

THIS FILE IS MADE AVAILABLE THROUGH THE DECLASSIFICATION EFFORTS AND RESEARCH OF:

THE BLACK VAULT

THE BLACK VAULT IS THE LARGEST ONLINE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT / GOVERNMENT RECORD CLEARING HOUSE IN THE WORLD. THE RESEARCH EFFORTS HERE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THOUSANDS OF DOCUMENTS THROUGHOUT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, AND ALL CAN BE DOWNLOADED BY VISITING:

[HTTP://WWW.BLACKVAULT.COM](http://www.blackvault.com)

YOU ARE ENCOURAGED TO FORWARD THIS DOCUMENT TO YOUR FRIENDS, BUT PLEASE KEEP THIS IDENTIFYING IMAGE AT THE TOP OF THE .PDF SO OTHERS CAN DOWNLOAD MORE!



NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

14675 Lee Road
Chantilly, VA 20151-1715

17 May 2004

John Greenewald, Jr.
The Black Vault Headquarters

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

This is in response to your letter dated 31 March 2004, received in the Information Access and Release Center of the National Reconnaissance Office on 29 April 2004. Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), you requested "a copy of Handling of Capsule-Mission 1005 Crash in Venezuela, August 1964; . . . Committee Meeting with Attachments A, B, C, D - Contingency Plan, August 1964."

Your request was processed in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, and Section 502 of the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2003. Ten documents totaling 48 pages were located. These records are being released to you in part. Material redacted is denied pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(1) as properly classified information under Executive Order 12958, Section 1.4(c); and exemption (b)(3) which applies to information specifically exempt by statute, the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 403-3(c)(7) which protects intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.

The FOIA authorizes federal agencies to assess fees for record services. Based upon the information provided, you were placed in the "other" category of requesters, which means that a requester is responsible for charges incurred for duplication in excess of the first 100 pages of document reproduction costs in the processing of this request. You also expressed a willingness to pay all costs. In this case, no fees were incurred.

You have the right to appeal this determination by addressing your appeal to the NRO Appeal Authority, 14675 Lee Road, Chantilly, VA 20151-1715, within 60 days of the above date. Should you decide to do this, please explain the basis of your appeal.

If you have any questions, please call me, Acting Chief, Information Access and Release Center on (703) 227-9128 and reference case number F04-0075.

Sincerely,



Linda S. Hathaway

Enclosure:

1. Mission 1005, Aug 64
2. Instructions, Aug 64
3. Venezuela Incident, Sep 64
4. PFIAB Briefing, 2 Oct 64
5. U.S. Interest in Obtaining Geodetic Map, Jan 60
6. Discoverer Program, Aug 61
7. Discoverer Contingency Plan, Feb 61
8. SAMOS Contingency Plan, Mar 62
9. Satellite Reconnaissance Contingency Plan, Jun 62
10. Committee Mtg w/attachments A, B, C, D, Aug 64



CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ROUTING

ORIG: [REDACTED]
UNIT: OSA/Security
EXT: 4397
DATE: 14 August 1964

TO: CARACAS

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO:

DEFERRED	X	PRIORITY
ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

[REDACTED]

TO: PRIORITY [REDACTED] INFO [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CORONA SECUR

1. THE U S EMBASSY CARA [REDACTED] THROUGH STATE DEPT CHANNELS THAT WHEN THEY ARE [REDACTED] AFTER RELEASE IN THE [REDACTED] GIVE THE FOLLOWING PRESS RELEASE: "AFTER EXAMINATION, IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE PORTIONS OF THE SPACE VEHICLE WHICH IMPACTED IN VENEZUELA LA FRIA IN MAY WERE A PART OF REGISTERED SATELLITE #22-A WHICH WAS LAUNCHED FROM VANDENBURG AFB 27 APR 64 TO ASSIST IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SPACECRAFT TECHNIQUES AND TECHNOLOGY."

2. FOR THE VENEZUELAN MINISTER OF DEFENSE THROUGH THE U S ATTACHE IN CARA - "THE EQUIPMENT WHICH IMPACTED NEAR LA FRIA, VENEZUELA, THAT WERE RETURNED TO THE U S GOVT BY VENEZUELAN AUTHORITIES HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED AS BEING PORTIONS OF A SPACE VEHICLE LAUNCHED FROM VANDENBURG AFB, CAL., FOR THE PURPOSE OF ASSISTING IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SPACECRAFT TECHNIQUES AND TECHNOLOGY. THIS SPACE VEHICLE WAS ESTIMATED TO HAVE RE-ENTERED THE ATMOSPHERE THROUGH NORMAL DECAY 26 MAY 64 IN THE GENERAL CARIBBEAN AREA. EXAMINATION

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~

RELEASING OFFICER

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No. [REDACTED]

Declassified and Released by the NRC
In Accordance with E. O. 12958
on 10/26/1997

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

ROUTING			
1	9		
2	10		
3	11		
4	12		
5	13		
6	14		
7	15		
8	16		
PRIORITY	DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIAL
	ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIAL

TO :
FROM:
CONF:
INFO :

PAGE TWO

TO

INFO

CITE

OF THE EQUIPMENT BY U S TECHNICIANS WILL PROVIDE EXTREMELY VALUABLE CORROBORATING DATA RE THE PERFORMANCE OF SPACECRAFT.

COOPERATION RENDERED BY THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT, THE VENEZUELAN ARMY, POLICE OFFICIALS, AND THE GOOD CITIZENS OF VENEZUELA, WITHOUT WHICH THIS VALUABLE DATA WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AVAILABLE, IS GREATLY APPRECIATED."

END OF MESSAGE

SAL/OSA

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AD/OSA

RELEASING OFFICER

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

7 Aug 64 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG: [REDACTED]
UNIT: SS/OBA
EXT: 6433
DATE: 7 Aug 1964

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING			
[REDACTED]			
	DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

TO : CARACAS
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF:
INFO:

[REDACTED]

TO IMMEDIATE [REDACTED] INFO [REDACTED] CITE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] COBONA SECUR
EYES ONLY [REDACTED]

REQUEST YOU DETERMINE WHETHER U.S. EMBASSY HAS MADE ANY STATEMENT RE DOWNED VEHICLE. IF SO, PLS GIVE EXACT WORDING RELEASE SO AIR FORCE INFORMATION OFFICER MAY INTELLIGENTLY RESPOND QUERIES WASHINGTON.

FYI - THERE WERE NO CAMERAS IN CAPSULE AS HAS BEEN REPORTED WASHINGTON PRESS.

END OF MESSAGE

Declassified and Released by the N R C
In Accordance with E. O. 12958
on NOV 26 1997

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

[REDACTED] AC/SS/OBA AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No. [REDACTED]

ORIG: [REDACTED] 2
UNIT: SAL/OSA
EXT: 7280
DATE: 15 SEPTEMBER 1964

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

TO : CARACAS
FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: Declassified and Released by the NRC

INFO: In Accordance with E. O. 12958

on NOV 26 1964 [REDACTED]

DEFERRED	X	PRIORITY
ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TO PRIORITY [REDACTED] INFO [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] /CORONA/SECUR

REF. A: [REDACTED]
REF. B: [REDACTED]

CITE [REDACTED]
Corona / Incident
Venezuela 78A

1. WITH REGARD REF B, COPIES OF REQUESTED PRINTS ARE BEING FORWARDED FOR TRANSMITTAL TO AIR ATTACHE AND SUBSEQUENT DELIVERY TO VEN MIN DEF.

2. WITHIN PAST WEEK USAF INFORMATION OFFICE HAS RELEASED TO PRESS STATEMENT CONTAINED IN PARA. 1 OF REF A. NO APPARENT NEWS MEDIA REACTION HAS YET BEEN OBSERVED. HOWEVER, IT ANTICIPATED THAT UPON DELIVERY OF REQUESTED PRINTS TO VEN MIN DEF, FURTHER REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION MAY BE FORTHCOMING. STATE DEPT. BY SEPARATE CABLE IS AUTHORIZING AMERICAN EMBASSY TO RELEASE TO VEN PRESS SAME STATEMENT CONTAINED IN PARA 1 OF REF. A, BUT

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

RELEASING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No. [REDACTED]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

ROUTING			
1	9		
2	10		
3	11		
4	12		
5	13		
6	14		
7	15		
8	16		
PRIORITY	DEFERRED	PRIORITY	MR
	ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	UL

TO :
FROM :
CONF :
INFO :

PAGE TWO

TO INFO CITE

ONLY UPON QUERY. STATEMENT CONTAINED IN PARA. 2 OF REF. MAY BE GIVEN TO VEN MIN DEF. BY ATTACHE. TO PRECLUDE ANY MISUNDERSTANDING AND FOR EASE OF REFERENCE THE SUBJECT STATEMENT IS QUOTED AS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE: THE EQUIPMENT WHICH IMPACTED NEAR LA FRIA, VENEZUELA, THAT WERE RETURNED TO THE U S GOVT BY VENEZUELAN AUTHORITIES HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED AS BEING PORTIONS OF A SPACE VEHICLE LAUNCHED FROM VANDENBURG AFB, CAL., FOR THE PURPOSE OF ASSISTING IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SPACECRAFT TECHNIQUES AND TECHNOLOGY. THIS SPACE VEHICLE WAS ESTIMATED TO HAVE RE-ENTERED THE ATMOSPHERE THROUGH NORMAL DECAY 26 MAY 64 IN THE GENERAL CARIBBEAN AREA. EXAMINATION OF THE EQUIPMENT BY U S TECHNICIANS WILL PROVIDE EXTREMELY VALUABLE CORROBORATING DATA RE THE PERFORMANCE OF SPACECRAFT. COOPERATION

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

RELEASING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy 1 to

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

ROUTING		
1	9	
2	10	
3	11	
4	12	
5	13	
6	14	
7	15	
8	16	
APPROPRIATE AGENCY	DEFERRED	PRIORITY
	ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TO :
FROM :
CONF :
INFO :

PAGE THREE

TO

INFO

CITE

RENDERED BY THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT, THE VENEZUELAN ARMY, POLICE OFFICIALS, AND THE GOOD CITIZENS OF VENEZUELA, WITHOUT WHICH THIS VALUABLE DATA WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AVAILABLE, IS GREATLY APPRECIATED. END QUOTE.

3. THE U.S. EMBASSY WILL BE REQUESTED TO PLAY THIS TRANSACTION IN LOW KEY AND, WITHIN ITS DISCRETION, TO DISCOURAGE ANY INCLINATION TO GENERATE MAJOR NEWS TREATMENT OF SUBJECT.

END OF MESSAGE



(By phone)



SAL/OSA

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

(S)D/NRO BRIEFING OF PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD - 2 OCT 64

Summary of Events, CORONA/J Mission
1005 Ballistic Impact in Venezuela

On 1 August 1964, the Assistant Army Attache, Caracas, was informed by a commercial photographer, San Cristobal, that a space capsule containing equipment with markings "U.S. - Secret" had been found at a point 10 kilometers from La Fria, Venezuela. The local Venezuelan Army Commander commandeered the equipment and forwarded it to the Venezuelan Army (G-2), Caracas. The equipment was turned over to the U.S. Embassy by the Venezuelan Government on 10 August.

A comparison of certain recorded equipment serial numbers with the records of the prime CORONA contractor established definitely that the space object which impacted was identical with the first recovery capsule of CORONA/J mission 1005 which was launched 27 April 1964. This satellite had malfunctioned on-orbit and normal recovery attempts were unsuccessful.

According to computation of the 6594th Test Wing, Sunnyvale, California, the satellite with recovery capsule re-entered through normal decay on 26 May 1964. At that time, the final impact prediction from that source was 79 degrees south, 147 degrees west at 0343Z plus or minus 30 minutes.

At the same time, however, SPADATS, under tasking of the (S) NRO, was checking an improved impact prediction program which, as of 1 July 1964, was established as standard method of operation for all (S) NRO space objects. This program predicted the satellite with impact travelling south to north in the general area of Venezuela. Personnel at Quito, Ecuador; Maracaibo, Venezuela; and Grand Turk were alerted to observe re-entry. Both Quito and Grand Turk reported negative sightings. Maracaibo reported sighting 5 pieces passing overhead and presumably impacting in the Caribbean area.

~~TOP SECRET~~/CORONA

COPY [REDACTED] COPIES
PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

Declassified and Released by the NRO

In Accordance with E. O. 12858

on NOV 26 1997

LIST OF MISSING ITEMS

1. Forebody:
 - a. 65% of the ablative material
 - b. 1 forward capsule guide
 - c. upper sections of explosive bolts.

2. Capsule:
 - a. cable cutters (ballast release)
 - b. radiation samples (undetermined number)
 - c. minalga canister contents (undetermined)
 - d. 2A14 module (arm and transfer signal distribution module)
 - e. 4A5 arm module (TM battery protection module)
 - f. TM transmitter and VCO's
 - g. TM connector plug
 - h. 50% of W2 harness

3. Aft Cover:
 - a. water seal release mechanisms (both)
 - b. water seal dimple motor harnesses (both)
 - c. re-entry valve
 - d. W4 cable (interface between capsule and forebody)
 - e. flashing light (base found on cover)

4. Most of parachute:

5. Thrust Cone: All except W1J1 and W1P1 and 10% of harness

6. Most of gold discs (retained by host natives). One disc returned.

A

STATEMENT FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC
AFFAIRS AND/OR SAFOI:

After examination it has been determined that the portions of a space vehicle which impacted in Venezuela late in May were a part of registered satellite #22-A which was launched from Vandenberg AFB 26 April 1964 to assist in the development of spacecraft techniques and technology.

As D

STATEMENT FOR THE VENEZUELAN MINISTER OF DEFENSE THROUGH
U.S. ATTACHE IN CARACAS.

The equipments which impacted near La Fria, Venezuela, which were returned to the U.S. Government by Venezuelan authorities have been established as being portions of a space vehicle launched from Vandenberg AFB, California, for the purpose of assisting in the development of spacecraft techniques and technology. This space vehicle was estimated to have re-entered the atmosphere through normal decay 26 May 64 in the general Caribbean area. Examination of the equipment by U.S. technicians will provide extremely valuable corroborating data re the performance of spacecraft. (Para) Cooperation rendered by the Venezuelan Government, the Venezuelan Army, Police officials, and the good citizens of Venezuela, without which this valuable data would not have been available, is greatly appreciated.

7-11-64
[Redacted]

N.Y.
Herald
Trib.

IN VENEZUELA, STRANGE THING FROM THE SKY

Aug. 7
1964

By Stuart H. Loory
Of The Herald Tribune Staff

Military officials yesterday were awaiting the arrival in Washington of a "strange object"—a 175-pound charred mangled piece of electronics gear—that fell from the sky near the remote Venezuelan village of La Fria last month.

Reports from Caracas quote an American embassy spokesman as identifying the object as an American satellite that fell out of orbit. The spokesman said two U. S. Army officers went to the village and recovered the object. The identification was made from markings on the gear.

In Washington, a spokesman at the Civilian National Aeronautics and Space Administration said he had been told the Army was returning the object to Washington for examination.

The NASA spokesman said the object did not belong to that agency. He noted that NASA tracks every object it has in orbit and that it would have spotted anything that fell out by its absence from radar scopes and radio broadcast patterns.

The only other American agency that orbits spacecraft is the Air Force and at the Pentagon, a spokesman said he knew nothing about the vehicle. "We're checking," he said and added that the check would not be completed last night.

The Air Force, over the past several years, has orbited an undisclosed number of classified satellites. Some of them reportedly have been used to take reconnaissance photographs of the Soviet Union and otherwise conduct intelligence missions.

Yesterday's reports from Caracas said the object contained a film pack that had been exposed, when opened by local residents. It also contained two American quarters and a nickel—coins that might have been inserted by workers building the vehicle or preparing it for space flight.

Unless the vehicle was intended for re-entry, it is highly unlikely that the object is a satellite at all. Satellites normally burn up from friction as they re-enter the atmosphere, and disintegrate or vaporize.

Atch. B

U. S. PRESS TO DATE

REUTERS, 4 Aug

"Caracas, Venezuela, Aug 4 (Reuters)- United States experts and Venezuelan Police today examined a North American space capsule found by villagers near the Colombian Border.

"News of the discovery in the Guarimito area north of the Andean town of Cristobal was brought to Caracas by the pilot of a photo survey airplane.

"He said the villagers saw the object fall some weeks ago. They stripped the capsule of camera apparatus and other equipment.

"One villager used nylon cords to make reins for his horse.

"The capsule measures about one by two yards and bears the date Nov 24, 1963."

UPI

"Caracas Venezuela - - A 'strange object' which fell from the sky near remote Venezuelan village last month has been identified as a U.S. satellite, it was reported today.

"Two U.S. Army officers who went to the Colombian-Border village of La Fria Tuesday identified the 175-pound object as American through contract numbers on a radio set, a U.S. Embassy spokesman said."

AP, 5 Aug

"Caracas, Venezuela, Aug 5 (AP). United States military investigators yesterday headed for a remote mountain village accessible only on foot, where peasants have discovered an American space instrument package.

"Peasants found the apparatus 23 days ago and began using parachute strands for donkey harnesses. Venezuelan authorities got word of the find and notified American officials. The United States Embassy said the device fell in Tachira State, near the Colombian border. It contained cameras, radio transmitters and other scientific instruments marked secret."

ATCH A
ATCH

Following verification of the space object as CORONA associated, a special team was dispatched to Venezuela to assess the local situation and return the equipment. Equipment was returned to the U.S. 12 August and technical evaluation has been conducted.

U.S. press coverage was scant, based upon Reuters, AP, and UPI dispatches from Caracas during the period 4 - 6 August (see Atch A). Venezuelan press coverage during initial period was considerable but not sensational. A New York Herald Tribune Staff article of 7 August 1964 (see Atch B), although referring to the U.S. satellite reconnaissance program, speculated that unless the vehicle was intended for re-entry, it was unlikely that the object was a satellite at all since such objects usually burn up during re-entry.

Initial U.S. Government reaction to press inquiry was that of "looking into the matter". An unclassified statement was prepared for the Venezuelan Minister of Defense (see Atch C), and a DOD press release to be used only in the event of specific inquiry (see Atch D). The latter statement was released on 11 September in response to a query from Knight Publications, however, a monitoring of that syndicate's newspapers has disclosed no news articles concerning the incident. There appears to be no current press interest with respect to this matter.

Technical evaluation verified that the impacted equipment was the first of two scheduled mission 1005 SRV and that there had been a ballistic impact with ablative shield intact.

Evaluation disclosed no information which would shed any further light on the cause of mission failure. Film was not exposed (mission telemetry had indicated failure of camera doors to open). The film was severely damaged by re-entry heat. Evaluation did establish that SRV re-entry was as a result of normal orbit degeneration with separation from instrument fairing caused by re-entry forces. Evaluation disclosed no evidence that equipment to the aft of the SRV was not destroyed as a result of re-entry forces.

A number of non-significant parts are missing (see Atch E); there is reported to have been some pilfering of the equipment by local Venezuelan natives. It has also been noted that a transmitter previously identified from commercial photographs of the equipment which bore the classification "Secret" is missing and is believed to have been retained by the host Government.

5 Atchs

As

~~TOP SECRET~~
Control System

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

INTRODUCTION

There are many academic reasons why the United States may be interested in obtaining a geodetic map of the globe. One of these is the ability of modern weapon systems to hit their target only as accurately as one can direct the missiles from the launching point. From the military point of view this particular use of an over-all grid of known reference points seems to have an overriding urgency with respect to all other possible uses for such a geodetic grid. The targeting problem, however, may be a special case of a world-wide survey and the specialized nature of the launch points as well as the targets may allow a solution without emphasizing the over-all world-wide grid as a necessary means to this end.

With this thought in mind several questions have been listed to indicate a course of action which would lead to a method of obtaining targeting information with somewhat less effort than if the world-wide grid approach were used. This approach is based on the very limited area of the world which is considered to have military targets worthy of ICBM weapon assignment, with the additional factor that such weapons will be launched from an area that is also limited in scope.

Declassified and Released by the N R C

In Accordance with E. O. 12958

on NOV 26 1997

~~SECRET~~

THE PROBLEM

In reducing data from a geodetical satellite, one is confronted with the problem of accurate measurements from known reference points and the extrapolation of these points to new reference points of interest. Two questions arise:

- (1) How well do we know the reference points?
- (2) What methods are available to measure the new points with respect to the references?

The first question has been studied for years by many groups throughout the world. Indications are that we do know reference points to within a tolerance of 500 to 1,000 feet. Some optimistic estimates are much closer than this.

In addition we have information about several hundred points within the Soviet; a significant number of these are recognizable from aerial photography. Assuming that these facts are true, it is our contention that any geodetic data reduction system should be geared this known information to the utmost in an attempt to measure new target points which may be found by future photography.

To design such a system adequately, several points must be clarified.

- (1) How many reference points do we have on a world-wide basis?

Probable answer: We expect to find several thousand points on a world-wide basis which are considered prime reference points.

~~SECRET~~

- (2) How many reference points do we have in the Soviet Union?

Probable answer: It is our understanding that there are undoubtedly over a thousand reference points in the Soviet Union that are well-known.

- (3) What degree of confidence do we have in these points?

Probable answer: Existing confirmation indicates a varying degree of confidence with many points being referred to within 300 feet of a grid which is referent to the eastern world. Other points are indicated as being known to around 5000 feet. The same is true of points in the western world with a 300 foot norm generally showing as a confidence level. It is also expected that two reference datum grids between western and eastern worlds will be the subject of debate. Indications are that these reference grids can be tied together at sea level within 300 to a thousand feet, based on present information.

- (4) How many of these are recognizable from the air?

The probable answer here would depend on looking at existing information, *together with camera scale, resolution etc.*

- (5) What is the distribution of these points with respect to probable target areas in the Soviet Union?

Probable answer: It is expected that these reference *+ extreme eastern* points cluster in the western part of the Soviet Union and that a significant area of unknown points exist between the western and the eastern part of this continent.

- (6) How much (if any) aerial photography do we already have of these reference points?

The answer to this question will be the subject of a study ; it is expected that we should have photographs of at least 10 per cent of the points which are presently referenced.

- (7) What is the best method of using existing knowledge as a means of recognizing these reference points in "new" photography, such as is now being planned?

Probable answer: The question of air recognition is one of the key points in resolving this problem. As will be seen later, this point will be critical in determining the nature of the ground-handling system.

Once these questions have been answered in a quantitative way, the design of the actual ground handling system can begin intelligently.

Several significant points are already clear in terms of ground handling problems. These are mentioned without attempting to resolve them at this point.

- (a) What integrity can we expect from the film itself?

i.e. Will it stretch or change dimension in process, significantly confusing the end use.

The answer to this question will depend on the film used and the method of handling. It may or may not be important depending on the over-all tolerances which one expects to work with. It may be necessary to go to glass plates immediately in order to preserve many changes film-wise. This will affect the design of the ground-handling factors in measuring equipment.

- (b) What degrees of rectification should be attempted and by what method (electronic, optical, computational) to preserve integrity?

Apparently, the experts disagree to some extent on the need for rectification in order to do photogrammetry. There seems to be a feeling that improved tolerances will result if rectification is not used and photogrammetry and computational correction for distortions would be better.

- (c) Should rectification be used only for photographic matching and reserve the original material for photogrammetry after the recognition process?

Probable answer: At the scales involved, rectification may not be necessary in order to optimize recognition. However, some simulation would be needed to clearly resolve this point. The recognition process may be so acute in these high altitudes that photographic matching would have to be applied and this in turn may necessitate rectification and scale change in order to affect this process.

- (d) Is there a possibility that photo matching to aid the recognition process could be accomplished by a modification to the existing twin viewer in Subsystem I.

Probable answer: The present Subsystem I viewer is particularly applicable for superimposing two photographs for optical matching where the human is used as the detector. The economics of doing this would have to be studied. It is expected that such an application may save considerable dollars in development.

- (e) Should this be accomplished by using center formats from originals or not?

Probable answer: Central formats may be useful in the recognition process and in using available some (~~center~~^{central}) filing systems. It is felt that the ~~center~~^{central} format may be a way of tying together existing photographs from many other sources and such new photographs as we could collect in a frame of reference that was compatible. Such compatibility would allow the use of considerable existing equipment. This does not imply that this would be adequate for the ~~photographic~~^{metric} process.

- (f) In measuring the distance between points, should the photography be exploited on the Nistri type of instrument "presently available" coupled to a standard computer and plotter? If not, what are the objections to this?

Probable answer: It is expected that the bridging process between known and unknown points will allow present state of the art photogrammetry to be used to measure new points. It is expected that presently available computers also can be used after being properly programmed to take advantage of statistical methods of data smoothing and that these can be efficiently coupled to prime instrumentation as mentioned above.

- (g.) Will the volume and time involved require a separate set of instruments and computers or can existing equipment be used?

Probable answer: It is expected that presently available instruments and computers will have to be expanded in their capacities in order to handle the volume of data which will be gathered from other sources than the one being discussed here. It is also expected that the "^{peak}power loads" imposed by such systems will be accompanied by significant periods of light loads on these computers. There is little doubt that the nature of the program being discussed, the volume of photographs that will be collected and the time needed for data reduction could be sandwiched into presently conceived systems which are being considered for complimentary programs. ~~There~~ ~~are~~ ~~not~~ Such systems do not exist (to the writer's knowledge) in the Army Mapping Service and ~~there~~ a new and different system for their use ^{should} ~~would~~ probably be the subject of a discussion outside the scope of this paper.

- (h.) What advantages in tolerances accrue from using the stars as a means of establishing the NADIR point?

The answer to this question is a very difficult one. The accuracy with which one can find the nadir of a photograph will depend not only on the ^{NATURE} ~~size~~ of the star photograph which is being proposed but the position in the orbit which the vehicle holds at the time the photograph is taken.

(h. continued)

This predicted position will be the result of the changing velocity of the vehicle as it passes around the earth in its orbit. The orbital mechanics are such this tolerance will have a prime effect on the ability to establish a true nadir point. The answer to this question will probably not be clear until considerable analysis is made of data on a given vehicle with respect to its orbit and it is felt that final photogrammetry will be the result of an iterative process ^{between} ~~which establishes~~ orbital points and ground check points ~~for the two is made perhaps two or three times.~~

- (i.) What instruments and computers (if any) are needed to exploit this possible advantage?

The answer to this question will depend almost entirely on the resolution of the difficult points raised in question h.

- (j.) What tie in is desirable between the photogrammetry process and the orbital data received from the 1104 to improve and refine orbit data?

Probable answer: It is almost certain that a very ^{close} ~~loose~~ tie should exist (between?) ground points established by photogrammetry and the orbital points predicted from the tracking computer and it is expected that the accuracy of both of these systems is interdependent and the present system which is being worked out on the complimentary program to the one being discussed should be expanded and revised in order that this tie between

(j. continued)

systems be made as efficient as possible. It is felt that both the 1104 computer presently planned for tracking and such a computer as is chosen for this function should be programmed concurrently and in a complimentary way so that this tie-in can be made as automatic as possible and not cause tremendous delays or use up tremendous amounts of manpower.

(k.) What effect does the camera have on the over-all ground-handling system?

Probable answer: It is expected that the recognition processes will be ^{severe} ~~severe~~ and that the longest focal length camera consistent with wide-angle coverage will optimize the usefulness of the system. The angles chosen and the direction of flight which would tend to minimize the coverage of unknown territory with respect to known territory would tend to minimize the errors in reducing the data. ^(For instance) ~~That is to say~~, if one could arrange to fly over control points immediately before entering and immediately after leaving an area of unknown points one would be in the best position to do photogrammetry.

The proper choice of control points can make this kind of problem less important.

The above comments on ground-handling would probably apply to any camera that was used but degree of accuracy obtained in the overall system would be affected materially by choosing an optimum camera. There is some question whether the presently planned camera is adequate in the minds of photogrammetrists. In summary, the following points seem pertinent to accurately resolve this problem regarding the camera; that the longest focal length and largest format compatible with vehicle size and shape would give the best results; that the greatest angular ^{coverage along} ~~(configuration)~~ the orbital track would give further enhancement to the tolerance problem; in regard to operational ^{plan} ~~velocity~~, that each pass be made an attempt to minimize the amount of unknown territory coverage; in regard to ground handling, that a minimum of ^{processing} ~~proofing~~, duplication, ⁺rectification be done on the original film before data reduction is attempted; that maximum use be made of existing information and concurrent information gathered by other systems, that existing photogrammetry equipment and existing computers are probably adequate to do the job.

The above comments are made in the context of a special case of target information for a specific mission, as opposed to creating a world-wide grid for a multiple purpose mission. It is not intended that these comments represent a general purpose solution to all problems but that it would be helpful in solving the specific problems with target.

ROUTING 			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
1.	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	
2.	Special Group Officer Office of Chief, CA Staff		
3.	2044 "K" Building		
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
RETURN TO SENDER			
	ACTION	CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION
	COMMENT	FILE	SIGNATURE
REMARKS			
<p>Tom,</p> <p>Attached is the State Department's proposed draft that was submitted to the Special Group last Thursday. [REDACTED] requested my comment on this and we see no objections - concur with the rewrite.</p> <p>As indicated in the Special Group Minutes, Defense is suppose to come in with their comments on the State Department's draft at the next meeting. This will probably come through [REDACTED] shop which is the focal point for 5412 group activities for Mr. Gilpatric.</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p>			
FROM			
NAME AND ADDRESS		PHONE NO.	DATE
Acting Chief, DPD-DD/P		4207	1 Aug 61

FORM 1582 1-59

(40)

Declassified and Released by the NRC
 In Accordance with E. O. 12958
 on NOV 26 1997

~~SECRET~~

Bull Chavys

When the Discoverer program was originally announced in November 1958 it was stated that much of the data expected to be obtained from it, such as the results of biomedical flights, would be of general scientific interest, would be unclassified, and the results released to the world. This has been done. Results which would be highly significant for the development of later systems and techniques for space navigation and other objectives involving national security have naturally been classified and not given public release.

We long ago announced our intention to develop photographic potentialities from satellites and many of the results have been released to the world. A part of the research and development of this nature is also vital to the design and operation of future satellite systems and naturally has been classified and not given public release. The Discoverer satellite, whose recoverable capsule reentered the atmosphere and apparently was retrieved by the authorities of _____, contained such photographic equipment, including a system for taking pictures of the earth's surface and its cloud cover. This contributed to a variety of scientific purposes, including the study of weather and the improvement of maps.

In this connection, the Soviet Union some time ago developed a capability for satellite photography and demonstrated this by taking pictures of the back side of the moon. The Soviet Union has not disclosed which of its other satellites orbiting over other countries contained photographic apparatus nor has the Soviet Union released the results of any such photography.

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

14 000703970

Copy [REDACTED]

21 February 1961

DISCOVERER CONTINGENCY PLAN

Press Release Action

DISCOVERER IX is presently out of command reach of existing ground stations giving rise to two possible situations:

- (1) Re-entry will not occur; or
- (2) Capsule may be prematurely released in other than prescribed recovery areas.

In order to properly control the release of official statements having to do with the latter possibility, the following has been established as the official channels for handling press releases under various conditions and situations.

AFBMD. Until there is enough evidence to assume that re-entry did occur at some point, AFBMD will continue to comply with the DISCOVERER press plan and issue any and all releases having to do with DISCOVERER IX. When there is sufficient evidence to indicate that successful recovery cannot be accomplished, BMD will announce to the press that DISCOVERER IX has experienced a mechanical failure and that no recovery effort will be attempted. Standby forces will continue in place to handle unforeseen situations resulting in possible retrieval.

Headquarters USAF. If it is assumed through evidence that re-entry did occur and a world-wide search is initiated, press release action will at that time be shifted from BMD to Headquarters USAF. In this situation

~~TOP SECRET~~

Declassified and Released by the NRC

In Accordance with E. O. 12958

on NOV 26 1997

BMD will continue to be used as necessary to make releases directed by higher headquarters.

Department of State. In the event the situation involves a foreign power, press release action will be shifted from Headquarters USAF to the Department of State and at this point world-wide search will be terminated and Headquarters USAF will decline further comment. A plan will be furnished to the Department of State to assist them in their response to the given situation at the time, depending upon whether the reaction is in response to hostile action or friendly action.

It has been determined that ^{*}at no time will press releases mention contents of the DISCOVERER XI capsule, unless foreign reaction reveals the true contents. In this event it may be stated that DISCOVERER XI contained ^{certain devices} ~~a small camera~~ designed to check solar effects upon spooled film, ^{film transport and} ~~and related camera~~ mechanisms. Research and development tests of this nature are vital to the design and operation of future satellite systems. In no instance will a test objective for such cameras be stated, such as mapping, geodesy, military reconnaissance, etc.

The above information is being furnished to responsible officials within the Department of the Air Force, Department of Defense, Department of State and Central Intelligence Agency.

[redacted]
Chief, Cover Sect.
DFD

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

9 MAR 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. GILPATRIC

SUBJECT: SAMOS Contingency Plan

Although we take all possible precautions, it is technically possible that a malfunction on orbit may cause re-entry of a SAMOS capsule to occur in such a way that the full reconnaissance capability of the particular vehicle could be exposed to a hostile or foreign power. I believe it would be wise to have a contingency plan agreed to which would insure clear assignment of responsibilities should such an event occur. I am therefore enclosing a proposed draft SAMOS Contingency Plan, which I suggest be distributed to the appropriate people and discussed at the next meeting of the Special Group.

Joseph V. Charyk
Under Secretary of the Air Force

1 Atch
draft

Declassified and Released by the NRC

In Accordance with E. O. 12958

on NOV 26 1997

~~SECRET~~



DRAFT
13 Feb 62

SAMOS CONTINGENCY PLAN

SITUATION:

Although all possible precautions are taken, it is possible that a malfunction on orbit may cause re-entry of a SAMOS capsule to occur at other than the prescribed time and place, exposing the full reconnaissance capability of the particular vehicle to a hostile or foreign power. In addition to the possibility of the capsule re-entering via parachute, there is also the possibility of the capsule re-entering with a ballistic impact in the event the particular malfunction(s) allow re-entry to occur with the heat shield retained and the parachute inoperative. In this case, although the capsule would be crushed at impact, tests have shown that the film would not be damaged beyond usefulness, and would thus also expose the full reconnaissance capability of that particular vehicle system.

CONTROL OF PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS:

The Director of [REDACTED] Whenever the possibility exists that any type of capsule re-entry is likely to occur at other than the prescribed time and place, the Director of [REDACTED] will immediately notify the Under Secretary of the Air Force and keep

~~SECRET~~

him continuously informed of the situation until such re-entry is certain, or the danger is past. The Director of [REDACTED] will arrange for standby recovery forces to remain in place or in readiness to handle unforeseen situations leading to a possible subsequent retrieval in those cases where the capsule re-enters over ocean areas. If it can be determined through evidence that re-entry would occur outside the prescribed area but over the ocean area, search will be initiated by the Director of [REDACTED] through available air-sea rescue facilities.

Headquarters U. S. Air Force. No Air Force or Department of Defense press announcement will be made except by specific authorization of the Under Secretary of the Air Force (Dr. Charyk). If statements are to be released, they may be released by the Air Force Space Systems Division, but only at the direction of the Under Secretary of the Air Force.

Department of State. When it is determined or suspected by the Under Secretary of the Air Force (Dr. Charyk), after clearing with the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense, that a foreign power is involved, the responsibility for all action and public announcements will transfer to the Department of State. No comment will be made by the Department of Defense or Hq USA F unless released by the Department of State (Mr. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, or his alternate, Mr. Roger Hilsman). Should it prove that the capsule has been retrieved by a possible foreign power (Soviet or Soviet Bloc

country) and their reaction is hostile in regard to the reconnaissance contents, the attached statement should be made to the press in response to a query, by the person designated by the Department of State.

There will be no further comment other than what may be necessary by the Department of State to effect return of the capsule and contents to the United States Government.

1 Atch
statement for press

General's OK.
For Cor. + ...
...

We long ago announced our intention to develop the SAMOS reconnaissance project to exploit photographic potentialities of satellites. The details of the research and development efforts of this nature have naturally been classified and not given public release, however our general intent was publicly known even before the earliest successful earth satellite vehicles were flown. A recoverable capsule of this project re-entered the atmosphere and apparently was retrieved by the authorities of _____, containing photographic reconnaissance equipment.

Our satellite reconnaissance program is entirely peaceful in intent and poses no threat to any nation. Its objective is to help maintain World peace by reducing the possibility of surprise attack from closed societies.

~~TOP~~



Return to
DOR

COPY

15 June 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. GILPATRIC

SUBJECT: Satellite Reconnaissance Contingency Plan

I refer to my memorandum to you dated 9 March 1962, Subject: SAMOS Contingency Plan. As you know, it is technically possible that a malfunction on orbit could cause re-entry of a reconnaissance satellite capsule at such a time and place that the full capability of the system would be exposed to either friendly or hostile foreign powers. A proposed SAMOS Contingency Plan, to be utilized in such an event, was forwarded with the above-referenced memorandum. A like contingency plan for CORONA-ARGON (Discoverer) has been in effect since 19 July 1961.

With publication and implementation of DOD Directive 5200.13, it no longer appears necessary or desirable to have separate contingency plans for these two systems. In fact, since the DOD Directive prohibits public identification of military satellite launches, the problem and potential embarrassment inherent in maintaining the unclassified and open Discoverer program cover for CORONA and ARGON have been eliminated; also, there is no necessity to publicly differentiate between projects.

Accordingly, it seems advantageous to have a single contingency plan applicable to all satellite reconnaissance vehicles. A draft of such a plan is inclosed, which I suggest be distributed to the appropriate people and discussed at the next meeting of the Special Group.

/s/

Joseph V. Charyk
Under Secretary of the Air Force

Inclosure
Satellite Reconnaissance
Contingency Plan (S)

~~TOP~~

Copy Series
~~TOP~~

Declassified and Released by the N R C

In Accordance with E. O. 12958

on NOV 26 1997

COPY

DRAFT
15 June 1962

SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE CONTINGENCY PLAN

SITUATION:

Although all possible precautions are taken, it is possible that a malfunction or orbit may cause re-entry of a reconnaissance satellite capsule to occur at other than the prescribed time and place, exposing the full reconnaissance capability of the particular vehicle to a hostile or foreign power. In addition to the possibility of the capsule re-entering via parachute, there is also the possibility of the capsule re-entering with a ballistic impact in the event the particular malfunction(s) allow re-entry to occur with the heat shield retained and the parachute inoperative. In this case, although the capsule would be crushed at impact, tests have shown that the film would not be damaged beyond usefulness, and would thus also expose the full reconnaissance capability of that particular vehicle system.

CONTROL OF PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS:

The [REDACTED] Whenever the possibility exists that any type of capsule re-entry is likely to occur at other than the prescribed time and place, the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] will immediately notify the Under Secretary of the

Air Force and keep him continuously informed of the situation until such re-entry is certain, or the danger is past. The [REDACTED] [REDACTED] will arrange for standby recovery forces to remain in place or in readiness to handle unforeseen situations leading to a possible subsequent retrieval in those cases where the capsule re-enters over ocean areas. If it can be determined through evidence that re-entry would occur outside the prescribed area, but over the ocean area, search will be initiated by the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] through available air-sea rescue facilities.

Headquarters, U. S. Air Force: No Air Force or Department of Defense press announcement will be made except by specified authorization of the Under Secretary of the Air Force (Dr. Charyk). If statements are to be released, they may be released by the Air Force Space Systems Division, but only at the direction of the Under Secretary of the Air Force.

Department of State: When it is determined or suspected by the Under Secretary of the Air Force (Dr. Charyk), after clearing with the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Deputy Director (Research), CIA (Dr. Scoville), that a foreign power is involved, the responsibility for all action and public announcements will transfer to the Department

~~SECRET~~

of State. No comment will be made by the Department of Defense or Hq USAF unless released by the Department of State (Mr. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, or his alternate, Mr. Roger Hilsman). Should it prove that the capsule has been retrieved by a hostile foreign power (Soviet or Soviet Bloc country) and their reaction identifies the contents of the capsule with a reconnaissance effort, the attached statement should be made to the press in response to query, by the person designated by the Department of State.

There will be no further comment other than what may be necessary by the Department of State to effect return of the capsule and contents to the United States Government.

1 Attachment
Statement for Press

~~SECRET~~

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL		
SECRET			
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	[REDACTED]		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			
ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN	
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE	
Remarks:			
<p style="font-size: 1.2em;">Prepare for forwarding to [REDACTED] State [REDACTED]</p> <p>Use approved # out Johnson committee document. Charyk also approved reference to Samos to cover Discover [REDACTED]</p> <p style="text-align: right; font-size: 1.5em;">[Signature]</p>			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET	

FORM NO. 2-61 237 Use previous editions

~~SECRET~~

State Proposed Redraft of Contingency Press Release

A satellite capsule containing photographic equipment has prematurely re-entered the atmosphere and apparently was retrieved by the authorities of _____.

We long ago announced our intention to develop photographic potentialities of satellites as an essential instrument in the exploration and exploitation of space. Our progress in this field is a matter of public record. We hope that in the interest of furthering international space cooperation the capsule will be returned.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

We long ago announced our intention to develop photographic reconnaissance potentialities of satellites. The details of the research and development efforts of this nature have naturally been classified and not given public release, however, our general intent was publicly known even before the earliest successful earth satellite vehicles were flown. A recoverable capsule containing photographic reconnaissance equipment re-entered the atmosphere and apparently was retrieved by the authorities of _____.

Our satellite reconnaissance program is entirely peaceful in intent and poses no threat to any nation. Its objective is to help maintain World peace by reducing the possibility of surprise attack from closed societies.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

CORONA

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY

13 AUG 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR INTERDEPARTMENTAL CONTINGENCY PLANNING
COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Committee Meeting

The (S) Director/National Reconnaissance Office has requested that a meeting of the (TS) National Reconnaissance Program Interdepartmental Contingency Planning Committee be convened in Room 4E886, Pentagon Building, 1100, 14 August 1964. An agenda and background materials are attached.



Brigadier General, USAF
Director
(S) NRO Staff

Declassified and Released by the N R C
in Accordance with E. O. 12958
on NOV 26 1997



11 D

S

CORONA

Handle via Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY
PAGE / OF PAGES



SUMMARY OF EVENTS

On 1 August 1964, the Assistant Army Attache, Caracas, was informed by a commercial photographer, San Cristobal, that a space capsule containing equipments with markings "U.S. - Secret" had been found at a point 10 kilometers from La Fria, Venezuela. The Assistant Army Attache was subsequently advised that the local Venezuelan Army Commander had commandeered the equipment and had been instructed to forward to the Venezuelan Army (G-2), Caracas. The Assistant Army Attache was on the aircraft which brought the equipments to Caracas on 5 August. The equipment was turned over to the U.S. Embassy by the Venezuelan Government on 10 August.

A comparison of certain recorded equipments serial numbers with the records of the prime CORONA contractor established definitely that the space object which impacted was identical with the first recovery capsule of CORONA/J mission 1005 which was launched 27 April 1964. This satellite had malfunctioned on-orbit and normal recovery attempts were unsuccessful.

According to computation of the 6594th Test Wing, Sunnyvale, California, the satellite with recovery capsule re-entered through normal decay on 26 May 1964. At that time, the final impact prediction from that source was 79 degrees south, 147 degrees west at 0343Z plus or minus 30 minutes.

At the same time, however, SPADATS, under tasking of the (S) NRO, was checking an improved impact prediction program which, as of 1 July 1964, was established as standard method of operation for all (S) NRO space objects. This program predicted the satellite with impact travelling south to north in the general area of Venezuela. Personnel at Quito, Ecuador; Maracaibo, Venezuela; and Grand Turk were alerted to observe re-entry. Both Quito and Grand Turk reported negative sightings. Maracaibo reported sighting 5 pieces passing overhead and presumably impacting in the Carribean area.

Since confirmation of the spacecraft's (TS) National Reconnaissance Program origin, the CIA established communications with its representative in Caracas concerning this matter. A special team consisting of one each technical representative from the (S) NRO Staff and CIA, and a CIA Security Officer were

COPY [REDACTED]
PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

Handle via [REDACTED]
Control System

dispatched to Caracas to assess the local situation and return the equipments to the U.S. for further examination. The CIA Security Officer departed Caracas 1500 local hours, 12 August, with the returned equipments, destination - the SETD in Palo Alto, California.

Initial examination by the special team in Caracas disclosed considerable damage due to heat experienced during re-entry and from forceable entry into the space capsule by natives. It has been noted that the transmitter previously identified from commercial photographs of the equipment which had borne the classification "Secret" is missing and is believed to have been retained by the host government. In addition, the following list of items is known to be missing:

- (A) Parachute, in hands of government at La Fria or San Cristobal.
- (B) Flashing light, location unknown.
- (C) Portion of ablator. (Nose piece, aft ring, and misc fragments shipped.)
- (D) Most of fiberglass parts of parachute cover.
- (E) Thrust cone.
- (F) Rocket motor.
- (G) Most of gold discs, retained by host nation ^{VES}. One disc returned.

U.S. press coverage has been scant, based upon Reuters, AP, and UPI dispatches from Caracas during the period 4 - 6 August. Venezuelan press coverage during initial period was considerable but not sensational. There has been no speculation on the part of either the U.S. or Venezuelan press as to the photographic reconnaissance mission. Except for an inquiry by Aviation Week magazine of State Department Science Advisor on 13 August, there is no current press interest indicated.

U.S. Air Attache, Caracas, advised that upon completion of investigation, an unclassified description, with photographs, and purpose of the mission would be required for transmittal to the Venezuelan Minister of Defense.

Appropriate personnel within the Executive Office, CIA, State Department, and DOD, including DOD public affairs personnel, have been apprised of this matter.

Handle via 
Control System

COPY 
PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES



U. S. GOVERNMENT STATEMENTS TO DATE

U.N. Registry Data: "1964 - 22A launch vehicle THOR AGENA, Satellite category A (development of spacecraft techniques and technology; date of launch 27 April 1964, Nodal period 90.8, Inclination 79.97, Apogee 444.5, Perigee 174.6."

Published Goddard Space Flight Center Data: "Object 22 A, catalogue #796, source U.S., launch 27 April, decay 26 May 1964."

U.S. Embassy, Caracas: No formal statement, however, U.S. Embassy spokesman orally confirmed spacecraft of U.S. origin.

SAFOI: In response to Hearst Syndicate 6 August request for confirmation of UPI bulletin: No information but would look into matter.

State Department, Science Advisor's Office: In response to AVIATION WEEK inquiry of 12 August: No information available.

~~SECRET~~

ATCH B

U. S. PRESS TO DATE

REUTERS, 4 Aug

"Caracas, Venezuela, Aug 4 (Reuters)- United States experts and Venezuelan Police today examined a North American space capsule found by villagers near the Colombian Border.

"News of the discovery in the Guarimito area north of the Andean town of Cristobal was brought to Caracas by the pilot of a photo survey airplane.

"He said the villagers saw the object fall some weeks ago. They stripped the capsule of camera apparatus and other equipment.

"One villager used nylon cords to make reins for his horse.

"The capsule measures about one by two yards and bears the date Nov 24, 1963."

UPI

"Caracas Venezuela - - A 'strange object' which fell from the sky near remote Venezuelan village last month has been identified as a U.S. satellite, it was reported today.

"Two U.S. Army officers who went to the Colombian-Border village of La Fria Tuesday identified the 175-pound object as American through contract numbers on a radio set, a U.S. Embassy spokesman said."

AP, 5 Aug

"Caracas, Venezuela, Aug 5 (AP). United States military investigators yesterday headed for a remote mountain village accessible only on foot, where peasants have discovered an American space instrument package.

"Peasants found the apparatus 23 days ago and began using parachute strands for donkey harnesses. Venezuelan authorities got word of the find and notified American officials. The United States Embassy said the device fell in Tachira State, near the Colombian border. It contained cameras, radio transmitters and other scientific instruments marked secret."

ATCH C

~~SECRET~~

PROPOSAL

Under no circumstances will information be volunteered to the press. Releases will be made only upon specific inquiry from the press.

Response to Venezuelan AP and UP news agency upon specific inquiry by U.S. Embassy, Caracas: "Charred portions of a space vehicle which impacted in La Fria, Venezuela, late in May have been identified as being of U.S. origin. Venezuelan authorities have turned over the equipment to the U.S. authorities who are returning them to the U. S. for detailed examination."

State Department: If queried by the press, the State Department should advise equipments have been established as being of U.S./DOD origin and refer to DOD for details.

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs and/or SAFOI:

Proposed press release #1, up until 19 August: "Charred portions of a space vehicle which impacted in Venezuela late in May have been ~~tentatively~~ identified as being of U. S. origin. Venezuelan authorities have turned recovered portions over to U.S. authorities who are returning them to the U.S. for detailed examination."

Proposed press release #2, to be released after 19 August:

"After examination it has been determined that the portions of a space vehicle which impacted in Venezuela late in May were a part of registered satellite #22-A which was launched from Vandenberg AFB 27 April 1964 to assist in the development of spacecraft techniques and technology."

For the Venezuelan Minister of Defense through the U.S. Attache in Caracas, not to be released prior to 19 August:

"The equipments which impacted near La Fria, Venezuela, which were returned to the U.S. Government by Venezuelan authorities have been established as being portions of a space vehicle launched from Vandenberg AFB, California, for the purpose of assisting in the development of spacecraft

~~SECRET~~

"techniques and technology. This space vehicle was estimated to have re-entered the atmosphere through normal decay 26 May 64 in the general Caribbean area. Examination of the equipment by U.S. technicians will provide extremely valuable corroborating data re the performance of spacecraft. (Para) Cooperation rendered by the Venezuelan Government, the Venezuelan Army, Police officials, and the good citizens of Venezuela, without which this valuable data would not have been available, is greatly appreciated." It is further proposed that this statement be accompanied by several unclassified photographs of THOR AGENA launches.

A G E N D A

Meeting of Interdepartmental Contingency
Planning Committee

14 Aug 64 - 11:00

Room 4E886, Pentagon Bldg

ITEM #1 - Consideration of contingency matters concerned with recent impact of portions of CORONA/J Mission 1005 in Venezuela.

- (A) Summary of Events (Attachment A).
- (B) Briefing with respect to situation as observed in Venezuela. (Major Johnson, (S) NRO Staff and [REDACTED] CIA, presently enroute to U.S. from Caracas.)
- (C) U.S. Government statements to date (Attachment B).
- (D) U.S. Press to date (Attachment C).
- (E) Proposal (Attachment D).

ITEM #2 - [REDACTED]

ITEM #3 - [REDACTED]

Handle via [REDACTED]
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

INTERDEPARTMENTAL CONTINGENCY PLANNING
COMMITTEE

Meeting at 1100 hours, 14 August 64

CHAIRMAN

Dr. Brockway McMillan - DOD

MEMBERS

[REDACTED] White House
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] of [REDACTED] - State Dept
[REDACTED] - CIA
[REDACTED] - CIA
[REDACTED] AFISO-S
[REDACTED] - JCS
[REDACTED] - DIA

CONSULTANT

[REDACTED] - USAF

BRIEFING TEAM

Major Albert W. Johnson - [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] - CIA

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~