Summary of the Report:

The report encapsulates several aspects of employee sentiment within the NSD, including their work experiences, satisfaction with leadership, and engagement with various workplace programs. It includes comparative analyses against broader Department of Justice metrics and government-wide averages.

Key Findings:

1. Employee Engagement and Satisfaction:
   • High levels of job significance with 95.4% of NSD employees feeling the work they do is important.
   • Generally positive views on supervision; 88.1% respect their immediate supervisors, and 86.7% reported that their supervisors treat them with respect.
   • However, there are challenges in motivation and leadership effectiveness; only 37.2% felt that senior leaders motivate high levels of commitment.
2. Organizational Effectiveness:
   • Strong positive responses on the NSD’s success in accomplishing its mission (93.7%).
   • The organization scores well in cooperation among colleagues and support for work-life balance.
3. Areas of Concern:
   • Lower satisfaction regarding opportunities for promotion and the link between pay and performance. Only 28.7% felt that pay raises are well-linked to job performance.
   • Concerns about handling poor performance and rewarding creativity; 44.0% are dissatisfied with how poor performers are managed.
4. Work/Life Balance and Support Programs:
   • Varied responses on teleworking policies and work/life programs suggest room for improvement in making these options more accessible and better supported.
5. Demographics and Workforce Diversity:
   • The survey provides demographic insights into the NSD workforce, which is crucial for tailoring diversity and inclusion efforts.

This survey serves as a crucial tool for the NSD to gauge employee morale and organizational health, indicating areas where the division excels and where it might focus on making improvements. The detailed breakdowns by question reveal both the strengths in employee engagement and critical areas where leadership and organizational practices could be enhanced to foster a more motivating and supportive work environment.

Document Archive

1st Level Subagency Report, Department of Justice, National Security Division – 2017 [26 Pages, 4MB]

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Comprised of representatives from various segments of the criminal justice community, including law enforcement, the judiciary, forensic laboratories, and criminal justice professional organizations, the board ensures a broad representation of viewpoints. Members are appointed to the APB to provide diverse perspectives and expertise in matters related to the development and implementation of CJIS services and capabilities.

The APB meets regularly to review and recommend policy, technical, administrative, and operational standards. It also ensures compliance with existing policies and evaluates proposals for new initiatives. By doing so, the APB plays a pivotal role in ensuring that CJIS services remain effective, efficient, and secure, while also balancing the needs of law enforcement with privacy and civil liberty concerns.

The board’s input is vital in shaping the policies and practices that govern how criminal justice information is collected, stored, shared, and used, making it an essential component of the nation’s law enforcement infrastructure.

These are the meeting minutes from the CJIS APB. These minutes provide a detailed look at information sharing among federal, state and local agencies regarding criminal justice matters.

Document Archive

Department of Justice – Criminal Justice Information Services Advisory Policy Board Meeting Minutes

December 2017 Minutes [460 Pages, 16.2MB]

June 2019 Minutes [218 Pages, 8.8MB]

December 2019 Minutes [474 Pages, 21MB]

June 2021 Minutes [655 Pages, 16.2MB]

The post Department of Justice – Criminal Justice Information Services Advisory Policy Board Meeting Minutes first appeared on The Black Vault.

The DOJ OIG investigation and review identified:

• Numerous and Serious Failures by MCC New York Staff. The DOJ OIG found numerous and serious
  failures by MCC New York staff constituting misconduct and dereliction of their duties. Among other
  things, these failures resulted in Epstein being unmonitored and alone in his cell with an excessive
  amount of bed linens, from approximately 10:40 p.m. on August 9 until he was discovered hanged in
  his locked cell on August 10 at approximately 6:30 a.m.
  • MCC New York Staff Failed to Ensure that Epstein Was Assigned a Cellmate. Following a July 23,2019, incident that resulted in Epstein being placed on suicide watch, the MCC New York Psychology Department determined that Epstein needed to be housed with an appropriate cellmate. On August 9, Epstein’s cellmate was transferred out of MCC New York. MCC New York staff knew that Epstein did not have a cellmate but did not take steps to ensure that he was assigned a new cellmate.
  • MCC New York Staff Failed to Undertake Required Measures Designed to Ensure that Epstein and Other Inmates Were Accounted for and Safe. BOP policy requires Special Housing Unit (SHU) staff to observe all inmates, conduct rounds, conduct inmate counts, search inmate cells, and ensure adequate supervision of the SHU. BOP staff in the SHU in the hours before Epstein’s death failed to carry out these responsibilities. Specifically, only one SHU cell search was documented on August 9, and it was not of Epstein’s cell. BOP records did not indicate when Epstein’s cell was last searched. Had Epstein’s cell been searched as required, the search would have revealed that Epstein had excess prison blankets, linens, and clothing in his cell. The OIG also found that SHU staff did not conduct any 30-minute rounds after about 10:40 p.m. on August 9 and that none of the required SHU inmate counts were conducted after 4:00 p.m. on August 9. MCC New York staff falsified count slips and round sheets to show that they had been performed when they were not, leaving Epstein unobserved for hours before his death. Following a DOJ OIG investigation, two MCC New York employees were charged criminally with falsifying BOP records. The charges were dismissed upon compliance by the employees with the terms of deferred prosecution agreements they entered into with the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York. That office declined prosecution for 2 other MCC New York employees who the OIG found created false documentation on earlier dates and times not proximate to the Epstein’s death.
  • MCC New York Staff Failed to Ensure that the Institution’s Security Camera System was Fully Functional Resulting in Limited Recorded Video Evidence. BOP policy also requires SHU staff to ensure the functionality of the video camera surveillance system. This investigation and review revealed longstanding deficiencies with MCC New York’s security camera system. Although video cameras in the SHU provided live video feeds to monitoring stations, system deficiencies resulted in nearly all of the cameras in and around the SHU where Epstein was being housed to not record video starting in late July 2019 and continuing through the date of Epstein’s death.
• Long-standing Operational Challenges. The DOJ OIG has repeatedly identified long-standing operational challenges that negatively affect the BOP’s ability to operate its institutions safely and securely. Many of those same operational challenges, including staffing shortages, managing inmates at risk for suicide, maintaining functional security camera systems, management failures, and widespread disregard of BOP policies and procedures, were again identified by the OIG during this investigation and review of the custody, care, and supervision of Epstein, one of the BOP’s most high profile inmates.
• No Evidence Contradicting the FBI’s Determination that there Was No Criminality Associated with Epstein’s Death. Separate from the OIG’s investigation, which focused on the conduct of BOP personnel, the FBI concurrently investigated whether Epstein’s death was the result of criminal conduct by any non-BOP actors. Among other things, the FBI investigated the cause of Epstein’s death and determined it was not the result of a criminal act. The Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, City of New York, determined that Epstein died by suicide. While the OIG determined MCC New York staff engaged in significant misconduct and dereliction of their duties, we did not uncover evidence contradicting the FBI’s determination regarding the absence of criminality in connection with Epstein’s death.

The combination of negligence, misconduct, and outright job performance failures documented in the report all contributed to an environment in which arguably one of the most notorious inmates in BOP’s custody was provided with the opportunity to take his own life. The BOP’s failures are troubling not only because the BOP did not adequately safeguard an individual in its custody, but also because they led to questions about the circumstances surrounding Epstein’s death and effectively deprived Epstein’s numerous victims of the opportunity to seek justice through the criminal justice process. The fact that these failures have been recurring ones at the BOP does not excuse them and gives additional urgency to the need for DOJ and BOP leadership to address the chronic problems plaguing the BOP.

The DOJ OIG made eight recommendations to improve the BOP’s management of its correctional institutions. The BOP agreed with all recommendations.

You can find the report below.

The Report

DOJ OIG Releases Report on the BOP’s Custody, Care, and Supervision of Jeffrey Epstein at the Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York, New York [128 Pages, 6.2MB]

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The post DOJ OIG Releases Report on the BOP’s Custody, Care, and Supervision of Jeffrey Epstein at the Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York, New York first appeared on The Black Vault.

On March 15, 2022, the Department of Justice published the following:

To mark the start of Sunshine Week, Attorney General Merrick B. Garland issued comprehensive new Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) guidelines today that strengthen the federal government’s commitments to transparency in government operations and the fair and effective administration of FOIA.

The Attorney General’s guidelines, which were announced in a memorandum (see below), direct the heads of all executive branch departments and agencies to apply a presumption of openness in administering the FOIA and make clear that the Justice Department will not defend nondisclosure decisions that fail to do so. The guidelines also emphasize that the proactive disclosure of information is fundamental to the faithful application of the FOIA and note the Justice Department’s efforts to encourage proactive agency disclosures, including by providing more specific criteria regarding how relevant metrics should be reported in agency Annual FOIA Reports, as the Government Accountability Office recommended.

“At the Justice Department, and across government, our success depends upon the trust of the people we serve. That trust must be earned every day,” said Attorney General Garland. “For more than fifty years, the Freedom of Information Act has been a vital tool for advancing the principles of open government and democratic accountability that are at the heart of who we are as public servants. Together with our partners across the federal government, the Justice Department will work every day to uphold those principles, which are essential to the rule of law.”

In addition, the Attorney General’s FOIA guidelines direct federal departments and agencies to continue efforts to remove barriers to requesting and accessing government records and to reduce FOIA processing backlogs. The guidelines note, for example, that the Justice Department’s Executive Office for Immigration Review is changing a policy under which it had long required individuals to file FOIA requests to obtain official copies of their own records of immigration court proceedings. The Attorney General encouraged all agencies to examine whether they have similar or other categories of records that they could make more readily accessible without requiring individuals to file FOIA requests.

“The Attorney General’s new FOIA guidelines underscore the Justice Department’s commitment to government that is open, transparent and accountable to the people we serve,” said Associate Attorney General Vanita Gupta, who also serves as the Department’s Chief FOIA Officer. “The Office of Information Policy looks forward to working with agencies to ensure the presumption of openness is applied across the government.”

The Attorney General’s guidelines highlight the key role played by agency Chief FOIA Officers who report each year to the Department of Justice on their progress in improving FOIA administration and also direct agencies to training and guidance documents issued by the Justice Department’s Office of Information Policy designed to help ensure proper training and compliance with FOIA across the federal government. For more information visit www.justice.gov/oip.

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The post Attorney General Merrick B. Garland Issues New FOIA Guidelines to Favor Disclosure and Transparency first appeared on The Black Vault.

There were three videos released, which outline procedural requirements, along with FOIA Exemptions 4, 5 & 6. They are displayed below in what appears to be chronological orders of the training day.

They were recorded circa 2020 on an unknown date.

Video Archive

The post Federal Highway Administration / Department of Justice Full-Day FOIA Training first appeared on The Black Vault.

The Department of Justice (Department) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) undertook this review to examine certain actions by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department during an FBI investigation opened on July 31, 2016, known as “Crossfire Hurricane,” into whether individuals associated with the Donald J. Trump for President Campaign were coordinating, wittingly or unwittingly, with the Russian government’s efforts to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.

Document Archive

Department of Justice Inspector General Report on FISA Applications and Other Aspects of the FBI’s Crossfire Hurricane Investigation, December 2019  – REVISED – [480 Pages, 33MB] I stumbled on a “revised” version of the report a few days after it was released. You will find the “revised” changes on page 3 of this .pdf, and the original is archived below.

Department of Justice Inspector General Report on FISA Applications and Other Aspects of the FBI’s Crossfire Hurricane Investigation, December 2019  [476 Pages, 33MB]

The post Department of Justice Inspector General Report on FISA Applications and Other Aspects of the FBI’s Crossfire Hurricane Investigation, December 2019 first appeared on The Black Vault.

Julian P. Assange, 47, the founder of WikiLeaks, was arrested today in the United Kingdom pursuant to the U.S./UK Extradition Treaty, in connection with a federal charge of conspiracy to commit computer intrusion for agreeing to break a password to a classified U.S. government computer.

According to court documents unsealed today, the charge relates to Assange’s alleged role in one of the largest compromises of classified information in the history of the United States.

The indictment alleges that in March 2010, Assange engaged in a conspiracy with Chelsea Manning, a former intelligence analyst in the U.S. Army, to assist Manning in cracking a password stored on U.S. Department of Defense computers connected to the Secret Internet Protocol Network (SIPRNet), a U.S. government network used for classified documents and communications.  Manning, who had access to the computers in connection with her duties as an intelligence analyst, was using the computers to download classified records to transmit to WikiLeaks.  Cracking the password would have allowed Manning to log on to the computers under a username that did not belong to her.  Such a deceptive measure would have made it more difficult for investigators to determine the source of the illegal disclosures.

During the conspiracy, Manning and Assange engaged in real-time discussions regarding Manning’s transmission of classified records to Assange.  The discussions also reflect Assange actively encouraging Manning to provide more information.  During an exchange, Manning told Assange that “after this upload, that’s all I really have got left.”  To which Assange replied, “curious eyes never run dry in my experience.”

Assange is charged with conspiracy to commit computer intrusion and is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  He faces a maximum penalty of five years in prison if convicted.  Actual sentences for federal crimes are typically less than the maximum penalties.  A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after taking into account the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

Assistant Attorney General for National Security John C. Demers, U.S. Attorney G. Zachary Terwilliger for the Eastern District of Virginia and Assistant Director in Charge Nancy McNamara of the FBI’s Washington Field Office made the announcement after the charges were unsealed.  First Assistant U.S. Attorney Tracy Doherty-McCormick, Assistant U.S. Attorneys Kellen S. Dwyer, Thomas W. Traxler and Gordon D. Kromberg, and Trial Attorneys Matthew R. Walczewski and Nicholas O. Hunter of the Justice Department’s National Security Division are prosecuting the case.

The extradition will be handled by the Department of Justice’s Office of International Affairs.

An indictment contains allegations that a defendant has committed a crime.  Every defendant is presumed to be innocent until and unless proven guilty in court.

Document Archive

Julian Assange Indictment [7 Pages, 0.6MB]

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According to the Department of Justice Criminal Resource Manual – Use of Hypnosis:

“In certain limited cases, the use of forensic hypnosis can be an aid in the investigative process. Witnesses to crimes have been able to recall certain facets of the crime while in a hypnotic state that they had not remembered without hypnosis. The use of hypnosis, however, is subject to serious objections and thus should be used only on rare occasions.

The information obtained from a person while in a hypnotic trance cannot be assumed to be accurate. Therefore, any information obtained by the use of hypnosis must be thoroughly checked as to its ultimate accuracy and corroborated. It would therefore be advisable to first consult with a board-certified forensic psychologist/ psychiatrist to ascertain if the matter in question is appropriate for the application of forensic hypnosis. Because of the question of admissibility with regard to information retrieved within a hypnosis session, Assistant United States Attorneys should also consider the appropriateness and potential application of the cognitive interview before using hypnosis. The cognitive interview is a non-hypnotic structured interview that is used to enhance the witness’s ability to remember an event by engaging in a reconstruction of to: the context in which the event took place.”

Document Archive

  Hypnosis Policy of the Department of Justice [13 Pages, 2.9MB]

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Fifteen years after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, the terrorist threat remains in the United States and abroad, as evidenced by recent attacks in Paris, France; San Bernardino, California; Brussels, Belgium; Orlando, Florida; and Nice, France. The U.S.’s national security depends on the ability to share the right information with the right people at the right time. This requires sustained and responsible collaboration among federal, state, local, and tribal entities, as well as the private sector and international partners.

In response to a request from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, and the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Offices of Inspector General (OIG) of the Intelligence Community (IC), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) conducted a review of the domestic sharing of counterterrorism information. The OIGs concluded that the partners in the terrorism-related
Information Sharing Environment components of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), DHS, DOJ, and their state and local partners are committed to sharing counterterrorism information. The partners’ commitment to protecting the nation is illustrated by the actions taken before, during, and following terrorism-related incidents, as well as by programs and initiatives designed to improve sharing of counterterrorism information.

However, the OIGs also identified several areas in which improvements could enhance information sharing.

To share information effectively, the federal, state, and local entities actively involved in counterterrorism efforts must understand each other’s roles,  responsibilities, and contributions, especially with the involvement of multiple agencies, such as the DOJ’s Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and DHS’ U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), in complex investigations. Updating or establishing new information sharing agreements among such entities should enhance coordination and collaboration, and reaffirm and formalize the roles and responsibilities of partners in the current information sharing environment. Similarly, although there is a national information sharing strategy, its implementation has been viewed to be uneven. The OIGs believe that the ODNI, DHS, and DOJ should review the interagency information sharing memorandum of understanding (MOU) and take necessary actions to update intelligence information sharing standards and processes among the departments, which we believe would result in better implementation of the strategy.

The OIGs also identified improvements in various practices and processes of the partners involved in counterterrorism. At DHS, a lack of unity in its Intelligence Enterprise, issues in the field related to staffing and access to classified systems and facilities, as well as problems with intelligence reporting processes, have made the DHS Intelligence Enterprise less effective and valuable to the IC than it could be. DOJ can improve its counterterrorism information sharing efforts by developing and implementing a consolidated internal DOJ strategy, and evaluating the continued need and most effective utilization for the United States Attorney’s Offices’ Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council (ATAC) meetings. Further, the FBI should spur participation associated with Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) and improve its efforts to obtain partners’ input in the process of identifying and prioritizing counterterrorism threats. Within the ODNI, the Domestic DNI Representative program is hindered by large geographic regions, as well as the lack of a clear strategic vision and guidance. In addition, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Domestic Representative program, although well received in the field, has also struggled to sufficiently cover its regions. At the state and local level, due to unpredictable federal support, fusion centers are focused on sustaining operations rather than enhancing capabilities. Further, varying requirements for state and local security clearances sponsored by federal agencies can impede access to classified systems and facilities.

Our review resulted in 23 recommendations to help improve the sharing of counterterrorism information and ultimately, enhance the Nation’s ability to
prevent terrorist attacks. We discuss our findings in detail in the Findings and Recommendations section of the report.

The Investigation

 Review of Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information, March 2017 [85 Pages, 6.7MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/ig/a1721.pdf

The post Review of Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information, March 2017 first appeared on The Black Vault.

This report contains the attestation review reports of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Assets Forfeiture Fund, Criminal Division, Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Office of Justice Programs, Offices of the United States Attorneys, Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces Program, and United States Marshals Service’s annual accounting of drug control funds and related performance for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2016.

The Office of the Inspector General performed the attestation reviews. The report and annual detailed accounting of funds obligated by each drug control program agency are required by 21 U.S.C. §1704(d), as implemented by the Office of National Drug Control Policy Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, dated January 18, 2013. The Department of Justice components reviewed, reported approximately $7.8 billion of drug control obligations and 23 related performance measures for fiscal year 2016.

The Office of the Inspector General prepared the attestation review reports in accordance with attestation standards contained in Government Auditing Standards, issued by the Comptroller General of the United States. An attestation review is substantially less in scope than an examination and, therefore, does not result in the expression of an opinion. We reported that nothing came to our attention that caused us to believe the submissions were not presented, in all material respects, in accordance with the requirements of the Office of National Drug Control Policy Circular, and as otherwise agreed to with the Office of National Drug Control Policy.

The Investigation

 Reviews of the  Annual Accounting of Drug Control Funds and Related Performance  Fiscal Year 2016, January 2017 [164 Pages, 4.7MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/ig/a1711.pdf

The post Reviews of the Annual Accounting of Drug Control Funds and Related Performance Fiscal Year 2016, January 2017 first appeared on The Black Vault.

In April 2009, the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) awarded a contract to Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), which is now known as CoreCivic, Inc., to house up to 2,567 low-security, non-U.S. citizen adult male inmates in the Adams County Correctional Center (Adams County).1 The BOP exercised the contract’s second of three 2-year option periods in 2015, extending it through July 2017 and increasing its value to about $468 million. As of June 2016, it was the third largest Department of Justice (Department or DOJ) contract in terms of dollars obligated since fiscal year (FY) 2009.

The DOJ Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducted this audit, covering the period April 1, 2012, through March 31, 2015, to: (1) assess CoreCivic’s contract performance; (2) determine whether CoreCivic complied with the terms, conditions, laws, and regulations applicable to the contract; and (3) assess the BOP’s formation and administration of the contract. We found that CoreCivic’s execution of the contract’s requirements did not fully accomplish the BOP’s program goals in several respects.

In May 2012, an inmate riot at the facility resulted in a correctional officer’s death and injuries to approximately 20 staff and inmates. The riot, according to a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) affidavit, was a consequence of what inmates perceived to be inadequate medical care, substandard food, and disrespectful staff members. A BOP after-action report found deficiencies in staffing levels, staff experience, communication between staff and inmates, and CoreCivic’s intelligence systems. The report specifically cited the lack of Spanish-speaking staff and staff inexperience.

Four years after the riot, we were deeply concerned to find that the facility was plagued by the same significant deficiencies in correctional and health services and Spanish-speaking staffing. In 19 of the 38 months following the riot, we found CoreCivic staffed correctional services at an even lower level than at the time of the riot in terms of actual post coverage.2 Yet CoreCivic’s monthly reports to the BOP, which were based on simple headcounts, showed that correctional staffing levels had improved in 36 of those 38 months. With regard to Spanish-speaking staff, while the BOP’s post-riot after-action plan recommended adding to the contract minimum requirements for bilingual staff, we found that the BOP did not modify the contract to include this requirement until June 2015,  subsequent to the start of our audit. Moreover, the contract modification does not define the level of speaking proficiency required and has no deadline or target date for compliance. As of July 2015, the facility’s inmate population consisted of approximately 2,300 aliens, predominately Mexican-nationals, yet only 4 of 367 staff spoke fluent Spanish. By February 2016, CoreCivic officials told us the number of fluent Spanish-speaking staff actually dropped to three people, and CoreCivic’s January 2016 job announcements for correctional officers stated no preference for bilingual applicants. In addition, the BOP told us that it does not validate the contractor’s staff for Spanish-speaking skills, and has not established any validation criteria for doing so.

We also found lower qualification levels and significantly higher staffing turnover rates for Adams County correctional officers and believe these factors contributed to the facility’s lack of experienced staff, which the BOP identified in its after-action report as a systemic problem in the area of safety and security at the facility. We reviewed CoreCivic’s hiring practices and determined the facility employs correctional officers with qualifications that would have been insufficient for employment at BOP-managed institutions. For example, the BOP requires entry-level correctional officers to have either a 4-year college degree or equivalent work experience, while CoreCivic does not require education beyond high school.

Additionally, we found significantly higher turnover rates at the facility than those at comparable BOP institutions and believe it likely results from the  substantially lower pay and benefits provided by CoreCivic. We found CoreCivic pays significantly lower wages and offers less time off than the BOP, and provides fewer career advancement opportunities. For example, the BOP pays entry-level correctional officers $18.69 per hour, 48 percent higher than the $12.60 per hour paid by CoreCivic. The State of Mississippi also offers its correctional officers more generous wages and paid time off than CoreCivic. Furthermore, the BOP offers new correctional officers noncompetitive promotion potential to $26.91 an hour, while CoreCivic pays correctional officers, throughout their careers, only the required prevailing wage rates set forth by the Department of Labor’s Service Contract Act wage determinations. The BOP’s contract with CoreCivic does not address either correctional officer qualification requirements or staff pay and benefits. We believe the BOP should evaluate the extent to which employee qualification levels and turnover rates impact safety and security concerns, and whether its contractual terms should be modified to address those concerns.

In addition, while the BOP’s solicitation that resulted in the Adams County contract required companies to develop a staffing plan that would illustrate the “total number of full-time equivalents (FTE) for each position title,” based on our discussions with BOP and CoreCivic officials, it became apparent that the contract was vague about how staffing levels should be calculated. A 2011 contract modification provided that staffing levels should not fall below a monthly average of 90 percent for Correctional Services and 85 percent for Health Services of the BOP-approved staffing plan. Both the BOP and CoreCivic told us they interpreted the contract to allow the calculation of staffing levels to be based on headcounts rather than FTE, and leave the determination of day-to-day staff assignments to the discretion of CoreCivic. As a result, we found the staffing levels CoreCivic reported to the BOP reflected neither actual staffing at the facility nor staffing insufficiencies.

Specifically, CoreCivic reported to the BOP simple headcounts of staff recorded on payroll records, regardless of the hours each employee actually worked. When we re-calculated correctional services staffing levels based on FTEs using time and attendance records, we found that, throughout the 4-year period we reviewed, staffing levels were lower than the levels represented by CoreCivic’s headcounts and were frequently lower than the BOP’s minimum staffing threshold. We found similar issues regarding CoreCivic’s reporting of health services staffing. Because the BOP was unaware of these staffing insufficiencies, it was unable to assess  the adequacy of staffing levels at the facility. When we reported these issues and our concerns about them to BOP officials, they told us CoreCivic’s reporting was consistent with the contract. We found that had the contract clearly specified that staffing levels should be measured using FTEs, between July 2011 and July 2015 the BOP could have taken $1,927,307 in invoice deductions as a result of inadequate correctional and health services staffing levels. We believe this nearly $2 million that the BOP expended could have been avoided with more precise contract language and was wasteful.

We also found that, beginning in December 2012, CoreCivic excluded from its required staffing reports the status of five critical health services positions  identified in the approved staffing plan, namely two dentists, two physicians, and one advanced registered nurse practitioner. As a result, the BOP, which was not notified of and did not identify the change, was unable to assess the effect of any vacancies on service provision or invoice amounts. We believe that this gap in oversight had a negative effect on CoreCivic’s ability to provide quality health care at the Adams County facility. In fact, we found that between December 2012 and September 2015, the Adams County facility was staffed with only a single physician for 434 days (43 percent of the time) and a single dentist for 689 days (69 percent of the time), resulting in inmate-to-provider ratios that were about double those specified in BOP program statements.

Finally, we found several aspects of the BOP’s control and oversight of the contract performance to be inadequate. The BOP structured this contract as a performance-based acquisition, for which the Federal Acquisition Regulation requires a performance work statement, measurable performance standards, and a
method of assessing contractor performance against those standards. However, the BOP did not implement appropriate performance standards to measure and evaluate CoreCivic’s performance. For example, the BOP’s oversight of staffing levels is limited because the contract requirements do not sufficiently specify how CoreCivic should measure and report facility staffing levels. We also found CoreCivic inconsistently used industry-standard dietary guidelines to evaluate the nutritional adequacy of food service offerings at the facility, an issue that may have been avoided had the contract specified which standards CoreCivic should have followed. Additionally, the BOP’s oversight of billings was inadequate in several ways, resulting in the BOP failing to identify instances where CoreCivic did not apply mandatory invoice deductions.

In August 2016, the Deputy Attorney General directed the BOP to begin reducing, and ultimately end, its use of privately operated prisons. Because this order was issued after the close of our audit period, any analysis of its basis or effect were outside of this audit’s scope.

This report makes 9 recommendations to assist the BOP in improving operations under the Adams County contract and in addressing $42,300 we have identified as questioned costs.

The Investigation

 Audit of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Contract with CoreCivic, Inc. to Operate the Adams County Correctional Center in Natchez, Mississippi, December 16, 2016 [73 Pages, 2.3MB]

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The post Audit of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Contract with CoreCivic, Inc. to Operate the Adams County Correctional Center in Natchez, Mississippi, December 16, 2016 first appeared on The Black Vault.

 Audit of the Handling of Firearms Purchase Denials Through the National Instant Criminal Background Check System, September 2016 [66 Pages, 4.3MB]

The National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) is used by Federal Firearms Licensees, importers, and manufacturers (collectively, “dealers”) to determine whether a prospective purchaser is legally prohibited from doing so. The process begins when the person provides a dealer with photo identification and a completed Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) Form 4473. The form asks questions corresponding to the categories of persons prohibited by federal law from possessing firearms. Providing false information is a federal crime.

If a prospective purchaser answers “yes” to any questions, the sale must be denied. Otherwise, the dealer generally must request a NICS check from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or their state point of contact. The transfer can occur only if the check does not identify prohibitive criteria, or if it takes more than 3 business days. If 3 business days pass without a determination that the transaction can be approved or must be denied, the dealer can either complete the sale (unless prohibited by local law) or wait for the check to be performed.

For approved transactions, identifying information about the purchaser and firearm is purged from NICS within 24 hours pursuant to federal law. For denied transactions, the FBI sends relevant information to ATF’s Denial Enforcement and NICS Intelligence (DENI) Branch for possible investigation. For a “delayed denial,” where a firearm transfer to a prohibited purchaser occurred because the check took more than 3 business days to complete, ATF is charged with recovering the firearm. Additionally, ATF consults with U.S. Attorneys’ Offices (USAO) to decide whether to refer for possible prosecution denial cases that it believes have prosecutorial merit.

The Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) undertook this audit to examine (1) the effectiveness of the FBI’s quality control processes for NICS transactions, the impact of state reporting and recording on FBI NICS determinations, and the FBI’s referral of denied NICS transactions to ATF; (2) ATF’s initial screening and referral of denied transactions to its field offices for investigation, and ATF field offices’ investigation of denied transactions; and (3) the USAOs’ prosecution of crimes associated with denials. FBI Processing of NICS Requests We found the FBI generally has an effective internal control system and quality control process.

The FBI processed more than 51 million NICS transactions from 2008 to 2014, and approved or denied about 50 million of them (state authorities processed more than 68 million requests during the same period). The FBI denied 556,496 of these transactions. The FBI told us its quality control process results in an accuracy rate that ranges from 99.3 percent to 99.8 percent.

We judgmentally selected 447 denied transactions and found that only 1 transaction was incorrectly denied, resulting in a 99.8 percent accuracy rate.1 We also reviewed NICS requests that remained open at the FBI on the 88th calendar day without an approval or a denial because federal regulation requires that unresolved requests be purged from NICS prior to the 90th calendar day. Of the roughly 42 million transactions the FBI processed from fiscal year (FY) 2008 to FY 2013, the FBI purged slightly more than 1 percent due to lack of approval or denial within 90 days. We reviewed 384 of these transactions and determined the FBI appropriately followed its processes in 375 of them (97.7 percent) and committed errors in 9.

We also assessed instances where a delayed denial, an incorrect approval that was discovered within 24 hours, or other errors by the FBI may have resulted in a firearm transfer to a prohibited person. We identified 1,092 transaction records that were marked to indicate the FBI denied the transaction within 3 business days and also that ATF retrieval may be required. We judgmentally selected 306 out of the 1,092 transactions. For 241 of them, we determined the FBI appropriately followed its processes, or the errors did not affect operations. However, for 6 transactions, we found that while the FBI recorded denials internally within 3 days, the denial was not communicated to dealers until from 1 day to more than 7 months after the denial. Additionally, we found that 59 transactions were initially approved by the FBI but should have been denied.

The FBI’s quality control checks identified and corrected 57 of these errors as a part of its internal review process. Although we found the overall FBI error rate was exceedingly low, even an isolated NICS process breakdown can have tragic consequences, as evidenced by the June 2015 fatal shooting at a Charleston, South Carolina church, where the NICS process, with timely and accurate data from local agencies, could have prevented the alleged shooter from purchasing the gun he allegedly used.

A subsequent FBI Inspection Division (INSD) report attributed primary responsibility for the delay that allowed the firearm to be transferred to untimely responses and incomplete records at various state and local agencies that feed into NICS, a problem we identified more generally in our review.

INSD’s review also determined that a check of the National Data Exchange (N-DEX), an FBI-developed repository of unclassified criminal justice records, would have revealed a prohibiting incident report for the alleged shooter, leading INSD to recommend the FBI seek to identify and review additional database resources or stakeholders both internal and external to the FBI. FBI officials told us that its NICS Section would need law enforcement approval (by way of the Advisory Policy Board) and a regulation change (28 CFR Part 25) in order to access N-DEX to conduct firearm background checks.

We also found that a number of errors were not caught due to weaknesses in the FBI’s system for following up on pending transactions. For example, the NICS system does not have a tracking process to ensure that external research requests are made in a timely manner for each open transaction, requested information is received and evaluated in a timely manner, and further research is conducted when needed.

The FBI told us it intends to implement an automated feature in the new NICS system to send second requests for information to agencies that do not respond in the first instance, but it does not yet have an implementation date for this feature. Information from State NICS Checks From 2008 through 2014, states handled about 68 million of the more than 119 million NICS transactions. To help ensure the completeness of the NICS database, states are required to update it with supporting documents when a prospective purchaser attempts to buy a firearm and is approved, denied, or delayed.

We reviewed a judgmental sample of 631 state processed transactions and determined that in 630 of them the states did not fully update the NICS database or inform the FBI of the transaction’s outcome. These failures mean the NICS database is incomplete, and increases the risk that individuals found by states to be prohibited purchasers could be able to purchase firearms in the future. ATF Handling of NICS Denials We found ATF’s controls generally have enabled it to appropriately process denials and refer them to the proper field division for investigation.

We determined the ATF DENI Branch processed 99 percent of the 447 FBI referrals we reviewed in accordance with its policy. To assess ATF’s firearm recoveries, we reviewed field divisions’ retrieval efforts for 125 firearms needing recovery from our sampled transactions previously discussed. We determined ATF recovered 116 of those firearms, including all firearms inappropriately transferred due to FBI error, and that ATF made reasonable attempts to recover 8 of the 9 remaining firearms. Our audit also revealed a group of NICS transactions the FBI denied but ATF believed should have been approved because of a disagreement regarding the definition of a “Fugitive from Justice,” a category that disqualifies prospective gun purchasers.

This disagreement was referred to the Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in 2008, and OLC provided informal advice in July 2008. In August 2010, the FBI requested formal reconsideration of that advice, but 6 years later OLC still has not rendered a decision. We believe this issue should be addressed as soon as possible. Of those transactions that were denied by the FBI in this category from November 1999 through May 2015, there were 49,448 instances in which ATF did not agree with the FBI’s denial determination. ATF tracked these cases as FBI denials but, because ATF did not agree with that determination, ATF did not attempt to recover the firearm in the 2,183 instances in which the firearm was transferred.

Prosecutions Related to NICS Denials We found that the number of NICS denial prosecutions has dropped substantially since FY 2003, when 166 subjects were accepted for consideration of prosecution. Between FY 2008 and FY 2015, an 8 year period, ATF formally referred 509 NICS denial cases that included 558 subjects to USAOs for possible prosecution. The USAOs accepted for consideration of prosecution 254 subjects (or less than 32 subjects per year), declined to prosecute 272 subjects, and decisions for 32 were pending at the time of our review.

We determined that, in general, USAOs most often prosecuted NICS denial cases when aggravated circumstances existed in addition to the prospective purchaser’s false “no” answer to at least one question on the Form 4473. An Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys (EOUSA) official told us and the Department confirmed in response to a draft of this report that their decisions reflected the application of the principle of the Department’s Smart on Crime Initiative that directs USAOs to prioritize prosecutions to focus on the most serious cases that implicate the most substantial federal interests. After the school shooting in Sandy Hook, Connecticut, the White House issued a report in January 2013 titled “Now is the Time: The President’s Plan to Protect our Children and our Communities by Reducing Gun Violence.”

One part of the multi-tiered plan, entitled “[m]aximize enforcement efforts to prevent gun violence and prosecute gun crime,” stated that the Attorney General would ask U.S. Attorneys to consider whether additional efforts would be appropriate in areas such as the prosecution of felons who illegally seek to obtain a firearm, and persons who attempt to evade the NICS system by providing false information. When we asked what the Attorney General did in response to the President’s plan, EOUSA explained that it provided U.S. Attorneys with two Presidential Memoranda, one on firearms tracing and one on improving records availability to NICS. However, these two memoranda addressed other parts of the “Now is the Time” plan and did not relate directly to the “maximize[ing]enforcement efforts” provision.

Thereafter, in response to a draft of this report, the Department stated that the Attorney General spoke with the U.S. Attorneys about the President’s plan on the afternoon of January 16, 2013, the date the President announced his plan. In addition, the Department noted that two U.S. Attorneys testified before Congress in February 2013 that, while the Department would prosecute particularly egregious false “no” cases arising from NICS denials, it would prioritize prosecuting prohibited persons who actually obtained guns illegally as opposed to those who attempted to purchase a firearm by making false statements during the background process but were unsuccessful.

EOUSA also provided the OIG with a White House Fact Sheet stating that on January 6, 2016, Attorney General Lynch instructed U.S. Attorneys to “continue to focus their resources – as they have for the past several years under the Department’s Smart on Crime initiative – on the most impactful cases, including those targeting violent offenders, illegal firearms traffickers, and dangerous individuals who bypass the background check system to acquire weapons illegally.”

We found that the number of NICS cases arising from denials prosecuted annually by the Department has not changed significantly since the President’s plan was issued, declining slightly from 24 in FY 2013 to 15 in FY 2014 and 20 in FY 2015, though the numbers of such cases remain extremely low compared to the overall number of federal firearms prosecutions.

In response to a draft of this report, EOUSA provided the OIG with FY 2016 data reflecting that overall number of firearms cases filed were projected to rise 4.3 percent over the average from FY 2012 through FY 2015, and that the percentage of firearms defendants as a share of the overall number of federal defendants would rise from 13.9 percent to a projected 15.7 percent during the same period, all of which it indicated reflected the Department’s prioritization of firearms prosecutions generally. The Department further indicated that it believes that it has consistently and appropriately prioritized the most impactful firearms prosecutions, and that at present there is no reason for it to reconsider its approach to NICS false “no” cases.

Inspector General Report

 Audit of the Handling of Firearms Purchase Denials Through the National Instant Criminal Background Check System, September 2016 [66 Pages, 4.3MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/ig/a1632.pdf

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Excerpt from report:

In fiscal year (FY) 2010, Congress passed Public Law 111–258 (2010), the Reducing Over-Classification Act, which required the Inspectors General for all federal agencies and departments with officers and employees possessing original classification authority to conduct two evaluations – one in FY 2013 and another in FY 2016. In September 2013, the Department of Justice (DOJ or Department) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) issued its audit report on DOJ’s Implementation of and Compliance with Certain Classification Requirements.

For that first evaluation, Congress directed the Inspectors General to: (1) assess whether applicable classification policies, procedures, rules, and regulations have been adopted, followed, and are effectively administered within departments, agencies, or components; and (2) identify policies, procedures, rules, regulations, or practices that may contribute to persistent misclassification of material within such departments, agencies, or components. The OIG found that DOJ, through the Justice Management Division’s (JMD) Security and Emergency Planning Staff (SEPS), had established classification policies and procedures, but had not effectively administered them to ensure that information was classified and disseminated appropriately.

Although we did not find indications of widespread misclassification, we identified deficiencies relating to the implementation of DOJ’s classification program, including a persistent misunderstanding and lack of knowledge of certain classification processes by DOJ officials. We also identified weaknesses in DOJ’s implementation of classification standards, the limited distribution of automated tools designed to improve DOJ’s classification and marking processes, and weaknesses in the application of information security education and training programs.

In our FY 2013 report, we made 14 recommendations to help improve DOJ’s classification management program and its implementation of classification procedures. Pursuant to the requirements of the Reducing Over-Classification Act, in this report we evaluate DOJ’s progress made pursuant to the results of our FY 2013 report. We found that since our last audit SEPS has improved its administration of classification policies and procedures and enhanced the DOJ’s classification management program.

These improvements were evident in our review of DOJ’s classification authority delegations, classification decision designations, updated classification guidance, and classification reports. We believe that DOJ achieved these improvements because SEPS provided updated classification guidance, instruction, and training to DOJ components, which resulted in components having a clearer understanding of classification policies and procedures. As a result of SEPS’s progress in these areas, we have closed 11 of the 14 recommendations identified in our FY 2013 audit.

The appropriate use of original classification authority (OCA) reduces the risks of misclassifying and overclassifying information. In our FY 2013 report, we found that several DOJ components improperly classified information as “original” classification decisions, when the classification of this type of information previously had been decided. The improper use of original classification authority increases the risk that individuals could classify the same piece of information differently, resulting in the misclassification of information. In our current audit, we found significant improvements in this area, as evidenced by DOJ reducing the number of officials with Original Classification Authority from 64 in FY 2013 to 46 in FY 2016 and eliminating original classification decisions, as shown in the number of reported original classification decisions decreasing from 4,455 in FY 2013 to 0 in FY 2015. In our FY 2013 audit, we found that the high number of original classification decisions was primarily due to a misunderstanding of the differences between original and derivative classification decisions within several Department components. We believe that the dramatic reductions are indicative of DOJ personnel now having a better understanding of the classification types, as well as an improved knowledge of how to classify information using security classification guides. In addition, in 2015 SEPS incorporated comprehensive classification marking instructions in the DOJ Marking Classified National Security Information, implemented a software application to improve classified marking procedures for electronic files processed on classified information systems, and mandated usage of these tools for all DOJ classifiers. Security Programs Managers throughout the Department told us that these changes have resulted in classifiers more appropriately marking classified work products, in particular electronic documents.

The IG Investigation

 Follow-up Audit of the Department of Justice’s Implementation of and Compliance with Certain Classification Requirements, September 2016 [45 Pages, 0.8MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/ig/a1626.pdf

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It consists of 21 regional U.S. Trustee Offices nationwide and an Executive Office for U.S. Trustees (EOUST) in Washington, DC.

US Trustees Office Brief Bank – copies of legal briefs maintained for reference for attorneys in the Executive Office of United States Trustees[13,340 Pages, 90.1MB]

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