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How the Japanese Army Fights

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FOREWORD

1. PURPOSE

Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12-22, *How the Japanese Army Fights*, is published to ensure the retention and dissemination of useful information which is not intended to become doctrine or to be published in Fleet Marine Force manuals. FMFRPs in the 12 Series are a special category: reprints of historical works which are not available elsewhere.

2. SCOPE

This reference publication was written by Lt. Cols. P.W. Thompson, H. Doud, and J. Scofield, and published originally in the Infantry Journal. It provides the reader with a detailed knowledge of the Japanese Army as it existed in 1942. From its organization and history, from arms and equipment, to analysis of the Japanese Army in campaign and in battle, the book is an excellent study of the Japanese soldier as an individual and his army as a whole. Written almost 50 years ago, many lessons observed in this manual are still valid as they apply to these theaters of operation and can be applied to operations in the Orient. The publication stands as a valuable source of information for all officers involved in contemporary warfare and who have an interest in World War II.

3. CERTIFICATION

Reviewed and approved this date.

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

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HOW THE JAPANESE ARMY FIGHTS

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

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INTRODUCTION

We Americans have learned much about the Jap since December 7, 1941—much that we should have known earlier had we not been blind to the dire necessity of knowing. And now that the necessity and the desire are in our minds and hearts, no book on the Army of the Japs needs an introduction. We must know our foes and know them well. And no more need be said.

CHAPTER 1

BEHIND THE FOG OF WAR

A Glance at the History and Organization of the Jap Army

[*Lieutenant Colonel Paul W. Thompson, Corps of Engineers, who has written this brief estimate of the history, organization, and men of the Jap Army, is also the author of Chapters 4 and 5, in which he describes the methods used by the Japanese forces in specific campaigns in China and Malaya.*]

THE BUILDINGS in Tokyo from which the Japanese Imperial General Staff does a fair job of directing far-flung military activities are old and have a down-at-the-heel appearance. In a sense, these structural eyesores set the motif for the Japanese Army. It is an army which looks like hell—but which performs acceptably. At least it has performed acceptably so far.

To attempt an estimate of the Japanese Army is something like attempting to describe the other side of the moon, the side which is never turned toward us. The Japs have never been ones to flaunt their business in the open; but since about 1931—the year marking the beginning of big-time Jap aggression—the veil they have thrown up around their military establishment and operations has been well-nigh impenetrable. Compared to the Japs, the Germans are guileless confidants, with their hearts and their mili-

tary archives on their sleeves. Two months after a German campaign (if it was successful), we have a good idea just how it was done, and by whom. But about all we know of the Jap victories in China is that they were accomplished by "detachments" of the army. It is incredible that a nation could have waged ten years of war and divulged so little to the world. Our difficulties in this respect are greatly increased by the inscrutable Jap language which, to all intents and purposes, denies us access to the Japanese military literature.

It is safe then to say that no American understands the Japanese Army in the way that many Americans understand, say, the German Army. However, by making the best of many sources, we are able to build up a general picture of our Far Eastern enemy which, though lacking details, is likely to be helpful. To build up such a picture is the aim of this article. Our logical starting point is *history*.

The United States Army was back in its western Indian posts ruminating over *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War* and discussing the activities of the Sioux, and the elder Moltke had dictated the peace at Versailles, before the Japanese Army in a modern sense was even established. When the modern Jap army was established—in the year 1872—it was with all the advantages of starting from scratch, with the experiences and knowledge of the entire world to guide it. The cornerstone of the new Jap military policy was conscription, which was established forthwith (in 1872). Simultaneously, Jap officer-students were dispatched over the world, but particularly to

Germany, where Prussian militarism had just scored its first blitz victories. The situation seems analagous to that of a small college that decides to crash into big-league football and sends emissaries to Alabama to find how it should be done.

The Japanese move toward military power was accompanied by moves in naval and political spheres. On the naval front, the move was to provide shipyards and bases, looking to the development of a powerful navy. On the political front, the incipient little empire proceeded gingerly, noting the fine points of international power politics as expertly portrayed during that era by such men as Disraeli and Bismarck.

Although we are considering the origins of an army, let us again remember that it is recent, not ancient, history which is before us. Men still living remember it all. Let us realize that as of those 1870's, Japan had 35,000,000 people crammed onto the four big, and many small, islands which extend over not more than ten degrees of latitude off the Vladivostok coast. Japan did *not* have Formosa or Korea or Sakhalin or the Kurile Islands—and of course not the mandates or Manchukuo. The army and the empire which it is now our mission to defeat are organisms that have grown up under our very eyes—literally under *your* very eyes if you are much beyond retirement age.

(It is interesting to reflect on the effects of causes stemming from the era we are discussing. In 1864 Bismarck won the victory against Denmark which led to the unification of Germany. In 1872 Japan laid the cornerstone of its military power. From

those two events, occurring within a span of eight years, and occasioning little general concern at the time, have sprung the chief agencies of trouble in the present-day world: the German and Japanese armies.)

The new Japanese diplomacy was throwing its weight around the great arena of Asiatic politics soon after its birth; but it was careful to pull its punches pending the coming-of-age of the new army. The army was given twenty-two years in which to mature. Then, in 1894, there was a little tune-up war with China, the fruits of which—domination of Korea—had to be foregone, temporarily, pending a settlement of the big issue with Russia. The Russo-Japanese war was big-league in all respects; but it was a case of the hound running for its dinner and the rabbit for its life. The Russians were not willing to make the total effort which would have been necessary to salvage the war after the initial reverses. And so an up-and-coming Japan got away with a victory not proportionate to its true national strength. Nonetheless, on each of a dozen fields, the Japs proved themselves tactically superior to the Russians, even though the Russians often had numerical and material superiority.

In World War I, the Japanese Army received no important test; but following the war, Jap diplomats schemed with the best of them. There were incidents every once in a while, such as the squeeze play on The Twenty-one Points (which misfired), and the scuttling of the naval parity ratios (in 1934). Through this post-war era, the Japs continued to worship at the feet of their military idols, the Ger-

mans. There were German missions to Japan, and there was a constant flow of Japanese officer-observers (standard equipment for each of which was one Leica camera) to Germany.

In 1931, the Japs invaded Manchuria and, meeting practically no resistance in the field (although there was plenty in the international drawing rooms), they made the invasion, and the power politics accompanying it, stick. In 1937 the olive-drab columns, still looking ragged, and still straggling through their thirty-miles-per-day marches, occupied the railway station at Peiping, and thereby set in motion "the China incident." That incident is still alive and kicking, and it merges with our present story.

The source of strength for any military power is in its people, from whom the common soldier is drawn. There are now approximately 100 million Japanese citizens, 70 million of them in Japan proper. It is a hard-working nation. It ekes out its sustenance from the often-barren land of those myriads of tight islands, and it stays in top-flight commercial competition through the willingness of its workers to work longer for less. The standard of living is low (the equivalent of $1.50 will get you a radio), but of literacy, fairly high. It has an economy and a psychology which produces soldiers who are strong and willing, who are accustomed to hardships perhaps greater than those in the military life, and who accept military service as an inevitable and honorable thing.

Colonel Doud's inimitable account [1] of his experiences with the Japanese infantry in garrison and on maneuvers—presents a fair picture of the inner workings of the Japanese soldier. We know that this tough little customer is extraordinary on two counts; first, on the count of *physical* endurance; and second, on the count of *emotional* qualities. Without pretending to contribute anything new to the subject, let us review what we know about our Far Eastern enemy, and cast up a balance.

The reference to emotional qualities may be extended to include what we call *morale*. And as a straw in the wind to show the direction of Jap thought on the subject, we can ring in the hallowed incident of the three living torpedoes of Shanghai, who are alleged to have converted themselves into a bangalore torpedo, stretched themselves under the Chinese wire before Shanghai, and lighted the fuse. Actually, evidence adduced at the time indicated strongly that the three engineers were simply victims of a premature explosion, but that is not the point. The point is that the Japanese authorities seized upon the incident, developed a suitable version, and glorified it to the skies. The three "heroes" were cast in bronze-and-stone, and set up in "shrines" over the land. It was and is the fashion for any Japanese soldier to betake himself to one of the shrines occasionally and steep himself in the official version of the glorious deed. Meanwhile, Japanese units in the homeland like to stage reënactments of the deed, probably for the benefit of the neighborhood boys who are approaching military age.

[1] See Chapter 3.

Another manifestation of this fanatical devotion business is the "code" under which the Jap soldier lives. The nearest approach to this in our army would appear to be our simple oath to support the Constitution. But the Japanese code covers three pages of very involved logic in very fine print. The code consists, in brief, of five points:

(1) The soldier should consider *loyalty* his essential duty. ("Remember that the protection of the state and the maintenance of its power depend upon the strength of its arms. . . . Bear in mind that duty is weightier than a mountain, while death is lighter than a feather.")

(2) The soldier should be strict in observing *propriety*. ("Inferiors should regard the orders of their superiors as issuing directly from Us" [the emperor].)

(3) The soldier should esteem *valor*. ("Never to despise an inferior enemy, or to fear a superior, but to do one's duty as soldier or sailor—that is true valor.")

(4) The soldier should highly value *faithfulness* and *righteousness*. ("Faithfulness implies the keeping of one's word, and righteousness the fulfillment of one's duty.")

(5) The soldier should make *simplicity* his aim. ("If you do not make simplicity your aim, you will become effeminate or frivolous and acquire fondness for luxurious and extravagant ways.")

If the Jap soldier boys were not born with the proper devotion, the idea is to give them every opportunity to acquire it.

Still pursuing morale, emotions and allied subjects, let us turn to that best and most interesting of

evidence, the accounts of eyewitnesses. We have two star ones at our service: first, Colonel Doud, whose words will be used here only incidentally; and second, one Robert Leurquin, a correspondent and apparently a Frenchman, who had the rare opportunity of living with front-line Japanese units during several actions in North China, and who wrote penetratingly of his experiences in the British military publication, *The Army Quarterly*.[2]

M. Leurquin, like Colonel Doud, never ceased to be amazed at the physical hardihood of the Jap soldiers, especially as manifested in their long marches. He essayed to get to the bottom of the matter, apparently through the medium of questions put to Jap officers. "If the explanations of the Jap officers are to be believed," says M. Leurquin, who evidently believes that they are to be believed, "the endurance is due less to training than to the fact that the flag is carried at the head of the regiment during such marches. To the Japanese soldier, this flag is not only the image of his country in arms, but the incarnation of imperial divinity, of the supreme chief of the race."

This explanation gives M. Leurquin the opportunity of developing the subject of "face," and of the "emperor cult," as applied to the common soldier. The latter has a grim determination not to "lose face," and M. Leurquin has seen him holding on, perhaps along about the thirty-fifth mile, ". . . though pain and fatigue were visible enough on his face." The determination not to lose face is strong

2 "The Japanese Punitive Expedition in China," by Robert Leurquin. *The Army Quarterly* (London), April, 1938.

enough at any time; but it reaches the life-and-death stage when the soldier is picking them up and putting them down under the eyes of the emperor, as symbolized by the flag up ahead. "This," says M. Leurquin, "is the driving factor in Japanese life" and especially, it seems, in Japanese military life.

M. Leurquin was always amazed, not alone at the thirty-five-mile marches, but also at the fact that they were made on scanty rations. Where Colonel Doud saw no rolling kitchens whatever, M. Leurquin saw a few—but they were employed, not in cooking, but in heating water. The Japanese soldier in North China fought and froze and made those terrific marches on a ration which, according to M. Leurquin, consisted of a half-pound of rice and some blackish potatoes. This ration was made edible by dousing it with hot water, which is where those kitchens come in. M. Leurquin says the units with which he lived had neither meat nor fish ("because of the cholera"); but in this detail he is at odds with Colonel Doud, who tells of beef eaten straight from the can. It is a case, no doubt, of rice and meat if they can be had, and otherwise, of rice alone. M. Leurquin notes, incidentally, that liquor was strictly forbidden, but that the troops were given plenty of cigarettes and sugar candy, ". . . of which they are very fond."

One of the fascinating passages in the Doud account has to do with the ceremony incident to delivering their rifles to young recruits. M. Leurquin carries this theme into the fields of North China. He describes a scene which he says was repeated every single evening. "Every evening, at rest . . . the

Japanese private, as soon as he had settled down in the hut of some Chinese peasant, used to wash himself thoroughly—an act which horrified the Chinese, who hate water. He then donned fatigue clothes and set to work to attend to his arms, dismounting his rifle—cleaning and greasing all its parts, polishing the woodwork with a soft cloth to make it shine, and cleaning the bayonet with tissue paper. . . ." (Some remarks corollary to these, on Japanese officers and their sabers, will be forthcoming in a later paragraph.)

For his crowning impression of the Japanese soldier M. Leurquin returns to the realm of the emotions. The Japanese soldier, he says, has little regard for discipline once he is in the field, and this disregard M. Leurquin ascribes to ". . . the feminine and emotional quality of the race, which makes the Japanese lose control of their nerves." (The choice of words there is a little unfortunate, for the "loss of nerves" is in the direction of increased boldness on the battlefield.) M. Leurquin's sentiments derive from his many observations of Japanese soldiers battling under "a veritable war hysteria," charging the Chinese works with flags waving, and seeking "hand-to-hand fights with a disdain for death that would lead to frightful massacres were the Japanese to face an enemy . . ."—such as the one they faced on Bataan Peninsula. "This intoxication of the Japanese soldier during a battle," continues our observer, "has other unfavorable consequences, above all that of leading him into acts of real indiscipline. Repeatedly in the course of the campaign (North China, 1937) the men of certain units were impelled by

their combative ardor and their desire for hand-to-hand fighting to impose their will on that of their officers; they dragged the officers along with them in an assault, despite the evident necessity to wait for a more propitious moment. . . . Passion controls the nerves of the Japanese soldier, and the warrior in him predominates over the military man."

M. Leurquin, it must be emphasized, was writing of the Japanese of 1937, and, of course, of the Chinese of the same date. As will become evident later in our story, the white-glove charges which so entranced M. Leurquin must have been abandoned, by necessity, early in the Chinese incident. Let us count on a brave enemy and a tough one; but not on a foolish one.

The present Japanese Army is the result of the conscription-training system which, as we have seen, has been in effect for seventy years. The tendency is to regard conscription, when applied to a populous nation, as tantamount to a very large standing army. Such has not been the Japanese method. Before examining the method itself, let us establish this particular point by a consideration of Japanese Army strengths during recent years.

At the close of World War I, Japan had an army of about twenty divisions, with a total strength of perhaps 400,000. The great earthquake of 1923, coupled with the worldwide depression of that time, moved the Japs to a reduction in size of their standing army. In 1925, there was a further reduction, which left the total army strength at about 250,000.

At that time, the army included seventeen divisions, some of them evidently at part-strength.

During the Manchurian incident, beginning in 1931, the strength of the army was increased to perhaps 375,000, which figure was maintained until 1937 brought trouble in China. During the Chinese incident, there has been a gradual increase in army strength, until as of today mobilization is probably as nearly complete as it is practicable to bring it.

Concerning the present strength of the Japanese Army, we can offer only estimates, conjectures, and informed guesses. The preponderance of evidence (collected from such sources as Churchill's speeches and the London *Times*) indicates the situation to be about as follows:

Divisional strength. The Japs have the equivalent of from 70 to 80 infantry divisions. This indicates an aggregate divisional strength of perhaps 1,500,000 men.

Armored strength. As we shall see, the Japs are not known to have any armored divisions on the panzer-division model. They are believed to have perhaps 15 tank regiments, each containing perhaps 150 tanks. This might indicate an armored strength equivalent to five or six divisions.

Aggregate strength. Based on the estimated divisional strength, and considering the known Jap tendency to skimp on corps and army units, the aggregate strength of the present Jap army could be put at, say, 2,500,000 men.

Dispositions. The Japs have on their hands a full-scale war with China and a strong possibility of war with Russia. It is evident that the Chinese

theater and the possible Russian theater must account for many of the Jap divisions. The military correspondent of the London *Times* opines that about thirty of the divisions are being kept in Manchukuo or in Korea, across from Siberia, and that another twenty are being kept (and kept busy) in China. This conjecture, which seems to check with the realities of the situation, would leave perhaps twenty-five divisions for the adventure in the southern seas. This figure also seems reasonable.

The term of conscript service in the Japanese Army in normal times is two years. Considering the size of the normal army, and the population of the nation, it is evident that the system works on a selective, rather than a universal, basis. In the latest year for which figures are available (1936), approximately 630,000 young men became eligible for conscript service, and were called before the examining boards. Of these 630,000, probably not more than 150,000 actually were inducted. The selection was effected about as follows: the examining boards arranged the men into six classes, according to the findings of the medical examiners. From the first three classes (those physically qualified for military service), names were drawn *by lot* in numbers sufficient to fill the vacancies existing. Thus, the Japanese system of selection has something (the luck of the draw) in common with our own.

The Japanese consider any male between the ages of 17 and 40 to be eligible for military service. In normal peacetime, the call to appear before the conscription board comes at the age of 20.

In addition to the standing army, the Japs have forms of service as follows: a "first reserve," into which men mustered out of the standing army go; a "first conscript reserve" and a "second conscript reserve" for men not selected for or not having the physical requirements for the standing army; a "first national army" for men mustered out of the various reserves (after seventeen years of service in them), and a "second national army" for men physically unqualified for hard military service.

As an indication of the degree of physical fitness of the typical Japanese male, the results of the draft classification for a normal year are of interest. Again we take the latest year for which figures are available (1936), and read as follows:

Total Number Examined	Class I	Class II-A	Class II-B	Class III	Class IV	Class V
630,802	195,832	75722	134,744	186,610	34,316	578

It appears that those in Class I and Class II-A are qualified for service in the standing army. Those in Class II-B are qualified for the "first conscript reserve," those in Class III for the "second conscript reserve," and those in Class IV for the "second national army." Those in Class V are unqualified for service of any type.

As revealed by the 1936 figures, the average Jap selectee is a runt, who is five feet three and a half inches tall and weighs 117 pounds. Of the men examined in that year, about one-quarter had a grade-school education (six school years) or less, and something more than one-half had completed high school. An infinitesimal percentage of the total (0.31) were complete illiterates. Broken down according to oc-

cupations, the picture was as follows: farmers, 31 per cent; industrial workers, 30 per cent; commercial workers, 15 per cent; teachers and literary men, 5 per cent; transportation workers, 4 per cent; others, 15 per cent. Thus, there are two chances in three that the Jap soldier opposite you is either a farmer or a factory hand. There are three chances in four that he is a Buddhist—and if he is not that, he is almost certainly a Shintoist.

From what has been said, it is evident that the Japs have been training selected conscripts at a rate of at least 150,000 per year for a long time. It is evident that the reservoirs of reserves must have been at full strength when mobilization started. For example, the "first reserve" must have contained at least 2,000,000 men, each of whom had had his two years of active service.

In addition to the system of conscription described above, the Japanese are known to have established a "youth's labor corps" into which young men are inducted at a pre-conscription age—perhaps 18. This labor service apparently is designed on the German model. If so, it is universal in application, and forms a sort of prep school for service in the army. In the German youth's labor corps (and presumably in the Japanese corps) the service is six months. The boys are taught to work with their hands at rough tasks, such as digging ditches; but they are also taught the fundamentals of soldiering and the virtues of the Samurai or of National Socialism, as the case may be. There have been many reports of units of the German youth's labor corps working near the front, generally on road and bridge maintenance jobs.

Something similar evidently is developing in the Japanese scheme of things.

The Japanese officer corps is something of a class institution. First of all, there is an élite corps of regular officers who are well-educated, who get the details to the staff colleges and to the foreign armies, and who are in line for the highest posts. Then there is a working-class of officers, most of whom have come up from the ranks, and who struggle along, apparently in complete contentment, with "limited promotion." Finally, there are the reserve officers, who are selected from the Class I conscripts, and given appropriate education and training.

M. Leurquin, the observer-correspondent whose views on the Japanese soldier have been presented earlier in this article, also delivered himself of some penetrating comment on the Japanese officer. Selected excerpts follow:

On the evening chores of the officer. "[Every evening during the campaign] . . . the Japanese officer used to put on his kimona and take his saber from its sheath, with infinite care to preserve the fine edge of its blade. He then would tie a handkerchief over his mouth so that his breath might not tarnish the brilliancy of the steel, and amorously caress the naked blade with a white silk handkerchief. Nobody spoke during this sword-cleaning process, which was in the nature of a rite. When the ceremony was ended, everybody came back to life again; some officers traced the characters of letters with fine brushes; others played a samisen, the Japanese harp;

others arranged flowers in vases, and thus they used to occupy themselves until the hour when the candles began to flicker, when they all stretched down and fell asleep to the rhythmical sound of the sentinel's steps outside. . . ."

On the Samurai saber. "It was General Araki who . . . after the Manchurian campaign, brought back to honor the famous Samurai saber, a terrific weapon which is wielded with both hands and whose guard is almost half as long as the blade. . . . If an officer is a descendant of a family of Samurai, he frequently carries the family saber. At Peking I met a young lieutenant whose saber was the pride of the entire regiment. The blade was six centuries old, and had been handed down from generation to generation; for six hundred years the men of this family had served uninterruptedly in the Japanese Army. Some officers, when they have to buy new sabers, are known to throw their entire family into debt in order to pay for these expensive weapons. . . ."

On character. ". . . On the whole, the Japanese officers are technically less sound than ours; but this insufficiency is remedied by a magnificent 'nerve' and fighting ardor, which might prove a source of danger in a European war, but which suits perfectly the peculiar type of warfare in the Far East. The Japanese officer . . . is a magnificent leader of men. His weakness consists of his failing to remain master of a combat, as European officers do. He goes through with a battle rather than directs it. His courage and conception of honor are far more inspired by a warring passion than by a real and realistic understanding of the necessities of the craft of arms. . . .

The Japanese is more of a warrior than a military man, and therein lies his weakness. The difference may be a subtle one, but it does exist: the essential quality of the warrior is bravery; that of the military man, discipline."

In the higher organization of the Japanese Army, expressed in American equivalents, it appears that the "Army General Staff" approximates our War Department General Staff; the "Ministry of War" approximates our War Department; the "Inspectorate General of Military Training" approximates our Headquarters Army Ground Forces; and the "Inspectorate General of Aviation" approximates our Chief of Army Air Forces. The Japanese air force occupies a position similar to our own. It is not a separate force, like the Luftwaffe, but it does have a certain degree of autonomy.

Again, in the light of our organization, a most peculiar relationship exists between the Jap army and the Jap government. The blunt fact is that the government—the Diet, that is—keeps hands off the army. In Japan it has always been that way except perhaps during the depression years of the 1920's. The army goes its way, responsible to no one save the emperor (or rather, to his advisers, who in turn are army-controlled). It is true that the Diet does control the national purse, but so far as military expenditures go, the control is a farce. There is no more chance of the Diet refusing to pass an army-inspired appropriation bill than there is of the King of England vetoing an act of Parliament. Thus, from high to low, from stem to stern, there is no suggestion of civilian

influence in the Jap military set-up. To coin a simile, there is nothing so rare as a civilian in high Jap strategy.

The mechanics of army-diet "collaboration" consist simply of providing the Minister of War with a seat in the cabinet (or, in times like these, of making him prime minister). From his seat in the cabinet, the general who is Minister of War can conveniently keep the Diet informed as to how and when and on what it is to vote.

The standard pre-China-incident Japanese division was a ponderous square-type affair, 25,000 strong. That division was inflexible, and was very weak in transportation, artillery, and automatic weapons. In China, the Japs have used a modification of this division, one which is smaller and more mobile, but still square-type.

However, Japan became interested in triangular-type divisions at approximately the same time we did. It is probable, then, that many (one-half?) of Japan's 70-odd divisions today are triangular in organization.

Here are a few highlights, as far as they are known, of the new Japanese triangular division. The division is very small—under 12,000 in aggregate strength. This lack of numerical strength is apparent all down the line. The Jap infantry regiment, for example, has a strength of just over 2,000—not a great deal more than half the strength of the corresponding American unit. As another typical example, the Jap engineer "regiment" has a strength

of 504, as against a figure of 648 for its American counterpart.

Considering the Jap division as a whole, and comparing it to our own, we find it to be still weak in automatic weapons (379 light and 82 heavy machine guns against 375 automatic rifles, 57 light and 122 heavy machine guns). The Japs also are weak in artillery (36 75-mm. guns and 12 105-mm. guns against 8 75-mm. guns, 36 105-mm. howitzers, and 12 155-mm. howitzers).

In addition to having its divisions partly square-type and partly triangular-type, the Japanese picture is complicated by the existence of many reinforced brigades, organized and equipped so as to be capable of independent action. No details concerning these brigades are available. It is probable, indeed, that they were organized and equipped individually, on a special task-force basis. The estimate of Japanese divisional strength made earlier in this article carried the tacit assumption that these independent brigades all had been expanded into divisions. But there is no positive confirmation of that assumption.

The absence of formally organized armored divisions in the Japanese Army has already been mentioned. It is a strange absence in an army which, according to legend (not so much according to fact), is German-trained and indoctrinated. There is the possibility that some of the army's 15 (or more) tank regiments have been converted into armored divisions. However, the only armored elements so far reported in action in the South Seas have been the tank regiments.

Viewing Japanese organization as a whole, one is

led to the conclusion that here is an army that has been tailor-made for the job at hand—warfare in the theaters of the Far East.

The quality of Japanese armament is discussed in Chapter 2. The gist of the points developed there, as regards weapons found in the infantry division, is as follows:

Rifle. The standard Jap rifle, the Arisaka, is a 1905 model, Mauser bolt-action, caliber .256, weight 10 pounds, 2 ounces.

Light machine gun. The standard Jap light machine gun is the Nambu, 1922 model, weight 22.5 pounds, "remarkably easy to shoot and to load."

Heavy machine gun. The standard Jap heavy machine gun is a Hotchkiss type, 1914 model, gas-operated and air-cooled.

Mortar. The mortar, or "heavy grenade-thrower," found in the infantry company and elsewhere, is "the best idea Japan has had for an infantry weapon." The shell for this mortar serves also as the Jap hand grenade. (However, the Stokes-Brandt mortar is coming in, and may be edging the heavy grenade-thrower out.)

Antitank guns. "The Japanese Army has nothing that can be strictly designated as an antitank gun . . . the lightest is the 37-mm. model 1922 infantry gun . . . [which is] yet relatively untried."

70-mm. "infantry gun." The Jap 70-mm. infantry gun is a 1922 model, very light (400 pounds), 8.8-pound projectile, low muzzle-velocity.

75-mm. gun. The Jap 75-mm. gun is a Krupp or Schneider, 1905 model.

105-mm. gun. The Jap 105-mm. gun is a new-model Schneider, and is the most modern of Jap artillery pieces.

The consensus has it that Japanese armament is, on the whole, below world-power standard in quality. But Japan has the armament in adequate quantities, which is of high importance, and of course it has those tough and well-trained soldiers. When only the Seine stood between Napoleon and annihilation of the army of the Prince of Schwarzenberg, the emperor begged "for ten pontons—not ten of the best pontons, but ten pontons of any kind whatever."

Contrary to the general belief, and as indicated in the summary above, the German influence is *not* dominant in Japanese armament. More important has been the French (Schneider, Stokes-Brandt, Hotchkiss) influence.

The transportation picture is startling. There are in the Japanese division upwards of 3,000 *horses*—and downwards of 300 motor vehicles. The motor vehicles themselves are still, to a large extent, imported standard-model Fords and Chevrolets. Writing of Japan's motor-car industry, the 1939-40 *Japan Year Book*, which is an official Jap publication and hence is seldom anything other than flattering, has this to say:

> The motor-car industry is perhaps the only one of all the heavy industries in Japan of which the country has not anything to feel proud of today. While there are more than 176,000 cars, buses and trucks of all kinds in the country today [1941], almost all of them are im-

ported, about 80 per cent of them being Fords and Chevrolets. Of the balance, a considerable number are other American and European makes.

Here in the Jap motor-car industry we have, perhaps, an incipient Achilles' heel.

CHAPTER 2

BEFORE PEARL HARBOR

The Japanese Soldier's Arms and Weapons

[*The Japs have always been exceedingly cautious with precise information about their military forces and their arms and weapons. But all possible information should be passed on to the American soldiers who are fighting and are going to fight with Tojo's men. If an American soldier knows how to handle a Jap rifle or machine gun, or the unique "heavy grenade-thrower" of the Japs, it well may be that he can turn a captured enemy weapon to his own use at a time when it counts the most.*

This chapter is based on a magazine article written by Lieutenant John Scofield early in 1941. It appeared originally in The American Rifleman, *the magazine of the National Rifle Association, which has given permission to include the article in this book. It has since been extensively revised and rewritten and the facts are well substantiated.*]

THE ARMY has always ruled Japan. For something like twelve hundred years the little yellow men of the Mikado have existed under a military dictatorship—conscription itself is at least a thousand years old.

With a population of slightly more than seventy million persons, Japan a year ago had a million men under arms in China—one out of every seventy of her population. Another one out of every seventy had

been killed in the fighting in China. The million still alive and under arms were organized into sixteen and one-half regular and reserve divisions of 25,000 men each; nine newly-organized divisions of three (instead of four) regiments, with a nominal strength of 18,000 men each; twelve independent brigades of 12,500 men each; two cavalry brigades; communications, engineer, and medical specialists totaled an estimated 100,000 more men; also there were possibly five other infantry divisions of 20,000 men each. What these figures are today only the Japs themselves can say, but won't.

Keeping such an army supplied is a gigantic organizational problem, but the Japs, imitating Occidental methods, have managed to accomplish it. Correspondents report few shortages and have reported seeing troops served fresh vegetables and meats far from coastal supply bases. Japanese soldiers, before attacking Malaya and the Philippines, had suffered few of the discomforts and privations undergone by Mussolini's discredited legions in their invasions of Ethiopia, Spain, and Greece. Chinese diseases and terrain have accounted for far fewer casualties than have well-aimed Chinese bullets and stubborn Chinese resistance.

The army that Japan is matching against the Democracies is well fed, cleanly uniformed and about as completely equipped as that of any belligerent today. Much of its matériel is old-fashioned and of conservative design, but what it lacks in improvements is balanced by plentiful quantities. For the most part the Japs have stuck to a few consistent models and this has eased the problem of supply.

Many Japanese weapons and more than a few Japanese concepts of how to fight a war hark back to earlier German thought. Rifles, automatic pistols, and artillery, as well as the organization and tactical doctrines of the army, reflect and betray the influence of German military instructors and advisers imported before the first World War. Today the Japanese Army is almost a poll-parrot copy of Der Führer's hordes. Man for man, the Jap fighters are probably as efficient as the average in Europe. But as Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell recently said, "We realize they are a dangerous and aggressive enemy—but where they have been met by anything like equal strength, they have been licked."

For fighting a war far from the temples of his ancestors, the Japanese soldier is paid ten yen (about $2.36) a month. Eight yen go home to his family, one and six-tenths yen is deducted for compulsory savings and the rest is his to squander or keep.

His personal equipment is simple but practical. When fully supplied with ammunition and rations the load he carries weighs about sixty pounds. His helmet weighs about two and one-quarter pounds; it has a high crown for protection against shrapnel and glancing bullets and is tan in color. The star insignia on the helmet is also of inconspicuous tan. No heavier than our own old helmet, it is easily punched by squarely-aimed bullets. Often the Japs wear it bonnet-fashion with straps tied under the chin and with a padded cloth as an inner helmet to keep out the biting North China cold. A coarse net over the helmet to hold leaves and twigs as camouflage is commonly used in the field.

The army uniform is tan (marines and sailors dress in the conventional blue and white). In North China and Manchukuo big warm coats of Australian wool and fur cap linings supplement other items of clothing. Wrap leggings are worn and footwear consists of big hobnailed shoes. The bayonet belt and cartridge boxes are of heavy, well-tanned leather.

Rifles, carbines, and machine guns are of caliber 6.5-mm. (.256 inch) and fire the same cartridge, which looks like our obsolete 6-mm. Lee-Navy cartridge. Of fairly recent adoption (pre-1929) is the 139-grain flat-base spitzer bullet, which is carried in the rifle at almost 2,700 feet a second before the 33-grain nitro-cellulose powder charge. The cartridge is semi-rimless, with an abrupt shoulder and is 2.98 inches over all. The bullet is of lead-antimony, with a cupro-nickel jacket and is seated almost a quarter of its even inch-and-a-quarter length into the cartridge case.

The earlier bullet had a round nose, was 24 grains heavier, .02 inches longer, and 300 feet a second slower at the muzzle than the present bullet. A Mauser-type clip holds five rounds. Despite copper and tin shortages they are issued in abundance. A big boost was given the waning copper supply in 1940 when eight million one-sen pieces were taken out of circulation. It is probable that aluminum slugs replaced them.

The army's old fashioned Arisaka (Meiji 38) is the favorite Japanese rifle. Since their first issue in 1905 (thirty-eighth year of the Meiji era) they have been changed but little and are still as good as most out-of-date versions of the tried-and-true Mauser

bolt-action design. Shortcomings in the rifle include the clumsy bolt-head safety, equally clumsy straight bolt-handle, lack of magazine cut-off, and a rear sight without windage or drift compensation. It is reasonably accurate up to six hundred yards and has only a slight recoil. A unique feature is the sliding bolt-cover which protects working parts from mud and dirt but gives it a heavy, unhandy appearance which belies its actual weight of 10 pounds 2 ounces, including bayonet. The rear sightleaf is of conventional design and is calibrated from 400 to 2,400 meters in jumps of one hundred; the sights themselves are ordinary barleycorn and inverted-V. The Japanese economize on wood for butt-stocks by making them of two pieces, shaped from a blank only half as deep as is necessary for a one-piece stock.

The rifle sling is used only to carry the rifle. In a prone position the Japs fire by grasping the weapon with their left hand just ahead of the trigger guard and aim with the sling hanging loose and thus without full steadiness. Rapid fire as we know it is virtually impossible with the Arisaka because the slack sling and action cocking on the closing thrust of the bolt makes it far too difficult for Japan's bespectacled little fighters to keep the rifle on their shoulders while operating the bolt.

The model-1911 Arisaka carbine, which is popular with artillery and cavalry units, differs from the long rifle only in length—it is twelve inches shorter. This carbine (or an earlier model without handguard) is used by some 1,500 gendarmes, quartered in Korea, Formosa and the Kwantung territory. It im-

parts 230 feet a second less speed to the 139-grain bullet than the regular rifle.

Far more modern than either the carbine or rifle is Japan's model-1925 Nambu automatic pistol. Of German-inspired design and outwardly patterned after the Luger-Parabellum, it is issued in two calibers: 8-mm. eight-round capacity for noncoms and 7-mm. seven-round capacity for officers. It is made in Japan and is the best finished, most practical Japanese small arm. Like the Colt .45 it can be entirely dismounted without the use of tools. It weighs less than the Colt (1.98 pounds) and has almost as few parts. The cartridges are rimless and look like Luger ammunition, bottle-necked in shape. The 8-mm. bullet weighs 102 grains and is of hardened lead. The muzzle velocity is just over 950 feet a second.

In both types the pistol has a grip safety on the front of the handle beneath the trigger guard and the rear sight is adjustable for range. Two forms of holster are issued. One is of heavy leather of ordinary pattern. The other can be attached to the pistol as a shoulder stock and is just long enough to carry the pistol, but has a telescoping section which can be pulled out far enough to use as a stock. At least part of the Japanese cavalry carry a Smith & Wesson type revolver manufactured in Japan. It is also issued to various components of the Japanese island police forces: State Police, Military Gendarmerie, Korea and Kwantung Territory Police, Police of the Mandated Islands, and regular gendarmerie.

Japan is hard to understand—so hard that few white men ever really do. One of the things most

difficult for the Occidental mind is the emphasis placed on use of bayonets and swords by the Japanese. They consider the bayonet the most essential weapon they carry and are taught to indulge in bayonet sticking whenever they can close with the enemy. Their 14-ounce, 15½-inch bladed knife bayonet does not resemble the fine old swords of the Samurai in the least but is a rough, sturdy, efficient product of twentieth century manufacturing methods. Almost invariably, the Japanese soldier carries his rifle with bayonet fixed.

The big heavy swords carried by officers are not a mere badge of rank but are used skilfully whenever opportunity offers. Both the cavalry saber type and the classic single-edged blades of Japan's feudal era will slice a handkerchief in mid-air, or part a man's body from collar bone to waist in a single clean slash. Tokyo's sword makers, until the "China Incident," were the remnants of a vanishing profession, but today they are riding the crest of a boom of orders from Nippon's war-bound fighters.

In combat the Japanese infantry platoon is normally divided into six eight-man groups; three of these are armed with the model-1922 Nambu light (22½-pound) machine gun. This air-cooled, gas-operated weapon is remarkably easy to shoot and as easy to load. The 6.5-mm. rifle ammunition is fed in ordinary five-round straight Mauser-type clips and develops better than 2,150 feet a second through the 19.1-inch barrel. As many as six full clips can be loaded at a time by placing them in a hopper-like arrangement leading into the receiver; the gun may be so loaded even while it is firing. It is accurate to at

least 600 yards while the rate of fire is 450 rounds a minute. No means for adjusting the speed of fire is provided.

An odd high-comb buttstock, something like that of our tommygun, gives the weapon a peculiar appearance which is heightened by thick cooling rings on the barrel. Bipod legs near the muzzle are permanently attached, but add only a pound to the gun's total weight.

This is the weapon that has done the heavy work in the Japanese infantry attacks in China. Normally, three light machine-gun squads form the first offensive wave of the platoon. Two grenade-thrower squads follow as the second wave. Some riflemen normally are assigned to reinforce the first groups while the balance remain to assist the grenade-thrower units whose high-angle fire acts to cover advances of light machine gunners.

The Nambu is commonly used on motorcycle sidecars and is employed for city and road patrol and by scouting parties. Along with heavier machine guns, it also is used on a special mount for antiaircraft defense.

The regular Japanese heavy machine gun is a 1914 Hotchkiss type, gas-operated and air-cooled. Eight are issued to a machine-gun company. It is supposedly useful for directed fire to 1,200 meters and for indirect barrage fire for another 1,000 meters. Our own experience with the 150-grain flat-base bullet in the Springfield suggests that effective ranges actually are considerably less. The total weight of the gun on its standard four-legged mount is 127 pounds. The mount itself weights sixty pounds and

embodies elevating and traversing gears. It can be spread-eagled into a litter arrangement easily carried by two men at a run. Ammunition is fed from the left side in thirty-round strips; on the AA mount a bag catches empties as they pop out of the gun's right side. The speed of fire, which cannot be regulated, is about 400 shots a minute. It can be adjusted for single shots as well as full-automatic fire. The sights have a range adjustment up to 2,400 meters. The velocity of regular rifle ammunition in the 1914 gun is over 2,300 feet a second. It is much used for AA defense on the regular mount, as well as on a specially designed mount which allows free traverse, and with special AA sights. Occasionally a complicated optical range-finder sight for ground use, which takes the place of ordinary aiming equipment, is seen. At least two men are required to operate these heavy guns: one firing and another handling ammunition.

Japanese naval and marine forces and possibly some army units apparently use a 6.5-mm. water-cooled machine gun with the water jacket extending beyond the muzzle as a flash-hider. The mount seems to be the same as that of the 1914 Hotchkiss heavy gun.

The trickiest arm the Japanese infantry has is its "heavy grenade-thrower." Actually it is a light (10½-pound) simplified trench mortar, and is the best idea Japan has had for an infantry weapon. It is almost as valuable in platoon operations as the light machine gun. Easily carried by one man who can handle a goodly supply of ammunition as well, it is issued six to a company and has characteristics of fire similar

to those of rifle grenade-thrower attachments. It has a short 56-mm. (2¼-inch) tube attached to a small adjustable shaft which rests on a broad base shoe. Because it lacks the big mortar's bipod mount, it is aimed by one man who holds it at a 45-degree angle while another drops the grenade down its smooth-bore tube. The range is set by turning the shaft, which adjusts the size of the combustion chamber and regulates the distance it will throw its projectile. Instead of firing when a grenade is dropped down its barrel, it is discharged with a lanyard. A small, compact and light weapon, it can be used with a minimum of protective cover against trenches, machine-gun nests, and foxholes as far distant as 550 yards. It needs no emplacement and in a pinch can be handled by one man.

Two heavy trench mortars are used by the Japanese. One, a 72-mm. model 1922, is gradually being replaced by a new 81-mm. Stokes-Brandt which is almost identical with the Stokes-Brandt of our own army. The 72-mm. weighs 116 pounds, fires a 4.7-pound projectile at 480 feet a second, and is good for nearly a mile range. The heavier Stokes-Brandt with its 7.1-pound shell is capable of better than two miles and can lob its big 14.3-pound bomb as far as a mile and a quarter. The muzzle velocity of the lighter 81-mm. projectile is 650 feet a second.

The Japanese Army has nothing that can strictly be designated as an antitank weapon but combines dual-purpose antitank infantry accompanying arms for the purpose. The lightest is the 37-mm. model 1922 infantry gun. With an extreme range of about five miles, it casts a 1.43-pound explosive shell

through its 42-inch barrel at a muzzle velocity of nearly 1,500 feet a second. The gun weighs only 90 pounds and has a lateral traverse of 12 degrees, vertical from minus 30 degrees to plus 33 degrees. With practically no Chinese tank forces to worry about, Japanese antitank guns are yet relatively untried, and until the Philippine invasion had seen heavy duty only in their capacity as light infantry supporting weapons.

Japan's neat little 70-mm. model 1922 infantry guns are (excepting 37's) the easiest to handle and the most mobile of all Japanese light artillery. The short barrel and high wheels give them some characteristics of the light howitzer. They cast their 8.8-pound projectiles in high arcs to a maximum of less than two miles. The entire weight of the gun and carriage is less than 400 pounds. Because of the low rate of fire they are unsuited for antitank use except in a pinch.

Japan spends about $75,000 apiece on her big tanks, which closely resemble some of our U. S. types. The heavies are armed with three-inch and 37-mm. guns while Nambu light machine guns are used from ports. A three-quarter-inch armor protects their four-man crews. They can rumble along at fifteen miles an hour over almost any kind of terrain and have been extensively used in operations in China. Japan also has lighter tanks and full- and half-track armored vehicles. They have big armored troop and supply trains which will run on rails and can quickly be switched to roads on bumpy solid tires. Big tanks seen in Shanghai had Navy anchor insignia on fronts and probably are regular Navy

equipment which are carried on ship to back up landing parties.

Japanese antiaircraft guns, which run the gamut of calibers from rapid-firing 13.2- and 20-mm. guns to big 105's, have not yet been tested in the face of any serious bombing raids. As with most other modern nations, the chances are their AA guns are efficient but none too plentiful. Apparently most used in China thus far has been their 13.2-mm. Hotchkiss dual gun which throws its little caliber .53 projectiles in a stuttering double stream at enemy aircraft and gets them there with an initial velocity of over 2,600 feet a second. Even speedier is the Oerlikon 20-mm., which gives its quarter-pound shells an almost even 100 feet more velocity. Both guns are light, fairly mobile and are equipped with flash-hiders to keep enemy aircraft from spotting their location.

Standbys for home defense against air attack are 75's, of two models. One was introduced in 1922 and the other in 1928. The older gun has a velocity of only 1,800 feet a second and will not reach as far into the skies as the newer version which has 560 feet more speed. Both handle 14½-pound explosive shells. The rate of fire is twenty-five rounds a minute. Vertical ranges are around 10,500 yards and the horizontal better than 15,000. The 105-mm. model 1925, which throws its 35-pound projectiles at 2,300 feet a second, is the biggest of the lot. The rate of fire is fifteen rounds a minute. Both the 75's and the 105's have 360 degrees traverse and 85 degrees elevation limits.

Little is known of the armament Japan uses in her warplanes. It is possible that 20- and 25-mm. cannon,

or perhaps even heavier weapons, are mounted along with caliber .256 machine guns. Lacking a heavy Chinese air force to cope with, the biggest aircraft job which the Japanese had to do until December, 1941, was the bombing of nearly every large Chinese city.

One of the Japanese aircraft machine guns, apparently of rifle caliber, is used also by the Navy. Mounted on the heavy landing barges, it was first seen in attacks on Hankow. One was mounted forward in a gun pit tended by a single man. The barges, which are armored, will carry an entire platoon fully armed and equipped. They are powered by two four-bladed aircraft engines carried aft.

Organically attached to every Japanese infantry division is a regiment of light field artillery with an effective strength of thirty-six guns and twelve howitzers. The guns are Krupp or Schneider 75's of various models, the newest being the 1930 Schneider. Most of them are Krupp 1905's, called "Meiji 38" by the Japanese. Formerly manufactured in Germany, they are now turned out in quantity in the factories at Nagoya and Osaka. Their original maximum range of 9,000 yards has been increased to an extreme of 13,300 yards. Stand-by howitzer is the old model 1905 120-mm., which is gradually being replaced by 105-mm. Schneider-Creusots.

Each infantry regiment is organically assigned a battery of four 1908 Krupp 75's weighing only 1,500 pounds in firing position. The 1908's proved effective in difficult Manchurian and Mongolian terrain where they were generally drawn by two horses.

This mountain gun fires a 12.8-pound projectile and has a range of 6,000 yards.

Each of the Japanese horse artillery battalions is assigned to one of the independent cavalry brigades. These battalions are armed with 75-mm. Krupp 1915's which weigh 3,285 pounds. A 14-pound explosive shell is used, with a range of 9,000 yards; also used is a 15-pound shrapnel projectile with a maximum range of 6,400 yards.

Japanese field artillery consists of 105-mm. guns and 150-mm. howitzers of various models. In addition to their old 1905 Arisaka 105's there is a 1930 Schneider 105-mm. with a range of 20,000 yards. There are four types of 150-mm. field howitzers in use, the newest being a 1929 model. The range of these heavy howitzers varies from 11,000 to 13,000 yards.

Heavy army artillery in 1937 numbered three regiments and eight independent battalions. Guns range from 150-mm. to 410-mm.; most of them are old models and include both low-trajectory and high-angle fire pieces. The principal item of fortress armament is a 240-mm. howitzer which has a maximum range of 12,000 yards. The 155's also are primarily used for fortress defense. It fires a high explosive projectile as far as 16,500 yards and will handle shrapnel to a maximum of 12,000 yards. The biggest artillery Japan has are 300-mm. (12-inch) and 410-mm. (16.4-inch) howitzers and 240-mm. railway guns. Prime movers are largely of American manufacture.

The ammunition of the Japanese artillery battery is fifty per cent high explosive, twenty-five per cent

shrapnel, and twenty-five per cent gas. Contrary to most reports, gas apparently has been used by the Japanese in China on several occasions. In October, 1937, use of gas, probably mustard, was protested to the League of Nations and in September, 1938, Chinese claimed two of their regiments were wiped out by gas in an engagement in the Yangtze valley near Juichang. Japanese infantry themselves carry gas masks in heavy wooden boxes, but probably have had little use for them. Frequently mistaken for masks are the little strainers Japanese soldiers and civilians in China wear over their noses when in the streets. They are worn by fastidious Japanese to keep dust and odors of Chinese villages out of their delicate nostrils, but are no protection against gas.

The Japanese munitions industry, were it not for shortages of essential materials, could easily supply all of the guns, ammunition and vehicles required by the Army. In 1937, Japan was said to be capable of a yearly production of 10,000 guns, 1,000 trucks, and huge quantities of other matériel. Undoubtedly she is doing better than that now. The largest munitions plants are at Osaka and Nagoya; Muroran and Hokkaido factories turn out heavy guns; powder and explosives are made at Itabasi and Koisibawa.

On a pre-Pearl Harbor basis the biggest chink in the Jap's armor was war economy. With 70,000,000 mouths to feed and several of these millions to supply in the field, Japan relied even more than beleaguered Britain on outside sources and, it appeared at the time, should have been more easily subject to strangulation by blockade. In 1937 Japan imported 85 per cent of her arms, either in the form

of fabricated products or in raw materials, notably U. S. scrap.

But that was before Pearl Harbor, before the fall of Singapore and the loss of Java, before Bataan. Whether Japan can now be choked hard by blockade depends upon how soon the United Nations can effect a mighty offensive against Tojo's legions. If that offensive is necessarily delayed by more pressing demands at other points on the globe, the Jap may begin to reap the rich harvest of rubber, oil, and metals that abound in his newly conquered territories. The result may then be that the vital center of Japanese economy will not be on the Jap's home grounds but at Singapore or Batavia.

CHAPTER 3

PEACETIME PREPARATION

Six Months with the Japanese Infantry

[*Lieutenant Colonel Harold Doud, Signal Corps, here relates his personal experiences while serving as a company officer with a Japanese infantry regiment in 1934-35. At the time Colonel Doud was a lieutenant of Infantry in the United States Army. This chapter first appeared in* The Infantry Journal *of January-February 1937. We were, of course, on a friendly basis with the Jap Army at the time of which Colonel Doud writes.*]

As THE finishing touch to my two-and-a-half-year language detail in Japan I was to do a tour of duty with troops. To all intents and purposes I was to be a company officer of the Imperial Japanese Army. For six months [the winter of 1934-35] I was to serve with the 2d Company, 7th Infantry Regiment, at Kanazawa. I looked forward to it.

My orders were followed by letters from the regimental adjutant and my future company commander. Both expressed the hope that my stay with them would be profitable.

In the meantime I had written to a missionary acquaintance at Kanazawa asking his aid in finding suitable quarters. He replied that there was only one house in Kanazawa suitable for one of my station. It was rather expensive, he said; the rent was eighty yen (about twenty-five dollars) a month. How-

ever, its seventeen rooms would be just about right for one of my rank. We were rather staggered at the thought of seventeen rooms, but since the letter implied that nothing less would do, we accepted it. Accordingly we packed our furniture and a few days later entrained for Kanazawa.

Although it was nearly midnight when we arrived, a reception committee met us at the station. The delegation included the regimental adjutant, the color lieutenant, the captain, and senior warrant officer from the 2d Company, and a detail of soldiers to handle our baggage. After the baggage had been equitably divided we marched in a body to the local inn where we were to put up until our furniture arrived. All hands accompanied us to our rooms, and the officers and warrant officer remained for a chat and the inevitable cup of tea.

A few days of sightseeing and I was ready to report for duty. Buckling on my saber and giving a final pat to my uniform, I started for the barracks. The regiment was housed within the walls of an old feudal castle, beautifully situated on a small hill in the center of the town. A soldier met me at the front gate and conducted me to the 2d Company's barracks. At the door he handed me a new pair of slippers, neatly stenciled with my name in Japanese characters. Following his example I took off my shoes, put on the slippers, and pattered after him to the orderly room.

There the captain introduced me to the officers and a few of the noncommissioned officers. He then announced that I was to be presented to the company. We put on our shoes and stepped out to the company parade. There I found the company drawn

up in a hollow square, three sides of which were made up by the three platoons and the fourth side by the company staff and an empty table.

I was invited to climb up on the table. As soon as I had taken this elevated post, the captain introduced me to the company. The company was then brought to attention, the senior warrant officer turned out a salute, and the ceremony was over.

Next we went to regimental headquarters, dropped our shoes, and went in. The adjutant escorted us to the colonel's office. Upon entering, the captain and I bowed to the colors and then to the colonel. The colonel spoke a few words of welcome, saying among other things that if it ever seemed to me that he was not treating me with the consideration due a guest, it was merely because he wished me to feel at home. He assured me that I would be treated like any other officer of the regiment.

I thanked the colonel for this sentiment, put on my shoes, and went with the captain to make the rounds of the principal staff officers and the battalion commanders. At each place we took off our shoes before entering. Before the morning was over I was thankful I had not worn boots.

At eleven I was presented to the regiment. This time there were two tables. The colonel mounted one and I the other. The adjutant presented the regiment and the colonel introduced me, making a polite reference to the friendly relations then existing between our two countries. The adjutant brought the regiment to attention and the colonel and I faced each other and saluted. That ended that ceremony.

It was now time for lunch. In a Japanese regiment all officers lunch at the officers' mess. There, my worst ordeal was the speech each new officer must make. When all were in their places, I made my shoeless entrance. Having obtained the colonel's permission to speak, I delivered my prepared oration. That over, I laid aside cap, gloves, and saber, and took my place at the colonel's left.

Lunch, served in an individual tray, consisted of five dishes. There was the usual enormous bowl of rice which is the main dish at every Japanese meal. A one-eyed fish-head stared fixedly at me from the bottom of a bowl of bodyless soup. Another small dish contained pickled *daikon,* a Japanese turnip which tastes like a radish, and another a handful of sugared beans. At my first luncheon, the *pièce de résistance* was an individual octopus for each officer. Boiled, but with legs and eyes still intact, it rested upon its back and glared at me. I couldn't quite stare it down.

The instant I took my seat all hands fell to with a will, not to mention speed. I took up my chopsticks and followed suit. In the Japanese fashion, I smoothed the way for my rice with gulps of soup. This I supplemented with an occasional bite of *daikon* and sugared beans. I made a few tentative picks at my octopus but every time I did those baleful eyes discouraged me.

I had just made a good start on the meal when I felt, or rather sensed, a silence. I glanced up, to find that all hands had finished and were apparently waiting for me. I hastily laid down my chopsticks. Immediately an officer arose and launched into a talk on a technical military subject. I soon learned

that this was standard procedure. Of the hour reserved for lunch only a few minutes were devoted to eating; the rest of the time to military education. The colonel left immediately after the lecture and the officers began drifting back to their duties.

At this time the regiment was having its "dog days' training." Although it was intensely hot, training was purposely intensified in order to accustom the men to great exertion in extreme heat. During the hottest part of the day a strenuous and lengthy bayonet practice was held. The officers were not exempt; from eleven to twelve they fenced with the Japanese two-handed sword.

Since each Japanese officer owns a fencing outfit, I equipped myself and joined in the daily workout. When my opponents got over their initial politeness I began to get some bad beatings. After a few days of taking stiff raps on the bare elbow I grew wary—I began to pick field officers for opponents, avoiding the young and agile lieutenants and captains.

During this period much of our time was taken up with the ceremonies incident to the semi-annual transfer of officers. In our division, both the division and brigade commanders were transferred and in our regiment we drew new commanders for the 1st and 2d Battalions and for a number of the companies. The Japanese custom of the service requires farewell and welcoming formations for all outgoing and incoming officers. Hence, the novelty of the hollow square, the tables, and the speech-making soon wore off.

After the welcoming formation for the new division commander I was called aside to meet him per-

sonally. Following the usual amenities he expressed an interest in a trip I had recently taken to Formosa while he was governor general there. Since I had never met this officer I was surprised and showed it. He smiled and said that his knowledge came from my *dossier,* made up by the military police.

I was now getting used to garrison life and looked forward to our first holiday scheduled for August 21. This was the anniversary of the storming of Banryu Hill during the siege of Port Arthur; here the regiment had distinguished itself by an assault against withering fire with the bayonet.

When the looked-for day finally arrived I soon discovered that our conception of a holiday as a day of rest was not shared by the Japanese Army. The festivities started with a 3:00 A.M. reveille. After breakfast, the men filed into the orderly room, a section at a time, and bowed low before the pictures of their comrades who had been killed in action.

Following this ceremony, the 2d Company marched to a shrine of the regiment's war dead on Mukoyama (Yonder Mountain). Here, after fitting obeisance, a bayonet tournament was held in commemoration of the bayonet assault that had carried Banryu Hill. The tournament ended shortly after daylight. Another bow to the shrine and back we marched to barracks. There the supply sergeant produced *sake* and a species of dried flounder, which we downed with a will. Then, after a few minutes' rest the regular day's work began. The other companies celebrated the holiday in similar fashion. And so I learned that if you start your holiday observance early enough it will not interfere with the

drill schedule. To the Jap soldier a holiday is a day for additional sacrifice and effort in the service of his emperor.

Several days after this celebration I got my first taste of Japanese field service. It was our battalion's turn to go to Camp Johana for a few days' combat firing. This camp lay about twenty-five miles inland beyond a range of mountains. We started out at nine o'clock at night in a driving rain and marched through a steady downpour until seven the next morning when we reached Johana.

The camp boasted several old barrack buildings which had been prepared against our coming by an advance detail. One building was allotted to each company and one reserved for the battalion officers. The soldiers slept, side by side, on a long wooden platform which ran the length of the barracks. The officers' accommodations were a bit more elaborate. The major, adjutant, surgeon, three company commanders and I occupied separate rooms furnished with an iron cot, a table, and a chair. The lieutenants bunked together in one large room and the warrant officers in another.

After breakfast the senior officers and I went to bed. As I dozed off I heard the lieutenants supervising the work of cleaning equipment in preparation for an inspection at noon by their company commanders.

On these trips away from the garrison the officers ate the same food the men did. Instead of rice we had *mugimeshi*, a mixture of rice and barley, supplemented by a vegetable stew of lotus roots. This was topped off by two or three slices of *daikon* for dessert.

Breakfast differed somewhat from this typical noonday and evening meal in that a thick, sweetish, bean soup replaced the vegetable stew.

At Johana we put in two days at firing platoon combat problems and then, at 4:00 A.M. on the third day, began the twenty-five-mile hike back to Kanazawa. The march was completed in a burning heat at two in the afternoon.

The 1st Company did not fall out when the battalion was dismissed. Instead, its company commander double-timed it around the area of barracks two or three times. This seemed so unusual to me that I asked "Why?" The company commander smiled. "I'm just proving to my men that they still have lots of 'go' and are not nearly as tired as they may think they are," he said.

We now fell to for a week's arduous work in preparation for the regiment's organization day. Each company was scheduled to put on a stunt or act of some sort and most of our time was devoted to this.

The ceremonies began at 7:30 A.M. with a Shinto service at the regimental shrine. At 9:30 came a regimental review. After the review the 2nd Company put on the sham battle it had been rehearsing all week. Following this, all hands returned to barracks which had been thrown open to the public for the day.

At noon the officers gave a banquet for the principal citizens of the town. The officers' wives, children, and servants had also been invited, but these were entertained separately, because in proper Japanese society mixed parties are taboo.

After dinner we listened to speeches and watched

the soldier entertainments. Our sham-battle stunt was matched by hula dances in one company, and by amateur acts in others. One company constructed a huge Sphinx in front of their barracks by piling up cots and covering them with canvas. Another set up a large globe, representing the world. Atop this a life-sized, straw-filled Japanese soldier waved his rifle and a Rising Sun flag. This figure bore the date 1937 (prophetic, in view of the China incident). The day ended with a *sake* party at the officers' club.

The next few weeks were largely devoted to training for the division autumn maneuvers. During this time we made another trip to Johana for a two-sided maneuver against the 35th Infantry Regiment from Toyama. We also put on several two- or three-day maneuvers using Kanazawa as a base.

The twelve-day autumn maneuvers were divided into three four-day periods devoted respectively to regimental, brigade, and divisional exercises. These exercises were chiefly remarkable for the long distances marched and the long periods without rest or sleep. One day we marched thirty-seven miles. Twice the troops went three days and two nights without sleep except what could be snatched during ten-minute halts and brief lulls in the situation. Sometimes the men slept while walking. Our junior lieutenant caused much amusement by marching squarely into a lumber pile on the side of the road while sound asleep.

The last four-day period was the most strenuous. *We started out at five in the morning and marched almost continuously until ten the next morning. In that time we covered fifty-six miles.* At ten o'clock

the umpires stopped the war long enough to untangle the situation which had gotten out of hand. Our regiment found itself halted in front of a Buddhist temple. We all piled into the temple compound and those of us who could keep our eyes open long enough ate a couple of our *nigurimeshi* (a mess of rice rolled into balls for ease in carrying and sometimes containing a salted plum in the center).

This blessed halt was all too short. It seemed we had just closed our eyes when orders came to fall back a mile or so and go into a defensive position. Fortunately for the tired soldiers, the line of defense ran through unharvested rice paddies so they were forbidden to dig trenches. While the company organized its position I crawled into the bushes for a short snooze and didn't come out until awakened by the smell of cooking rice.

At nightfall everybody was occupied with outpost duty and patrols. The Japanese go in for patrolling in a big way. In bivouac, virtually everybody who is not actually on post as a sentry is out on a patrol of some kind. I remarked on this to Captain Teshima and he replied that the idea was to keep everybody busy.

"But why not let some of them sleep?" I asked.

"Oh, no!" he said. "That is not necessary. They already know how to sleep. They need training in how to stay awake."

The next morning at dawn the enemy attacked our position. Just as the two opposing forces confronted each other with fixed bayonets, the bugles blew recall and the battle was over. The troops assembled under their NCO's and started out on the

five-, six-, and seven-mile marches to their billets where they were to rest until the following morning. The officers gathered for a critique at the primary school in a neighboring village. When this was over we boarded the local trolley and headed for the billeting area.

Japanese troops always billet on the civilian population whenever this is possible. The Japanese citizen does not look on this the way an American does. In Japan practically every family has or has had a son with the colors, and therefore has a direct interest in the army. The policy of recruiting soldiers in the locality where they are to serve further adds to this interest. The people regard it as a privilege to have soldiers quartered in their homes and they do their utmost to entertain them and make them comfortable.

The officers were quartered with the more substantial citizens. Captain Teshima and I were always billeted together. Our hosts felt it their bounden duty to entertain us with food and *sake* until late at night not realizing that perhaps we had not slept for two nights in a row. In other respects also their attention was sometimes slightly embarrassing. On one occasion while boiling at my ease in the family bath, the door opened and in walked my hostess to inquire if she could be of any assistance. I quickly assured her that I had everything needed.

One of the families with whom I was quartered boasted a foreign-style bed. This they had prepared for my special use. I found it too short for me and hard as a rock, but they were so proud of it that

I couid hardly admit that I would rather sleep on the mats.

Our last problem was a 24-hour division staff exercise. This time we marched only sixteen or seventeen miles, and but for the heavy rain which began to fall during the forenoon, we would have had an easy time of it. The next morning after the usual dawn assault the buglers sounded recall for the last time and a few hours later we were entraining for the trip back to Kanazawa. To me Kanazawa meant sleep, breakfast, French-fried potatoes, apple pie, and coffee.

One of my minor trials had been the matter of food. In barracks and at Johana, I had learned to like the soldiers' regular garrison ration, but the field ration was another matter as far as I was concerned. There are no field kitchens in the Japanese Army. Therefore, when in the field the Japanese soldier lives on his emergency ration of canned beef and hardtack plus an occasional meal of rice and barley. The rice and barley are cooked individually when time and opportunity permit. The beef is eaten uncooked just as it comes from the can.

In billets, however, we were feasted and toasted until all hours of the night. I found that special pains were taken to cater to the queer tastes of the "foreign barbarian." The billeting detail always spread the word ahead that the foreign officer was very fond of *sukiyaki,* a succulent compound of beef or chicken and several vegetables. As a consequence Captain Teshima and I had at least one meal of *sukiyaki* wherever we billeted. Before the maneuvers

were over he said he hoped he would never see *sukiyaki* again as long as he lived.

A month after we returned to Kanazawa the second-year men completed their conscription period and were discharged. This was November 30. The night before, the company threw a *sake* party for the retiring soldiers. All the company officers attended, and the captain and I both made speeches. The soldiers appeared to enjoy my description of life in the American Army, but I think they enjoyed my funny Japanese even more.

Early in the morning of the 30th, the area of barracks was packed with relatives and friends of the soldiers who were to be discharged. Shortly after eight, a formal farewell ceremony was held on each company parade. The captain congratulated the men upon the completion of their service, and thanked them for their efforts in helping the company to maintain its high standards. In conclusion, he urged them to remember the lessons they had learned while with the colors. A spokesman for the retiring soldiers then stepped forward and thanked the captain and the company officers and NCOs for their guidance during the past two years and wished them a successful future. An exchange of salutes between the two groups terminated the ceremony.

The next day, December 1, was the annual promotion day. When a man is promoted, custom prescribes that he make the round of his superiors and friends to report his promotion. I was unaware of this custom until I found the newly-promoted men waiting to report to me. Their report, identical in form, ran like this: "Sir, Sergeant Tanaka respect-

fully reports that by the grace of the Lieutenant's honorable shadow, he has this date become a sergeant in the Imperial Army. He also begs the Lieutenant's continued favor."

I congratulated each man and hoped he would soon have another promotion to report.

The next few weeks were devoted largely to fatigue, such as cleaning and repairing clothing and equipment for the new men coming in in January. The men were given a six-day holiday over the New Year, but I received seven days in order to permit me to be absent on Christmas Day.

Immediately after the holidays, the officers resumed fencing. Every morning we assembled in the fencing hall at six o'clock. After donning fencing equipment and removing our socks we lined up in bare feet, paired off and fell to for an hour of strenuous slashing and whacking. The hall was unheated and the windows were wide open. This meant that we had the choice of fencing energetically or freezing.

After this workout we repaired to the officers' club for a breakfast of rice, sweet bean soup, and a raw egg. One feature of these breakfasts was a peculiar, but not unpleasant, wine made from the powdered flesh of *mamushi,* a poisonous Japanese snake. I was told that this snake wine was especially efficacious in renewing manly vigor after great physical exertion.

On January 20, 800 new conscripts were inducted into the regiment. They began arriving early in the morning accompanied by all their friends and relatives. The processing clicked with machine-like precision: by noon the recruits had drawn their

uniforms and were being initiated in the mysteries of making up an army bunk. To a number it was a real mystery; many of these men had never seen a bed on legs before.

The noon meal that day was attended by all the officers and the nearest male relative of each new man. The captain explained the routine of a soldier's life and told the relatives not to worry about their sons and nephews for they would be well taken care of and well fed.

A few days later the new conscripts were issued rifles. Giving a rifle to a Japanese soldier is a ceremony of deep significance. The entire company was formed on the parade facing a long rack of rifles. Captain Teshima explained the honor and responsibility of being entrusted with a rifle. The *samurai* regarded his sword as his soul, he said, and the soldier must regard his rifle in the same light. Each new soldier then stepped forward as his name was called, bowed deeply to the rifle in the captain's hands, took the rifle, raised it in obeisance to his forehead, stepped back, made an awkward present arms and resumed his place in ranks.

Shortly after this the regimental commander, who knew that I was interested in the pre-conscriptional system of training, invited me to accompany him on two inspection trips. One trip carried me to the Middle School of Komatsu and the other to the Young Men's Training Association at Tsurugi.

We were met on the station platform at Komatsu by all of the principal town and school authorities. Upon leaving the station, we found all the school children of the city lined up on both sides of the

street. Each child carried a Japanese flag in one hand and an American flag in the other. As soon as he saw the flags, the colonel pushed me ahead of him, saying that it was my party. As I passed each group, the children made a deep bow at a word of command from their teacher. This was my cue to salute—which I did for two solid blocks!

Upon arrival at the school, we were conducted to a small, concrete, tomb-like structure inside of which were locked the pictures of the Emperor and the Empress. All bowed to the pictures, which were not visible. We spent the rest of the day observing the military training and other school activities. On our way back to the railway station in the afternoon we again found the children and their flags on hand. Once more I walked between the lines, saluting at their bows and saying *domo arigato* (thank you) to their *banzais.*

My last few days in Kanazawa were occupied with packing, farewell calls, and parties. There was a *sake* party at the company where I made my farewell speech and another at the officers' mess, where I featured in like manner. At a final *geisha* party the officers of the regiment presented me with a fine large equestrian figure of Masashige, a famous Japanese warrior, engraved with my name in Japanese characters.

On the day of departure, although it was five o'clock in the morning when we arrived at the railway station, my striker, the NCOs of the 2d Company, and all the officers of the regiment with many of their wives, were already there waiting to see us off. As the train pulled out I returned the last salute.

CHAPTER 4

THE JAP ARMY IN ACTION

Campaigns in the China Incident

[*In this chapter Colonel Thompson describes the tactics used by the Japs in three campaigns in China and sketches the strategy and effectiveness of Chinese guerrilla methods.*]

HAVING VIEWED the Japanese Army as it stands, let us take a look at it *in action*. Offhand, that would appear easily done, for it is an army which has been in action constantly for the past decade. However, as we have noted, the Japs have kept the details of their doings to themselves. There has been, alas, no Japanese counterpart of the German *Militär-Wochenblatt*, or if there has been, we haven't been able to get it, or if we have, we haven't been able to read it.

Therefore we must in general content ourselves with little better than sketchy outlines of the various campaigns. We shall consider these in order to establish certain points and hence we shall not be concerned with comprehensive and chronologically complete accounts.

These general outlines are sure to leave us with some uncertainties. There is, for example, the very broad fact that the Japs have inflicted on the Chinese one defeat after another, and have taken from them their largest cities and richest lands. However, and trite as it may sound to say it, it is a fact that an

army which was something less than a world-beater could still have beaten the courageous but weapon-poor Chinese. Note the fineness of the point as made: it tells us that the Japs *may* not have been world-beaters, but it does not state that they *were* not so. It tells us, in short, nothing. We must try another tack.

Let us try the tack indicated by the *character* (not the number) of the Japanese victories—try it in face of the sad paucity of detail. The victories, all of them it seems, have been won by safe and sure methods. All of them have been won by pushing along main routes of communications. Each has seen an overwhelming superiority in the air, heavy pressure on the front, local infiltrations and close-in envelopments.

There have been a half-dozen campaigns, and a score of victories—but there has not been a single important battle of annihilation on the German model. The Chinese have often been mauled, and they have left their share of dead on many a field—but they have always lived to fight another day. As we shall see, the Japs are not averse to taking risks *tactically*. But strategically, they prefer to garner the spoils a little at a time, without undue risk.

This circumstance is illustrated in the campaign of the winter and spring of 1938. The general situation leading up to that campaign is illustrated on map 1. The "incident" at Peiping (Peking) had occurred the previous July, the Japs had moved south through the provinces of Chahar and Suiyuan, and after three tough months had taken Shanghai and Nanking.

The Japanese lines as of January 1, 1938, were about as indicated. There was a very strong Jap force in the north, and a lesser force in the Nanking-Shanghai area. Between these two forces, occupying positions generally between the Lunghai Railway and the Yellow River, was the main Chinese army, 400,000 strong. (The Jap strengths are unknown, but at the end of the campaign they aggregated at least 10 divisions.)

Faced with this general situation as of January 1, 1938, the Japs set up the strategic mission of "closing the Lunghai Corridor." After a series of misfires and setbacks, after a parade of generals, and after six months of alternate freezing and fighting, the Japs succeeded in "closing the corridor," and in thus extending their control through the coastal districts from Tientsin to Shanghai. The mechanics of the attack on the corridor were as indicated on the sketch. Strong forces converged on the key point of Suchow, operating along the Tsinpu Railway. By the time the corridor was closed, the Chinese divisions were far away to the west.

There is evidence of a great deal of bungling on the tactical side of the Jap operation in the Lunghai Corridor. But while we will touch on that matter later, our present point has to do with the strategy involved. Why were the Japs satisfied to close a corridor when they might have annihilated an army? If they had learned well at the feet of their German teachers, they might have thrown strong forces against Chungchow and against Hankow, perhaps as indicated on the sketch, and so have encircled and

annihilated the crack Chinese troops to the east. This course certainly would have involved great difficulties and considerable risks. But the prize



Map 1

would have been correspondingly great. It might even have meant the collapse of the Chiang Kai-shek policy of "buying time with space." The Japs, however, preferred to play it close to the chest. They preferred to stick to their normal practices.

Another thing about those Japanese victories: they were leavened with an occasional defeat. Tough as they undoubtedly are, the little sons of heaven know what it is to drop what they're doing and run for their lives. There are several cases in point to be drawn from the still but deep and extensive waters of the China incident—including the recent ill-fated Japanese venture south from the security of the gunboat-guarded Yangtze to Changsha. But the classic example, the bitterest pill yet to come the way of the Jap army, stems from the year 1938, from that same gruelling campaign in the Lunghai Corridor.

At that time—March, 1938—the pride of the Japanese Army was a couple of light armored, or mechanized divisions. These divisions were *élite,* and were commanded by two famous generals: Isogai and Itagaki. In January of 1938, the two Japanese forces began the pincers movement against Suchow as illustrated on the map. Between changes of generals, freezing blizzards, Chinese resistance—both organized and guerrilla—the advances went along any way but smoothly. As of March, after two months of heavy going, the northern Jap force had reached the Yellow River, 60 miles north of Suchow. This, decided the Japs, was the time and place for the mechanized divisions. The plan, apparently, was an envelopment of Suchow from the east, along the Taierchwang-Suchow railroad. The expectation apparently was that these armored elements would cut through the miserable mass of Chinese like a hot knife through butter.

Again details are lacking, but on March 27 the combat elements of the mechanized divisions had

reached the town of Taierchwang. These combat elements were putting on a show. They had streaked out ahead and had outdistanced both the infantry divisions which were to support them, *and their own trains.* At Taierchwang the mechanized forces encountered the Chinese regulars in well-organized positions—concrete bunkers, obstacles, and the like. The Japs decided that this was a situation for the infantry to clear up, and so they sat back and waited for the infantry to appear.

The Chinese, however, were prepared to do more than defend Taierchwang. Apparently they had been waiting for something just like this. Using every road, path and byway, the Chinese forces converged on Taierchwang. North of the town the guerrillas carried their activities to new heights. The grand result was that the two Jap divisions found themselves under constant attack. Worse for them, they saw the days slip by one after the other with no sign of trains or help. The trains and the help were, in fact, effectively cut off and contained by other Chinese forces.

After a week or so had passed, the Japanese situation was bad. The High Command, alarmed, attempted to relieve the situation by flying in supplies by bomber planes. What could be brought in that way proved just a drop in the bucket; and all the time the Chinese attacks surged and subsided. After two weeks the Jap tanks and trucks were standing in the streets without gas, and the Jap soldiers were nursing with care the pocketfuls of cartridges which remained. Concerned as they were about the diminishing supply of ammunition, it is likely that the lit-

tle sons of heaven were even more concerned about their almost complete failure to eat. After two weeks, the Jap rations were practically exhausted.

On the eighteenth day of the siege, the remnants of the two divisions—and remnants is the word—gathered their strength and made a desperate dash to the north, to the safety of the railroad and the main Jap forces. The dash north was a rout, with the Chinese attacking constantly. At Yihisien, halfway to the railroad, the Japs were forced to turn and make a stand. Here they stood for two more weeks, under conditions which defy description, in English at least. Finally, after the two weeks of real hell, the remnants of the remnants again made a break. This time they staggered along until they joined hands with a relief column marching from the north.

Of course, there are no precise figures on the Jap losses in the defeat at Taierchwang. One German source states that not more than one-third of the entire force—which this source puts at 60,000 strong—escaped with their bare lives. The other two-thirds were killed or taken prisoner—it making little difference which, since according to a Chinese statement, "all the prisoners of Taierchwang died—from starvation."

The Japanese losses at Taierchwang far transcended the 40,000 soldiers killed, or the great quantities of equipment lost, or even the loss of the two *élite* divisions. In that grim operation the Japs also lost their aura of invincibility. In showing the Chinese their heels and their feet of clay, the Japs also lost a very great deal of military face.

This discussion of the debacle at Taierchwang is

not intended as a low rating of an opponent whose successes, after all, outnumber his reverses as ten is to one. However, the Taierchwang debacle does speak for itself, and there is no sense in refusing to hear. As so convincingly illustrated, the Japs, long as they may be on personal courage, are short on staff work, on supply, on coördination. This is not to say that they will not, and have not, improved. But neither Rome nor an efficient general staff was ever built in a day.

The marked lack of boldness which characterized Japanese strategy in the Lunghai Corridor had been illustrated, perhaps even more convincingly, the preceding fall in the operations around Shanghai. The latter city lies on a narrow peninsula, bounded by the Yangtze River on the north and by Hangchow Bay on the south. By October, 1937, with the battle for Shanghai in full swing, Chiang Kai-shek had crammed into the peninsula upwards of half a million troops. Included were his *élite* divisions. The Japs were operating with complete control of the air, complete control of Hangchow Bay, and complete control of the Yangtze River. The situation was made to order for surprise landings in force far to the Chinese rear. Such strategy, if successful, would have trapped the large Chinese forces on the peninsula, and might well have led to a Jap-dictated peace. The Japs, however, continued to pour troops into their end of the peninsula, and for two months they persisted in frontal attacks against the strong Chinese positions. When they finally shifted the pressure to the southern flank, there resulted only

very shallow envelopments, which simply forced the Chinese to fall back on successive positions.

Incidentally, when the Chinese did begin a general retirement from the Peninsula, the movement soon became something near a rout. The Japs, however, were unable to press the pursuit and take full advantage of the situation. Thus the mass of the Chinese Army escaped to Nanking, and thence to the interior.

FORCING THE YANGTZE—LENGTHWISE

Immediately following the long-last closing of the Lunghai Corridor, the Japs entered upon another campaign which is of especial interest to students of their army. This time the theater of operations was literally a river—China's greatest, one of the big ones of the world, the Yangtze. In America, we have no counterpart for the Yangtze. It is as big and as long, practically, as the Mississippi. But it is well-behaved, its banks are firm, and in its natural state it is navigable for large ocean vessels for perhaps 1,500 miles. It is today an artery of traffic as important to the interior of China as the Mississippi was important to the interior of our country in the year 1840. Still, a few miles inland from the banks of the great stream, actually within hearing range of the steamer whistles, the Chinese populace is living as in the Middle Ages. The road net, too, is of Middle Age vintage, consisting chiefly of foot- and cart-paths.

Suchow had fallen on May 21. Immediately thereafter, there began a shifting of Japanese forces to the Nanking-Wuhu area. The shift was by boat, over

Shanghai. Early in June the campaign started. It was a push straight up the Yangtze, obviously aimed at Hankow, "the Chicago of China," the seat of Chiang Kai-shek's government and, so everyone thought, the chief source of his strength.

The best estimates indicate that the Jap strength originally committed to the Yangtze campaign was of the order of 20,000 troops and 50 naval vessels. As will develop, the campaign was prosecuted on what might be termed the strategic piecemeal. That is, new forces were continually brought up and thrown in, until at the campaign's end, there were something like 100,000 Jap troops and at least 100 Jap naval vessels involved.

The advance to Anking (map 2), 35 miles upstream from Wuhu, was a parade, simply a case of convoying transports loaded with troops to their destination. Anking thereupon became the base for future operations. It was then the middle of June.

From Anking on, the idea was for the gunboats and destroyers to cruise forward, keeping pace with motorized and foot units moving along the banks. This idea turned out to be impractical. The naval guns were able to silence the Chinese shore batteries; but the troops on the banks found the going much more difficult. In fact, the ground advance was brought to a complete halt twenty miles or so west of Anking. This unexpected circumstance was attributed to the bad roads, the complete lack of roads, the defensive potentialities of the terrain, and the expert manner in which the Chinese capitalized on those potentialities.

Leaving the soldiers (probably only a few odd bat-

talions of them) struggling forward and backward among the rice swamps west of Anking, the naval elements pushed ahead. On June 24 they reached the vicinity of Matang. There they were brought up sharp by the results of one of the outstanding barrier operations of modern war. The barrier extended full across the great river. It consisted of scores of



Map 2

junks, each of which had been loaded with stone, bound to adjoining craft, and sunk. As the river fleet had steamed westward, the Jap air force had for days been bombing the obstacle, but to no good point. The fleet arrived, and under the cover of fire from mine-sweepers and bombardment from the air, the war vessels attempted to ram their ways

through. These attempts likewise failed, and completely.

The Japanese solution to the ensuing dilemma was to land contingents of troops fifteen miles downstream from the obstacle. These contingents had the mission of working around the flanks of the Chinese troops defending the obstacle, annihilating or forcing them to evacuate, and so clearing the stage for an engineer job of obstacle-clearance.

This was a good plan, except that once again the Jap ground troops found the going extremely difficult. They advanced, but very slowly, and only with heavy losses. The Jap air force was active, alternately bombing Hankow, the defenders of the obstacle, the obstacle itself, and the troops immediately confronting the advancing ground troops. The small Chinese air force, finding the mass of ships downstream from the obstacle too inviting a target to pass up, also was active. The air fighting was replete with dramatic instances. One Chinese pilot gained authentic and eternal fame by diving his plane onto the deck of a Jap destroyer. One Jap squadron performed a feat that now ranks alongside the human-bangalore-torpedo incident in Japanese legend by boldly landing on the Chinese landing field at Nanchang, shooting up the field, setting hangars, planes and other facilities afire, and then taking off.

The air-river-ground battle before Matang was going into its second week, and the Jap ground troops were approaching the flanks of the Chinese obstacle positions, when Nature took a hand in the proceedings. There were heavy rains upstream, and the river level began to rise. Soon, to the consterna-

tion of the Chinese, it had risen high enough to permit the Jap war vessels to pass over the sunken junks. The first thing the Japs then did was to land fresh troops upstream from the obstacle. Thus outflanked, and practically encircled, the defense collapsed.

After the fall of Matang and its obstacle, it was a parade to and through Hukow. The next logical objective was Kiukiang, a strategic point which controlled both the highway to Nanchang and the Chinese entrance into Lake Poyang. Just below Kiukiang, the Jap river fleet again encountered trouble. This time the trouble was less in the form of obstacles than of fire—from light and medium artillery batteries, emplaced on an island, as indicated on the sketch. The position was very strong, since on either side the river banks faded away into wide areas of swamps, through which the inevitable outflanking forces of the attacker could scarcely operate. All in all, the ships lay in front of the island for three weeks, while the ground troops again demonstrated their inability to blast away the resistance. After three weeks the fleet decided to take its losses and to land troops on the island, come what may. This maneuver succeeded, and at about the same time, a ground force fought its way into Hwangmei, ten miles to the north. In the face of this double threat (and not knowing that the Hwangmei menace soon would be mired down in the deliberately flooded lowlands), the Chinese defenders of the island abandoned the position. The Japs then moved into Kiukiang. It was the end of July.

At this point, there is to be discerned a slackening in the Japanese enthusiasm for the river war. No

doubt the admirals and the generals argued it out, and apparently the decision was that the royal road to Hankow lay over Nanchang, by land and not by water. Therefore, the boats were set to anchor, and preparations begun for a major push on Nanchang. The opposing forces have been estimated at 60,000 Japs, 120,000 Chinese.

The attack was launched south, generally along the rail line to Nanchang. For a day or two, progress was slow but sure. Then the advance came to an abrupt halt. It had got beyond range of the naval guns. There, approximately six miles south of Kiukiang, the Japanese inched their way forward through the month of August. And what a month it was! The rainy season was over, and there hung over the land a heavy, humid, stifling heat. It was a heat that continued day in and day out, and through the night, unbroken by breeze or rain. There were swarms of mosquitoes everywhere, and of course, fever. Chinese reports of the time put Jap fever casualties at forty per cent; and later Jap accounts admit a figure of ten per cent. These were the same troops who had almost frozen to death in the Lunghai Corridor a few months before.

There was not much the Japs could show for their August fighting. One flying column succeeded in taking Juichow, an important traffic center, late in the month, but was in no shape to go farther. The main effort along the railway never reached Teian, the halfway point on the road to Nanchang. In their attempts to break the Chinese lines north of Teian, the Japs at one time resorted to their favorite tactics of envelopment by water. In this case, the detach-

ments were landed near Singtse, with the mission of rolling up the Chinese right flank. The Chinese must have been expecting the maneuver, for they were there with machine guns. The attempted landing was a debacle.

Tough as the river way to Hankow had been, it now looked as though the land way was even tougher. So the admirals and generals got together, and decided that this time it would be all out for Hankow, and *along the river*. Reinforcements had arrived, bringing the Yangtze army strength to 100,000, and the naval strength to perhaps 100 units. September was about to break.

On or about September 1 the attack was launched. The Chinese tactics ran true to form: they blocked the river between Matuchen and Wusueh, and organized positions to defend the block. The Jap tactics also were typical. The naval vessels shelled the block and the positions, thus holding pressure on the front. Infantry units were landed downstream with orders to move against the flanks of the positions. And the air force supported all phases of the attack. As things were getting well under way, there came good Jap news from the north: the force which had been mired down since July near Hwangmei had finally extricated itself, had gained high ground to the north, and now had swung to the south and southwest. On September 12, this force occupied Kwangsi after a hard fight, and so became a direct threat to the Chinese left flank. Meanwhile, infantry assault units, "working in exemplary coöperation with gunboats and the air force," had taken Matuchen. Two days later, with pressure on the front

and both flanks turning, the Chinese abandoned their position, the Japs cleared away the riverblock, and resumed their advance upstream.

The story of the Matuchen-Wusueh riverblock was repeated at a point twelve miles upstream. There the Japs were delayed two weeks before their river-land-air tactics carried them through. As of the middle of October, the fleet lay just downstream from the objective, Hankow. Meanwhile, that city was also threatened from the north, where a partly mechanized army of 100,000 men, commanded by a prince-marshal, was moving south. Under the circumstances, Chiang Kai-shek of course decided, once again, to save his army. This he did, through an orderly withdrawal. On October 25 the Japs marched into a Hankow which had been stripped of everything of military value, including the factories.

The Yangtze River campaign gives us examples, one after another, of the water-envelopment tactics which have characterized Japanese operations in the Philippines and, especially, in Malaya. In principle, of course, such envelopment is entirely conventional: there is the pressure on the front, and the thrusts against one or both flanks, or against the rear. The mechanics of the water-envelopment, however, are unique. The troops must be skilled in the technique of embarking and debarking under all sorts of conditions. They must be, in effect, marine-soldiers.

The chief reason for including this consideration of the Yangtze River campaign here is to use it as a vehicle for demonstrating the Jap predilection

for coördinated water-land operations. With that matter concluded, there is nothing lost by noting a few incidentals from the campaign:

(1) On several occasions the stalwart Jap soldier was stopped cold, and fought to more than a standstill, by the ill-equipped Chinese. The Japs are good, but they are very, very human.

(2) The Japanese grand strategy in this campaign again gets a low mark. There is little boldness, and considerable vacillation, in it. Once again the Chinese Army escaped with strength, equipment, and morale intact. The Japs won the river and the campaign, but not the war.

(3) The Chinese strategy of riverblocks is noteworthy. They demonstrated on a grand scale the homely axiom that there is no such thing as an undefended obstacle, since when undefended it ceases to be an obstacle. With the defensive positions intact, the sunken junks at Matang were a formidable obstacle. Undefended, they would have been a pile of rock, to be pulled out of the way by derrick-boats in a matter of hours.

The ability of the Chinese to withdraw in time, to reorganize and to counterattack, has irked the Japanese no end. Thus, it was with considerable joy and pride that an official Jap announcement described what was then called the solution to the annoying Chinese practices. As quoted in the German military press, this announcement read about as follows:

The Chinese military machine . . . realizing the superiority of the Japanese Army, has openly adopted

the tactic of retreating after a defeat into the pathless mountainous areas, where pursuit is very difficult. There the Chinese assemble and reorganize. Against this tactic, the Japanese expeditionary force in China has recently been employing an effective countermeasure: The Japanese forces attack energetically, defeat the Chinese forces quickly, and then withdraw from the area. This induces the Chinese to return to the same area . . .

where, apparently, they are again attacked and defeated by the Japanese, who again withdraw, again attack, and so on, *ad infinitum*. The Jap announcement went on to say that this stratagem had worked in South China, and was then (1940) being worked in Central and North China. The announcement did not make clear just what it was that induced the Chinese to return to the chosen area, nor why the war had lasted so long if the scheme really worked so well.

On February 18, 1942, there emanated from Chungking the first of a series of communiqués describing an action between Chinese and Japanese troops in the vicinity of a town called Yishen. To the casual reader this may have seemed strange, for Yishen is in the Taiyi Mountains, and the Taiyi Mountains are in the province of Shantung—not far, in fact, from Taierchwang, where the Jap armored divisions were so roughly handled in the spring of 1938. It was logical to wonder how a major action could develop in an area which had been "conquered" four years before.

Actually, the Yishen incident was a typical mani-

festation of one of the two great branches of Chinese high strategy. It was a manifestation of what might be termed the *organized* guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines, and as such was to be distinguished from the other branch of Chinese high strategy, as manifested by the more conventional defenses of the Lunghai Corridor and the Yangtze River.

While we are concerned principally with an analysis of the Japanese Army, it is profitable to dwell briefly on this behind-the-lines war, since it has influenced, and continues to influence, so importantly the situation in China.

The important thing to note is the *national* character of the Chinese guerrilla operations. Although tactically the operations break down into individual actions which are irregular and predatory in nature, strategically they form a calculated element in the defense of China. It is important to realize that these operations ". . . derive from the masses, and are supported by them. . . ." If the definition of total war is the unreserved employment of all national resources to the end of defeating the enemy, then in the Chinese guerrilla operations we have a classic example of total war.

The quotation cited above is from the pen of one Mao Tzu Tung, a Chinese general who became a Communist years ago, and who picked up the fine points of national guerrilla strategy from his Russian associates. This illustrates the Russian influence in China's behind-the-lines war—and indicates another debt which enemies of the Axis powers owe to their Russian allies.

Indeed, for a brief outline of the principles along which the Chinese guerrillas operate we can do no better than go to a directive issued by another of the Chinese-Communist generals, the commander of the noted Eighth Army, General Tschu-De. As quoted by the Russian news agency (Tass), the directive included admonitions and instructions as follows:

Until now [1938] we have allowed the Japanese to force the fight under conditions of his choosing. Because of our inferiority in arms and equipment, we have suffered great losses. . . . In the future, the fight must be carried, not only by the army, but by the people, organized to operate closely with the army. Facilities for guerrilla warfare must be established throughout the land. . . . Sensitive points in the enemy installations must be discovered and attacked. . . . We must strike the enemy where he is least able to defend . . . and we must avoid the fight where he is strong. . . .

We must abandon the old idea that small units of the army may not operate independently. In the future small units must operate behind the Japanese lines, entirely upon their own resources . . . and in accordance with the following principles:

(1) Leaders must have the boldness to capitalize on all local successes.

(2) Total secrecy must be maintained in order to neutralize the efforts of Japanese spies.

(3) Speed and surprise must characterize all actions.

(4) Advantage must be taken of the difficulties of terrain, especially in attacks on enemy lines of communication.

(5) It must be remembered that while our strategy is defensive, our tactics are those of relentless attack.

(6) Areas difficult of access—mountains, for example—must be used for rendezvous and assembly purposes.

General Tschu-De goes on to describe the national character of the guerrilla warfare, and to emphasize the necessity for total coöperation on the part of the people. Here he touches on an essential element of the grand plan—an intelligence organization able to keep the guerrilla leaders *minutely* informed as to enemy dispositions and activities. The end in view is to incorporate all civilians—including children—in the espionage system.

With this conception of Chinese guerrilla strategy in mind, such actions as the one in the Taiyi Mountains—or such as the fifteen campaigns which the Japs have waged since 1938 in the Mountains of Shensi, also within the "occupied" area—become intelligible.

We have noted how the "battle of annihilation" has always eluded the Japs in the field. However, it is possible that the Japs have been less concerned over the Chinese armies that got away than over the armies that stayed behind—the armies that melted into the mass of Chinese humanity, that took refuge in the hills and mountains and, on occasion, assemble and strike ". . . at points where the enemy is least able to defend. . . ."

CHAPTER 5

THE JAP ARMY IN ACTION

The Fight for Malaya

[*Here Colonel Thompson shows how the Japanese Army fought and maneuvered down the Malaya Peninsula until Singapore fell at its onslaught.*]

IN CHAPTER 4 we followed the Jap through his adventure in China, attempting to put a finger on such incidents as would throw light on his characteristics and so enable us to know him better. That will be our technique in this, the Malayan Campaign. We shall attempt to develop the campaign in general outline, and then to go deeper into certain illuminating incidents.

But before we turn to battle let us first take a look at the physical aspects of the Malayan peninsula. The peninsula has a mass of low but rugged mountains for a backbone. The mountain mass is ringed by coastal plains, narrow on the east, and wide on the west and south. The coastal plains are cut by many rivers and creeks and there are many swamps. The eastern coast, facing on the South China Sea, is regular. Its beaches are sandy and gently sloping and are backed up by rows of coconut palms or bushes. The western coast, facing on the Straits of Malacca, is less regular, and is indented by many small inlets and harbors. Almost everywhere along the western coast, the mangrove forests extend down to the water's edge.

Malaya has a hot, humid, seasonless climate. The temperature by day normally reaches 100 degrees, but the nights are relatively cool (perhaps seventy degrees). The rainfall is of the order of 200 inches per year. The campaign took place during the monsoon season. There were frequent rains and many overcast days, but by and large the weather was fair.



Map 3

Originally Malaya was covered completely by dense tropical forests. That is the condition today through the mountainous interior, but on the coastal plains and particularly on the western plain the inhabitants have cleared large areas. In the northern states, particularly in the state of Kedah, most of the

cleared areas have been put to rice cultivation. Further south, particularly in the states of Perak and Selangor, are the rubber plantations, well-kept with their trees spaced out along regular lines. In the southernmost state, Johore, the terrain is low and flat, and much of it is still covered by jungle. In short, the rice granary of the peninsula is the state of Kedah. The center of the rubber industry is Kuala Lumpur in Selangor. The center of the fabulously rich tin-mining industry is Ipoh, in Perak. There are goldmines near Raub, and iron mines (Japanese-managed) near Kuantan, on the eastern coast. Malaya was the richest of the Crown Colonies.

A graphic description of some of the minor discomforts incident to jungle fighting in Malaya is at hand in a dispatch to the London *Sunday Express:*

As he (the soldier) struggles beneath the boughs he will see them suddenly covered with red ants running from hidden places. They have furiously gleaming black eyes, red mandibles. They drop all over him and search for bare flesh. An ant will bite till it is killed.

But the ants are not so bad as the brown leeches. Upon the leaves and grass-stalks they stand on their tails—some scarcely thicker than a thread, some an inch and a half long.

If they cannot find a way through your boots or puttees, they climb your legs to your knees: get at you they will. If one bites you, others attacking later will descend at once upon the sore first made. They hang in clusters on the body. A leech's bite causes irritation for days.

The forest vegetation itself is more than a hindrance. There are trees that grow long slender tendrils armed with talon-thorns that cling sharply to anything that runs into them.

The population of Malaya is about 5,500,000. It is a mixed population, about two-fifths Malayans (happy and indolent), two-fifths Chinese (small-business men), and one-fifth Indians. There were on the peninsula a handful of 18,000 Europeans (also happy and indolent), and a very few Japs. It turned out that these very few Japs had made it a point to know everything about their particular parts of the country. And so, while negligible in numbers, they were by no means negligible in influence on the campaign, as we shall see. The mass of the population was indifferent to the war. The people were spectators of, rather than participants in, the drama that swept around them.

The most highly developed part of the peninsula, the western coastal plain, is traversed throughout its length by a railway and by a macadam highway, both of which have their southern termini at Singapore. A fairly dense net of subsidiary and "estate" roads serves the region. The western coast, with its many inlets and harbors, supports an active fishing and shipping business.

The narrow eastern coastal plain is inhabited chiefly by Malayans and is far less extensively developed than the other coast. There are few roads on the eastern coast, and none running its length. However, as the Japs were to demonstrate, the terrain is by no means impassable to foot troops and animal-drawn transport.

The terrain along the Kedah-Thailand border at the far northern end of the theater of operations demands our special attention. That border is formed essentially of the mountainous divide. Only two

passes of any importance cross the divide. Through one of these passes, the chief one, run the main railway and highway which traverse the length of the western coastal plain. These important lines of communication—*all*-important is really the word, as the campaign was to show—lead directly to Singora, on the eastern coast of Thailand. Through the other pass runs a good road connecting the western coastal plain with another easternmost Thai port, Patani. These two passes form the gateway into northwestern Malaya.

In general, communications from west coast to east coast are few. One significant item is the railway that runs southwest from Kota Bahru directly through the mountain mass to a junction with the main west-coast railway line at Gemas, in Johore. Along the Kota Bahru-Gemas railway line are many tunnels and bridges—a natural set-up, one would think, for demolition engineers. The other significant item in east-west communications is the Kuantan-Kuala Lumpur road.

Rice and fish are the food staples in Malaya, as in Japan. At the time of the campaign, the rice paddies generally were dry, and hence they constituted no important obstacle to cross-country movement. The fishing activities of the Malayans influenced the campaign not only from the standpoint of food supply, but also from the standpoint of providing a supply of small boats. We shall see how the Japs profited by that circumstance. Similarly, they profited from the fact that the Malayans are a bicycle-riding people.

The Jap plan for the Malayan campaign involved

a main-effort drive down the well-developed west coast, and secondary drives down the east coast and down the Kota Bahru-Gemas railway. The main-effort drive was to be fed from the portheads of Singora and Patani, which being in Thailand were there for the taking, and which as we have seen were at the head of lines of communications leading directly into the heart of western Malaya. The secondary drives were to be fed from a porthead to be established at Kota Bahru, and perhaps from other portheads further south. The importance of the passes along the Thai border and of the defection of Thailand, in the Japanese plan, is evident.

As for forces involved, the best estimates indicate that the Japs employed a total of six infantry divisions and one tank regiment (150 tanks) in the campaign. Most of this force—perhaps all except two divisions—was employed in the west-coast drive down from Patani and Singora.

The British, or Imperials, are believed to have employed a total of four infantry divisions, some of them perhaps under strength. Of these divisions, one (the 18th) was English, two (the 9th and 11th) were Indian, and one (the 8th) was Australian. There were also a few native Malayan troops on the Imperial side.

The air belonged to the Japs, particularly after they had seized the airfields at Kota Bahru and Alor Star. It has been estimated that the Jap air strength consisted of a total of 300 planes, of which perhaps one-third were fighters. Except for occasional specific actions of no great significance, Imperial airpower was negligible.

The vital significance of the Singora-Patani port-heads to the Japanese plan was shown during the first few days of the campaign, when the Imperial high command decided to shoot the works in an attempt to disrupt the steady flow of men and matériel into those ports. The result of the attempt was the tragic loss of the battleship *Prince of Wales* and the battle cruiser *Repulse* and, perforce, the delivery into Japanese hands of control of the surface of the China Sea. With control both of the air and of the seas to the east, there was nothing to stop Japanese traffic to the eastern coasts of Malay and Thailand.

But to cast up the balance of the opposing ground forces is not to convey the complete picture. The Japanese poured their forces in at the critical points —chiefly those along the Kedah-Thailand border. But the Imperial strength was, at the start of the campaign, distributed over the entire peninsula. Indian troops—perhaps one of the Indian divisions —were guarding the northern frontier, including the beaches near Kota Bahru. A large part of the total Imperial strength, including the Australian division, was in the southern state of Johore and even in Singapore. Thus, while in total ground forces involved there was no great disparity between the Imperials and the Japs, at most points of actual contact the Japs enjoyed a material numerical superiority.

On the tactical side the campaign was an excellent example of "jungle warfare" and of the use of waterways as arteries of communication and movement. Through the campaign there was none, or practically none, of the fanatic frontal charges which

characterized Jap tactics in North China. In Malaya it was a case of constant *infiltration* and constant *small-scale envelopment.*

Many of the envelopments were over water and involved landings behind the Imperial front. In these water-land operations the experience gained along the Yangtze River and elsewhere in China (described in Chapter 4) no doubt was of real value, but most of the Malayan landings had a character uniquely their own. In China the landings habitually were made under the guns of the navy. The same was true of the basic landing at Kota Bahru where half a dozen Jap troop transports stood offshore while the troops reached the beaches in various types of special landing crafts.

But most of the tactical landings involved in the envelopments under discussion occurred on the *western* coast where, of course, there was no Jap naval support. These landings generally were small in size—perhaps a company or two or at the most a battalion. The Japs made great use of what they found locally in the way of floating craft—and in view of the size of the Malayan fishing fleet what they found was considerable. In addition there is evidence that a few special landing craft, motorized and with a capacity of as many as 100 men each, were transported overland from Singora for use along the western coast.

There are at hand several eyewitness descriptions to aid us in getting a picture of what one of these water-land envelopment expeditions looked like while on the boats. According to one account, ". . . the landings are made at night from barges

. . . [which] . . . are towed down from farther north by tugs or launches in convoys of twelve or fourteen. The landing craft use their own motors only when fairly near the shore. These barges . . . are of special design. . . . Native craft are also frequently used." Another account describes a convoy of ". . . about a dozen small craft, consisting of barges and sampans, some of which were equipped with outboard motors." This particular convoy is described as "creeping along" until within range of "our artillery." As the artillery opened up the convoy is described as breaking up and withdrawing seaward with all speed—where, out of range, the Japs are described as "heaving-to among the fishing traps and stealing the fish caught by the Malayans."

A characteristic of the Japanese landings was the evident use of alternate objectives. There are several instances in which a convoy, encountering resistance at one point on the coast, moved up or down coast to another more favorable point. Thus was the principle of infiltration applied to tactical landings.

The spectacle of numerous small landings being made down a coast off which the British navy was operating raises the question as to what the navy was doing during the landings. The answer seems to lie in the stealth with which the expeditions were conducted. As noted, the convoys consisted of small craft, many of which had been commandeered from the natives. The convoys moved close to shore and among the fishing fleets so that it was difficult for the British to spot them. Furthermore much of the movement was at night, and indeed there are instances in which entire convoys entered inlets and

kept under the cover of the mangrove trees during the day. In any event the fact remains that the Japs were able to use a body of water which they did not in general control, for their tactical envelopments.

To clarify the tactical effects of these water-ground envelopments, the best we can do is to consider a concrete case. A pertinent one is the operation leading to the fall of the tin-mining center of Ipoh in Perak. Referring to the map, let us reconstruct that operation in so far as is possible with details now available.

The situation north of Ipoh on December 20 was about this: The Japs operating out of the base at Singora-Patani were advancing south in two main columns along roads as indicated. Imperial forces were opposing these advances with fair success. From all appearances the Imperials were set to make a major stand along a line anchored in the mountains northeast of Kuala Kangsar and extending westward across the Perak River. This was the situation until December 22. On (or about) that date there was a Jap landing near Port Weld, and soon there was another near Sitiawan. It is likely that neither of these landings was in great force—perhaps a battalion at Port Weld and even a smaller force at Sitiawan. But all available Imperials were committed up front and there was no reserve available with which to meet the threat to flank and rear. The choice of the Imperials was to withdraw or to be destroyed. They chose to withdraw—only to have the essentials of the situation re-enacted at points farther south.

Illustrated by this account is the fact that the

strategic flanks of the Imperial forces in Malaya were hanging in thin air. This is noteworthy, since there is a tendency to assume that any flank which rests on a sea which is in turn under friendly control is secure. Actually against an enemy schooled in the water-ground tactics of the Japs such flank is secure only as long as forces sufficient to guard the coast-line in the rear are available. The Imperial west flank in Malaya may as well have been resting on the crest of an undulating hill within a thousand yards of the main enemy forces.

Incidentally, following the fall of Kuala Kangsar the Japs converted the Perak River into a thoroughfare. Commandeering native boats, they used the river for transporting supplies and troops toward the new fronts to the south. Thus once again was demonstrated the Jap proclivity for capitalizing directly on waterways. Certainly, anyone who has considered waterways solely as obstacles must change his ways of thinking.

The Japanese advance down the western coastal plain was generally along the main north-and-south roads and railway. The actual fighting, however, occurred largely in the fields and jungles adjacent to the roads. The situation appears similar to that of the Louisiana maneuver country.

In this connection it is to be recalled that much of the coastal plain area in Malaya has been cleared. The rice paddies of the northern state of Kedah were dry at the time of the campaign. The rubber-tree stands of the southern states are well-kept forests, traversed by roads and trails. Even the jungles, while impassable for vehicles, are crossed and criss-crossed

by lanes and paths which may be negotiated by properly trained men.

The Jap army is tailor-made for the Far East. The six-or-so divisions employed in Malaya obviously were tailor-made for *that part* of the Far East. There is no doubt but that the Japs had been training for this type of warfare for a long time. They had all the answers to all the little problems. For example, the Jap soldier was very lightly clothed, often with a one-piece short jumper and rubber shoes. Incidentally, and no doubt intentionally, this uniform made the Jap soldier practically indistinguishable from the ordinary Malayan plantation worker—a fact which was a constant source of trouble and danger to the Imperials, who could never bring themselves to shooting indiscriminately at any and all suspicious targets. Incidentally again, the Australians later went into battle stripped to the waist; but this had the earmarks of an expedient and not of a planned procedure as in the case of the Japs and their jumpers.

The Jap troops operating off the roads were also lightly armed, generally with tommy guns and light mortars. They carried relatively large supplies of ammunition but were not burdened with anything else. Apparently they made a practice of living off the country—a practice which in Malaya should be quite simple for troops who can get along on rice alone. Indeed, it is entirely likely that the invaders did better than get along on rice alone, for the Imperial practice on abandoning plantations, depots, and the like, was to distribute the edible stores to the natives through the countryside. It is unlikely

that the Japs failed to note and appreciate this practice.

Indeed, reports at the time described one favorite Jap practice on occupying an area. First, patrols were sent out to insure that no Imperial troops were still around. Then the practice was "to send a requisitioning party who demand everything they need, including food, livestock, shoes, and bicycles. . . . If the Malayans are unwilling to surrender their goods the Japs do not hesitate to threaten to use force."

Meanwhile, the countryside itself afforded more than rice. There is an account, for example, of twelve Englishmen who became separated from their command during the early fighting near the Thailand border and who made their way two hundred miles south through the jungle subsisting entirely on tropical fruits such as bananas and papayas. It is to be assumed that the Japs could do as well.

"Infiltration" or "jungle warfare" are the words generally applied to the actual fighting off the roads as it occurred throughout Malaya. The basic Jap tactic involved extreme decentralization: giving a small unit or even an individual soldier an objective and telling it or him to get there. In the process of getting there the Jap practice was constantly to seek to slip through or, if attack was necessary, to make it from a flank. All accounts agree on the reluctance of the Japs to push ahead frontally. No reliable account mentions any important Jap bayonet charges.

Thus in the Malayan jungles the Japs substituted patience and cunning for the recklessness which sometimes characterized their actions in China. Pa

tience and cunning—there are many examples to illustrate. On one occasion a British headquarters was surprised when a single Jap soldier bobbed up from the middle of a lagoon where according to their calculations he must have been lying motionless for at least six hours. On another occasion a party of Britishers were greeted by a bunch of muddy individuals who ran forward yelling "We are Indians." It is stated that the British did not fall for that one, however.

The Japanese training appears to have emphasized working from tree tops. Sniping became a normal hazard to the Imperials, and the picking off of snipers an important business. There are many examples on record. One case which made the dispatches involved an Australian who was shot in the heel while standing in a three-foot trench. This incident not only illustrates the sniping angle but possibly also the caliber of Japanese marksmanship.

One significant aspect of this jungle fighting was that it continued more or less on a twenty-four-hour basis. "In most wars," says the special correspondent of the London *Times,* with the British forces in Malaya, "the soldier has been reasonably certain that his rear was secure, even if there was a danger to his flank. In this campaign, the soldier has always felt, *even at night,* that danger lay all around him, and that he was liable to be cut off at any moment of the day or night." Another account mentions the necessity for "fighting by day, and digging weapons-pits and slit trenches for protection against dive-bombers by night." A medico, receiving a group of casualties after a month of campaigning, remarked

how they all "dropped off to sleep, even before they could be given something to eat." It was, all accounts agree, a "nerve-wracking" form of warfare.

The ability of the Japs to find their way through the jungles has been the cause for considerable speculation. The answer seems to lie in fifth columnists who in the crisis turned out to be proficient guides. There never has been much Japanese immigration into Malaya, but the immigrants who came apparently came for a purpose. As an example of their proficiency, the Jap maneuver north of Kuantan on the east coast may be cited. At the time (about January 3) the Japs were advancing straight down the coast, overland, on that town. It happened that the country immediately to the north of the town was difficult—but it could be by-passed through the use of some little-known trails to the west. Sure as shooting, when the invaders came to the point, thirty miles north of the town where the trails branch off they unerringly took them, made all the turns correctly, and arrived in the town in due course. A barber sent into this village, a fisherman into that one, and so on—that method probably served the Japs better than the most elaborate map collection.

The most effective answer devised by the Imperials for the infiltration tactics was the *ambush*. "Ambushes from behind a screen of jungle, surprise attacks through shady rubber plantations, skirmishes by night . . ." So begins a typical dispatch from the front.

It is clear that this Malayan jungle warfare was of a type to put a premium on those personal character-

istics which the Japanese soldier has in generous measure. The commanding general of British forces in northern Malaya summarized them expertly when he said: "The Japanese are very formidable opponents. They combine the cunning and resourcefulness of the tribesmen of the Northwest Frontier of India with the discipline and direction of a modern army." Incidentally, in the same interview the general threw some additional light on the personality of the Japanese army officer when he told how two of them had been captured while attempting to land on the western coast. The two were dressed as Malayans—but they still carried with them their long two-handed Samurai sabers!

In the Jap advance a Malayan bicycle.seen (and there were many to be seen) was a bicycle commandeered. After a few days of campaigning, the sight of Japanese patrols and units wheeling down the jungle lanes became commonplace. As an afterthought, perhaps *commandeered* is too harsh a word. It is possible that the Japs paid for the bikes they took—paid for them in crisp, new Malayan notes, printed in Japan. The Jap soldiers were well-heeled with this bogus currency.

Another manifestation of the jungle fighting and the constant envelopments was the frequent isolation of Imperial units. However when units found themselves isolated they often were able to turn the jungle to their own purposes. The men would dissolve into it and many of them eventually made their ways back to the Imperial lines.

In this jungle war, there was little artillery action. Ground observation of fire was almost impossible,

targets often were uncertain, and problems of transportation were formidable. On the other hand, in almost every action there was extensive use of mortars. Meanwhile, the Jap air force, even with its complete command of the air, was unable normally to enter the battle directly, although it did subject trains and rear establishments to severe pounding. As the campaign moved south into the more open spaces of Selangor, artillery, planes, and tanks came more prominently into the picture.

It will be discerned that the real purpose of the Jap jungle attacks was to keep the Imperial troops engaged and so to prevent interference with the west-coast landings. The Imperial withdrawals were due not to reverses in the jungle fighting but to the fact that flanks and rear were constantly menaced by the landings.

The Japanese tactics thus involved bringing about an Imperial withdrawal through a combination frontal-flanking attack. As the withdrawal proceeded the Japs normally brought up along the roads their vehicles and trains—including the frequently mentioned "light armored cars, special two-man carriers, and light tankettes."

The character of the fighting changed to accord with changes in the terrain as the campaign moved into the relatively open, relatively well-developed areas of the state of Selangor. Thus the first mention of Jap tanks in action came on January 2, in a correspondent's report to the London *Times*, datelined Kuala Lumpur. At that time the Imperials, having abandoned Ipoh, were fighting delaying actions along the lower Perak River down which the Japs

continued to float their boats and rafts. The correspondent's report had it that the Japs ". . . had brought up field artillery . . . armored carriers . . . *light tanks* armed with Bren or antitank guns . . . and in occasional engagements on the roads had used *medium tanks* probably of seven tons or more."

The references to tanks and to the changing character of the fighting brings us to the Slim River area, fifty miles north of the peninsula capital, Kuala Lumpur. By January 9 the Imperials were back along the Slim River where they prepared to make their first serious stand since the evacuation of Ipoh. This was to be the battle for Kuala Lumpur, the rubber capital of the world and an important center of communications in its own right. Hopes were high that here at last the invader would be halted. But here was the place where the Japs finally took the wraps off their tanks. "Whereas until now enemy tanks have played a secondary role," says the *Times* correspondent, "coming into action on the roads after small infantry units with tommy guns have penetrated a substantial distance ahead, the tanks on January 9 formed the spearhead of the attack . . ."

As for the attack itself, it ". . . was launched in the early morning under the cover of darkness. As a result, it has been difficult to establish exactly the number of enemy units taking part. It seems, however, that at least six light two-man tanks, twelve medium tanks of about twelve tons, and some even heavier tanks, attacking in that order, took part in the attack . . . Using an estate road, they came around our advance posts on the main road where we had antitank guns ready, joined the main road

some distance in the rear, and advanced down it for some distance, shelling and machine-gunning our men and their vehicles. Then again they took to open country and attacked our positions on a bridge over the Slim River. Our three-inch guns, firing at point-blank ranges, accounted for two, and possibly three, of the medium tanks. Each [Jap] tank carried one cannon of about two-inch caliber, and two machine guns, and had a crew of four or five men. . . ."

The correspondent quoted just above goes on to describe how the Jap attack was carried out "in the usual Jap fashion" and was "accompanied by much shouting of *Banzai!* and much waving of flags." Another usual development was the isolating of some British and Indian troops north of the Slim River. Once more as usual many of these troops "succeeded in making their way to the south. Some of them came down the railway and some through the jungle and nearly all had to swim across the Slim River" before rejoining their units.

The action along the Slim River took place on January 9. During the ensuing week the withdrawal continued with no major actions developing. On January 16 a new element entered the picture: the Australian division, which had been engaged in preparing defensive works in Johore. "As the Australians neared the lines, they met British and Indian troops who had been fighting for five weeks. Their tired and lined faces lit up at the sight of this unexpected relief." The general idea at the time seemed to be that the Australians would beat the Japs at their own game: jungle fighting. "General

Gordon-Bennett [Australian commander] told the correspondents that the Ausralians were guerilla fighters by nature and training, and were going into battle in full confidence, but not blind optimism, believing that they had the answer to the Japanese problem. . . . They knew that the Japs were not as good as many believed. Man for man the Australians were better. . . ."

However, the first Australian brush was with Jap tanks, not Jap jungle fighters. The affair developed just south of the Muar River and again it was a case of a position which the Imperials hoped desperately to hold. With their main drive down through Gemas held up the Japs as always shifted to the coastal flank which in this case brought them to the Muar River area. On January 17 a single Australian battalion was sent to hold the main road leading south from Muar. The battalion took up a position nine miles south of the town. At dawn the next morning (January 18) the Japs attacked straight down the road with about ten medium (12-ton) tanks. The tanks were out in front, apparently traveling down the road in file. The Australians on their part had emplaced and carefully concealed two antitank guns, each just off the road a hundred yards or so apart. Each of the guns commanded a long length of straight road.

The first gun allowed six tanks to pass down the road [again the special correspondent of the London *Times* speaking] and it was actually the rear gun that was the first to go into action. These men, tense with expectancy, waited until the leading tank was only 30 yards away. Then, with loud shouts of "Whacko," they

let the Japanese have everything they had got. The tanks were close behind each other in a steep cutting where they could not turn around, and the gun had a perfect field of fire. Five tanks were picked off one after the other, several caught fire, and the ammunition they were carrying began to explode. The sixth tank was screened by the others and the gun could not sight it effectively, so one of the Australians picked up two hand grenades, ran alongside the burning tanks, and threw the grenades under the sixth tank and put it out of action. Most of the Japanese crews were killed inside the tanks. A few got out but were picked off by rifle fire. Meanwhile the first gun farther up the road had let loose against the four remaining tanks, which were also close behind each other. Again they were picked off, one after the other.

The successful ambush was climaxed according to the *Times* account by a "remarkable incident." Out of one of the disabled tanks climbed an officer in European uniform. He seized a bicycle which had been tied to the rear of the tank and "made off up the road." This was typical of the many evidences of German observers or advisers operating with the Jap ground forces in Malaya.

Following the loss of their tanks, the Japs south of Muar immediately reverted to their old forte: infiltration through the jungle—or rather through the rubber plantations. Soon ". . . both sides were sniping at each other and many Japanese were concealed up rubber trees." Soon too the Australian battalion was encircled. Meanwhile a second battalion of Australians had been sent to the Muar sector.

There followed, from January 18 to 22, one of the epic stories of the Malayan campaign. Let us pick up the stirring account as of January 18, from the columns of the London *Times:*

After destroying the tanks the first battalion had a fairly quiet day, but that night their rear was cut off, and they found themselves hemmed in by Japanese. Enemy snipers, concealed in the branches of rubber trees, kept up fire all night, and one company of Australians made an extremely successful bayonet attack.

On the next day, January 19, the battalion had another quiet day (although snipers were active) until about 4:00 P.M., when the enemy launched a heavy attack with infantry strongly supported by mortar fire and artillery. It was successfully repulsed, but at 5:30 the Australians decided to withdraw to make contact with the other battalion. Some mechanized transport was ambushed by Japanese machine-gun posts and had to be abandoned. The infantry succeeded in breaking through the encircling ring of Japanese troops, and fought for 15 miles in the face of heavy fire before rejoining the other battalion on the next morning. The two battalions, now united, received orders to withdraw to the east to our main positions, but the road was blocked by some machine-gun nests. The Australians attacked these nests with bayonets, routed the enemy, broke through the block, and advanced a considerable distance along the road with all the transport of the second battalion. Then their way was blocked by a bridge that was in the hands of the Japanese, who were firing machine guns from behind sandbags.

Early on January 21 the enemy launched an attack from the rear with infantry supported by mortars, by dive-bombers, and at least one tank. The tank broke

through and put much of the remaining transport out of action, not, however, the wireless van [radio truck] or ambulances. The Australians, who also had the remnants of some Indian units with them, now held half a mile of road and the jungle on each side. They were surrounded by the Japanese and their main line of retreat was blocked by the bridge. The tragedy of the situation was that the nearest British forces were only seven miles to the east. That afternoon ambulances with the worst cases drove up to the bridge and permission was asked of the Japanese to let these wounded through. The Japanese refused and said that they would only accept unconditional surrender of the entire force, so the ambulances returned. One ambulance with several desperate cases sought permission the next morning, and was fired on with machine guns.

Attempts were made to relieve these encircled and beleaguered men, and a guerrilla party of 15 specially chosen men, armed with tommyguns (the same men who had previously penetrated behind the Japanese lines and ambushed a Japanese staff car) were sent out from headquarters with instructions to make their way to the bridge and shoot up the Japanese from the rear. At the time of writing nothing further has been heard of this party.

A counterattack by British troops was planned on the next day (January 22), but was later abandoned in view of developments in other sectors. Early on that day food and supplies were dropped by airplanes on the beleaguered Australians. At 11:05 their commanding officer sent them the following message: "Regret there is little prospect of any attack to help you. Special party, if successful, should have appeared before this. Twenty of your men and many Indians have already returned through jungle to road which is at present in our possession. You may at your discretion leave wounded with

volunteers, destroy heavy equipment, and escape. Sorry unable help after your heroic effort. Good luck." Actually this message was never picked up, as the batteries of the wireless van had petered out, but the commanding officer of the encircled troops had given the same order that morning, and the men began to make their way back. Thirty-one men, of whom 20 were wounded but able to walk, made a dash across 250 yards of open country, and most of this group returned safely to our lines. The other tired, footsore, hungry, wounded men set off to limp their way back through the jungle and swamp. A certain number has returned, but it will be several days before it is known how many men survive from these two battalions.

To appreciate the heroic nature of these men's exploit one must remember that they were under fire pretty continuously for six days, repelling enemy attacks, making counterattacks, beleaguered by the enemy, fired at by snipers from trees, bombed and machine-gunned from the air, and pounded by mortars. They got little sleep, for the sniping went on all through the night. There was never any thought of surrender. They kept their transport as long as they could, and did all they could for the many wounded, most of whose wounds had been caused not by small-arms fire but by mortar shells and by bayonets. They kept on attacking and counterattacking, and maintained an offensive spirit right until the end. The grimy, unshaven survivors, their clothes torn and their legs bleeding from scratches and insect bites, spoke of their experience as if it had been all part of the day's work.

When the Japs crossed the Muar River and destroyed the Australian battalions along the road to the south it was clear that the sands were running out fast. The reverses on the western coast led to the

evacuation of the Mersing (east coast) defenses on which the Australians had labored for four months. During the last week in January there was a series of bitterly fought rear-guard actions. Finally on January 30 the Australians and the Gordon Highlanders formed a bridgehead twenty miles out from the causeway which connects Singapore Island with the mainland. Within this bridgehead was another one, very shallow, held by two other British regiments. During the moonlit night of January 30 the outer bridgehead troops fell back through the inner line and crossed over the causeway. They were followed shortly by the troops who had held the inner line. There was "little interference" by the Japanese. Soon after the last soldier had crossed, there came the "huge explosion" which "made the whole island shake." The causeway had been breached. The Battle of Malaya was over and the siege of Singapore had begun.

Singapore Island is a flat area of about 220 square miles. Much of the island is swampy, much of it is given over to rubber plantations, and some of it is still covered by jungle. The island is separated from the mainland by the Straits of Johore, a crescent-shaped body of water about thirty miles long, and ranging from 1,000 to 3,000 yards in width. The shores of Singapore Island fronting on the Straits of Johore are indented by many creeks and lagoons, the most significant of which turned out to be Sungei Kranjii Creek midway along the island's western shore. Near the mouths of these two creeks, and at many other points around the island's

periphery, the terrain is swampy, and the mangrove wilderness extends down to the water's edge. But between the mouths of the creeks (and at many other places around the island) the beaches are firm, and are backed up by the fairly open country of the rubber plantations. Opposite the stretch of beach between the two creeks the Straits are perhaps 1,200 yards wide.



Map 4: Singapore

Crowded onto Singapore Island is a heterogeneous population, predominantly Chinese, of close to a million—including perhaps 100,000 British. Like the native population of the peninsula, this one on the island was generally apathetic to the war. Indeed, "apathetic" may be too mild a word. The last-

minute efforts to increase the strength of the island's fortifications were greatly impeded by what looks to have been a general sit-down, or a stay-away, strike on the part of native labor. For example, one reliable report indicates that of the 12,000 hands normally employed at the naval base, fewer than 800 could be gotten out after the war started. Another report tells how bomb craters blown in airfields were repaired by Europeans if they were repaired at all. The dog-tired Imperial soldiers who moved back over the causeway late in January found anything other than an enthusiastic, or even a grim, homefolk before whom to make the last stand.

The causeway, we have seen, was blown the night of January 30. The best evidence indicates that the breach was about sixty feet long.

Although the Japs had not interfered with the final withdrawal over the causeway, they gave immediate evidence of their intention to settle the issue of Singapore swiftly and forcefully. British reconnaissance in the days immediately following the beginning of the siege indicated heavy Japanese movements to the south of the peninsula. Within a few days it was estimated that all of the five or six divisions which had been engaged on the mainland were concentrated in Johore, just across the Straits. Meanwhile, the intensity of aerial bombardment over the island increased from day to day. Artillery (much of it evidently captured stuff), which, as we have seen, had been used sparingly in the campaign on the peninsula, was brought up in mass, and there followed a ceaseless bombardment of the forward positions of the Imperials beyond the Straits. "Ceaseless"

is the word for both the air and the artillery bombardments. Both of them went on night and day.

On the island, the Imperial situation was anything but rosy. There was, to begin with, the apathetic population, the spirits of which had not been improved by the forced shift from the regular sources of water supply in Johore to emergency ones on the island. Then there was the fact that every airfield on the island lay under observed artillery fire (observation from both planes and balloons). Since the nearest fields from which fighter planes could operate were in Sumatra, 200 miles away, the defenders of Singapore were practically without air support. This was a major handicap in that flat and relatively open terrain.

The Imperial plan for defense of the island appears to have been a makeshift. The situation in which the island now found itself had never been foreseen or at least had never been provided for.

While details are not definitely known, we may indulge in a little surmising. With forty-five miles of coastline to guard it is reasonable to suppose that the Imperials held their forward positions lightly and kept a strong reserve ready for counterattack. Part of the defense plan was a patrol service which at night was supplemented by searchlights situated so as to command the Straits opposite likely landing places. The official Australian observer at the front, writing under the date of February 6, told how ". . . our men have been busy patrolling all the lonely creeks and estuaries cutting into the foreshore of the island. There will not be one such spot unfamiliar to the men guarding the area, and mobile

patrols will deal swiftly with any Japanese attempt to send small parties across in efforts to establish a bridgehead. Movement by night will be one of the main features of this work." The measure so described may well have been sufficient to deal swiftly with "small parties"; but the parties which were forming up even on February 6 were by no means small. The Japs were fixing to go all out on this one.

None of the defenders, even those who had been in World War I, remembered anything surpassing the artillery bombardment which shook Singapore Island on Sunday, February 9. The shells were falling on the forward positions, and in Singapore City the "thunder of the guns was incessant—not an occasional exchange of fire, but a continuous uninterrupted roar, which rattled all the window panes and shutters in the island." One observer estimated the rate of artillery fire at 100 rounds per minute. Meanwhile, during the daylight hours the Jap bombers were also active, although ". . . the dive-bombing was nothing like that some of us [the Australians] had experienced at the hands of the Germans in Crete and before Tobruk."

The night of February 9-10 was very dark, and cloudless. The moon (a near-full one) was due to rise at 1: a.m.

At 11:00 p.m. on February 9 the Jap artillery concentrated on the few Imperial searchlights which remained in action. The zero hour had come, and the crossing was under way. That it was in great force no one who had lived through the preparatory bombardment doubted. One of the last searchlights, just before it went out, swept its beam across the

water and disclosed "at least fifty craft together."

These "craft" were sizable boats, carrying at least thirty men each. It is highly likely that they were more of the "special landing craft" which the Japs are known to have; and it is highly unlikely that they were native sampans or barges. There is good evidence (sparks following hits by machine-gun bullets) to indicate that the boats were armored.

Against this caliber of attack the Imperial patrols in the Straits could have had little effect. Still, ". . . one patrol of three of our men got close enough to a Japanese craft carrying about thirty men to throw in a hand grenade, which sank it. . . ."

As it developed, the Japs had forced the crossing along the 5,000-yard front between Sungei Kranjii and Sungei Berih creeks. It was a sector held by the Australians.

The Japs, who have never read the books which tell of the hazards of offensive operations by night, continued to pour strength into their bridgehead throughout that night. At dawn the dive-bombers with their characteristic shallow dives came, and in force. There were high-level bombers too, in force, flying very high, and as always in tight formations of nine planes each. Meanwhile, the artillery, having played its important part in the preparation for the crossing, subsided, its role being taken over by the dive-bombers (on the German model).

As a matter of fact, the Japs had given a clear indication of their technique of night-time crossing of watercourses in their assault on Hong Kong Island on December 24. The moat separating Hong Kong Island from the mainland is about 500 yards wide.

After a violent twelve-hour artillery bombardment, the Japs pushed off in their special landing craft at *9:30 p.m.* The defenders, perhaps believing conventionally that a landing would not be attempted until shortly before dawn, appear to have been taken by surprise. At 9:50 p.m. (according to Jap accounts) the landing was a success; and by 7:30 a.m. the attackers were on the island in force. Thus the assault on Hong Kong was almost completely a night operation.

When the Imperials on Singapore Island were unable to make any sort of counterattack on February 10, it was evident that Singapore's number was up. On February 11, and possibly on February 10, the short breach in the causeway was repaired and soon thereafter Jap tanks rolled onto the island. By February 14 it was estimated that three Jap divisions, and many tanks, were in the fight. The Imperials were pressed steadily back toward Singapore City and the naval base. The emergency reservoirs on which the city now depended for water were lost. The last oil tanks were fired ("black smoke hung fatefully over the whole island—there had been enough oil on the island to fill Japan's war requirements for three months"). Final demolitions at the naval base were touched off. Finally, at 7:00 p.m. on February 16, almost exactly one week from the time of the first crossing, the surrender was signed.

According to Japanese figures (undisputed to date) the number of prisoners involved in the surrender was about 60,000. These were broken down as follows: British, 15,000; Australian, 13,000; Indian, 32,000. Since evacuations were few, these

figures give us a good check on estimates of forces involved in the peninsula campaign. The Australian figure (13,000) is especially interesting, since it may be compared to the figure given by the Australian Prime Minister for the total number of Australian troops sent to Malaya (18,000). It appears that perhaps 2,000 Australians may have been evacuated; and it follows that the casualties in the fighting up to the surrender must have been of the order of 3,000 killed or missing. According to Japanese reports, matériel captured at Singapore included the following: forty pieces of field artillery, fifty large-caliber anti-aircraft guns, fifty small-caliber anti-aircraft guns, five thousand trucks and automobiles.

The picture of a series of delaying actions fought down a narrow theater 400 miles long suggests the thought of demolitions in mass, of "scorched earth." There is a natural question as to why the Japs in Malaya could not have been held up longer, if not indefinitely, by the ruthless application of gun-cotton and TNT.

The answer to that question is found in the nature of the country and in the nature of the Jap tactics. It is one thing to "scorch" a dry, barren region such as is found in China. It is quite another thing to do the same to a damp, lush region such as Malaya. It is one thing to confound a highly mechanized and motorized force by the destruction of a few bridges and causeways. It is quite another thing to do the same to an army which travels on foot, or at the most on bicycles, and which considers waterways not as obstacles but as avenues of movement.

Still, and although demolitions could hardly have changed the course of tactical events in any important respect, the fact remains that there existed prior to the campaign no general *plan* for widespread demolitions. This was one other respect in which the defenders of Malaya were caught short. For example, the plantation owners were at a loss to know what to do with their full granaries, and the solution they frequently adopted of distributing the grain and supplies to the people of the countryside had little other effect than to impose on the Japs a requisitioning and collecting job.

As for strategic demolitions—those designed to deny to the enemy the basic resources of the country—the situation is not entirely clear. Along the Kota Bahru railway the Imperial rear guard consisted of an armored train loaded with explosives and engineers. The latter demolished bridges and tunnels as the train withdrew, and it is probable that the rail line was put out of commission for a very long time. On the other hand, the Japanese reported resumption of through traffic on the main western-coast rail line as of February 15. The Malayan mines were situated inland where they could not be effectively flooded or otherwise damaged. The same applies in general to the bauxite mines. Meanwhile, the trams connecting the mines to the small ports were flimsy affairs which, even if destroyed, could be quickly replaced. The dredges working the large tin mines could easily be destroyed (and no doubt were destroyed) but there was nothing to be done about the many open tin diggings, worked by hand methods. Finally there was no practicable way of attacking the

millions of rubber trees. All in all, Malaya with its fabulous resources comes close to being unscorchable.

To the grand clash of armies and groups of armies in Europe and Russia, to the "tactician's paradise—quartermaster's hell" of the Middle East, to the War for the Passes in the Balkans and the War from the Air in Crete—to all of these campaigns, which themselves run the gamut of types of warfare, there must now be added a worthy newcomer: the Jungle War in Malaya. There are interesting and homely lessons to be gleaned from that six-division attack down the long peninsula towards Singapore:

Infantry mortars. Mortars were used most effectively as supporting artillery for the advances through the jungle—to the practical exclusion of normal field artillery.

Tank-plane tactics. Tanks played an insignificant role in the jungle fighting and, except on flat and open Singapore Island, planes seldom were able to enter the battle directly.

Transport. The Japs moved by foot, by boat, and by bicycles—the Imperials by truck. Under the circumstances, the advantages were all with the Japs.

Waterways. These were not effective as obstacles for the Imperials, but in many cases were highly effective as avenues of movement for the Japs. The avenue offered by the western coastal waters was in fact the key to the Japs' envelopment tactics.

Local resources. The ability and readiness of the Japs to subsist largely on local food supplies was a further indication of their toughness, stamina, and

resourcefulness. The clear indication is that those who fight the Japs must be able to equal their ability to get along on little. Other prime examples of the conversion of everyday local resources to the business of invasion was the Jap seizure of bicycles and floating craft.

Night operations. The Japs fought their war on a twenty-four-hour basis, and in many instances extensive operations were launched and carried through in darkness. Jungle war calls for decentralization of command, and the Japs were smart enough to see that troops trained to operate successfully in the jungle could likewise operate successfully at night.

Demolitions. Estimates as to the effects of demolitions based on large-scale enemy motorization must not be applied unqualifiedly to an enemy which moves afoot, by boat, and by bicycle. Modern war on the European model has skyrocketed the significance of TNT. Modern war on the Malayan model deflates that significance.

"Scorched earth." It is quite impossible to "scorch" completely a lush, tropical country. It is indeed difficult to "scorch" any country and to do so demands an utter ruthlessness which the Russians have, and which we may be sure our enemies have. When the Malayan shoe is on the other foot, let no one suppose that the Japs will leave behind sampans or barges or stores of food.

Native population. The difficulties of waging a war in the midst of an apathetic (or worse) population are evident. Tough as it might be on the population, an utter ruthlessness is called for when an

enemy uniforms himself so as to resemble native workmen.

Guides. Let us repeat from our text: In a thick country of trails and paths, a handful of guides familiar with the country are of more use than any number of compasses and maps.

But after all the "lessons" from Malaya are listed, the most lasting impression remains this: That in the jungle, war—which had been so extensively taken over by machines elsewhere—was returned to the individual soldiers. Malaya was lost to well-trained soldiers who had only fair equipment but who had in generous measures the *human* characteristics of will-to-win, stamina, resourcefulness. When Malaya is re-won, it will be by soldiers who have those characteristics in even greater measure.

CHAPTER 6

WARTIME EDITORIALS FROM *THE INFANTRY JOURNAL*

[*These wartime comments, mainly on the American and Filipino forces in the Philippine Islands and their Japanese foes, are included here in the hope that they will, in a small way at least, guide and inspire all Americans in the job that lies ahead.*]

WE KNOW OUR FOES

(January, 1942)

THE GREAT objective of ending the threat from the armed forces of international gangsters has been stated in the plainest and most forceful terms by our Commander-in-Chief. Rule by Nazi and Nipponese terror must be banished from this earth without chance of return. That is our aim and our job. And it's not a job we can finish off-hand with a battle or two in a few months of fighting.

It is no news at all to the leaders of our Army that the Jap and the German are hard-fighting soldiers. They have had that name for a long time, even to the point of exaggeration. We knew the Boche for a fighter in our first war against him. And we know what the Nazi has done since he first began war in earnest. Of the Jap we know how he fought against Russia early in the century. We know of his wide experience of war in China since his first "so sorry" act ten years ago. Indeed, we know, from the begin-

ning, that the treacherous Pacific enemy, like the treacherous European enemy, is a fighting soldier. But we know, at the same time, he's not good enough to end what he's trying to do.

The fact that we're facing, to east and west, a foe in no way second-rate, who knows how today's warfare is fought because he has been long in the field can mean no short, sharp series of victories and then the finish. It means, our smashing of the Jap and his Nazi masters, a scrap that may last for years before we and our Allies have ended the job.

We remember, for one thing, that we're still building our Army, though it has great strength in men and machines already. We think, too, of the flow, only now running faster and faster, of guns, planes, tanks, and ships—a torrent of the tools of war in the end, but not for a while. And we think of this war in terms of thousands of miles of air and ocean—but of air and ocean that shall be the paths to our victories even before our strength is full.

The war's history in Europe and its beginning for us in the Pacific has told us one other thing that must be burned into the brain of every American fighter. We're fighting enemies who play the dirtiest kind of pool. There is no treachery and trickery we cannot look for as we begin our assault to set the Rising Sun and bend the Swastika into a pretzel.

We know from the methods of the Nazis that the Axis powers have killed whatever honorable rules of conduct men once may have had for battle. And we've seen from what our Jap foes have done in China, and from what they have striven with an insane frenzy to do against our own possessions and

people, that they have as little thought as the Nazis of fighting with what soldiers once thought of as honor. A fanatic fights with distortion and destruction in his mind, but he can plan efficiently at the same time to deliver his mad fanatic assaults against the world that holds the freedom he's been taught to hate.

Jiu-jitsu is a prime example of the Jap's idea of fighting. As an experienced wrestling instructor once said, jiu-jitsu is mainly dirty wrestling. It has in it every foul trick that is barred from the sports of wrestling and fighting in the ring.

Well, this war is a fight against Nazi and Nipponese fighters who know no rules. And so long as we remember it, and stay on guard, and use whatever it takes to knock such fighting out for the count, we'll win our battles, and with our Allies we'll clean up the face of the world.

We should not get the idea, either, that simply because the Jap is a little man, or the German traditionally a follower, or because our men and teams have consistently beaten them both in athletic events, that they have any weakness in campaign or combat. The hardened Japanese soldier is tough, and so is the Nazi. But it's simply a toughness that comes through training—it's nothing they are born with. The German or Jap recruit, unless he happened first to be a worker or an athlete, is as soft and flabby as any. Indeed, his physical condition will not meet the average of the American soldier.

The Jap has the extra disadvantage of being a runt. But a runt who is strong can fight, as we know from experience in every sport. He can march and

he can fight, and his smallness is no particular disadvantage in the air or on the sea. His runtiness also makes him cocky, and makes him hate the taller races of the earth, even though there are tall Japs in some regions.

It's well to remember, too, that the Jap, for all his imitativeness and his failure to improve on the inventions he has taken from our civilization, believes with an unshakable faith that he's the best man on earth. Though we know that the Nazi thinks this way because he's been told it so often, it is something we in America seldom stop to think of concerning the Jap. We've been sure in our hearts that ours is the best way of life, and the best land with the best people in it, despite our faults. We're sure of it now beyond doubt. But never does the average Jap—and certainly not the Japanese soldier—see an American, or an Englishman, or a Russian, or for that matter even a German, without looking down upon him in his mind as he looks up at him with his eyes. The little brown Jap is taught from his childhood that his is the superior race of the earth—that white men are bragging scum, unfit to step upon the ground of the islands where the sun also rises.

Not until such ideas die in their world, die in Europe and die in Asia, can our world take any time for breath. And we, with Britain and China and the other Allies who have joined and will join in the fight, are chosen to make those ideas die. No people ever had a work that meant more than ours, either to themselves or to this earth. No Army and Navy of a people ever had a prouder, more glorious aim in hand and mind and heart than ours now has.

From where we look to the West the sun doesn't rise—it sets. And one day, when the might of our arms and the strength of our purpose has reached six thousand miles to do what it must and should, the sun that rises on the desperate, fanatic power that calls itself Nippon shall sink behind islands that know at last their place in a modern world. The force of our arms, now beginning its fight, shall smash alike the little Jap and his master, the Nazi, till their toughness is tired out and softened again, and their people have learned that the world is a place to be shared and built up, not grabbed and exploited.

But to smash the ideas and smack down the strength of the Nazi conquerors and the Nipponese would-be conquerors is probably a job of years. And whether of months or years or decades, we take it up knowing it for the great task it is, and knowing our enemies for just what they are. We know them across the Atlantic and across the Pacific as treacherous, tough, fanatical foes. We know them as foes whose ideas cannot live in the end, and whose ways and weapons of fighting can never in the end stand up to our own. The *Heils* and *Banzais* may be loud for a while. But before it's over they'll be drowned out forever by good American razzberries.

THE FIGHTING FORCES

(February, 1942)

THE SPREAD of open ground is narrow—but a few thousand yards. On the west are the jungled steeps of the foothills that climb into the peak of Mariveles farther south. The tangle of river, lagoon, and

swamp that skirts the bay lies on the east. Mountain and swamp alike are tough terrain.

There are stubbled, sun-caked, paddied ricefields to the front, and courses of marsh-lined rivers cut across them from mountain to swamp. Fields of fire are long and there is some concealment from the enemy's planes where much is needed. And there is more farther back where the slopes of the mountains begin.

There are *barrios* in this area, mainly small ones—a line of *nipa* houses down each side of the road and perhaps an artesian well where the village people go to get their water. But by now perhaps these houses are burned or flattened by bombs or shells, though they offer no stronghold for troops.

This is the line through Hermosa, the barrio of Comeliness. Its ground as a whole is strong. And on this ground a strong man has set up a strong defense.

If it can be taken, the cost of its taking will be a heavier cost than the Jap has been accustomed to paying. He is up against troops who can shoot—among them many an expert rifleman, machine-gunner, and mortarman from the ranks of the Philippine Army, the Philippine Scouts, and our own trained regiments fighting beside them.

These men have already had much practice besides what they've had on the range. They have lined the Lingayen beaches with Japanese dead, and the shore at Batangas, and the Atimonan shore and the palm-covered slopes behind it. And at many a line of delay between these beaches and Bataan, they have placed an accurate fire on the squat invaders.

But now in these shortened stronger lines disposed in depth in upper Bataan they are costing the Japs tenfold for every yard. In the air above the odds are practically all on one side. And on the ground below the odds are heavy. But for every gain—and often for no gain at all—it is costing the Japs tenfold.

Down below the mountains of Bataan and out in the neck of Manila Bay, the troops of Corregidor are likewise giving it and taking it. The fortress lies within its rocky island ready for the bombers of the Japs and ready for assault from the sea. Each time the bombers come in to crack their eggs on the rocks, the island's defenses keep them high and fewer fly away than flew over. On the rock, as around and on the mountain, the flag is flying and the enemy finds each attack he delivers tougher and tougher.

The hearts of Americans are all with the valiant troops on Bataan. But especially pulling for them are those who have been with the troops in the Islands and who know the land and its soldiers.

That is one sector. Some way off, probably to the south, is another. And from this sector bombers have been striking the Philippine invader from the rear, striking often and striking with force and accuracy at ships near Mindanao. Here the toll mounts steadily as bombsights align again and again on warship and transport.

But our broadest sector of all so far in this war is the sea. In the Atlantic our ships and those of our Allies have been doing, quietly and efficiently, a first-rate job of keeping the sealanes open. The Atlantic situation is different now—vastly different from a

year ago. Supplies are steadily crossing the sea as well as reaching our bases.

In the wider Pacific we cannot know as clearly the tasks of our Navy. But we know it is strong and constantly busy in furtherance of the war. We know the vastness of the stretches in which it is working. And one day we shall know the results of all it is doing now.

These are our own fields of action. Those of our Allies are likewise spread over great areas on more than one continent. The British are hammering away in Africa and stiffening their lines elsewhere. The Chinese armies are hard at the Japs in their own vast country. The great Russian counteroffensive continues, a most vital phase in the greatest campaign of history.

Like ourselves, our Allies are fighting with increasing strength of arms on their side. Yet so strong still are the Nazi and the Jap that new drives in new directions cannot yet be dropped from possibility. But if these do come there is growing resistance to meet them. And there will be more and more strength toward the end for the drives of our own we shall make against these enemies.

From Manila you can look on any clear evening twenty miles to the west across the bay and there see the peak of Mariveles against the red and lowering sun. To the south of Mariveles, across the two-mile strait but lower against the evening glow, stands the rock of Corregidor. There are Japanese looking now from Manila across that bay and into that blood-red

sunset. And there are other Japs by divisions attacking toward the slopes of the mountain that stands each evening in front of the Manila sun.

In these strongholds are not only American and Filipino troops—and men of both Armies with whom readers of this book have served in quiet days. There are doubtless soldiers too of every branch of this Army of ours shoulder to shoulder in those outnumbered valiant forces. The fighting arms are there—airmen, artillerymen, cavalrymen, engineers, and signal troops, and the Doughboys of many weapons. The arms and the services are there, all of them—all in one thirty-mile area under a fighting leader opposing the Japanese foe.

There, for the moment, are the fightingest forces of our land armies, who have cost the enemy heavily already and will cost him vastly more. There already have American arms equalled their valor of the past. There—for the moment—is the first of our major sectors—but only the first.

BATTLE ON BATAAN

(March, 1942)

WE HEAR no word now from those who said a few months past Americans were soft. Each day anew the crisp inspiring phrases of a leader of jungle fighters on Bataan affirm their lack of judgment.

The news each day is brief but whatever the outcome the news is good. For it has told us that American fighting men have all that war demands. It has told us that the American measure of battle endurance still meets the mark of Lundy's Lane, the Seven Days, and St. Mihiel. And that our battle skill lacks

nothing seen at New Orleans or Gettysburg or Chateau-Thierry.

By now our troops know every twist of every trail that climbs and circles Mariveles and her foothills. They and their fighting Philippine comrades know the use of the jungle cover. They know which noises of the tropic woods are nature's and which are enemy born, what jungle tree may hide a Jap, what foliage gives concealment from his planes.

Every communiqué that tells of an assault met or a counterstroke delivered gives evidence of a most skillful handling of troops. Our methods of defensive fighting are sound methods, the best with which a determined enemy in larger numbers can be met. You can read the news from Bataan, and even without the details of the ground and the troops upon it, see the tests our defensive tactics are meeting almost daily. The concentration of the heaviest fires before the main line of resistance, the hand-to-hand fighting where the foe does gain to the line, and the sharp counterblow to cut him off or eject him from the battle position where he may get through the main line of resistance.

For long the main line of resistance has been for us all of the Army only a thick blue line on a military map marked MLR. A line that touches "the foremost edges of the foremost combat defenses." Not a trench, of course; for in sound defensive fighting you do not spread your troops out in a line. You put them in unit groups on the strongest pieces of ground so they can plaster the other unoccupied parts of the line with their deadly crossing fires. If you make a thin fence of straight-ahead fire by spac-

ing your men along the MLR, and the enemy breaks through it anywhere, he is then behind all the rest of it. So instead your defense is made up of fighting groups, each including machine guns, on the strongest places the ground affords. And you back up your foremost groups with others on good ground farther in rear. And the whole you back up with your supporting weapons, and with some of your troops as reserves. And every man digs in so that he can take the shelling and bombing, and give to his foe the smallest possible target when it comes time to open on him as he makes his attack.

When this time comes, the ground out in front of the MLR gets the heaviest fire that an army can produce. It is swept by the fire of every man in a place from which he can aim with his weapon at an enemy upon it. It gets the concentrated rain of steel from the shells of mortars and supporting artillery—and of bombers if bombers are there to assault their suitable targets.

In the jungles everything must be closer together, and the jungle cut away, when there is time, in order to give the defenders a field of fire. And the folds of terrain that build up a jungled mountain and the masses of growth that cover them may prevent the use of artillery and planes, and force the defenders to rely for support mainly on the high-curving fire of their mortars.

Yes, the Main Line of Resistance is not now so much a heavy blue line on a map as a line tying Bay to Ocean in Bataan. It's a line through the Philippine jungles—over the nose of a mountain and down to the waters that flank it. It's a line before which our

foes have died in thousands in the face of straight American and Filipino aim and stout American and Filipino valor.

And straightness of aim has not been the least of the story. For a long time shooting has been to us all an annual season on the range after preliminary squeezing of triggers and holding of breaths and aiming—or other dry runs to fit the weapon. It has meant a struggle with bolos to get them over the line as marksmen—and a time of the pits and the firing point and of scoring and marking. And maybe alibis afterward.

There is only one bull's-eye now and it isn't a round black spot or a line of black squares on a white paper target. It isn't that easy to see, and there's often not time for the finest of aim though the aim must be good if the bullet is to count. The target is the soldier of the enemy coming to kill. And he's a target that seldom stays put while you aim, so your aim must be speedy but accurate. He's also a target that keeps on coming when you miss, so your aim means, more often than not, either his life or your own.

In the jungle the range may be short, exceedingly short. It may be at hand-grenade distance you line your sights on a glimpse of your foe. Or you may have to shoot at a sound or movement in the tangled brush. But you aim the same way you aimed on the range at the bull's-eye. You breathe the same way. You squeeze the same way on your trigger. Or you do if you want to live and hold your part of the battle position.

It's that kind of shooting that has piled up the Japs in Bataan every time they have struck. It's that kind

of shooting that has made every gain so costly. The Philippine soldier ranks high in his scores with every infantry weapon. His training has been the same as our own. Thus the forces of General MacArthur and General Wainwright give all other troops in our Army the finest example of the value that marksmanship has in this war.

Like the soldier of wars of the past, the soldier of Bataan shows the steel of American arms. His foe may be tough but he is still tougher. War is his business, not his religion. He fights it with due respect for the chances, with common sense, with skill and endurance. He's a fighting soldier, not a hardy fanatic fool. When need be, he gives his life, but not for a mere Banzai. There is nothing soft in his body, his mind, or his spirit.

As this book goes to press, the news that Bataan has fallen comes across the world. Three great months of battle those mountains saw, three months of the hardest, finest fighting American troops have ever done.

Around those men of the two fighting nations, around those soldiers of the Philippine and American fighting regiments who fought at such odds for so long, and around their two great fighting leaders, the battle hopes of the two nations have arisen.

Those hopes could not be changed by the loss of an army. The greater Army of the United States grows daily in strength and fighting quality. And it gains the faster in fighting knowledge and spirit for the fight its comrades made on Bataan in the first three months of war.

APPENDIX

Japanese Military Terms and Characters

The following is a list of military terms and their Japanese equivalents which may be useful to unit intelligence officers:

ARMY TERMS

MILITARY TERM	JAPANESE EQUIVALENT
Army	Rikugun.
General staff	Sanbō hombu.
Chief of general staff	Sanbō sōchō.
Navy	Kaigun.
Navy department	Kaigun shō.
Grade	Kaikyū.
General officer	Shōkan.
General	Taishō.
Lieutenant general	Chūjō.
Major general	Shōshō.
Field officer	Sakan.
Colonel	Taisa.
Lieutenant colonel	Chūsa.
Major	Shōsa.
Company officer	Ikan.
Captain	Tai-i.
First lieutenant	Chū-i.
Second lieutenant	Shō-i.
Noncommissioned officer	Kashikan.
Warrant officer or special duty sergeant major	Tokumu sōchō.
Sergeant major	Sōchō.
Sergeant	Gunsō.
Corporal	Gochō.
Soldier	Hei, heitai.
Superior private	Jōtō hei.
First class private	Ittō hei.
Second class private	Nitō hei.
Grade	Kaikyū.
Army (unit)	Gun.
Army headquarters	Gun shireibu.
Army commander	Gun shireikan.

MILITARY TERM	JAPANESE EQUIVALENT
Division	Shidan.
Division headquarters	Shidan shireibu.
Division major general attached to	Shidan shireibuzuki shosho.
Division commander	Shidan chō (chūjō).
Division artillery	Shidan hōhei.
Division cavalry	Shidan kihei.
2 brigades of infantry	Hohei niko ryodan.
1 regiment of cavalry	Kihei ikko rentai.
1 regiment of field or mountain artillery	Yahōhei, moshiku wa sanpōhei, ikko rentai.
1 battalion of engineers	Kōhei ikko daitai.
1 battalion of transport troops	Shichōhei ikko daitai.
Brigade	Ryodan.
Reinforced brigade	Konsei ryodan.
Composite brigade	Shūsei ryodan.
Brigade cavalry	Ryodan kihei.
Infantry brigade	Hohei ryodan.
Cavalry brigade	Kihei ryodan.
Heavy field artillery brigade (There is no light artillery brigade organization.)	Yasen jū hōhei ryodan.
Regiment	Rentai.
Regiment headquarters	Rentai honbu (not shireibu).
Regiment commander	Rentaichō.
Regiment adjutant	Rentai fukukan (fukkan).
Battalion	Daitai.
Battalion headquarters	Daitai honbu.
Battalion commander	Daitaichō.
Battalion adjutant	Daitai fukukan.
Company, troop, battery	Chūtai.
Company (troop, battery) headquarters	Chūati jimushitsu (not hombu).
Company (troop, battery) commander	Chūtaichō.
Platoon	Shōtai.
Platoon commander	Shōtaichō.
Squad	Buntai.
Squad commander	Buntaichō.
Detachment	Butai.
Arms or services	Heika.

MILITARY TERM	JAPANESE EQUIVALENT
Arms	Honka.
Infantry	Hohei (aka) (really hi) (red).
Cavalry	Kihei (midori) (green).
Artillery	Hōhei (kiiro) (yellow).
Light field	Ya hō hei.
Mountain	Sanpō hei.
Heavy field	Yasen jūhōhei.
Antiaircraft	Kōsha hōhei.
Heavy	Jūhōhei.
Engineers	Kōhei.
Transport corps	Shichō hei.
Air	Kōkū hei (sorairo) (really usu konjō) (sky blue).
Military police	Kenpei (kuro) (black).
Staff services	Kakubu.
Medical	Eiseibu (fuka midori) (dark green).
Veterinary	Jū-ibu (murasaki) (purple).
Intendance	Keiribu (gincha) (silver tea).

NAVAL TERMS

Auxiliary gunboat	Tokusetsu hōkan.
Battleship	Senkan.
Battle cruiser	Jun-yō senkan.
Cruiser	Jun-yōkan.
Coast defense vessel	Kaibōkan.
Combined destroyer group	Kuchiku rentai.
Destroyer	Kuchikukan.
Division	Shōtai.
Destroyer unit	Kuchikutai.
Mother ship	Bokan.
Aircraft tender or mother ship	Kōkū bokan.
Destroyer mother ship	Suirai bokan.
Mine sweeper mother ship	Sōkai bokan.
Airplane; flying machine	Hikōki.
Fleet	Kantai.
Land airplane	Rikujō hikōki.
Seaplane	Suijō hikōki.
Gunboat	Hōkan.
Combined fleet	Rengō kantai.
Gunboat unit	Hōkantai.
Naval gun	Kaigunhō.

MILITARY TERM	JAPANESE EQUIVALENT
River gunboat	Kayō hōkan.
Submarine	Sensuikan.
Squadron; flotilla	Sentai.
Destroyer squadron	Suirai sentai.
Submarine unit	Sensuitai.
Submarine squadron	Sensui sentai.
Salvage ship	Kyūnansen.
Torpedo boat	Suiraitei.
Minesweeper	Sōkaitei (sen).

IMPORTANT MILITARY CHARACTERS

Arms, services, and units.

Infantry Hohei	Cavalry Kihei	Artillery Hōhei	The first character alone means army (gun); with second character, corps (gundan).	Division Shidan	Brigade Ryodan
步兵	騎兵	砲兵	軍團	師團	旅團

Regiment Rentai	Battalion Daitai	Company (troop battery) Chūtai	Platoon Shōtai	Engineer Kōhei
聯隊	大隊	中隊	小隊	工兵

近衛 Konoe, the Imperial guards; used for units of the Imperial Guards Division.

航空兵 Kōkūhei, the air service (a new word).

Numbers.

One	Two	Three	Four	Five	Six
一	二	三	四	五	六
Seven	**Eight**	**Nine**	**Ten**	**Hundred**	**Thousand**
七	八	九	十	百	千

〇 Zero, used generally where our zero is used, though the character for ten is sometimes used.

Grades of officers.—Characters showing officers' grades are given as follows:

Company Officers.

Captain Taii	First lieutenant Chūi	Second lieutenant Shōi
大尉	中尉	少尉

Field Officers.

Colonel Taisa	Lieutenant colonel Chūsa	Major Shōsha
大佐	中佐	少佐

General Officers.

General	Lieutenant general	Major general
Taishō	Chūsho (or chūjō)	Shōshō
大將	中將	少將

CHARACTERS ON IDENTIFICATION TAGS

Reading identification tags.—Japanese is read from top to bottom and from right to left. The characters here used are Chinese characters adapted by the Japanese. One, two, three, or more characters constitute a word. The dash on the enlisted man's tag separates the regiment number from the man's serial number in the regiment. The arm of service is frequently abbreviated and the first character only used. This is true on the enlisted man's tag. In case of engineers, "battalion" is substituted for "regiment." A detailed explanation of the reading of tags follows:

Enlisted man.—Identification tag of an enlisted man. Reading from top to bottom the first character gives the arm or service, followed by regimental number, a small dash, and ending with the serial number of the man in his regiment. It reads, "Infantry 56 (regulation), No. 147."



Officer.—This is an officer's identification tag which gives in order from top to bottom, arm or service, grade, and name. This tag reads, "Infantry, first lieutenant, Yamamoto."



NOTE.—In all enumerations the Japanese habitually use the order MP, Inf., Cav., Arty., Engrs., Air Service, Transport, abbreviated sometimes to Ken, Ho, Ki, Hō, Kō', Kōkū, Schichō.

Enlisted Men.

騎 One character here shown—ki for kihei, cavalry.

二三 One or more characters for number of regiment (in this case 23).

- Dash separating regimental number from serial number of man in regiment.

四一九 Serial number of man in regiment. One or more characters (in this case 419).

Officers.

工兵 Generally two characters for arm of service (here engineer).

大尉 Two characters for rank (here captain).

田中 One, two, three, or four characters for name of officer (here Tanaka).

Examples.—The following are examples of the translation of identification tags:



Artillery.
18th Regiment.
No. 54.



Engineer.
9th Battalion.
No. 60.

Cavalry.
Second lieutenant.
Kawaguchi.



Infantry.
Major general.
Hara.



Cavalry.
Colonel.
Uchida.



Infantry.
141st Regiment.
No. 1,251.

Engineer.

Lieutenant Colonel.

Matsunō.



Artillery.
10th Regiment.

No. 9.

Infantry.
76th Regiment.

No. 442.

Cavalry.

Major.

Tani.



Artillery.
12th Regiment.

No. 187.



Infantry.
91st Regiment.

No. 761.

工兵大尉中上川

Engineer.

Captain.

Nakami-
gawa.

歩兵中尉本西

Infantry.

First
Lieutenant.

Motonishi.

騎八ー六四二

Cavalry.
8th
Regiment.

No. 642.

歩五二ー五〇三

Infantry.

52nd
Regiment.

No. 503.

(Paul Dorsey photo)

The field equipment of the Japanese soldier

(Paul Dorsey photo)

Tradition expects every Jap infantryman to use the bayonet effectively and often. In training and in the field the dagger-type blade plays a prominent role. It is 16 inches long and weighs eight-tenths of a pound. The rifle is the 6.5 mm. Arisaka '38—a Mauser five-shot type. The knock-down leaf sight is graduated from 550 to 2,600 yards and an extreme range of 4,375 yards is claimed. However, it is only fairly accurate beyond 500 yards as there is no windage scale or allowance for drift. The cartridge case is brass and the pointed lead bullet has a nickel-steel jacket. Ammunition is carried in clips of five in three leather ammunition boxes attached to the belt. In all 120 rounds are carried. It has been announced several times that this rifle is to be displaced by a 1919 model which fires a 7.7 mm. cartridge, but it is not believed that this has been done

(*European photo*)

Jap marines practicing a bayonet assault some time before December 7, 1941



(*Wide World photo*)

Billed as The Third Regiment lined up in front of their barracks in Tokyo for final inspection before leaving for Manchukuo and the China "incident" in 1937, the Jap troops in the foreground are armed with the 70-mm. infantry battalion rifled gun. This gun can deliver fire from 200 to 2,800 yards range but its effective range is 300 to 1,500 yards. It has a panoramic sight mounted on the left side of the piece. The sight bracket includes a range drum with four divisions marked in mils, an elevating bubble and a cross bubble. High explosive shrapnel and smoke shells are used and the range is extended by increasing the powder charge. The rate of fire is ten rounds per minute; there are five rounds to the box. The gun and ammunition caisson in tandem are drawn by a single horse.

(Acme photo)

Two men ordinarily fire the Jap grenade thrower. One aims while the other drops the grenade down the smooth-bore tube. The range is set by turning the shaft which adjusts the size of the combustion chamber. It is discharged by jerking a lanyard. Valuable in platoon operations, it is issued six to a company. One man can fire this weapon, but two are considered much more effective as the rate of fire is doubled from ten a minute to twenty. Because it lacks a bipod mount it is aimed by one man while the other drops the grenade down the smooth-bore ten-inch tube. The range is from 140 to 700 yards. The shell is also used as a hand grenade



(*European photo*)

A Jap tank, somewhere on the "Shanghai Front" in early October, 1937

(Acme photo)

A group of Jap aviators at Saigon, French Indo-China, during the summer of 1941

(*Acme photo*)

Jap ski troops at a sports meet during the winter of 1939-40 at Takada, Japan

(*European photo*)

On the northern China front a group of Jap soldiers are looking for results from a field kitchen



(*Paul Dorsey photo*)

The endurance of the Jap fighting man has been remarked by almost every occidental observer. Hikes of 30 to 35 miles a day are not uncommon. But even fanatic devotion to the emperor is subject to the weaknesses of the flesh as witness the three soldiers in this picture taken after a forced march into Hankow at the conclusion of the five-months-old Yangtze River campaign in 1938



(*Paul Dorsey photo*)

The Japs are strong for water-envelopment tactics such as used recently in the conquest of Malaya. Similar tactics were used in the capture of Hankow on the Yangtze in 1938. To use it successfully Army and Navy must work together and troops must be, in effect, marine-soldiers. Above is a Jap landing barge loaded with troops at Hankow near the end of the five-months' drive up the Yangtze from Nanking

(INS photo)

Early in the operations in China the Jap schooled himself in jungle warfare whenever he found suitable territory

(*Acme photo*)

At Matang the combined army and navy forces of the Japs met the first of four river blocks the Chinese were to use in delaying the drive up the Yangtze to Hankow. The navy was pushing ahead of the army when the first barrier was encountered. Bomb attacks and ramming by warships failed to remove the barrier and at last Jap soldiers were forced to fight their way around the flanks of the Chinese defending the barrier. Here is shown a small contingent of Jap soldiers attempting to outflank the defenders



(*Acme photo*)

A Japanese landing party in the forward part of a landing boat approaching Tahsitao Island occupied by Chinese troops. Jap landing boats vary in type and size. Some are armored. They are propelled by low-powered gasoline or Diesel motors. Note the life preservers worn by the soldiers. The camouflage is typical of that usually worn by Japs



(Wide World photo)

This tank and its crew did not win through to Singapore. An Australian anti-tank-gun team accounted for them somewhere north of the Straits of Johore

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