The Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (IC IG) initiated this investigation in response to a referral from IC IG Inspections. The referral alleged that [[REDACTED]] a former ODNI employee and mother of [[REDACTED]] took actions regarding the hiring of in May of 2008 which constituted violations of either 5 USC SS 2302(b )(6 )-(7) or 5 USC § 3110. A careful review of available records regarding the process and procedures surrounding [[REDACTED]] selection and hiring failed to reveal any evidence to substantiate this allegation .

Document Archive

OIG/IC Investigation on 2008 Nepotism Allegations, Case Number 2014-0011, Completed August 2015 [8 Pages, 3MB]

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The post OIG/IC Investigation on 2008 Nepotism Allegations, Case Number 2014-0011, Completed August 2015 first appeared on The Black Vault.

According to the document:

“On December 2, 2015, a terror attack in San Bernardino, California killed 14 people and injured 17 others. The next day, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) seized pursuant to a search warrant the iPhone of one of the subjects believed to have been responsible for the attack, Syed Rizwan Farook. Thereafter, on February 9 and March 1, 2016, then-FBI Director James Comey testified before Congress, in substance, that the FBI was not able to obtain access to data on the Farook iPhone, and then that it would require assistance from the manufacturer, Apple, to do so. To accomplish this, on February 16, 2016, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Central District of California (USAO) sought and obtained an ex parte court order requiring Apple to assist the FBI in its effort to search the iPhone.

A few days later, the USAO filed a motion with the Court seeking to compel Apple’s compliance with the ex parte order, and Apple filed a motion to vacate the order. However, on March 21, 2016, before the District Judge ruled on these pending motions, the USAO reported to the Court that an outside party had  demonstrated to the FBI a possible method for unlocking the iPhone. One week later, on March 28, 2016, the USAO reported back to the Court that the FBI had successfully accessed the iPhone and no longer required assistance from Apple. On April 19, 2016, then- FBI Executive Assistant Director (EAD) Amy Hess testified about the matter before Congress and cited rapidly changing technology as a reason the FBI was not able to exploit the iPhone without the assistance of a third party.

On August 31, 2016, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) received a referral from the FBI Inspection Division after former EAD Hess expressed concern about an alleged disagreement between units within the FBI Operational Technology Division (OTD) over the “capabilities available to the national security programs” to access the Farook iPhone following its seizure, and concerns that this may have resulted in her or Comey giving inaccurate testimony to Congress on the FBI’s capabilities. Specifically, EAD Hess expressed concerns that an OTD unit may have had techniques available to exploit the Farook iPhone that certain unidentified OTD officials did not employ and that these officials were indifferent to the fact that FBI leadership and others were testifying to Congress, and filing affidavits in court, that the FBI had no such capability. The OIG has conducted inquiries into the situation, including interviewing relevant key participants, and found no evidence that OTO had the capability to exploit the Farook iPhone at the time of the Congressional testimony and initial court filings. We therefore determined that neither the Congressional testimony nor the submissions to the Court were inaccurate when made. However, we found that inadequate communication and coordination within OTO caused a delay in engaging all relevant OTO personnel in t he search for a technical solution to the Farook iPhone problem, as well as the outside party that ultimately developed the method that unlocked the phone, issues that we learned the FBI has since taken steps to address.”

Document Archive

 A Special Inquiry Regarding the Accuracy of FBI Statements Concerning its Capabilities to Exploit an iPhone Seized During the San Bernardino Terror Attack Investigation, March 2018 [17 Pages, 2.5MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/fbifiles/o1803.pdf

The post A Special Inquiry Regarding the Accuracy of FBI Statements Concerning its Capabilities to Exploit an iPhone Seized During the San Bernardino Terror Attack Investigation, March 2018 first appeared on The Black Vault.

The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Office of Inspector General (OIG) completed its Inspection of the NRO Cadre Implementation Plan for Department of Defense Civilians. I am providing this memorandum report for your attention as the NRO strives to establish a permanent NRO Department of Defense (DoD) Cadre on 4 October 2015. The NRO OIG recognized the efforts of the employees supporting the transition, and the resulting success based on those efforts.

However, the OIG also identified challenges and deficiencies that may influence the NRO’s ability to meet the 4 October 2015 milestone and/or manage its future workforce.

Unlike other government organizations, the NRO lacks its own permanent cadre of personnel and primarily relies upon other Intelligence Community (IC) agencies and DoD entities to provide personnel to support its mission. Congress has recognized that this borrowed workforce model has steadily deteriorated over time and noted that a more stable workforce model may provide the Director, NRO (DNRO) with the management capacity required to meet the
organization’s critical mission. Pursuant to congressional direction (Intelligence Authorization Act (IAA) of Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 and 2015) for the NRO to augment its current staffing model with career service employees, the NRO commenced efforts to establish a permanent NRO DoD Cadre.

In the IAAs, Congress requested the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and DNRO, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), to provide a detailed implementation plan for modernizing the NRO workforce. Congress requested this plan generally include a strategy for 1) transitioning the current Air Force and Navy civilians and 2) establishing a personnel system that incorporates recruitment, training and development,  recognition, and promotions, as well as metrics to measure success. In addition, Congress requested the NRO work with other IC agencies and DoD entities to perform a workforce study to evaluate the NRO’s future size and skills composition. The workforce study was to be provided to the congressional intelligence and defense committees within 90 days of enactment of the FY 2014 IAA. Further, Congress encouraged the IC Inspector General (ICIG) to provide annual
implementation plan progress reports to Congress. After coordination with the ICIG, it was determined that the NRO OIG would assess NRO’s progress in establishing a permanent NRO DoD Cadre.  As the NRO elected to focus initially on the Congressional request for a strategy for transitioning the current Air Force and Navy civilians, the NRO OIG evaluated the Implementation Plan for Creating a DoD Civilian Workforce for the NRO and the transition activities administered by the Workforce Stability Initiative (WSI) NRO DoD Cadre Working Group (WG).

The Investigation

 Inspection of the National Reconnaissance Office Cadre Implementation Plan for Department of Defense Civilians, July 31, 2015 [15 Pages, 2.6MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/ig/F-2017-00046-NRO.pdf

The post Inspection of the National Reconnaissance Office Cadre Implementation Plan for Department of Defense Civilians, July 31, 2015 first appeared on The Black Vault.

This report contains the attestation review reports of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Assets Forfeiture Fund, Criminal Division, Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Office of Justice Programs, Offices of the United States Attorneys, Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces Program, and United States Marshals Service’s annual accounting of drug control funds and related performance for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2016.

The Office of the Inspector General performed the attestation reviews. The report and annual detailed accounting of funds obligated by each drug control program agency are required by 21 U.S.C. §1704(d), as implemented by the Office of National Drug Control Policy Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, dated January 18, 2013. The Department of Justice components reviewed, reported approximately $7.8 billion of drug control obligations and 23 related performance measures for fiscal year 2016.

The Office of the Inspector General prepared the attestation review reports in accordance with attestation standards contained in Government Auditing Standards, issued by the Comptroller General of the United States. An attestation review is substantially less in scope than an examination and, therefore, does not result in the expression of an opinion. We reported that nothing came to our attention that caused us to believe the submissions were not presented, in all material respects, in accordance with the requirements of the Office of National Drug Control Policy Circular, and as otherwise agreed to with the Office of National Drug Control Policy.

The Investigation

 Reviews of the  Annual Accounting of Drug Control Funds and Related Performance  Fiscal Year 2016, January 2017 [164 Pages, 4.7MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/ig/a1711.pdf

The post Reviews of the Annual Accounting of Drug Control Funds and Related Performance Fiscal Year 2016, January 2017 first appeared on The Black Vault.

The international mailing and shipping industry is growing significantly — global eCommerce topped $1.55 trillion in 2015, and is projected to grow another 162 percent by 2020. The [REDACTED] International Service Center (ISC) in [REDACTED] is one of five major facilities the U.S. Postal Service uses to receive inbound international mail. The Postal Service recorded inbound international mail volume of about 219 million pieces in fiscal year (FY) 2015, nearly [REDACTED] of which arrived at the [REDACTED] ISC.

With limited exception, all inbound international mail is subject to inspection by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP).  [REDACTED][REDACTED][REDACTED][REDACTED][REDACTED][REDACTED][REDACTED][REDACTED][REDACTED][REDACTED][REDACTED][REDACTED][REDACTED][REDACTED][REDACTED][REDACTED][REDACTED][REDACTED][REDACTED].

The significant mail volume at the [REDACTED] ISC poses unique operational and technical challenges to the Postal Service and CBP. Specifically, CBP does [REDACTED][REDACTED][REDACTED][REDACTED][REDACTED][REDACTED][REDACTED][REDACTED].

The Postal Service and CBP collaborated on a [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED] ISC beginning in November 2015 where the Postal Service provided to CBP [REDACTED][REDACTED][REDACTED][REDACTED][REDACTED][REDACTED][REDACTED]. CBP can more quickly analyze these mailings to determine which to [REDACTED][REDACTED][REDACTED]and relay those requests back to the Postal Service, which can remove the [REDACTED][REDACTED][REDACTED][REDACTED][REDACTED][REDACTED][REDACTED][REDACTED][REDACTED][REDACTED].

Declassified Audit Report

 Inbound International Mail Operations – [REDACTED] Service Center Audit Report, December 30, 2016 [20 Pages, 5.7MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/ig/MS-AR-17-003.pdf

The post Inbound International Mail Operations – [REDACTED] Service Center Audit Report, December 30, 2016 first appeared on The Black Vault.