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Mr. John Greenewald, Jr.  
[REDACTED]

15 MAY 1998

Dear Mr. Greenewald,

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Bill Hansen, Director

ADDRESS

SELECTED READINGS

PREPARATORY to

DISCUSSIONS of

OPERATION

OVERLORD

and

D-DAY

6 JUNE 1944

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

THE PLAN

# The Enemy Observed

Aerial reconnaissance of beach obstacles (left). As the aircraft swoops in for a close shot (right) the Wehrmacht troops abandon their work and dive for cover.





German dispositions to meet a cross-Channel invasion on the eve of D-Day





CUT-AWAY DIAGRAMS OF TORRIK MG PIT or O.P.  
for 2 mm.



GERMAN ANTI-TANK OBSTACLES USED AS UNDERWATER OBS  
TETRAHEDRA. I



TETRAHEDRA. II



GERMAN STEEL OBSTACLES-HEDGEHOG



**DIVISIONS AVAILABLE TO GERMANY ON 6 JUNE 1944  
(BASED ON GERMAN SITUATION MAPS)**

Theater	Inf type	Pz type	Misc
Denmark	2	1+ 2 Brig	3
Norway	11		
Finland	10		
<b>Eastern Front</b>	<b>122</b>	<b>25+ 1 Brig</b>	<b>17+ 1 Brig</b>
OB SUEDOST (Balkans)	20	2	3
OB SUEDWEST (Italy)	17+ 1 Brig	7	1
OB WEST (France and Low Countries)	41+ 1 Rgt	11	9
<b>Zone of Interior</b>	<b>3+ 1 Brig</b>	<b>1+ 2 Brig</b>	<b>4+ 2 Brig</b>
<b>TOTAL GERMAN DIVISIONS</b>	<b>226+ 2 Brig 1 Rgt</b>	<b>47+ 5 Brig</b>	<b>37+ 5 Brig</b>
<b>AXIS SATELLITES</b>			
Finnish, Eastern Front and Finland	14+ 8 Brig	1	1 Brig
Românian, Eastern Front and România	17+ 5 Brig	1	2
Hungarian, Eastern Front and Hungary	9+ 3 Brig	2	5
Bulgarian, Occupation Duty in Balkans and Bulgaria	11		
Italian, In Zone of Interior	4		
<b>TOTAL AXIS SATELLITE DIVISIONS</b>	<b>55+ 16 Brig</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>7+ 1 Brig</b>

## Table of Equivalent Ranks

U.S. Army	German Army and Air Force	German Waffen-SS
None	Reichsmarschall	None
General of the Army	Generalfeldmarschall	Reichsfuehrer-SS
General	Generaloberst	Oberstgruppenfuehrer
Lieutenant General	General der Infanterie	Obergruppenfuehrer
	Artillerie	
	Gebirgstruppen	
	Kavallerie	
	Nachrichtentruppen	
	Panzertruppen	
	Pioniere	
	Luftwaffe	
	Flieger	
	Fallschirmtruppen	
	Flakartillerie	
	Luftnachrichtentruppen	
Major General	Generalleutnant	Gruppenfuehrer
Brigadier General	Generalmajor	Brigadefuehrer
None	None	Oberfuehrer
Colonel	Oberst	Standartenfuehrer
Lieutenant Colonel	Oberstleutnant	Obersturmbannfuehrer
Major	Major	Sturmabteilungsfuehrer
Captain	Hauptmann	Hauptsturmfuehrer
Captain (Cavalry)	Rittmeister	
First Lieutenant	Oberleutnant	Obersturmfuehrer
Second Lieutenant	Leutnant	Untersturmfuehrer

## COMPARATIVE FIRE POWER OF THE U.S. AND GERMAN 1944-TYPE INFANTRY DIVISIONS

	U.S.	German 1944
Strength (officers and enlisted men) .....	14,037	12,763
Rifles-carbines .....	11,507	9,067
Pistols .....	1,228	1,981
Submachine guns .....	295	1,503
Light MG's and automatic rifles .....	539	566
Heavy MG's .....	90	90
60-mm. mortars .....	90	—
81-mm. mortars .....	54	41
120-mm. mortars .....	—	21
Bazookas .....	558*	1011†
Flame throwers .....	—	21
U.S. .50-cal. MG's; German 20-mm. AA guns .....	237	12
37-mm. AT guns .....	13	—
57-mm. AT guns .....	57	—
75-mm. AT guns .....	—	35
75-mm. infantry howitzers .....	—	18
105-mm. howitzers .....	54‡	36
U.S. 155-mm. howitzers; German 150-mm. howitzers .....	12	10§

\*Also had 2,131 rifle grenade launchers.

†Either bazookas or antitank rifles.


‡Eighteen were found in the cannon companies of the infantry regiments.

§Six were infantry howitzers, two in an infantry howitzer company assigned to each infantry regiment. Each howitzer company had, in addition, six 75-mm. howitzers.


**Glossary of Code Names :**

Anvil	The invasion of southern France, August 1944.	Jupiter	Plans for an amphibious invasion of Norway.
Arcadia	The first Roosevelt-Churchill war conference after the entry of the United States in the war. Held in Washington, December 1941-January 1942.	Mulberries	The artificial harbors and ports designed and built in Great Britain.
Avalanche	The invasion of the Italian mainland, September 1943.	★ Neptune	The first phase of "Overlord." It included the mounting of the invasion forces in England, the crossing of the English Channel under naval escort, and the fight for the beaches in Normandy.
Blarney	An exercise in command control held by Headquarters 21 Army Group in the spring of 1944.	Nightlight	A task force planned for the occupation of Norway in the event of a German withdrawal from that country or against light German resistance.
Bolero	The assembly in the United Kingdom of American troops and supplies in preparation for the invasion of France.	★ Overlord	The over-all strategic plan for the invasion of France and for operations up to D+90. Also, the actual campaign.
Candle	A training exercise to test signal communications for "Overlord" held by Headquarters 21 Army Group in the spring of 1944.	Pirate	An amphibious exercise of Canadian troops in England.
Chastity	A projected operation for the capture of the Quiberon Bay area in Southern Brittany to take place about D+40, using elements of the Third United States Army. The project was abandoned when the capture of Le Havre and Antwerp began to appear practicable.	Pluto	The laying of the oil pipeline under the English Channel during the invasion of Normandy. The code name was abbreviated from the words "pipeline under the ocean."
Dragoon	The name at first given to the contemplated invasion of southern France. It was replaced by the name Anvil.	Pointblank	The coordinated British-American strategic bomber offensive ordered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It lasted from the spring of 1943 to the spring of 1944.
Duck	An amphibious invasion exercise carried out by United States troops in England.	Rankin	An Allied plan for a return to the European continent under conditions of various degrees of disintegration of the German Armed Forces. It was anticipated that such conditions might develop before the "Overlord" invasion.
Fabius	A series of six amphibious exercises in which American, British, and Canadian troops participated.	Roundup	The code name given to early invasion planning by British planning staffs. The name "Overlord" replaced Roundup.
★ Fortitude North	Allied deception operations, showing an invasion threat to Norway.	Sea Lion	The German plan for an amphibious invasion of England in 1940.
★ Fortitude South	Allied deception operations, showing an invasion threat to the Pas-de-Calais coast of France.	Sledgehammer	Proposed invasion of France in 1942.
Harlequin	A pre-invasion amphibious exercise of British forces.	Spartan	A Canadian invasion exercise in England.
Husky	The invasion of Sicily, July 1943.	Swordhilt	A plan for an air and seaborne attack on the north coast of the Brittany Peninsula.
		Thunderclap	A higher command staff exercise during April and May 1944.
		Tiger	An amphibious invasion rehearsal by American ground and naval units stationed in Britain.
		Trident	The Roosevelt-Churchill war conference held in Washington, May 1943.





Of the six assault areas surveyed by OVERLORD planners, the Caen-Cotentin sector offered the broadest advantages with the fewest limitations in fighter support and beach supply.



After disposing of several previous proposals, the planners for OVERLORD prescribed a four-corps assault with ground forces under the command of the 21st Army Group.

# Appendix A

## DIGEST OF OPERATION "OVERLORD"

### *Object.*

1. The object of Operation "Overlord" is to mount and carry out an operation, with forces and equipment established in the United Kingdom, and with target date the 1st May, 1944, to secure a lodgement on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be developed. The lodgement area must contain sufficient port facilities to maintain a force of some twenty-six to thirty divisions, and enable that force to be augmented by follow-up shipments from the United States or elsewhere of additional divisions and supporting units at the rate of three to five divisions per month.

### *Selection of a Lodgement Area.*

2. In order to provide sufficient port facilities to maintain these large forces, it will be necessary to select a lodgement area which includes a group of major ports. We must plan on the assumption that ports, on capture, will be seriously damaged and probably blocked. It will take some time to restore normal facilities. We shall thus be forced to rely on maintenance over beaches for an extended period.

3. A study of the beaches on the Belgian and Channel coasts shows that the beaches with the highest capacity for passing vehicles and stores inland are those

in the Pas de Calais,\* and the Caen †—Cotentin ‡ area. Of these, the Caen beaches are the most favourable, as they are, unlike the others, sheltered from the prevailing winds. Naval and air considerations point to the area between the Pas de Calais and the Cotentin as the most suitable for the initial landing, air factors of optimum air support and rapid provision of airfields indicating the Pas de Calais as the best choice, with Caen as an acceptable alternative.

4. Thus, taking beach capacity and air and naval considerations together, it appears that either the Pas de Calais area or the Caen-Cotentin area is the most suitable for the initial main landing.

5. As the area for the initial landing, the Pas de Calais has many obvious advantages such that good air support and quick turn round for our shipping can be achieved. On the other hand, it is a focal point of the enemy fighters disposed for defence, and maximum enemy air activity can be brought to bear over this area with the minimum movement of his air forces. Moreover, the Pas de Calais is the most strongly defended area on the whole French coast. The defences would require very heavy and sustained bombardment from sea and air: penetration would be slow, and the result of the bombardment

\* "Pas de Calais area" has been assumed as the area between Gravelines and the River Somme.

† "Caen area" is taken as that between the River Orne and the base of the Cotentin Peninsula.

‡ The "Cotentin" Peninsula is the peninsula in which Cherbourg is situated.

of beach exits would severely limit the rate of build-up. Further, this area does not offer good opportunities for expansion. It would be necessary to develop the bridgehead to include either the Belgian ports as far as Antwerp or the Channel ports Westwards to include Havre and Rouen. But both an advance to Antwerp across the numerous water obstacles, and a long flank march of some 120 miles to the Seine ports must be considered unsound operations of war unless the German forces are in a state not far short of final collapse.

6. In the Caen-Cotentin area it would be possible to make our initial landing either partly on the Cotentin Peninsula and partly on the Caen beaches, wholly in the Cotentin or wholly on the Caen beaches. An attack with part of our forces in the Cotentin and part on the Caen beaches, is, however, considered to be unsound. It would entail dividing our limited forces by the low-lying marshy ground and intricate river system at the neck of the Cotentin Peninsula; thus exposing them to defeat in detail.

7. An attack against the Cotentin Peninsula, on the other hand, has a reasonable chance of success, and would ensure the early capture of the port of Cherbourg. Unfortunately, very few airfields exist in the Cotentin, and that area is not suitable for rapid airfield development. Furthermore, the narrow neck of the Peninsula would give the Germans an easy task in preventing us from breaking out and expanding our initial bridgehead. Moreover, during the period of our consolidation in the Cotentin the Germans would have time to reinforce their coastal troops in the Caen area, rendering

a subsequent amphibious assault in that area much more difficult.

8. There remains the attack on the Caen beaches. The Caen sector is weakly held; the defences are relatively light and the beaches are of high capacity and sheltered from the prevailing winds. Inland the terrain is suitable for airfield development and for the consolidation of the initial bridgehead; and much of it is unfavourable for counter-attacks by panzer divisions. Maximum enemy air opposition can only be brought to bear at the expense of the enemy air defence screen covering the approaches to Germany; and the limited number of enemy airfields within range of the Caen area facilitates local neutralisation of the German fighter force. The sector suffers from the disadvantage that considerable effort will be required to provide adequate air support to our assault forces and some time must elapse before the capture of a major port.

After a landing in the Caen sector it would be necessary to seize either the Seine group of ports or the Brittany group of ports. To seize the Seine ports would entail forcing a crossing of the Seine, which is likely to require greater forces than we can build up through the Caen beaches and the port of Cherbourg. It should, however, be possible to seize the Brittany ports between Cherbourg and Nantes and on them build up sufficient forces for our final advance Eastwards.

Provided that the necessary air situation can first be achieved, the chances of a successful attack and of rapid subsequent development are so much greater in this sector than in any other that it is considered that the advantages far outweigh the disadvantages.

*The Lodgement Area Selected.*

9. In the light of these factors, it is considered that our initial landing on the Continent should be effected in the Caen area, with a view to the eventual seizure of a lodgement area comprising the Cherbourg-Brittany group of ports (from Cherbourg to Nantes).

*Opening Phase up to the Capture of Cherbourg.*

10. The opening phase in the seizing of this lodgement area would be the effecting of a landing in the Caen sector with a view to the early capture and development of airfield sites in the Caen area, and of the port of Cherbourg.

11. The main limiting factors affecting such an operation are the possibility of attaining the necessary air situation; the number of offensive divisions which the enemy can make available for counter attack in the Caen area; the availability of landing ships and craft and of transport aircraft; and the capacity of the beaches and ports in the sector.

12. Although the strength of the G.A.F. available in 1944 on the Western front cannot be forecast at this stage, we can confidently expect that we shall have a vast numerical superiority in bomber forces. The first-line strength of the German fighter force is, however, showing a steady increase and although it is unlikely to equal the size of the force at our disposal, there is no doubt that our fighters will have a very large commitment entailing dispersal and operations at maximum intensity. Our fighters will also be operating under serious tactical disadvantages in the early stages, which will

largely offset their numerical superiority. Before the assault takes place, therefore, it will be necessary to reduce the effectiveness of the G.A.F., particularly that part which can be brought to bear against the Caen area.

13. The necessary air situation to ensure a reasonable chance of success will therefore require that the maximum number of German fighter forces are contained in the Low Countries and North-West Germany, that the effectiveness of the fighter defence in the Caen area is reduced and that air reinforcements are prevented from arriving in the early stages from the Mediterranean. Above all, it will be necessary to reduce the overall strength of the German fighter force between now and the date of the operation by destruction of the sources of supply, by the infliction of casualties by bringing on air battles, and, immediately prior to the assault, by the disorganization of G.A.F. installations and control system in the Caen area.

14. As it is impossible to forecast with any accuracy the number and location of German formations in reserve in 1944, while, on the other hand, the forces available to us have been laid down, an attempt has been made in this paper to determine the wisest employment of our own forces and then to determine the maximum number of German formations which they can reasonably overcome. Apart from the air situation, which is an over-riding factor, the practicability of this plan will depend principally on the number, effectiveness, and availability of German divisions present in France and the Low Countries in relation to our own capabilities. This consideration is discussed below (paragraph 35).

15. A maximum of thirty and a minimum of twenty-six equivalent divisions are likely to be available in the United Kingdom for cross-Channel operations on the 1st May 1944. Further build-up can be at the rate of three to five divisions per month.

16. Landing ships and craft have been provided to lift the equivalent of three assault divisions and two follow-up divisions, without "overheads," and it has been assumed that the equivalent of an additional two divisions can be afloat in ships.

17. Airborne forces amounting to two airborne divisions and some five or six parachute regiments will be available, but, largely owing to shortage of transport aircraft, it is only possible to lift the equivalent of two-thirds of one airborne division simultaneously, on the basis of present forecasts.

18. Even if additional landing ships and craft could be made available, the beaches in the Caen area would preclude the landing of forces greater than the equivalent of the three assault and two follow-up divisions, for which craft have already been provided. Nevertheless, an all-round increase of at least 10 per cent. in landing ships and craft is highly desirable in order to provide a greater margin for contingencies within the framework of the existing plan. Furthermore, sufficient lift for a further assault division could most usefully be employed in an additional landing on other beaches.

19. There is no port of any capacity within the sector although there are a number of small ports of limited value. Maintenance will, therefore, of necessity be largely over the beaches until it is possible to capture and open up the port

of Cherbourg. In view of the possibilities of interruption by bad weather it will be essential to provide early some form of improvised sheltered waters.

20. Assuming optimum weather conditions, it should be possible to build up the force over the beaches to a total by D plus 6 of the equivalent of some eleven divisions and five tank brigades and thereafter to land one division a day until about D plus 24.

#### *Proposed Plan.*

##### *Preliminary Phase.*

21. During the preliminary phase, which must start forthwith, all possible means including air and sea action, propaganda, political and economic pressure, and sabotage, must be integrated into a combined offensive aimed at softening the German resistance. In particular, air action should be directed towards the reduction of the German air forces on the Western front, the progressive destruction of the German economic system and the undermining of German morale.

22. In order to contain the maximum German forces away from the Caen area diversionary operations should be staged against other areas such as the Pas de Calais and the Mediterranean Coast of France.

##### *Preparatory Phase.*

23. During this phase air action will be intensified against the G.A.F., particularly in North-West France, with a view to reducing the effectiveness of the G.A.F. in that area, and will be extended to include attacks against communications more directly associated with move-

ment of German reserves which might affect the Caen area. Three naval assault forces will be assembled with the naval escorts and loaded at ports along the South Coast of England. Two naval assault forces carrying the follow-up forces will also be assembled and loaded, one in the Thames Estuary and one on the West Coast.

#### *The Assault.*

24. After a very short air bombardment of the beach defences three assault divisions will be landed simultaneously on the Caen beaches, followed up on D Day by the equivalent of two tank brigades (United States regiments) and a brigade group (United States regimental combat team). At the same time, airborne forces will be used to seize the town of Caen; and subsidiary operations by commandos and possibly by airborne forces will be undertaken to neutralize certain coast defences and seize certain important river crossings. The object of the assault forces will be to seize the general line Grandcamp-Bayeux-Caen.

#### *Follow-up and Build-up Phase.*

25. Subsequent action will take the form of a strong thrust Southwards and South-Westwards with a view to destroying enemy forces, acquiring sites for airfields, and gaining depth for a turning movement into the Cotentin Peninsula directed on Cherbourg. When sufficient depth has been gained a force will advance into the Cotentin and seize Cherbourg. At the same time a thrust will be made to deepen the bridgehead South-Eastwards in order to cover the construc-

tion and operation of additional airfields in the area South-East of Caen.

26. It is considered that, within fourteen days of the initial assault, Cherbourg should be captured and the bridgehead extended to include the general line Trouville-Alençon-Mont St. Michel. By this date, moreover, it should have been possible to land some eighteen divisions and to have in operation about fourteen airfields from which twenty-eight to thirty-three fighter-type squadrons should be operating.

#### *Further Developments after Capture of Cherbourg.*

27. After the capture of Cherbourg the Supreme Allied Commander will have to decide whether to initiate operations to seize the Seine ports or whether he must content himself with first occupying the Brittany ports. In this decision he will have to be guided largely by the situation of the enemy forces. If the German resistance is sufficiently weak, an immediate advance could be made to seize Havre and Rouen. On the other hand, the more probable situation is that the Germans will have retired with the bulk of their forces to hold Paris and the line of the Seine, where they can best be covered by their air forces from North-East France and where they may possibly be reinforced by formations from Russia. Elsewhere they may move a few divisions from Southern France to hold the crossings of the Loire and will leave the existing defensive divisions in Brittany.

It will therefore most probably be necessary for us to seize the Brittany ports

first, in order to build up sufficient forces with which we can eventually force the passage of the Seine.

28. Under these circumstances, the most suitable plan would appear to be to secure first the left flank and to gain sufficient airfields for subsequent operations. This would be done by extending the bridgehead to the line of the River Eure from Dreux to Rouen and thence along the line of the Seine to the sea, seizing at the same time Chartres, Orleans and Tours.

29. Under cover of these operations a force would be employed in capturing the Brittany ports; the first step being a thrust southwards to seize Nantes and St. Nazaire, followed by subsidiary operations to capture Brest and the various small ports of the Brittany Peninsula.

30. This action would complete the occupation of our initial lodgement area and would secure sufficient major ports for the maintenance of at least thirty divisions. As soon as the organization of the L. of C. in this lodgement area allowed, and sufficient air forces had been established, operations would then be begun to force the line of the Seine, and to capture Paris and the Seine ports. As opportunity offered, subsidiary action would also be taken to clear the Germans from the Biscay ports to facilitate the entry of additional American troops and the feeding of the French population.

#### *Command and Control.*

31. In carrying out Operation "Overlord" administrative control would be greatly simplified if the principle were adopted that the United States forces were

normally on the right of the line and the British and Canadian forces on the left.

#### *Major Conditions Affecting Success of the Operation.*

32. It will be seen that the plan for the initial landing is based on two main principles—concentration of force and tactical surprise. Concentration of the assault forces is considered essential if we are to ensure adequate air support and if our limited assault forces are to avoid defeat in detail. An attempt has been made to obtain tactical surprise by landing in a lightly defended area—presumably lightly defended as, due to its distance from a major port, the Germans consider a landing there unlikely to be successful. This action, of course, presupposes that we can offset the absence of a port in the initial stages by the provision of improvised sheltered waters. It is believed that this can be accomplished.

33. The operation calls for a much higher standard of performance on the part of the naval assault forces than any previous operation. This will depend upon their being formed in sufficient time to permit of adequate training.

34. Above all, it is essential that there should be an over-all reduction in the German fighter force between now and the time of the surface assault. From now onwards every practical method of achieving this end must be employed. This condition, above all others, will dictate the date by which the amphibious assault can be launched.

35. The next condition is that the number of German offensive divisions in

reserve must not exceed a certain figure on the target date if the operation is to have a reasonable chance of success. The German reserves in France and the Low Countries as a whole, excluding divisions holding the coast, G.A.F. divisions and training divisions, should not exceed on the day of the assault twelve full-strength first-quality divisions. In addition, the Germans should not be able to transfer more than fifteen first-quality divisions from Russia during the first two months. Moreover, on the target date the divisions in reserve should be so located that the number of first-quality divisions which the Germans could deploy in the Caen area to support the divisions holding the coast should not exceed three divisions on D Day, five divisions on D plus 2, or nine divisions by D plus 8.

During the preliminary period, therefore, every effort must be made to dissipate and divert German formations, lower their fighting efficiency and disrupt communications.

36. Finally, there is the question of maintenance. Maintenance will have to be carried out over beaches for a period of some three months for a number of

formations, varying from a maximum of eighteen divisions in the first month to twelve divisions in the second month, rapidly diminishing to nil in the third month. Unless adequate measures are taken to provide sheltered waters by artificial means, the operation will be at the mercy of the weather. Moreover, special facilities and equipment will be required to prevent undue damage to craft during this extended period. Immediate action for the provision of the necessary requirements is essential.

37. Given these conditions—a reduced G.A.F., a limitation in the number or effectiveness of German offensive formations in France, and adequate arrangements to provide improvised sheltered waters—it is considered that Operation "Overlord" has a reasonable prospect of success. To ensure these conditions being attained by the 1st May, 1944, action must start now and every possible effort made by all means in our power to soften German resistance and to speed up our own preparations.

*Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,  
30th July, 1943*



**DIRECTIVE TO SUPREME COMMANDER,  
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE**

1. You are hereby designated as Supreme Allied Commander of the forces placed under your orders for operations for liberation of Europe from Germans. Your title will be Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force.

2. *Task.* You will enter the continent of Europe and, in conjunction with the other United Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces. The date for entering the Continent is the month of May, 1944. After adequate channel ports have been secured, exploitation will be directed towards securing an area that will facilitate both ground and air operations against the enemy.

3. Notwithstanding the target date above you will be prepared at any time to take immediate advantage of favorable circumstances, such as withdrawal by the enemy on your front, to effect a reentry into the Continent with such forces as you have available at the time; a general plan for this operation when approved will be furnished for your assistance.

4. *Command.* You are responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and will exercise command generally in accordance with the diagram at Appendix. Direct communication with the United States and British Chiefs of Staff is authorized in the interest of facilitating your operations and for arranging necessary logistic support.

5. *Logistics.* In the United Kingdom the responsibility for logistics organization, concentration, movement and supply of forces to meet the requirements of your plan will rest with British Service Ministries so far as British Forces are concerned. So far as United States Forces are concerned, this responsibility will rest with the United States War and Navy Departments. You will be responsible for the coordination of logistical arrangements on the continent. You will also be responsible for coordinating the requirements of British and United States forces under your command.


6. *Coordination of operations of other Forces and Agencies.* In preparation for your assault on enemy occupied Europe, Sea and Air Forces agencies of sabotage, subversion and propaganda, acting under a variety of authorities are now in action. You may recommend any variation in these activities which may seem to you desirable.


7. *Relationship to United Nations Forces in other areas.* Responsibility will rest with the Combined Chiefs of Staff for supplying information relating to operations of the Forces of the U. S. S. R. for your guidance in timing your operations. It is understood that the Soviet Forces will launch an offensive at about the

same time as OVERLORD with the object of preventing the German forces from transferring from the Eastern to the Western front. The Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean Theater, will conduct operations designed to assist your operation, including the launching of an attack against the south of France at about the same time as OVERLORD. The scope and timing of his operations will be decided by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. You will establish contact with him and submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff your views and recommendations regarding operations from the Mediterranean in support of your attack from the United Kingdom. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will place under your command the forces operating in Southern France as soon as you are in a position to assume such command. You will submit timely recommendations compatible with this regard.


8. *Relationship with Allied Governments—the re-establishment of Civil Governments and Liberated Allied Territories and the administration of enemy territories.* Further instructions will be issued to you on these subjects at a later date.

# COMMAND OF THE ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE





At H-5 hours, the parachute elements of two airborne divisions were to come in on the Cotentin west coast and cut across the peninsula to the drop zones behind Utah Beach.



The overall invasion plan showing the disposition of the Allied divisions and their routes to Normandy

# Appendix E

## CHRONOLOGY OF MAIN PLANNING PAPERS FROM 1 JANUARY 1944

<i>Date</i>	<i>Hq</i>	<i>Paper</i>
31 Jan	FUSA	Planning Directive for OVERLORD
1 Feb	Joint Commanders	NEPTUNE, Initial Joint Plan
4 Feb	Second Army (Br)	Outline Plan
10 Feb	TF 122, FUSA	Joint Agreement for Amphibious Operations
12 Feb	V Corps	Preliminary 'OVERLORD' Plan
25 Feb	FUSA	Operations Plan NEPTUNE
28 Feb	V Corps	Planning Guide, Operation "OVERLORD"
28 Feb	ANCXF	Operation "NEPTUNE"—Naval Plan*
7 Mar	21 A Gp	Directive to FUSAG
10 Mar	SHAEF	Directive to 21 A Gp, AEAf, ANCXF
20 Mar	Second Army, 83 Group (2d TAF)	Joint Plan
26 Mar	V Corps	NEPTUNE Plan
27 Mar	VII Corps	Plan of Operation, NEPTUNE
8 Apr	21 A Gp, ANCXF	NEPTUNE Joint Fire Plan
10 Apr	ANCXF	Operation NEPTUNE—Naval Orders (ON)
15 Apr	AEAf	Operation NEPTUNE—Overall Air Plan
16 Apr	1st Div	Field Order No. 35
21 Apr	WNTF	Operation Plan No. 2-44 (ONWEST 2)†
24 Apr	War Office	Movement Plan
28 Apr	21 A Gp	Amended Directive to FUSAG
1 May	ANCXF	Amendment No. 1 to ON
2 May	Ninth AF	IX Tactical Air Command Plan for Operation NEPTUNE
6 May	82d Abn Div	Field Order No. 6
8 May	FUSAG, 9th AF, WNTF	Joint Operations Plan, U.S. Forces for Operation OVERLORD (Revised)
9 May	VII Corps	Field Order No. 1
12 May	4th Div	Field Order No. 1
15 May	Assault Force U	Operation Order No. 3-44—(ONWEST/U-3)‡
18 May	V Corps	Letter of Instruction, Amending NEPTUNE Plan
18 May	101st Abn Div	Field Order No. 1
20 May	Assault Force O	Operation Order No. BB-44 (ONWEST/O)
27 May	FUSA	Revision No. 2 to Annex 12 (Fire Support)
28 May	82d Abn Div	Revision of Field Order No. 6
28 May	VII Corps	Field Order No. 1 (Corrected Copy)

\* Superseded by Operation NEPTUNE—Naval Orders (ON). All copies ordered destroyed.  
 † Changes of 4, 10, and 22 May and addenda of 29-31 May.  
 ‡ Changes of 30 May and 1 June.

### List of Regiments

#### AMERICAN D-DAY ASSAULT DIVISIONS

##### OMAHA BEACH

1st U.S. Division  
116 Infantry  
16 Infantry  
18 Infantry  
26 Infantry  
115 Infantry  
2nd Rangers  
5th Rangers  
741 Tank Bn.  
111 Field Artillery Bn.  
7 Field Artillery Bn.  
81 Chemical Bn.

##### UTAH BEACH

4th U.S. Division  
8 Infantry  
22 Infantry  
12 Infantry  
359 Infantry (attached from 90th Div.)  
70 Tank Bn.

#### BRITISH D-DAY ASSAULT DIVISIONS

##### SWORD BEACH

3rd British Division  
8th Bde.  
1st Bn. The Suffolk Regt.  
2nd Bn. The East Yorkshire Regt.  
1st Bn. The South Lancashire Regt.  
9th Bde.  
2nd Bn. The Lincolnshire Regt.  
1st Bn. The King's Own Scottish Borderers  
2nd Bn. The Royal Ulster Rifles  
185th Bde.  
2nd Bn. The Royal Warwickshire Regt.  
1st Bn. The Royal Norfolk Regt.  
2nd Bn. The King's Shropshire Light Infantry  
Divisional Troops  
3rd Reconnaissance Regt. R.A.C.  
3rd Divisional Engineers  
3rd Div. Signals  
7th, 33rd and 76th Field, 20th Anti-Tank and  
9and Light Anti-Aircraft Regts. R.A.  
2nd Bn. The Middlesex Regt. (Machine Gun)

##### JUNO BEACH

3rd Canadian Division  
7th Bde.  
The Royal Winnipeg Rifles  
The Regina Rifle Regt.  
1st Bn. The Canadian Scottish Regt.  
8th Bde.  
The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada  
Le Régiment de la Chaudière  
The North Shore (New Brunswick) Regt.  
9th Bde.  
The Highland Light Infantry of Canada  
The Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders  
The North Nova Scotia Highlanders  
Divisional Troops  
7th Reconnaissance Regt. (17th Duke of York's Royal  
Canadian Hussars)  
3rd Canadian Div. Engineers  
3rd Canadian Div. Signals

12th, 13th and 14th Field, 3rd Anti-Tank and  
4th Light Anti-Aircraft Regts. R.C.A.  
The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (Machine Gun)

##### GOLD BEACH

50th British (Northumbrian) Division  
69th Bde.  
5th Bn. The East Yorkshire Regt.  
6th and 7th Bn. The Green Howards  
151st Bde.  
6th, 8th and 9th Bns. The Durham Light Infantry  
231st Bde.  
2nd Bn. The Devonshire Regt.  
1st Bn. The Hampshire Regt.  
1st Bn. The Dorsetshire Regt.  
Divisional Troops  
61st Reconnaissance Regt. R.A.C.  
50th Div. Engineers  
50th Div. Signals  
74th, 90th and 124th Field, 102nd Anti-Tank and  
25th Light Anti-Aircraft Regts. R.A.  
2nd Bn. The Cheshire Regt. (Machine Gun)

#### OTHER FORMATIONS

##### 79th Armoured Division

30th Armoured Bde.  
22nd Dragoons  
1st Lothians and Border Horse  
2nd County of London Yeomanry (Westminster  
Dragoons)  
141st Regt. R.A.C.  
1st Tank Bde.  
11th, 42nd and 49th Bns. R.T.R.  
1st Assault Bde. R.E.  
5th, 6th and 42nd Assault Regts. R.E.  
79th Armoured Div. Signals  
1st Canadian Armoured Personnel Carrier Regt.  
1st Special Service Bde.  
Nos. 3, 4 and 6 Commandos  
No. 45 (Royal Marine) Commando  
4th Special Service Brigade  
Nos. 41, 46, 47 and 48 (Royal Marine) Commandos  
Royal Marine  
Armoured Support Group: 1st and 2nd Royal Marine  
Armoured Support Regts.  
Units of the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers

#### AIRBORNE FORCES

##### 6th Airborne Division

3rd Parachute Bde.  
8th and 9th Bns. The Parachute Regt.  
1st Canadian Parachute Bn.  
5th Parachute Bde.  
7th, 12th and 13th Bns. The Parachute Regt.  
6th Airlanding Brigade  
12th Bn. The Devonshire Regt.  
2nd Bn. The Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light  
Infantry  
1st Bn. The Royal Ulster Rifles  
Divisional Troops  
6th Airborne Armoured Reconnaissance Regt. R.A.C.  
6th Airborne Div. Engineers  
53rd Airlanding Light Regt. R.A.  
6th Airborne Div. Signals

U.S. 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions

## Allied Naval Forces - Operation Neptune

BRITISH		U.S.A.		Minesweepers	
<b>Battleships</b>	SAUMAREZ	REDPOLE	HALCYON	<b>Battleships</b>	AUK
RAMILLIES	SAVAGE	STORK	HARRIER	ARKANSAS	BROADBILL
RODNEY	SCORPION		HOUND	NEVADA	CHICKADEE
WARSPITE	SCOURGE		HUSSAR	TEXAS	NUTHATCH
	SERAPIS	<b>Asdic Trawlers</b>	HYDRA		PHEASANT
<b>Cruisers</b>	BOUX	BOMBARDIER	ILFRACOMBE	<b>Cruisers</b>	STAFF
AJAX	STEVENSTONE	BRESSAY	JASON	AUGUSTA	SWIFT
ARETHUSA	SWIFT	COLL	KELLET	QUINCY	THREAT
ARGONAUT	TALYBONT	DAMSAY	KENORA	TUSCALOOSA	TIDE
BELFAST	TANATSIDE	FLARAY	LARNE		
BELLONA	TARTAR	FLINT	LENNOX	<b>Destroyers</b>	<b>FRENCH</b>
BLACK PRINCE	ULSTER	FOULNESS	LIGHTFOOT	BALDWIN	<b>Cruisers</b>
DANAE	CLYDEES	FUSILLIER	LLANDUDNO	BARTON	GEORGES LEYGUES
DIADEM	UNDAUNTED	GAIRSAY	LOYALTY	BUTLER	MONTCALM
EMERALD	UNDINE	GATESHEAD	LYDD	CARNICK	
ENTERPRISE	URANIA	GRENADIER	LYME REGIS	CHERARDI	<b>Destroyer</b>
PROBISHER	URCHIN	HUGH WALPOLE	MALPEQUE	CORRY	LA COMBATTANTE
GLASGOW	URSA	LANCER	MELITA	DOYLE	
HAWKINS	VENUS	LINDISFARNE	MILLTOWN	ELLYSON	<b>Corvettes</b>
MAURITIUS	VERSATILE	LORD AUSTIN	MINAS	ENDICOTT	ACONIT
ORION	VERULAM	NORTHERN FOAM	ONYX	FITCH	RENONCULE
SCYLLA	VESPER	NORTHERN GEM	ORESTES	FORREST	
SIRIUS	VIDETTE	NORTHERN GIFT	PANGBOURNE	FRANKFORD	<b>Frigates</b>
	VIGILANT	NORTHERN PRIDE	PARRSBORO	GLENNON	LA DECOUVERTE
<b>Monitors</b>	VIMY	NORTHERNREWARD	PELORUS	HAMLETON	L'AVENTURE
EREBUS	VIRAGO	NORTHERN SKY	PERSIAN	HARDING	LA SURPRISE
ROBERTS	VIVACIOUS	NORTHERN SPRAY	PICKLE	HERNDON	L'ESCARAMOUCHE
	VOLUNTEER	NORTHERN SUN	PINCHER	HOBSON	
<b>HQ Ships</b>	WENSLEYDALE	NORTHERN WAVE	PIQUE	JEFFERS	<b>POLISH</b>
BULOLO	WESTCOTT	OLVINA	PLUCKY	LAFFEY	<b>Cruiser</b>
HILARY	WRESTLER	SAPPER	POOLE	MCCOOK	DRAGON
LARGO		SKYE	POSTILLION	MEREDITH	
	<b>Frigates</b>	TEXADA	QUALICUM	MURPHY	<b>Destroyers</b>
<b>Destroyers</b>	CHELMER	VELETA	RATTLESNAKE	NELSON	KRAKOWIAK
ALCONQUIN	HALSTED	VICTRIX	READY	O'BRIEN	SLAZAK
ASHANTI	HOLMES		RECHUTT	PLUNKETT	
BEAGLE	RETALICK	<b>Fleet</b>	RIFLEMAN	BODMAN	<b>NORWEGIAN</b>
BLANKNEY	RIOU	<b>Minesweepers</b>	ROMNEY	SATTERLEE	<b>Destroyers</b>
BLEASDALE	ROWLEY	ARDROSSAN	ROSS	SHURICK	GLAISDALE
BRISSENDEN	STAYNER	BANGOR	RYE	THOMPSON	STORD
CAMPBELL	THORNBOROUGH	BEAUMARIS	SALAMANDER	WALKER	SVENNER
CATTISTOCK	TORRINGTON	BLACKPOOL	SALTASH		
COTSWOLD	TROLLOPE	BLAIRMORE	SEAGULL	<b>HQ Ship</b>	<b>GREEK</b>
COTTEMORE	NITH	BOOTLE	SEAHAM	ANCON	<b>Corvettes</b>
DUFF		BOSTON	SELKIRK	BAYFIELD	KRIEZIS
EGLINTON	<b>Corvettes</b>	BRIDLINGTON	SHIPPICAN		TUMPAZIS
FAULKNER	ALBERNI	BRIDPORT	SIDMOUTH	<b>Frigates</b>	
FURY	ARMERIA	BRITOMART	SPEEDWELL	BORUM	<b>NETHERLANDS</b>
GRENVILLE	AZALEA	CARAQUET	STEADFAST	MALDY	<b>Sloops</b>
KADA	CAMPANULA	CATHERINE	SUTTON		FLORES
HAMBLEDON	CLARKIA	CATO	TADOUSSAC	<b>Patrol Craft</b>	SOEMBA
HOTHAM	CLEMATIS	COCKATRICE	TENBY	484 617 1233	
HURON	CLOVER	COWICHAN	VESTAL	552 618 1252	
IMPULSIVE	GODETIA	DORNOCK	WASAGA	564 619 1261	
ISIS	KITCHENER	DUNBAR	WEDGEPORT	565 1176 1262	
JERVIS	LAVENDER	EASTBOURNE	WHITEHAVEN	567 1225 1263	
KELVIN	MIGNONETTE	ELGIN	WORTHING	568 1232	
KEMPENFELT	MIMICO	FANCY			
MELBRAE	NARCISUS	FORT WILLIAM	<b>ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY AIR FORCE</b>		
MIDDLETON	OKLIP	FORT YORK	<b>Royal Air Force, Second Tactical Air Force</b>		
OBEDIENT	PENNYWORT	FRASERBURGH	<b>Royal Air Force, Air Defence of Great Britain</b>		
OFFA	PETUNIA	FRIENDSHIP	<b>Royal Air Force, Airborne and Transport Forces</b>		
ONSLAUGHT	PINK	GAZELLE	<b>United States Ninth Air Force</b>		
ONFLOW		GEORGIAN			
OPPORTUNE	<b>Sloops</b>	GLEANER	<b>ALLIED STRATEGIC AIR FORCE</b>		
ORIBI	HIND	GORGON	<b>Royal Air Force, Bomber Command</b>		
ORWELL	MAGPIE	GOZO	<b>United States Eighth Air Force</b>		
PYCHLEY		GRECIAN	<b>ROYAL AIR FORCE COASTAL COMMAND</b>		
		GUYSBOROUGH			

Other vessels  
4,126 Landing Ships  
and Craft; 736 Ancillary  
Ships and Craft;  
864 Merchant Ships.

### Calendar Based on D-Day, 1944

D-day .. June 6	D+31 .... July 7	D+61 .... August 6
D+1 ..... 7	32 ..... 8	62 ..... 7
2 ..... 8	33 ..... 9	63 ..... 8
3 ..... 9	34 ..... 10	64 ..... 9
4 ..... 10	35 ..... 11	65 ..... 10
5 ..... 11	36 ..... 12	66 ..... 11
6 ..... 12	37 ..... 13	67 ..... 12
7 ..... 13	38 ..... 14	68 ..... 13
8 ..... 14	39 ..... 15	69 ..... 14
9 ..... 15	40 ..... 16	70 ..... 15
10 ..... 16	41 ..... 17	71 ..... 16
11 ..... 17	42 ..... 18	72 ..... 17
12 ..... 18	43 ..... 19	73 ..... 18
13 ..... 19	44 ..... 20	74 ..... 19
14 ..... 20	45 ..... 21	75 ..... 20
15 ..... 21	46 ..... 22	76 ..... 21
16 ..... 22	47 ..... 23	77 ..... 22
17 ..... 23	48 ..... 24	78 ..... 23
18 ..... 24	49 ..... 25	79 ..... 24
19 ..... 25	50 ..... 26	80 ..... 25
20 ..... 26	51 ..... 27	81 ..... 26
21 ..... 27	52 ..... 28	82 ..... 27
22 ..... 28	53 ..... 29	83 ..... 28
23 ..... 29	54 ..... 30	84 ..... 29
24 ..... 30	55 ..... 31	85 ..... 30
25 ... July 1	56 .. August 1	86 ..... 31
26 ..... 2	57 ..... 2	87 .. September 1
27 ..... 3	58 ..... 3	88 ..... 2
28 ..... 4	59 ..... 4	89 ..... 3
29 ..... 5	60 ..... 5	90 ..... 4
30 ..... 6		

### Glossary of Landing Ships and Craft Used in World War II\*

Abbreviation	Full Name	Characteristics
AKA	American Cargo Ship, Attack	Carried 6 LCVP's and 8 LCM's, 400 men and 200 vehicles. Speed: 14 knots.
APA	American Transport, Personnel	Carried 30 LCVP's, 96 men, 80 vehicles. Speed: 15 knots.
LCA	Landing Craft, Assault	Carried 30 fully-equipped soldiers.
LCA (HR)	Landing Craft, Assault (Hedge-row)	Projected 60-lb. bombs ("hedge-rows"), the blast of which cleared lanes through wire and anti-personnel minefields.
LCC	Landing Craft, Control	Craft used as close-in control point for amphibious operations.
LCH	Landing Craft, Headquarters	Infantry landing craft converted as headquarters. Carried 60 men. Speed: 12½ knots.
LCI (L)	Landing Craft, Infantry (Large)	Carried 200 men and their equipment to beach. Displacement: 175-207 tons. Speed: 12½ knots.
LCI (S)	Landing Craft, Infantry (Small)	Carried 96 fully-equipped men. Speed: 11½ knots.
LCM	Landing Craft, Mechanized	Carried tanks and vehicles from ship to shore. Speed: 5½ knots.
LCP (L)	Landing Craft, Personnel (Large)	Carried 22 men. Displacement: 6 tons. Speed: 10 knots.


\* Sources: ANCXF, Operation Neptune—Naval Orders (Short Title: ON), 14 April, 1944. Part ON 22, amended 1 May and 12 May 1944; United States, Civilian Production Administration, Landing Craft and the War Production Board (Washington, 1944), 2-4.

Abbreviation	Full Name	Characteristics
LCP (S)	Landing Craft, Personnel (Small)	Carried 20 men. Some were modified to carry 6 stretcher cases. Speed: 5½ knots.
LCP (R)	Landing Craft, Personnel (Ramp)	Displacement: 6.4 tons. Had ramp for embarking and disembarking.
LCS	Landing Craft, Support	Displacement: 8 tons.
LCT (3)	Landing Craft, Tank (Mark III)	Carried 55 men and 11 vehicles from ship to beach. Speed: 8 knots.
LCT (4)	Landing Craft, Tank (Mark IV)	Carried 55 men and 11 vehicles. Speed: 6 knots.
LCT (6)	Landing Craft, Tank (Mark VI)	Carried heavy tanks, artillery, and vehicles from ship to beach.
LCV	Landing Craft, Vehicle	Displacement: 8 tons. Carried vehicles.
LCVP	Landing Craft, Vehicle and Personnel	Assault craft with ramp. Carried one vehicle or 30 men. Speed: 8½ knots.
LSD	Landing Ship, Dock	Repair dock for smaller vessels.
LSI (L)	Landing Ship, Infantry (Large)	Converted merchant ship. Carried 18 to 24 assault craft and 1,100 men. Speed: 16 knots. Displacement: 7,300 to 14,000 tons.
LSI (M)	Landing Ship, Infantry (Medium)	Former Dutch and Canadian ships. Carried 8 assault craft and 440 men. Speed: 20 knots. Displacement: 3,100 to 3,700 tons.
LSI (H)	Landing Ship, Infantry (Hand Hoisting)	Former cross-Channel ships. Carried 6 craft and 240 men. Speed: 20 knots. Displacement: 2,400 to 4,200 tons.
LSM	Landing Ship, Medium	Similar in type to LCT, but larger, faster, and ocean-going.
LST (1)	Landing Ship, Tank (Mark I)	Ramped ship. Could beach. Carried 35 tanks, vehicles and 175 men. Speed: 8 knots.
LST (2)	Landing Ship, Tank (Mark II)	Carried 60 tanks and vehicles. Could beach. Had ramp. Speed: 9 knots.

Abbreviation	Full Name	Characteristics
LSV	Landing Ship, Vessel	Sea-going ship. Used for transporting landing craft and other heavy items. Displacement: 4,570 to 4,710 tons.
LVT	Landing Vehicle, Tracked	Armored and unarmored tracked amphibious cargo carriers. Displacement: 11.8 to 18.4 tons.
MT Ship	Mechanized Transport Ship	Transported 40 vehicles and 160 men. Speed: 7½ knots.
SG-B	Small Supply Coaster	Carried 200 tons of supplies. Speed: 6 knots.
Rhino Ferry	.....	A large self-propelled ferry or pontoon barge capable of carrying a full LST load. Used for bridging water gap between LST and the beach. Could carry from 10 to 12 40-ton tanks. Was ramped. Speed: 8½ knots.



# THE NAVAL BOMBARDMENT



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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS  
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE



Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen of the Allied Expeditionary Force!

You are about to embark upon the Great Crusade, toward which we have striven these many months. The eyes of the world are upon you. The hopes and prayers of liberty-loving people everywhere march with you. In company with our brave Allies and brothers-in-arms on other Fronts, you will bring about the destruction of the German war machine, the elimination of Nazi tyranny over the oppressed peoples of Europe, and security for ourselves in a free world.

Your task will not be an easy one. Your enemy is well trained, well equipped and battle-hardened. He will fight savagely.

But this is the year 1944! Much has happened since the Nazi triumphs of 1940-41. The United Nations have inflicted upon the Germans great defeats, in open battle, man-to-man. Our air offensive has seriously reduced their strength in the air and their capacity to wage war on the ground. Our Home Fronts have given us an overwhelming superiority in weapons and munitions of war, and placed at our disposal great reserves of trained fighting men. The tide has turned! The free men of the world are marching together to Victory!


I have full confidence in your courage, devotion to duty and skill in battle. We will accept nothing less than full Victory!


Good Luck! And let us all beseech the blessing of Almighty God upon this great and noble undertaking.

*Dwight D. Eisenhower*



**'OK, Let's Go'** 





Rubber tanks as "bats" near Dover, 1944; Hitler was duped by decoys

## The Dummy D-Day

The invasion of Normandy on June 6, 1944, owed much of its success to the most remarkable practical joke in history.

As the Allies geared up for D-Day, they knew it would be impossible to conceal their invasion plans from the Germans. But they *could* mislead them as to the time and place of the offensive. In the spring of 1944, German surveillance cameras photographed widespread "cover" military operations in southeastern England—bustling army bases half-hidden in the woods, large-scale movements of jeeps and tanks, and an oil refinery under construction at Dover, across the English Channel from Calais, France. The Germans also monitored "secret" radio transmissions concerning new troop concentrations near Dover. It all added up to a single unmistakable conclusion: The Allies would invade Europe through Calais, probably in late July.

But the Nazis were mistaken. The oil refinery was made of old sewage pipes and canvas, built by movie set designers. The combat vehicles were inflatable rubber, the military bases

were dummies, the radio messages were fake—and the real invasion was planned not for Calais in late July, but for Normandy in early June.

Nor did the deception cease once the invasion was under way. While Allied troops were storming the beaches at Normandy, two decoy fleets accompanied by British air squadrons were crossing the Channel toward Calais. The decoy ships carried electronic devices that amplified and returned the pulses of the Germans' radar equipment, and the squadrons overhead released strips of metal foil. Both maneuvers gave the illusion on Nazi radar screens of a massive air and sea attack. Meanwhile, scores of dummy paratroopers—equipped with recordings of gunfire and soldiers' cries—were dropped on the beach south of Calais.

The elaborate ruse lured Hitler into spreading his troops dangerously thin, and the Allies got their foothold in Europe. Even after D-Day, the Führer remained convinced that the *real* invasion was still planned for late July. By the time he got it straight, Germany was on the road to defeat.