The record below is an oral history interview conducted with Major Fred N. Thompson by Major Samuel Riddlebarger and Major Richard Clement. The topics discussed were Major Thompson’s time as an F-100 pilot, along with his experience as a POW. The interview was collected under the Project Corona Harvest program.

This document remained classified for more than 53 years. Created in 1970, The Black Vault found reference to it in 2009, and requested the release of it. It was denied (FOIA case 2009-02421-F), based on the fact the USAF claimed the entire oral history was classified. In 2016, a new Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) request was filed , and although it took nearly 7 years, it was released.

Document Archive

Air Force Oral History Interview: Maj. Fred N. Thompson – 2 June 1970 [94 Pages, 29MB]

The post Air Force Oral History Interview: Maj. Fred N. Thompson – 2 June 1970 first appeared on The Black Vault.

The following is a CD-ROM document archive, created by the CIA.

The Black Vault had filed a FOIA request for ALL manufactured CD-ROMs/DVDs available for purchase, and this was one of them.

It is not clear exactly what documents are catalogued on this disc, or why it was created, but within it are multiple CIA histories, along with a long list of NIEs.

Below, you will find an index, exactly how it was received from the CIA.

Document Archive

.Zip Archive

.Zip File of the below archive [4,370 Pages, 256MB]

CD-ROM Index

The below file index is categorized how it was stored on the CD-ROM.

Histories

	CIA AND THEGENERALS		14M
	CIA AND THE HOUSE OF NGO		14M
	CIA AND RURAL PACIFICATION		32M
	GOOD QUESTIONS WRONG ANSWERS		3.1M
	THE WAY WE DO THINGS		7.5M
	UNDER COVERARMIES		29M

NIE (National Intelligence Estimates)

	IIM_74-003.pdf	2.7M
	IIM_74-013.pdf	552K
	IIM_75-002.pdf	642K
	IIM_75-016.pdf	948K
	IM-0587_68.pdf	792K
	INTRODUCTION.pdf	1.6M
	MEMORANDUM_ABOUT_ONE..>	418K
	MEMO_0646_67.pdf	747K
	MEMO_1-JUN-67.pdf	829K
	MEMO_1-MAR-68.pdf	718K
	MEMO_3-APR-68.pdf	461K
	MEMO_3-MAY-65.pdf	589K
	MEMO_4-APR-55.pdf	761K
	MEMO_5-JAN-68.pdf	624K
	MEMO_6-FEB-67.pdf	849K
	MEMO_6-JUN-56.pdf	426K
	MEMO_6-MAY-55.pdf	500K
	MEMO_9-FEB-54.pdf	622K
	MEMO_9-JUN-64.pdf	513K
	MEMO_10-JAN-52.pdf	458K
	MEMO_10-JUN-65.pdf	509K
	MEMO_11-FEB-66.pdf	857K
	MEMO_11-SEP-67.pdf	1.3M
	MEMO_14-MAR-51.pdf	498K
	MEMO_18-MAR-66.pdf	719K
	MEMO_19-APR-54.pdf	618K
	MEMO_19-JAN-66.pdf	797K
	MEMO_20-DEC-63.pdf	613K
	MEMO_20-FEB-69.pdf	667K
	MEMO_20-OCT-66.pdf	517K
	MEMO_21-APR-65.pdf	717K
	MEMO_23-APR-55.pdf	594K
	MEMO_23-FEB-54.pdf	1.0M
	MEMO_24-MAR-54.pdf	522K
	MEMO_26-AUG-66.pdf	18M
	MEMO_28-JUL-64.pdf	468K
	MEMO_29-DEC-65.pdf	1.0M
	MEMO_30-APR-57.pdf	558K
	MEMO_FOR_DCI_2-DEC-6..>	508K
	MEMO_FOR_DCI_9-JAN-6..>	959K
	MEMO_FOR_DCI_26-FEB-..>	536K
	M_H_NIE_53_14.3-73.pdf	879K
	M_H_SNIE_10-12-65.pdf	681K
	M_H_SNIE_57-1-73.pdf	911K
	NIE_5.pdf	717K
	NIE_5_MAP_SUPPLEMENT..>	474K
	NIE_10-2-54.pdf	971K
	NIE_10-3-54.pdf	709K
	NIE_10-7-54.pdf	1.4M
	NIE_10-55.pdf	2.5M
	NIE_14.3-66.pdf	1.9M
	NIE_14.3_53-61.pdf	1.7M
	NIE_20.pdf	921K
	NIE_35.pdf	1.1M
	NIE_35_1.pdf	937K
	NIE_35_2.pdf	873K
	NIE_50-61.pdf	1.9M
	NIE_50-68.pdf	1.1M
	NIE_53-63.pdf	1.3M
	NIE_53-66.pdf	1.5M
	NIE_53-71.pdf	1.3M
	NIE_53_14.3-1-74.pdf	1.0M
	NIE_53_14.3-2-74.pdf	1.1M
	NIE_53_14.3-73.pdf	1.5M
	NIE_57-1-75.pdf	895K
	NIE_58-67.pdf	786K
	NIE_63-3-54.pdf	548K
	NIE_63-4-54.pdf	545K
	NIE_63-5-54.pdf	817K
	NIE_63-7-54.pdf	1.5M
	NIE_63-54.pdf	638K
	NIE_63-56.pdf	1.4M
	NIE_63-59.pdf	1.4M
	NIE_63.1-2-55.pdf	614K
	NIE_63.1-3-55.pdf	1.4M
	NIE_63.1-55.pdf	1.3M
	NIE_63.2-57.pdf	1.2M
	NIE_63.3-55.pdf	1.2M
	NIE_63.3_1-55.pdf	918K
	NIE_67-59.pdf	1.0M
	NIE_68-57.pdf	864K
	NIE_68-59.pdf	1.1M
	NIE_91.pdf	1.1M
	ONE_MEMO_12-APR-67.pdf	1.2M
	ONE_MEMO_18-JAN-68.pdf	818K
	ONE_MEMO_FOR_DCI_8-A..>	548K
	ONE_MEMO_FOR_DCI_13-..>	757K
	ONE_MEMO_FOR_DCI_16-..>	595K
	ORE_25-48.pdf	1.0M
	ORE_29-50.pdf	1.8M
	ORE_50-50.pdf	1.0M
	ORE_58-50.pdf	884K
	SE-52.pdf	824K
	SE-53.pdf	666K
	SM_7-65.pdf	632K
	SM_7-67.pdf	778K
	SM_11-65.pdf	519K
	SM_18-65.pdf	537K
	SNIE_10-1-66.pdf	934K
	SNIE_10-1-67.pdf	1.1M
	SNIE_10-2-61.pdf	694K
	SNIE_10-2-66.pdf	972K
	SNIE_10-3-61.pdf	715K
	SNIE_10-3-64.pdf	1.0M
	SNIE_10-3-65.pdf	907K
	SNIE_10-3-66.pdf	686K
	SNIE_10-3_1-65.pdf	1.0M
	SNIE_10-4-54.pdf	744K
	SNIE_10-4-61.pdf	927K
	SNIE_10-4-65.pdf	736K
	SNIE_10-5-65.pdf	1.0M
	SNIE_10-6-65.pdf	834K
	SNIE_10-6_1-65.pdf	705K
	SNIE_10-7-65.pdf	737K
	SNIE_10-9-65.pdf	1.3M
	SNIE_10-10-65.pdf	1.0M
	SNIE_10-11-65.pdf	1.1M
	SNIE_10-12-65.pdf	1.4M
	SNIE_10-62.pdf	1.2M
	SNIE_10-62_ANNEX.pdf	752K
	SNIE_10-65.pdf	912K
	SNIE_10-67.pdf	889K
	SNIE_11-11-67.pdf	1.0M
	SNIE_13-9-70.pdf	969K
	SNIE_13-10-70.pdf	942K
	SNIE_13-10-71.pdf	1.1M
	SNIE_13-66.pdf	704K
	SNIE_14-69.pdf	1.2M
	SNIE_14.3-1-67.pdf	572K
	SNIE_14.3-63.pdf	1.2M
	SNIE_14.3-64.pdf	1.7M
	SNIE_14.3-67.pdf	1.7M
	SNIE_14.3-69.pdf	1.8M
	SNIE_14.3-70.pdf	1.3M
	SNIE_50-2-64.pdf	1.2M
	SNIE_50-64.pdf	903K
	SNIE_53-2-61.pdf	715K
	SNIE_53-2-63.pdf	1.3M
	SNIE_53-2-64.pdf	791K
	SNIE_53-64.pdf	1.0M
	SNIE_53-65.pdf	689K
	SNIE_53-68.pdf	1.8M
	SNIE_53_14.3-75.pdf	520K
	SNIE_57-1-73.pdf	1.5M
	SNIE_57-1-74.pdf	1.1M
	SNIE_57-67.pdf	1.0M
	SNIE_57-70.pdf	1.6M
	SNIE_57-73.pdf	1.0M
	SNIE_57_1-67.pdf	818K
	SNIE_58-1-68.pdf	909K
	SNIE_58-2-61.pdf	1.1M
	SNIE_58-2-62.pdf	1.0M
	SNIE_58-3-61.pdf	926K
	SNIE_58-3-62.pdf	1.1M
	SNIE_58-4-62.pdf	1.1M
	SNIE_58-5-62.pdf	1.2M
	SNIE_58-5_1-62.pdf	1.2M
	SNIE_58-6-62.pdf	1.5M
	SNIE_58-61.pdf	1.3M
	SNIE_58-62.pdf	616K
	SNIE_58-63.pdf	1.0M
	SNIE_58-65.pdf	736K
	SNIE_58-68.pdf	732K
	SNIE_58-70.pdf	1.6M
	SNIE_58_1-62.pdf	893K
	SNIE_63-2-54.pdf	729K
	SNIE_63-6-54.pdf	503K
	SNIE_63.1-2_1-55.pdf	594K
	SNIE_63.1-4-55.pdf	653K
	SNIE_63.1-60.pdf	689K
	SNIE_68-2-59.pdf	1.1M
	SNIE_68-2-60.pdf	601K
	SNIE_68-60.pdf	889K
	STAFF_MEMO_124.pdf	452K
	USIB_MEMO_9-APR-65.pdf	549K

The post The CIA’s Vietnam Document CD-ROM first appeared on The Black Vault.

In November 1969, Stanley R. Resor, Secretary of the Army, and General William C. Westmoreland, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, directed Lieutenant General William R. Peers, U.S. Army, to “explore the nature and scope of the original Army investigations of what occurred on 16 March 1968 in Son My Village, Quang Ngai Province, Republic of Vietnam.” This collection of materials, commonly known as the “Peers Inquiry,” which provides the results of General Peers’ investigation of the “My Lai incident”— later also known as the “My Lai massacre”— is divided into four volumes: the report, witness testimonies, exhibit materials, and CID [U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command] statements.

The following documents were obtained from the Library of Congress.

Document Archive

Volumes 1-5 Complete .zip Download (All files below, searchable, are included) [862MB]

Volume I – The Report of the Investigation [395 Pages, 25.6MB] – Volume I of the Peers Inquiry contains the narrative report of the investigation. The report, which is divided into twelve chapters and two annexes, includes the 29 March 1969 letter from Ronald L. Ridenhour reporting the incident to the Secretary of Defense, the mission statement of the Inquiry, findings and recommendations, maps, an extensive table of contents, and a 26-page glossary.

Volume II – Testimony [18,163 Pages, 633MB] – Volume II of the Peers Inquiry, entitled “Testimony,” is further subdivided into a series of “books,” and is comprised of approximately 20,000 pages of testimony and summaries of testimony by over 350 witnesses.

Volume III – Exhibits [2,419 Pages, 208MB] – Volume III of the Peers Inquiry, entitled “Exhibits,” is further subdivided into a series of seven “books” containing all the supporting documents that were officially entered into the inquiry record. These documents include directives, statements, overlays and sketches, administrative memoranda, aerial maps and photographs, and operational and after-action reports. A small number of pages in the PDF version of the “Exhibits” series are illegible due to the poor quality of the original documents.

Volume IV – CID Statements [543 Pages, 32MB] – Volume IV of the Peers Inquiry contains CID statements received prior to the submission of this report. Only those considered to be relevant to this inquiry have been included. Also considered were the CID statements summarizing the interviews of Vietnamese civilians and military personnel. Although the Vietnamese testimony was of some value to this investigation, the inclusion of their statements in the report was not considered essential. The names of these Vietnamese and other non-Vietnamese personnel interviewed by the CID have been included.

The post The Peers Inquiry Report: Department of the Army Review of the Preliminary Investigations into the My Lai Incident first appeared on The Black Vault.

According to the document:

“There is increasing evidence — albeit mainly circumstantial — that Communist forces in the III and IV Corps areas of South Vietnam are receiving an important share of their arms and ammunition via southeastern Cambodia. Communist forces in the northern half of South Vietnam receive some Cambodian supplies, primarily foodstuffs, through northeastern Cambodia. However, these forces receive their arms and ammunition almost exclusively from North Vietnam, through Laos and the DMZ.

It is still not clear whether the materiel moving across the border in southeastern Cambodia is smuggled into Cambodia by sea infiltration, comes from supplies stored by the Communists on Cambodian territory after moving through Laos and/or South Vietnam, or — as a lesser possibility — from Cambodian stocks. The balance of evidence does indicate, however, that military shipments delivered to Sihanoukville are moved directly to Cambodian military bases, and that. the volume of Communist. military assistance to Cambodia is consistent with Cambodia’s needs.

The quantities of arms shipped through south-eastern Cambodia cannot be determined, but even relatively small, occasional deliveries would contribute significantly to the small requirements of Communist forces in the III and IV Corps areas estimated at less than 7 tons per day of arms and ammunition at the levels noted during the Tet offensive and some 3 tons daily at current levels of combat. 

The implication of Cambodian military and civilian personnel in some smuggling of arms and ammunition appears fairly certain, but we have no convincing evidence that officials at the highest levels of government: are involved. Recent steps by Sihanouk and his regime to tighten anti-smuggling controls are not likely to stamp out the smuggling from Cambodia to South Vietnam.”

Although this document was released before, in December of 2018, I filed a Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) request to the CIA. There was additional information released. All versions are archived below.

Document Archive

Cambodia’s Role in the Movement of Arms and Ammunition to the Vietnamese Communists, July 1968 – 2019 Release (Highlighted Version) – [22 Pages, 9.6MB] – This is the MDR release in 2019, with highlights that point out the newly released information.

Cambodia’s Role in the Movement of Arms and Ammunition to the Vietnamese Communists, July 1968 – 2019 Release (Clean Version) – [22 Pages, 9.6MB] – This is the MDR release in 2019, with highlights that point out the newly released information.

Cambodia’s Role in the Movement of Arms and Ammunition to the Vietnamese Communists, July 1968 – 2008 Release – [21 Pages, 1MB]

The post Cambodia’s Role in the Movement of Arms and Ammunition to the Vietnamese Communists, July 1968 first appeared on The Black Vault.

According to a declassified report, released to The Black Vault in July of 2015:

The following information is being entered by Investigator ___________.  ______ wrote to the Director, FBI on January 2, 1998 and Sen. Phil Gramm, Texas on Feb 2, 1998. Claims an unnamed subsource is aware of an incident in 1966 where the CIA and U.S. military forces committed a friendly fire mass murder of U.S. soldiers to conceal evidence of war crimes in which VietCong prisoners were used for biological experiments and then murdered.

After requesting the official CIA Inspector General’s report, the entire investigation was denied to me, and it was said to be classified in it’s entirety. I filed an FOIA appeal, which fought for the release of some portion of the document. After months of waiting, I was surprised that they reconsidered their decision, and released a couple pages to me.

Although this is not the final report, or evidence from the investigation, it did state they concluded that the claims were unwarranted and unfounded, and there was no evidence to support anything happened like the ‘source’ had claimed.

My question is, if the information was false and there was nothing the story — why was the entire batch of documents found (it is unknown how much) including the CIA/IGs final report – classified?

Download the Declassified Records (After FOIA Appeal)

 Investigation Case Record, Declassified July 2015 [5 Pages, 0.6 MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/biological/F-2014-00280.pdf

The post Allegations of Biological Experiments in Viet Nam, 1966 first appeared on The Black Vault.

According to Wikipedia:

“Project AGILE was an ARPA project in the 1960s that investigated means for engaging in remote, limited warfare of an asymmetric type. The research was intended for use in providing U.S. support to countries engaged in fighting Communist insurgents, particularly in Vietnam and Thailand. Project AGILE was directed by the United States Department of Defense Advanced Research Projects Administration, or ARPA, and ran from mid 1961 through 1974, when it was canceled. The project was charged with developing methods to use in the looming Vietnam War, and also provided information for use by Thailand in counterinsurgency action against Communist rebels.”

The following are documents and reports released under the Freedom of Information Act:

The Military Research and Development Center, Thailand

The Military Research and Development Center, Thailand (MRDC) is a Joint Thai-U.S. organization established to undertake research, development, test and evaluation activities in support of the Royal Thai Armed Forces, with special emphasis on strengthening Thai counterinsurgency capabilities.

MRDC is established within the Thai Ministry of Defense Supreme Command Headquarters under the leadership of Major General Singchai Menasuta, Director, and Mr. Thomas W. Brundage, Deputy Director. It is stalled jointly and its work is conducted jointly, by officers of the Royal Thai Armed Forces and officers and civilians assigned from the U.S. Department of Defense. Representation From the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence has also been provided. Scientific, technical and military operations experience are represented on the staff.  The U.S. component of the MRDC, called the Research and Development Field Unit (RDFU), and requisite financial and materiel support, are provided through the Advanced Research Projects Agency. Office of the Secretary of Defense as part of
ARPA’s program of research in Remote Area Conflict (Project AGILE).

 The Military Research and Development Center [243 Pages, 44MB ]

Project AGILE Reports

 Project AGILE, Quarterly rept., 1 Oct-31 Dec 1962, 15 January 1963 [ 157 Pages, 44MB ]

 The Use of a Marking Agent for Identification by Dogs, 11 March 1966 [ 119 Pages, 3.1MB ] – This research was supported by the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense and was monitored by ARPA/AGILE under Contract No. SD-171.  One of the most provoking problems of remote area conflict is the detection and identification of enemy personnel. This problem is exemplified by the present conflict in the Republic of’ Vietnam, where the opposing forces are usually not distinguishable by any characteristic ethnic or racial features, identifying clothing or uniforms, language, or other appearances or actions. Obviously, the inability to identity the opposition makes almost impossible the task of controlling or countering this foe. One approach to resolving this problem lies in the development of methods for marking or labeling the enemy so that friendly forces can be distinguished from the foe. Such a concept was evolved and placed into laboratory investigation in the early 1960’s.  The concept hinges around the use of a marking chemical or other material having a characteristic physical property, such as odor; which can be detected by trained dogs but will be unnoticed by human beings.

The post Project AGILE first appeared on The Black Vault.

The Code of Conduct and the Vietnam Prisoners of War – by Commander John S. McCain, United States Navy

Individual Research Project: The Code of Conduct and the Vietnam Prisoners of War by John S. McCain, U.S. Navy

POW: It Can Happen to You! [49 Pages]

Performance of American POWS in the Vietnam War : adequate training or creative leadership? by Scott A. Arcuri

Prisoner of War Negotiations – Korea and Vietnam (Master Thesis) [93 Pages, 12.68mb]

The post Prisoners of War (POWs) first appeared on The Black Vault.

U.S. Intelligence and Vietnam [141 Pages]

Lessons Learned in Vietnam

A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam. Volume I. The Enemy [670 Pages, 33mb] – The chapters of this volume describe several key insights concerning the Communist Vietnamese in the period 1945-1975. These insights relate to decisions that were made and events that occurred, from which can be derived lessons concerning the Vietnam War. By their very nature, insights are specifically focused on the people, places, and historical events associated with Southeast Asia in general and, in this volume, particularly with the Communist Vietnamese. Lessons, on the other hand, must have a more general application if they are to be of value in the future. The lessons from Vietnam are not new to warfare. In the main they are lessons from earlier conflicts that were forgotten, misunderstood, or misapplied. Not surprisingly, however, a few lessons were applied properly. Because lessons are general in nature they usually appear to be platitudes. So, too, do the principles of war or the observation of von Clausewitz, or Napoleon, or Sun Tzu. This executive summary sets forth some insights and lessons that emerge solely from this volume — The Enemy.

A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam. Volume II. South Vietnam [385 Pages, 30mb] – This volume is concerned with the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), focusing primarily on the society, the government and its armed forces. The long subjugation of the Vietnamese population by the Chinese and the French, and the periods of relative independence, have exerted manifold influences on the society, the government and the military. The chapters of this volume each examine a specific aspect of South Vietnam to provide an understanding of the environment, people, and government and the factors that contributed to the collapse of the Republic. The following topics are examined: The societal structure and significant differences between US and Vietnamese societies; The governmental structure and US/GVN working relationships; The influence of geography and climate on the conduct of the war; The South Vietnamese economy and the impact of US aid and physical presence on that economy; The development and performance of the South Vietnamese armed forces and their leadership; The morale and will of the South Vietnamese people and the influence of the American presence; and The domestic and international constraints on GVN policy.

A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam. Volume III. US Foreign Policy and Vietnam 1945-1975 [340 Pages, 16mb] – The chapters of Volume III develop a number of key insights and lessons relating to the formulation of US policy toward Vietnam during the years 1945-1975. These insights underscore both the general context and the specific nature of US policy making–the global environment in which Vietnam policy was formulated, the historical precedents which influenced subsequent US foreign policy and particularly Southeast Asian policies, and the US policy-making process. The insights are specific, focusing on such issues as US perceptions of its global role, US perceptions of external powers, both friendly and unfriendly, consistencies and contradictions in US foreign policies, the influence of historical precedents on US policy makers, and the advantages and liabilities inherent in specific approaches to policy making. In contrast, the lessons derived in this volume are general, concentrating on the broader issues and themes discussed in the volume which are relevant to a discussion of US foreign policy during the 1945-1975 period and to present day policy considerations.

A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam. Volume IV. US Domestic Factors Influencing Vietnam War Policy Making [249 Pages, 20mb] – The Vietnam War demonstrated the important role played by domestic factors in foreign policy making. Social change, the US economy, the media, and the American political scene contributed to the shaping of US involvement in the war. Nevertheless, American domestic politics strongly influenced the course of US involvement in the war. While presidential politics determined the direction of US involvement through the 1960s, congressional reassertion of its constitutional function to advice and consent on foreign policy matters and more specifically on war-related issues characterized the 1970s. The following insights and lessons are derived from each of the five chapters of Volume IV.

A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam. Volume 5. Planning the War [426 Pages, 23mb] – The chapters of Volume V develop a number of key insights and lessons relating to the planning for the US involvement in the Vietnam conflict. In addition to identifying the roots and origins of US planning and policy initiatives for Vietnam, this volume describes and assesses the efficacy of US contingency planning; the US foreign policy objectives and strategies for Vietnam, national mobilization policy during this critical period, the planning and implementation of pacification and Vietnamization programs, the planning and implementation of US combat forces withdrawals, the objectives and strategies of US negotiations to end hostilities, and the impact of the US\’s follow-on efforts in support of South Vietnam. The insights are specific, focusing on such issues as the need for maintaining clarity and consistency in directives issued by the National Command Authority which state policy objectives and strategies, the need for a mechanism whereby US foreign policy can be thoroughly reassessed on a periodic basis, and need for US leaders and planners alike to be able to sample or test the national will to keep plans and policies in line with their desires and direction, all of which surfaced during the planning of the war. The lessons, on the other hand, are general in nature and concentrate on the broad issues and themes discussed in the volume.

A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam. Volume VI. Conduct of the War. Book I. Operational Analyses[651 Pages, 31.1mb] – This is Book 1, Operational Analyses, of Volume VI, Conduct of the War, of the Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam. The course of the ground war is treated chronologically in the first five chapters, reflecting the following: (1) US Aid and Advice (1950-1960) – often based on faulty perceptions of threat and the natural tendency to create an ally in our own image; (2) the Counterinsurgency Era (1960-1964) which resulted from the failure of earlier advice and support and the endemic political instability in South Vietnam; (3) America Takes Charge (1965-1968) – when the US deployed the best combat forces it has ever put in the field at the outset of a war, and a period when the massive US presence stabilized the military situation in RVN but deprived both the RNVAF and the GVN from learning how to stand on their own; also US and international public support for the war declined steadily; (4) US Phases Out (1969-1972) – when public and congressional attitudes made it necessary for the US to turn the war over to the RVNAF, and a period during which serious morale and disciplinary problems wracked many US units; (5) RVNAF Stands and Falls – Alone (1973-1975) – when US presidential promises for aid and support failed to materialize and the RVNAF proved unable to stand against the combined arms onslaught of the expanded and modernized PAVN operating from a superior geostrategic position. Air, naval, and unconventional operations are analyzed in the closing three chapters, and in each case the data and analyses cover the entire span of the war.

A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam. Volume 6. Conduct of the War. Book 2. Functional Analyses[551 Pages, 32mb] – The purpose of this book is to provide separate analyses of several of the functional aspects related to conduct of the war in Vietnam. Land, air, sea and river, and clandestine operations are analyzed in Book 1. This book responds to the Request for Proposal (RFP) dealing with the following subtasks: Intelligence; Logistics; Command and Control; The Advisory Effort; Psychological Operations; Civil Affairs; Measures of Progress – Keeping Score; Technology; and Allies.

A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam. Volume 7. The Soldier [378 Pages, 28mb] – The chapters of Volume VII, the Soldier, develop a number of key insights and lessons concerning the US soldier during the years 1960-1973. These insights highlight a broad and diverse array of soldier-related problems and policies that developed in the years of the United States\’ combat role in Indochina. The insights are specific, focusing on the major themes discussed in the chapters of volume, including personnel policies and problems, racial discrimination, drug abuse, leadership quality, and careerism. The accompanying lessons, in contrast, while derived from the US soldier\’s experiences in Vietnam, are more general in tone, with wider application and greater interest to US military leaders and planners.

A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam. Volume 8. Results of the War [156 Pages, 7mb] – This volume describes and assesses the results and implications of the Vietnam War of the United States. Each of the five essays focuses on one particular area of concern: lessons of history and their use and importance for the making of future policy, the nation\’s foreign policy and role in the international order, the US domestic scene, the nation\’s defense establishment, and the region of Southeast Asia. All of the essays provide useful insights as to the results of Vietnam for these specific areas of interest.

The post Vietnam Intelligence & Lessons Learned first appeared on The Black Vault.

According to Wikipedia:

John Sidney McCain III (born August 29, 1936) is the senior United States Senator from Arizona. He was the Republican presidential nominee in the 2008 United States presidential election. McCain followed his father and grandfather, both four-star admirals, into the United States Navy, graduating from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1958. He became a naval aviator, flying ground-attack aircraft from aircraft carriers. During the Vietnam War, he was almost killed in the 1967 USS Forrestal fire. In October 1967, while on a bombing mission over Hanoi, he was shot down, seriously injured, and captured by the North Vietnamese. He was a prisoner of war until 1973. McCain experienced episodes of torture, and refused an out-of-sequence early repatriation offer. His war wounds left him with lifelong physical limitations.

Below you will find documents relating to McCain during this era.

Navy Personnel Command Documents relating to Senator John S. McCain, United States Navy

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/mccain/JohnMcCainDocuments.pdf

The post Senator John S. McCain first appeared on The Black Vault.

The following 18 CD-ROMs were created by the DoD, when they transferred their FOIA Reading Room to their online Reading Room — when the collections were digitized. The Black Vault has archived the entire 18 CD set below.

Please note: Some of the CD’s did NOT have indexes. This includes CD #7, #12, #16, #16A, and #17.

CD-ROM #1 (6,788 Pages)

CD-ROM #2 (6,941 Pages)

CD-ROM #3 (7,551 Pages)

CD-ROM #4 (270 Pages)

CD-ROM #5 (7,148 Pages)

CD-ROM #6 (8,575 Pages)

CD-ROM #7 (2,546 Pages)

CD-ROM #8 (6,915 Pages)

CD-ROM #9 (8,688 Pages)

CD-ROM #10 (13,613 Pages)

CD-ROM #11 (16,311 Pages)

CD-ROM #12 (13,523 Pages)

CD-ROM #13 (4,842 Pages)

CD-ROM #14 (14,981 Pages)

CD-ROM #15 (6,177 Pages)

CD-ROM #16 (8,709 Pages)

CD-ROM #16A (4,358 Pages)

CD-ROM #17 (13,873 Pages)

The post DoD Document Collections first appeared on The Black Vault.