022 (released November 2022)

 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, May 2022 [361 Pages, 119MB]

Archived Versions

 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, November 2019 [376 Pages, 1.5MB]

 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, October 16, 2016 [400 Pages, 1.7MB]

The post DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms first appeared on The Black Vault.

The DARO has been charged with unifying existing reconnaissance architectures and enhancing the management and acquisition of all joint Service and Defense-wide manned and unmanned airborne reconnaissance/surveillance capabilities.

DARO is engaged in the task of benchmarking its fundamental responsibilities and resources. It will create the climate necessary for change by concentrating its energies in the following areas: (a) assessment and tradeoff of system level capabilities; (b) analysis of system requirements to ensure interoperability; (c) development of new and improved sensor technologies; (d) pursuit of Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations; and (e) development of a unifying airborne reconnaissance architecture consistent with other reconnaissance related roadmaps. The architecture will be joint and integrated, address manned and unmanned systems, stress open and digital designs, be adaptable to changing threats and include multi-level secure communications linked into the global network.

In developing an effective unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) program plan, an evolutionary approach is the most prudent course of action given the existing and forecast budgetary environment. An evolutionary approach to the migration of UAVs into the mainstream of tactical reconnaissance capabilities builds on mature technologies, while permitting a “phased” approach to architectural development, testing, and operational employment. A broad range of alternatives exists, and now is the time to make a commitment to a proper mix of UAVs and manned reconnaissance capabilities. These alternatives will be available as developments warrant and simulations validate the interoperability of UAVs and manned aircraft to meet mission needs. Figure ES-1 identifies the major UAV programs that are the primary focus of the DARO. Other UAV systems discussed in this document for completeness and context are shown in relation to the primary DARO programs in Figure ES-2. This initial UAV program plan embraces lessons learned from past UAV programs and builds on recommendations of the 1993 Defense Science Board (DSB) Summer Study on  global Surveillance and the DoD Deep Target Surveillance/Reconnaissance Study to integrate manned and UAV capabilities. Most importantly, this plan highlights the ultimate goal of any military system or plan — service to the warfighter.

Document Archive

Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO) Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), Program Plan, April 1994 [170 Pages, 10.6MB]

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The post Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO) Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), Program Plan, April 1994 first appeared on The Black Vault.

On June 7, 2021, DARPA released the following press release, with the video above.

In recent tests at Eglin Air Force Base, DARPA’s Mobile Force Protection (MFP) program demonstrated a Counter-Unmanned Air System (C-UAS) multilayer defense architecture to defeat unauthorized drone intrusions over military installations or operations. Development of this low-cost reusable drone interceptor system approach began four years ago with the aim of creating an integrated system for thwarting attacks from self-guided small unmanned aircraft. The goal is to protect high value convoys moving through potentially populated regions where there is a requirement to avoid using explosive defensive weapons and mitigate collateral damage.

The technology demonstrator successfully neutralized tactically-relevant drones using a newly-developed X band radar that automatically senses and identifies unmanned aerial system threats. The radar then pairs targets to specific interceptors through an automated decision engine tied to a command and control system, launching and guiding rotary and fixed wing interceptors with two types of drone countermeasures while on the move and without operator intervention.

“Because we were focusing on protecting mobile assets, the program emphasized solutions with a small footprint in terms of size, weight, and power,” said MFP program manager Gregory Avicola in DARPA’s Tactical Technology Office. “This also allows for more affordable systems and less operators.”

The requirement that the system field non-kinetic solutions pushed concepts that could be employed in and around civilian areas. The primary drone negation mechanism shoots strong, stringy streamers from reusable interceptors that foul propellers causing loss of propulsion. Additionally, other non-kinetic techniques were developed and demoed. The focus on defeating raids with multiple threats, rather than single unmanned aerial attackers, required the development of an integrated solution of sensors, autonomy, and mitigation solutions more robust than existing systems. Dynetics was the primary systems integrator.

DARPA is currently working with the military services to transition technology developed in the MFP project into various acquisition programs.

Image Caption: Mobile Force Protection project vehicle launches drone interceptor in test at Eglin Air Force Base.

# # #

The post Mobile Force Protection Program Concludes with Successful Demonstration first appeared on The Black Vault.

Artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) is a next-generation computer capability that holds the potential for changing everything from how people live and work to how wars are fought and won. The Combat Capabilities Development Command Chemical Biological Center (DEVCOM CBC) is keeping pace with this computing revolution through its Grand Challenge Program, beginning with three pilot projects and a workshop to recruit more.

Video Archive

The post U.S. Army Lab Explores AI/ML Potential in Development of Chemical Biological Defense Solutions first appeared on The Black Vault.

According to the introduction of the audit:

“We performed the audit in response to allegations made to the Defense Hotline including the allegation that Sandia National Laboratory officials assigned to the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs) directed the Defense Special Weapons Agency to procure work from Department of Energy national laboratories. This is the second of two reports. The first report discusses two allegations related to Defense Special Weapons Agency procurements through the Department of Energy.”

Document Archive

Report 98-036, Intergovernmental Personnel Act Employees in the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs), December 11, 1997 [55 Pages, 13MB]

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The post Report 98-036, Intergovernmental Personnel Act Employees in the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs), December 11, 1997 first appeared on The Black Vault.

According to the document:

“The Independent Assessment Panel (IAP) was chartered to review and assess the DoD management and organization of National Security in Space and make appropriate recommendations to strengthen the U.S. position. The IAP was supported in its efforts by a study team from the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA). The IAP is grateful for the participation of liaison officers from the Department of Defense, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (see Appendix C for the study team and liaison participants). This task was performed by IDA for the Director, Space Policy Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategic Capabilities under task entitled
‘Department of Defense Organization and Management for National Security in Space.'”

The document was requested by The Black Vault in September of 2017 and it was obtained in December of 2017, under NRO FOIA Case F-2017-00168.

Document Archive

 Leadership, Management, and Organization for National Security Space, July 2008 [58 Pages, 0.4MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/dtic/ADA486551.pdf

The post Leadership, Management, and Organization for National Security Space, July 2008 first appeared on The Black Vault.

This report is the first in a series of reports that discuss the acquisition of the Chemical Demilitarization Program (the Demilitarization Program). The mission of the Demilitarization Program is to destroy chemical munitions through incineration or other approved alternative technologies. In 1985, the Congress, in section 1521, title 50, United States Code, “Destruction of Existing Stockpile of Lethal Chemical Agents and Munitions,” (Public Law 99-145), directed DoD to oversee the destruction of the stockpile of lethal chemical agents and munitions because of concerns for the stockpile deterioration. The Army established the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization to manage the day-to-day operations of destroying the chemical weapons. In May 2001, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics designated the Demilitarization Program as a major Defense acquisition program (Acquisition Category ID) and assigned the Army as the Executive Agent. Through July 2002, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers awarded contracts for construction, systemization, operations, and closure of chemical destruction facilities at Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System, Johnston Island, Hawaii, and Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility, Tooele, Utah. The Office of the Secretary of Defense approved a cost estimate totaling $24 billion, of which the program office awarded $5.8 billion in contracts for the Demilitarization Program.

Who Should Read This Report and Why? This report should be read by all who are interested in the Army’s demilitarization of its chemical munitions stockpile. This report discusses why the Army needs to update its acquisition program baseline agreement and to obtain a documented threat assessment.

Document Archive

 A Revised Acquisition Program Baseline and Threat Assessment for the Chemical Demilitarization Program, October 2002 [34 Pages, 1.4MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/dod/D-2003-015).pdf

The post A Revised Acquisition Program Baseline and Threat Assessment for the Chemical Demilitarization Program, October 2002 first appeared on The Black Vault.

The Defense Intelligence Summary is produced by the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

These are classified documents, published by the DIA, and utilized by those with proper clearances within the Department of Defense (DOD). Issues detail intelligence issues throughout the globe and most remain classified to this day.

Below are some that have been released under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

Declassified Defense Intelligence Summaries

(From the most recent to the oldest)

 Defense Intelligence Summary #10-66, 13 January 1966 [33 Pages, 18.9MB]

 Defense Intelligence Summary #1-66, 3 January 1966 [45 Pages, 33.9MB]

 Defense Intelligence Summary #273-65, 19 November 1965 [46 Pages, 25.1MB]

 Defense Intelligence Summary #271-85, 17 November 1965 [14 Pages, 7.4MB]

 Defense Intelligence Summary #1,  9 November 1961 [6 Pages, 1.6MB] – One missing page, and 3 pages fully exempt from release.  That is the determination after waiting more than 7 YEARS for this document to be declassified.

The post Defense Intelligence Summary Archive first appeared on The Black Vault.

Abstract:

When the blind seek to leak the blind, a cautionary note is in order. This report is written in blissful ignorance of whatever systematic efforts the United States Government has made to construct a counter-deception capability, designed to detect, neutralize and undermine those foreign deception operations that degrade governmental performance through U.S. intelligence channels. To the extent that such a  capability exists, what follows may be superfluous. Neither the public literature on intelligence activities nor the public record of intelligence predictions confirms the existence of such a counter-deception capability, but the public record is notoriously murky and subject to correction.

This report explores the effects of deception upon strategic warning systems, and possible protective efforts for the detection of strategic foreign deception. The report excludes from consideration evaluation of organizational alternatives for counter-deception systems. Drawing only upon public sources, this report is designed to serve as a background reference for readers interested in methodologies for coping with deception, or in references to the literature of deception and cognition.

This report was obtained from the CIA CREST system, and the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).

Download the Document

 On Countering Strategic Deception, by William R. Harris, November 1973 [100 Pages, 41.5MB]

The post On Countering Strategic Deception, by William R. Harris, November 1973 first appeared on The Black Vault.

Title: ( U ) Situation Awareness and Decision Support System for Defensive Counterspace
PDF URL: (pdf) – 2 MB –
Accession Number: ADB339747
Personal Author(s): Bowman, Christopher ;  DeSieno, Duane
Corporate Author: DATA FUSION AND NEURAL NETWORKS BROOMFIELD CO
Report Date: 10 Apr 2008
Descriptive Note: Final rept. 10 Apr 2007-10 Apr 2008
Pages:77 Page(s)
Report Number: FA9453-07-M-0109FR   ( FA945307M0109FR )  ,  AFRL-RV-PS – TR-2008-1026 AFRL-RV-PS   ( AFRLRVPSTR20081026 AFRLRVPS )  ,  XC – TR-2008-1026 AFRL-RV-PS   ( XCTR20081026 AFRLRVPS )
Monitor Series: TR-2008-1026     ( TR20081026 )  ,  AFRL-RV-PS     ( AFRLRVPS )
Contract/Grant/Transfer Number: FA9453-07-M-0109     ( FA945307M0109 )

After waiting many months, I was denied, in full, access to the record.  I quickly filed an appeal. Whenever a document is fully denied, I do wonder if they truly reviewed the document, or if they simply denied access.

After a couple more months of waiting, I partially won my appeal – and they released a portion of the document. Although still primarily redacted, it does give some insight with the “Executive Summary” being partially released.

Download Situation Awareness and Decision Support System for Defensive Counterspace

 Situation Awareness and Decision Support System for Defensive Counterspace [79 Pages, 5.2MB]

Excerpt:

The fundamental deficiency with operational automated situation assessment and response software systems is that in too many cases they deliver the answer to the problem they were designed to solve rather than the current mission context problem. What the AF needs is a context assessment (CA)
capability that interprets the situation assessment and response outputs using all the available current mission contextual knowledge.

This DF&NN SBIR Phase 1 effort is the first to provide a technical architecture for the development of Context Assessment (CA) software for Data Fusion & Resource Management (DF&RM) systems. CA software provides an interpretation (i.e., explanation and evaluation) of the DF&RM system outputs based upon the current mission context data base. As such CA improves the user situation awareness and the utility of his supporting DF&RM svstem.

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/defenseissues/F-2015-00120-A.pdf

The post Situation Awareness and Decision Support System for Defensive Counterspace first appeared on The Black Vault.

Analysis of the Homeland Security Act [16 Pages]

The National Strategy For Homeland Security: Office of Homeland Security [90 Pages]

President’s Homeland Security Department Proposal [35 Pages]

The post Homeland Security first appeared on The Black Vault.

International Security Environment to the Year 2020: Global Trends Analysis (Full Report) [84 Pages, 5mb]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/defenseissues/2020.pdf

The post International Security Environment to the Year 2020 first appeared on The Black Vault.

A Comparison of the Defense Acquisition Systems of France, Great Britain, Germany and the United States [304 Pages]

A Comparison of U.S. Navy Sea Air Land (SEAL) Teams and U.S. Army Special Forces [301 Pages]

Army Annual Financial Report (2001) [20 Pages]

Base Structure Report (Listing of Facilities) – FY 2002 – 117 Pages

China – Military to Military Exchanges in 2000 [7 Pages]

Chinese Military Power [52 Pages]

Department of Defense Base Structure Report [68 Pages]

DOE Needs Better Controls to Identify Contractors Having Foreign Interests [21 Pages]

Executive Office of the President – Procedures for Acquiring Access to and Safeguarding Intelligence Information [19 Pages]

Feasibility of Third World Advanced Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat.Volume 1: Long Range Ballistic Missile Threat [49 Pages]

Feasibility of Third World Advanced Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat. Volume 2: Emerging Cruise Missile Threat [49 Pages]

Handbook of Problem Solving Techniques for Intelligence Analysts – November 21, 1986 [350 Pages]

High Power Radio Frequency Weapons: A Potential Counter to U.S. Stealth and Cruise Missile Technology [43 Pages]

Homeland Security: A Canadian Perspective [41 Pages]

HOMELAND SECURITY: A Framework for Addressing the Nation’s Efforts [21 Pages]

How to Get It: A Guide to Defense – Related Information Resources [400 Pages]

Joint Vision 2010 publication [39 Pages]

Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report [194 Pages]

Manhigh III. USAF Manned Balloon Flight Into The Stratosphere [246 Pages, 11.85mb] – This report covers the manned balloon flight MANHIGH III, the third, and last, of a series of flights into the stratosphere directed by the Aeromedical Field Laboratory. Twelve sections prepared by the pilot and the task scientists, describe the vehicle and its performance, selection and preparation of prospective pilots, the principal psychological and physiological parameters of the subject before, during and after the flight, the operation of a sealed environment under space equivalent conditions, cosmic radiation studies, and related problems such as pilot’s nutrition.

.doc Munitions Storage Area Security [13 Pages]

Secure Database Data Transfer with Starlight [26 Pages]

Special Operations Forces Posture Statement [118 Pages]

Strengthening Transatlantic Security: A U.S. Strategy for the 21st Century [68 Pages]

Trends in Background Issues of Applicants for Access to Classified Information [6 Pages]

The post Miscellaneous Defense Records first appeared on The Black Vault.

 Unintended Consequences of Strategic Gaming, 02 May 1977 [ 50 Pages, 7.8MB ] – Strategic planning is an essential element of modern defense. It synthesizes the doctrine, politics, weapons and occasionally even the philosophy of the nation state. Because a country embodies its program for continued existence and the destruction of its opposition in it, strategic planning can directly affect many hundreds of millions of people.

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/defenseissues/14-F-1263.pdf

The post Strategic Gaming first appeared on The Black Vault.

The below reports were received from multiple agencies on the topics, and are provided here for research.

Declassified Documents

Advanced Modeling and Simulation for Analyzing Combat Concepts in the 21st Century [69 Pages]

Allied Contributions to the Common Defense [133 Pages]

THE CADRE PAPERS: Does the United States Need Space-Based Weapons? [127 Pages]

Defense against Ballistic Missiles [15 Pages]

Defense Science and Technology Base in the 21st Century [64 Pages]

Feasibility of Population Targeting [126 Pages]

In Front of the Threat: Evolving the Department of Defense Strategic Organizational Structure to Prepare for The Challenges Of Weapons Of Mass Destruction [94 Pages]

Personality Profiles of U.S. Navy Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) Personnel [18 Pages, 900k] – One hundred thirty-nine U.S. Navy Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) personnel completed the NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI) . The average profiles were compared to adult male norms for five broadly defined domains. SEALs scored lower in Neuroticism and Agreeableness, average in Openness, and higher in Extraversion and Conscientiousness compared to these two populations. High Extraversion and conscientiousness scores have been shown to predict job performance in other professions. SEALs seek excitement and dangerous environments, but are otherwise stable, calm, and rarely reckless or impulsive. Although this average profile may not characterize any individual SEAL, we believe this study provides the most comprehensive personality profile of Navy SEALs to date. Navy SEAL, NEO Personality Inventory, Personality, Profile.

Political Influence and the Commander in Chief: Congress, the President, and War Powers, 2006 Doctoral Thesis[216 Pages, 10.7MB] – This project examines war powers politics between the president and Congress. Congress is supposed to declare or authorize wars; the president is supposed to direct the overall war effort and protect the nation from attack. Yet, armed attacks against the United States are historically rare, as are declarations of war and congressional authorizations for the use of force. What is not rare, however, is the actual use of military force. American troops have been deployed into combat situations hundreds of times in the nation’s history. Thus emerges a basic puzzle: given the constitutional framework and institutional incentives of the executive and legislative branches, does war powers control in fact reside with Congress? More directly, does Congress have any meaningful war powers? The author frames the congressional-presidential relationship in principal-agent terms, and suggests that the president’s unilateral authority and ability to control the war powers agenda largely relegates Congress to a position of indirect influence. The author tests for evidence of congressional influence in two areas: the initial decision to employ military force and the factors affecting the duration of military operations. He then examines the political and situational factors that influence Congress to confront the president through war-related hearings. While evidence does not point to a direct congressional role in the war powers arena, results indicate that a long-term, more indirect form of congressional influence may exist in such areas as economic aid, permanent troop deployments, and potential presidential consultation with congressional leaders. Framed against the background of the 2006 midterm elections, this study suggests that scholars and other observers may do well to focus less on direct constraint, and instead turn their attention to the broader ways in which Congress responds and influences the president.

Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland Security Concepts, Issues, and Options [328 Pages]

Surface Warfare, Concept to Reality November/December 1997 [49 Pages, 5.8mb]

Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century [108 Pages]

The US Army and the Interagency Process: Historical Perspectives. The Proceedings of the Combat Studies Institute 2008 Military History Symposium (6th) Held at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas on 16-18 September 2008 [439 Pages, 6.7 MB] – These proceedings represent the sixth volume to be published in a series generated by the Combat Studies Institute’s annual Military History Symposium. These symposia provide a forum for the interchange of ideas on historical topics pertinent to the current doctrinal concerns of the United States Army. Every year, in pursuit of this goal, the Combat Studies Institute brings together a diverse group of military personnel, government historians, and civilian academicians in a forum that promotes the exchange of ideas and information on a pressing topic of national significance. This year’s symposium, hosted by the Combat Studies Institute, was held 16-18 September 2008 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The 2008 symposium’s theme, The US Army and the Interagency Process: Historical Perspectives, was designed to explore the partnership between the US Army and government agencies in attaining national goals and objectives in peace and war within a historical context. The symposium also examined current issues, dilemmas, problems, trends, and practices associated with US Army operations requiring interagency cooperation. In the midst of two wars and Army engagement in numerous other parts of a troubled world, this topic is of tremendous importance to the US Army and the nation.

The post Wartime/Defense Tactics and Strategies first appeared on The Black Vault.