Agencies periodically conduct their own special investigations and produce reports about certain allegations against their respective departments.

For example, the CIA Inspector General produced a report regarding the allegations of the connection between the CIA and drug trafficking.  Each agency will do the same types of investigations.

Below, you will find reports and indexes that are relevant.  I decided to compile them here in one archive, as it is interesting to show a complete set of allegations/investigations.

Declassified Documents

Air Force

Air Force Office of the Inspector General Closed Investigations, 2017-2020 [5 Pages, 2.3MB]

AMTRAK

 AMTRAK/OIG Closed Investigations, 2016 [5 Pages, 2.3MB]

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Inspector General

CIA Inspector General Report of Investigation: Improper Handling of Classified Information by John M. Deutch, February 18, 2000 [84 Pages, 266kb]

 CIA Inspector General Report of Dumping Hazardous Material into Potomac at CIA HQ, February 2, 2000 [33 Pages, 4.14MB]

List of CIA/IG Closed Investigations, June 2014 – December 2016 [15 Pages, 6MB]

List of CIA/IG Closed Investigations, January 1, 2005 – May 2014 [33 Pages, 4.4MB]

List of CIA/IG Closed Investigations, January 1, 1997 – October 5, 2004 [57 Pages, 15.1MB]

List of CIA Inspections and Special Studies, 1994-1997 [26 Pages, 2.49MB]

List of CIA Inspections and Special Studies, 1990-1994 [16 Pages, 4.2MB]

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

 DIA/IG Closed Investigations, 2016 [2 Pages, 1.5MB]
 DIA/IG Closed Investigations, 2014-2015 [5 Pages, 1.3MB]
 DIA/IG Closed Investigations, 2011-2013 [5 Pages, 1.2MB]
 DIA/IG Closed Investigations, 2005-2008 [12 Pages, 4.6MB]

Department of Agriculture Inspector General (USDA)

 Department of Agriculture Closed Investigation Logs, 2016 [13 Pages, 1.8MB]
 Department of Agriculture Closed Investigation Logs, 2014-2015 [22 Pages, 7.7MB]

Department of the Army (ARMY)

 Department of the Army Closed Investigation Logs, January 2010 – September 2016 [100 Pages, 21.9MB]

Department of Commerce Inspector General

 Department of Commerce Closed Investigation Logs, 2016 [21 Pages, 4.2MB]

 Department of Commerce Closed Investigation Logs, 2014-2015 [17 Pages, 2.3MB]

 Department of Commerce Closed Investigation Logs, 2000-2005 [28 Pages, 1.1MB]

Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General

 Department of Defense Closed Investigation Logs, 2016 [21 Pages, 4.2MB]

Department of Education (ED) Inspector General

 Department of Education Closed Investigation Logs, 2016 [4 Pages, 1.8MB]

Department of Energy (DOE) Inspector General

 Department of Energy Closed Investigation Logs, 2014-2015 [11 Pages, 1.7MB]

 DOE/IG Investigation into Fisker Automotive, 2012 [32 Pages, 1.96MB] – On 26 March 2012, the DOE was notified about a misuse of funds and questionable business practices by Fisker Automotive.  They previously had received DOE Loan Program Office financing.  These files are the first release relating to their investigation.

 National Nuclear Security Administration Nuclear Weapons Systems Configuration Management, March 2014 [30 Pages, 0.8MB] – The Office of Inspector General received multiple allegations regarding the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) management of configuration management (CM) information.  The allegations related to incomplete product definitions for NNSA nuclear weapons, and ineffective management of classified nuclear weapons drawings, a situation that could lead to unauthorized changes to the drawings.  In response, we initiated this audit to determine whether NNSA had maintained accurate and complete CM information for nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons components to support safe, sound and timely decisions related to these devices. The review substantiated the allegations and identified instances in which NNSA had not maintained accurate and complete CM information for its nuclear weapons and components.

 DOE/IG Finds 6 BILLION U.S. Dollars MISSING, March 20, 2014 [9 Pages, 1.78MB] – The Office of Inspector General (OIG), in recent audits, investigations, and inspections, has identified significant vulnerabilities in the management of contract file documentation that could expose the Department to substantial financial losses. Specifically, over the past 6 years, OIG has identified Department of State (Department) contracts with a total value of more than $6 billion in which contract files were incomplete or could not be located at all. The failure to maintain contract files adequately creates significant financial risk and demonstrates a lack of internal control over the Department’s contract actions.

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Inspector General

2016 [87 Pages – 1.87MB]

April 1, 2009 – September 30, 2009 [87 Pages – 1.87MB]

October 1, 2008 – March 31, 2009 [71 Pages – 2.66MB]

April 1, 2008 – September 30, 2008 [72 Pages – 2.70MB]

October 1, 2007 – March 31, 2008 [56 Pages – 3.5MB]

April 1, 2007 – September 30, 2007 [56 Pages – 2.8MB]

October 1, 2006 – March 31, 2007 [104 Pages – 2MB]

April 1, 2006 – September 30, 2006 [102 Pages – 8.76MB]

October 1, 2005 – March 31, 2006 [88 Pages – 413kb]

April 1, 2005 to September 30, 2005 [74 Pages – 62MB]

October 1, 2004 to March 31, 2005 [60 Pages – 1.32MB]

April 1, 2004 to September 30, 2004 [86 Pages – 3.53MB]

October 1, 2003 to March 31, 2004 [86 Pages – 3.53MB]

April 1, 2003 to September 30, 2003 [62 Pages – 1.24MB]

October 1, 2002 to March 31, 2003 [54 Pages – 963kb]

Department of Housing and Urban Development

HUD/OIG Congressional Response – 2015-2016 [121 Pages – 1.4MB] – HUD OIG response to a Congressional Request for a list of closed investigations not disclosed to the public – 2015-2016.

HUD/OIG Investigations Regarding HUD Employees – 2015 [3 Pages – 1.1MB] – This is an interim release, and is an index of potentially responsive records. The actual case files will be sent to me in the future, and once received, I will add them here.

Department of Interior (DOI) Inspector General

 DOI/IG Closed Investigation Logs, 2016 [6 Pages, 1.2MB]
 DOI/IG Closed Investigation Logs, 2014-2015 [32 Pages, 1.96MB]

Department of Justice (DOJ) Inspector General

 DOI/IG Closed Investigation Logs, 2017-2020 [30 Pages, 0.4MB]
 DOI/IG Closed Investigation Logs, 2014-2015 [16 Pages, 2.1MB]

Department of State

 DOS/IG Closed Investigations, 2013-2015 [8 Pages, 3.6MB]

Department of Transportation (DOT)

 DOT/IG Closed Investigations, 2016 [8 Pages, 0.7MB]

Department of Treasury Inspector General (TOIG)

 DOT/IG Closed Investigations, 2016 [7 Pages, 0.8MB]

Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)

 VA/IG Closed Investigations, 2014-2015 [111 Pages, 17.4MB]

Director of National Intelligence Inspector General

 ODNI OIG Semi-Annual Reports, published in 2013 [98 Pages – 8.82MB]
 ODNI OIG Semi-Annual Reports, 1 April – 30 September 2014 & 1 October – 31 March 2015 [104 Pages – 32MB]
 ODNI OIG Closed Investigations, 2016-2019 [7 Pages – 2.0MB]
 ODNI OIG Closed Investigations, 2014-2015 [4 Pages – 1.0MB]

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

 EPA/IG Closed Investigations, 2016 [3 Pages, 1.1MB]

The Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM)

EXIM OIG IG Investigations, 2016 [4 Pages – 2.8MB]
EXIM OIG IG Investigations, 2014-2015 [6 Pages – 2.8MB]

Farm Credit Administration (FCA) Inspector General

 FCA/IG Investigations Closed 2015-2016 [3 Pages, 0.5MB]

Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Inspector General

 FCC/IG Investigations Closed 2016 [6 Pages, 0.6MB]
 FCC/IG Investigations Closed 2014-2015 [4 Pages, 0.9MB]
 FCC/IG Investigations Closed 2005-2013 [11 Pages, 1.8MB]

Federal Election Commission (FEC) Inspector General

 FEC/IG Investigations Closed 2014-2015 [1 Page, 0.4MB] – I did confirm – the FEC only did one IG investigation during this time period.

Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) Inspector General

 FHFA/IG Investigations Closed 2016 [18 Pages, 7.5MB]

Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Inspector General

 FTC/IG Investigations Closed 2016 [65 Pages, 10.7MB] – The FTC gave their semi annual reports for Congress, when responding for a log. I have written for clarification since this differs greatly from other agency responses.

General Services Administration (GSA) Inspector General

 GSA/IG Investigations Closed 2016 [12 Pages, 0.8MB]

Government Accountability Office (GAO) Inspector General

 GAO/IG Investigations Closed 2014-2015 [4 Pages, 0.7MB]

Health and Human Services (HHS) Inspector General

 IG Investigations Closed 2016 [24 Pages – 1.1MB]
 IG Investigations Closed 2005-2008 [150 Pages – 3.37MB]

Housing and Urban Development Inspector General

IG Investigations Involving HUD Employees Closed 2015

      16-IGF-OIG-00148.pdf             968K  
      2011HQ002041I_roi_Redacted.pdf   3.1M  
      2014SI000850I_roi_Redacted.pdf   1.1M  
      2014SI001273I_roi_Redacted.pdf   1.8M  
      2014SI001671I_roi_Redacted.pdf   3.9M  
      2014SI001699I_roi_Redacted.pdf   1.0M  
      2015SI000137I_roi_Redacted.pdf   2.5M  
      2015SI000166I_roi_Redacted.pdf   692K  
      2015SI000238I_roi_Redacted.pdf   2.1M  
      2015SI000239I_roi_Redacted.pdf    14M  
      2015SI000251I_roi_Redacted.pdf   1.2M  
      2015SI000289I_roi_Redacted.pdf   476K  
      2015SI000290I_roi_Redacted.pdf   4.2M  
      2015SI000412I_roi_Redacted.pdf   2.4M  
      2015SI000423I_roi_Redacted.pdf   2.8M  
      2015SI000444I_roi_Redacted.pdf   2.6M  
      2015s1000474i_roi_Redacted.pdf   3.1M

National Archives and Records Administration (NARA)

NARA/IG Investigations Closed 2016 [12 Pages – 2.3MB]

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)

NASA/IG Investigations Closed 2016 [10 Pages – 3.4MB]

National Credit Union Administration (NCUA)

NCUA/IG Investigations Closed 2016 [2 Pages – 0.4MB]

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)

NGA/IG Investigations Closed 2016 [12 Pages – 2.9MB]
NGA/IG Investigations Closed 2014-2015 [12 Pages – 2.3MB]

National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)

NLRB/IG Investigations Closed 2016 [3 Pages – 1.9MB]

National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Inspector General

 IG Investigations Closed 2016  [3 Pages – 1.0MB]
 IG Investigations Closed 2014-2015  [6 Pages – 3.5MB]
 Inspection of the National Reconnaissance Office Declassification Activities, 22 October 2014 [34 Pages – 4.1MB]

National Security Agency (NSA) Inspector General

IG Investigations Closed 2017-2020  [23 Pages – 6.5MB]
 IG Investigations Closed 2010-2017  [23 Pages – 6.5MB]
 IG Investigations Closed 2014-2015  [5 Pages – 1.9MB] – (This duplicated the above release, but is archived here for reference)
 IG Investigations Closed 2005-2008  [10 Pages – 2.1MB]

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Inspector General

 NRC/IG Investigations Closed 2016 [6 Pages – 0.6MB]
 NRC/IG Investigations Closed 2014-2015 [6 Pages – 3.5MB]

Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Inspector General

 OPM/IG Investigations Closed 2016 [7 Pages – 0.6MB]
 OPM/IG Investigations Closed 2014-2015 [8 Pages – 0.5MB]

Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) Inspector General

 SEC/IG Investigations Closed 2016 [3 Pages – 0.6MB]

 SEC/IG Investigations Closed 2014-2015 [2 Pages – 0.5MB]

Small Business Administration (SBA) Inspector General

SBA/IG Investigations Closed 2014-2015 [4 Pages – 0.6MB]
 SBA/IG Investigations Closed 2016 [4 Pages – 0.6MB] – Still seeking an index that has case names, or summaries, or anything more than what was released here.

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR)

 SIGAR/IG Investigations Closed 01/01/2011 – 08/01/2013 [16 Pages – 2.4MB]

The Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA)

 TIGTA Investigations Closed 2016 [186 Pages – 35.9MB]

United States Postal Service (USPS) Inspector General

 OIG Management Alert HR-MA-14-002, Mail Isolation, Control, and Tracking, December 3, 2013 [15 Pages – 2.4MB]

The post Agency Inspector General Reports and Investigations first appeared on The Black Vault.

The Black Vault filed for the report on April 22, 2019, and it was released (with redactions) on January 26, 2023.

Document Archive

Evaluation of the Oversight of Intelligence Interrogation Approaches and Techniques (DODIG-2019-077) [90 Pages, 9.5MB]

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The post Evaluation of the Oversight of Intelligence Interrogation Approaches and Techniques (DODIG-2019-077) first appeared on The Black Vault.

The Black Vault filed a FOIA request for the review and release of the final report on July 12, 2016. It would take until January 6, 2023 for it to be partially done so.

The result is below.

Document Archive

DoD/IG Investigation: Evaluation of Foreign Officer Involvement at the United States Special Operations Command – June 15, 2016 [146 Pages, 11.5MB]

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The post DoD/IG Investigation: Evaluation of Foreign Officer Involvement at the United States Special Operations Command – June 15, 2016 first appeared on The Black Vault.

The Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (IC IG) Investigations Division investigated the alleged disclosure of classified talking points for the Presidential candidate briefings ahead of the 2016 Presidential elections to NBC News and TIME Magazine by an unknown individual.

Based on our analysis of available information, interviews of individuals tasked with preparation, briefing, and knowledge of the classified talking points, we did not identify any individual who was responsible for the alleged unauthorized disclosures. Therefore, this matter is unsubstantiated.

Document Archive

Alleged Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information – Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community – Case: INV-17-0002 – 2017 [29 Pages, 9.5MB]

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The post Alleged Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information – Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community – Case: INV-17-0002 – 2017 first appeared on The Black Vault.

Document Archive

Alleged Unauthorized Disclosure – Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community – Case: 18-0001-IN – 2018 [22 Pages, 6MB]

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The post Alleged Unauthorized Disclosure – Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community – Case: 18-0001-IN – 2018 first appeared on The Black Vault.

The United States Office of Government Ethics (OGE) is a separate agency within the executive branch of the U.S. Federal Government which is responsible for directing executive branch policies relating to the prevention of conflicts of interest on the part of Federal executive branch officers and employees. Primary duties include establishing the executive branch standards of conduct; issuing rules and regulations interpreting the criminal conflict of interest restrictions; establishing the framework for the public and confidential financial disclosure systems for executive branch employees; developing training and education programs for use by executive branch ethics officials and employees; and setting the requirements for, supporting, and reviewing individual agency ethics programs to ensure they are functioning properly.

Document Archive

 U.S. Postal Service Ethics Program Reviews for 2006, 2000, 1995, 1993, 1991, 1987 and 1981 [88 Pages, 2.5MB]

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The post U.S. Postal Service Ethics Program Reviews first appeared on The Black Vault.

The Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (IC IG) initiated this investigation in response to a referral from IC IG Inspections. The referral alleged that [[REDACTED]] a former ODNI employee and mother of [[REDACTED]] took actions regarding the hiring of in May of 2008 which constituted violations of either 5 USC SS 2302(b )(6 )-(7) or 5 USC § 3110. A careful review of available records regarding the process and procedures surrounding [[REDACTED]] selection and hiring failed to reveal any evidence to substantiate this allegation .

Document Archive

OIG/IC Investigation on 2008 Nepotism Allegations, Case Number 2014-0011, Completed August 2015 [8 Pages, 3MB]

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The post OIG/IC Investigation on 2008 Nepotism Allegations, Case Number 2014-0011, Completed August 2015 first appeared on The Black Vault.

The allegations addressed in this investigation, were that Zerene Aerospace was dealing in fraudulent aircraft parts and allegedly manufacturing aircraft skins, including wing components and control surfaces out of blocks of aluminum for various aircrafts, specifically the U.S. Air Force (USAF) E-3 (military version of the Boeing 707). Also, Zerene was allegedly changing data plates on various parts for both military and civilian aircraft. The weight of the items manufactured by Zerene was heavier than appropriate parts, indicating Zerene was using a different grade of aluminum. Zerene was not an authorized Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) repair station or a Department of Defense (DOD) contractor and consequently not in conformance to industry standards.

Initial surveillance revealed that aircraft parts were being manufactured at Zerene and on several occasions, several persons related to FAA Repair Stations and Aircraft Parts Brokers were observed at Zerene. In response to this information, a task force, titled “Operation Wingspan” was created involving several Federal Law Enforcement Agencies.

Document Archive

Operation Wingspan, Department of Transportation Inspector General Investigation I08A0003320401, August 2, 2013 [15 Pages, 0.5MB]

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The post Operation Wingspan, Department of Transportation Inspector General Investigation I08A0003320401, August 2, 2013 first appeared on The Black Vault.

According to the objective of the audit:

“We determined whether the material condition of the Integrated Tactical Warning/Attack Assessment Ground-Based Radars (ITW / AA GBR) is adequate to perform and sustain required capabilities. Specifically, we examined the infrastructure, maintenance,: planned or required upgrades, funding, and management of the radar sites.”

Document Archive

Evaluation of the Integrated Tactical Warning/Attack Assessment Ground-Based Radars, September 8, 2016 [55 Pages, 19MB]

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The post Evaluation of the Integrated Tactical Warning/Attack Assessment Ground-Based Radars, September 8, 2016 first appeared on The Black Vault.

Office of the Secretary of Defense personnel responsible for deciding the realignment or closure of military installations based on the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) data calls and National Security Agency management personnel should read this report. The report discusses the validity, integrity, and supporting documentation of the data provided by the National Security Agency to assist the Secretary of Defense in BRAC 2005 recommendations.

Document Archive

National Security Agency Data Call Submissions and Internal Control Processes for Base Realignment and Closure 2005, May 13, 2005, Report No. 05-INTEL-10 [30 Pages, 5.5MB]

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The post National Security Agency Data Call Submissions and Internal Control Processes for Base Realignment and Closure 2005, May 13, 2005, Report No. 05-INTEL-10 first appeared on The Black Vault.

This Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General (DOD/IG) report has the following objective:

“Our objective was to determine if special access program (SAP) industrial security inspections conducted by DoD Components are effectively ensuring the protection and security of defense contractor facilities, information, and technology.”

Although the title was published online by the DOD/IG, the report itself was classified.  The Black Vault submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request on April 22, 2019, and the final response, including the redacted report, was released on August 14, 2019.

Document Archive

Evaluation of Special Access Programs Industrial Security Program – DODIG-2019-054 [9 Pages, 1.7MB]

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The post Evaluation of Special Access Programs Industrial Security Program – DODIG-2019-054 first appeared on The Black Vault.

The Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) is an independent entity established within the executive branch to address integrity, economy and effectiveness issues that transcend individual Government agencies and aid in the establishment of a professional, well-trained and highly skilled workforce in the Offices of Inspectors General.

Document Archive

 The Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) Meeting Minutes, 2013-2015 [65 Pages, 7.9MB]

https://documents2.theblackvault.com/documents/fbifiles/cigieminutes-2013-2015.pdf

The post The Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) Meeting Minutes first appeared on The Black Vault.

Press Release from Department of Justice, published June 14, 2018:

Department of Justice (DOJ) Inspector General Michael E. Horowitz announced today the release of a report examining various actions by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the DOJ in advance of the 2016 election in connection with the investigation into former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s use of a private email server (referred to by the FBI and DOJ as the “Midyear” investigation).

The DOJ Office of the Inspector General’s (OIG) findings are summarized in detail in the report’s Executive Summary, which is included below. The scope of the OIG’s review included:

– Allegations that DOJ or FBI policies or procedures were not followed in connection with, or in actions leading up to or related to, former FBI Director James Comey’s public announcement on July 5, 2016, and his letters to Congress on October 28 and November 6, 2016, and that certain underlying investigative decisions were based on improper considerations (Chapters 3-11);

– Allegations that DOJ and FBI employees improperly disclosed non-public information (Chapter 12, and as noted in our report, the OIG will separately report on related investigations as they are concluded, consistent with the Inspector General Act, other applicable statutes, and OIG policy);

– Allegations that former FBI Deputy Director Andrew McCabe should have been recused from participating in certain investigative matters (Chapter 13);

– Allegations that former Assistant Attorney General for the DOJ’s Office of Legislative Affairs, Peter Kadzik, improperly disclosed non-public information to the Clinton campaign and/or
should have been recused from participating in certain Clinton-related matters (Chapter 14); and

– Allegations that the timing of the FBI’s release of certain Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) documents on October 30 and November 1, 2016, and the use of a Twitter account to publicize
the same, were influenced by improper considerations (Chapter 15). During the course of the review, the OIG discovered text messages and instant messages between some FBI employees on the investigative team, conducted using FBI mobile devices and computers, that expressed statements of hostility toward then candidate Donald Trump and statements of support for Clinton. We also identified messages that expressed opinions that were critical of the conduct and quality of the investigation. We included in our review an assessment of these messages and actions by the FBI employees (Chapter 12, and as noted in our report, the OIG is preparing a separate report describing the OIG’s efforts to recover text messages during this review).

The OIG’s conclusions and nine recommendations to the DOJ and FBI appear in Chapter 16. The DOJ’s and FBI’s responses the OIG’s draft report are included in the report as attachments. As noted in the report, a non-public classified appendix was delivered to Congress, DOJ leadership, and the FBI. In addition, the report includes a non-public Law Enforcement Sensitive (LES) appendix containing a version of Chapter 13 that includes LES information.

The OIG’s report is the result of more than 100 witness interviews, including former Director Comey, former Attorney General (AG) Loretta Lynch, former Deputy Attorney General (DAG) Sally Yates, members of the former AG’s and DAG’s staffs, FBI agents and supervisors and DOJ attorneys and supervisors who conducted the Midyear investigation, personnel from the FBI’s New York Field Office and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York involved in the Anthony Weiner investigation, former and current members of the FBI’s senior executive leadership, and former President Bill Clinton. In addition, the OIG did an independent review of significantly more than 1.2 million documents, including interview reports, agent and attorney notes, memoranda, emails, text messages, and instant messages.

Please note that this review is separate from the review the OIG announced on March 28, 2018, concerning the DOJ’s and FBI’s compliance with legal requirements, and with applicable DOJ and FBI policies and procedures, in applications filed with the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court relating to a certain U.S. person. That review is ongoing and the OIG will issue a separate report relating to those issues at a future date when our investigative work is complete.

The Report

 A Review of Various Actions by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Justice in Advance of the 2016 Election, June 2018 [568 Pages, 8.4MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/doj/2016_election_final_report_06-14-18_0.pdf

The post A Review of Various Actions by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Justice in Advance of the 2016 Election, June 2018 first appeared on The Black Vault.

According to the document:

“The Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency conducted a joint inspection of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) from October through December 1995. The goal of the inspection was to determine the efficiency and effectiveness of the processes and mechanisms to manage and administer NRO resources and administrative programs. The objectives to: evaluate the authorities and delegations of thc NRO and oversight organizations; evaluate the processes to identify mission requirements and plan and organize resources for them; evaluate internal  administrative and management programs; and, evaluate internal management oversight processes.”

I requested the document under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in June of 2016, and it was finally released in April of 2018.

Note: Strangely, the letter erred on multiple dates. It said the date of the letter was April 27, 2017, but was actually sent the same day in 2018. It also notes my request was from 2006, but actually, it was 2016. Unclear why the mistakes, but alas, I wanted to point them out for clarity.

Document Archive

 1996 Joint Inspection of the National Reconnaissance Office, Inspection Report No. 96-014, 23 July 1996 [166 Pages, 15.1MB]

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The post 1996 Joint Inspection of the National Reconnaissance Office, Inspection Report No. 96-014, 23 July 1996 first appeared on The Black Vault.

In October of 2012, multiple complaints were filed against the CIA’s Inspector General David Buckley.  They detailed allegations of “cronyism” and misuse of power, in which General Buckley issued a formal letter reply.

In November of 2017, I requested records pertaining to this investigation, from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The FBI chairs the investigations into matters such as these.

On November 29, 2017, the FBI sent a CD with some responsive material. They are continuing to process my request for additional records, but what has been released thus far is General Buckey’s official response, and a copy of some (all?) of the complaints.

Additional documents will be posted when available.

Document Archive

 FBI Release #1 [42 Pages, 22.8MB]

The post Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) Investigation into Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Inspector General General David Buckley first appeared on The Black Vault.

This administrative investigation was initiated upon receipt of information from [[ REDACTED ]] NASA-OIG, who advised [[ REDACTED ]] in Pittsburgh, PA contacted her regarding a computer with a plate labeled Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) NASA Property and reels of magnetic data tape (reel tapes), several labeled 1969, that were found while an acquaintance was cleaning the residence of a deceased person.

The Investigation

 NASA OIG Investigation: Recovery of Possibly Historical 1969 NASA Data Tapes, December 4, 2015 [61 Pages, 14.8MB]

The post NASA OIG Investigation: Recovery of Possibly Historical 1969 NASA Data Tapes, December 4, 2015 first appeared on The Black Vault.

The federal Witness Security Program (WITSEC Program) was established to provide for the security, health, and safety of government witnesses whose lives are at risk as a result of their testimony against organized crime members, drug traffickers, terrorists, and other major criminals. 1 Since the WITSEC Program’s inception in 1971, more than 8,700 witnesses and over 9,900 family members and other associates of witnesses have been admitted into the WITSEC Program.
Within this population, there are known or suspected terrorists (KSTs) who have agreed to cooperate in major terrorism investigations and prosecutions, including the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 1995 Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building attack in Oklahoma City, the 1998 East Africa Embassy bombings, a 2007 plot to bomb John F. Kennedy Airport, and a 2009 plot to bomb the New York City subway system.

In May 2013, the Department of Justice (Department) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) issued an interim report on the Department’s handling of KSTs admitted into the USMS WITSEC Program. The report included 16 recommendations to the Office of the Deputy Attorney General to improve information sharing among entities responsible for the WITSEC Program and reduce the risk to the public when admitting KSTs into the WITSEC Program. As we described in that report, we found that the Department had not identified all KSTs admitted into the WITSEC Program; lacked adequate and appropriate oversight of
these individuals; did not ensure that the identities of KSTs admitted into the WITSEC Program were placed on the government’s consolidated terrorist watchlist,
as appropriate; and did not appropriately share information with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other national security stakeholders, thus preventing these stakeholders from taking necessary precautions with respect to, and properly monitoring, these individuals.

In this report, we follow up on findings in our May 2013 report to determine whether the corrective actions taken by the FBI, USMS, and OEO sufficiently addressed the risks we identified. Specifically, our objectives for this audit were to evaluate the Department’s: (1) handling of KSTs admitted to the WITSEC Program; (2) practices for watchlisting and the processing of encounters with this group of WITSEC Program participants; and (3) procedures for mitigating
risks to the public through restrictions placed on this high-risk group of WITSEC Program participants. We determined that since November 2015, OEO and the FBI admitted two new KSTs into the WITSEC Program, and in doing so followed their protocols and appropriately coordinated with each other and the USMS. However, we also concluded that while the FBI, USMS, and OEO have developed new policies and procedures to address the issues we identified in our May 2013 review, they have not sufficiently and appropriately implemented all of them. Additionally, we remain concerned that the Department has not ensured that KST information has been appropriately shared with relevant national security stakeholders, and that those responsible for monitoring these individuals have the information they need to do so effectively.

The Investigation

 Audit of the Department of Justice’s Handling of Known or Suspected Terrorists Admitted into the Federal Witness Security Program Audit, September 2017 [67 Pages, 27.1MB]

The post Audit of the Department of Justice’s Handling of Known or Suspected Terrorists Admitted into the Federal Witness Security Program Audit, September 2017 first appeared on The Black Vault.

The Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General initiated this investigation on a complaint received from  [[ REDACTED ]] (who alleged he was sent the Personally Identifiable Information (PII) for dozens of Federal Agency employees and applicants by the FEMA Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Office pursuant to a FOIA request he filed.

Durin r the investigation, it was determined that  [[ REDACTED ]], Disclosure Unit, FEMA, Washington, DC, sent [[ REDACTED ]] two emails on October 2, 2014, containing un-redacted PII within attachments. When interviewed, [[ REDACTED ]] took responsibility for the improper release of PII, and said it was unintentional. This case was presented for prosecution to the United States Attorney’s Office, District of Columbia, and was declined due to lack of intent.

The Investigation

 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) Investigation I15-FEMA-WFO-14136 [27 Pages, 0.9MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/ig/2017-IGFO-00120.pdf

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BRAC 2005 is the formal process outlined in Public Law l 01-51 0, “Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990,” as amended, under which the Secretary of Defense may realign or close military installations inside the United States and it’s territories. As part of BRAC 2005, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics issued, “Transformation Through Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC 2005) Policy Memorandum One-Policy,
ResponsibilitiesJ and Procedures,” April 16, 2003, which stated that the DoD Office of Inspector General would review the accuracy ofBRAC data and the certification process.

The BRAC 2005 process was mandated for the United States and its territories and was divided into the following data cal ls- capacity analysis, supplemental capacity, Military value, Cost of Base Realignment Actions, Joint Process Action Team Criterion Number 7, and scenario specific. The Intelligence agencies’ collection process was divided into the following data calls- capacity analysis and Military value, and scenario specific.

This report summarizes the data calls as of April 2005, for the Defense Intelligence Agency BRAC 2005 process. The Defense Intelligence Agency, located in Washington DC, is a member of the National Intelligence Community and a primary producer of foreign military intelligence. The Defense Intelligence Agency was required to perform t·he capacity analysis, Military value, and scenario specific data calls. The DIA was responsible for collecting data from the Joint Intelligence Commands and the Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers. which were required to perform only the capacity analysis and Military value data calls.

Document Archive

 Defense Intelligence Agency Data Call Submissions and Internal Control Processes for Base Realignment and Closure 2005, May 13, 2005 [33 Pages, 5.7MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/dod/05-INTEL-09.pdf

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This report is the first in a series of reports that discuss the acquisition of the Chemical Demilitarization Program (the Demilitarization Program). The mission of the Demilitarization Program is to destroy chemical munitions through incineration or other approved alternative technologies. In 1985, the Congress, in section 1521, title 50, United States Code, “Destruction of Existing Stockpile of Lethal Chemical Agents and Munitions,” (Public Law 99-145), directed DoD to oversee the destruction of the stockpile of lethal chemical agents and munitions because of concerns for the stockpile deterioration. The Army established the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization to manage the day-to-day operations of destroying the chemical weapons. In May 2001, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics designated the Demilitarization Program as a major Defense acquisition program (Acquisition Category ID) and assigned the Army as the Executive Agent. Through July 2002, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers awarded contracts for construction, systemization, operations, and closure of chemical destruction facilities at Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System, Johnston Island, Hawaii, and Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility, Tooele, Utah. The Office of the Secretary of Defense approved a cost estimate totaling $24 billion, of which the program office awarded $5.8 billion in contracts for the Demilitarization Program.

Who Should Read This Report and Why? This report should be read by all who are interested in the Army’s demilitarization of its chemical munitions stockpile. This report discusses why the Army needs to update its acquisition program baseline agreement and to obtain a documented threat assessment.

Document Archive

 A Revised Acquisition Program Baseline and Threat Assessment for the Chemical Demilitarization Program, October 2002 [34 Pages, 1.4MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/dod/D-2003-015).pdf

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According to the report:

“We have audited the accompanying financial statements of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), which comprise the balance sheet as of September 30, 2015, the related statement of net cost and changes in net position, and the combined statement of budgetary resources (hereinafter referred to as the “financial statements”) for the year then ended, as well as the related notes to the financial statements.

Management is responsible for the preparation and fair presentation of the financial statements in accordance with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States of America; this includes the design, implementation, and maintenance of internal control relevant to the preparation and fair presentation of financial statements that are free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error.

Our responsibility is to express an opinion on the financial statements based on our audit. We conducted our audit in accordance with auditing standards generally accepted in the United States of America; the standards applicable to financial audits contained in Government Auditing Standards, issued by the Comptroller General of the United States; and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Bulletin No. 15-02, Audit Requirements for Federal Financial Statements. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free from material misstatement.”

The Audit

 Audit of the National Reconnaissance Office Fiscal Year 2015 Financial Statements, 13 November 2015 [20 Pages, 2.9MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/nro/F-2017-00040.pdf

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The Intelligence Community (IC) defines the term insider threat as an insider using her/his authorized access, wittingly or unwittingly, to do harm to the security of the United States. As recently experienced by the IC and the Department of Defense, this harm can take many forms, including industrial espionage, unauthorized disclosure of classified information, or even violent acts. This is an organization-wide risk that is not limited to information technology or counterintelligence (CI).

To address the magnitude of this risk, in October 2011, the President released an Executive Order (E.0.)1 requiring departments and agencies to establish an insider threat program. The President subsequently issued several additional memoranda that established the National Insider Threat Policy clarifying his expectations for protecting federal entities.

Under Presidential direction, the National Insider Threat Task Force (NIITF) issued guidance on how to comply with the National Insider Threat Policy and specified what must be included in an insider threat program. It prescribed a coordinated effort across multiple disciplines. Examples ofthese disciplines include Personnel Security, Law Enforcement, Privacy and Civil Liberties, Human Resources, Information Assurance, CI, and Office of Inspector General (OIG). These interrelated disciplines are supposed to form an agency-wide safety net, including government and contractors, to deter, detect, and mitigate actions by employees who may represent a threat to national security.

Accepting that an insider threat program takes time to mature, the President provided a timeline for agencies to reach initial operating capability with their respective Insider Threat Programs. The NITTF, with White House concurrence, clarified that by 20 May 2013, all agencies must

1. (U) designate an insider threat senior official(s ),
2. (U) issue an insider threat policy signed by the department or agency head, and
3. (U) submit to department or agency leadership an insider threat program
implementation plan that addresses how the organization intends to meet the
requirements set forth in the minimum standards.

The Investigation

 Audit of the National Reconnaissance Office Insider Threat Program (Project Number 2015-002 A), 30 April 2015 [9 Pages, 1.8MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/nro/F-2017-00045.pdf

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The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Office of Inspector General (OIG) completed its Inspection of the NRO Cadre Implementation Plan for Department of Defense Civilians. I am providing this memorandum report for your attention as the NRO strives to establish a permanent NRO Department of Defense (DoD) Cadre on 4 October 2015. The NRO OIG recognized the efforts of the employees supporting the transition, and the resulting success based on those efforts.

However, the OIG also identified challenges and deficiencies that may influence the NRO’s ability to meet the 4 October 2015 milestone and/or manage its future workforce.

Unlike other government organizations, the NRO lacks its own permanent cadre of personnel and primarily relies upon other Intelligence Community (IC) agencies and DoD entities to provide personnel to support its mission. Congress has recognized that this borrowed workforce model has steadily deteriorated over time and noted that a more stable workforce model may provide the Director, NRO (DNRO) with the management capacity required to meet the
organization’s critical mission. Pursuant to congressional direction (Intelligence Authorization Act (IAA) of Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 and 2015) for the NRO to augment its current staffing model with career service employees, the NRO commenced efforts to establish a permanent NRO DoD Cadre.

In the IAAs, Congress requested the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and DNRO, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), to provide a detailed implementation plan for modernizing the NRO workforce. Congress requested this plan generally include a strategy for 1) transitioning the current Air Force and Navy civilians and 2) establishing a personnel system that incorporates recruitment, training and development,  recognition, and promotions, as well as metrics to measure success. In addition, Congress requested the NRO work with other IC agencies and DoD entities to perform a workforce study to evaluate the NRO’s future size and skills composition. The workforce study was to be provided to the congressional intelligence and defense committees within 90 days of enactment of the FY 2014 IAA. Further, Congress encouraged the IC Inspector General (ICIG) to provide annual
implementation plan progress reports to Congress. After coordination with the ICIG, it was determined that the NRO OIG would assess NRO’s progress in establishing a permanent NRO DoD Cadre.  As the NRO elected to focus initially on the Congressional request for a strategy for transitioning the current Air Force and Navy civilians, the NRO OIG evaluated the Implementation Plan for Creating a DoD Civilian Workforce for the NRO and the transition activities administered by the Workforce Stability Initiative (WSI) NRO DoD Cadre Working Group (WG).

The Investigation

 Inspection of the National Reconnaissance Office Cadre Implementation Plan for Department of Defense Civilians, July 31, 2015 [15 Pages, 2.6MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/ig/F-2017-00046-NRO.pdf

The post Inspection of the National Reconnaissance Office Cadre Implementation Plan for Department of Defense Civilians, July 31, 2015 first appeared on The Black Vault.

We conducted this follow-up review in response to Public Law (PL) 111‑258, “Reducing Over-Classification Act,” which requires that the Inspector General (IG) of each department or agency of the U.S. with an officer or employee who is authorized to make original classifications, in consultation with the Information
Security Oversight Office (ISOO) shall carry out evaluations of that department or agency or a component of the department or agency:

• to assess whether applicable classification policies, procedures, rules, and regulations have been adopted, followed, and effectively administered within such department, agency, or component; and

• to identify policies, procedures, rules, regulations, or management practices that may be contributing to persistent misclassification of material within such department, agency, or component.

Findings

We determined that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) fully implemented two and partially implemented 11 of the 13 recommendations we previously made. Of the 11 that were partially implemented, four were in the process of being implemented in conjunction with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)).

The Investigation

 Follow up to DoD Evaluation of Over-Classification of National Security Information, December 1, 2016 [59 Pages, 3.5MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/ig/DODOIG-2017-000137.pdf

The post Follow up to DoD Evaluation of Over-Classification of National Security Information, December 1, 2016 first appeared on The Black Vault.

On July 18,2014, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations (01), initiated an investigation on the basis of allegations that SEC information was leaked to Reuters, an international news agency, regarding 10 investment companies under investigation by the SEC for their “High Frequency Practices” practices.

The investigation determined that nonpublic information was included in the July 17, 2014, Reuters article. However, OIG was unable to determine which specific individual(s) improperly disclosed information to Reuters based on the March 24,2014, email regarding SEC’s on-going review of HFT practices.

The Investigation

 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Case #14-ENF-0726-I – Improper Disclosure of Nonpublic Information [18 Pages, 3.7MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/SEC/14-ENF-0726-I.pdf

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