The report is divided into four parts:

1. ALA-17 Flare Tests: Examines the effectiveness of deploying one to three flares as decoys. The tests demonstrated successful missile decoying under most conditions, with a few exceptions.
2. C-130 Susceptibility: Analyzes the vulnerability of C-130 aircraft to ground-launched infrared-guided missiles during low-level flight. It was feasible to achieve missile lock-on at low offsets from the launch site, though larger offsets posed challenges.
3. QRC-399 Countermeasures: Evaluates the QRC-399 equipment’s ability to disrupt missile guidance systems. A high jamming-to-signal ratio was critical for success, particularly against the more agile ATOLL missile.
4. Infrared Radiometry: Assesses the effectiveness of airborne countermeasures and measures infrared emissions from target aircraft, providing insights into decoy probabilities and radiant intensities.

The findings contribute to understanding infrared countermeasure technologies and air-to-air and ground-to-air missile vulnerabilities.

Document Archive

HAVE CARGO Captive Flight Tests, Phase III, Volume IV [154 Pages, 53MB]

The post HAVE CARGO Captive Flight Tests, Phase III, Volume IV – August 1974 first appeared on The Black Vault.

According to Wikipedia:

Aurora was a rumored mid-1980s American reconnaissance aircraft. There is no substantial evidence that it was ever built or flown and it has been termed a myth.

The U.S. government has consistently denied such an aircraft was ever built. Aviation and space reference site Aerospaceweb.org concluded, “The evidence supporting the Aurora is circumstantial or pure conjecture, there is little reason to contradict the government’s position.”

Others come to different conclusions.

In 2006, veteran black project watcher and aviation writer Bill Sweetman said, “Does Aurora exist? Years of pursuit have led me to believe that, yes, Aurora is most likely in active development, spurred on by recent advances that have allowed technology to catch up with the ambition that launched the program a generation ago.”

Throughout my years running The Black Vault, I have seen and heard about the connection between the program name SENIOR CITIZEN, and it’s association with the rumored Aurora Program. However, it has been a struggle getting information about this.

Below are documents related to the Aurora, as released under the Freedom of Information Act.

Document Archive

Department of Defense

 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) Structure – Codes and Definitions for All DOD Components, April 2004 [2,160 Pages, 4.6MB] – This document shows the “Senior Citizen” designation and program element number. In addition, it lists the Aurora, with the program element 0101119F.

United States Air Force

Based on the above program element numbers, I filed FOIA requests for information relating to it. I filed to the Air Force, and the OSD/JS in hopes someone may shed light on what the program element was.

OSD/JS just forwarded my request to the Air Force, and the Air Force denied having any records on it.  It doesn’t make sense, so I appealed based on the document above, listing specifically the SENIOR CITIZEN Program Element (PE) number.

My appeal was denied as well.

Senior Citizen Program Element Request

 ALL FOIA Case Processing Notes, Letters, Memos etc. as released 23 April 2018 [58 Pages, 4.9MB]

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Aurora Program Element Request

Like the Senior Citizen program element above, this also received a “no records” response. What happened to ANY information regarding these program elements?

FOIA Response Dated February 7, 2020 [4 Pages, 1MB]

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Archived

Aurora – The Senior Citizen Program – The program was given the “GLOMAR RESPONSE” by the USAF in 1997. The letter is below:

The post The Senior Citizen Program – “The Aurora” first appeared on The Black Vault.

Background

In 1959 the CIA selected Lockheed’s A-12 over a Convair proposal called KINGFISH. On 26 January 1960, the CIA ordered 12 A-12 aircraft. After selection by the CIA, further design and production of the A-12 took place under the code-name OXCART.

Document Archive

Black Shield Mission BX 6847, 26 January 1968 [132 Pages, 4.2MB]

The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs

2017 Release  The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs [286 Pages, 39MB] 

Archived 2013 Release  The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and Oxcart Programs [407 Pages, 64.9MB]  (Source: The National Security Archive) – This document was re-reviewed and re-released. Both versions are archived here for reference.  This document also took fame as the most detailed account of Area 51 yet published by the U.S. Government.

Archived Unknown Date Release The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance – The U-2 and OXCART Programs 1954-1974 [390 Pages]

History of the Oxcart Program, 1 July 1968 [25 Pages]

Oxcart Facts [12 Pages]

Hiding OXCART in Plain Sight
(CIA Document Explaining Oxcart)

While the A-12 was being tested and refined, US officials mulled over two major issues concerning it. The first was whether to publicly disclose the OXCART program. The Department of Defense had grown concerned that it could not overtly explain all the money the Air Force was spending on its versions of the A-12. At the same time, some CIA and Pentagon officials recognized that crashes or sightings of test flights could compromise the project. With a turning radius of no less than 86 miles at full speed, the A-12 overflew a vast expanse of unrestricted territory. Soon after the first flights in April 1962, CIA and the Air Force changed the program’s cover story from involving an interceptor aircraft to a multipurpose satellite launch system.^[1]

In late 1962 and early 1963 the Department of Defense considered surfacing the YF-12A to provide a cover, reasoning that divulging the existence of a purely tactical aircraft would not reveal any clandestine collection capabilities. Voiced principally by CIA officials and James Killian and Edwin Land of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), the contrary argument—disclosing any version of the A-12 would compromise its design innovations, enable the Soviets to develop countermeasures, and destroy its value for reconnaissance—prevailed for the time being. The surfacing issue lingered, however, because OXCART technology would be useful for the Air Force’s supersonic B-70 bomber then under development, and for the proposed commercial supersonic transport that Congress was thinking about subsidizing. President Kennedy told CIA and the Pentagon to develop a plan for surfacing the OXCART program but to wait further instructions before proceeding.

By early 1964 the argument for disclosure had become persuasive. More A-12s were arriving at the test site and making more flights. The aircraft’s existence probably would be revealed eventually under circumstances the US government could not control, such as a training accident or equipment malfunction, or through a news leak. Commercial airline crews had sighted the A-12 in flight, and the editor of Aviation Week indicated that he knew about highly secret activities at the Skunk Works and would not let another publication scoop him. A key factor was that the Soviets’ TALL KING radar would be able to identify and track the A-12 despite its small, nonpersistent radar return. Finally, the White House’s reluctance to resume flights over Soviet territory would soon force a change in the A-12’s mission. Instead of flying over denied areas to collect strategic intelligence, it would most likely be used as a quick-reaction surveillance platform in fast-moving conflicts—a tactical function the Air Force should carry out, not CIA.^[2]

On 29 February 1964, the National Security Council decided to surface OXCART. Later that day, the White House announced the successful development of an advanced experimental aircraft, the A‑11, which has been tested in sustained flight at more than 2,000 miles per hour and at altitudes in excess of 70,000 feet. The performance of the A-11 far exceeds that of any other aircraft in the world today. The development of this aircraft has been made possible by major advances in aircraft technology of great significance for both military and commercial applications. The A‑11 aircraft now at Edwards Air Force Base are undergoing extensive tests to determine their capabilities as long-range interceptors.^[3]

For security reasons, the Air Force’s YF-12A interceptor was surfaced, not the A-12, and it was referred to as the A-11, at Kelly Johnson’s suggestion. None of the aircraft were already at Edwards, so two had to be rushed from the test site to support the cover story. Johnson recalled that “the aircraft were so hot that when they were moved into the new hanger the fire extinguishing nozzles came on and gave us a free wash job.”^[4] Testing of the A-12s continued at the secret facility; CIA’s involvement in the project remained classified, although it was widely assumed.

Surfacing the “A-11” unexpectedly embroiled program managers and technicians in a debate over using an OXCART aircraft to publicly set a world speed record. The presidential announcement stated that “[t]he world record for aircraft speed, currently held by the Soviets [1,665 mph], has been repeatedly broken in secrecy by the…A-11. The President has instructed the Department of Defense to demonstrate this capability with the procedure which, according to international rules, will permit the result of the test to be entered as a new world record.” CIA leaders strongly opposed using any of the A-12s to attempt this aeronautical feat. Of the four aircraft used in test flights, only Article 121 had reached the cited speed. Using it in the record trials would set back the testing schedule, jeopardize the aircraft, and undermine the security of the program because the differences between the CIA and Air Force versions would be noticed, and the record would have to be set under the auspices of an uncleared international aviation organization.^[5]

Consequently, the A-12 was kept out of the competition. No YF-12As were put forward right away because managers of that program were concentrating on armaments rather than speed. At the time, the interceptor had not flown above Mach 2.6. A plane was not ready for the speed trial for over a year. Then on 1 May 1965, a YF-12A set speed and altitude records of 2,070.1 mph and 80,257.65 feet—the first of many for OXCART aircraft.

Footnotes

1. Scoville to Joseph Charyk (Undersecretary of the Air Force), “Interdepartmental Cover Support for Project OXCART,” 29 May 1962.

2. McCone untitled memorandum to DDCI Marshall Carter, 10 February 1964; “Briefing Note for the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence…Factors Influencing Decision to Surface the A-11,” 10 March 1964.

3. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, 1:322-23.

4. Johnson, “History of the OXCART Program,” 15-16.

5. Jack C. Ledford (Director, OSA) memorandum to Wheelon, “Effect on OXCART Program if Aircraft S/N 121 is Used for Speed Record Attempt,” 19 August 1964; Ledford memorandum to McCone, “Effect of Using OXCART 121 for Speed Record Attempt,” 20 August 1964; Carter letter to Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus R. Vance, 24 August 1964; Cunningham memorandum to McCone, “Establishment of World Record of Aircraft Speed by the A-11,” 28 April 1964.

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The post Project Oxcart – The Lockheed A-12 Reconnaissance Aircraft first appeared on The Black Vault.

Project Isinglass was the code name given to two heavily classified, manned reconnaissance aircraft studied by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as potential replacements for the Lockheed A-12 and SR-71 during the mid 1960s.

The first proposal under the Isinglass name, a high-altitude plane to fly at Mach 4 to 5, was considered an insufficient advancement over existing aircraft; the second, much more advanced design, sometimes referred to as Project Rheinberry, was an air-launched, Mach 20 rocket-powered boost-glide aircraft that would use a very-high-altitude trajectory to avoid defenses. This aircraft was considered too costly for development, and the project was abandoned in 1967.

Below, are documents received about Project Isinglass.

National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Documents

 ISINGLASS Research & Development Program, 1966 [125 Pages, 14.5MB]

The post Project Isinglass first appeared on The Black Vault.