Downfall: Strategic Plan for Operations in the Japanese Archipelago

U.S. Marine Corps
FOREWORD

1. PURPOSE

Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12-39, *Downfall: Strategic Plan for Operations in the Japanese Archipelago*, is published to ensure the retention and dissemination of useful information which is not intended to become doctrine or to be published in Fleet Marine Force manuals. FMFRPs in the 12 series are a special category: reprints of historical works which are not available elsewhere.

2. SCOPE

This reference publication is the actual strategic plan for the conquest of Japan in World War II published in May of 1945. Replete with the original directives and assumptions that were made, the plan envisions the operation in terms of forces, organization, and coordination. The plan specifically outlines the operations on separate islands, spells out the logistics operations, and sets forth the phasing of the entire operation. For the history student and the student of operational and strategic planning, this volume is a storehouse of treasures, a storehouse waiting to be tapped.

3. CERTIFICATION

Reviewed and approved this date.

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

M. P. CAULFIELD
Major General, U.S. Marine Corps
Director, MAGTF Warfighting Center
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE PACIFIC

"DOWNFALL"
Strategic Plan
for
Operations in the Japanese Archipelago

1st Edition
28 May 1945
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE PACIFIC

"DOWNFALL"

Strategic Plan
for
Operations in the Japanese Archipelago

28 May 1943

1. The attached Strategic Plan constitutes the basis for directives for operations to force the unconditional surrender of JAPAN by seizure of vital objectives in the Japanese Archipelago.

2. Pending the issue of directives based thereon, the Plan is circulated to senior Commanders and Staff Sections of United States Army Forces in the Pacific and to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, as a general guide covering the larger phases of allocation of means and of coordination in order to facilitate planning and implementation, both operational and logistic. It is not designed to restrict executing agencies in detailed development of their final plans of operations.

3. The Plan is being forwarded to the Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force, for his information and guidance.

4. Directives and Staff Studies covering the several operations to be conducted will be issued by Headquarters concerned at appropriate times.

For the Commander-in-Chief:

R. K. SUTHERLAND
Lieutenant General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff.
"DOWNFALL"
Strategic Plan
for
Operations in the Japanese Archipelago

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1. DIRECTIVE.

a. This Plan is formulated pursuant to directives contained in JCS 1259/4, 3 April 1945 and JCS radiogram WX 87938, 26 May 1945. It covers operations of United States Army and Naval Forces in the PACIFIC to force the unconditional surrender of JAPAN by invasion of the Japanese Archipelago.

b. The following over-all objective for the operations is assigned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

"To force the unconditional surrender of JAPAN by:

(1) Lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardments and destroying Japanese air and naval strength.

(2) Invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of JAPAN."

c. The following basic command relationships are established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

(1) Command of all United States Army resources in the PACIFIC (less the Twentieth Air Force, Alaskan Department and Southeast Pacific) is vested in the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific.

(2) Command of all United States Naval resources in the PACIFIC (less Southeast Pacific) is vested in the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

(3) The Twentieth Air Force, for the present, continues operations under the direct control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to support the accomplishment of the over-all objective.

(4) The Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific is charged with making plans and preparations for the campaign in JAPAN. He cooperates with the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet in the plans and preparations for the naval and amphibious phases of the invasion of JAPAN.

(5) The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet is charged with making plans and preparations for the naval and amphibious phases of the invasion of JAPAN. He cooperates with the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific on the plans and preparations for the campaign in JAPAN.

(6) The Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force cooperates with the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific and with the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet in the preparation of plans connected with the invasion of JAPAN.

(7) The Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific is charged with the primary responsibility for the conduct of the operation.
OLYMPIC, including control in case of exigencies of the actual amphibious assault through the appropriate naval commander. The land campaign and requirements therefor are primary in the OLYMPIC operation. Account of this will be taken in the preparation, coordination and execution of plans.

(8) The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet is charged with the responsibility for the conduct of the naval and amphibious (subject to subparagraph c. (7) above) phase of the OLYMPIC operations and correlates his plans with the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific.

(9) The Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force cooperates in the plans, preparations and execution of operation OLYMPIC and in the continuance of the campaign in JAPAN. At appropriate times, to be determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Twentieth Air Force comes under the direction of the appropriate commander for the support of operations directed above.

2. ASSUMPTIONS.

a. Hostile. (See Annex 2 a, G-2 Estimate of the Hostile Situation in the Pacific Area (Under separate cover).)

(1) That the Japanese will continue the war to the utmost extent of their capabilities and will prepare to defend the main islands of JAPAN with every means available to them. That operations in this area will be opposed not only by the available organized military forces of the Empire, but also by a fanatically hostile population.

(2) That approximately three (3) hostile divisions will be disposed in Southern KYUSHU and an additional three (3) in Northern KYUSHU at initiation of the OLYMPIC operation.

(3) That total hostile forces committed against KYUSHU operations will not exceed eight (8) to ten (10) divisions and that this level will be speedily attained.

(4) That approximately twenty-one (21) hostile divisions, including depot divisions, will be on HONSHU at initiation of that operation and that fourteen (14) of these divisions may be employed in the KANTO PLAIN area.

(5) That the enemy may withdraw his land-based air forces to the Asiatic Mainland for protection from our neutralizing attacks. That under such circumstances he can possibly amass from 2,000 to 2,500 planes in that area by exercise of rigid economy, and that this force can operate against KYUSHU landings by staging through homeland fields.

(6) That the attrition caused by our continued land-based and carrier-based air preparation and support, and by our destruction of aircraft manufacturing and maintenance facilities, will reduce the hostile capability for air action against our landings to suicide attacks of uncertain proportion at an early phase of the operations.

(7) That hostile fleet elements will be forced to withdraw to the YELLOW SEA or Western SEA OF JAPAN. That the enemy will maintain the capability of a suicide attack against KYUSHU landings with the approximate strength of a typical carrier task group. That his remaining submarines and large numbers of small suicide craft will oppose our landings and that mines will be used in large numbers.

(8) That hostile sea communications across the JAPAN SEA, while relatively unimpaired prior to KYUSHU landings, will be progressively and rapidly restricted to complete interdiction by the time air is operating from HONSHU.

(9) That during continuation of Russian neutrality, the production capacity of hostile industries and raw material sources in MANCHURIA, North CHINA and KOREA will remain relatively unimpaired.

--2--
(10) That hostile logistic position will permit determined defense in areas of projected operations by hostile ground forces enumerated in (3) and (4) above.

b. Own Forces.

(1) That the entire resources available to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific and the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet will be available for the support of these operations.

(2) That there will be no effective redeployment of major ground combat units from EUROPE in time for commitment prior to early 1946.

(3) That entry of RUSSIA into the war against JAPAN at some stage of the operations may be expected.

(4) That United States Forces will be established on the line BONINS-NORTHERN RYUKYUS at initiation of the operations.

(5) That at initiation of the operations, land-based air forces will have attained offensive air superiority over Southern KYUSHU. That strategic land and carrier-based air forces will have effectively crippled the hostile aircraft and electronics industries and reduced capacity of rail lines in Southern HONSHU, SHIKOKU and KYUSHU to an extent providing little capacity beyond tactical needs.

(6) That at initiation of the operations the United States Pacific Fleet will dominate waters east of the main islands of JAPAN, and the EAST CHINA SEA and as far north as Southern KYUSHU. That forward naval bases will be functioning in the PHILIPPINES, RYUKYUS and MARIANAS.

3. OPERATIONS.

a. Concept. (See Chart, Annex 3. a., General Concept of Operations).

This Plan of campaign visualizes attainment of the assigned objectives by two (2) successive operations, the first to advance our land-based air forces into Southern KYUSHU in order to support the second, a knock-out blow to the enemy's heart in the TOKYO area. The operations are continued and extended until such time as organized resistance in the Japanese Archipelago ceases.

Concept of the OLYMPIC operation visualizes entry into Southern KYUSHU by major joint overseas landing operations after intensive air preparation. Preparatory air operations include assaults by Carrier Task Groups and prolonged action by land-based elements operating in force from the RYUKYUS and MARIANAS. Initial assaults seize and develop the KAGOSHIMA WAN and ARIAKI WAN as ports of entry. The area is occupied as far north as the general line TSUNO-SENDAI to block mountain defiles and prevent hostile interference with our operations.

These operations are expected to require fourteen (14) to seventeen (17) divisions with appropriate supporting troops, drawn from forces available in the PACIFIC with minimum use of redeployed elements. Forty (40) land-based air groups and naval elements for blockade and direct support are established for support of the CORONET operation.

Concept of the CORONET operation visualizes a major joint assault supported by the massed air and naval power in the PACIFIC, to destroy hostile forces and seize the TOKYO-YOKOHAMA area.

Initial operations establish local air support and drive into the KANTO PLAIN from outlying beaches, while defenses of the approaches to the TOKYO WAN and Northern SAGAMI BAY are reduced by intensive naval and air action. Forces are built up by subsequent landings, and operations are continued to the occupation of the TOKYO-YOKOHAMA Area and the KANTO PLAIN.

These operations are expected to require initially twenty-five (25) divisions with appropriate supporting troops, drawn from PACIFIC resources remaining after OLYMPIC, augmented by redeployment. Land-based air elements and naval forces are established as required to support operations in central and northern JAPAN to conclusion, and to operate
against the Asiatic Mainland as necessary. Logistic facilities are established in the TOKYO
WAN to support consolidation of central and northern JAPAN.

It is estimated that the maximum air garrison will not exceed fifty (50) groups,
which figure is subject to revision as the situation develops.

Occupation of the KANTO PLAIN is followed by such operations from the
OLYMPIC and CORONET areas as may be necessary to terminate organized resistance in
the Japanese Archipelago.

If required by the situation prior to CORONET, intermediate operations are con-
ducted to establish advance fighter elements in Southern SHIKOKU or Southeast HONSHU
to cover our advance.

In event forces allocated OLYMPIC operation are insufficient to accomplish tasks
assigned, build-up in OLYMPIC area from elements earmarked for CORONET is continued at
the rate of three (3) divisions per month beginning about (X plus 30) with supporting
troops as required by the situation. The CORONET operation is adjusted accordingly.

In event forces allocated CORONET operation are insufficient to successfully per-
form tasks assigned, build-up from the War Department Strategic Reserve is continued direct
to the objective area at a rate of four (4) divisions and appropriate supporting troops per
month beginning about (Y plus 90) to a strength required by the situation.

The United States Pacific Fleet conducts the amphibious phases of the opera-
tions, supports ground action after landing and covers the operation by naval and air action
against hostile supporting air, naval and land forces.

The Twentieth Air Force, initially employed on strategic targets in coordination
with long-range land-based and carrier-based air action, tactically supports as necessary
the amphibious and ground phases of the respective assaults.

The Commanding General, CHINA Theater cooperates by conduct of diversionary
and containing operations within the limits of his capabilities.

Should RUSSIA enter the war prior to completion of the CORONET assault
phase, diversions from forces herein allocated may be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
order to establish and maintain a sea route to Eastern SIBERIA. In this event, the operations
outlined above are conducted with minimum alteration, such adjustments being made in tim-
ing as may be required to procure essential replacements for the forces committed.

b. Employment of Forces.

(1) Coordination.

Operations of United States Army Forces, the United States Pacific Fleet
and the Twentieth Air Force are coordinated under the following provisions
and principles:

(a) RYUKYUS.

1. CINCPAO provides facilities for, and assists with all available
means at his disposal, the establishment in the RYUKYUS of such
elements of the Far East Air Forces as are designated by CINCAFPAC in order to augment air action to the maximum prior to
the OLYMPIC operation. The operations of these Army Air Forces
are conducted under the control of CINCAFPAC. When the major
portion of the Seventh Air Force has been deployed in the
RYUKYUS, command of these forces passes to CINCAFPAC. In
case Seventh Air Force units are required the, after by CINCPAO
for support of local operations, arrangements are made with CINCAFPAC by dispatch.

2. CINCPAO continues to press the development of port and airdrome
facilities, and to assist in establishing increased Army Air Forces in
the RYUKYUS. CINCAFPAC furnishes within the limit of his
capabilities, United States Army resources to assist in the deploy-

—4—
of additional Army Air Forces.

(b) **Air Forces.**

1. Land-based air forces of the Army and of the Naval Service operate under the control of CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC respectively, except:
   
   a. The Twentieth Air Force operates as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
   
   b. Marine units assigned to operate with major ground elements of the Fleet Marine Force under Army control likewise pass to the control of the Army Commander designated by CINCAFPAC.
   
   c. When the Army is responsible for the air defense of an area or position, Marine units engaged in such air defense pass to the operational control of the appropriate Army Air Commander.

2. a. During the amphibious phase of an operation while control is exercised by CINCPAC, land-based air elements operating in the objective area are controlled by CINCPAC, through a Commander designated by him. The instructions of this Commander, wherever practicable, are transmitted to the appropriate land-based air echelon through an Army Air Controller who accompanies the Naval Air Commander designated.
   
   b. Similarly, after land-based air forces are established in an objective area and responsibility for air operations passes to CINCAFPAC, control of carrier-based air elements operating in an objective area is exercised by the Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, wherever practicable through a Navy Air Controller at the objective area. Amount of carrier-based air available for operations in an objective area and the duration of such support are established in the plan for the specific operation.
   
   c. Definition of objective areas, duration of amphibious phases and amount of land-based air available for operation in objective areas, are established in the plans for specific operations.

3. Operations of land-based and carrier-based air forces other than operations covered in sub-paragraphs (b) 1. and 2. above, are coordinated by pre-arrangement between CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC and Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force for each major operation or campaign. Timing and areas of operations are included in the arrangements.

(c) **Control of Landing Forces Ashore.**

1. Unless otherwise agreed to by CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC for a specific operation or campaign, CINCPAC controls amphibious movements and landings through a Senior Naval Commander designated by him. This Commander in turn controls Attack Force or Group Commanders who are responsible for amphibious operations at their respective objectives.

2. Control of forces ashore passes to the Commander of each Assault Division or separate Landing Force after his arrival and establishment ashore, and upon his notification to the Commander of the corresponding Naval Attack Group or Force that he is ready to assume control of his forces ashore. The Commander of each Assault Division or separate Landing Force and the Commander of each Naval Attack Group or Force promptly reports to his next Senior Ground or Naval Commander the time he assumes or relinquishes control of forces ashore.

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3. In operations involving large units, control of forces ashore passes to each Corps Commander within his respective area of operation after his arrival and establishment ashore and upon notification to the Commander of the corresponding Naval Attack Force that he is ready to assume control of his forces ashore. Each Corps Commander and corresponding Naval Attack Force Commander promptly reports to his next superior Commander:
   a. The time each Division and separate Landing Force and its corresponding Naval Attack Group Commander assumes or relinquishes control of the forces ashore.
   b. The time he himself assumes or relinquishes control of forces ashore.

4. Division, separate Landing Force, and higher Commanders who have assumed control of their forces ashore continue under control of the next Senior Naval Attack Group or Force Commander until their next Senior Army Commander assumes control of forces ashore.

5. Control of forces ashore passes to the Commander of the Army Forces upon his announcement to the Commander of the Naval Forces that he is ready to assume control of his forces ashore. The two Commanders promptly report to CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC the time of assumption of control of forces ashore by the Commander of the Army Forces.

6. Nothing in this type procedure limits the two Commanders-in-Chief from exercising under their general responsibilities such controls as extraordinary or unforeseen circumstances may necessitate.

(d) United States Marines.
   1. Control of United States Marine ground units forming parts of landing forces is exercised by CINCAFPAC.

(e) Naval Forces, SWPA.
   1. When Commander, Seventh Fleet moves his headquarters to JAPAN, the Naval Forces required in the Southwest Pacific Area are assigned as a task force under the command of the Commander, Philippine Sea Frontier.

(2) Organization.

(a) United States Army Forces in the Pacific.
   For organization of United States Army Forces in the Pacific for OLYMPIC and CORONET operations, see Chart, Annex 3 b (2) (a).

(b) United States Pacific Fleet.
   1. Organization of the United States Pacific Fleet for the several operations is as prescribed by CINCPAC.
   2. For the OLYMPIC operation, CINCPAC has designated the Third Fleet, including Fast Carrier Task Groups, to provide strategic support and the Fifth Fleet to provide direct support and amphibious operations.

(3) Forces.

(a) UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE PACIFIC
   Command of all U. S. Army resources in the PACIFIC (except Alaskan Department, 20th Air Force and Southeast Pacific).
   Landing forces, CORONET operation.
   Operations of U. S. Army Forces, CORONET operation.
   Theater command, SWPA.
1. Sixth Army
   — Landing forces, OLYMPIC operation.
   Operation of ground forces, OLYMPIC operation.
   Preparation of Sixth Army elements from Western Pacific, OLYMPIC operation.
   Mounting of elements transported into OLYMPIC area under Sixth Army control.
   Preparation and mounting of follow-up elements from KYUSHU, CORONET operation.

2. Eighth Army
   — CORONET operation.
   Preparation of Eighth Army elements, CORONET operation.
   Mounting of elements transported into CORONET area under Eighth Army control.

3. Tenth Army
   — CORONET operation.
   Preparation of Tenth Army Elements, CORONET operation.
   Mounting of elements transported into CORONET area under Tenth Army control.

4. First Army
   — CORONET operation.
   Preparation of First Army elements, CORONET operation.
   Mounting of elements transported into CORONET area under First Army control.

5. Far East Air Forces
   — Land-based air support, OLYMPIC and CORONET operations (except 20th Air Force under JCS control).
   Preparation of FEAF elements for mounting, OLYMPIC and CORONET operations.

6. United States Army Forces Middle Pacific
   — Preparation and mounting of U.S. Army Forces from Middle Pacific for OLYMPIC and CORONET operations as directed (for CINCPAC).
   Logistic support and administrative control of U.S. Army Forces in the Middle Pacific.
   U.S. Army Garrisons, Middle Pacific.

7. United States Army Forces Western Pacific
   — Logistic support of U.S. Army Forces, Western Pacific.
   Logistic Support of U.S. Army Forces, OLYMPIC operation.
   Preparation of elements OLYMPIC Base Command for OLYMPIC operation.
   Mounting of elements transported to OLYMPIC area under USAFWESPAC control.

8. Army Service Command "C"
   — Base development:
   Logistic support, CORONET operation.
9. Naval Forces
SWPA
(for CINCPAC)

Preparation and mounting of Naval and Marine elements from SWPA, OLYMPIC and CORONET operations.

(b) UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

Naval operations, OLYMPIC and CORONET.
Strategic naval support, including general supporting carrier-based air operations.
Amphibious phases, OLYMPIC and CORONET operations.
Preparation and mounting of Naval and Marine ground and land-based air elements from POA, OLYMPIC and CORONET operations.
Theater Command, Pacific Ocean Areas.

(c) TWENTIETH AIR FORCE

VHF operations, PACIFIC area.

c. Operations Required.

(1) KYUSHU Operation. "OLYMPIC" (See Chart, Annex 3 c (1), Concept). Southern KYUSHU; Target Date for "X" Day, 1 November 1945.

(a) Tasks.

1. By joint overseas expeditionary operations, seize and occupy Southern KYUSHU as far north as the general line TSUNO—SENDAI; establish air forces and naval facilities for support of the CORONET operation.

2. Defend area occupied, preventing hostile interference with operations of land-based air forces, naval forces and logistic facilities in Southern KYUSHU.

3. Support the CORONET operation by:
   a. Maintaining sea and air blockades and conducting air and naval preparatory and supporting operations as directed.
   b. Staging and mounting four (4) follow-up divisions from OLYMPIC assault forces.
   c. Staging and mounting as additional follow-up elements, AFPAC reserve units committed in OLYMPIC.

4. Prepare to conduct such overland and amphibious operations in KYUSHU and the INLAND SEA area as may be directed subsequent to the assault phase of the CORONET operation.

(c) Estimate of Forces Required.

1. United States Army Forces in the Pacific.
   a. Ground.
      (1) Assault.
      Sixth Army Headquarters and Army Troops. Twelve (12) Divisions (Including 3 USMC).
(2) Follow-up.
Two (2) Divisions.

(3) Total Initial Commitment.
Fourteen (14) Divisions.

(4) AFPAC Reserve.
Three (3) Divisions (2 PHILIPPINES, 1 RY-UKUS).

b. Air Garrison.

X plus 90 40 Groups 2794 a c
(equivalent) (approximate)

c. Total Commitment.

\[
\begin{array}{cccc}
\text{Personnel Vehicles} & \text{D.W.T.} \\
\text{Troops and equipment} & 766,700 & 134,300 & 1,205,730 \\
\text{Construction Material} & 265,200 \\
\hline
\text{Total Tonnage} & 1,470,930
\end{array}
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a. Strategic Support.

(1) As designated by CINCPAC.

(2) Preliminary Estimate:

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<td>CVL</td>
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b. Naval Assault Lift.

(1) As designated by CINCPAC, to float twelve (12) Divisions at 33,000 personnel and 50,750 D.W.T. each.

(2) Preliminary Estimate:

20 AGC
210 APA
12 AP
84 AKA
92 APD
3 APH
515 LST
16 LSD
360 LSM
6 LSV

c. Direct Supporting Elements.
As designated by CINCPAC.

(2) HONSHU Operation. "CORONET" (See Annex 3 c (2), Concept). TOKYO Area; Target Date for "Y" Day, 1 March 1946.

(a) Tasks.

1. By joint overseas expeditionary operations destroy hostile forces and occupy the TOKYO-YOKOHAMA area.

2. Complete occupation of the KANTO PLAIN area; establish air forces, naval and logistic facilities for support of subsequent operations in Central and Northern JAPAN.

3. Conduct such subsequent operations in Central and
Northern HONSHU and Japanese Islands to the northward as may be directed to terminate hostile resistance in these areas.

(b) Estimate of Forces Required. (Tentative)

1. United States Army Forces in the Pacific.
   a. Ground.
      (1) Assault.
         AFPAC Advanced Hq and Hq Troops.
         Eighth Army Hq and Army Troops.
         Tenth Army Hq and Army Troops.
         Total fourteen (14) Divisions (12 Inf, 2 Armd).
      (2) Follow-up.
         First Army Hq and Army Troops.
         Reserve Afloat.
         Total Ten (10) Divisions.
      (3) AFPAC Reserve.
         1 Division AB—KYUSHU.
         1 Corps (3 Divisions) redeployed.
      (4) Total Initial Commitment.
         Twenty-five (25) Divisions.
      (5) Build-up as Required.
         (Y plus 90)—onward, four (4) Divisions per month, direct from UNITED STATES.
   b. Air Garrison.
      As required by situation at the time, not to exceed:
      Y plus 90 50 Groups 3328 a c (equivalent) -(approximate)
   c. Commitment. (Seaborne and Airborne):
      Personnel Vehiages D.W.T.
      Troops and Equipment 1,026,000 190,000 1,540,000
      Construction Material 1,100,000
      Total Tonnage 2,640,000

   a. Strategic and Direct Support.
      As designated by CINCPAC.
   b. Naval Assault Lift.
      As designated by CINCPAC, to float fourteen (14) Divisions at 33,000 personnel and 43,500 D.W.T. each.

   d. Allocation of Forces.
      (1) United States Army Forces in the Pacific.
         (a) Employment of major units, ground forces in the Pacific May 1945—June 1946 is shown in Annex 3 d (1) (a).
         (b) Tentative deployment of land-based air forces for support of OLYMPIC and CORONET operations is shown in Chart, Annex 3 d (1) (b).

   —10—
(c) Troop Lift Requirements, OLYMPIC and CORONET operations, are shown in Table, Annex 3 d (1) (c).

(2) United States Pacific Fleet.

Allocation of naval assault shipping and carrier-based air elements for OLYMPIC, CORONET and such subsidiary operations as may be directed, is as determined by CINCPAC.

4. LOGISTICS

a. General:

Army and Marine Corps forces employed in these operations are staged and mounted from the PHILIPPINES, RYUKYUS, MARIANAS and HAWAIIAN Islands, with equipment and supplies as prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific.

Naval forces are assembled and employed as directed by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

b. Responsibilities:

The Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific, is responsible for the logistic support of all Army forces employed in these operations (except Twentieth Air Force), also for support of all Marine Corps elements while operating under his control.

The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, is responsible for the logistic support of all Naval forces employed in these operations and for providing organizational equipment and mounting-out supplies for Marine Corps units passing to Army control.

Where units of one force are serving with or under the other, necessary coordination to effect the supply and support of such elements is accomplished between the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific, and the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, is responsible for the logistic support of the Twentieth Air Force elements, as provided in JCS 823 and 823 I to 5, inclusive.

c. Supply:

The supply of Army elements employed in these operations is accomplished through agencies of United States Army Forces, Middle or Western Pacific, as determined and directed by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific. Army supplies in the Middle Pacific are utilized to the extent necessary to stage, equip, and mount Army forces in the Middle Pacific area. Additional supplies in the Middle Pacific Area are held in reserve for resupply to objective areas as may be required. Where additional facilities are required to effect the foregoing at certain locations, coordination is obtained through the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas.

Resupply to Marine Corps units employed in these operations, of material common to both the United States Marine Corps and United States Army forces, is furnished from United States Army stocks, distributed through Army channels. For Marine Corps elements operating under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific, material peculiar to the Marine Corps, required for resupply, is obtained through Marine Corps supply channels and transported to the objective areas as arranged by agreement between the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific, and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas.

Resupply of Army forces employed in this operation is, in general accomplished by direct shipment from the United States, in transportation as arranged for by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific. Shipment of supplies for support of Naval forces is arranged and directed by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Supply of the bulk of construction materials required for the two forces is direct from the United States, augmented as necessary from bases under the control of the
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific, and the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, respectively, as agreed upon by arrangement between these commanders.

d. Evacuation.

Evacuation of Army, Navy and Marine Corps personnel from objective areas initially is by Naval assault shipping, followed at the earliest practicable date by the employment of hospital ships and aircraft. Evacuation is to ports and bases where bed credits have been established. At the earliest practicable date, evacuation from objective areas direct to the United States, of Army patients requiring prolonged hospitalization, is initiated. The United States Army hospital ships employed in support of these operations are operated under Naval control, as arranged between the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific, and the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

e. Hospitalization:

During the early phases of operations and prior to the establishment of fixed hospitals in the objective areas, minor casualties are hospitalized in mobile-type hospitals assigned to combat forces. Casualties requiring prolonged treatment during the early phases of operations are hospitalized in fixed hospitals at Army and Naval bases in the Pacific, and in the objective area when fixed hospitals are established therein. Fixed-bed hospital units are established in the objective areas as a part of Army or Naval installations, as determined by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific, and the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

f. Transportation:

Naval assault shipping provided by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, is employed for transportation of assault and follow-up elements forward from mounting areas, augmented by heavy shipping, if required. Heavy shipping, if required for the foregoing, is provided by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific, or the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, depending upon whether Army or Naval units are to be transported therein.

Resupply and construction materials required for support of Army and Naval facilities ashore are transported to ports in the objective areas in shipping as arranged for by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific, and the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, respectively.

Lighterage and other harbor equipment required in objective area ports is provided by each service to the extent of available resources.

The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, performs harbor clearance to the high-water mark in all harbors utilized by United States forces in the objective areas.

In exercising control of ports in the objective areas used in common by Army and Naval forces and elements, the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific, determines the amount of and the time of arrival of all shipping arriving in such ports except Pacific Fleet combatant and Auxiliary units, minecraft, patrol and escort and harbor vessels. Each service is responsible for the handling and discharge, upon its arrival in port, of such shipping pertaining to its Service.

g. Construction:

Construction in the objective areas is limited to provision of minimum operational facilities. Following the assault phase, base areas, ports, communications systems, and Air and Naval operating facilities are developed to support operations. The Army Command of land operations initiates the construction of the above facilities and allocates areas for all shore establishments. At a date designated by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific, the responsibility for continuing construction and development of the Naval facilities ashore is transferred to Naval control; thereafter each Commander constructs and operates installations pertaining to his Service in the manner and priorities as determined by him.

The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, furnishes construction materials and troops for the construction of Marine Air operating facilities and other ex-
clusively Marine installations required for the support of Marine Corps Forces employed in these operations.

Construction forces available for these operations from either service, which may be excess to the requirements of the owning service, are available for employment on projects of the other service, under appropriate arrangements.

Maximum use is made of available local resources, including existing installations and civilian labor. Allocation of these resources is made as directed by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific.

h. Control of Installations and Facilities:

The Army Commander of land operations exercises, initially, complete control of all facilities and installations ashore, irrespective of whether they pertain to Army or Navy. At a date to be designated by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific (approximately Landing Day plus 15 days), the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific, will transfer to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, the responsibility for all Naval and Marine Corps installations and forces ashore, except those Marine Corps Forces attached to Army Forces for employment in combat and air operations. From and after this designated date, each service directly controls the construction, operations, and maintenance of its own shore installations.

The Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific, controls all ports in objective areas, used in common by Army and Naval shipping.

The Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific, exercises control of the civilian population to the extent and in the manner necessary to prevent interference with the progress of military operations in the objective areas, to obtain the maximum exploitation of local means, and to carry out the policy of the Government of the UNITED STATES with respect to the populace.
DISTRIBUTION LIST

STRATEGIC PLAN

"DOWNFALL"

28 May 1945

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"DOWNFALL"

Strategic Plan For
Operations in the Japanese Archipelago

ANNEXES

2 a  G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE HOSTILE SITUATION IN THE PACIFIC AREA (Under Separate Cover).

3 a  GENERAL CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.

3 b (2) (a) ORGANIZATION OF UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE PACIFIC, "OLYMPIC" AND "CORONET" OPERATIONS.

3 c (1) CONCEPT, "OLYMPIC" OPERATION (KYUSHU).

3 c (2) CONCEPT, "CORONET" OPERATION (HONSHU).

3 d (1) (a) EMPLOYMENT OF MAJOR UNITS GROUND FORCES IN THE PACIFIC, MAY 1945 - JUNE 1946.

3 d (1) (b) DEPLOYMENT OF LAND-BASED AIR FORCES, "OLYMPIC" AND "CORONET" OPERATIONS.

3 d (1) (c) TROOP LIFT REQUIREMENTS, "OLYMPIC" AND "CORONET" OPERATIONS.
ANNEX 3G(2)
CONCEPT OF "CORONET" OPERATION
1 MAR '46

LEGEND

UNITs COMMITTED
SUPPORTING OPERATIONS
GARRISON
DIVISIONS MOUNTED
ASSAULT
FOLLOW-UP

NOTE:
* BUILD UP:
4 DIVISIONS PER MONTH
FROM STRATEGIC RESERVE
IN THE UNITED STATES,
IF REQUIRED.
## ESTIMATE OF TROOP LIFT REQUIREMENTS

### "DOWNFALL OPERATION"

### "OLYMPIC"—(1 November 1945)

**Major Assault Units**
- Sixth Army Hq & Hq Tps
- XI Corps
- IX Corps
- 9 Infantry Divisions
- 1 Amphib. Corps Hq & Hq Tps
- 1 Marine Divisions
- 8 Air Groups

**Major Follow-up Units**
- 2 Infantry Divisions
- 4 Air Groups

### COMMITMENT

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*May be augmented by 3, AMPAC Reserve Divisions

### "CORONET"—(1 March 1946)

**Major Assault Units**
- AMPAC Adv Hq & Hq Tps
- Eighth Army Hq & Hq Tps
- Ninth Army Hq & Hq Tps
- III Amphib. Corps Hq & Hq Tps
- 3 Marine Divisions
- 4 Corps Hq & Hq Tps
- 2 Armored Divisions
- 9 Infantry Divisions
- 12 Air Groups

**Major Follow-up Units**
- First Army Hq & Hq Tps
- 3 Corps Hq & Hq Tps
- 11 Infantry Divisions
- 36 Air Groups

### COMMITMENT

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<th>Seaborne</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Vehicles</th>
<th>D.W.T.</th>
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<tr>
<td>Assault</td>
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**Build up**
- AMPAC Reserve—3 Divisions
- U.S—4 Divisions per month as required

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**NOTE:**
- "AMPAC" refers to the Allied Monterey Peninsula Army Command.
- "U.S." refers to the United States Army.

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**Annex:**
- ESTIMATE OF TROOP LIFT REQUIREMENTS
- "ANNEX 3 d (1) (c)"