Conducted primarily in the early 1990s, the interviews were part of a formal study by the Office of Net Assessment, drawing on the testimony of Soviet officers such as Marshal Sergei Akhromeev, General Andriian Danilevich, and Western figures including former U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown.
The collection offers new insight into how both sides viewed nuclear deterrence,
the potential for war, and the logic behind massive arms buildups.

Soviet Doubts About Nuclear Warfighting

The document reveals that, by the 1970s, leading Soviet military thinkers had concluded that nuclear weapons were not true warfighting tools, but rather political instruments of deterrence. “At no time did the USSR ever intend to make first use of nuclear weapons,” Marshal Akhromeev told U.S. researchers, explaining that although a preemptive attack would offer an advantage in theory, neither side would actually win if nuclear war began. He described nuclear arms as “political tools,” and noted that both superpowers’ command and control systems for nuclear forces reached full reliability only in the
mid-1970s, greatly reducing the risk of unauthorized or accidental use.

General Danilevich described how the results of secret Soviet computer models, shown to Brezhnev
and other Politburo members in the early 1970s, predicted catastrophic devastation after a nuclear exchange. According to the unpublished findings, the Soviet armed forces would be “reduced to 1/1000 of their previous strength,” with 80 million Soviet citizens killed and 85% of industrial capacity destroyed. Danilevich recalled that Brezhnev was “visibly terrified” by the exercise and had to be reassured that it was not a real launch. The summary of this study was never published, as its message was judged “too psychologically detrimental to morale and resolve.” Instead, later models artificially reduced predicted destruction to make nuclear war appear less suicidal, a practice that continued into the 1980s.

Strategic Misperceptions and Internal Rivalries

The interviews point to a persistent pattern of misreading the other side’s intentions. Akhromeev, who was initially distrustful of the U.S., said that face-to-face meetings with American generals in the late 1980s changed his views, revealing that both sides had long misunderstood each other’s actual policies and motivations. “Each side made a tremendous misreading of the other side’s intentions, which led to a greater possibility of accidental strikes,” he said, but added that there was never an imminent danger of war in the 1970–87 period.

The document also details internal disputes within the Soviet leadership, especially between the General Staff, political authorities, and the powerful industrial sector. General Batenin recalled deep tensions between military planners and party leaders over decisions such as force structure and the production of new weapons, with disagreement over whether quantity or quality should be prioritized. The interviews highlight that subjective factors, political alliances, and personal relationships often overrode technical analysis in weapons procurement and strategy.

Economic Pressure and Arms Buildup

A recurring theme in the interviews is the immense economic burden of the Soviet arms race. Sergei Blagovolin, who worked on assessing the U.S. industrial mobilization potential, recalled that Soviet planners estimated the U.S. could produce “50 nuclear submarines and 50,000 tanks per year” in a mobilization scenario. These threat assessments were used for decades to justify vast increases in Soviet military spending and production, which ultimately contributed to the economic strains that weakened the USSR in the 1980s.

Chemical and New Weapons

On chemical weapons, both Soviet and U.S. interviewees agreed that the USSR maintained large stockpiles as a “secondary means” of warfare, to be used only if nuclear escalation could be avoided or in retaliation. Soviet planners consistently matched U.S. capabilities, but chemical weapons were viewed as fundamentally less decisive than nuclear arms.

There is also acknowledgment that both superpowers tracked and attempted to match technological innovations—such as cruise missiles, precision-guided munitions, and laser-based weapons—but economic and political realities limited their actual impact on the nuclear balance.

Political Leadership and Decision-Making

The interviews note the sometimes limited military experience of Soviet political leaders, with Brezhnev described as “very weak in the area of military decision making,” often leaving key decisions to the Minister of Defense and the General Staff. Final choices on weapons development and arms control frequently reflected a compromise between military advice, party priorities, and the interests of the defense industry.

Lasting Lessons

The released record offers a rare, unfiltered view of the late Cold War from the perspective of both Soviet and Western insiders. The testimony shows that, beneath the rhetoric and buildup, both sides recognized the catastrophic potential of nuclear war and relied on deterrence—not victory—as the true goal. The collection reveals how misperceptions, internal politics, and economic exhaustion shaped the course of the Cold War, and how close both superpowers came to the brink while ultimately avoiding direct conflict.

###

Document Archive

The Crowded Path to Unlimited Soviet Arsenals: What Soviet Party Leaders, General Staff, and Industrialists Thought They Were Doing in the Cold War [153 Pages, 6.5MB]

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The post Declassified DoD Interviews Reveal Soviet Cold War Fears and Nuclear Realities first appeared on The Black Vault.

The document reveals that on September 29, 1957, a significant nuclear accident occurred in the Chelyabinsk region, part of the Ural Mountains. This event, often referred to as the “Kyshtym disaster”, involved an explosion at a nuclear waste storage facility near the town of Kyshtym. The facility was part of the Mayak Production Association, a major Soviet nuclear complex involved in producing plutonium for weapons.

According to various intelligence reports cited in the document, the explosion resulted from the overheating of buried nuclear waste. The containment measures failed, leading to a release of highly radioactive materials into the environment. This incident caused widespread contamination, affecting a large area and exposing thousands of people to dangerous levels of radiation.

The NRC document includes excerpts from several declassified CIA reports. One such report from May 1958 details that “various Soviet employees and visitors to the Brussels Fair have stated, independently but consistently, that the occurrence of an accidental atomic explosion during the spring of 1958 was widely known throughout the USSR”​​. The explosion site was identified as being in the Chelyabinskaya Oblast, and while the exact number of casualties remains uncertain, it was commonly believed that several scores of individuals perished in the incident​​.

Further intelligence describes the aftermath of the explosion, with extensive radioactive contamination rendering a significant area uninhabitable. Eyewitness accounts from the time recount that “all stores in Tomensk-Uralskiy which sold milk, meat, and other foodstuffs were closed as a precaution against radiation exposure”​. New food supplies were brought in under strict controls, and the population was subjected to measures reminiscent of wartime shortages.

The NRC document also references the account of Zhores Medvedev, a Soviet biochemist and geneticist who defected to the West. Medvedev reported that the Soviet authorities had kept the disaster under wraps, not evacuating affected populations until symptoms of radiation sickness became apparent. This delay in response exacerbated the health impacts, leading to numerous deaths and chronic illnesses among the exposed population​.

Additionally, the NRC document includes details from a Soviet film, classified at the time, which showed the construction of a new city in the Ural Mountains specifically for testing a 20-megaton nuclear device. The test’s objectives included assessing the resilience of civilian infrastructure, such as a subway system, to a nuclear blast. The film depicted the obliteration of the city, with only the subway surviving, highlighting the devastating power of the explosion and its impact on both military equipment and animal life used as test subjects​​.

Despite the magnitude of the disaster, Soviet officials consistently denied any knowledge of such incidents during interactions with U.S. delegations. For instance, during meetings in the USSR, Soviet officials, including L. M. Voronin, claimed ignorance about the accident and insisted that their agencies were only involved in peaceful nuclear activities​.

The secrecy and disinformation surrounding the Kyshtym disaster are indicative of the broader context of Cold War-era nuclear accidents, where both superpowers often concealed the true extent of their nuclear mishaps to maintain strategic and political advantages. The release of these documents provides a rare glimpse into the hidden history of nuclear risks and the human cost of the nuclear arms race.

###

Document Archive

FOIA Case NRC-2021-000112 Release Package [33 Pages, 4MB]

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The post Declassified NRC Document Sheds Light on Kyshtym Nuclear Explosion first appeared on The Black Vault.

Abt’s analysis offers an examination of how evolving military technologies could threaten urban areas, primarily focusing on the implications of nuclear weaponry. The report assesses the potential for both active and passive defense systems to mitigate these threats and explores alternatives that could reduce casualties and physical damage in the event of war.

The document discusses various strategies that could potentially safeguard cities from the catastrophic effects of modern warfare. These include hardening of infrastructure, urban dispersal, and the implementation of active defenses. One notable quote from the document states: “The effects of modern strategic weapons on urban-industrial areas are considered from the aspects of weapon technology, military strategy, and arms control considerations.”

The insights provided by the report are not only historically significant but also bear relevance to current debates on urban planning and civil defense strategies. As modern warfare continues to evolve, the concepts discussed in the 1963 report remain pertinent, suggesting that urban centers may need to consider innovative defense strategies to protect against high-tech weaponry.

Document Archive

Military Technology and the Survival of Cities, January 1963 [77 Pages, 2.20MB]

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The post Newly Released 1963 Report Sheds Light on Nuclear Era Urban Defense Strategies first appeared on The Black Vault.

Document Archive

Operational Suitability Test of the LABS Computer – 19 November 1953 [58 Pages, 10.2MB]

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The post Operational Suitability Test of the LABS Computer – 19 November 1953 first appeared on The Black Vault.

Edward Teller, often referred to as the “father of the hydrogen bomb,” was a prominent figure in the field of nuclear physics. His work and theories have significantly influenced the development of nuclear energy and weapons. The below document, “Fusion by Inertial Confinement,” reflects Teller’s insights and research into the potential of fusion energy.

Fusion, the process that powers the sun, has long been considered the holy grail of energy sources, promising an almost limitless supply of clean energy. Teller’s document delves into the concept of inertial confinement, a method of achieving nuclear fusion. This method involves compressing and heating small fuel pellets, typically containing isotopes of hydrogen like deuterium and tritium, to conditions where fusion reactions can occur.

One of the key revelations from the document is Teller’s perspective on the feasibility and challenges of harnessing fusion energy. His insights into the technical and scientific hurdles provide a valuable historical context for understanding the evolution of fusion research. Teller’s work in this area laid the groundwork for future advancements in fusion technology.

The document also sheds light on the state of fusion research in the late 1970s, a time when the field was still in its infancy. The challenges of achieving a controlled fusion reaction, which requires extremely high temperatures and pressures, were significant. Teller’s analysis and predictions in the document offer a snapshot of the scientific community’s understanding and ambitions at the time.

The release of “Fusion by Inertial Confinement” is not just a historical curiosity but also a reminder of the ongoing quest for a clean and abundant energy source. While significant progress has been made since Teller’s time, the dream of practical fusion power remains elusive. This document serves as a testament to the vision and perseverance of scientists like Edward Teller, who dedicated their lives to pushing the boundaries of what is possible.

In conclusion, the FOIA release of Edward Teller’s “Fusion by Inertial Confinement” offers a unique window into the history of fusion research. It highlights the visionary work of one of the most influential physicists of the 20th century and underscores the continuing journey towards realizing the potential of fusion energy.

Document Archive

Fusion by Inertial Confinement by Edward Teller – September 1978 [16 Pages, 3.3MB]

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The post Declassified 1978 Edward Teller Document Sheds Light on Early Fusion Research first appeared on The Black Vault.

It is especially noteworthy that he calls attention once more to the huge nuclear arsenals still maintained, and at great cost, by the United States and Russia. He makes yet another plea for the Russian Duma to ratify START-2. Even without START-2, he points out that the Russian arsenal will shrink. Yet, if proliferation continues, Dr. Rogov notes that Russia might have to make a costly new effort to rebuild its strategic nuclear forces.

For the American reader, it is worth noting that Dr. Rogov published these views first for the Russian audience. The Center for Naval Analyses’ publication of his views is meant to continue the building of bridges to reconcile Russian and American strategic thinking. After the learning experiences of the Cold War, we found we could understand each other quite well. Now–as the Russian economy staggers from crisis to crisis, as Russians turn inward, and as the United States is diverted elsewhere–there is a danger that our strategic perspectives will diverge. We need to take every opportunity to ensure that this doesn’t happen.

Document Archive

Nuclear Weapons in the Multipolar World, October 1998 [37 Pages, 1.3MB]

FOIA Release Letter

The post Nuclear Weapons in the Multipolar World, October 1998 first appeared on The Black Vault.

A more thorough description was sent out in a 2015 Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) press release:

“Discreet Oculus is a research and development effort to design and field a fully integrated, ground-based, geographically-dispersed, centrally-managed, operational prompt diagnostics system, and is designed to identify, and characterize a limited nuclear attack. Its sensors and computer networks record seismic, acoustic, air pressure, radiation, light, and radio frequency signals to help determine the size, location, altitude, and other characteristics of a nuclear attack. Information collected by this system will be used to help national and military leaders identify what was detonated, where the materials came from, and who launched or supported the attack.”

In May of 2018, The Black Vault filed a FOIA request to the DTRA for all records pertaining to Discreet Oculus. It would take more than 4 years, but the below packet of records was released in December of 2022.

They are available for download below.

Document Archive

Discreet Oculus / US Prompt Diagnostics System Documents from the Defense Thread Reduction Agency (DTRA) Released December 30, 2022 [87 Pages, 14MB]

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The post Discreet Oculus / US Prompt Diagnostics System first appeared on The Black Vault.

The Black Vault filed a FOIA request for this report on September 28, 2016, and it was not released until October 28, 2022. The redacted version is below:

Document Archive

Evaluation of DoD Nuclear Enterprise Governance (DODIG-2016-25) [62 Pages, 13MB]

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The post Evaluation of DoD Nuclear Enterprise Governance (DODIG-2016-25) first appeared on The Black Vault.

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JP 3-72, Nuclear Operations, 11 June 2019 [60 Pages, 1.2MB]

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The post JP 3-72, Nuclear Operations, 11 June 2019 first appeared on The Black Vault.

According to the Objectives:

“We reviewed DOD OIG reports issued from September 30, 2010, to June 18, 2015, in order to summarize the key observations and recommendations.”

“We summarized 10 reports issued by the 000 Office of Inspector General from September 30,2010, to June 18, 2015, that contained findings on aspects of the nuclear enterprise. Weaknesses identified in the nuclear enterprise include: planning and coordination, guidance, requirements, manning and training, budget or funding priority, and logistics and parts issues. Chart 1 depicts the number of reports having findings in the specified category. Note that the reports had more than one weakness area identified.”

Document Archive

Summary of Nuclear Enterprise Weaknesses Identified in DoD OIG reports Issued from September 30, 2010 to June 18, 2015 [37 Pages, 12.5MB]

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The post Summary of Nuclear Enterprise Weaknesses Identified in DoD OIG reports Issued from September 30, 2010 to June 18, 2015 first appeared on The Black Vault.

On 21 January 1968, an aircraft accident involving a United States Air Force (USAF) B-52 bomber occurred near Thule Air Base in the Danish territory of Greenland. The aircraft was carrying four hydrogen bombs on a Cold War”Chrome Dome” alert mission over Baffin Bay when a cabin fire forced the crew to abandon the aircraft before they could carry out an emergency landing at Thule Air Base. Six crew members ejected safely, but one who did not have an ejection seat was killed while trying to bail out. The bomber crashed onto sea ice in North Star Bay, Greenland, causing the conventional explosives aboard to detonate and the nuclear payload to rupture and disperse, which resulted in radioactive contamination.

The United States and Denmark launched an intensive clean-up and recovery operation, but the secondary stage of one of the nuclear weapons could not be accounted for after the operation completed. USAF Strategic Air Command “Chrome Dome” operations were discontinued immediately after the accident, which highlighted the safety and political risks of the missions. Safety procedures were reviewed and more stable explosives were developed for use in nuclear weapons. (Description of event courtesy of Wikipedia)

Declassified Documents

Department of the Air Force

•  USAF FOIA Response, April 25, 2018 [2 Pages, 0.3MB]
  • “Thule Nuclear Weapons Accident DOSE Evaluation Report” dated April 2001 [48 Pages, 0.6MB]
  • PROJECT CRESTED ICE – USAF B-52 Accident at Thule, Greenland, 21 January 1968 [214 Pages, 5.5MB]
  • USAF Nuclear Safety, Volume 65 (Part 2) Special Edition – Jan/Feb/March 1970, No.1 [100 Pages, 16.6MB]
  • Thule Photographs, 72dpi Thumbnails[11 Pages, 3.0MB]
  • Search for Personal Information – Thule Nuclear Weapons Accident, November 8, 2017 [6 Pages, 3.0MB]
  • USAF FOIA Reading Room Printout Regarding Palomares, Spain and Thule Air Base Nuclear Accidents [2 Pages, 0.5MB]
  • Response to Freedom of Information Act for Records Related to Project Crested Ice, 22 November 2017 [12 Pages, 0.7MB]

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

 CIA Documents on the 1968 B-52 Crash [247 Pages, 47MB]

National Security Agency (NSA)

 NSA Documents on the 1968 B-52 Crash [21 Pages, 6.2MB]

 Full FOIA Case File for the above [40 Pages, 15MB]

The post 1968 Thule Air Base B-52 Crash with 4 Hydrogen Bombs On Board first appeared on The Black Vault.

In late summer of 1958, the United States Navy Task Force 88 (TF 88) conducted one of the U.S.’s most expeditiously planned and executed nuclear tests operations, codenamed ARGUS, when it conducted three high-altitude nuclear tests in the south Atlantic Ocean. Operation Argus was unique among U.S. atmospheric nuclear test operations in that its main objective was neither for diagnostic tests of a weapons design nor for effects tests for military systems. Instead Operation Argus was conducted to establish a proof of theory that a very high-altitude nuclear detonation could produce phenomena of potentially significant military importance by interfering with communications and weapons performance. When the Eisenhower Administration subsequently released the occurrence of these tests to the public in the spring of 1959, it was hailed as the “greatest scientific experiment ever conducted.”

The Argus nuclear tests grew out an idea conceived of by Lawrence Livermore physicist Nicholas Christofilos. In late 1957 and early 1958, Christofilos examined the possibility that a nuclear detonation at an extremely high altitude would create an artificial radiation belt in the upper regions of the Earth’s atmosphere. Naturally occurring belts of electrically charged particles above the Earth had just been discovered by Explorer I, the first satellite launched by the United States in early 1958. These particles, named the Van Allen belts, in honor of the man who directed the experiment that discovered them, consist of high-energy electrons and protons ejected from great solar flares that are trapped in the Earth’s geomagnetic field.

Livermore’s Christofilos theorized that a nuclear detonation several hundred miles above the Earth could produce a shell of trapped radiation in the upper atmosphere, orientated along the Earth’s magnetic field, like the Van Allen belts. The theory was of extreme interest to the United States government, particularly the Department of Defense, for the possible effects that an artificially created radiation belt might have on its defense systems, including degradation of radio and radar transmission and damage or destruction to ICBM warheads entering the belt.

Soon after Christofilos published his findings, the President’s Science Advisory Committee convened a working group at the Livermore Laboratory to discuss the military implications. With the looming possibility of an atmospheric nuclear test moratorium that Fall, the group recommended that a test of the theory be conducted as soon as possible. As such, in April 1958, the decision was made to proceed with Operation Argus as a major national undertaking, under the direction of former Livermore Director Herb York, then chief scientist for the new Advanced Research Projects Agency of the DOD.

On Aug. 27, 1958, just five months from inception to execution, Navy Task Force 88, consisting of nine ships and approximately 4,500 crew, launched the first Argus shot (Argus I) via missile from the USS Norton Sound. Over the span of 11 days, two more nuclear tests, Argus II (August 30) and Argus III (September 6) were launched from the Norton Sound.

In order to first monitor and assess natural background radiation, and then monitor the effects of the Argus test series, the Explorer IV satellite was launched on July 26, 1958. On Aug. 10, Explorer V was also launched, but it failed to achieve orbit. The failure, however, did not affect the mission, as Explorer IV continued to function and supply adequate data during each phase of the operation. In addition, sounding rockets were fired to backup and supplement the satellite data.

More than 40 ground stations throughout the world tracked and/or monitored telemetry of Explorer IV. The combined data from Explorer IV, the sounding rockets, and from surface stations all confirmed the presence of the effects predicted by Nicholas Christofilos – that the detonation of a nuclear device at a sufficiently high altitude could indeed produce a shell of electrons surrounding the Earth and that the radiation could degrade the reception and transmission of radar signals. The readings on the trapped electrons made possible the plotting out by actual measurement what had been only conjecture – the form and shape of the shell. Within this shell, the trapped electrons traveled vast distances and followed the magnetic field pattern in spiral motions out to altitudes of more than 4, 000 miles.

Document Archive

Operation Argus Document, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), 30 April 1982 Report Date [142 Pages, 5MB]

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Additional Information

The post Operation Argus – High-Altitude Nuclear Detonations in 1958 first appeared on The Black Vault.

NUMBER ONE IN A SERIES OF INFORMATION PAPERS ON TOPICS ASSOCIATED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS, PRINCIPALLY DESIGNED FOR USE BY TRADOC SCHOOL INSTRUCTORS AND MAJOR COMMAND STAFF OFFICERS.

Document Archive

Nuclear Notes Number 1 – The Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP), June 1974 [22 Pages, 6.0MB]

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The post Nuclear Notes Number 1 – The Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP), June 1974 first appeared on The Black Vault.

General Leslie Groves, head of the Manhattan Engineer District, in late 1944 commissioned a multi-volume history of the Manhattan Project called the Manhattan District History. Prepared by multiple authors under the general editorship of Gavin Hadden, a longtime civil employee of the Army Corps of Engineers, the classified history was “intended to describe, in simple terms, easily understood by the average reader, just what the Manhattan District did, and how, when, and where.” The volumes record the Manhattan Project’s activities and achievements in research, design, construction, operation, and administration, assembling a vast amount of information in a systematic, readily available form. The Manhattan District History contains extensive annotations, statistical tables, charts, engineering drawings, maps, photographs, and detailed indices. Only a handful of copies of the history were prepared. The Department of Energy’s Office of History and Heritage Resources is custodian of one of these copies.

The history is arranged in thirty-six volumes grouped in eight books. Some of the volumes were further divided into stand-alone chapters. Several of the volumes and stand-alone chapters were never security classified. Many of the volumes and chapters were declassified at various times and were available to the public on microfilm. Approximately a third of the volumes, or parts of volumes, remain classified.

The Office of Classification and the Office of History and Heritage Resources, in collaboration with the Department’s Office of Science and Technical Information, have committed to making available full-text on this OpenNet website the entire thirty-six volume Manhattan District History. Unclassified and declassified volumes will be scanned and posted as available. Classified volumes will be declassified with redactions, i.e., still classified terms, phrases, sentences, and paragraphs will be removed and the remaining unclassified parts made available to the public. The volumes will be posted incrementally as review and processing is completed.

Following is a listing of the books, volumes, and stand-alone chapters of the Manhattan District History. Links to pdf copies are provided for those volumes and chapters that currently are available.

Document Archive

[ 13,904 Pages Total ]

The post Manhattan District History, Written Circa Late 1940s first appeared on The Black Vault.

Superviolence is defined as the illegitimate use of nuclear, chemical, or biological mass destruction devices by domestic agents for attack or threat against U.S. civil society. Political extremism, sever mental imbalance, and criminal gain are examined as possible motivations. Since the nuclear industry constitutes the primary source of fissionable material for fabricating an illicit weapon, its policies, practices, and diversion safequards program are investigated. The threat process is analyzed in five phases: idea conception, group formation, weapon fabrication, application (attack or threat), and consequences. The steps of each phase are described for various weapons, with emphasis on the human factors, skills and resources involved. Potential failure modes are identified, and assessed as more severe in the nuclear than in the chemical or biological case. The important distinctions between direct attack, coercive threat, and sham are analyzed in detail. Actual nuclear superviolence is held to be an extremely unlikely phenomenon due to its dependence on the coalescence of specialized motives, high commitment, inhibition of restraints, technical skills, and significant resources in a risky, failure-prone process of inapparent utility. Chemical or biological superviolence is deemed more practicable, with the latter having an anit-personnel potential greater than the nuclear case. Provisions for controlling and responding to superviolent incidents are examined.

Document Archive

Superviolence: The Civil Threat of Mass Destruction Weapons, 1972 [448 Pages, 18.5MB]

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The post Superviolence: The Civil Threat of Mass Destruction Weapons, 1972 first appeared on The Black Vault.

This document was first requested, but fully denied, in ISCAP appeal number 2009-054-doc3. It was a CIA document, and it was only referred to by “Title and Date: [Classified], 1976.”

Originally, The Black Vault requested it in 2016, but it was reviewed and denied again.  In 2018, since two years had passed, another Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) request was filed by The Black Vault.

This yielded a response in March of 2020, and about 50% of the record was released. Although much is redacted; the history is partially revealed.

Document Archive

Possible Resumption of Negotiations for US Reactor, Iran, February 1976 [4 Pages, 1.2MB]

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The post Possible Resumption of Negotiations for US Reactor, Iran, February 1976 first appeared on The Black Vault.

This series of 12 video segments examines some of the lessons learned from the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident. The segments include the unique perspective of two survivors of Chernobyl. The videos offer information about radiation and how EPA is preparing to respond to a large-scale radiological or nuclear incident in the United States.

It was produced and released by the EPA — and archived by TheBlackVault.com. It is an official U.S. Government video.

Document Archive

Recovering from a Nuclear Incident – Lessons Learned from Chernobyl [294 Pages, 8.5MB]

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Video Archive

Part 1

Part 2

Part 3

Part 4

Part 5

Part 6

Part 7

Part 8

Part 9

Part 10

Part 11

Part 12

The post Recovering from a Nuclear Incident – Lessons Learned from Chernobyl first appeared on The Black Vault.

This document was first released in 2003, though heavily redacted. In February of 2018, I requested a Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) of the record, in hopes it would be further declassified. It was not, in fact, the redactions were nearly identical, with the exception that one of the document’s footers had less redacted, but does not add anything new.

Both records are archived below for reference… the latest release, from 2018, is listed first.

Document Archive

 2018 Release: China: The Galaxy-II Computer and Nuclear-Related Research, August 3, 1994 [12 Pages, 1.5MB]

https://documents2.theblackvault.com/documents/cia/chinagalaxy-ii.pdf

 2003 Release: China: The Galaxy-II Computer and Nuclear-Related Research, August 3, 1994 [11 Pages, 0.6MB]

https://documents2.theblackvault.com/documents/cia/DOC_0000996365.pdf

The post China: The Galaxy-II Computer and Nuclear-Related Research, August 3, 1994 first appeared on The Black Vault.

Document Excerpt:

“In his speech of 5 October, President Gorbachev announced numerous unilateral Soviet measures relating to strategic offensive arms in response to President Bush’s unilateral initiatives. Gorbachev stated that the Soviets would unilaterally reduce their number of accountable strategic warheads to 5,000 rather than the 6,000 provided for in START. Moreover, be said they would remove 503 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBMs), including 137 missiles with multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), from alert status. Gorbachev’s statement reflects reductions since the September 1990 START data exchange, and therefore includes some missiles that had already been deactivated.”

Document Archive

 Gorbachev’s Response to the US Nuclear Initiative: Implications for Soviet Strategic Offensive Forces, 31 October 1991 [8 Pages, 1.4MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/cia/MDREOM-2018-00328.pdf

The post Gorbachev’s Response to the US Nuclear Initiative: Implications for Soviet Strategic Offensive Forces, 31 October 1991 first appeared on The Black Vault.

This memo was issued to provide the status of the “North Korea Nuclear Issue” back in 1992.

I filed an MDR request on the record in February of 2018, as the original that I saw was heavily redacted. It appears it was reviewed late in 2017, therefore my MDR request was denied, but I was furnished a copy. Two years need to pass to request an MDR.

Document Archive

 Memorandum, William T. Pendley to the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Subject: North Korea Nuclear Issue – Where are We Now?, dated October 27, 1992 [6 Pages, 1.5MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/dod/18-M-0747.pdf

The post Memorandum, William T. Pendley to the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Subject: North Korea Nuclear Issue – Where are We Now?, dated October 27, 1992 first appeared on The Black Vault.

The background to how this Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request played out is the most interesting part of this.

It started with seeing reference to the document in a bibliography about Air Force Plant 67, or the Georgia Nuclear Aircraft Laboratory.

The Georgia Nuclear Aircraft Laboratory, also known as AFP No. 67, for Air Force Plant 67 was a United States Air Force test facility located in the Dawson Forest in Dawsonville, Georgia. It was the site of Lockheed’s lab for investigating the feasibility of nuclear aircraft. The site was used for irradiating military equipment, as well as the forest to determine the effect of nuclear war, and its effects on wildlife. The area was closed in 1971 and acquired by the city of Atlanta for a second airport, but its topography was determined to be ill-suited for an airport. Documents explaining what went on at the site remain highly classified, and the entrance to the underground portion of the facility has been buried. The only objects left above ground were the concrete foundations on which the buildings and reactors were placed. (Source: Wikipedia)

I was informed that the document was controlled by NASA, and I should contact them to obtain it. So, in September of 2016, I did just that… never knowing how it would all play out.

I believe this may hold the record for how many times a SINGLE FOIA request was passed back and forth between agencies. In fact, in 9 months, this was the journey:

NASA->DTIC->NASA->DOE->DTIC->NASA->DOE->NASA->DOE

The oddest thing is that I was told by NASA they didn’t have the document – but when it was all over — the DOE told me it was NASA who gave it to them for review. Confused? Yeah, so was I!  I had to get The Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) at the National Archives & Records Administration (NARA) to help me with the request. Although I didn’t hear back from them directly, I assume they played a role in finally getting them to stop playing “hot potato.”

Now, on to the document.

According to the record:

In nuclear missile components, the combination of cryogenic temperatures resulting from the use of liquid hydrogen as the propellant fluid and nuclear radiation is expected to produce effects on the engineering properties of mnterials that are new both to materials engineers and to missile design engineers. Before reliable
systems can be designed, these effects on the properties of materials must be known.

To meet this requirement, Lockheed Nuclear Products outlines in this proposal to NASA a program for a study of the combined effects of nuclear radiation and cryogenic temperatures on the engineering properties of pertinent materials that may be used in the construction of nuclear missiles.

This proposal includes an analysis of the state-of-the-art relative to the effects of cryogenic temperatures, nuclear radiation, and low-temperature annealing on the engineering properties of materials. The rationale for choosing the temperatures, integrated radiation doses, radiation under stressed and unstressed conditions, materials, and specific tests to be used in the test program is presented.

These specific tests will include evaluation of engineering design characteristics and the determination of fundamental. properties of the materials of interest; these will be compared to give extrapolation of limited data. Conceptual designs and the basis for the selection are given for the cryostats, special test equipment
and instrumentation, and the refrigeration equipment. Presented also is a preliminary study of a method for reducing gamma heating and radioactivation in the reactor cryostat and virtually eliminating any perturbation of the reactor during Insertion or removal of cryostate from the reactor beam hole. Also included is a preliminary analysis of the factors that could possibly affect the safety of reactor operation. And a test program based on the concepts and equipment
discussed is presented. It includes materials to be tested, types and number of tests to be made, the number of specimens to be tested for each determination and the statistical basis for establishing this number, and the methods for preparation and selection of Individual test specimens. The capabilities of Lockheed Nuclear Products as the prime contractor and Arthur D. Little, Incorporated, as the major subcontractor include pertinent experience of the two companies,
resumes of the personnel available for the project, the project organization, and facilities available to the project. Furthermore, a schedule for the entire program is presented.

Document Archive

 Proposal Nuclear Radiation Effects on Materials at Cryogenic Temperatures, July 1959 [279 Pages, 46.1MB]

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According to the website for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC):

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, or FERC, is an independent agency that regulates the interstate transmission of electricity, natural gas, and oil. FERC also reviews proposals to build liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals and interstate natural gas pipelines as well as licensing hydropower projects. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 gave FERC additional responsibilities as outlined and updated Strategic Plan. 

Internally, FERC operates their own intranet site (a website only accessible to FERC employees or authorized users). On this, you will find their own internal “Wiki” site called FERCipedia.

In March of 2017, I requested under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) a copy of the main page for FERCipedia, along with all pages accessible via “one click” from that front page. Essentially, all the main pages was my target.

On April 24, 2017, FERC released the below to me as responsive to my request.

Declassified Documents

 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) “Wiki” Site FERCipedia Main Pages, and “One Click” [12 Pages, 3.2MB]

 FOIA Response for the below pages [3 Pages, 1.4MB]

 Introduction to FERCipedia [13 Pages, 1.4MB]

 Petroleum Home [1 Page, 0.9MB]

 Petroleum Home Page #2 [1 Page, 0.9MB]

 FERCipedia Document Library Home [1 Page, 0.5MB]

 FERCipedia User Aids [1 Page, 0.5MB]

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Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, we have witnessed the dissolution of an empire having over 40,000 nuclear weapons, over a thousand metric tons of nuclear materials, vast quantities of chemical and biological weapons materials, and thousands of missiles. This Cold War arsenal is spread across I I time zones and lacks the Cold War infrastructure that provided the control and financing necessary to assure that chains of command remain intact and nuclear weapons and materials remain securely beyond the reach of terrorists and weapons-proliferating states. This problem is compounded by the existence of thousands of weapons scientists who, not always having the resources necessary to adequately care for their families, may be tempted to sell their expertise to countries of proliferation concern.

In order to assess the Department of Energy’s part of current U.S. efforts to deal with this critical situation, in February 2000 Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson asked former Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker and former White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler to co-chair a bipartisan task force to review and assess DOE’s nonproliferation programs in Russia and to make recommendations for their improvement. After nine months of careful examination of current DOE programs
and consideration of related nonproliferation policies and programs of the U.S. Government, the Task Force reached the following conclusions and recommendations.

To continue reading, reference the .pdf below:

Document Archive

 A Report Card on the Department of Energy’s Nonproliferation Programs with Russia, dated January 10, 2001 – by Howard Baker, Lloyd Cutler [86 Pages, 2.9MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/doe/HQ-2017-00673-F.pdf

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The Nuclear Weapon Characteristics Handbook, dated September 1990, was first requested in June of 2009, and it was not until February of 2017 that it was finally released. Nearly EIGHT years passed from the point of requesting, to actually receiving the below document.

The following was written by A. Nareth as an introduction to the document found below:

For more than forty years, deterrence has been the cornerstone of US defense policy, consisting of a stockpile of nuclear weapons and the missiles} aircraft, and artillery to deliver them. Sandia National Laboratories’ special mission, as part of the Department of Energy, is to ensure that nuclear warheads meet the highest standards of operational capability, reliability, safety, and control.

With this review, we discuss Sandia’s role in weaponizing nuclear explosives, the historical development of the stockpile and our monitoring and evaluation activities. We include a discussion of the important safety and use control aspects of nuclear warhead engineering. Our net assessment concludes that today’s stockpile is effective and reliable but that important work remains to be done to make it as safe and secure as evolving technologies permit.

In its history, the stockpile has been shaped by strategic doctrine that has evolved from massive retaliation to flexible response as the intemational situation warranted. Until recent years, arms control and strategic defense have not been major components of strategic design because of technical limitations. Today it is dear that deterrence, as represented by the stockpile, will be bolstered by new aspects of national security policy that are now technically or politically viable.

It is fair to assume that the stockpile will not grow; indeed, it is quite possible that new arms reduction agreements may reduce the number and types of weapons deployed. However, the responsibilities associated with maintaining a competent nuclear weapon arsenal will continue to be formidable. Its deterrent value must be sustained. Safety is of paramount importance: a single accident involving a nuclear explosion or dispersal of nuclear material would be a catastrophe, and could badly damage or terminate public support for a nuclear deterrent. In addition, we will continue to pursue improvements in command and control: the President must have flexible, exclusive, and unencumbered command of our nuclear forces.

Ensuring quality effort and product is a major initiative for the Laboratories. Quality is conformance to requirements … in the case of nuclear weapons, ensuring quality means meeting requirements of performance, schedule, and cost. We are striving to improve our designs and the manufacturing procedures for the nuclear weapons complex so that we do meet these goals, and we will increase our efforts to streamline some of these processes.

One aspect of nuclear weapon quality that is of particular concern is reliability. Assessing nuclear weapon reliability is an evolving process. Our assessments are updated through periodic laboratory and flight testing of samples of each weapon in the stockpile- a process allowing us to see the effects of new technologies and more demanding requirements. We recognize that smaller and safer weapons, and those with greater military capabilities, may be less reliable if we are not vigilant throughout each weapon’s lifetime- through development, production, deployment, and retirement. I am personally committed to continuous improvement of quality to ensure that reliability is high and is in balance with safety and control.

The stockpile of the first forty years of the nuclear age was designed during a cold war. During the next forty years it must be designed to foster stability, nonproliferation, and peace. I believe our policy makers may begin to think of the stockpile not in terms of deterring war, but in terms of maintaining peace. Modern weapons must be militarily appropriate, safe, secure, and survivable. A “peacetime stockpile” must offer an appropriate level of deterrence and fit with arms control, verification, strategic defense, and conventional force strategy as part of an integrated national security posture.

Declassified Document

 Nuclear Weapon Characteristics Handbook, September 1990 [90 Pages, 18.5MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/nnsa/NuclearWeaponsCharacteristicHandbook.pdf

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A nuclear weapon is an explosive device that derives its destructive force from nuclear reactions, either fission or a combination of fission and fusion. Both reactions release vast quantities of energy from relatively small amounts of matter; a modern thermonuclear weapon weighing little more than a thousand kilograms can produce an explosion comparable to the detonation of more than a billion kilograms of conventional high explosive.

Even small nuclear devices can devastate a city. Nuclear weapons are considered weapons of mass destruction, and their use and control has been a major aspect of international policy since their debut.

A Search for Confined Fireballs in the Atmosphere [35 Pages, 722k]

Air Force Search & Recovery Assessment of the 1958 Savannah, GA B-47 Accident [13 Pages]

Annual Report on the Restricted Data Program: Calendar Year 2000 [35 Pages]

Department of Defense Plan for Integrating National Guard and Reserve Component Support for Response to Attacks Using Weapons of Mass Destruction

Effects of Nuclear Attack on Freight Transportation Systems: Interactions and Comparisons Among Modes [54 pages, 2.85MB] – The operations and equipment used in transferring vehicle loads between two vehicles or between a vehicle and a terminal are examined for seven different classes of cargo. For each of these classes, the usual method of load transfer is discussed, and expedient methods that could be used in a postattack situation are suggested. St. Louis, Missouri is used to illustrate the problem of moving cargo through a damaged area after a nuclear attack. Several alternative methods of moving cargo via multiple transportation modes are analyzed, and a simple procedure for determining the minimum-time route among the alternatives is proposed. The transportation resources required to deliver the minimum supplies for survivor support in the St. Louis area are analyzed for different mixes of trains and trucks and for movements of the supplies over a range of distances. A general summary of the vulnerability of each transportation mode to nuclear attack is provided, and the remedial actions that might be taken in the preattack period to enhance postattack capability are discussed.

 Emissions from Reactions in Nuclear Weapons, 29 June 1963 [ 87 Pages, 2.30MB ] – This paper treats the emissions from the reactions occurring in nuclear weapons, specifically the neutrons and electrons emitted during the course of a nuclear explosion.

Federal Response to a Domestic Nuclear Attack (Counterproliferation Papers, Future Warfare Series, Number 46)[36 pages, 300 KB] – The United States government needs to plan for and prepare against terrorist attacks. Terrorism, when combined with weapons of mass destruction, increases the planning complexity. In the event of a nuclear terrorist attack, the government will need to conduct consequence management in the affected areas, govern the non-affected areas, and prevent future attacks. This paper examines what actions, following a nuclear terrorist attack on domestic soil, produce the broadest and deepest results and what options the President has to address such a national emergency. The federal government must address the national effects caused by the attack itself as well as the anticipated results caused by communities enacting protective measures at the detriment of their neighbors. To produce the list of coordinated actions and options, this paper uses a scenario where a terrorist loads a 10-kiloton (kt) weapon into a truck, drives it to the nation’s capital, and detonates it. After detonation, the government must attempt to mitigate the weapon’s real and perceived effects. A review of the mitigating responses reveals that some actions are nearly impossible without prior planning and coordination. Additionally, the government must operate within a framework of constitutionally granted authorities. Continuity of government is assumed sufficient to exercise command and control and is beyond the scope of this paper. It is also beyond the scope of this paper to present more than a cursory overview of preventing a subsequent attack.

Facts About Fallout [8 Pages]

Fireball Yields [31 Pages] – This document took just about 11 years to obtain! The original request was filed in December of 1996, and the document finally arrived in November of 2007.

Information on DOE’s Requirements for Protecting and Controlling Classified Documents [8 Pages]

Initial Nuclear Radiation From Low Yield Fission Weapons [44 Pages]

Iraq: Nuclear and Missile Proliferation [28 Pages]

Letter P.T. Cullen dated 4/22/49 [2 Pages]

The Local Environment Resulting from a Massive Nuclear Attack on Whiteman Air Force Base, 1980 [54 Pages, 2.02MB] – The study examines the potential blast and fallout damage that would be sustained by the 15 counties surrounding the Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri following a nuclear attack against the associated Minuteman missile silos. The study also provides recommendations concerning the shelters that would be required to protect the population of these 15 counties from blast effects and heavy fallout. The study was performed in consonance with the new emphasis that FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) is giving to nuclear civil protection in counterforce areas. It is intended to be a prototype for analyses of areas containing other U.S. counterforce targets, notably the other five Minuteman wings, the Titan missiles, the Strategic Air Command bases, and the strategic submarine bases.

The Manhattan Project: Making the Atomic Bomb [76 Pages]

Medical Consequences of Nuclear Warfare [122 Pages] – The dramatic technological, social, and economic progress of the twentieth century has yet toprevent the use of armed conflict to resolve political differences among nations. As those of usin military medicine prepare to support our forces into the next century, we must continually beready for the many challenges presented by modern warfare.

Nuclear Attack on U.S. Space-Based Assets [140 Pages]

Nuclear Crash: The U.S. Economy After Small Nuclear Attacks [179 Pages]

Nuclear Deterrence [87 Pages]

Nuclear South Asia [71 Pages]

Operations Charioteer, Musketeer, Touchstone, Cornerstone, Aqueduct, Sculpin and Julin [494 Pages]

OPERATION CROSSROADS. FAILURES OF MASTS, YARDARMS, BOOMS AND RIGGING [218 Pages]

OPERATION CROSSROADS. U.S.S. INDEPENDENCE (CVL22) TEST ABLE. VOLUME 1 [405 Pages]

OPERATION CROSSROADS. TESTS ABLE AND BAKER [193 Pages]

 Civil Preparedness and Post-Attack U.S. Economic Recovery: A State-of-the-Art Assessment and Selected Annotated Bibliography, Volume 1, October 1979 [341 Pages, 14.7MB] – This report contains an assessment of the state-of-the-art of modeling and analysis for civil preparedness and management of
the post-attack U.S. economy. This evaluation was derived from a large volume of related literature. A selected annotated bibliography of over 100 entries follows a state-of-the-art assessment.

 Managing the U.S. Economy in a Post-Attack Environment: A System Dynamics Model of Viability, Volume 2, November 1979 [77 Pages, 3.2MB] – The primary objective of this study is to determine if post-attack viability (or collapse) is automatic for a given system, or if management actions can influence the outcome. In investigating this problem, the approach focuses on exploring the structure of a post-attack system for instabilities, identifying the processes that could lead to collapse, and then evaluating if and how alternative post-attack management policies can mitigate the effects of those instabilities.

Options for Accelerating Economic Recovery after Nuclear Attack. Volume 3, July 1979 [122 Pages, 5.92MB] – The United States may fail to exploit to the fullest its potential for economic recovery following a nuclear attack because failures in post-attack management in both the political and the economic sectors. This report looks at possible adjustments in our continually evolving peacetime management systems, adjustments which might contribute substantially to post-attack recovery at little peacetime cost. The post-attack considerations addressed include making government more effective in bringing about economic recovery and, very importantly, making sure that government continues as government, i.e., that we do not sink into anarchy. Five broad categories of adjustments are discussed.

Personnel Casualty Study, July 1968 [318 Pages, 11.3MB] – This investigation has resulted in the development of a computer code (SEP – Shelter Evaluation Program) which predicts casualties of personnel when subjected to the initial effects of a nuclear weapon. Conditions for both sheltered and unsheltered personnel were considered. Available casualty data were analyzed and functional relationships between casualty and appropriate weapon effects were approximated. Analytic models relating the weapon effects to these casualty functions were also developed for SEP Code. A validation of the code was performed using existing Hiroshima data. Finally, results are presented for a range of construction and weapon parameters to illustrate how SEP Code may be easily utilized to study shelter effectiveness in terms of added survivors.

Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (8/23/1974)

Radioactivity Fall-Out and Radex Plots [55 Pages]

Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Preventing and Defending Against Clandestine Nuclear Attack[59 Pages, 1.1MB] – The DSB addressed this threat in previous studies conducted in 1997 (also chaired by Richard Wagner) and 1999/2000 (chaired by Roger Hagengruber). Much has changed since then. The 11 Sept. 2001 attacks demonstrated the intent of terrorists to inflict massive damage. Nuclear proliferation has proceeded apace, with North Korea and Iran achieving nuclear weapon capability or coming closer to it, and it could spread further. The United States is engaged in a war against terrorism, and DoD is beginning to devote significant effort to combating WMD. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has been established. Thinking about the threat of clandestine nuclear attack has changed, and some efforts to explore defenses have begun. However, one thing has not changed: little has actually been done against the threat of clandestine nuclear attack. The DSB Summer Study on Transnational Threats (1997) first developed the ambitious idea of a very large, multi-element, global, layered civil/military system of systems of scope sufficient to have some prospect of effectively thwarting this threat. There was little resonance with this vision (outside of the Task Forces in 1997 and 2000), but since then, and especially since the attacks of 11 Sept. 2001, it has begun to be discussed more widely. This report will revisit such a national/global system, largely as context for the main focus of the Task Force: DoD’s roles and capabilities. Following briefings from many government agencies and subject matter experts, the Task Force arrived at its basic findings and recommendations in early 2003. Since then, those results have been discussed in over 40 meetings within DoD and elsewhere, leading to certain refinements. This report reflects the outcomes of that process and weaves together viewgraphs used in the discussions with elaborating text.

The Threat of Inadvertent Nuclear War in South Asia [103 Pages]

United States Nuclear Tests, July 1945 through September 1992 [182 Pages]

Vulnerabilities of Social Structures: Studies of Social Dimensions of Nuclear Attack [768 Pages, 39.1 MB] – Possible patterns of social effects and societal vulnerabilities which would result from nuclear attack on the United States are surveyed through analyses of the social sciences. The analyses are centered on the various ways in which social structure and social institutions may be considered to be vulnerable to nuclear attack. A monograph is presented on the general problems of societal analysis posed by attempts to study the vulnerabilities of social structure to nuclear attack. The central theme is that levels of behavioral ordering beyond the individual — particularly social institutional and social organizational processes — set the dimensions for the social effects of attack. Five essays report on particular domains of social effects which may result from nuclear attack and on particular methodological problems which must be solved in the study of social effects. Topics considered include individual- human and social psychological dimensions of nuclear attack, demographic effects and population recovery problems, economic recovery after nuclear war, political-administrative dimensions of nuclear attack, and the use of especially the comparative method of social analysis as a tool for developing knowledge about societal vulnerability. A number of ways are traced in which the social dimensions and domains of nuclear attack indicate problems for planners and administrators. The fundamental problem of social planning to reduce societal vulnerability is to understand and control the unfolding of what can be conceived as characteristic, time-dependent, sequentially ordered progressions of social attack effects.

The Warsaw Pact Short-Warning Nuclear Attack: How Viable an Option? 1979 [58 Pages, 3.31MB] – NATO bases its theater doctrine on the assumptions that any Warsaw Pact attack will be preceeded by considerable warning time and that initial hostilities will be in a conventional mode. In this paper the author assesses the viability of the opposing scenario: a Warsaw Pact short-warning attack with nuclear weapons employed from the start. The author concludes that Soviet open source documents indicate that NATO is preparing to fight the wrong first battle of the next war.

Wartime Missile Strike Intelligence: An Indirect Bomb Damage Assessment System

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