The Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG), led by Inspector General Robert P. Storch, has released an unclassified summary of a previously classified report titled “Evaluation of the DoD’s Actions Regarding Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (UAP).” This disclosure follows a full version of the classified report issued on August 15, 2023.

Inspector General Storch remarked, “Given the significant public interest in how the DoD is addressing UAPs, we are releasing this unclassified summary to be as transparent as possible with the American people about our oversight work on this important issue.”

The unclassified summary reveals that the DoD lacks a comprehensive and coordinated strategy for addressing UAPs. It is found that different components within the DoD have developed varied processes for the collection, analysis, and identification of UAP incidents. This lack of uniformity and integration poses potential risks to national security and military forces. The summary states, “the DoD’s lack of a comprehensive, coordinated approach to address UAP may pose a threat to military forces and national security.”

One significant concern highlighted in the summary is the absence of an overarching UAP policy within the DoD. This gap means that there is no assurance of identifying and mitigating potential national security and flight safety threats posed by UAPs. The DoD OIG emphasizes the need for a unified policy, as the current state lacks “assurance that national security and flight safety threats to the United States from UAP have been identified and mitigated.”

To address these shortcomings, the DoD OIG has proposed 11 total recommendations to various defense bodies, including the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, and the Director of the All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office. These recommendations focus on establishing a coherent policy integrating roles, responsibilities, and coordination procedures relating to UAP into the existing framework of intelligence, counterintelligence, and force protection policies.

The summary serves as a call to action for the DoD to formulate a consistent approach to UAP incidents, encompassing aspects of intelligence gathering, analysis, and policy formulation. The need for a unified response is critical in ensuring the security and safety of military operations and national interests in the face of unidentified aerial phenomena.

The unclassified summary of the report, now accessible to the public, is obviously a trimmed down version of the classified report issued last August. The Black Vault, since August 2023, has had an open case for the review and release of the report. Updates on that will be posted, when available.

Document Archive

Unclassified Summary of Report No. DODIG-2023-109, “Evaluation of the DoD’s Actions Regarding Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena,” August 15, 2023 [16 Pages, 2.5MB]

Loading...

Taking too long?

Reload document

| Open in new tab

Download [2.57 MB]

The post IG’s Evaluation of the DoD’s Actions Regarding Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena Finally Released first appeared on The Black Vault.

Agencies periodically conduct their own special investigations and produce reports about certain allegations against their respective departments.

For example, the CIA Inspector General produced a report regarding the allegations of the connection between the CIA and drug trafficking.  Each agency will do the same types of investigations.

Below, you will find reports and indexes that are relevant.  I decided to compile them here in one archive, as it is interesting to show a complete set of allegations/investigations.

Declassified Documents

Air Force

Air Force Office of the Inspector General Closed Investigations, 2017-2020 [5 Pages, 2.3MB]

AMTRAK

 AMTRAK/OIG Closed Investigations, 2016 [5 Pages, 2.3MB]

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Inspector General

CIA Inspector General Report of Investigation: Improper Handling of Classified Information by John M. Deutch, February 18, 2000 [84 Pages, 266kb]

 CIA Inspector General Report of Dumping Hazardous Material into Potomac at CIA HQ, February 2, 2000 [33 Pages, 4.14MB]

List of CIA/IG Closed Investigations, June 2014 – December 2016 [15 Pages, 6MB]

List of CIA/IG Closed Investigations, January 1, 2005 – May 2014 [33 Pages, 4.4MB]

List of CIA/IG Closed Investigations, January 1, 1997 – October 5, 2004 [57 Pages, 15.1MB]

List of CIA Inspections and Special Studies, 1994-1997 [26 Pages, 2.49MB]

List of CIA Inspections and Special Studies, 1990-1994 [16 Pages, 4.2MB]

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

 DIA/IG Closed Investigations, 2016 [2 Pages, 1.5MB]
 DIA/IG Closed Investigations, 2014-2015 [5 Pages, 1.3MB]
 DIA/IG Closed Investigations, 2011-2013 [5 Pages, 1.2MB]
 DIA/IG Closed Investigations, 2005-2008 [12 Pages, 4.6MB]

Department of Agriculture Inspector General (USDA)

 Department of Agriculture Closed Investigation Logs, 2016 [13 Pages, 1.8MB]
 Department of Agriculture Closed Investigation Logs, 2014-2015 [22 Pages, 7.7MB]

Department of the Army (ARMY)

 Department of the Army Closed Investigation Logs, January 2010 – September 2016 [100 Pages, 21.9MB]

Department of Commerce Inspector General

 Department of Commerce Closed Investigation Logs, 2016 [21 Pages, 4.2MB]

 Department of Commerce Closed Investigation Logs, 2014-2015 [17 Pages, 2.3MB]

 Department of Commerce Closed Investigation Logs, 2000-2005 [28 Pages, 1.1MB]

Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General

 Department of Defense Closed Investigation Logs, 2016 [21 Pages, 4.2MB]

Department of Education (ED) Inspector General

 Department of Education Closed Investigation Logs, 2016 [4 Pages, 1.8MB]

Department of Energy (DOE) Inspector General

 Department of Energy Closed Investigation Logs, 2014-2015 [11 Pages, 1.7MB]

 DOE/IG Investigation into Fisker Automotive, 2012 [32 Pages, 1.96MB] – On 26 March 2012, the DOE was notified about a misuse of funds and questionable business practices by Fisker Automotive.  They previously had received DOE Loan Program Office financing.  These files are the first release relating to their investigation.

 National Nuclear Security Administration Nuclear Weapons Systems Configuration Management, March 2014 [30 Pages, 0.8MB] – The Office of Inspector General received multiple allegations regarding the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) management of configuration management (CM) information.  The allegations related to incomplete product definitions for NNSA nuclear weapons, and ineffective management of classified nuclear weapons drawings, a situation that could lead to unauthorized changes to the drawings.  In response, we initiated this audit to determine whether NNSA had maintained accurate and complete CM information for nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons components to support safe, sound and timely decisions related to these devices. The review substantiated the allegations and identified instances in which NNSA had not maintained accurate and complete CM information for its nuclear weapons and components.

 DOE/IG Finds 6 BILLION U.S. Dollars MISSING, March 20, 2014 [9 Pages, 1.78MB] – The Office of Inspector General (OIG), in recent audits, investigations, and inspections, has identified significant vulnerabilities in the management of contract file documentation that could expose the Department to substantial financial losses. Specifically, over the past 6 years, OIG has identified Department of State (Department) contracts with a total value of more than $6 billion in which contract files were incomplete or could not be located at all. The failure to maintain contract files adequately creates significant financial risk and demonstrates a lack of internal control over the Department’s contract actions.

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Inspector General

2016 [87 Pages – 1.87MB]

April 1, 2009 – September 30, 2009 [87 Pages – 1.87MB]

October 1, 2008 – March 31, 2009 [71 Pages – 2.66MB]

April 1, 2008 – September 30, 2008 [72 Pages – 2.70MB]

October 1, 2007 – March 31, 2008 [56 Pages – 3.5MB]

April 1, 2007 – September 30, 2007 [56 Pages – 2.8MB]

October 1, 2006 – March 31, 2007 [104 Pages – 2MB]

April 1, 2006 – September 30, 2006 [102 Pages – 8.76MB]

October 1, 2005 – March 31, 2006 [88 Pages – 413kb]

April 1, 2005 to September 30, 2005 [74 Pages – 62MB]

October 1, 2004 to March 31, 2005 [60 Pages – 1.32MB]

April 1, 2004 to September 30, 2004 [86 Pages – 3.53MB]

October 1, 2003 to March 31, 2004 [86 Pages – 3.53MB]

April 1, 2003 to September 30, 2003 [62 Pages – 1.24MB]

October 1, 2002 to March 31, 2003 [54 Pages – 963kb]

Department of Housing and Urban Development

HUD/OIG Congressional Response – 2015-2016 [121 Pages – 1.4MB] – HUD OIG response to a Congressional Request for a list of closed investigations not disclosed to the public – 2015-2016.

HUD/OIG Investigations Regarding HUD Employees – 2015 [3 Pages – 1.1MB] – This is an interim release, and is an index of potentially responsive records. The actual case files will be sent to me in the future, and once received, I will add them here.

Department of Interior (DOI) Inspector General

 DOI/IG Closed Investigation Logs, 2016 [6 Pages, 1.2MB]
 DOI/IG Closed Investigation Logs, 2014-2015 [32 Pages, 1.96MB]

Department of Justice (DOJ) Inspector General

 DOI/IG Closed Investigation Logs, 2017-2020 [30 Pages, 0.4MB]
 DOI/IG Closed Investigation Logs, 2014-2015 [16 Pages, 2.1MB]

Department of State

 DOS/IG Closed Investigations, 2013-2015 [8 Pages, 3.6MB]

Department of Transportation (DOT)

 DOT/IG Closed Investigations, 2016 [8 Pages, 0.7MB]

Department of Treasury Inspector General (TOIG)

 DOT/IG Closed Investigations, 2016 [7 Pages, 0.8MB]

Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)

 VA/IG Closed Investigations, 2014-2015 [111 Pages, 17.4MB]

Director of National Intelligence Inspector General

 ODNI OIG Semi-Annual Reports, published in 2013 [98 Pages – 8.82MB]
 ODNI OIG Semi-Annual Reports, 1 April – 30 September 2014 & 1 October – 31 March 2015 [104 Pages – 32MB]
 ODNI OIG Closed Investigations, 2016-2019 [7 Pages – 2.0MB]
 ODNI OIG Closed Investigations, 2014-2015 [4 Pages – 1.0MB]

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

 EPA/IG Closed Investigations, 2016 [3 Pages, 1.1MB]

The Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM)

EXIM OIG IG Investigations, 2016 [4 Pages – 2.8MB]
EXIM OIG IG Investigations, 2014-2015 [6 Pages – 2.8MB]

Farm Credit Administration (FCA) Inspector General

 FCA/IG Investigations Closed 2015-2016 [3 Pages, 0.5MB]

Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Inspector General

 FCC/IG Investigations Closed 2016 [6 Pages, 0.6MB]
 FCC/IG Investigations Closed 2014-2015 [4 Pages, 0.9MB]
 FCC/IG Investigations Closed 2005-2013 [11 Pages, 1.8MB]

Federal Election Commission (FEC) Inspector General

 FEC/IG Investigations Closed 2014-2015 [1 Page, 0.4MB] – I did confirm – the FEC only did one IG investigation during this time period.

Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) Inspector General

 FHFA/IG Investigations Closed 2016 [18 Pages, 7.5MB]

Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Inspector General

 FTC/IG Investigations Closed 2016 [65 Pages, 10.7MB] – The FTC gave their semi annual reports for Congress, when responding for a log. I have written for clarification since this differs greatly from other agency responses.

General Services Administration (GSA) Inspector General

 GSA/IG Investigations Closed 2016 [12 Pages, 0.8MB]

Government Accountability Office (GAO) Inspector General

 GAO/IG Investigations Closed 2014-2015 [4 Pages, 0.7MB]

Health and Human Services (HHS) Inspector General

 IG Investigations Closed 2016 [24 Pages – 1.1MB]
 IG Investigations Closed 2005-2008 [150 Pages – 3.37MB]

Housing and Urban Development Inspector General

IG Investigations Involving HUD Employees Closed 2015

      16-IGF-OIG-00148.pdf             968K  
      2011HQ002041I_roi_Redacted.pdf   3.1M  
      2014SI000850I_roi_Redacted.pdf   1.1M  
      2014SI001273I_roi_Redacted.pdf   1.8M  
      2014SI001671I_roi_Redacted.pdf   3.9M  
      2014SI001699I_roi_Redacted.pdf   1.0M  
      2015SI000137I_roi_Redacted.pdf   2.5M  
      2015SI000166I_roi_Redacted.pdf   692K  
      2015SI000238I_roi_Redacted.pdf   2.1M  
      2015SI000239I_roi_Redacted.pdf    14M  
      2015SI000251I_roi_Redacted.pdf   1.2M  
      2015SI000289I_roi_Redacted.pdf   476K  
      2015SI000290I_roi_Redacted.pdf   4.2M  
      2015SI000412I_roi_Redacted.pdf   2.4M  
      2015SI000423I_roi_Redacted.pdf   2.8M  
      2015SI000444I_roi_Redacted.pdf   2.6M  
      2015s1000474i_roi_Redacted.pdf   3.1M

National Archives and Records Administration (NARA)

NARA/IG Investigations Closed 2016 [12 Pages – 2.3MB]

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)

NASA/IG Investigations Closed 2016 [10 Pages – 3.4MB]

National Credit Union Administration (NCUA)

NCUA/IG Investigations Closed 2016 [2 Pages – 0.4MB]

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)

NGA/IG Investigations Closed 2016 [12 Pages – 2.9MB]
NGA/IG Investigations Closed 2014-2015 [12 Pages – 2.3MB]

National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)

NLRB/IG Investigations Closed 2016 [3 Pages – 1.9MB]

National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Inspector General

 IG Investigations Closed 2016  [3 Pages – 1.0MB]
 IG Investigations Closed 2014-2015  [6 Pages – 3.5MB]
 Inspection of the National Reconnaissance Office Declassification Activities, 22 October 2014 [34 Pages – 4.1MB]

National Security Agency (NSA) Inspector General

IG Investigations Closed 2017-2020  [23 Pages – 6.5MB]
 IG Investigations Closed 2010-2017  [23 Pages – 6.5MB]
 IG Investigations Closed 2014-2015  [5 Pages – 1.9MB] – (This duplicated the above release, but is archived here for reference)
 IG Investigations Closed 2005-2008  [10 Pages – 2.1MB]

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Inspector General

 NRC/IG Investigations Closed 2016 [6 Pages – 0.6MB]
 NRC/IG Investigations Closed 2014-2015 [6 Pages – 3.5MB]

Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Inspector General

 OPM/IG Investigations Closed 2016 [7 Pages – 0.6MB]
 OPM/IG Investigations Closed 2014-2015 [8 Pages – 0.5MB]

Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) Inspector General

 SEC/IG Investigations Closed 2016 [3 Pages – 0.6MB]

 SEC/IG Investigations Closed 2014-2015 [2 Pages – 0.5MB]

Small Business Administration (SBA) Inspector General

SBA/IG Investigations Closed 2014-2015 [4 Pages – 0.6MB]
 SBA/IG Investigations Closed 2016 [4 Pages – 0.6MB] – Still seeking an index that has case names, or summaries, or anything more than what was released here.

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR)

 SIGAR/IG Investigations Closed 01/01/2011 – 08/01/2013 [16 Pages – 2.4MB]

The Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA)

 TIGTA Investigations Closed 2016 [186 Pages – 35.9MB]

United States Postal Service (USPS) Inspector General

 OIG Management Alert HR-MA-14-002, Mail Isolation, Control, and Tracking, December 3, 2013 [15 Pages – 2.4MB]

The post Agency Inspector General Reports and Investigations first appeared on The Black Vault.

The Black Vault filed a FOIA request for this report on September 28, 2016, and it was not released until October 28, 2022. The redacted version is below:

Document Archive

Evaluation of DoD Nuclear Enterprise Governance (DODIG-2016-25) [62 Pages, 13MB]

Loading...

Taking too long?

Reload document

| Open in new tab

Download [12.79 MB]

The post Evaluation of DoD Nuclear Enterprise Governance (DODIG-2016-25) first appeared on The Black Vault.

It was received by The Black Vault from the NSA, through MDR case 103586.

Document Archive

Final Report of the Audit on the FISA Amendments Act §702 Detasking Requirements, 24 November 2010, AU-10-0023 [57 Pages, 21MB]

The post Final Report of the Audit on the FISA Amendments Act §702 Detasking Requirements, 24 November 2010, AU-10-0023 first appeared on The Black Vault.

Document Archive

Alleged Unauthorized Disclosure – Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community – Case: 18-0001-IN – 2018 [22 Pages, 6MB]

Loading...

Taking too long?

Reload document

| Open in new tab

Download [6.07 MB]

The post Alleged Unauthorized Disclosure – Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community – Case: 18-0001-IN – 2018 first appeared on The Black Vault.

The Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (IC IG) Investigations Division (INV) completed an investigation into possible improprieties in the hiring of an employee.

Document Archive

The investigation archived here was in a FOIA request asking for two “Conflict of Interest” cases. Both are available in the pdf below:

Director of National Intelligence, Inspector General, Investigation 18-0011-IN, “Possible Improprieties with the Hiring Process of an Employee”  [20 Pages, 6.4MB]

Loading...

Taking too long?

Reload document

| Open in new tab

Download [6.30 MB]

The post Director of National Intelligence, Inspector General, Investigation 18-0011-IN, “Possible Improprieties with the Hiring Process of an Employee” first appeared on The Black Vault.

On January 29, 2018, the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community ( IC IG), Investigations Division ( INV), received a referral from the Office of General Counsel (OGC ), Office of the Director for National Intelligence (ODNI) regarding a possible violation of a criminal conflict of interest provision…

Document Archive

The investigation archived here was in a FOIA request asking for two “Conflict of Interest” cases. Both are available in the pdf below:

Director of National Intelligence, Inspector General, Investigation 18-0010-IN, “Conflict of Interest” [20 Pages, 6.4MB]

Loading...

Taking too long?

Reload document

| Open in new tab

Download [6.30 MB]

The post Director of National Intelligence, Inspector General, Investigation 18-0010-IN, “Conflict of Interest” first appeared on The Black Vault.

The United States Office of Government Ethics (OGE) is a separate agency within the executive branch of the U.S. Federal Government which is responsible for directing executive branch policies relating to the prevention of conflicts of interest on the part of Federal executive branch officers and employees. Primary duties include establishing the executive branch standards of conduct; issuing rules and regulations interpreting the criminal conflict of interest restrictions; establishing the framework for the public and confidential financial disclosure systems for executive branch employees; developing training and education programs for use by executive branch ethics officials and employees; and setting the requirements for, supporting, and reviewing individual agency ethics programs to ensure they are functioning properly.

Document Archive

 U.S. Postal Service Ethics Program Reviews for 2006, 2000, 1995, 1993, 1991, 1987 and 1981 [88 Pages, 2.5MB]

Loading...

Taking too long?

Reload document

| Open in new tab

Download [2.42 MB]

The post U.S. Postal Service Ethics Program Reviews first appeared on The Black Vault.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) mismanaged the distribution of commodities in response to Hurricanes Irma and Maria in Puerto Rico. FEMA lost visibility of about 38 percent of its commodity shipments to Puerto Rico, worth an estimated $257 million. Commodities successfully delivered to Puerto Rico took an average of 69 days to reach their final destinations. Inadequate FEMA contractor oversight contributed to the lost visibility and delayed commodity shipments. FEMA did not use its Global Positioning System transponders to track commodity shipments, allowed the contractor to break inventory seals, and did not ensure documented proof of commodity deliveries. Given the lost visibility and delayed shipments, FEMA cannot ensure it provided commodities to Puerto Rico disaster survivors as needed to sustain life and alleviate suffering as part of its response and recovery mission.

Document Archive

FEMA Mismanaged the Commodity Distribution Process in Response to Hurricanes Irma and Maria, September 25, 2020 [48 Pages, 3MB]

Loading...

Taking too long?

Reload document

| Open in new tab

Download [3.12 MB]

The post FEMA Mismanaged the Commodity Distribution Process in Response to Hurricanes Irma and Maria, September 25, 2020 first appeared on The Black Vault.

The allegations addressed in this investigation, were that Zerene Aerospace was dealing in fraudulent aircraft parts and allegedly manufacturing aircraft skins, including wing components and control surfaces out of blocks of aluminum for various aircrafts, specifically the U.S. Air Force (USAF) E-3 (military version of the Boeing 707). Also, Zerene was allegedly changing data plates on various parts for both military and civilian aircraft. The weight of the items manufactured by Zerene was heavier than appropriate parts, indicating Zerene was using a different grade of aluminum. Zerene was not an authorized Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) repair station or a Department of Defense (DOD) contractor and consequently not in conformance to industry standards.

Initial surveillance revealed that aircraft parts were being manufactured at Zerene and on several occasions, several persons related to FAA Repair Stations and Aircraft Parts Brokers were observed at Zerene. In response to this information, a task force, titled “Operation Wingspan” was created involving several Federal Law Enforcement Agencies.

Document Archive

Operation Wingspan, Department of Transportation Inspector General Investigation I08A0003320401, August 2, 2013 [15 Pages, 0.5MB]

Loading...

Taking too long?

Reload document

| Open in new tab

Download [477.92 KB]

The post Operation Wingspan, Department of Transportation Inspector General Investigation I08A0003320401, August 2, 2013 first appeared on The Black Vault.

Office of the Secretary of Defense personnel responsible for deciding the realignment or closure of military installations based on the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) data calls and National Security Agency management personnel should read this report. The report discusses the validity, integrity, and supporting documentation of the data provided by the National Security Agency to assist the Secretary of Defense in BRAC 2005 recommendations.

Document Archive

National Security Agency Data Call Submissions and Internal Control Processes for Base Realignment and Closure 2005, May 13, 2005, Report No. 05-INTEL-10 [30 Pages, 5.5MB]

Loading...

Taking too long?

Reload document

| Open in new tab

Download [5.71 MB]

The post National Security Agency Data Call Submissions and Internal Control Processes for Base Realignment and Closure 2005, May 13, 2005, Report No. 05-INTEL-10 first appeared on The Black Vault.

The Department of Justice (Department) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) undertook this review to examine certain actions by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department during an FBI investigation opened on July 31, 2016, known as “Crossfire Hurricane,” into whether individuals associated with the Donald J. Trump for President Campaign were coordinating, wittingly or unwittingly, with the Russian government’s efforts to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.

Document Archive

Department of Justice Inspector General Report on FISA Applications and Other Aspects of the FBI’s Crossfire Hurricane Investigation, December 2019  – REVISED – [480 Pages, 33MB] I stumbled on a “revised” version of the report a few days after it was released. You will find the “revised” changes on page 3 of this .pdf, and the original is archived below.

Department of Justice Inspector General Report on FISA Applications and Other Aspects of the FBI’s Crossfire Hurricane Investigation, December 2019  [476 Pages, 33MB]

The post Department of Justice Inspector General Report on FISA Applications and Other Aspects of the FBI’s Crossfire Hurricane Investigation, December 2019 first appeared on The Black Vault.

On 10 April 1997, the President’s National Security Adviser indicated in a letter to the Senate Majority Leader that he would direct the Intelligence Community to prepare a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Vietnam’s cooperation with the United States on Prisoner of War/Missing in Action (POW/MIA) issues. Terms of Reference for the estimate were formulated by the National Intelligence Council and coordinated with members of the Intelligence Community and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. The draft estimate was presented to the Military Intelligence Board and the National Foreign Intelligence Board for approval in April 1998, and NIE 98-03, “Vietnamese Intentions, Capabilities, and Performance Concerning the POW/MIA Issue,” was published in May 1998.

Senator Robert C. Smith issued A Critical Assessment of the NIE in November 1998 and asked that the Military Intelligence Board and the National Foreign Intelligence Board retract the estimate for reasons cited in his assessment. In January 1999, the Director of Central Intelligence advised. Senator Smith that both boards had voted unanimously to let the estimate stand, describing it as an accurate assessment of current knowledge and understanding of the POW/MIA issue. Senator Smith continued to demand that the estimate be retracted and, on 18 March 1999, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence requested that the Inspectors General of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense examine the estimate and the charges made in the Critical Assessment. We began a joint inquiry in mid-April 1999.

Document Archive

A Review of the 1998 National Intelligence Estimate on POW/MIA Issues and the Charges Levied by A Critical Assessment of the Estimate, 29 February 2000 [178 Pages, 7.8MB]

Loading...

Taking too long?

Reload document

| Open in new tab

Download [7.16 MB]

The post A Review of the 1998 National Intelligence Estimate on POW/MIA Issues and the Charges Levied by A Critical Assessment of the Estimate, 29 February 2000 first appeared on The Black Vault.

According to the document:

“The Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency conducted a joint inspection of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) from October through December 1995. The goal of the inspection was to determine the efficiency and effectiveness of the processes and mechanisms to manage and administer NRO resources and administrative programs. The objectives to: evaluate the authorities and delegations of thc NRO and oversight organizations; evaluate the processes to identify mission requirements and plan and organize resources for them; evaluate internal  administrative and management programs; and, evaluate internal management oversight processes.”

I requested the document under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in June of 2016, and it was finally released in April of 2018.

Note: Strangely, the letter erred on multiple dates. It said the date of the letter was April 27, 2017, but was actually sent the same day in 2018. It also notes my request was from 2006, but actually, it was 2016. Unclear why the mistakes, but alas, I wanted to point them out for clarity.

Document Archive

 1996 Joint Inspection of the National Reconnaissance Office, Inspection Report No. 96-014, 23 July 1996 [166 Pages, 15.1MB]

Loading...

Taking too long?

Reload document

| Open in new tab

Download [14.39 MB]

The post 1996 Joint Inspection of the National Reconnaissance Office, Inspection Report No. 96-014, 23 July 1996 first appeared on The Black Vault.

In October of 2012, multiple complaints were filed against the CIA’s Inspector General David Buckley.  They detailed allegations of “cronyism” and misuse of power, in which General Buckley issued a formal letter reply.

In November of 2017, I requested records pertaining to this investigation, from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The FBI chairs the investigations into matters such as these.

On November 29, 2017, the FBI sent a CD with some responsive material. They are continuing to process my request for additional records, but what has been released thus far is General Buckey’s official response, and a copy of some (all?) of the complaints.

Additional documents will be posted when available.

Document Archive

 FBI Release #1 [42 Pages, 22.8MB]

The post Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) Investigation into Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Inspector General General David Buckley first appeared on The Black Vault.

This administrative investigation was initiated upon receipt of information from [[ REDACTED ]] NASA-OIG, who advised [[ REDACTED ]] in Pittsburgh, PA contacted her regarding a computer with a plate labeled Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) NASA Property and reels of magnetic data tape (reel tapes), several labeled 1969, that were found while an acquaintance was cleaning the residence of a deceased person.

The Investigation

 NASA OIG Investigation: Recovery of Possibly Historical 1969 NASA Data Tapes, December 4, 2015 [61 Pages, 14.8MB]

The post NASA OIG Investigation: Recovery of Possibly Historical 1969 NASA Data Tapes, December 4, 2015 first appeared on The Black Vault.

BRAC 2005 is the formal process outlined in Public Law l 01-51 0, “Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990,” as amended, under which the Secretary of Defense may realign or close military installations inside the United States and it’s territories. As part of BRAC 2005, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics issued, “Transformation Through Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC 2005) Policy Memorandum One-Policy,
ResponsibilitiesJ and Procedures,” April 16, 2003, which stated that the DoD Office of Inspector General would review the accuracy ofBRAC data and the certification process.

The BRAC 2005 process was mandated for the United States and its territories and was divided into the following data cal ls- capacity analysis, supplemental capacity, Military value, Cost of Base Realignment Actions, Joint Process Action Team Criterion Number 7, and scenario specific. The Intelligence agencies’ collection process was divided into the following data calls- capacity analysis and Military value, and scenario specific.

This report summarizes the data calls as of April 2005, for the Defense Intelligence Agency BRAC 2005 process. The Defense Intelligence Agency, located in Washington DC, is a member of the National Intelligence Community and a primary producer of foreign military intelligence. The Defense Intelligence Agency was required to perform t·he capacity analysis, Military value, and scenario specific data calls. The DIA was responsible for collecting data from the Joint Intelligence Commands and the Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers. which were required to perform only the capacity analysis and Military value data calls.

Document Archive

 Defense Intelligence Agency Data Call Submissions and Internal Control Processes for Base Realignment and Closure 2005, May 13, 2005 [33 Pages, 5.7MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/dod/05-INTEL-09.pdf

The post Defense Intelligence Agency Data Call Submissions and Internal Control Processes for Base Realignment and Closure 2005, May 13, 2005 first appeared on The Black Vault.

According to the report:

“We have audited the accompanying financial statements of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), which comprise the balance sheet as of September 30, 2015, the related statement of net cost and changes in net position, and the combined statement of budgetary resources (hereinafter referred to as the “financial statements”) for the year then ended, as well as the related notes to the financial statements.

Management is responsible for the preparation and fair presentation of the financial statements in accordance with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States of America; this includes the design, implementation, and maintenance of internal control relevant to the preparation and fair presentation of financial statements that are free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error.

Our responsibility is to express an opinion on the financial statements based on our audit. We conducted our audit in accordance with auditing standards generally accepted in the United States of America; the standards applicable to financial audits contained in Government Auditing Standards, issued by the Comptroller General of the United States; and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Bulletin No. 15-02, Audit Requirements for Federal Financial Statements. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free from material misstatement.”

The Audit

 Audit of the National Reconnaissance Office Fiscal Year 2015 Financial Statements, 13 November 2015 [20 Pages, 2.9MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/nro/F-2017-00040.pdf

The post Audit of the National Reconnaissance Office Fiscal Year 2015 Financial Statements, 13 November 2015 first appeared on The Black Vault.

The Intelligence Community (IC) defines the term insider threat as an insider using her/his authorized access, wittingly or unwittingly, to do harm to the security of the United States. As recently experienced by the IC and the Department of Defense, this harm can take many forms, including industrial espionage, unauthorized disclosure of classified information, or even violent acts. This is an organization-wide risk that is not limited to information technology or counterintelligence (CI).

To address the magnitude of this risk, in October 2011, the President released an Executive Order (E.0.)1 requiring departments and agencies to establish an insider threat program. The President subsequently issued several additional memoranda that established the National Insider Threat Policy clarifying his expectations for protecting federal entities.

Under Presidential direction, the National Insider Threat Task Force (NIITF) issued guidance on how to comply with the National Insider Threat Policy and specified what must be included in an insider threat program. It prescribed a coordinated effort across multiple disciplines. Examples ofthese disciplines include Personnel Security, Law Enforcement, Privacy and Civil Liberties, Human Resources, Information Assurance, CI, and Office of Inspector General (OIG). These interrelated disciplines are supposed to form an agency-wide safety net, including government and contractors, to deter, detect, and mitigate actions by employees who may represent a threat to national security.

Accepting that an insider threat program takes time to mature, the President provided a timeline for agencies to reach initial operating capability with their respective Insider Threat Programs. The NITTF, with White House concurrence, clarified that by 20 May 2013, all agencies must

1. (U) designate an insider threat senior official(s ),
2. (U) issue an insider threat policy signed by the department or agency head, and
3. (U) submit to department or agency leadership an insider threat program
implementation plan that addresses how the organization intends to meet the
requirements set forth in the minimum standards.

The Investigation

 Audit of the National Reconnaissance Office Insider Threat Program (Project Number 2015-002 A), 30 April 2015 [9 Pages, 1.8MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/nro/F-2017-00045.pdf

The post Audit of the National Reconnaissance Office Insider Threat Program (Project Number 2015-002 A), 30 April 2015 first appeared on The Black Vault.

According to the HUD/OIG website:

The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Inspector General is one of the original 12 Inspectors General authorized under the Inspector General Act of 1978.

Over the years, we have forged a strong alliance with HUD personnel in recommending ways to improve departmental operations and in prosecuting program abuses. We strive to make a difference in HUD’s performance and accountability.

We are committed to our statutory mission of detecting and preventing fraud, waste, and abuse and promoting the effectiveness and efficiency of government operations. While organizationally we are located within the Department, we operate independently with separate budgetary authority.

This independence allows for clear and objective reporting to the Secretary and the Congress. Our activities seek to:

• Promote efficiency and effectiveness in programs and operations;
• Detect and deter fraud and abuse;
• Investigate allegations of misconduct by HUD employees; and
• Review and make recommendations regarding existing and proposed legislation and regulations affecting HUD.

The Executive Office and the Offices of Audit, Investigation, Counsel, and Management and Technology are located in Headquarters. Also, the Offices of Audit and Investigation have staff located in eight regions and numerous field offices.

Below, you will find HUD OIG Responses to Congressional Requests for a list of Closed Investigations not Disclosed to the Public, 2015-2016.

Document Archive

 HUD OIG Responses to a Congressional Request for a list of Closed Investigations not Disclosed to the Public, 2015-2016 [121 Pages, 1.4MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/hud/Congressional_data_call_rev_Redacted.pdf

The post HUD OIG Responses to a Congressional Request for a list of Closed Investigations not Disclosed to the Public, 2015-2016 first appeared on The Black Vault.

According to the document:

In November 1990, we started the “Audit of the Management of the ISLAND SUN Program.” ISLAND SUN is an unclassified nickname for a special access program. The overall audit objective was to review program management, which included a review of financial controls. The Defense Information · Systems Agency (DISA), formerly Defense Communications Agency, administered the FY · 1985 through 1990 ISLAND SUN funds. The Comptroller, Joint Staff became responsible for administering the ISLAND SUN funds effective october 1, 1990. The National Security Agency (NSA), used the funds to provide program management and contracting support to the program. The Director for Operations, Joint Staff is the program sponsor and directs the use of the ISLAND SUN
funds.

In administering the FY 1990 Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) funds, DISA did not report the correct obligation status of the ISLAND SUN program. As a result, amounts that should have been available for obligation by the Joint Staff were not available. We found $8.1 million in invalid obligations and $7.6 million in unrecorded obligations. The unrecorded obligations may be used to offset the invalid obligations. We also found that DISA has recorded $.2 million more in commitments than can be supported. Poor record keeping ties up funds that could be made available for other uses.

We issued a draft quick-reaction report so that DISA could correct the ISLAND SUN program’s obligation status and make FY 1990 RDT&E funds, expiring September 30, 1991, available to the Joint Staff.

Document Archive

 Final Quick-Reaction Report on the Defense Information Systems Agency’s Financial Support to the ISLAND SUN Program, October 1991 [15 Pages, 1.3MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/dod/islandsun-dodig1.pdf

The post Final Quick-Reaction Report on the Defense Information Systems Agency’s Financial Support to the ISLAND SUN Program, October 1991 first appeared on The Black Vault.

On June 9, 201 5, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Office of lnspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, initiated this investigation on the basis of information provided Director Andrew Ceresney , SEC Division of Enforcement NF), alleging that [       REDACTED       ]  was having an ongoing affair with a subordinate  [ REDACTED ] Attorney. After Ceresney and [ REDACTED ] Regional Director [ REDACTED ] became aware of the relations, [ REDACTED ] removed [ REDACTED ] supervisor.

The Investigation

 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Case #15-ENF-0290-I – Inappropriate Relationship With a Subordinate Employee [17 Pages, 3.9MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/SEC/15-ENF-0290-I.pdf

The post Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Case #15-ENF-0290-I – Inappropriate Relationship With a Subordinate Employee first appeared on The Black Vault.

The DoD OIG conducted this audit, the third in a series of audits on property accountability in support of OIR, to determine whether the Army had effective controls for processing and transferring ITEF equipment to the Iraqi government. The audit found that Army commands documented procedures for processing and transferring ITEF equipment to the Iraqi government. However, the 1st Theater Sustainment Command did not have effective controls to maintain complete visibility and accountability of the ITEF equipment in Kuwait and Iraq prior to transfer to the Iraqi government, and could not provide complete data for the quantity and dollar value of equipment on hand, including rolling stock and ammunition. As a result, the 1st Theater Sustainment Command did not have accurate, up-to-date records on the quantity and location of ITEF equipment on hand in Kuwait and Iraq, and did not have effective controls because it did not use centralized systems to maintain visibility and accountability of ITEF equipment. Instead, the 1st Theater Sustainment Command relied on multiple spreadsheets developed by different commands in both Kuwait and Iraq to provide it with visibility and accountability of equipment and did not consistently account for equipment in Iraq.

The DoD OIG recommended that the Commander, 1st Theater Sustainment Command, use automated systems to account for and provide complete visibility of ITEF equipment. The Command agreed with the recommendation and initiated steps to implement corrective actions.

Objective

The document states the objective of this investigation as:

We determined whether the Army had effective controls for processing and transferring Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF) equipment to the Government of Iraq.

This is the third in a series of audits on property accountability in support of Operation Inherent Resolve. ITEF, created by the FY 2015 National Defense Authorization Act, assists the Government of Iraq to combat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Examples of ITEF equipment provided to the Government of Iraq include body armor, navigation sets, magazine pouches, ambulances, and cargo trucks.

The Army’s 1st Theater Sustainment Command (1st TSC) maintains visibility and property accountability of ITEF equipment until transferred to the Government of Iraq.

Findings

Army commands documented procedures for processing and transferring ITEF equipment to the Government of Iraq. For example, the 1st TSC developed a standard operating procedure that includes step-by-step instructions for processing and transferring ITEF equipment. However, the 1st TSC did not have effective controls to maintain complete visibility and accountability of ITEF equipment in Kuwait and Iraq prior to transfer to the Government of Iraq.

Equipment visibility provides users with equipment location, movement, and status. Army Regulation 735-5 states that all property acquired by the Army will be continuously accounted for from the time of acquisition until the ultimate consumption or disposal of the property.

However, the 1st TSC could not provide complete data for the quantity and dollar value of equipment on hand, including rolling stock and ammunition. Rolling stock refers to vehicles. Examples include Mine Clearance Systems, ambulances, and wrecker trucks. 

The 1st TSC did not have effective controls because it did not use centralized systems to maintain visibility and accountability of ITEF equipment. Instead, the 1st TSC relied on multiple spreadsheets developed by different commands in both Kuwait and Iraq to provide it with visibility and accountability of equipment and did not consistently account for equipment in Iraq.

As a result, the 1st TSC did not have accurate, up-to-date records on the quantity and location of ITEF equipment on hand in Kuwait and Iraq. Accurate, up-to-date records of equipment on hand in Kuwait and Iraq are critical for filling equipment requests. The process to contact multiple commands and reference multiple spreadsheets to determine equipment quantities and location could delay the fulfillment of a request or delay the development of future requests. In addition, not having accurate records of equipment on hand could result in duplicate equipment requests. Further, the use of manually populated spreadsheets increased the risk for human-error when inputting and updating equipment data.

Document Archive

 The Army Did Not Implement Effective Controls To Maintain Visibility and Accountability of Iraq Train and Equip Fund Equipment, September 14, 2016 [27 Pages, 2.9MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/dod/DODIG-2016-00799.pdf

The post The Army Did Not Implement Effective Controls To Maintain Visibility and Accountability of Iraq Train and Equip Fund Equipment, September 14, 2016 first appeared on The Black Vault.

According to the report:

On September 21, 2015, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Office of the Inspector General (OIG), discovered that [ REDACTED ] Office of the Chief Accountant (OCA), may have transmitted nonpublic information from his personal Gmail e-mail account to his official SEC work e-mail account. Specifically, during the course of investigative activities related to OIG Case #15-COM-0419-I, the OIG found [ REDACTED ] forwarded an internal SEC e-mail and attachment dated April 12, 2015, [ REDACTED ]  

It appeared [ REDACTED ] forwarded this e-mail from his personal Gmail address on April 12, 2015. The content in the e-mail attachment included a narrative of highlights of [ REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED ] and recommendations to the Commission. As a result, on January 13, 2016, the OIG initiated a separate investigation concerning [ REDACTED ] improper handling of nonpublic SEC information.

The Investigation

 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) CASE# 16-COM-0209-1, Employee Emailed Non Public Information to Personal GMAIL Account [10 Pages, 2.0MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/ig/16-COM-0209-I-SEC.pdf

The post Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) CASE# 16-COM-0209-1, Employee Emailed Non Public Information to Personal GMAIL Account first appeared on The Black Vault.

Fifteen years after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, the terrorist threat remains in the United States and abroad, as evidenced by recent attacks in Paris, France; San Bernardino, California; Brussels, Belgium; Orlando, Florida; and Nice, France. The U.S.’s national security depends on the ability to share the right information with the right people at the right time. This requires sustained and responsible collaboration among federal, state, local, and tribal entities, as well as the private sector and international partners.

In response to a request from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, and the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Offices of Inspector General (OIG) of the Intelligence Community (IC), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) conducted a review of the domestic sharing of counterterrorism information. The OIGs concluded that the partners in the terrorism-related
Information Sharing Environment components of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), DHS, DOJ, and their state and local partners are committed to sharing counterterrorism information. The partners’ commitment to protecting the nation is illustrated by the actions taken before, during, and following terrorism-related incidents, as well as by programs and initiatives designed to improve sharing of counterterrorism information.

However, the OIGs also identified several areas in which improvements could enhance information sharing.

To share information effectively, the federal, state, and local entities actively involved in counterterrorism efforts must understand each other’s roles,  responsibilities, and contributions, especially with the involvement of multiple agencies, such as the DOJ’s Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and DHS’ U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), in complex investigations. Updating or establishing new information sharing agreements among such entities should enhance coordination and collaboration, and reaffirm and formalize the roles and responsibilities of partners in the current information sharing environment. Similarly, although there is a national information sharing strategy, its implementation has been viewed to be uneven. The OIGs believe that the ODNI, DHS, and DOJ should review the interagency information sharing memorandum of understanding (MOU) and take necessary actions to update intelligence information sharing standards and processes among the departments, which we believe would result in better implementation of the strategy.

The OIGs also identified improvements in various practices and processes of the partners involved in counterterrorism. At DHS, a lack of unity in its Intelligence Enterprise, issues in the field related to staffing and access to classified systems and facilities, as well as problems with intelligence reporting processes, have made the DHS Intelligence Enterprise less effective and valuable to the IC than it could be. DOJ can improve its counterterrorism information sharing efforts by developing and implementing a consolidated internal DOJ strategy, and evaluating the continued need and most effective utilization for the United States Attorney’s Offices’ Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council (ATAC) meetings. Further, the FBI should spur participation associated with Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) and improve its efforts to obtain partners’ input in the process of identifying and prioritizing counterterrorism threats. Within the ODNI, the Domestic DNI Representative program is hindered by large geographic regions, as well as the lack of a clear strategic vision and guidance. In addition, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Domestic Representative program, although well received in the field, has also struggled to sufficiently cover its regions. At the state and local level, due to unpredictable federal support, fusion centers are focused on sustaining operations rather than enhancing capabilities. Further, varying requirements for state and local security clearances sponsored by federal agencies can impede access to classified systems and facilities.

Our review resulted in 23 recommendations to help improve the sharing of counterterrorism information and ultimately, enhance the Nation’s ability to
prevent terrorist attacks. We discuss our findings in detail in the Findings and Recommendations section of the report.

The Investigation

 Review of Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information, March 2017 [85 Pages, 6.7MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/ig/a1721.pdf

The post Review of Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information, March 2017 first appeared on The Black Vault.