The Army Did Not Implement Effective Controls To Maintain Visibility and Accountability of Iraq Train and Equip Fund Equipment, September 14, 2016

Background

The DoD OIG conducted this audit, the third in a series of audits on property accountability in support of OIR, to determine whether the Army had effective controls for processing and transferring ITEF equipment to the Iraqi government. The audit found that Army commands documented procedures for processing and transferring ITEF equipment to the Iraqi government. However, the 1st Theater Sustainment Command did not have effective controls to maintain complete visibility and accountability of the ITEF equipment in Kuwait and Iraq prior to transfer to the Iraqi government, and could not provide complete data for the quantity and dollar value of equipment on hand, including rolling stock and ammunition. As a result, the 1st Theater Sustainment Command did not have accurate, up-to-date records on the quantity and location of ITEF equipment on hand in Kuwait and Iraq, and did not have effective controls because it did not use centralized systems to maintain visibility and accountability of ITEF equipment. Instead, the 1st Theater Sustainment Command relied on multiple spreadsheets developed by different commands in both Kuwait and Iraq to provide it with visibility and accountability of equipment and did not consistently account for equipment in Iraq.

The DoD OIG recommended that the Commander, 1st Theater Sustainment Command, use automated systems to account for and provide complete visibility of ITEF equipment. The Command agreed with the recommendation and initiated steps to implement corrective actions.

Objective

The document states the objective of this investigation as:

We determined whether the Army had effective controls for processing and transferring Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF) equipment to the Government of Iraq.

This is the third in a series of audits on property accountability in support of Operation Inherent Resolve. ITEF, created by the FY 2015 National Defense Authorization Act, assists the Government of Iraq to combat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Examples of ITEF equipment provided to the Government of Iraq include body armor, navigation sets, magazine pouches, ambulances, and cargo trucks.

The Army’s 1st Theater Sustainment Command (1st TSC) maintains visibility and property accountability of ITEF equipment until transferred to the Government of Iraq.

Findings

Army commands documented procedures for processing and transferring ITEF equipment to the Government of Iraq. For example, the 1st TSC developed a standard operating procedure that includes step-by-step instructions for processing and transferring ITEF equipment. However, the 1st TSC did not have effective controls to maintain complete visibility and accountability of ITEF equipment in Kuwait and Iraq prior to transfer to the Government of Iraq.

Equipment visibility provides users with equipment location, movement, and status. Army Regulation 735-5 states that all property acquired by the Army will be continuously accounted for from the time of acquisition until the ultimate consumption or disposal of the property.

However, the 1st TSC could not provide complete data for the quantity and dollar value of equipment on hand, including rolling stock and ammunition. Rolling stock refers to vehicles. Examples include Mine Clearance Systems, ambulances, and wrecker trucks. 

The 1st TSC did not have effective controls because it did not use centralized systems to maintain visibility and accountability of ITEF equipment. Instead, the 1st TSC relied on multiple spreadsheets developed by different commands in both Kuwait and Iraq to provide it with visibility and accountability of equipment and did not consistently account for equipment in Iraq.

As a result, the 1st TSC did not have accurate, up-to-date records on the quantity and location of ITEF equipment on hand in Kuwait and Iraq. Accurate, up-to-date records of equipment on hand in Kuwait and Iraq are critical for filling equipment requests. The process to contact multiple commands and reference multiple spreadsheets to determine equipment quantities and location could delay the fulfillment of a request or delay the development of future requests. In addition, not having accurate records of equipment on hand could result in duplicate equipment requests. Further, the use of manually populated spreadsheets increased the risk for human-error when inputting and updating equipment data.

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 The Army Did Not Implement Effective Controls To Maintain Visibility and Accountability of Iraq Train and Equip Fund Equipment, September 14, 2016 [27 Pages, 2.9MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/dod/DODIG-2016-00799.pdf

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