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COMMANDER DESTROYER DIVISION ONE-NINETY-TWO

C/O FLEET POST OFFICE  
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Ser: 002  
13 July 1964

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
[13 AUGUST 1964]

From: Commander Destroyer Division ONE HUNDRED NINETY-TWO

To: Commander Carrier Division FIVE (CTF 77)

Subj: Chronology of Events; Gulf of Tonkin 4 August 1964

1. Attached chronology and overlays are forwarded herewith for forwarding to Joint Chiefs of Staff.

  
J. J. HERRICK

Copy to:  
CO, USS MADDOX (DD-731)  
CO, USS TURNER JOY (DD-951)

Approved for Release by USN on 07-07-2005 pursuant to E.O. 12958, as amended

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Chronological Sequence of Events USS MADDOX (DD 731)  
and USS TURNER JOY (DD 951) action of 4 August 1964  
in the Gulf of Tonkin.

I

BACKGROUND

On 2 August 1964, USS MADDOX (DD 731), commanded by CDR Herbert L. OGIER, Jr., USN, with Commander Destroyer Division 192 (CTG 72.1), CAPT J. J. HERRICK, USN, embarked, was conducting a surveillance and intelligence patrol (DESOTO) in the Gulf of Tonkin. During the afternoon of that date, MADDOX, while in international waters about 28 miles from North Vietnam, was attacked by three DRV PT boats. MADDOX successfully evaded three observed torpedoes and took the attacking PT's under fire. All three PT's were hit by MADDOX fire. MADDOX suffered no damage.

Following the engagement, COMSEVENTHFLT, by msg 022225Z August 1964, directed CTG 72.1 to take operational control of the USS TURNER JOY (DD 951), commanded by CDR Robert C. BARNHART, Jr., USN, which had joined MADDOX after the engagement. Both ships were directed to resume the DESOTO Patrol along a newly prescribed route which was specified in CINCPACFLT msg 021104Z August 1964.

On the morning of 4 August the patrol proceeded from the East in the direction of Point Delta, an arbitrary DESOTO Patrol point off the coast of North Vietnam (DRV). At 1145G the patrol turned southwest to a course roughly paralleling the DRV coast, and proceeded to the vicinity of Point Charlie, arriving there at 1608G. At no time did the patrol approach closer than sixteen miles from the DRV coast. The patrol turned East (090) at 1608G in order to retire for the night to a prescribed 24 mile square area centered about 100 miles from the DRV coast. It was intended that MADDOX and TURNER JOY would, during the night, maneuver in company within the prescribed area once it was reached.

Because of the 2 August attack, a CAP was being provided by TICONDEROGA (CVA 14) for the 4 August DESOTO patrol. This CAP was present during the evening except for the period 1649 to 2057.

II

CHRONOLOGY

NOTE: The times included herein are the best results obtained from the integration of information and plots from both MADDOX and TURNER JOY with careful reconstruction of the engagement common plot. Prior reported times, if in variance, should be disregarded as less accurate.

1300 - Steaming in the Tonkin Gulf off the coast of North Vietnam as units of Task Group 72.1 on DESOTO Patrol. Ships in company include MADDOX and TURNER JOY. SOPA and OTC is COMDESDIV 192/CTG 72.1 embarked

MADDOX. Ships in column formation, MADDOX is guide in Station one, TURNER JOY is in Station two, 1000 yards astern on base course 090, speed 20 knots proceeding to night steaming area. Very dark night with no moon and thunderstorm activity in area.

- 1941 - MADDOX picked up an intermittent radar contact (skunk - unidentified surface contact) to the northeast at 42 miles. Not held by TURNER JOY's radar.

NOTE: From prior experience of MADDOX and TURNER JOY in the Gulf of Tonkin, junks are seldom encountered more than 30-40 miles from the coast. During the engagement of the night of the 4th, no contacts identified or suspected as junks were detected in the area of engagement. Thus, except for the contacts described in this chronology, the radar-scopes of both MADDOX and TURNER JOY were free from distracting contacts. (A few weather and wake contacts were soon identified as such).

- 1945 - MADDOX detected a contact at 070, 36.4 miles and designated it as skunk "N", with course 170, speed 33 knots. This contact was not held by TURNER JOY. Contact was evaluated as a probable patrol craft due to its high speed. Considered to be a threat in that it was closing rapidly. Maximum boiler power ordered at this time by OTC. Soon after, two other contacts were picked up to the northeast (in the same general area as first contact), at approximately 40 miles, also closing.

NOTE on speed and other characteristics of Tonkin Gulf vessels:

Gulf of Tonkin junks are of two basic sail powered types which generally operate in fleets of twenty to one hundred. Within the fleets the junks operate in pairs when towing a large trawl net between the boats. When engaged in trawling, the net acts much like a large sea anchor and prevents the junks from making more than a few knots through the water. Junks not fishing and under full sail can make about 6 knots. Tonkin Gulf junks are very similar in appearance to the South Vietnam types, VTAC-2 and PTBC-1a as shown in the OSOD Junk Blue Book.

Two types of PT boats are known to belong to the DRV Naval Forces which operate in the Gulf. The P-4 class is a 50 knot (plus) boat which carries two 18" torpedoes and two 12.7 MM twin guns. The P-6 class has a maximum designed speed of 43 knots. It carries two 21" torpedoes, two 25 MM twin guns and is equipped with radar (Skinhead).

There is a third type of vessel, the PGM "Swatow" class boat which has a speed of 25 knots, a Skinhead radar, and guns. It is believed that these slower craft are used to lead the PT's in to their target during night engagements, leaving

the last moments of the run-in up to the individual PT to make their own adjustments for the attack solution. It is further believed that the PT's reposition themselves for subsequent attack by first seeking the fresh wakes of the target vessels, getting their "bearings", and then opening out for another attack.

- 1946 - Changed course to 130 to open threat. CTG 72.1 evaluated the situation as a trap, since these relatively high speed craft appeared to be waiting in the area used on prior occasions, and most recently, the night before, by the MADDOX and TURNER JOY as a night-steaming area.
- 1950 - MADDOX designated a contact at 044, 38 miles as skunk "O", course 243, speed 28 knots. Designated a contact at 060, 36.6 miles, as skunk "P" course 340, speed 40 knots.

NOTE: All three skunks, "N", "O" and "P", were tracked consistently with no chance of confusion between contacts. Courses and speeds were determined. Initial contact was made by a third class Radarman with 3 years experience. Skunk "N" was detected on the bridge radar repeater and plotted independently by the Executive Officer on the bridge at 1945. Long detection ranges were attributed to "ducting" or "trapping" which is a propagation phenomenon consistently experienced since 2 August in the Gulf. Ducting is caused by a temperature inversion in the lower atmosphere, and, when it exists, ranges of surface contacts up to 100 miles are possible. Validity of contacts: positive. None of these contacts were held by TURNER JOY, because its radar was tuned for detection of close contacts in order to obtain ranges on MADDOX while operating at high speeds, darken ship and in close formation.

25X4

- 1955 - Changed course to 140. A MADDOX contact was designated skunk "R" bearing 104, 29 miles, with course 270, speed 10 knots. Evaluated as possible threat. Bearing drifted left and closed slowly. No electronic intercept. Closest point of approach on "R" was 055, 20 miles at 2027. "R" made no change in course to intercept MADDOX and TURNER JOY.
- 2005 - Changed speed to  (maximum boiler power was almost achieved at this time).
- 2007 - MADDOX observed that contacts "N", "O" and "P" merged on the radar at about 32 miles. (This was taken as an indication that they had joined up in close formation. For a short time after "N", "O" and "P" closed up, the MADDOX Operations Officer was able to observe, on the bridge repeater, that the three contacts were close together in a straight line formation).
- 2012 - Changed speed to

- 2020 - Changed course to 160 to further open skunks "N", "O" and "P".
- 2030 - Skunk "N", "O" and "P" (merged), continued on course 240, 30 knots. MADDOX commenced tracking an undesignated skunk at 330, 40 miles, on about the same course and speed as the MADDOX and TURNER JOY. All contacts drifted aft and faded about 2045, due to long range.
- 2111 - Both ships detected and tracked a skunk designated "U", at 090, 13 miles, course 160, speed approximately 30 knots. (Prior reported course of 200 was in error). Both ships fire control radars locked on skunk "U" which was evaluated a probable-PT boat.
- 2116 - MADDOX evaluated "U" as 4 contacts proceeding together in close formation. TURNER JOY evaluated "U" as 3 contacts proceeding together in close formation.
- 2117 - Vectored CAP to investigate skunk "U", with negative results.
- 2134 - "U" closed to 23,200 yards when a new threat was detected by MADDOX closing at high speed (35-40 knots), bearing 093, 9800 yards. MADDOX locked on this new contact, designated "V" and batteries were released. TURNER JOY locked on a 50 knot contact nearer in and slightly to the right of "V", designated as "V-1." At this time MADDOX designated another contact as skunk "P", but soon evaluated it as weather.
- 2139 - TURNER JOY opened fire on "V-1", bearing 090, range 7000 yards.
- 2142 - MADDOX lost contact on "V", bearing-090, 9000 yards and opening, after an apparent quick turn of "V" to the left. At the same time that this maneuver was noticed, MADDOX sonar reported hydrophone effects bearing 051, which was classified torpedo. The turn away by contact "V" was similar to that noticed in the action on 2 August as a maneuver peculiar to boats launching torpedoes. (A comparison of the proximity of MADDOX and TURNER JOY DRT marks, in plotting "V-1" and "V", respectively at time 2139 indicate a possibility that this might have been only one contact which launched at time 2137, turned back, and launched another torpedo at 2142). Initial fall of shot from TURNER JOY was over the contact and a 10 mil down spot was applied by Director 52 radar operator (Mk 35 Radar - Mark 56 Guidance Control System). The spot did not have time to take effect because firing was checked at 2141. The contact "V-1" was tracked by TURNER JOY at high speeds (50 knots) closing on an intercept course. Firing immediately resumed with both Mk 52 and 53 (5"/54) rapid fire gun and hits were observed by the Mk 35 radar operator. "Lock-on" was lost and firing ceased at 2142. While contact was held, target echoes on both surface search and FC radars were strong, though small, and a good steady lock-on was obtained. This contact was evaluated as a definite high speed small craft.
- 2143 - MADDOX changed course to the right with full rudder to avoid the torpedo, transmitting a warning to TURNER JOY. At no time during the

action did TURNER JOY's SQS-23 detect torpedo noises. (This is a general characteristic of this type sonar and, in fact, JOY's sonar has in the past failed to detect torpedo noises when, during exercises, torpedoes were known to have passed close aboard). At about 2144 TURNER JOY received the MADDOX report of a torpedo in the water bearing 040. This bearing was plotted on TURNER JOY DRT and a right course change was immediately recommended by CIC to the bridge to avoid the torpedo in accordance with standard torpedo evasion doctrine which is: If torpedo is fired from abaft beam then ship turns away and stops 30° beyond the reciprocal of the torpedo bearing. TURNER JOY came right and just after steadying on course 210°, a torpedo wake passed up the port side aft to forward, at a distance of about 300 feet. This torpedo wake was seen by four people: the ASW Officer in Director 51, the Director 51 rangefinder operator, the port lookout, and the Director 52 operator. All evaluated it as a definite torpedo. The ASW Officer has seen many torpedo wakes before as had Director 51 rangefinder operator. The port lookout reported this sighting to the bridge and course was changed again to the right.

2143 - MADDOX illuminated the target area to the east with star shells after having lost target "V". TURNER JOY also had no radar contacts at this time.

NOTE: Throughout the ensuing action MADDOX expended 24 star shells. Illumination was attempted by various methods, by firing on point targets, by covering a large area with shots on each quarter, and by firing overhead. Except for one instance of such doubtful validity that it is not mentioned in the chronology, results were negative. On several occasions aircraft requested star shell illumination, which was provided. It is conceivable that the illumination assisted the patrol boats more than it did the destroyers and aircraft since there were strong indications that the boats did not have radar. The same comment applies to aircraft dropped flares and photo-flash. TURNER JOY did not fire star shells because she had none aboard. 5"/54 star shells have been withdrawn from the fleet pending re-design and re-working of stocks. Star shells and flares would be more effective with larger, more slowly moving targets. The arc of visibility for one star shell is only about 3°; the great number of shells needed to illuminate a PT action would probably be better spent directed at the PT's.

2144 - Torpedo noises were reported again from MADDOX sonar, almost immediately after the first evasive action. The first contact sonar reported was evaluated positively as a torpedo. Many subsequent reports by MADDOX sonar reported over the next hour, however, are believed to have been mostly self noise with some being aircraft noise and possibly also patrol boat sounds. (Note: MADDOX sonar personnel were accustomed to ASW exercises conducted at 15-20 knots. They were therefore, relatively unfamiliar with sounds associated with [redacted] steaming on rapidly changing courses). For the remainder of the action, however,

25X4

MADDOX evaded such reported contacts, not feeling it appropriate to question the source of the sounds reported as torpedoes while in action. TURNER JOY continued a wide circle right, changing course at intervals whenever MADDOX reported a torpedo wake. No surface radar contacts were obtained from 2142 to 2201.

- 2201 -- TURNER JOY picked up a 20 knot radar contact at 2000 yards to the West (V-2). Contact appeared to be opening and TURNER JOY's course was changed at 2204 to 010 to bring guns to bear. Contact turned around initially to close, then began opening to the West. At 2210 course was changed to 060 to unmask guns and turn continued until ship steadied on 180. Firing was commenced and terminated shortly thereafter due to lost radar contact.
- 2212 - Contact was regained at about 6000 yards to the West and firing resumed by TURNER JOY on "V-2".
- 2212½ - TURNER JOY ceased firing. It was estimated by radar that three hits had been obtained. TURNER JOY again proceeded on a Southerly course (160°T), firing briefly on the contact to the West.
- 2218 - TURNER JOY detected another contact to the Northwest at a range of (approx) 3200 yards. Fire control lock-on was obtained and a southerly course observed. Firing began at 2218 and ceased at 2219 when contact plotted DFW (Dead in Water). Evaluation of this contact is low possible since its presence cannot be correlated with other contacts or tracks. Furthermore, the contact persisted for only about 2 minutes. TURNER JOY continued to the South (160°T) to rejoin MADDOX.
- 2221 - TURNER JOY obtained a contact, designated "V-3", bearing 008 at a range of 3600 yards and closing with a speed of 48 knots. At 2224 contact had closed to 2500 yards and had been "locked-on" by F/C system.
- 222 - Firing commenced at this time. Explosions were observed by many TURNER JOY personnel. After numerous hits right on target "V-3", the contact disappeared from all radars and was believed sunk at 2228. Commanding Officer and others observed a thick column of black smoke from this contact, with no flame, leading to belief that the contact sank and did not burn on the surface.

During the next few minutes TURNER JOY was having difficulties with her after 5" mounts and was unable to engage any targets. No targets were detected on any radars with the exception of an intermittent contact closing rapidly from the North.

- 2237 - Aircraft, at request of TURNER JOY, began strafing the general area of the above contact as TURNER JOY continued southerly. By 2242 this contact had closed to 2100 yards. TURNER JOY changed course to starboard and contact overshot wake at 2243. By 2247 ship took this contact under rapid fire for about 1 minute. This PT boat was sighted by six people at various times during its closing track. Contact



appeared to be following in wake. One depth charge was launched to shake up the PT. As soon as depth charge launched, TURNER JOY turned to starboard and contact again overshot wake.

- 2247 - Many personnel on the TURNER JOY saw a searchlight bearing approximately due north at a distance of approximately 10 miles. At this time TURNER JOY was on course, 310°T. MADDOX bore about 305°T, definitely eliminating that ship as the source of the light. All TURNER JOY's original contacts, V-1, V-2 and V-3, had been plotted in the vicinity of from 10 to 15 miles north of the TURNER JOY's 2247 position. Thus the major contact area coincided with the apparent position of the light. Three theories have been proposed for this light, (a) It was a recall light for all PT's in the action, (b) It was a call for assistance from a damaged vessel or, (c) It was a light used by the PT boats to pick up survivors.
- 2252 - The contact which had been closing from the north just prior to 2237 was held by TURNER JOY bearing 105°T, 2200 yards. At 2254 rudder was put over hard left and a ram was attempted at 2252. Contact was lost in sea return at 700 yards.
- 2259 - Contact was regained bearing 320, 1500 yards. Contact appeared on opposite side of TURNER JOY after having evaded ram. Immediate "lock-on" was obtained and firing began at 2300. Four bursts were observed on this contact and contact was lost at 2303. The entire episode with this contact, lasting from 2232 until 2303, provided what is considered by TURNER JOY as definite proof that contacts were using wake to obtain sighting and intercept. \*This contact overshot the wake twice indicating that he could not observe a course change from any position but dead astern. USS TURNER JOY verified on ECM equipment (ELR) that contacts had no radar in operation by complete absence of normal CH. 10M or DRV seaborne radars.
- MADDOX acquired an intermittent radar contact close-up astern. At this time TURNER JOY also detected a contact astern of MADDOX, but too close to MADDOX to take under fire. MADDOX fired 3 inch mount astern in attempt to flush shadower. Validity of contact: possible.
- 2306 - MADDOX released a depth charge against time 2304 contact. No apparent results. Boats seem to seek the wake possibly to take advantage of a relatively blind area and also as a means of locating the target.
- TURNER JOY turned West to rejoin MADDOX then 9½ miles bearing 272.
- 2309 - A surface radar contact was obtained at 2800 yards and movement towards TURNER JOY's wake was noted. At 2310 depth charge was launched and firing commenced. No hits were observed. Contact was lost at 2311.
- 2319 - MADDOX sonar reported torpedo bearing 200. (Post engagement analysis indicates doubtful). Fired on weak intermittent radar surface contact.

\*See continued comment on p. 8

to the West. Range and bearings were not recorded. Validity of contact: poor. Various maneuvers were made as TURNER JOY began falling in 4000 yards astern of MADDOX.

- 2321 - A contact bearing 005, was obtained by TURNER JOY at 1300 yards and taken under fire. This was evaluated by TURNER JOY as the same contact which was lost at 2311. Firing ceased at 2322 with contact opening, no hits were observed.
- 2342 - TURNER JOY observed another contact on radar to the North at a range of 4000 yards, and taken under fire for a brief period. This contact closing fast and was tracked at 39 knots. Again no hits were reported and contact was lost at 2351.
- 2347 - TURNER JOY observed a contact between MADDOX and TURNER JOY. This was finally evaluated as high speed wake. Fire control could not lock on this target. On detecting the contact, however, TURNER JOY informed MADDOX, who dropped a depth charge astern.

No other surface contacts were observed until contact with USS S. N. MOORE was obtained at 0016. At this time, MADDOX and TURNER JOY had reached the southern end of the Gulf of Tonkin. No other significant incidents occurred thereafter. As a final descriptive note, the entire engagement took place on a generally North to South axis with the distance between the first turn to the South of MADDOX and TURNER JOY to open skunk "N" at 1946, and the final contacts about 2340 was about 85 miles. Ammunition expended in both ships: MADDOX, 5/38 Frag (2), 5/38 AAC (3), 5/38 star shells (24), 3/50 Frag (95) and 4 depth charges; TURNER JOY, 5/54 Frag (134), 5/54 AAC (86), 3/50 Frag (28), and 1 depth charge.

\* Continued comment from 2259 entry:

Furthermore, it is believed that the DRV PTs used stern chase and quarter approach tactics because most U.S. destroyers, including MADDOX which they had engaged on 2 August, have two 5" mounts forward and only one aft. While TURNER JOY has two 5" mounts aft, the PTs were possibly unaware of this because of TURNER JOY's recent arrival in the Gulf, with no involvement in the 2 August engagement.

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W A R N I N G

~~APPENDED DOCUMENTS CONTAIN~~

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~~CODEWORD MATERIAL~~

Approved for Release by NSA on 07-05-2005  
pursuant to E.O. 12958, as amended

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

14 October 1964


SUBJECT: Chronology of Events of 2-5 August 1964 in the Gulf of Tonkin

1. The report forwarded herewith contains the events, in chronological order, surrounding the naval engagements on 2 and 4 August 1964 between the U. S. destroyers MADDOX and TURNER JOY and North Vietnamese Naval PT boats.

2. In-so-far as the SIGINT aspects of the action are concerned the report is as complete as the need for documentation of SIGINT involvement appeared to necessitate. Documentation presented by the non-SIGINT portions of this report is only as complete as DIRNSA's receipt of relevant messages allowed.

3. A similar report is in preparation covering the 18-19 September incident in the Gulf of Tonkin.

FOR THE CHIEF, B2:

  
DELMAR C. LANG  
Lt. Col., USAF  
Chief, B205

Copy to: DIR  
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INTRODUCTION

The following report presents the details, generally speaking in chronological order, of the events surrounding the 2 and 4 August attacks by North Vietnamese PT boats on Desoto Patrol vessels, the destroyers USS MADDOX and USS TURNER JOY, in international waters off the coast of North Vietnam.

Desoto Patrols, accomplished to assert the right of U. S. vessels to patrol in international waters and for the purpose of collecting intelligence, were established in April 1962 and have operated since in waters off the China and North Vietnamese coastlines.

[REDACTED] the USS MADDOX was equipped with one manual Morse position, one HF/VHF voice intercept position, one VHF/UHF [REDACTED] position and a capability for the collection of ELINT signals.

NSA25X1  
NSA25X3

As a matter of routine NSA, prior to each such patrol, provides for both SIGINT tasking of the collection facility aboard the destroyer and for SIGINT support to the destroyer. In the instance of the August Gulf of Tonkin patrol SIGINT support, if in the form of SIGINT reports, was to be sent to the USS MADDOX via [REDACTED] a Naval SIGINT station at [REDACTED] was the guard for the MADDOX and would assure that all relevant SIGINT reports reached the MADDOX. Provisions were also made for any SIGINT producing unit to transmit critical information in their possession directly to the MADDOX. Additionally, technical support required by the SIGINT collection unit aboard was made available to the MADDOX prior to her departure, with arrangements in effect for transmission to the MADDOX of additional technical information of high relevancy as it became available.

NSA25X3

The destroyer initially involved in the patrol, the USS MADDOX, was from a carrier task group of which the aircraft carrier USS TICONDEROGA was the flag. While the MADDOX patrolled in the Gulf of Tonkin the TICONDEROGA with her supporting destroyer screen and other support vessels stood to sea south of the entrance to the Gulf. It was from this task force that air support and the second patrol destroyer, the USS TURNER JOY, was drawn following the attack against the MADDOX on 2 August.

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~


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In reading the following report it may be helpful to bear in mind that messages originated by CTG 72.1 came from the USS MADDOX, and those from CTG 77.5 were from the USS TICONDEROGA. USN-414T, indicated on some messages as the originator, was a Marine contingent at USM-626J (Phu Bai, SVN) charged, in conjunction with USM-626J, with the collection, processing and reporting of North Vietnamese naval communications. The SIGINT reports included in this document are, in each instance, followed by a copy(s) of the actual DRV message(s) on which the SIGINT report was based. It should also be borne in mind that, aside from the SIGINT information which is as complete as the purpose of this report appeared to require, this report is based only on that information available to NSA and does not purport to contain all relevant non-SIGINT information.

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~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS - 30/31 JULY THROUGH AUGUST 1964

1. During the night of 30/31 July, a marine operation was conducted under CINCPAC OPLAN 34A. This action, involving two boats of the so-called "Nasty" type (specially built, shallow draft, high speed craft), resulted in the shelling of the island of Hon Me, a few miles off the coast of North Vietnam. A reaction was conducted by PT boats of the DRV Navy and was observed in COMINT. (Tab 1)

2. A Desoto patrol, the destroyer USS MADDOX, with a SIGINT collection unit aboard, was active in the Gulf of Tonkin at the time of the attack. During the attack the Maddox drew off from the scene and stayed well out to sea; however, she observed the "Nasties" retiring south under pursuit by DRV PT boats. By 1 August Maddox had resumed her scheduled patrol which required that she pass Hon Me Island. On that day DRV naval communications reflected trackings of the Maddox by DRV entities. (Tab 2)

2. 192024Z August. To determine if the Maddox was aware of the planned action against Hon Me, a message was sent to NSAPAC Rep Vietnam (C). The responses to this query indicated that the Maddox was not aware of the action. (Tab 3)

4. At 011924Z August, 12 hours and 33 minutes before the DRV attack on the Maddox, USN-27 (San Miguel, Philippines) issued at Immediate precedence to a wide distribution, including [redacted] a report under the title "DRV Navy May Attack Desoto Patrol." The report warned, based on the interception of DRV naval communications, that an attack on the U.S. vessel was possibly imminent. (Tab 4) At 011954Z (30 minutes after the USN-27 warning) the Maddox reported that she had received information indicating possible hostile action. (Tab 5) Evidence that the source of this warning to the Maddox was from SIGINT is presented in Tab 6 (both sides). NSA25X3

5. From this time (011954Z) the action developed as follows:

012152Z August - USN-27 reported that the DRV placed the "enemy" southeast of Hon Me. (Tab 7) (This was in follow-up #1 to original spot report. (Tab 4)).

020302Z August - DIRNSA sent a message to COMSEVENTHFLT, CINCPACFLT and [redacted] advising of reactions to the OPLAN 34A action of 31 July and warning that DRV reaction to the Desoto patrol might be severe. This was five hours before the attack occurred. (Tab 8)

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020414Z August - USN-27 issued a follow-up to their spot report (Tab 4) providing further COMINT information regarding possibly imminent attack on Desoto patrol. (Tab 9)

020429Z August - DIRNSA sent a message directly to the Maddox providing current technical data for its use in on-board COMINT collection and advisory warning. (Tab 10)

020531Z August - USS Maddox reported that she had sighted three PT craft ten miles north of Hon Me and then reported arriving at scheduled destination at 020300Z (Point Delta, northeast of Hon Me Island). (Tab 11)

Approx 020716Z August - USN-27 issued a CRITIC message based on a DRV decrypt which indicated that DRV craft were to close with the "enemy" and to use torpedoes. This CRITIC was released approximately 55 minutes before the attack and was readdressed by DIRNSA at 020732Z. [redacted] intelligence watch for the Maddox, was a recipient of the NSA readdressal. (Tab 12)

NSA25X3

020807Z August - Maddox indicated that she was being attacked by three DRV PT boats and was opening fire with her five inch guns. (Tab 13)

020808Z August - USS Ticonderoga (Task Force Commander) indicated that the Maddox was being pursued by three high speed surface craft. (Tab 14)

020829Z August - Maddox indicated that the PT boats had completed their torpedo attack and that she, the Maddox, was retiring to the southeast. COMSEVENTHFLT instructed the Maddox to retire from the area, but to fire in self defense. (Tab 15)

020947Z August - DIRNSA sent a message to the field stations advising them in some detail of the action. This was done to alert them to the action and to explain the reason for the requested vigilance in collection, processing and reporting. (Tab 16)

021232Z August - USN-27 issued spot report follow-up #3 which indicated that Desoto was now under continuous surveillance. The report also indicated that at least four torpedo boats were in position preparing for an imminent attack upon Desoto. (Tab 17)

020949Z August - Maddox sent a "Gulf of Tonkin Action SITREP" recapping the 2 August engagement. (Tab 18)

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

A marine operation, under CINCPAC OPLAN 34A, was also conducted following the 2 August incident. This action was conducted during the period 032222Z-04025Z. It consisted of an offshore shelling by three "Nasty" craft against the military complex located at the south bank of the RON River and the Ving Son Radar site.

7. On 4 August the following sequence of events led to yet another DRV attack, this time upon both the Maddox and the Turner Joy.

040028Z August - To document all direct COMINT support to the Desoto patrol DIRNSA sent a message to NSAPAC REP PHIL asking for an accounting of all such exchanges between USN-27 and the Maddox. NSAPAC REP PHIL reply on reverse side of Tab 30. (Tab 30)

041115Z August - USN-414T (a small Marine contingent co-located and working with USM-626J) issued a flash precedence message again based on DRV decrypts, stating: "Possible DRV Naval operation planned against the Desoto Patrol tonight 04 August." (Tab 31)

041140Z August - USM-626J reported at flash precedence COMINT evidence of "Imminent Plans of DRV Naval Action possibly against Desoto Mission." (Tabs 32 and 33)

041240Z August - The Maddox reported that she had received the information indicating attack was imminent and that she was heading southeast at best speed. (Tabs 34 and 35)

041336Z August - The carrier Ticonderoga reported that the Maddox was tracking "two skunks" (unidentified surface vessels) and "three bogies" (unidentified aircraft). (Tab 36)

041400Z August - The Ticonderoga reported that the Maddox opened fire against a PT boat making an "attacking run" from the west and that the PT boat launched a torpedo. (Tab 37)

041434Z August - Ticonderoga reported that the original "two skunks" had opened to 40 miles but that three new "skunks" were closing on the Desoto Patrol at 40 knots. (Tab 38)

041442Z August - The Maddox announced that she had commenced firing on PT boat at 041440Z. (Tab 39)

041452Z August - The Maddox reported that she was under continuous torpedo attack. (Tab 40)

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

021008Z August - The Ticonderoga sent a recap of the action.  
(Tab 19)

021124Z August - DIRNSA dispatched a second message to the field stations advising them of additional details and alerting them to possible DRV search and rescue operations leading to possible increased COMINT reflections and further activity. (Tab 20)

021226Z August - CINCPACFLT stated to CINCPAC and COMSEVENTHFLT that it was his opinion that Desoto Patrol must be resumed in order to assert right of freedom of the seas and instructed COMSEVENTHFLT to resume patrol with two destroyers, the Maddox and the Turner Joy.  
(Tab 21)

021232Z August - USN-27 issued a report based on DRV decrypts indicating that the DRV was continuing its close surveillance of the USS Maddox. (Tab 22)

021443Z August - The Maddox issued a further SITREP report providing additional details of the Action. (Tab 23)

021615Z August - DIRNSA declared SIGINT READINESS BRAVO "LANTERN" at the relevant field stations and processing centers. The message also provided reporting guidance to stations. (Tab 24)

021628Z August - DIRNSA announced the establishment of the BRAVO Readiness condition to the intelligence community. (Tab 25)

022330Z August - The Maddox indicated that she was resuming her patrol. (Tab 26)

030956Z August - USM-626J (Phu Bai, South Vietnam) reported COMINT indications that DRV patrol vessels were possibly converging on Hon Me Island. (Tab 27)

030745Z August - The Maddox reported that she had arrived in the general vicinity of Hon Me Island. (Tab 28)

031546Z August - Report received that Maddox and Turner Joy were being followed by surface craft. (Tab 29)

6. Following the action on 2 August, COMINT reflected the North Vietnamese engaging primarily in "mop-up" actions, principally concerned with locating their damaged PT boats and towing them back to ports. Meanwhile they continued to track and report on the U.S. vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin.

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

041515Z August - The Maddox reported that attacks were continuing and that she had successfully avoided all torpedoes. (Tab 41)

041616Z August - NAVCOMSTATION Philippines reported that the Maddox thought a DRV PT boat had sunk one of its own boats. (Tab 42)

041732Z August - Reports issued by Maddox indicated that the action was apparently over as no contacts had been noted during the last fifteen minutes. Reports also began to suggest doubt as to number of PT boats and torpedoes actually involved in the attack. (Tabs 43 and 44)

042052Z August - At this point the need to assure prompt reporting of [redacted] reactions to Tonkin Gulf activity lead to broadening SRB lantern to include all pertinent additional non-[redacted] stations. (Tab 45)

042158Z August - A chronological sequence of the events of 4 August was issued by the Maddox containing a recap of the naval engagement. (Tab 46)

050753Z August - DIRNSA issued a message based on COMINT evidence warning that DRV might be preparing for yet another attack on 5 August. Message stemmed from traffic intercepted at USM-626J. (Tab 47)

051219Z August - CINCPACFLT issued an operational status report regarding Desoto Patrol and a recap of the 4 August engagement. (Tab 48)

060347Z August - The Maddox and Turner Joy were directed by CINCPAC to resume their patrol. (Tab 49)

070118Z August - To assure that all available COMINT evidence of the attacks on the U.S. naval destroyers was available, DIRNSA sent a message to the Maddox asking for relevant details based on its intercept of DRV communications. (Tab 50) Intercept conducted aboard the Maddox was reported as containing no material which would provide proof of the attack. (Tab 51)

8. Representative examples of DIRNSA's COMINT reporting of the activities directly and indirectly related to the situation in the Gulf of Tonkin are included. They range from individual translations (Tab 52), to summaries of specific actions or subjects (Tabs 53 and

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

54), to a summary of all COMINT revealed actions in [redacted] which appeared to relate, or possibly relate, to the situation. (Tab 55) These are examples only, continuous reporting was actually accomplished.

9. On the night of 4 August JCS ordered CINCPAC to conduct one time maximum effort air strikes against specified targets in North Vietnam (Tab 56). Following this order the chronology of events, reconstructed from those messages available to DIRNSA, was as follows:

041547Z August - CINCPAC ordered CINCPACFLT to airlift mines to the Ticonderoga for possible purpose of mining Swatow boat bases in North Vietnam. (Tab 57).

041554Z August - CINCPAC ordered CINCPACFLT to destroy all PT boats and Swatows in the area of engagement. (Tab 58)

041628Z August - CINCPAC ordered COMUSMACV to recall all RVN PTFs active in OPLAN 34A actions to Da Nang, SVN, and to discontinue all OPLAN 34A actions that might be in progress. (Tab 59)

041718Z August - CINCPAC granted authority to engage any DRV/CHICOM aircraft whose actions indicated hostile intent against U.S. forces. (Tab 60)

042014Z August - CINCPACFLT ordered COMSEVENTHFLT to be prepared at 050700Z August to strike targets in North Vietnam. These targets were the PT and Swatow boats in designated ports and harbors and the oil storage facilities at Vinh. (Tab 61)

042035Z August - CINCPAC advised CINCPACFLT to be prepared to execute air strikes beginning at 042300Z. (Tab 62)

042227Z August - CINCPAC issued the air strike "execute" order to CINCPACFLT. (Tab 63)

050043Z August - JCS ordered CINCPAC to implement at least portions of CINCPAC OPLAN 37-64. This order was issued "in view of attacks authorized" and "for the purpose of providing a deterrent to enemy action and to be prepared to undertake immediate operations against North Vietnam". (Tab 64)

050424Z August - CINCPAC issued orders to his subordinate commands implementing actions required to deploy forces IAW CINCPAC OPLAN 37-64. (Tab 65)

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

050445Z August - CINCPAC recommended to JCS additional alerts and further deployment of forces over and above those already directed under OPLAN 37-64. (Tab 66)

051553Z August - JCS directed CINCPAC to complete operational planning and preparations for employment of U.S. resources being provided under OPLAN 37-64 and OPLAN 99-64. (Tab 67)

052303Z August - JCS issued a report disclosing the results of the air strikes. (Tab 68)

10. COMINT product reporting on a limited basis was accomplished throughout the air strikes. This was due to a low level of North Vietnamese communications activity during and, for a period, after the air strikes. These reports consisted primarily of [ ] and DRV radar tracking of the attacking aircraft. An example of NSA SIGINT reporting accomplished with regards to the air strikes is contained in Tab 69.

NSA25X1 NSA25X3

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

P 310922Z

FF USN 27

TO QUEBEC/QUEBEC

PLUS NSA25X1  
NSA25X3~~SECRET KIMBO~~

2/Q/VHN/R24-64 ST220 RPT 2/Q/VHN/R24-42 ST220

DRV NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS REFLECT "ENEMY" INCURSION, 31 JULY 1964

1. ON 31 JULY DRV NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS REFLECTED AN "ENEMY" VESSEL FIRING ON THE ISLAND OF HON ME (19-21N 105-56E) AND TENUOUS INDICATIONS OF ANOTHER ATTACK AGAINST AN UNDETERMINED TARGET IN THE BEN THUY GENERAL AREA. TWO, POSSIBLY FOUR, DRV VESSELS REACTED, HOWEVER, THE INTRUDERS APPARENTLY ESCAPED UNHARMED.
2. AT 301730Z SWATOW CLASS PGM T-142, OPERATING IN COMPANY WITH THE T-146, REPORTED, POSSIBLY TO PORT WALLUT THAT THE ENEMY'S ATTACK BEGAN IN THE ANCHORAGE AREA AT HON ME. THE T-142 FURTHER REPORTED THAT EVEN THOUGH NORTH OF THE ISLAND THEY WOULD GIVE CHASE AND TRY TO CATCH THE ENEMY. AT 301836Z PORT WALLUT WAS INFORMED BY THE SAME VESSEL THAT "WE ARRIVED AT 19-18N 105-54-42E . . . . THE ENEMY TURNED BACK TO THE EAST FROM HON ME." BY 301900Z THE DRV VESSELS HAD GIVEN UP THE CHASE AND WERE RETURNING TO PORT.
3. AT 301805Z BEN THUY INFORMED THE T-377 THAT THE "ENEMY HAS FIRED INTO HON ME. K1'S VESSEL HAS BEEN SENT . . . . REPORT POSITION TO K2." TENUOUS INDICATIONS OF POSSIBLY ANOTHER

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

ATTACK IN THE BEN THUY AREA WERE NOTED AT 310120Z WHEN THE T-379 WAS ORDERED TO BRING THE WOUNDED TROOPS BACK" AND THE T-377 WAS OBSERVED POSSIBLY OPERATING IN CONJUNCTION WITH AN UNIDENTIFIED COASTAL ARTILLERY ELEMENT.

4. COMMENT: BOTH THE T-337 AND T-379 (EX T-185 AND T-187) ARE BASED AT QUANT KHE AND OPERATE WITH SOUTHERN FLEET PATROL UNITS. SINCE ONE GROUP (T-377 AND T-379) OF VESSELS WAS CONTROLLED BY BEN THUY AND ANOTHER GROUP (T-142 AND T-146), BY PORT WALLUT IT IS BELIEVED THAT TWO DIFFERENT AREAS WERE FIRED ON BY THE INCURSION UNIT(S).

5. SIGNIFICANT TRANSLATIONS OF THIS ACTIVITY WILL BE PUBLISHED IN THE 2/Q/VHN/T SERIES.

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

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NSA25X1  
NSA25X3

NSA25X1  
NSA25X3

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

TAB 2

O 011635Z ZYH

FM USM 626J

TO GOLF ELEVEN/ALFA

[REDACTED] AFSSO CONAD  
[REDACTED] AFSSO SAC  
[REDACTED] AFSSO TAC

PLUS CONTAIWANDEF/COM/US

COMNAVFORJAPANRZ [REDACTED]

ZEM -

NSA25X1 NSA25X3  
P.L. 86-36

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

2/G11/VHN/R01-64 RPT 2/G11/VHN/R01-64 SPOT REPORT ST 220

PROBABLE DESOTO MISSION LOCATED BY DRV NAVAL ENTITY.

BEGINNING AT 1419Z, 01 AUGUST, DRV NAVAL VESSEL T146

UTILIZING A LOW-GRADE CIPHER SYSTEM INFORMED VESSEL T142

QUOTE ... TURN ON EQUIPMENT ((3GR/G)) ENEMY GOING ON A

COURSE OF 52 DEGREES LOCATED 9 NAUTICAL MILES FROM HON

ME ((19:21N 105:51E)) BEARING 134 DEGREES UNQUOTE.

AT 1422Z, VESSEL T146 SENT QUOTE ENEMY LOCATED 9

NAUTICAL MILES FROM HON ME BEARING 148 DEGREES UNQUOTE.

COMMENT: PROJECTED COURSE AND ORBIT OF DESOTO MISSION

CORRELATES WITH THE ABOVE SIGHTINGS

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

(unclassified until filled)

NSA FORM N2288 REV AUG 63  
(Supersedes N2288 REV JUN 61  
to be used until exhausted)

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

COPY NR.

ACTION PRECEDENCE  
IMMEDIATE

INFO PRECEDENCE  
NONE

SPECIAL HANDLING  
~~COMINT CHANNELS/LIMITED DISTRIBUTION/~~

NOFORN


FROM: DIRNSA

DATE: 19 AUGUST 1964

DISTRIBUTION  
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

TO: NSAPAC REP VIETNAM (C)

B26 6  
B2 1



TAB 3

~~TOP SECRET COMINT CHANNELS/LIMITED DIST/NOFORN~~


B26/361/64 WS/451

QUESTION HAS ARISEN AS TO WHETHER THE MADDOX WAS AWARE OF KITKAT (C)  
OPERATION ON NIGHT OF 30 JULY. IF SO, BY WHOM WERE THEY NOTIFIED  
AND THRU WHAT CHANNELS? ALSO, CAN YOU PROVIDE THE OPERATING  
INSTRUCTIONS THE MADDOX WAS UNDER ON THE SAME NIGHT? WAS IT BY  
COINCIDENCE OR PLAN THAT THE MADDOX WAS IN POSITION TO WITNESS THE  
WITHDRAWAL PHASE OF THE NIGHT'S ACTION?

M/R: This message intended to clarify circumstances behind  
initial attack against DESOTO mission on 2 August.

P.L. 86-36

CONCUR: Col Lang B205



3068S

/B26/3240S

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

191945

Z

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

AGI NR.

AGC NR.

08210/19

DTG

192024Z

DOCUMENT NOT RELEASABLE TO

FOREIGN NATIONALS

REFERS TO MESSAGE

AGO N  
AGI O  
DTG N  
SUSPENSE E

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

P 200100Z

FM NSAPAC REP VIETNAM (C)

TO DIRNSA

INFO HQ NSAPAC

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET COMINT CHANNELS LIMITED DISTRIBUTION NOFORN~~

CITE: F46/2637 SW-524 SH-1793

REF: B26/363/64 DTG 192024Z (NOTAL)

1. TO BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE MADDOX WAS NOT AWARE OF THE KITKAT (C) OPERATION ON NIGHT OF 30 JULY. IF THEY WERE NOTIFIED THEY WOULD HAVE RECEIVED THE INFORMATION FROM CINCPAC BY WHOM THEY WERE CONTROLLED.
2. WE DO NOT HOLD THE OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS THE MADDOX WAS UNDER ON THE NIGHT OF 30 JULY, OTHER THAN THE GENERAL OP INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DESOTO PATROL PROMULGATED BY CINCPAC.
3. BELIEVE IT WAS ONLY BY COINCIDENCE THAT THE MADDOX WITNESSED THE WITHDRAWAL PHASE OF THE NIGHTS ACTION. SOG/MACV PLANNED THE ACTION TO AVOID ANY ASSOCIATION GS INTERFERENCE WITH THE DESOTO PATROL. HOWEVER, CINCPAC WAS AWARE OF THE PLANNED MAROP AND COULD HAVE ALERTED THE MADDOX TO BE ON LOOKOUT FOR MAROPS VESSELS.
4. SUGGEST YOU CONTACT CINCPAC OR HQ NSAPAC FOR FURTHER INFO CONCERNING MADDOX PATROL

1080

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

T003ZCZCLAA617CHSA740

PP



P.L. 86-36

DE 2 21/0046Z AUG

ZKZK PP RNI DE

P 202320Z

FM HQ NSAPAC

TO DIRNSA (B-26)

ZEM

~~SECRET COMINT CHANNELS F403/2406 HW-1424~~

SUBJ: DESOTO PATROL

YOUR 201331Z (PASSING YOUR 192024Z, B26/361/64)

QUESTIONS CONTAINED IN REFERENCE WERE DISCUSSED WITH N2, PACFLT.

THAT HEADQUARTERS PREVIOUSLY ASKED COM7TH FLT SAME QUESTIONS

BUT HAS NOT RECEIVED REPLY. WE WERE ADVISED THAT ANSWERS, WHEN

RECEIVED, WOULD PROBABLY BE PROVIDED ONLY TO WASHINGTON ECHELONS.

RECOMMEND YOU COORDINATE MATTER WITH CNO IF ANSWERS TO YOUR

QUESTIONS STILL DESIRED.

1250

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

VZCZCUCD582

ZKZK PP ZSL DESS669

P 262020Z

FM HQ NSAPAC

TO DIRNSA (B26) (DDI ZSL)

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET COMINT CHANNELS/PRIVACY/LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

CITE F403/2 47

SUBJECT: DESOTO PATROL AND 34A OPERATIONS

A. MY 2 2320Z, F403/2406

B. YOUR 201441Z (WHICH PASSED YOUR 192024Z, B26/261/64)

1. REQUEST YOU HANDLE FOLLOWING INFO AS PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION.

2. CINCPAC POSED TO CINCPACFLT SAME QUESTION YOU ASKED IN REF (B). CINCPACFLT ADVISED CINCPAC AS FOLLOWS. "PRIOR TO START OF DESOTO OPERATIONS ON 31 JUL CTG 72.1 HAD NO INFORMATION CONCERNING SOG OPERATIONS. HOWEVER, SEVERAL DAYS PRIOR TO PATROL, A SERIES OF MESSAGES WERE EXCHANGED BETWEEN CINCPACFLT, CONSEVENTHFLT, AND COMUSMACV CONCERNING LIAISON TO PREVENT INTERFERENCE BETWEEN DESOTO AND 34A OPERATIONS. IN ADDITION, PERSONAL LIAISON BY COMSEVENTHFLT WITH COMUSMACV INDICATED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO DIFFICULTIES AND 34A OPERATIONS WOULD BE ADJUSTED TO PREVENT INTERFERENCE (REF B PERTAINS). NO DETAILED INFORMATION OR SCHEDULE FOR 34A OPERATION WAS PROVIDED CTD 72.1 PRIOR TO 3 AUG AND NONE

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

WAS NECESSARY SINCE HIS MOVEMENTS WERE WATCHED CLOSELY BY ALL  
HIGHER ECHELONS. END"

144ø

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~SECRET KIMBO~~

ZKZK OO NNN NRL DE

O 011924Z ZYH

FM USN 27

NSA25X1  
NSA25X3

TO DIST QUEBEC/MIKE

TAB 4

PLUS

ZEM

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

2/Q/VHN/T26-64 ST 220 RPT 2/Q/VHN/R26-64 ST 220

DRV NAVY MAY ATTACK DESOTO PATROL

1. AT 011627Z BEN THUY SENT A MESSAGE TO 255 (UNIDENTIFIED TO TYPE/CLASS) NOTING THAT IT HAD BEEN "DECIDED TO FIGHT THE ENEMY TONIGHT ((1 GR U)) WHEN YOU RECEIVE DIRECTING ORDERS." THE T-255 WAS ALSO QUERIED IF SHE HAD RECEIVED THE ENEMY'S CONSECUTIVE CHANGE FROM 520 (UNIDENTIFIED). COMMENT: THE DESOTO PATROL IS CURRENTLY IN THE VICINITY OF HON ME ISLAMD (19-21N 105-56E).

0888

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

NSA25X1  
NSA25X3

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

JULY AUG DESOTO SITREP ONE

A. MY 011954Z

1. HAVE TERMINATE ORBIT. PROCEEDING DUE EAST FM PT CHARLIE AT TEN KNOTS UNTIL DAYLIGHT.
2. HEAVY CONCENTRATION OF JUNKS TO NORTH CONTEMPLATE SERIOUS REACTION MY MOVEMENTS VIC PT CHARLIE IN NEAR FUTURE. RCVD INFO INDICATING POSS HOSTILE ACTION

TAB 5

JULY AUG DESOTO SITREP 2

1. CONDITIONS UNCHANGED. UNODIR AM PROCEEDING PT DELTA.
2. IF INFO RECEIVED CONCERNING HOSTILE INTENT BY DRV IS ACCURATE, AND HAVE NO REASON TO BELIEVE IT IS NOT, CONSIDER CONTINUANCE OF PATROL PRESENT AN UNACCEPTABLE RISK.

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

(confidential HVCCO until filled)

NSA FORM N2288 REV AUG 63  
(Supersedes N2288 REV JUN 61  
to be used until exhausted)

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

COPY NR.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

NONE

DISTRIBUTION

FROM: DIRNSA

DATE: 13 AUGUST 1964

ADP

TO: USN-<sup>467N</sup>

B

NSA25X1

B2

NSA25X3

B22

B26

P05

D32

INFO: HQ NSAPAC

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

B205/270

SUBJ: WARNING TO DESOTO PATROL

TAB 6

1. MESSAGES SENT BY USS MADDOX PRIOR TO BOTH 2 AND 4 AUGUST ATTACKS BY DRV PT BOATS STATED THAT VESSEL HAD RECEIVED INFORMATION INDICATING ATTACK WAS IMMINENT (CTU 77.12 DTG 041240Z AND JULY/AUGUST DESOTO SITREP NR ONE DTG 011954Z APPLY). 2. APPREC YOU ADVISE BY RETURN

MESSAGE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION AND, IF FROM SIGINT, THE SPECIFIC SIGINT REPORTS IF POSSIBLE (STATION DESIGNATOR/SERIALIZATION/DTG) CONTAINING THE INFORMATION

M/R: This message requests the USS MADDOX to confirm or deny if the source of the warning information was SIGINT.

P.L. 86-36

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

[Redacted]

/B205/5174s/sad

D.C. LANG LTCOL USAF/CH B205/

5174s

130345

Z

PAGE

1

PAGES

OF

1

AGI NR.

AGO NR.

08005/13

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

DTG

AGO N

AGI O

DTG N

SUSPENSE E

130413Z

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

(unclassified until filled)

NSA FORM N2288 REV AUG 63  
(Supersedes N2288 REV JUN 61  
to be used until exhausted)

~~SECRET~~

COPY NR.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

PRIORITY

PRIORITY

~~COMINT CHANNELS~~

DISTRIBUTION

FROM: USN 467N

DATE: 15 AUG 64

ACT B2  
INFO B

TO: DIRNSA

////ADV COPY TO P055////

B22

B26

INFO: HQ NSAPAC

D32

NSA25X1

P05

NSA25X3

ADP

DRF

~~SECRET COMINT CHANNELS~~

A. YOUR 130413Z

1. FOLLOWING MSGS PROVIDED ADVANCE WARNING OF ATTACKS ON

2 AND 4 AUGUST

A. 2 AUGUST

1. USN 27 21Q/VHN/R26-64

2. USN 27 21Q/VHN/R27-64

3. USN 414T 020640Z (UNSERIALIZED DESOTO SLOG ITEM)

B. 4 AUGUST

1. USM 626J 2/G11/VHN/R11664

L23 NOTE: DTG 130413Z B205/270 AGO 08005/13

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

Z

JPH/GPN

15-3-92

PAGE

PAGES

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OF

1

DOCUMENT MARKING

AGI NR.

48861

AGO NR.

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

DTG

150515Z

AGO

AGI

DTG

SUSPENSE

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

O 012152Z ZYH

FM USN 27

TO DIST QUEBEC/MIKE

PLUS

ZEM

NSA25X1  
NSA25X3

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

2/Q/VHN/R27-64, ST 220, FOR EVALUATION. FOLLOWUP NR 1 TO SPOT

REPORT 2/Q/VHN/R26-64, DRV NAVY MAY ATTACK DESOTO PATROL

1. AT 011652Z THE OBSERVATION POST ON HON ME

ISLAND (19-21N 105-56E) AND SWATOW CLASS PGM T-146

WERE INFORMED THAT THE 011800G POSITION OF THE ENEMY

VESSEL WAS ELEVEN NAUTICAL MILES SOUTHEAST OF HON ME

BEARING 168 DEGREES. COMMENCING AT 011018Z AND

CONTINUING THROUGH PRESENT DESOTO PATROL BEING TRACKED

BY RADAR STATION POSSIBLY LOCATED HON NGU (18-48N

105-47E) AND ANOTHER STATION TENUOUSLY LOCATED HON

MATT (18-47N 105-58E).

2. AT 011755Z PORT WALLUT INFORMED THE SAME SWATOW

CLASS VESSEL, T-146, THAT THREE VESSELS FROM BATTALION

135 (UNIDENTIFIED) "HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO POSSIBLY

HON NE (19-54N 106-01E) TO ARRIVE PRIOR TO 020300G AUG."

REMAINDER OF TEXT GARBLED.

3. AT 012012Z SWATOW CLASS PGM T-377 REPORTED THAT "THE

UNIT ((PROBABLY DRV)) WAS LAUNCHED AT 0230G AND WAS WAITING

NORTHEAST OF HON NGU."

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

TAB 7

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

4. CONCURRENTLY THE OBSERVATION POST ON HON ME ISLAND WAS ORDERED "TO OBSERVE ALL SHIPS AND DIRECT SAME TO THEIR OBJECTIVE" AND TO "INVESTIGATE THE LACH TRAY RIVER ESTUARY (20-49N 106-37E) SO THAT ON 2 AUGUST" SHIPS CAN BE DIRECTED TO ENTER AN NAP (20-35N 106-17E). IN VIEW OF THE INDICATED INTENT TO REACT TO THE DESOTO PATROL THIS MESSAGE SUGGESTS THAT FISHING VESSELS IN THE AREA MAY BE WITHDRAWN TO AN NAP. ON 31 JULY POSSIBLY TEN FISHING CRAFT WERE ACTIVE IN THIS AREA.

1800

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

NSA25X1  
NSA25X3



NSA25X1  
NSA25X3

~~(confidential HVCCO until filled)~~

NSA FORM N2288 REV AUG 63  
(Supersedes N2288 REV JUN 61  
to be used until exhausted)

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

COPY NR.

ACTION PRECEDENCE

FLASH

INFO PRECEDENCE

IMMEDIATE

SPECIAL HANDLING

NONE

DISTRIBUTION

FROM: DIRNSA

DATE: 01 AUGUST 1964

ADP

ADN

P05

P04

B

B2

B22

B26

DRF

P055

NSA25X1  
NSA25X3

TO: COMSEVENTHFLEET

CINCPACFLT

INFO: JCS

NSAPAC REP VIETNAM ~~(c)~~

CNO

HQ NSAPAC

SSO MACV

NSAPAC REP PHIL

USN-27

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

B205/241-64

SUBJ: POSSIBLE PLANNED ATTACK BY DRV NAVY ON DESOTO PATROL

USN-27 SPOT REPORT 2/Q/VHN/R26-64/011924Z REPORTS SIGINT

SUGGESTIONS THAT DRV NAVY MAY INTEND ATTACK UPON DESOTO PATROL.

FYI, IN RELATION TO THIS POSSIBILITY, DRV NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS

OF 30 AND 31 JULY REPORT AN ATTACK ON HON ME ISLAND (19-21N/105-

56E) AND INDICATE DRV INTENTIONS AND PREPARATIONS TO

REPULSE FURTHER SUCH ATTACKS. DUE THESE REPORTED ATTACKS BY VESSELS

IDENTIFIED IN DRV COMMUNICATIONS ONLY AS "ENEMY", AND THE INDICATED

SENSITIVITY ON PART OF DRV AS WELL AS THEIR INDICATED

PREPARATIONS TO COUNTER POSSIBLE THE DRV REACTION TO DESOTO

TAB 8

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

020250

Z

D.C. LANG LTCOL USAF 5174s

D.C. LANG LTCOL USAF CH B205

PAGE

PAGES

1 OF 2

DOCUMENT MARKING

AGI NR.

AGO NR.

08001/02

DTG

020302Z

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGO

AGI

DTG

SUSPENSE

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

~~(confidential HVCCO until filled)~~

NSA FORM N2288 REV AUG 63  
(Supersedes N2288 REV JUN 61  
to be used until exhausted)

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

COPY NR.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

DISTRIBUTION

FROM:

DATE:

TO:

PATROL MIGHT BE MORE SEVERE THAN WOULD OTHERWISE BE ANTICIPATED.

USN-27 REPORTS DESOTO IN VICINITY OF HON ME AS OF APPROX 011924Z

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

Z

DOCUMENT MARKING

PAGE

PAGES

OF

AGI NR.

AGO NR.

REFERENCES TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

DTG

AGO

AGI

DTG

SUSPENSE

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

Z 022414Z ZYH

FM USN 27

TO DIST QUEBEC/MIKE

PLUS

NSA25X1  
NSA25X3

AND USN 4674

ZEM

~~SECRET KIMBO~~ 2/Q/VHN/R28-64 ST 220 FOLLOW UP NR 2 TO SPOT REPORT

2/Q/VHN/R26-64

DRV NAVY MAY ATTACK DESOTO PATROL

DRV COMMUNICATIONS ENTITIES CONTINUE ACTIVE BUT NO

OPERATIONAL TRAFFIC WAS INTERCEPTED BETWEEN 012213Z AND 02007Z.

INTERCEPT JUST AVAILABLE INDICATES THAT AT THAT TIME

THE POSITION OF THE DESOTO WAS REPORTED AS TWENTY-

NINE NAUTICAL MILES FROM THE MATT (18-47N 105-58E) MOVING

INTO THE DIRECTION OF HON ME (19-21N 105-56E). COMMENT:

MANEUVERS ON THE PART OF THE DESOTO PATROL TO CLEAR THE HON

ME AREA ARE PROBABLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE LULL IN ACTIVITY.

1080

TAB 9

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

NSA25X1  
NSA25X3

~~(confidential HVCCO until filled)~~

NSA FORM N2288 REV AUG 63  
(Supersedes N2288 REV JUN 61  
to be used until exhausted)

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

COPY NR.

ACTION PRECEDENCE  
IMMEDIATE

INFO PRECEDENCE  
PRIORITY

SPECIAL HANDLING  
NONE

FROM: DIRNSA

DATE: 02 AUGUST 1964

TO: USN-467N

INFO: [redacted]

USN-27

NSAPAC REP VIETNAM ~~(C)~~

DIRNAVSECGRUPAC

HQ NSAPAC

DISTRIBUTION

ADP

P05

P04

B

B2

B22

B26

DRF

NSA25X1

NSA25X3

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

B205/242-64

SUBJ: DESOTO TECH SUPPORT

FYI: DRV NAVAL FAST PATROL BOATS NOTED 25 JULY

OPERATING ON 131.20 (131,20) MCS. BOATS WERE USING TACTICAL

CALLS NR ONE AND NR TWO. CALL PROCEDURES WERE: "NR 1 CALLING  
NR 2", AND VICE VERSA

TAB 10

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

020404

Z

D.C. LANG LTCOL USAF 5174S

D.C. LANG LT COL USAF CH B20

PAGE

1

OF

PAGES

1

DOCUMENT MARKING

AGI NR.

AGO NR.

08002/02

DTG

020429Z

REFERENCES TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGO

AGI

DTG

SUSPENSE

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

O 121042Z

FM JCS

INFO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE

RUEPIA/CIA

RUEHCR/STATE

RUEPKR/NSA

020531Z

FM CTG 72.1

TO AIG 181

INFO RUMFZKCTG 77.5

RUMGZN/CTG 77.6

RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

JULY-AUGUST DESOTO SITREP THREE (S)

1. CTG 72.1 ORIG THIS MSG. SIGHTED THREE PT CRAFT TEN MILES NORTH OF HON ME ISLAND ON SOUTHERLY HEADING SPEED TWENTH AT 020430Z. CPA TO THIS UNIT SEVEN MILES. EVAL AS PROBABLE PAPA-FOURS. UNABLE TO IDENTIFY POSITIVELY DUE TO RANGE.
2. SIGHTED TWO PROBABLE SWATOW CLASS PGM NORTH OF HON ME AT 020515Z ON SOUTHERLY HEADING SPEED ONE FIVE KTS. ALL CRAFT APPEAR TO BE HEADING FOR VIC HON ME.

TAB 11

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

JULY-AUG DESOTO SITREP THREE

1. CTG 72.1 ORIG THIS MSG. ARRIVED VIC PT DELTA  
020500Z APPROX 75 JUNKS IN AREA. NO OTHER CRAFT  
VISIBLE WILL DEVIATE FM TRACK AS NECESSARY TO AVOID  
PASSING THRU JUNK CONCENTRATIONS. NO FURTHER  
EVID HOSTILE INTENT RECEIVED.
2. DO NOT HAVE CHICOM WITH ANY STA. PRESENTLY HAVE SET COMM  
WITH CTG 77.5 ON X CIRCUIT DELTA 30.1 FOXTROT

~~SECRET KIMBO~~



~~SECRET KIMBO~~

CRITIC

CRITIC

CRITIC

CRITIC

CRITIC

CRITIC

ZCZC

ZZ

DE

ZKZK ZZ ZZZ DE

ZYH

FM USN 27

TO DIRNSA

ZEM


~~S E C R E T K I M B O~~

DESOTO

1. FOLLOWING  EXTRACT FURNISHED FYI:

A. 020444Z/4D:

RECEIVED ORDERS - 146 - 142 DID ((1GR U)) USE HIGH SPEED TO  
GO TOGETHER WITH (ENEMY) FOLLOWING TO LAUNCH TORPEDOES. CHI  
CFT 02/0716 DTG 020717Z



NSA25X1 NSA25X3  
P.L. 86-36

TAB 12

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

20 July 1963

Dist: O/S

NONE Lateral CRITIC, Southeast Asia

AFSSO STRIKE

AFSSO 2 AD

OGA

CG 3RDMARDIV

CINCLANTFLT

CINCNELM

CINCPAC

CINCPACFLT

CINCUSNAVEUR

COMNAVFORJAPAN

CONTAIWANDEFCON (HS)

COMSEVENTHFLT

CUSASA


DIR NAVSECGRU

HQ NSAPAC

NEAAL



NSAPAC REP PHIL



NSAPAC REP VIETNAM (C)

PACSCYRGN

SSO BANGKOK

SSO HAWAII

SSO KOREA

SSO MACV

SSO OKINAWA

SSO PARIS

SSO USEUCOM

SSO ZAMA

USASAPAC


USAFSS




USA-32



USA-57



USM-9



USM-626

USM-626J



USN-27



Note: AFSSO USAF services CORKPOPPER addressees from original CRITIC message.

NSA25X1  
NSA25X3 P.L.  
86-36

Z 020920Z

FM JCS

INFO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE

RUEHCR/STATE

RUEPCR/NSA

Z 020834Z

FM PINCPACFLT

INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

RUEKDA/JCS

RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

Z 020826Z

FM CONSEVENTHFLT

INFO CNO

CINCPACFLT

COMNAVFOR JAPAN

Z 020807Z

FM CTG 72.1

TO COMSEVENTHFLT

CTG 77.5

CTG 77.6

BT

UNCLAS

BEING ATTACKED BY THREE DRV PT CRAFT. I AM OPEN FIRE WITH  
5 INCH BATTERY. AIR SUPPORT FROM TICO ETA 15 MIN.

TAB 13

~~SECRET~~

Z 020931Z

FM JCS

INFO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE

RUEHCR/STATE

RUEPCR/NSA

Z 020904Z

FM CINCPACFLT

INFO RUEKDA/JCS

RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

RUECW/CNO

Z 020808Z

FM CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT FIVE

TO TUATZL COMSEVENTHFLT

INFO RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT

RUXSMA/COMUSMACV

RUATZY/CTF SEVEN TWO

BT

~~SECRET~~

A. JULY/AUG DESOTO PATROL

1. MADDOX AT 25 KTS CLAIMS BEING PURSUED BY THREE HIGH SPEED  
45 KT SURFACE CRAFT.

2. ORIG PROVIDING FOUR F8E COVER ARMED WITH ZUNI AND FAMMO

3. INSTRUCTED NOT TO OPEN FIRE UNLESS MADDOX OR AIRCRAFT FIXED

UPON.

GP 3

TAB 14

~~SECRET~~

ZZ

P.L. 86-36

DE

15B 02/1349Z AUG

ZFH-2

Z 020841Z :::GENSER:::

FM COMSEVENTHFLT

INFO CNO

CINCPACFLT

COMNAVFORJAPAN

Z 020829Z :::GENSER:::

FM CTG 72.1

TO COMSEVENTHFLT

CTG 77.5

CTG 77.6

BT

U N C L A S

PT CRAFT COMPLETED TORPEDO ATTACK AND RETIRING. SHIP

SUSTAINED NO DAMAGE. SHIPS GUNS DAMAGED ONE. AIRCRAFT

FROM TICO NOW ATTACKING PT CRAFT. I AM RETIRING TO SOUTHEAST.

BT

TAB 15

~~SECRET~~

MZCZCTCZ029  
ZKZK ZZ ZSL DE  
EUH716  
J'''' ZZ RUEPCR  
DE RUEPCR 0262 0/2/0953  
Z 020952Z  
FM JCS  
INFO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE  
RUEHCR/STATE  
RUEPCR/NSA  
/0919Z  
FM CINCPACFLT  
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC  
RUEKDA/JCS  
RUECW/SECNAV  
RUMSMA/COMUSMACV  
RUATH/COMNAVFORJAPAN  
BT

~~SECRET~~

COMNAVFORJAPAN PASS TO SECNAV FOR INFO  
QUOTE  
Z 020859Z  
FM IOMSEVENTHFLY  
TO RUMGCR/CTG 72.1  
INFO RUMFZK/CTG 77.5  
RUMFZN/CTG 77.6  
RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT  
RUECW/CNO  
RUATH/COMNAVFORJAPAN  
RUMFZY/CTF 72  
RUMGCR/USS MADDOX  
BT

~~SECRET~~

Q. RETIRE FROM AREA UNTIL SITUATION CLEARS AND FURTHER ADVISED.  
DO NOT PURSUE ATTACKING CRAFT. FIRE AS NECESSARY IN SELF DEFENSE.  
2. REPORT PRESENT SITUATION.

~~GP-1~~  
BTT

~~SECRET~~

(unclassified until filled)

NSA FORM N2288 REV AUG 63  
(Supersedes N2288 REV JUN 61  
to be used until exhausted)

~~SECRET~~  
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

COPY NR.

ACTION PRECEDENCE  
FLASH

INFO PRECEDENCE  
FLASH

SPECIAL HANDLING  
~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~


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FROM: DIRNSA

DATE: 02 AUGUST 1964

TO: USN-27  
USM-626J  
USA-57  
USA-32

USM-9



ADP  
P05  
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B21  
B26  
B24  
DRF

NSA25X3 NSA25X6  
P.L. 86-36

INFO: HQ NSAPAC  
NSAPAC REP VIETNAM (e)

SUSLO (M)



NSAPAC REP PHIL



~~SECRET COMINT CHANNELS~~

B205/243-64

BJ: DRV VESSELS ATTACK DESOTO PATROL IN GULF OF TONKIN  
FYI THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION TRANSMITTED BY USS MADDOX  
(DESOTO PATROL VESSEL) TO COMSEVENTHFLT AND READDRESSED BY  
COMSEVENTHFLT TO CNO, CINCPACFLT, COMNAVFORJAP. ALL MESSAGES  
WERE FLASH PRECEDENCE AND UNCLASSIFIED.

MESSAGE NR ONE: SENT AT 020740Z: QUOTE I AM BEING APPROACHED BY  
HIGH SPEED CRAFT WITH APPARENT INTENTION OF TORPEDO ATTACK. INTEND  
OPEN FIRE IF NECESSARY IN SELF DEFENSE UNQUOTE.

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

D. C. LANG, LTCOL, 5174s

D. C. LANG, LTCOL, CH B205

DOCUMENT MARKING

RELEASED AT (ZULU)  
020945 Z

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

AGI NR.

AGO NR.  
08004/02

DTG

020947Z

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGO  
AGI  
DTG  
SUSPENSE

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

(unclassified until filled)

NSA FORM N2288 REV AUG 63  
(Supersedes N2288 REV JUN 61  
to be used until exhausted)

~~SECRET~~  
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

COPY NR.

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

DISTRIBUTION

FROM:

DATE:

TO:

MESSAGE NR TWO: SENT AT 020807Z: QUOTE BEING ATTACKED BY 3 DRV PT  
CRAFT. I AM OPENING FIRE WITH FIVE INCH BATTERY. AIR SUPPORT FROM  
TICONDIROGA ETA 15 MINUTES UNQUOTE

MESSAGE NR THREE: 020829Z: QUOTE PT CRAFT COMPLETED TORPEDO ATTACK  
AND RETIRING SHIP SUSTAINED NO DAMAGE. SHIPS GUN DAMAGED ONE  
((DRV PT BOAT)). AIRCRAFT FROM TICONDIROGA NOW ATTACKING PT  
CRAFT. I AM RETIRING TO SOUTHEAST UNQUOTE.

REQUEST EXTREME COLLECTION, PROCESSING AND REPORTING VIGILANCE ON  
PART OF ALL WITH REPORTING ACCOMPLISHED IAW ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES  
AND AT PRECEDENCE APPROPRIATE TO ACTIVITY. ESPECIALLY CONCERNED

REGARDS [ ] REACTION

NSA25X1  
NSA25X3

FOR [ ]: APPREC DESOTO SITREPS PASSED VIA TELECON. REQUEST YOU  
PASS ANY RECEIVED AFTER THREE AND ARRANGE FOR DIRNSA RECEIPT  
DIRECT FROM ORIGINATOR ALL FUTURE SITREPS

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (2020)

020945

Z

DOCUMENT MARKING

PAGE

PAGES

2

OF

2

AGI NR.

AGO NR.

08004/02

DTG

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGO

AGI

DTG

SUSPENSE

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET KIMBO~~

TAB 17

O 021232Z ZYH

FM USN 27

TO DIST QUEBEC/MIKE

PLUS

PLUS USN 467N

ZEM

NSA25X1  
NSA25X3

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

2/Q/VHN/R29-64 ST220 FOLLOW UP NR3 TO SPOT REPORT 2/Q/VHN/R26-64

DRV NAVY MAY ATTACK DESOTO PATROL

BETWEEN 020309Z - 020732Z DRV NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS CONTINUED

TO KEEP THE DESOTO UNDER CLOSE SURVEILLANCE. DURING THIS

PERIOD DRV NAVAL VESSELS WERE APPARENTLY GROUPING TO ATTACK

AS REFLECTED WHEN THE T-377 (T-379 POSSIBLY IN COMPANY)

ENTERED NORTHERN FLEET WATERS AND MAINTAINED CONTINUOUS

COMMUNICATIONS WITH PORT WALLUT. THIS PLACED A MINIMUM OF

FOUR DRV VESSELS IN THE IMMEDIATE AREA OF THE DESOTO

INCLUDING T-135, T-142, T-146. AN ATTACK WAS IMMINENT AT


020612Z WHEN UNIDENTIFIED SHORE STATION POSSIBLY SAM SON (19-43-30N

105-55E) ORDERED THE T-146 TO "LEAVE THE T-135 AND TURN BACK TO THE

PATH OF THE ENEMY ... TO ATTACK." NO  REFLECTION TO THE

DESOTO PATROL OBSERVED THRU END OF THIS REPORT.

~~SECRET KIMBO~~



NSA25X1  
NSA25X3

NSA25X1  
NSA25X3

NSA25X1  
NSA25X3

~~SECRET~~

O 021339Z

FM JCS

TAB 18

INFO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE

RUEHCR/STATE

RUEPIA/CIA

RUEPCR/NSA

021242Z

FM CINCPACFLT

INFO RUEKDA/JVV

RUECW/SECNAV

RUATH/COMNAVFORJAPAN

BT

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

COMNAVFORJAPAN NOT ADDEE PASS TO SECNAV

QUOTE

Z 020949Z

FM CTG 72.1

TO RUECW/CNO

RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT

RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

RUM /CTG 72

RUMGCR/USS TICONDEROGA

INFO RUWDED/COMCRUDESAC

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RUM:4/CTG 70.8

RUMGCR/USS TURNER JOY

RUMGCR/SSO MADDOX

BT

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

GULF OF TONKIN ACTION SITREP ~~(S)~~

1. MY POSITION AT 020915Z: 19-21.5N 106-46E. RETIRING AT BEST SPEED TO RDVU WITH TURNER JOY THENCE TICO UNODIR.

2. PRESENT SITUATION CALM. ANTICIPATE RDVU WITH TURNER JOY APPRO 021200Z. TICO AIRCRAFT PROVIDING CONTINUOUS AIR SUPPORT. MADDOX AIR RADAR INOP. TURNER JOY PROVIDING AIR DETECTION. VOICE COMY WITH CTG 77.5 ON CKT D30.1F.

3. ACTION SUMMARY FOLLOWS:

1. AT 020750Z 3 TORPEDO BOATS NEARING 268 TRUE; RANGE 11.5 NM  
PAGE TWO RUMGCR 020X

WERE DETECTED CLOSING MADDOX AT SPEED OF 50 KTS. MADDOX

2. MADDOX ATTEMPTED TO AVOID ON COURSE 150° SPEED 27 KTS.

3. AT 0808Z WHEN BOATS CLOSED TO 9000 YARDS MADDOX TURNED TO COURSE 150° TRUE AND FIRED 3 WARNING SHOTS WITH 5 INCH BATTER.

4. TORPEDO BOATS CONTINUED TO CLOSE AND WERE TAKEN UNDER CONTINUOUS FIRE.

5. ALTHOUGH RECEIVING NUMEROUS HITS AND NEAR MISSED 2 BOATS CLOSE TO ABOUT 5000 YARDS AND BECAUSE OF VOLUME OF FIRE MADE AN INEFFECTIVE LAUNCH OF 2 TORPEDOES. MADDOX TURNED AWAY AND

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

TORPEDOES PASSED ON STARBOARD SIDE FROM AFT TO FORWARD. THIRD TORPEDO BOAT HAD PULLED ALMOST ABEAM BY 0821Z. HE TURNED TO CLOSE AND AT TIME OF RECEIVING DIRECT HIT DROPPED TORPEDO IN WATER BUT IT WAS NOT OBSERVED TO RUN.

7. MACHINE GUN FIRE FROM PT BOATS RESULTED IN ONLY ONE HIT ON MADDOX AND NO CASUALTIES.

8. AFTER BOATS TURNED AWAY MADDOX TURNED TO PURSUE UNTIL RELIEVED BY TICO AIRCRAFT.

~~GP 1~~

BT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

O 021217Z

FM JCS

INFO RUEHCR/STATE

RUEPIA/CIA

RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE

RUEPCR/NSA

Z 021114Z

FM CINCPACFLT

INFO RUECW/SECNAV

RUEKDA/JCS

RUATH/COMNAVFORJAPAN

~~SECRET~~ COMNAVFORJAPAN NOT ADDEE PASS TO SECNAV

QUOTE

Z 021008Z

FM CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT FIVE

TO COMSEVENTHFLT

CINCPACFLT

CINCPAC

CNO

CTG SEVEN TWO

COMUSMACV

~~SECRET~~

TORP ATTACK

SITREP NR. ONE

TAB 19

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

AT MSG RECEIVED FROM MADDOX QUOTE AM BEING APPROACHED BY HIGH  
SPEED CRAFT WITH APPARENT INTENTION OF TORPEDO ATTACK. INTEND  
TO OPEN FIRE IF NECESSARY SELF DEFENSE. UNQUOTE. TURNER JOY WHO WAS  
ON WATCH DOG STATION FOR CTG 77.5 YANKEE TEAM OPS AT/N17-31 108-00E  
WAS ORDERED TO PROCEED TO ASSIST MADDOX. AT 020805Z FLASH MESSAGE  
WAS SENT TO COMSEVENTHFLT, INFO CINCPACFLT, CTG 72, COMUSMACV HAT CTG  
77.5 WAS PROVIDING FOUR F8'S FOR AI COVER MADDOX WITH ORDERS NOT TO  
PAGE 2 RUHLHL 0284 ~~SECRET~~  
FIRE UNLESS MADDOX FIRED UPON. THESE ACFT WERE ORBITING TURNER JOY  
HAVING BEEN PREVIOUSLY LAUNCHED FROM TICO AT 020710Z. MADDOX REPORTED  
IN MESSAGE RECEIVED TICO AT 021515 THAT QUOTE IT IS BEING ATTACKED BY  
DRV PT CRAFT, AND THAT HE WAS OPENING UP WITH 5 INCH BATTERY. UNQUOTE.  
WORD PASSED TO WATCH DOG F8'S TO ATTACK THE DRV PATROL BOAT ONLY IF  
THEY ATTACKED MADDOX. ON ARRIVAL OVER MADDOX, MADDOX WAS OPENING  
FIRE WITH 5 INCH BATTERIES AND DIRECTED AIRCRAFT TO ATTACK PT BOATS.  
ZNI ATTACKS MADE FIRST. NO DIRECT HITS OBSERVED. STRAFING ATTACKS  
MADE ON ALL THREE BOATS. PILOTS DEBRIEFED REPORTED ONE PT BOAT  
DAMAGED AND DEAD IN THE WATER, TWO PT BOATS DAMAGED AND PROCEEDING  
TO BEACH, SECOND FLIGHT OF FOUR F8'S VECTORED TO MADDOX BUT ORDERED  
NOT TO PURSUE PT CRAFT PURSUANT TO SEVENTH FLEET MSG 020859Z F8'S  
DIRECTED TO ORBIT POSITION BUT TO HOLD FIRE UNLESS PT CRAFT RESUMED  
ATTACKS. WHEN THIS FLIGHT DEPARTED MADDOX LAST REPORT ONE PT TRAILING.  
MADDOX REPORTS NO PERSONNEL OR MATERIAL CASUALTIES. MORE FOLLOWS.

~~GP-3~~

~~SECRET~~

(unclassified until filled)

NSA FORM N2288 REV AUG 63  
(Supersedes N2288 REV JUN 61  
to be used until exhausted)

~~SECRET~~  
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

COPY NR.

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

FLASH


IMMEDIATE

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

FROM: DIRNSA

DATE: 02 AUGUST 1964

TO: USN-27  
USM-626J  
USA-57  
USA-32



USM-9

INFO: HQ NSAPAC  
NSAPAC REP VIETNAM (C)

NSAPAC REP PHIL

SUSLO (M)

DISTRIBUTION

ADP  
P05  
P055  
P04  
B  
B2  
B22  
B26  
B23  
DRF  
NSA25X1  
NSA25X3  
NSA25X6 P.L.  
86-36

TAB 20

~~SECRET/VOMINT CHANNELS~~

B205/244-64

SUBJ: DRV NAVAL ATTACK ON DESOTO PATROL

FURTHER MY B205/243. USS MADDOX REPORTED AT APPROX 020838Z THAT ONE  
DRV PT BOAT WAS DEAD IN THE WATER AND BURNING AND THAT OTHER TWO  
PT BOATS WERE HEADED FOR THE BEACH. BELIEVE IT LIKELY THAT SEARCH  
AND RESCUE OPERATION WILL BE CONDUCTED BY DRV VESSELS THUS  
INCREASING LIKLIHOOD OF REFLECTIONS AND FURTHER ACTIVITY. DESOTO  
ARRIVED VICINITY 19-47N 106-08E AT APPROX 020300Z WHERE IT WAS TO  
ORBIT FOR EIGHT HOURS. MADE DEVIATION FROM TRACK TO AVOID PASSING  
THRU LARGE CONCENTRATION OF JUNKS THERE BUT ATTACK ON DESOTO  
(ROUGHLY FIVE HOURS LATER (0807Z)) PROBABLY IN VICINITY OF ABOVE  
COORDINATES. BURNING PT BOAT PRESUMABLY SAME GENERAL AREA

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

D. C. LANG, LTCOL, USAF, 5174s

D. C. LANG, LTCOL, CH B205

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

021120 Z

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

AGI NR.

AGO NR.  
08005/02

DTG

021124Z

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGO  
AGI  
DTG  
SUSPENSE

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

O 021226Z VYH

FM CINCPACFLT

TO USN 27


USM 626J

USN 414T

INFO COMNAVFORJAPAN

COMSEVENTHFLT

NSA25X1  
NSA25X3



TAB 21

ZEN/DIRNAVSECGRUPAC

DIRNAVSECGRU

DIRNSA

NSAQAC

CNO

CINCPAC

~~SECRET~~ COMINT CHANNELS

1. FOLLOWING CINCPACFLT MSG (DTG 021104Z) TO CINCPAC AND COMSEVENTH-  
FLT QUOTED FOR YOUR INFO:

DESOTO PATROL (U)

A. CINCPACFLT 141203Z JULY NOTAL

1. IN VIEW MADDOX INCIDENT CONSIDER IT IN OUR INTEREST THAT WE  
ASSERT RIGHT OK FREEDOM OF THE SEAS AND RESUME GULF OF TONKIN  
PATROL EARLIEST.

2. FOR COMSEVENTHFLT. UNODIR, CONDUCT PATROL WITH TWO DESTROYERS,  
RESUMING ASAP. WHEN READY, PROCEED TO POINT CHARLIE ARRIVING FIRST  
DAY THENCE PATROL NORTHWARD TOWARD POINT DELTA DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RETIRE TO THE EASE DURING HOURS OF DARKNESS. ON SECOND DAY PROCEED TO POINT DELTA THENCE PATROL SOUTH TOWARD POINT CHARLIE RETIRING AT NIGHT AS BEFORE. ON THIRD DAY PROCEED TO POINT LIMI AND PATROL TOWARD POINT MIKE, RETIRING TO EAST AT NIGHT. ON FOURTH DAY PROCEED TO POINT MIKE AND PATROL TOWARD POINT NOEMBER, RETIRING AT NIGHT. ON FIFTH DAY, RETURN TO NOEMBER AND RETIRE TO SOUTH THROUGH POINTS OSCAR AND PAPA AND TERMINATE PATROL. CPA TO NORTH VIETNAMESE COAST EIGHT NM. CPA TO NORTH VIETNAMESE ISLAND FOUR NM. ABOVE POINTS AS SPECIFIED IN REF A. PATROL SHIPS ARRIVE INITIAL POINT OF TRACK ONE HOUR AFTER SUNRISE EACH DAY AND DEPART TRACK ONE HOUR PRIOR SUNSET. CLEAR TO SEAWARD DURING PERIODS OF REDUCED VISIBILITY.

2. REQUEST ALL SIGINT INDICATIONS OF DR OR [REDACTED] REACTION TO RESCHEDULED DESOTO PATROL BE REPORTED BY MOST EXPEDITIOUS MEANS TO CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, COMSEVENTHFLT, COMNAVFORJAPAN AND [REDACTED]

NSA25X1  
NSA25X3

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

O 021232Z ZYH

FM USN 27

TO DIST QUEBEC/MIKE

PLUS [REDACTED]

PLUS USN 467N

NSA25X1  
NSA25X3 P.L.  
86-36

~~S E C R E T K I M B O~~

2/Q/VHN/R29-64 ST220 FOLLOW UP NR 3 TO SPOT REPORT 2/Q/VHN/R26-64

DRV NAVY MAY ATTACK DESOTO PATROL

BETWEEN 020309Z - 020732Z DRV NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS CONTINUED TO

KEEP THE DESOTO UNDER CLOSE SURVEILLANCE. DURING THIS PERIOD

TAB 22

DRV NAVAL VESSELS WERE APPARENTLY GROUPING TO ATTACK AS REFLECTED

WHEN THE T-377 (T-379 POSSIBLY IN COMPANY) ENTERED NORTHERN FLEET

WATERS AND MAINTAINED CONTINUOUS COMMUNICATIONS WITH PORT WALLUT.

THIS PLACED A MINIMUM OF FOUR DRV VESSELS IN THE IMMEDIATE AREA OF

THE DESOTO INCLUDING T-135, T-142, T-146. AN ATTACK WAS IMMINENT

AT 020512Z WHEN UNIDENTIFIED SHORE STATION POSSIBLY SAM SON (19-43-

30N 105-55E) ORDERED THE T-146 TO "LEAVE THE T-135 AND TURN BACK

TO THE PATH OF THE ENEMY ... TO ATTACK." NO [REDACTED] REFLECTION TO

THE DESOTO PATROL OBSERVED THRU END OF THIS REPORT.

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

BT

NSA25X1  
NSA25X3

NSA25X1  
NSA25X3

NSA25X1  
NSA25X3



NSA25X1  
NSA25X3

~~SECRET~~

P.L. 86-36

OO

DE  42B 02/2331Z AUG

O 021443Z (CENSER)

FM CTU 72.1.2

TO AIG 181

INFO CNO

(MANY OTHERS)

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN (CENSER)

25X4

JULY-AUGUST DESOTO 021200Z OPSUM

A. CINCPACFLT 021104Z NOTAL

B. COMSEVENTHFLT 021255Z NOTAL.

TAB 23

1. CTG 72.1 ORIG THIS MSG. MILITARY SIGHTINGS CONTAINED MY SITSUM 3.

2. FOR ADDEES THIS MSG NOT INCLUDED AS ADDEES MY ACTION REPORTS:

MADDOX ATTACKED BY 3 DRV P-4 CRAFT AT TIME 020750Z AT POSITION 19-47N

106-31.1E. EVAL THESE CRAFT AS SAME S P-4 REPORTED SITSUM 3.

ANTICIPATING ATTACK MADDOX HAD OPENED POINT DELTA 15 MILES TO SEAWARD

PRIOR TO PURSUIT BY P-FOURS. MADDOX SPEED  P-4 SPEED 50

KNOTS AT 020808, RANGE 9000 YARDS, MADDOX FIRED 3 WARNING SHOTS WHICH

WERE UNHEEDED. MADDOX THEN TOOK P-FOURS UNDER FIRE. 3 TORPEDO FIRINGS

OBSERVED. 2 PASSED DOWN STARBOARD SIDE AFTER 90 DEGREE PORT TURN.

OTHER TORPEDO NOT OBSERVED TO RUN. 30 CAL MACHINE GUN FIRE ALSO

EXPERIENCED. NO MATERIAL OR PERSONNEL CASUALTIES TO MADDOX. ALL

3 P-FOURS HIT BY GUNFIRE. 1 APPEARED HIT AND BURNING. REMAINING 2

RETIRED TO WEST. MADDOX RETIRED TO NE AND DIRECTED F8A AIRCRAFT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FROM TICO ONTO P-FOURS. MADDOX PRESENTLY IN COMPANY WITH TURNER JOY PROCEEDING 17-30N 108-00E FOR UNREP FROM ASHTABULA. COMPL UNREP INTEND PROCEED IAW REFS A AND B. 3 CHICOM COMM UNSAT TO DATE. UNODIR AM GUARDING CKT D30.1F (TG77.5 CID) WHICH HAS BEEN SAT FROR COMM WITH TG 77. UNITS. DURATT UNSAT TO DATE. ALL RECENT TRAFFIC PASSED VIA SHIP/SHORE.

4. MATERIAL DEFICIENCIES: MADDOX AN/SPS40 INOP. EXPECT SAT BY MORNINGS TURNER JOY AN/SPG53 RADAR INOP ETR INDEF.

5. IT IS APPARENT THAT DRV HAS CUT DOWN THE GUANTLET AND NOE CONSIDERS ITSELF AT WAR WITH US. IT IS FELT THAT THEY WILL ATTACK US FORCES ON SIGHT WITH NO REGARD FOR COST. U.S. SHIPS IN THE GULF OF TONKIN CAN NO LONGER ASSUME THAT THEY WILL BE CONSIDERED NEUTUALS EXERCISING THE RIGHT OF FREE TRANSIT. THEY WILL BE TREATED AS BELLIGERENTS FROM FIRST DETECTION AND MUST CONSIDER THEMSELVES AS SUCH. DRV PTS HAVE ADVANTAGE ESPECIALLY AT NIGHT OF BEING ABLE TO HIDE IN JUNK CONCEN- TRATIONS ALL ACROSS THE GULF OF TONKIN. THIS WOULD ALLOW ATTACK FROM SHORT RANGE WITH LITTLE OR NR EARLY WARNING. PRESENT US-GUNNERY SUIT NOT TOO WELL FITTED FOR ANTI-PT EVEN IN DAYLIGHT. SHORT HULL DD SUCH AS MADDOX TOO SHORT LEGGED FOR LONG PATROL WHERE HIGH SPEEDS ARE REQUIRED AS IN PT EVASION. CONSIDER RESUMPTION OF PATROL CAN ONLY BE SAFELY UNDERTAKEN BY DD, CL/CA TEAM AND WITH CONTINUOUS AIR COVER.

~~GP-3~~

~~SECRET~~

ACTION PRECEDENCE  
IMMEDIATE

INFO PRECEDENCE  
IMMEDIATE

SPECIAL HANDLING  
NONE

DISTRIBUTION

FROM: DIRNSA

DATE: 2 AUGUST 1964

TO: USN-27  
USA-57  
USM-626J

USA-32  
[redacted]  
USM-9

[redacted]  
USN-414T

ADN  
ADP  
P05 NSA25X3  
P04 NSA25X6 P.L.  
D31 86-36  
D32 NSA25X1  
B  
B2  
B22  
B23  
B24  
B21  
B26  
AUSLO  
DRF  
P055  
ADNSG

INFO: HQ NSAPAC

[redacted]  
NSAPAC REP VIETNAM (c)  
NSAPAC REP PHIL

[redacted]  
SUSLO (M)

[redacted]

CUSASAPAC  
PACSECRGM  
DIRNAVSECGRUPAC  
CUSASA  
USAFSS  
DIRNAVSECGRU  
ASSTDIRNAVSECGRU

[redacted]

TAB 24

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

B205/245

SUBJECT: SIGINT READINESS BRAVO LANTERN

1. IN VIEW OF ATTACK BY NORTH VIETNAMESE VESSELS ON U.S.S.  
MADDOX (DESOTO PATROL) IN GULF OF TONKIN ON NIGHT OF 1/2 AUGUST,  
AND INTENT TO CONTINUE DESOTO PATROL WITH TWO U.S. DESTROYERS

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

D. C. LANG, LTCOL, USAF, 5174

D. C. LANG, LTCOL, CH B205

021540 Z

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

AGI NR.

AGO NR.  
08006/02

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

DTG

021615Z

AGO  
AGI  
DTG  
SUSPENSE

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

DISTRIBUTION

FROM:

DATE:

TO:

FOR FIVE DAYS BEGINNING 3 AUGUST, SIGINT READINESS BRAVO LANTERN  
IS DECLARED AT ACTION ADDRESSES THIS MESSAGE.

2. REPORTING TO BE ACCOMPLISHED IAW FOLLOWING:

A. ALL FIELD STATIONS REPORT DRV [ ] REFLECTIONS/

REACTIONS TO DESOTO PATROL AS OBSERVED IAW TECHINS 4014 AND 4019

AT PRECEDENCE APPROPRIATE TO SIGNIFICANCE OF ACTY. ASSURE THAT

CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, COMSEVENTHFLT, COMNAVFORJAPAN, NSAPAC REP

VIETNAM, AND [ ] ARE INCLUDED AS RECIPIENTS ALL REPORTS,

WRITING IN TO ESTABLISHED DISTRIBUTIONS AS REQUIRED. SIX HOUR

REPORTING NOT RPT NOT REQUIRED. IMPORTANT THAT TECH DATA

FORMING BASIS ALL REPORTS BE FORWARDED SOONESE POSSIBLE TO

[ ] DIRNSA, [ ] FLAG ALL REPORTS SIGINT READINESS BRAVO

LANTERN.

B. [ ] WILL PROVIDE TIMELY WRAP-UP REPORT AS

REQUIRED OF ALL [ ] REFLECTIONS/REACTIONS.

C. DIRNSA WILL PROVIDE TOTAL TIMELY WRAP-UP [ ] DRV

REFLECTIONS/REACTIONS AS REQUIRED.

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

Z

DOCUMENT MARKING

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OF

AGI NR.

AGO NR.

08006/02

DTG

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

GO  
AGI  
DTG  
SUSPENSE

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

NSA25X1  
NSA25X3

NSA25X3  
NSA25X6 P.L.  
86-36  
NSA25X1

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~  
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

COPY NR.

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

DISTRIBUTION

FROM:

DATE:

TO:

NSA25X6

3. FOR  APPREC YOU ARRANGE SUCH  PARTICIPATION AS  
YOU DEEM APPROPRIATE.

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

Z

DOCUMENT MARKING

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3

AGI NR.

AGO NR.

08006/02

DTG

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

GO

AGI

DTG

SUSPENSE

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

O 021628Z ZYH

FM DIRNSA

TO OSCAR VICTOR ALFA

[Redacted]

NSA25X1  
NSA25X3

USN 414T

COMNAVFOR JAPAN

[Redacted]

NSA25X1  
NSA25X3 P.L.  
86-36

ADDEUR

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~ 3/O, [Redacted] /R15-64

SIGINT READINESS BRAVO LANTERN ESTABLISHED

TAB 25

IN VIEW OF HOSTILE DRV REACTION TO THE CONTINUING DESOTO PATROL,  
SIGINT READINESS BRAVO LANTERN IS HEREBY ESTABLISHED AT USN-27,  
USA-57, USM-626J, USA-32, [Redacted] USM-9, [Redacted] AND USN-414T.  
SIGINT INDICATIONS OF DRV, [Redacted] REFLECTIONS OR REACTIONS WILL  
BE REPORTED AT APPROPRIATE PRECEDENCE AS THEY BECOME AVAILABLE.

[Redacted] WILL ACCOMPLISH TIMELY SUMMARY REPORTING OF [Redacted]

DEVELOPMENTS. DIRNSA WILL ACCOMPLISH ALL SOURCE SUMMARY REPORTING  
IN THE 3/O, [Redacted] SERIES AS REQUIRED.

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

~~SECRET~~

P.L. 86-36

OO

DE

3B 03/0350Z AUG

O 022330Z :::CENSER:::

FM CTU 72.1.2

TO AIG 181

INFO CNO

CTG 77.5

CTG 77.6

COMUSMACV

DIRNSA

USS MADDOX

USS TURNER JOY

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

JULY-AUGUST DESOTO SITSUM 4 ~~(S)~~

A. JCS 021725Z NOTAL

B. CINCPACFLT 021104Z NOTAL

1. CTC 72.1 ORIG THIS MSG MY POSITION 1733N 108-07E. COURSE  
305 DEGREES, SPEED 20 KTS. UNODIR PROCEEDING TO IMPLEMENT REF  
B AS APPROVED BY REF A. ETA POINT C 030640Z.

TAB 26

2. ON ARRIVAL POINT C INTEND CONDUCT PATROL OUTLINED REF B  
OUTSIDE 11 NAUTICAL MILE CPA TO MAINLAND STIPULATED REF A.  
INTEND TO BE MINIMUM 15 MILES SEAWARD OF PATROL TRACK BY  
DARKNESS.

~~GP-3~~

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET KIMBO~~

Z 030956Z ZYH

FM USM 626J

TO GOLF ELEVEN/ALFA

TO COMUSTDC

COMNAVFORJAPAN

[REDACTED]

NSA25X1  
NSA25X3

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

2/G11/VHN/R07-64 SIGINT READINESS BRAVO, [REDACTED] REPORT NR 2 ST220

DRV PATROL VESSELS POSSIBLY CONVERGING ON HON ME.

DRV VESSELS FIRST REPORTED PRESENCE OF 2 DESTROYERS

AT 0837Z, BEARING 179, RANGE 25 NAUTICAL MILES,

COURSE 0 (ZERO).

SINCE THAT TIME, HAIPHONG HAS ASKED VESSEL T142

IF IT NEEDED ANY CATEGORY OF SHIP (AT HON ME). AT

0845Z, VESSEL T333 REPORTED T339 SUNK, AND THAT T333

AND 336 WERE ((ENROUTE)).

TOTAL NUMBER OF DRV PATROL VESSELS OBSERVED AS OF

0905Z IS SIX (6): T-135, 142, 146, 165, 333 AND 336.

TAB 27

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

NSA25X1  
NSA25X3

NSA25X1  
NSA25X3

~~SECRET~~

P.L. 86-36

OO

DE  7B 03/1405Z JUL

O 030745Z CENSER

FM CTG 72.1

TO AIR 181

INFO CTG 77.5

CTG 77.6

COMUSMACV.

DIRNSA

USS MADDOX

USS TURNER JOY

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

JULY AUGUST DESOTO SITSUM 5 (3)

1. CTG 72.1 ORIG THIS MSG. PATROL ARRIVED VIA PT CHARLIE 030('2Z

NO UNUSUAL ACTIVITY NOTED THUS FAR

2. INTEND PATROL FROM HATS CHARLIE TO DELTA THEN RETIRE TO EAST

PRIOR DARKNESS. CONDITION ONE SET UNTIL RETIREMENT. CTG 77.5

PROVIDING CONTINUOUS CAP OVERHEAD.

3. MADDOX AIR RADAR NOW OPERATIVE.

4. DETECTED PROBABLE SKIN HEAD RADAR BEARING 330 TRUE AT 030620Z

TAB 28

INDICATING POSSIBLE SURVEILLANCE MY MOVEMENTS.

~~GP-3~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

P.L. 86-36

OO   
DE  21B 03/2346Z AUG  
O <sup>03/546Z</sup> ~~SECRET~~ CENSER

FM CTU 72.1.2

TO AIG 181 (CNO)

INFO CTG 77.5

CTG 77.6

COMUSMACV

DIRNSA

USS TURNER JOY

USS MADDOX

CTU 72.2.3

CTG 70.8

CTF 72

NAVSECGRU ACT FUTEA

CTG 72.1

CTU 72.1.0

DIA JACE/AJCC

OSD/ISA

~~NAVSECGRU~~ DET COMUSTDC

NACPA

NEACP

JCS (JRC)

6925 SG CLARK AFB

TAB 29

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

JULY-AUGUST DESOTO SIGSUM 6 (S)

A. MY 031403Z

1. MY 031220Z POSITION 18-45N 107-16E NIGHT STEAMING PER  
REF A. HOLD SURFACE CONTACT 0- DEGREES TRUE RANGE 38.5  
MILES. CONTACT HAS PARALLELED MY MOVEMENTS INCLUDING  
ZIG-ZAGGING WITH ME FOR PAST HOUR. TURNER JOY HOLDS EGM  
CONTACT EAL SKIN HEAD RADAR IN SAME BEARING. STRONGLY  
SUSPECT SHADOWING BY BLOC PATROL/PT CRAFT

~~GP-3~~

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

~~(confidential HVCCO until filled)~~

NSA FORM N2288 REV AUG 83  
(Supersedes N2288 REV JUN 61  
to be used until exhausted)

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

COPY NR.

ACTION PRECEDENCE  
IMMEDIATE

INFO PRECEDENCE  
PRIORITY

SPECIAL HANDLING  
NONE

FROM: DIRNSA

DATE: 3 AUGUST 1964

TO: NSAPAC REP PHIL

INFO: HQ NSAPAC

DISTRIBUTION

ADP  
P05  
B  
B2  
B22  
B26

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

B205/251/64 WP 113

SUBJ: DESOTO SUPPORT

1. HAVE INDICATIONS THAT USN-27 AND USS MADDOX WERE IN COMMUNICATIONS PRIOR TO 2 AUGUST INCIDENT. REQUEST YOU PROVIDE BY IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE RUN-DOWN SUCH COMMS. PARTICULARLY NEED INFO ON ANY EARLY WARNING WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN PASSED TO INCLUDE NATURE OF WARNING AND TIME.

INFO NEEDED TO ROUND-OUT DOCUMENTATION OF SIGINT SUPPORT TO THE MADDOX PRIOR TO THE ATTACK. 2. FYI ALL CONCERNED MOST GRATIFIED WITH ROLE OF SIGINT PRODUCERS, EXPECT APPROPRIATE BOUQUETS WILL BE FORTHCOMING

M/R: Request for field activity action in support of B2 effort to document SIGINT support to the USS MADDOX prior to the attack by DRV Naval craft on 2 August.

DRAFTER

*L. C. Grant*  
L. C. GRANT, B205/5174S

RELEASING OFFICER

*D. C. Lang*  
D. C. LANG, LTCOL, CH B205

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

040010

Z

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AGI NR.

AGI NR.

08001/04

RRS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

DTG

TAB 30

AGO N

AGI O

DTG N

SUSPENSE E

040028Z

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

~~(confidential HVCCO until filled)~~

NSA FORM N2288 REV AUG 63  
(Supersedes N2288 REV JUN 61  
to be used until exhausted)

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

COPY NR.

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

NONE

FROM: NSAPAC REP PHIL

DATE: 5 AUG 64

ACT:

B2

TO: DIRNSA

ADV COPY: B2

INFO:

ADP

B

B22

B26

P05

DRF

INFO: HQ NSAPAC

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

F42/7580 PW 105

SUBJ: DESOTO SUPPORT

REF: B205/251 040028Z

1. REGRET EXCESSIVE DELAY IN RESPONSE. COMMUNICATIONS  
DIFFICULTIES DELAYED RECEIPT OF INFO HERE.

2. INFO FORWARDED TO MADDOX CONSISTED OF THE SEVERAL  
REPORTS ISSUED DURING THE PERIOD (2/Q/VHN/R25, 27, 28 AND  
29) PLUS A NUMBER OF TRANSMISSIONS CONTAINING PARTIAL  
TRANSLATIONS/GISTS OF INTCPD MSGS ALONG WITH THEIR TIMES  
G INTCPT. HERewith CHRONOLOGICAL LISTING OF THESE  
TRANSMISSIONS (READ DTG OF XMISSION, TEXT OR SERIAL NR  
OF REPT). 010535Z: BADLY GARBLED MSG FROM BEN THUY TO  
PXI ENTITY REPORTS SIGHTING ENEMY VESSEL 20 NAUTICAL  
MILES FROM LY MUA (17-38N 106-30E) BEARING ((0))50

DRAFTER

EJL/RC/5-3-55

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

Z

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1 of 3

AGI NR.

46295

AGO NR.

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGO

AGI

DTG

SUSPENSE

DTG.

051025Z

~~SECRET KIMBO~~



~~(confidential HVCCO until filled)~~

NSA FORM N2288 REV AUG 63  
(Supersedes N2288 REV JUN 61  
to be used until exhausted)

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

COPY NR.

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

DISTRIBUTION

FROM:

DATE:

TO:

DEGREES. TOI: 311920Z 0'0546Z: 2/Q/VHN/R25-64

011300Z. 377 (U/I AS TO TYPE/CLASS) LOCATED EAST OF HON NGUS

(18-47-48N 105-45-08 ELM TOI 011230Z. 011720Z: AT 011627Z

BEN THUY SENT A MESSAGE TO 255 ((UNIDENT AS TO TYPE/CLASS))

INFORMING THEM IT HAD BEEN DECIDED TO FIGHT THE ENEMY TONIGHT.

255 WAS ALSO QUERIED NF THEY HAD RECEIVED THE ENEMY'S CONSECUTIVE

CHANGE FROM 520 ((UNIDENT)). 011830Z: AT 011652Z AN UNIDENTIFIED

ENTITY SENT A MESSAGE TO COMPANY 510 ((PROBABLY OBSERVATION

STATION ON HON ME ISLAND 19-21N 105-56E)) AND SWATOW CLASS PGM

T146 INFORMING THEM THAT AT 011800G AN ENEMY TACK VESSEL WAS

ELEVEN NAUTICAL MILES SOUTHEAST OF HON ME ON A BEARING OF 168

DEGREES. ((MULTIPLE PART MSG INCOMPLETE)). 011846Z: AT 011755Z

PORT WALLUT INFORMED TE T146 THAT THREE VESSELS FROM BATTALION 135

((UNIDENT)) HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO ARRIVE AT ((C AL HOON NE)) ((17-54-40N

106-00-40E)) BEFORE 0300G ON 02 AUGUST. REMAINDER OF TEXT GARBLED.

012032Z: AT 011641Z MSG ZCLHEN UNIDENT ENTITIES INDIC THAT COP ON

HON ME IS "TO OBSERVE ALL SHIPS AND DIRECT SAME TO THEIR OBJECTIVE."

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (2020)

Z

DOCUMENT MARKING

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

AGI NR.  
46295

AGO NR.

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

DTG

051025Z

AGO

AGI

DTG

SUSPENSE

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

~~(confidential HVCCO until filled)~~

NSA FORM N2288 REV AUG 63  
(Supersedes N2288 REV JUN 61  
to be used until exhausted)

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

COPY NR.

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

DISTRIBUTION

FROM:

DATE:

TO:

SAME COP DIRECTED "TO INVESTIGATE LACH TRAY RIVER ESTUARY  
(20-49N 106-37E) SO THAT ON 02 AUG "SHIPS CAN BE DIRECTED TO  
ENTER AN NAP (20-35N 106-17E). IN VIEW PREVIOUS MSG INDIC  
DECISION TO REQUEAECO DESTOT BELIEVE ABOVE MAY INDIC THAT  
FISHING VESSELS TO BE CLEARED FROM VICINITY ON HON ME. ON  
31 JULY POSSIBLY 10 FISHING VESSELS ON HON ME. ON 31 JULY  
POSSIBLY 10 FISHING VESSELS OPERATING THIS AREA. 012058Z AT  
012013Z THE T377 ((SWATOW CLASS PGM)) NOTIFIED BEN THUY THAT  
THE UNIT LAUNCHED AT 0230G AND WAS WAITING QTE FIVE LIEN  
UNQTE NORTHWEST OF HON NGU.

012152Z: 2/Q/VHN/R27-64

020414Z: 2/Q/VHN/R28-64

021232Z: 2/Q/VHN/R29-64

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

Z

DOCUMENT MARKING

PAGE PAGES

3 OF 3

AGI NR. 46295

AGO NR.

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

DTG

061025Z

AGO  
AGI  
DTG  
SUSPENSE

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

Z O 041115Z ZYH

FM USN 414T

TO USN 467N

[Redacted]

INFO

[Redacted]

NSA25X1  
NSA25X3

USM 27

NSAPAC REP VIETNAM ~~(c)~~

DIRNSA

~~S E C R E T K I M B O~~

DESOTO

1. POSS DRV NAVAL OPERATION PLANNED AGAINST THE DESOTO PATROL

TONITE 04 AUG. AMPLIFYING DATA FOLS

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

TAB 32

Z 041140Z ZYH

FM USM 626J

TO GOLF ELEVEN/ALFA

[ ] /AFSSO CONAD  
[ ] /AFSSO SAC  
[ ] /AFSSO TAC

PLUS COMTAIWANDEF/COM/US

NSA25X3 P.L.  
86-36

COMNAVFORJAPAN

[ ]

USN 467N

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

2/G11/VHN/R11-64 SIGINT READINESS BRAVO, LANTERN, REPORT NUMBER 7

ST 220

IMMINENT PLANS OF DRV NAVAL ACTION POSSIBLY AGAINST DESOTO MISSION.

HAIPHONG INFORMED VESSEL T142 (SWATOW CLASS) TO MAKE READY FOR

MILITARY OPERATIONS THE NIGHT OF 04 AUGUST. THE SISTER SHIP, T-146

HAS ALSO RECEIVED SIMILAR ORDERS.

MESSAGE EXCHANGES INDICATE THAT ALL EFFORTS ARE BEING MADE TO

INCLUDE MTB T333 IN THIS OPERATION, AS SOON AS ADDITIONAL OIL CAN

BE OBTAINED FOR THAT VESSEL.

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

NSA25X1  
NSA25X3

NSA25X1  
NSA25X3

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

TAB 33

"To 145 & Cadre Khoai. [1 U] so that when you have orders the 146 can tow [4 gr M] the 336 back. If the tank truck hasn't yet come to supply you, then the 146 can transfer fuel to the 333. With regard to orders, the 333 will carry out military operations independently with 146. (Continued)

[continuation unavailable]

4 Aug 0927Z

USN 414T intercepted at 040927Z Date/time of file: 041558G

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

~~SECRET~~

Z 041408Z

FM JCS

INFO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE

RUECHR/STATE

RUEPIA/CIA

RUEPCR/NSA

RUECEM/CMC

Z 041240Z

FM CTU 77.12

TO AIG 181

INFO RUMFZK/J8RM/CTG 77.5

RUMFZN/H3WX/CTG 77.6

RUMJMA/COMUSMACV

RUEPCR/DIRNSA

RUMGCR/NENB/USS TURNER JOY

RUMGCR/NHHK/USS MADDOX

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

DESOTO (U)

1. RCVD INFO INDICATING ATTACK BY PGN P-4 IMMINENT. MY POSITION  
19-10N 107-00E. PROCEEDING SOUTHEAST. AT BEST SPEED

~~GP-3~~

TAB 34

~~SECRET~~



(confidential HVCCO unit filled)

NSA FORM N2288 REV AUG 63  
(Supersedes N2288 REV JUN 61  
to be used until exhausted)

~~SECRET KIMBO~~  
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

COPY NR.

ACTION PRECEDENCE  
PRIORITY

INFO PRECEDENCE  
PRIORITY

SPECIAL HANDLING  
NONE

DISTRIBUTION

FROM:

[Redacted]

DATE: 14 AUG 64

ACT  
INFO

B2

NSA25X1 NSA25X3  
P.L. 86-36

B

B22

B26

D32

P05

ADP

DRF

TO:

DIRNSA

ADV COPY SNOO

INFO:

HQ NSAPAC

DIRNAVSECGRUPAC

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

TAB 35

WARNING TO DESOTO PATROL (S)

A. YOUR 130413Z B205/270

1. FOL MSGS HELD [Redacted] RELATE TO WARNING OF ATTACK ON DESOTO AS REQ

REF A:

A. USN -27 011924Z 2/Q/VHN/R26-64 ST 220

B. USN-27 011944Z TECH SUP TO 2/Q/VHN/R26-64

C. USN-414T 020640Z (DIRNSA NOT ADDEE) QUOTED IN PART [Redacted]

FM VESSEL T142 TO PORT WALLUT: RCVD ORDERS - 146 - 142 DID ((1 GRU))

USE HIGH SPEED TO GO TOGETHER WITH (ENEMY) FOLLOWING TO LAUNCH

TORPEDOES."

D. USM-626J 020740Z 2/G11/VHN/R02-64

E. USN-414T 020805Z (DIRNSA NOT ADDEE) FOLLOW Q TO USN 414T

020640Z ABOVE AND QUOTED IN PART [Redacted] EXTRACT FM T 146 TO T 142,

ORDER 135 NOT TO MAKE WAR DURING THE DAY - (PRETEND) TO GO TO THE

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

Z

DON/GTR/14-3-50

PAGE

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1

OF

2

DOCUMENT MARKING

AGI NR.

48533

AGO NR.

DTG

140704Z

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGO

AGI

DTG

SUSPENSE

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

~~(confidential HVCCO until filled)~~

NSA FORM N2288 REV AUG 63  
(Supersedes N2288 REV JUN 61  
to be used until exhausted)

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

COPY NR.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

DISTRIBUTION

FROM:

DATE:

TO:

SHORE RETURN TO HON ME."

F. USN-27 021232Z 2/Q/VHN/R29-64

G. USN-414T 041115Z (NO SERIAL)

H. USM-626J 041140Z 2/G11/VHN/R11-64 ST 220

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

Z

DOCUMENT MARKING

PAGE

PAGES

2 OF 2

AGI NR.

48533

AGO NR.

DTG

140704Z

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGO

AGI

DTG

SUSPENSE

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

~~SECRET~~

Z 041336Z

FM CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT FIVE

TO RUATOQL/BVKG/COMSEVENTHFLT

INFO RUMGCF/J6FZ/CTG SEVEN TWO PT ONE

RUMGCF/H3WX/CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT SIX

~~S E C R E T~~

DESOTO PATROL (U)

1. CTG 72.1 REPORTS VIA CID NET TWO SKUNKS THREE BOGIES.
2. 2 F8'S, 2 A4D'S LAUNCHED 041326Z TO BE FOLLOWED BY 4 AIH'S FIFTEEN MINUTES LATER.

TAB 36

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Z 041617Z

FM JCS

INFO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE

RUEHCR/STATE

RUEPIA/CIA

RUEPCR/NSA

RUECEM/CMC

Z 04140Z

FM CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT FIVE

TO RUATZL/BVKG/COMSEVENTHFLT

RUATZY/T5GL/CTF SEVEN TWO

INFO RUEKC/ANMCC

RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT

RUECW/CNO

RUATH/COMNAVFORJAPAN

RUAMC/COMNAVFORKOREA

RUMFS/COMNAVPHIL

RUAGFL/COMUSTDC

RUATZZ/V4SZ/CTF SEVEN THREE

RUMGCF/J6FZ/CTG SEVEN TWO PT ONE

RUMGCF/Q0HS/CTG SEVEN TWO PT FOUR

RUMGCF/E5RX/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT

RUMGCF/03VL/CTU SEVEN TWO PT FOUR PT THREE

TAB 37

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RUEAHQ/DIA

RUEKDA/JCS

RUATNA/NAVSECGRUACT FUTEMA

RUATW/NAVSECGRUACT KAMI SEYA

RUAGFL/NAVSECGRUACT TAIPEI

RQKMJ/NEACP

RUACC/NECPA

RUEPDA/OSD/IFR

RUMGCF/H3WX/CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT SIX

RUMGCF/D9HO/CTU SEVEN TWO PT ONE PT TWO

RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

~~SECRET~~

DESOTO PATROL (U) SITREP NR 5

1. PT FROM WEST CONTINUED ATTACKING RUN. MADDOX OPENED FIRE. PT  
LAUNCHED TORPEDO - WITHDRAWING. HQ PT'S WILL BE ATTACKED BY TICO  
ACFT AUGMENTED BY CONSTELLATION ACFT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Z 041531Z

FM JCS

INFO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE

RUEHCR/STATE

RUEPIA/CIA

RUEPCR/NSA

RUECEM/CMC

Z 041434Z

FM CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT FIVE

TO RUATZL/BKG/COMSEVENTHFLT

RUATZHYPT5GL/CZL SEVEN TWO

INFO RUEKC/ANMCC

RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT

RUECW/CNO

RUATH/COMNAVFORJAPAN

RUAMC/COMNAVFORKOREA

RUMFS/COMNAVPHIL

RUAGFL/COMUSTDC

RUATZZ/4SZ/CTF SEVEN THREE

RUMGCF/J6FZ/CTG SEVEN TWO PT ONE

RUMCCG/Q0HS/CTG SEVEN TWO PT FOUR

RUMGCK/E5RX/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT

RUMGCF/O3VL/CTU SEVEN TWO PT FOUR PT THREE

TAB 38

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RUEAHQ/DIA

RUEKDA/JCS

RUATNA/NAVSECGRUACT FUTEMA

RUATW/NAVSECGRUAKT KAMI SEYA

RUACTL/NAVSECGRUACT TAIPEI

RUERG/NECPA

RUEKMJ/NEACP

RUEPDA/OSD/IFR

RUMGCF/H3WX/CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT SIX

RUMCCF/D9HO/CTU SEVEN TWO PT ONE PT TWO

RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

~~S E C R E T~~

DESOTO PATROL (U) SITREP NR 3

1. 2 ORIGINAL JUNKS OPEN TO 40 MILES. 3 NEW SKUNKS CONTACTED AT  
13 MILES, CLOSED TO 11 MILES AT 40 KNOTS, EVALUATED AS HOSTILE.

CAP/STRIKE/PHOTO OVERHEAD AND UNDER CONTROL OF DESOTO.

~~SECRET~~

Ø41442Z

FM CTG 72.1

TO RUHLHLWTCINCPACFLT

INFO RSKDA/JCS

RUECW/CNO

RUHLHL/CINCPAC

RUATZL/COMSEVENTHFLT

RUATZY/KTF 72

RUMFZKCTGUUMT

BT

UNCLAS

COMMENCED FIRING ON CLOSING PT BOAT Ø4144ØZ

TAB 39





Z 041559Z

FM JCS

TO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE

RUEHCR/STATE

RUEPIA/CIA

RUEPCR/NSA

RUECEM/CMC

Z 041452Z

TO RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT

INFO RUEKDA/JKS

RUECW/CNO

RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

RUATZL/BVKG/COMSEVENTHFLT

RUATZY/T5CL/CTE 72

RUMFZK/J8RM/CTG 77.5

TAB 40

BT

UNCLAS

AM UNDER CONTINUOUS TORPEDOES ATTACK

BT

Z 041610Z

FM JCS

INFO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE

RUEHCR/STATE

RUEPIA/CIA

RUEPCR/NSA

RUECEM/CMC

Z 041515Z

FM CTG 72.1

TO RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT

INFO RUEKDM/JCS

RUECW/CNO

RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

RUATW/COMSEVENTHFLT

RUATZK/T5GL/CTF 72

RUMFZK/J8RM/CTG 77.5

BT

UNCLAS

HAVE THUS FAR BEEN SUCCESSFULLY AVOIDED AT LEAST SIX TORPEDOES

SMALL CRAFT CONTINUING ATTACKS BELIEVE ONE SUNK BY TURNER JOY

AT LEAST TWO REMAIN NO AIR SUPPORT AT PRESENT ADS IND ADS INBOUND

ETA 15 MINUTES FRS INBOUND ETA 50 MINUTES AM ILLUMINATING FOR

AIRCRAFT.

TAB 41

O 041830Z

FM JCS

INFO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE

RUEHCR/STATE

RUEPIA/CIA

RUEPCR/NSA

RUECEM/CMC

041737Z

FM CINCPACFLT

INFO RUECW/CNO

RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

RUEKDA/JCS

Z 041616Z

FM NAVCOMMSTA PHIL

TO COMSEVENTHFLT

CINCPACFLT

USS TICONDEROGA

BT

UNCLAS

FOLLOWING RECD FROM CTG 72.1 WE THINK A PT BOAT SUNK ONE

OF ITS OWN BOATS

BT

TAB 42



~~SECRET~~

Z 041811Z

FM JCS

INFO RUPWW/WHITE HOUSE

RUEHCR/STATE

RUEPIA/CIA

RUEPCR/NSA

RUECEM/CMC

Z 041732Z

FM CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT FIVE

TO RUATZL/BVKG/COMSEVENTHFLT

RUATZY/T5GL/CTF SEVEN TWO

INFO RUEKC/ANMCC

RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT

RUECW/CNO

RUATH/COMNAVFORJAPAN

RUAMC/COMNAVFORKOREA

RUMFS/COMNAVPHIL

RUAGFL/COMUSTDC

RULTZZ/V4SZ/CTF SEVEN THREE

RUMGCF/J6FZ/CTG SEVEN TWO PT ONE

RUMGCF/Q0HS/CTG SEVEN TWO PT FOUR

RUMGCF/E5RX/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT

RUMGCF/03VL/CTU SEVEN TWO PT FOUR PT THREE

TAB 43

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RUEAHQ/DIF

RUEKDA/JCS

RUATNA/NAVSECGRUACT UTEMA

RUATW/NAVSECGRUACT KAMI SEYA

RUAGFL/NAVSECGRUACT TAIPEI

RUEKMJ/NEACP

RUERC/NECPA

RUEPDA/OSD/IFR

RUMGCF/H3WX/CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT SIX

RUMGCF/D9HO/CTU SEVEN TWO PT ONE PT TWO

RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

BT

~~SECRET~~

DESOTO PATROL (U) SITREP, 47

1. DESOTO REPORTS AT LEAST 21 TORPEDOES LAUNCHED - NO HITS.
2. THREE PT'S REPORTED SUNK.
3. WX OVER DESOTO PAST THREE HOURS VARIED 800 TO 3000 BROKEN, AEAT MILES VISIBILITY AND DETERIORATING, WHICH IS HAMPERING AIRCRAFT IN LOCATION OF TARGETS.
4. EIIS MOVED FROM MIDDLEMAN POSIT TO DESOTO TO ATTEMPT VECTOR PLANES TO CONTACTS. TWO F4'S ON THE SCENE AND 2 ABOUT TO LAUNCH.
5. NO TORPEDO FIRINGS LAST 15 MINUTES. DESOTO PATROL REPORTS NO CONTACTS ON SCREEN.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Z 041754Z

TO AIG 181

INFO RUMFZK/J8RM/CTG 77.5

RUMFZN/H3WX/CTG 77.6

RUEPCR/DIRNSA

RUMGCR/NENB/USS TURNER JOY

RUMLNR/NHTS/USS MADDOX

RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

DESOTO ACTION SITREP (S)

1. SITREP MADDOX AND JOY NOW APPARENTLY IN CLEAR FURTHER RECAP REVEALS TURNER JOY FIRED UPON BY SMALL CALIBRE GUNS AND ILLUMINATED BY SEARCH LIGHT. JOY TRACKED 2 SETS OF CONTACTS. FIRED ON 13 CONTACTS. CLAIMS POSITIVE HITS ON 3, 1 SUNK, PROBABLE HITS.

3. JOY ALSO REPORTS NO ACTUAL VISUAL SIGHTINGS OR WAKE. HAVE NO RECAP OF AIRCRAFT SIGHTINGS BUT SEEMED TO BE FEW. ENTIRE ACTION LEAVES MANY DOUBTS EXCEPT FOR APPARENT

PAGE 2 RUMFCR 756B S E C R E T NOFORN

ATTEMPTED AMBUSH AT BEGINNING. SUGGEST THOROUGH RECONNAISSANCE IN DAYLIGHT BY AIRCRAFT.

2. UNODIR AM PROCEEDING WITH MOORE TO TG 77.5 WATCHDOG STATION 14-30N 108-10E AWAITING FURTHER INSTRUCTION QM 39 MADDOX AND TURNER JOY IN NEED OF FUEL AND AMMO PRIOR FURTHER DEPLOYMENT

~~GP-3~~

TAB 44

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

DE [ ] 548 04/2104Z AUG

ZKZK ZZ RNI DE

Z 04205<sup>2</sup>3Z ZYH

FM DIRNSA

TO OSCAR/SIERRA

[ ]

USN-414T

ADDEUR

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

3/0/[ ]/R18-64

SIGINT READINESS BRAVO LANTERN EXPANDED

SIGINT READINESS BRAVO LANTERN DECLARED

IN DIRNSA 3/0,[ ]/R15-64 ON 02 AUGUST IS

HEREBY EXPANDED TO INCLUDE USM-626, [ ]

[ ]

[ ] REFLECTIONS OR REACTIONS

TO THE CURRENT US/NORTH VIETNAMESE ENCOUNTER

AS WELL AS INDICATIONS OF CHICOM ACTIONS

OR INTENT WITH REGARD TO SOUTHEAST ASIA

WILL BE REPORTED IN ESTABLISHED VEHICLES

AT IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE.

NSA25X1 NSA25X3  
P.L. 86-36

NSA25X1  
NSA25X3

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

~~SECRET~~

TAB 46

Z 042158Z

FM CTU 77.12

TO AIG 181

INFO RUMFZK/J8RM/CTG 77.5

RUMFZN/H3WX/CTG 77.6

RUEPCR/DIRNSA

RUMGCR/NENB/USS TURNER JOY

RUMGCR/NHHK/USS MADDOX

RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

ATTACK ON DESOTO FINAL SITREP (S)

1. CHRONOLOGICAL SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

AT 041215Z RCVD INFO THAT DRV INTENDED ATTACK. MY POSITION 19-10.7N  
107-99E. PROCEED WTTUUTH (AS RECVD) AT [REDACTED] TO BUY TIME  
FOR AIR COVER. REQUESTED COVER FROM CTG 77.5. AT 151 ?)S (AS RECVD)  
DETECTED THREE TO FIVE CONTACTS 40-2 MILES TO EAST AND IN  
SIGHT STREAM AREA. THESE CONTACTS APPEARED TO ATTEMPT PURSUIT BUT  
BROKE OFF AFTER ABOUT TEN MINUTES AT RANGE 40 MILES. REQUESTED  
AIR SUPPORT FROM CTG 77.5 AT 041325Z. AT 041408Z THREE CONTACTS  
PAGE 2 RUMFCR ~~SECRET NOFORN~~

DETECTED 090, 14 MILES ON COURSE 130, SPEED [REDACTED] THIS CONTACT  
HELD BY BOTH SHIPS. AT 1419Z CONTACTS CHANGED TO 155, 40 KTS. FIRST  
CAP OVER HEAD 1410Z. AT 1439Z DESOTO UNITS COMMENCED FIRE ON LEAD  
CONTACT WHICH HAD TURNED TO INTERCEPT. PROBABLY TORPEDO DETECTED

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

ON SONAR. FROM THIS TPW UNTIL 1635Z DESOTO UNITS OPERATED INDEPENDENTLY ALKKVFQTPW (AS RECVD) EVASION AND FIRING AT TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY. ACTION CEASED AT APPROX 1635Z WITH NO FURTHER DETECTIONS. DESOGO UNITS PROCEEDED TO VIC 17-30N 18-00E TO AWAIT DECISION ON POSSIBLE LOGISTICS ARRANGEMENTS. AT 2045Z SE COURSE FOR FIVE AUGUST PATROL AREA IAW INSTRUCTIONS FROM COMSEVENTHFLT.

2. AIR COVER FROM TICO WAS IN AREA CONTINUOUSLY FROM 1410Z UNTIL STEERED AT 1750Z. AIR COVER FROM CONSTELLATION STATION FROM AFSI NR 1615Z UNTIL STEER AT 1750Z. DUE TO WEATHER, LIMITED VISIBILITY AND LACK OF EFFECTIVE ILLUMINATION, AIR SUPPORT NOT SUCCESSFUL IN LOCATING TARGETS.

3. CO TURNER JOY CLAIMS SINKING ONE CRAFT AND DAMAGE TO ANOTHER WITH GUNFIRE. DAMAGED BOAT RETURNED CONFIRE- NO HITS. CO TURNER JOY AND OTHER PERSONNEL OBSERVED BURSTS AND BLACK SMOKE FROM HITS ON THIS BOAT. THIS BOAT ILLUMINATED TURNER JOY AND HIS RETURN FIRE WAS OBSERVED AND HEARD BY TP PERSONNEL. MADDOX SCORED NO KNOWN HITS AND NEVER POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED A BOAT AS SUCH.

4. THE FIRST BOAT TO CLOSE MADDOX (1459Z) PROBABLY FIRED TORPEDO. AT MADDOX WHICH WAS HEARD BUT NOT SEEN. ALL SUBSEQUENT MADDOX TORPEDO REPORTS ARE DOUBTFUL IN THAT IT IS SUSPECTED THE SONARMAN WAS HEARING THE SHIPS OWN PROPELLER BEAT REFLECTED OFF RUDDERS DURING COURSE CHANGES (WEAVING). TURNER JOY DETECTED 2 TORPEDO RUNS (MORE TO FOLLOW)

~~SECRET~~

~~(Confidential HVCCU until filled)~~

NSA FORM N2288 REV AUG 63  
(Supersedes N2288 REV JUN 61  
to be used until exhausted)

~~SECRET KIMBO~~  
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

COPY NR.

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

IMMEDIATE

IMMEDIATE

NONE

DISTRIBUTION

TAB 47

FROM: DIRNSA

DATE: 5 AUG 64

ZSL  
ZHA  
ZAZ  
ZAD

TO: OSCAR VICTOR ALFA

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

PO55/238

SUBJ: NORTH VIETNAM

DRV NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS CONTINUE TO REFLECT ACTIVITY OF THE VESSELS WHO WERE NOTED IN THE SHADOWING AND THE ATTACK OF THE USS MADDOX AND THE USS TURNER JOY ON 4 AUGUST. APPARENTLY THE ACTIVITY NOTED IN THESE COMMUNICATIONS IS SIMILAR TO ACTIVITY WHICH FOLLOWED THE 2 AUGUST ATTACK ON THE USS MADDOX. WHILE DAMAGED VESSELS ARE BEING TOWED TO PORT, PREPARATIONS ARE PRESUMABLY BEING MADE FOR ANOTHER ATTACK FOR 5 AUGUST.

(2/G11/VHN/R18-64, Ø5Ø435Z)

M/R: Continued reflections on the Desoto Patrol.

P.L. 86-36

	RELEASING OFFICER	RELEASED AT (ZULU)
	1stLT/4718 D.C. LANG LTCOL USAF/4718S	Z
		PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES
		AGI NR.
		AGO NR. Ø8Ø14/Ø5
REFERS TO MESSAGE	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	DYK. Ø5Ø735Z
AGO AGI DTG SUSPENSE	<del>SECRET KIMBO</del>	

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

Z 050435Z ZYH

FM USM 626J

TO GOLF ELEVEN/ALFA

[REDACTED] AFSSO CONAD

[REDACTED] AFSSO SAC

[REDACTED] AFSSO TAC

PLUS COMTAIWANDEF/COM/US

NSA25X1 NSA25X3  
P.L. 86-36

COMNAVFORJAPAN

[REDACTED]  
USN 467N

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

2/G11/VHN/R18-64 SIGINT READINESS BRAVO, LANTERN, REPORT 18 ST 220

HAVE INDICATIONS THAT SWATOW PGM T-146 AND TWO ELEMENTS OF "MTB  
SQUADRON 135", WHICH ARE ANCHORED AT HON ME, ARE PREPARING TO  
ATTACK NIGHT 05 AUG.

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

NSA25X1  
NSA25X3

~~SECRET~~

P 051219Z

FM CINCPACFLT

TO RUECW/CNO

RUEKDA/JCS

RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

INFO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON

RUATZL/COMSEVENTHFLT

RUMGZK/CTF SEVEN SEVEN

TAB 48

~~SECRET~~

PIERCE ARROW SITREP TWO (U)

A. CINCPACFLT 050158Z

1. SITREP AS OF 051100Z

2. SITUATION:

A. CTG 72.1 IS ON DESOTO PATROL WITH MADDOX AND TURNER JOY IN GULF OF TONKIN BUT HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO PROCEED SOUTH TO JOINT 77.5, STAND DOWN AND REPLENISH 6 AUG.

B. SAR ALERT CONDITION SET IN GULF OF TONKIN.

3. INTELLIGENCE: ANALYSIS AND FINAL EVALUATION OF NUMBER

PAGE 2 RUHLHL 0653 ~~SECRET~~

OF PT INVOLVED ATTACKS ON MADDOX AND TURNER JOY AS WELL AS

NUMBER OF TORPEDOES FIRED NOT COMPLETE. TWO "P-4" CLASS

PT REPORTED DESTROYED, ONE ADDITIONAL DAMAGED; EXCESSIVE NUMBER

OF TORPEDO FIRINGS REPORTED PROBABLY DUE TO SONARMEN HEARING SHIPS

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

OWN PROPELLER BEAT REFLECTED OFF RUDDERS DURING COURSE CHANGES (WEAVING). CURRENT NAVAL ORDER OF BATTLE CREDITS DRV NAVY WITH 13 "P-4" CLASS PT EACH CARRYING 2 18 INCH TORPEDO TUBES WITH NO AT SEA RELOAD CAPABILITY. THIRTY SWATOW CLASS MGB AND FOUR S.O.-1 CLASS PC HAVE NO ORGANIC TORPEDO CAPABILITY.

4. DEPLOYMENTS:

- A. USS BUGARA PROCEEDING TO 18-45N 106-15E AS SAR LIFEGUARD.
- B. CTG 70.4 DIRECTED TO GET UNDERWAY AND PROCEED TO POSITION OF TG 77.5 AND TG 77.6 IN SOUTH CHINA SEA.
- C. USS TUCKER PROCEEDING TO SUBIC FOR DESOTO ELINT INSTALLATION
- D. CAVALIER BOILER CASUALTY REPAIRED.
- E. CTG 76.5 AA FOUR HOUR READINESS AT 050400Z.
- F. USS MAUNA DEA PROCEEDING 042300Z TO SUBIC FOR PROVISIONING.
- G. DET ALFA MOPHOTO CREW TO CUBI PT.

PAGE 3 RUHLHL 0653 ~~SECRET~~

- H. SIX CODS ON STATION AT CUBI PT 051100Z.
- I. MOMAT 0303 BEING DEPLOYED TO SUBIC TO SUPPORT MINE PREPARATION.
- J. CTG 70.8 IN TOPEKA WITH TUCKER AND RUPERTUS DIRECTED UNDERWAY FROM YOKOSUKA TO SUPPORT OPS OFF VIETNAM.
- K. CURRENT AND HITCHITI DIRECTED UNDERWAY SUBIC TO OPERATE VICINITY CVA TASK GROUPS.
- L. TG 70.2.4 ORDERED DEPLOY TO CUBI PT FOR MINE TRANSPORT AS DIRECTED.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

M. MONTICELLO AND MAGOFFIN ENROUTE TO EASTPAC ORDERED RETURN  
YOKOSUKA.

5. LOGISTIC DEFICIENCIES: NO SIGNIFICANT DEFICIENCIES.
6. SIGNIFICANT SUPPLEMENTARY ACTIONS: NONE .
7. DECISIONS REQUIRED BY CINCPAC OR OTHER COMMANDERS: NONE.
8. SUMMARY OF TG 77.5 AND TG 77.6 AIR OPS IN FOLLOWING SITREP.

GP-4

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

P 060403Z

FM JCS

INFO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE

RUEHCR/STATE

RUEPIA/CIA

RUEPCR/NSA

P R 060347Z

FM CINCPAC

TO RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT

RUEKDA/JCS

RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

RUHLKM/PACAF

~~SECRET~~

DESOTO PATROL (U)

A. JCS 7761 DTG 052228Z

1. RESUME PATROL IN ACCORD WITH REF A. GP-4

TAB 49

~~SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~  
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

COPY NR.

ACTION PRECEDENCE  
FLASH

INFO PRECEDENCE  
ROUTINE

SPECIAL HANDLING  
NONE

FROM: DIRNSA

DATE: 06 AUGUST 1964

TO: USN-467N

DISTRIBUTION

D/DIR

ADN

ADP

P05

NSA25X1 NSA25X3

B

P.L. 86-36

B2

B26

DRF

INFO: DIRNAVSECGRUPAC  
ASSTDIRNAVSECGRU

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

R205/258-64

TAB 50

1. URGENT NEED AT HIGHEST LEVELS FOR FOLLOWING INFORMATION FROM  
USN-467N. REQUIRE RESPONSE, INCLUDING NEGATIVE, BY FLASH PRECEDENCE  
TO ARRIVE DIRNSA NLT 070900Z RPT 070900Z.

2. REQUIRED IS A SUMMARY OF ALL INFO AVAILABLE FROM YOUR INTERCEPT  
(ESPECIALLY YOUR VHF VOICE INTERCEPT WHICH IS TOTALLY UNIQUE)

WHICH PROVIDES PROOF OF DRV ATTACK ON FOUR AUGUST UPON U.S. NAVAL  
VESSELS. OF GREATEST VALUE WOULD BE INDIVIDUAL TRANSMISSIONS SUCH  
AS FIRING ORDERS, ORDERS TO ATTACK, REFERENCES TO USE OF TORPEDOS  
OR OTHER WEAPONS AGAINST U.S. NAVAL VESSELS, ETC. BE SURE TO INCLUDE  
TIMES OF INTERCEPT.

3. CANNOT OVEREMPHASIZE URGENCY OF NEED FOR THIS INFORMATION.

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

D.C. LANG LT COL, USAF, 5174S

D. C. LANG, LTCOL, CH B205

070115

Z

DOCUMENT MARKING

PAGE

PAGES

1 OF 2

AGI NR.

AGO NR.

08001/07

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

DTG

070118Z

AGO

AGI

DTG

SUSPENSE

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

DISTRIBUTION

FROM:

DATE:

TO:

M/R: Information requested urgently needed to meet SECDEF and SECSTATE requirement, as well as requirement expressed in JCS message 7770/061642Z. This message prepared and released following telephone consultation with Chief, B2.

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

Z

DOCUMENT MARKING

PAGE PAGES

2 OF 2

AGI NR.

AGO NR.

08001/07

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

DTG

070118Z

AGO

AGI

DTG

SUSPENSE

ACTION PRECEDENCE  
FLASH

INFO PRECEDENCE  
FLASH

SPECIAL HANDLING  
NONE

DISTRIBUTION

FROM: USN-467N

DATE: 07 AUG 64

ACT: B2

TO: DIRNSA

// ADVANCE COPY TO P055  
VIA DDP//

INFO: B

INFO: DIRNAVSECGRUPAC  
ASST DIRNAVSECGRU

B26  
P05  
ADN  
ADP  
D/DIR  
DRF

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

A. YOUR 070118Z CITE B205/258-64

1. MANUAL MORSE INTERCEPT THIS DETACHMENT CONTAINS NO MATERIAL  
TO PROVE DRV ATTACK ON 4 AUG.

2. ON FOUR AUG INTERCEPTED VIETNAMESE LANGUAGE VHF  
TRANSMISSION BETWEEN 0900-0906Z ON 131.0 MCS AND BETWEEN 1345-  
1354Z ON 31.35 MCS. HOWEVER ALL INTERCEPT APPEARS TO BE  
SIGNAL CHECKING BETWEEN TWO UNIDENT STATION WITH NO INTELLIGENCE  
BEING PASSED.

TAB 51

3. DURING PERIOD OF ACTUAL ATTACK VOICE TRANSMISSIONS FROM  
MADDOX AND SUPPORTING AIRCRAFT BLOCKED ALL FREQS BETWEEN 100  
AND 200 MCS.

SAME SITUATION NOTED DURING 2 AUG ATTACK

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

JEM/CAE/ 7-3-35

2

DOCUMENT MARKING

PAGE PAGES

1 OF 1

AGI NR. 46841

AGO NR.

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

DTG

070615Z

AGO  
AGI  
DTG  
SUSPENSE

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

ZHA  
ZAD

OSCAR/VICTOR ALFA  
PLUS ADDEUR - [redacted]

IMMEDIATE

[redacted]  
PLUS: [redacted], COM7THFLT, USN-414T,  
USN-467N & NSAPAC REP PHIL

NSA25X1  
NSA25X3

Vietnamese  
(North)

[redacted]

61-1329-64

2/O/VHN/T10-64  
ST 220  
Dist: HCF

DRV NAVAL ENTITY REPORTS LOSSES AND CLAIMS TWO ENEMY  
AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN

[U/I]: TRA<sup>a</sup>

4 Aug 64 2242G

--

[U/I]: LAP<sup>a</sup>

--

After the 135 had already started to report to you, we shot  
down two enemy planes in the battle area, and one other plan was  
damaged. We sacrificed two ships and all the rest are okay. The  
combat spirit is very high and we are starting out on the hunt and  
[are waiting to] receive assignment. Men are very confident because  
they themselves saw the enemy planes sink. The enemy ship could  
also have been damaged. Report this information back to the unit  
(C val to mobilize them.)

TAB 52

(a) Not identified.

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

3/O/VHN/RØ1-64 ST 22Ø  
SPOT REPORT  
4 AUGUST 1964  
DIST: OSCAR/VICTOR ALFA

SUMMARY OF SIGINT REFLECTIONS OF DRV ATTACK  
IN GULF OF TONKIN 2-4 AUGUST 1964

DRV NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS FOLLOWING THEIR UNSUCCESSFUL ATTACK ON THE USS MADDOX IN THE GULF OF TONKIN ON 2 AUGUST WERE LARGELY CONCERNED WITH (1) THE RECOVERY AND DISPOSITION OF TWO PT BOATS DAMAGED BY THE MADDOX AND AIRCRAFT LAUNCHED BY THE USS TICONDEROGA, AND (2) TRACKING AND SHADOWING OF THE MADDOX AND THE USS TURNER JOY WHICH BY NOW HAD JOINED THE MADDOX.

IT IS NOW APPARENT THAT THE ATTACK WAS CARRIED OUT BY TOPEDO  
TAB 53  
FLOTILLA 135 COMPRISED OF AT LEAST THREE PT BOATS -- THE T333, T336 AND T339. THE LATTER WAS SUNK WHILE THE T336 SUSTAINED HEAVY DAMAGES; THE T333 APPARENTLY ESCAPED WITH ONLY MINOR DAMAGES. FOLLOWING THE ACTION ANOTHER PT BOAT, THE T146 CONDUCTED AN EXTENSIVE SEARCH FOR THE FLOTILLA, FINALLY LOCATING THE T333 AND T336 ABOUT 19ØØ HOURS LOCAL TIME ON 3 AUGUST. A TUGBOAT DEPARTED HAIPHONG ON THE 4TH TO TOW THE TWO DAMAGED CRAFT BACK TO HAIPHONG. THUS DRV NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS CONFIRMED THE INFORMATION PROVIDED EARLIER BY THE PILOTS OF THE TICONDEROGA WHO, WHEN DEBRIEFED, REPORTED THAT ONE PT BOAT WAS HIT AND DEAD IN WATER WHILE TWO OTHERS, ALTHOUGH HIT, HAD HEADED FOR THE BEACH. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE TWO PT BOATS WITHDREW TO LACH CHAO ESTUARY (19-46N 1Ø5-52E) AT THE MOUTH OF THE SONG MA RIVER JUST EAST OF THANH HOA. A 1 AUGUST MESSAGE REQUESTED THAT THE ESTUARY BE

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

INVESTIGATED AS A POSSIBLE REFUGE AFTER THE ATTACK ON THE FOLLOWING DAY.

AFTER THE 2 AUGUST ATTACK, THE MADDOX WAS ORDERED TO RESUME PATROL NORTH AND SOUTH OF HON ME ISLAND (19-21N105-56E) JOINED BY THE USS TURNER JOY WITH AIR COVER FROM THE TICONDEROGA SEAWARD OF THE TWO DESTROYERS TO PRECLUDE ANY OVERFLIGHTS OF THE MAINLAND. DURING 3 AUGUST DRV NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS REFLECTED THE TRACKING AND SHADOWING OF THE TWO DESTROYERS THROUGHOUT THE DAY; THIS ACTIVITY WAS REPORTED BY BOTH DESTROYERS. THEY WERE ALSO APPARENTLY SHADOWED BY TWO PRESUMABLY DRV AIRCRAFT. A DRV MERCHANT SHIP ADVISED ITS SHIPPING OFFICE IN HAIPHONG THAT "TWO BOMBERS" WOULD "FLY IN THE DIRECTION OF THE SHIP AND INVESTIGATE". NO FURTHER IDENTIFICATION OF THE AIRCRAFT WAS PROVIDED.

ON 4 AUGUST, DRV NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS AGAIN INDICATED PREPARATIONS FOR ANOTHER ATTACK THAT NIGHT. THE T142 AND T146 WERE ORDERED TO PREPARE FOR "MILITARY OPERATIONS". THE T333, WHICH APPARENTLY ESCAPED UNSCATHED AFTER THE FIRST ATTACK, WAS ORDERED TO OBTAIN OIL TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SECOND ATTACK. THAT NIGHT THE MADDOX REPORTED BOTH SURFACE CRAFT AND AIRCRAFT APPEARING ON ITS RADAR SCREEN. THEY WERE LATER IDENTIFIED AS HOSTILE AND REPORTED CLOSING IN. THE MADDOX REPORTED AT 1440Z THAT IT WAS COMMENCING FIRE ON THE CLOSING PT BOAT. SUBSEQUENT REPORTS FROM THE DESTROYER INDICATED THAT TWO PT BOATS HAD BEEN SUNK. THIS WAS LATER CONFIRMED BY A DRV MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

WHICH STATED "WE SACRIFICED TWO SHIPS AND THE REST ARE OKAY." THE SAME MESSAGE ALSO REPORTED THAT TWO ENEMY PLANES HAD BEEN SHOT DOWN AND ONE DAMAGED AND THAT THIS HAD LIFTED THE MORALE OF THEIR MEN. THERE HAS BEEN NO CONFIRMATION OF THE SHOOTDOWN FROM SEVENTH FLEET ELEMENTS IN THE AREA AND CINCPAC HAS STATED THAT NO U.S. AIRCRAFT WERE LOST IN THE ENGAGEMENT. THERE IS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT FLARES USED TO ILLUMINATE THE BATTLE AREA WERE MISTAKENLY REPORTED AS FALLING AIRCRAFT.

ALTHOUGH INITIAL MESSAGES INDICATED THAT THE T142, T146 AND T333 WOULD BE INVOLVED IN THE ATTACK ON THE U.S. DESTROYERS ON THE NIGHT OF 4 AUGUST, SUBSEQUENT MESSAGES SUGGEST THAT NONE OF THESE WERE INVOLVED. REPORTS FROM THE MADDOX THAT IT WAS UNDER ATTACK SOME SEVENTY NAUTICAL MILES NORTHEAST OF THE NAVAL BASE AT QUANG KHE SUGGEST THAT NAVAL UNITS SUBORDINATE TO THE SOUTHERN FLEET COMMAND WITH ITS HEADQUARTERS AT BEN THUY (NEAR VINH) WERE INVOLVED IN THE SECOND ATTACK.

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

O 060102Z ZYH

FM DIRNSA

TO OSCAR/VICTOR XRAY

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~ 3/O/VHN/R02-64 ST 220

GULF OF TONKIN SIGINT SITUATION REPORT NO. 1 (4-5 AUGUST)

THIS IS THE FIRST IN A SERIES OF GULF OF TONKIN SIGINT SITREPS WHICH WILL CONTINUE AS LONG AS THE SITUATION WARRANTS. OF THE OTHER REPORTS PUBLISHED, THE MOST RECENT INFORMATION IS CONTAINED, 3/O/VHN/R01-64.

FOLLOWING THEIR 4 AUGUST ATTACK ON THE USS MADDOX AND THE USS TURNER JOY AND PRIOR TO THE U.S. AIR STRIKE AGAINST NORTH VIETNAMESE NAVAL INSTALLATIONS, IT WAS APPARENT IN NORTH VIETNAMESE NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS THAT PLANS WERE BEING MADE TO REGROUP FOR ANOTHER POSSIBLE ATTACK AGAINST THE TWO U.S. DESTROYERS ON THE NIGHT OF 5 AUGUST. MESSAGES WERE OBSERVED BEING PASSED FROM BOAT T142 INFORMING HAIPHONG THAT TWO UNITS OF TORPEDO FLOTILLA 135 AS WELL AS BOAT T146 WERE READY FOR ACTION. PORT WALLUT WAS SUBSEQUENTLY INFORMED BY T142 THAT T146 WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO RENDEZVOUS WITH THE OTHER TWO BOATS AND REQUESTED ANOTHER REPLACEMENT. THESE PLANS WERE BROUGHT TO AN ABRUPT END WITH THE U.S. AIRCRAFT HIT QUANG KHE AND VINH. A MESSAGE WAS PASSED AT 0626Z, 5 AUGUST, FROM HAIPHONG TO THE BOATS, INFORMING THEM OF THE STRIKE AGAINST VINH AND ORDERING THEM TO CAMOUFLAGE AND DISPERSE.

TAB 54

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~



~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

SIGINT REFLECTIONS OF THE ACTUAL AIR STRIKES AND THE SUBSEQUENT DAMAGE HAVE BEEN EXTREMELY LIMITED IN THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS HAVE BEEN SPARSE SINCE THE AIR STRIKES BEGAN. LIMITED TRACKINGS OF THE APPROACHING U.S. AIRCRAFT WERE REFLECTED BY NORTH VIETNAMESE RADAR FACILITIES. AT 0823Z ON 5 AUGUST PORT WALLUT REPORTED TO THE NAVAL DIRECTORATE IN HAIPHONG THAT THREE JETS WERE OVERHEAD, THAT THEY WERE STRAFING THE SHIPS, AND ONE SHIP WAS DISABLED. INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM OTHER SOURCES INDICATES THAT THIS PORT WAS NOT UNDER ATTACK AT ANY TIME; THEREFORE, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THIS MESSAGE WAS REFERRING TO ANOTHER PORT. OTHER SIGINT REFLECTIONS WERE NOTED IN A MESSAGE OF 5 AUGUST AT 0626Z WHICH STATED THAT VINH HAD BEEN DESTROYED BY ENEMY AIRCRAFT AND THAT ENEMY AIRCRAFT HAD ALSO DESTROYED NORTH VIETNAMESE SHIPS AT HON ME. IN TOTAL, THE SINKING OF FOUR SHIPS AND THE DAMAGING OF FOUR OTHERS ARE ALL THAT CAN BE ESTABLISHED FROM NORTH VIETNAMESE NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS DURING THE PERIOD 2-5 AUGUST.

NORTH VIETNAMESE MESSAGES DURING THIS PERIOD DO NOT CLARIFY THE NUMBER AND TYPE OF SHIPS INVOLVED. REFERENCE IS USUALLY MADE TO THE FLOTILLA COVER NUMBER OR TO SHIPS IN GENERAL. THUS RECLUDING A CLEAR SIGINT PICTURE OF THE SPECIFIC SHIPS WHICH HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN RECENT ACTIVITIES.

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

P 061402Z

FM DIRNSA

TO OSCAR/VICTOR XRAY

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~ 3/O/VHN/R02-64 CHANGE 1

GULF OF TONKIN SIGINT SITUATION REPORT NO. 1

CHANGE PARA, 4TH SENTENCE TO READ: "OTHER SIGINT REFLECTIONS WERE NOTED IN A MESSAGE OF 5 AUGUST AT 0626Z WHICH STATED THAT VINH HAD BEEN BOMBARDED REPEAT BOMBARDED..."

THIS IS AN ELECTRICAL CHANGE ONLY.

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

O 061604Z ZYH

FM DIRNSA

TO OSCAR/VICTOR XRAY

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~ 3/O/VHM/R03-64 ST220

SUMMARY OF DRV NAVAL COMMUNICATION REVEALING PRE-PLANNED ATTACKS ON  
USS MADDOX:

THIS REPORT IS A SUMMARY OF THOSE DRV NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS DURING  
THE PERIOD 1-5 AUGUST WHICH DEMONSTRATE IRREFUTABLY THAT DRV NAVAL  
BOATS DID, IN FACT, ENGAGE IN PREPLANNED COMBAT AGAINST U.S. DESTROYERS  
PATROLLING IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS. WHILE THE ACTUAL ATTACK TOOK  
PLACE AT 0802Z ON 2 AUGUST, DRV NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS DEMONSTRATED  
THEIR AGGRESSIVE INTENT AS EARLY AS 1627Z ON 1 AUGUST.

FOLLOWING ARE GISTS, IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER, OF THOSE MESSAGES  
WHICH SUPPORT THE U.S. POSITION THAT THE GULF OF TONKIN CRISIS WAS  
INSTIGATED BY THE DRV.

TAB 55

1 AUGUST/1627Z: "THE ATTACK FORCE HAS GONE DOWN. (WE ARE) DETERMINED  
TO FIGHT THE ENEMY TONIGHT WHEN THERE ARE ORDERS TO GUIDE THE ATTACK."

1 AUGUST/1652Z: MESSAGE INDICATED THAT A SURVEY OF THE LACH CHAO  
ESTUARY HAS BEEN MADE AND "THE SHIPS CAN BE GUIDED IN THERE TO HIDE."

1 AUGUST/1652Z: THIS MESSAGE CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED THAT THE DRV WAS  
TRACKING U.S. VESSELS WHEN THEY SAID "THERE IS AN ENEMY VESSEL  
NORTHEAST OF HON ME DIRECTION 160 DEGREES, DISTANCE 11 NM.

1 AUGUST/1755Z: MESSAGE INDICATED THAT THREE SHIPS OF FLOTILLA 135  
WERE UNDER ORDER TO DEPLOY TO THE ENGAGEMENT AREA. THESE THREE

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

SHIPS OF FLOTILLA 135 ARE THE SAME SHIPS WHICH MADE THE ATTACK ON  
2 AUG.

2 AUGUST/0309Z: MESSAGE URGED A DRV MTB TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH A  
COASTAL OBSERVATION POST IN ORDER TO BE AWARE OF THE CHANGE IN COURSE  
BY THE "ENEMY" VESSEL.

2 AUGUST/0444Z: THE CLEAREST EVIDENCE OF THE ATTACK IS OFFERED IN  
THIS DIRECT TRANSLATION: "HAVE RECEIVED ORDER AND THE T146 AND T142  
HAVE COME DOWN RISING A FAST SPEED AND ARE TO GO PARALLEL TO THE  
ENEMY AND TO LAUNCH TORPEDOES."

2 AUGUST/0709Z: SHIP T146 WAS TOLD THAT "THE ENEMY IS A LARGE SHIP ...  
AND IS 15 DEGREES AT A DISTANCE OF 19 NAUTICAL MILES HEADING 27  
DEGREES, SPEED 11 NAUTICAL MILES."

2 AUGUST/0716Z: AN UNIDENTIFIED SHIP SAID "WE HAVE CONTACTED FLOTILLA  
135 AND ARE ON OUR WAY."

2 AUGUST/0802Z: THIS IS THE TIME THE ACTUAL ATTACK COMMENCED.

2 AUGUST/0944Z: SHIPS T336, T142 AND T146 WERE CONTACTED AND TOLD TO  
"CONCENTRATE TONIGHT AND MEET COMRADE PHAT."

3 AUGUST/0024Z: A MESSAGE TO SHIP T146 SAID THE SHIPS OF FLOTILLA  
135 MUST BE ABLE TO BUILD UP A COMBAT (CAPABILITY) AND THAT THE SHIPS  
MUST HAVE ORDERS FROM HEADQUARTERS PRIOR TO ANY DEPLOYMENT.

3 AUGUST/0545Z: THE FIRST INDICATION OF DRV NAVAL DAMAGES WAS  
CONTAINED IN A MESSAGE FROM SHIP T333 REPORTING SHIP T339 SUNK AND  
THAT A HEAVILY DAMAGED T336 WAS IN TOW BY T333.

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

4 AUGUST/1034Z: INDICATIONS OF DRV ATTEMPTS TO KEEP ACTIVITIES UNDER COVER WERE CLEAR IN A MESSAGE SAYING "YOU CAN'T PUBLICIZE THE SITUATION OF THE BOATS OF FLOTILLA 135 TO THE BACH DANG." THE BACH DANG WAS THE TUG ORIGINALLY DEPLOYED TO TOW IN THE DAMAGED VESSELS.

4 AUGUST/1559Z: INDICATIONS OF DRV INTENTIONS TO PRESS THE ATTACK WERE FOUND IN THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE: "AFTER THE (FLOTILLA) 135 HAD ALREADY STARTED TO REPORT TO YOU, WE SHOT DOWN TWO ENEMY PLANES IN THE BATTLE AREA, AND ONE OTHER PLANE WAS DAMAGED. WE SACRIFICED TWO SHIPS AND ALL THE REST ARE OKAY. THE COMBAT SPIRIT IS VERY HIGH AND WE ARE STARTING OUT ON THE HUNT AND (ARE WAITING TO) RECEIVE ASSIGNMENT." THE REFERENCE TO HAVING SHOT DOWN TWO PLANES MIGHT HAVE BEEN AN ATTEMPT TO BOLSTER THE CONFIDENCE OF DRV NAVAL PERSONNEL.

4 AUGUST/1911Z: FURTHER CONFIRMATION OF ACTUAL DRV INVOLVEMENT WAS FOUND IN A MESSAGE SAID "KHOAI HAD MET THE ENEMY"

5 AUGUST: MESSAGES OF THIS DATE WERE ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY REFLECTIONS OF U.S. AIR STRIKES AGAINST DRV NAVAL POSITIONS AND BOATS.

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

O 072100Z ZYH

FM DIRNSA

TO OSCAR/VICTOR XRAY

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~ 3/O/VHN/R05-64 ST220

GULF OF TONKIN SITUATION REPORT NO. 3

NORTH VIETNAMESE (DRV) NAVAL ACTIVITY REMAINS AT A LOW LEVEL FOLLOWING THE 5 AUGUST U.S. AIR ATTACK ON ITS PT BOAT FACILITIES.

READABLE DRV NAVAL CIPHER MESSAGES INDICATE THAT ACTIVITY AMONG NAVAL UNITS IS LIMITED TO SITUATION REPORTS AND COUNTERMEASURES TAKEN TO REDUCE THE NAVY'S VULNERABILITY TO AIR ATTACK.

THESE MESSAGES, APPARENTLY LIMITED TO UNITS IN THE NORTHERN FLEET, HQ PORT WALLUT, INDICATE THAT THE BULK OF ITS VESSELS REMAIN DISPERSED, CAMOUFLAGED AND PERIODICALLY CHANGE THEIR ANCHORAGE. THERE IS AN ALMOST TOTAL ABSENCE OF COMMUNICATIONS THAT CAN BE ASSOCIATED WITH THE SOUTH FLEET AT BEN THUY.

SITUATION REPORTS MENTION THE TOWING OF DAMAGED VESSELS TO PORT, DESCRIPTION OF BATTLE ACTIVITIES DURING THE AIR RAIDS AND THE PRESENT DISPOSITION OF SHIPS IN THE FLEET.

ON 6 AND 7 AUGUST EXPORTATIONS TO THE FLEET "ORGANIZE FOR VICTORY AND DESTROY THE ENEMY" WERE NOTED. THESE MESSAGES SEEMED TO BE DESIGNED TO SHORE UP THE MORALE OF THE FLEET TO RESIST FURTHER ENEMY ATTACKS.

AIR-GROUND RECOGNITION SIGNALS AND THE MARKINGS OF DRV AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN GIVEN TO NAVAL UNITS. THIS ACTION FOLLOWS A GARBLED

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

MESSAGE WHICH INFERS THAT THE DRV SHOT DOWN ONE OF ITS OWN AIRCRAFT  
ON 5 AUGUST.

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

---

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

OSCAR/VICTOR XRAY  
PLUS ALL CVA NSCDETS WESPAC

SC

IMMEDIATE

NONE

2/O/VHN/R06-64 ST 220

DZI

GULF OF TONKIN SITUATION REPORT NUMBER 4

DURING 7 AUGUST NORTH VIETNAMESE (DRV) NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS KEPT A SUSPICIOUS WATCH ON THE ACTIVITIES OF U.S. NAVAL VESSELS IN THE GULF OF TONKIN. HAIPHONG, THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE NAVAL FLEETS, HAS REPORTEDLY ORDERED THE MAINTENANCE OF A FIRST DEGREE ALERT AS IT FELT THAT "THE ENEMY WAS PREPARING A NEW CONSPIRACY." AT THE SAME TIME PORT WALLUT WHICH IS THE HQ FOR THE NORTHERN FLEET REPORTED THE MOVEMENT OF THREE ENEMY DESTROYERS AND TWO CRUISERS FOR OVER TWO HOURS. PORT WALLUT ALSO NOTED THAT ENEMY AIRCRAFT HAD VIOLATED AIRSPACE (2/G11/VHN/R45-64).

THE DRV MAY BE PLANNING A NEW "CONSPIRACY" OF ITS OWN, ACCORDING TO A READABLE CIPHER MESSAGE PASSED BETWEEN TWO UNIDENTIFIED NAVAL ENTITIES ON 8 AUGUST. "NO. 44, THE ENEMY IS OBSERVING YOU. GO OUT FROM BAI CHAI HA TU (AS IN TEXT, MEANING UNKNOWN. BAI CHAI PORT IS LOCATED AT 20-57N 107-05E) (AT) POST 5 (YOU WILL BE) WITHIN THE AREA OF (OUR) NAVAL POWER, THEN FIRE (DONT MOVE) (PARENS IN ORIGINAL TEXT) WHEN THE ENEMY FIRES, THEN ACTIVELY ENGAGE HIM." (2/O/VHN/R05-64). ALTHOUGH THE EXACT MEANING OF THIS MESSAGE IS NOT CLEAR, IT COULD BE INTERPRETED AS DRV INTENTIONS TO PROVOKE AN INCIDENT IN DRV TERRITORIAL WATERS. IT CAN ALSO BE VIEWED AS AN ORDER TO ENGAGE U.S. VESSELS ONLY FROM WITHIN DRV WATERS.

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~




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NSA25X3



NSA25X1  
NSA25X3



NSA25X1  
NSA25X3




NSA25X1  
NSA25X3




NSA25X1  
NSA25X3



NSA25X1  
NSA25X3



NSA25X1  
NSA25X3



~~TOP SECRET~~

FROM: JCS  
TO: CINCPAC  
INFO: COMSVFLT  
CINCPACFLT  
COMUSSUBPAC  
CTC 77  
CTC 77.5  
CRC 77.6  
WHITE HOUSE  
STATE  
OSD  
CIA  
AMEREMB SAIGON  
AMEREMB BANGKOK  
AMEREMB VIENTIANE  
AMMCC  
NEACP  
CCP

This message never officially received by DIRNSA. This was sent from NMCC by telephone to NSASCC and hand copied there. It was subsequently reproduced. The date/time group for this message is not available.

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: AIR STRIKE AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM ~~(TS)~~

1. By 0700 local, 5 August, conduct a one-time maximum effort attack of following with objective
  - a. Swatow and PTs located at bases, Port Wallut, Hongay, Phuc Loi, Kuang Kha, Loc Chao Estuary, coordinates 1946N 10557E. Targets are boats.
  - b. Against Swatows and PT boats for purpose of armed attack and PT boats are considered outside 3 mile limit.
  - c. If weather precludes meeting above time of attack, proceed soonest and notify JCS ASAP.
2. Use CVA aircraft only.
3. Armed Recon aircraft are to avoid Hainan Island not to come within 50 miles of CHICOM border.
4. Continue Desoto Patrol.

TAB 56

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

5. Defer 34A Operations for 24 hours.

6. Advise details of operations as planned when available, including no of sorties each target complex. Weapon loading, tactics etc. flash report on mission success desired, photo coverage ASAP.

7. If target destroyed on first strike you should request authority for 2d strike.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

O 041547Z ZFD

FM CINCPAC

TO RUHPB/CINCPACFLT

INFO RUEKDA/JCS

RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

RUATZL/COMSEVENTHFLT

~~TOP SECRET~~

DE SOTO PATROL EMERGENCY ACTIONS (U)

1. AIRLIFT 100 NT 50 MINES TO TICONDEROGA OR

CONSTELLATION ASAP AND REPORT ETA.

2. PURPOSE MINES IS POSSIBILITY MINING FIVE SWATOW BASES IN

VN. BE PREPARED TO EXECUTE ON ORDER. GP3

TAB 57

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

04/1554Z

FM CINCPAC

TO RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT

INFO RUEKDA/JCS

RUATZL/COMSEVENTHFLT

RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

RUMGZN/CTG 77.5

RUMGZN/CTG 77.6

~~SECRET~~

1. IN VIEW OF PT BOAT ATTACKS ON TURNER JOY AND MADDOX,  
TAKE STEPS TO DESTROY ALL DRV PT BOATS AND SWATOWS IN THE GENERAL  
AREA OF THE ENGAGEMENT IN THE TONKIN GULF, AIRCRAFT TO CEASE  
PURSUIT AT THE THREE MILE LIMIT; SHIPS AT ELEVEN MILES

TAB 58

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

TAB 59

I 041628Z

FM JCS

INFO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE

RUERCR/STATE

RUEPIA/CIA

RUEPKR/NSA

RUYCEM/CMC

Z O 041607Z

FM CINCPAC

TO RUMSHA/COMUSMACV

INFO RUEKDA/JCS

RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT

RUMGZN/CTG 77.5

RUMGZN/CTG 77.6

RUATZL/COMSEVENTHFLT

~~SECRET~~

1. RECALL ALL RVN PTF'S TO DAWANG<sup>N</sup> ASAP, DISCONTINUE  
34A MAROPS THAT MAY BE IN PROGRESS.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Z 041718Z

FM CINCPAC

TO RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT

INFO RUEKDA/JCS

RUATZL/COMSEVENTHFLT

RUMGZN/CTG 77.5

RUMGZN/CTG 77.6

S E C R E T

RULSE OF ENGAGEMENT (U)

1. AUTHORITY GRANTED TO DECLARE HOSTILE AND ENGAGE ANY DRV/  
CHICOM AIRCRAFT WHOSE ACTIONS AND BEHAVIOR INDICATE WITHIN  
REASONABLE CERTAINTY THAT AIR ATTACK ON U.S. FORCES IS INTENDED.

~~GP 3~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Z 042014Z GENSER

FM CINCPACFLT

TO COMSEVENTHFLT

INFO CTG 77.6

CTG 77.5

CINCPAC

TAB 61

~~S E C R E T~~

A. CINCPACFLT 041644Z

1. BE PREPARED AT 050700 TO STRIKE FOLLOWING TARGETS:

A. PT AND SWATOW BOATS RPT BOATS LOCATED AT QUANG KHE (17-42-18N 106-29-01E), BEN THUY (18-38-52N 105-42-39E), HON NE ISLAND (19-55N 106-01E) AND SONG MA ESTUARY (19-47N 105-55E), HON BAY (20-57-04N 107-04-30E), AND PORT WALLUT (21-12-10N 107-34-21E).

B. ANY IDENTIFIED NVN SWATOW/PT CRAFT LOCATED AT SEA.

C. VINH OIL STORAGE. (COMBINE ATTACK WITH THAT ON VINH/BEN THUY COMPLEX ABOVE). APPLY SUFFICIENT FORCE TO INSURE DESTRUCTION OF OIL STORAGE. THIS TARGET IS NUMBER ONE PRIORITY.

2. DESIRABLE THAT ALL TARGETS BE STRUCK SIMULTANEOUSLY. HOWEVER, IF FORCES AVAILABLE (2 CVA) ARE INADEQUATE TO INSURE HIGH PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS AGAINST ALL TARGETS, YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO RECYCLE AIRCRAFT AS

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NECESSARY AND STRIKE THE TWO SOUTHERN TARGETS (QUANS  
KHE AND BEN THUY) WITH SECOND LAUNCH.

3. ADVISE STRIKE PLAN. WHEN ORDERED THESE STRIKES HAVE  
PRIORITY OVER ARFED RECCE DIRECTED REF A. CONSIDER THAT  
A MAXIMUM EFFORT OF ABOUT 75 AIRCRAFT (BOTH CVAS COMBINED)  
SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN EACH LAUNCH TO INSURE SUCCESS.

4. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT TARGETS ARE BOATS ONLY (AT PIERS  
AND AT SEA) PLUS VINH OIL STORAGE.

5. THIS IS A PREPARATORY RPT PREPARATORY ORDER. DO NOT  
LAUNCH UNTIL EXECUTE RECEIVED.

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

O 042035Z

FM CINCPAC

TO RUHPB/CINCPACFLT

INFO RUEKDA/JCS

RUHPHR/CINCUSARPAC

RUHTKM/CINCPACAF

RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

TAB 62

~~TOP SECRET~~

AIR STRIKE PLAN (C)

1. PREPARE TO EXECUTE AIR STRIKES BEGINNING AT 042300Z  
BOATS REPEAT BOATS AS TARGETS AT FOLLOWING NVN SWATOW AND PT  
BOAT BASES WITH HIGH LEVEL DAMAGE EXPECTANCY.  
CONVENTIONAL ORDNANCE ONLY.

A. PORT WALLUT	211210N 1073421E	BE	615-0010
B. BEN THUY (VINH)	183852N 1074239E	BE	617-0038
C. HON GAY	205704N 1070430E	BE	615-0008
D. QUANG KHE	174300N 1063120E	BE	617-0585

PAGE 2 TUHPA 445 T O P S E C R E T

- E. LUCH CAO ESTUARY OF SONG MA RIVER NEAR THANH HOA  
1946N 10555E.
2. STRIKE WITH VERY HIGH LEVEL OF EXPECTED DAMAGE THE VINH POL  
STORAGE 184009N 1054315E BE 617-0182.
3. ATTACK AND DESTROY ANY NVN SWATOWS/PT BOATS AT SEA.
4. POST STRIKE RECES REQUIRED.

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

5. PROVIDE AIR DEFENSE AND SAR FOR STRIKE FORCES.

6. RUDES OF ENGAGEMENT CINCPAC 041718Z APPLY.

EXECUTE TO FOLLOW.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

O 042227Z

FM CINCPAC

TO RUHPC/CINCPACFLT

INFO RUMSMS/COMUSMACV

RUATZL/COMSEVENTHFLT

RUHLKM/PACAF

RUHPHR/CINCUSARPAC

RUEKDA/JCS

TAB 63

~~TOP SECRET LIMDIS~~

A. CINCPAC 042035Z

B. CINCPAC 042153Z

1. AUTHORITY GRANTED TO EXECUTE REF A. FURTHER GUIDANCE

CONTAINED REF B.

2. REPORT LAUNCHES, RECOVERYS, ESTIMATED STRIKE RESULTS, AND

CONFIRMED STRIKE RESULTS AS THEY OCCUR BY IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE MSG.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

DE RUEPCR 047 05/0125Z  
Z 05013Z ZFF3  
FM JCS  
INFO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE  
RUEHCR/STATE  
RUEPIA/CIA  
RUEPCR/NSA  
Z 050043Z ZFF3  
FM JCS  
TO RUHPA/CINCPAC  
RUEKDL/CINCSSTRIKE  
RUCSBR/CINCSAC  
INFO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV  
RUMBC/COMUSMACT  
RUCDAA/COMATS  
RUECYN/COMSTS  
RUHPB/CINCPACFLT  
RUHPHR/CINCUSARPAC  
RUHLHK/CINCPACAF  
RUEKC/ANMCC  
RUEKVDA/NECPA  
RUEKMJ/NEACP

TAB 64

~~TOP SECRET~~ JCS7729 JCS SENDS

SUBJECT: ALERTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF CINCPAC OPLAN 37-64 FORCES

REF: JCS 7720 DTG 042115Z

1. IN VIEW OF ATTACKS AUTHORIZED IN REF, TAKE THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CINCPAC OPLAN 37-64, CATEGORY 3 FORCES FOR PURPOSE OF PROVIDING A DETERRENT TO ENEMY ACTION AND TO BE PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE IMMEDIATE OPERATIONS AGAINST NVN.

PAGE 2 RUEPCR 015 ~~TOP SECRET~~

- A. DEPLOY FOLLOWING UNITS ASAP.
- (1) ONE CVS GP - JAPAN TO SO. CHINA SEA
  - (2) SLF (MARINE) - SAIL VICINITY DA NANG
  - (3) EMBARK AND SAIL MARINE BRIGADE - OKINAWA

TO S. CHINA SEA

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- (4) SAIL ONE CVA TG - 1ST FLT TO WESTPAC
- (5) ONE RECCE TASK FORCE (6 RF - 101S)

STRICOM TO KADENA

B. FOLLOWING FORCES ARE ALERTED FOR DEPLOYMENT  
IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT OF POLITICAL CLEARANCE.

STRICOM UNITS MAY DEPLOY BUT REMAIN IN US TERRITORY  
UNTIL CLEARANCE RECEIVED.

- (1) 2 B-57S SQDNS - CLARK TO SVN
- (2) 1 F-105 SQDN - YOKOTA TO KORAT
- (3) 2 F-100 SQDNS - CLARK TO TAKHLI
- (4) 1 FIS SQDN (15 F-102) - CLARK TO SVN
- (5) 8 KC-135S - SAC TO CLARK
- (6) 2 F-100 SQDNS - STRICOM TO CLARK
- (7) 2 F-105 SQDNS - STRICOM TO YOKOTA
- (8) 1 RECCE TF (6 RF-101) - MISAWA/KADENA TO

PAGE 3 RUEPCR 015 ~~TOP SECRET~~

SEA

B-57S WILL RETAIN USAF MARKINGS.

C. FOLLOWING FORCES ARE ALERTED FOR POSSIBLE  
DEPLOYMENT.

- (1) 173RD ABN BRIGADE - OKINAWA TO SEA
- (2) FORWARD FLOATING DEPOT - PHILIPPINES TO  
THAILAND
- (3) MARING AIR GROUP - OKINAWA TO DA NANG

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

(4) 1 US ARMY BRIGADE - HAWAII TO THAILAND  
AIRLIFT FOR 173RD BRIGADE WILL BE EARMARKED AND  
RETAINED IN PLACE TO DEPLOY THIS UNIT OR WILL BE  
OBTAINED FROM MATS. MARINE AIR GROUP WILL BE PREPARED  
TO MOVE AT TIME DECISION IS MADE TO LAND MARINE BRIGADE.

2. APPROPRIATE ADDRESSEES ARE DIRECTED TO PROVIDE  
FORCES AND SUPPORT THE ABOVE ACTIONS.

3. REQUEST CINCPAC RECOMMENDATION ON ANY OTHER  
ALERTING ACTIONS AND DEPLOYMENTS DESIRED.

4. REQUEST CINCPAC KEEP JCS INFORMED AS TO PROGRESS.  
ADVISE AIRCRAFT AND BASE SUPPORT CAPACITY DA NANG. GP-3

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Ø5Ø424Z

FM CINCPAC

TO RUHLKM/PACAF

RUMPB/CINCPACFLT

RUHPR/CINCUSRPAC

RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

RUMBC/COMUSMACTHAI

RUAUAL/CH TATACHKAWA

INFO RUUAUZ/5AF

RUMALC/13AF

RUATZL/7TH FLT

RUMFS/CINCPACREI PHL

RUUAUZ/COMUSJAPAN

RUAGFL/COMUSTDC

RUAMC/COMUSKOREA

RUABFB/PACREI RYUKYUS

RUHPCR/CTF 79

RUEKDL/CINCSTRIKE

RUHPCR/ARSTRIKE

RUETDXL/AFSTRIKE

RUHPCR/COMSS

RUCDAA/COMATS

RUHPG/CRFMFPAC

RUEKDA/JCS

TAB 65

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

ALERT AND DEPLOYMENT ORDER

A. JCS 7729 DTG 050043Z

1. REF A AUTHORIZES ALERT AND DEPLOYMENT OF SELECTED FORCES TO SUPPORT CINCPAC OPLAN 37.

FOR CINCUSARPAC:

2. ALERT FOR POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT

A. 173 ABN BDE FOR DEPLOYMENT FROM OKI TO SESIA VIA AIR.

B. FFD FOR DEPLOYMENT FROM PHILIPPINES TO THAILAND.

C. 1 SDE, 25 INF DIV, FOR DEPLOYMENT FROM HAWAII TO

PAGE 2 RUHPA 535 ~~TOP SECRET~~

THAILAND VIA AIR TO NARRY WITH DAFD, SEC II, KORAT.

FOR PACAF:

3. ALERT FOLLOWING FORCES FOR DEPLOYMENT AS INDICATED UPON RECEIPT OF POLITICAL CLEARANCE FROM COUNTRIES CONCERNED:

A. 2 B-57 SQS WITH U.S. MARKINGS FROM CLARK TO BIEN HOA.

B. 1F-105 SQ FROM YOKOTA TO KORAT.

C. DEPLOY TANKER SUPPORT AND ADDITIONAL 4 F-100'S FROM CLARK TO TAKI.

D. 1 RTF (6RF-101'S WESTPAC TO TSN.

4. BE PREPARED TO RECEIVE CONUS AUGMENTATION FORCES WHEN DEPLOYED.

FOR CINCPACFLT:

5. DEPLOY ASAP:

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

A. 1 CVS GRP FROM JAPAN TO SO CHINA SEA (CONFIRMS PREVIOUS VERBAL ORDERS)

B. CTG 76.5 FROM PRESENT LOCATION TO VICINITY DANANG.

C. EMBARK AND SAIL (MET (-) CONSISTING OF RLT (-) FROM KI TO SO CHINA SEA.

D. SAIL 1 CVA TG FROM 1ST FLT TO WESTPAC.

6. ALERT MARINE AIR GROUP OF THE MED (-) TO BE PREPARED TO  
PAGE 3 RUHPA 535 ~~TOP SECRET~~

MOVE AT TIME DECISION IS MADE TO LAND MEB (-) AT DANANG.

FOR CINCUSARPAC, PACAF AND CHWD:

7. CONSISTENT WITH AIRLIFT REQUIREMENTS FOR MOVEMENT OF PACOM FORCES ALERTED ABOVE DETERMINE MAXIMUM PACOM AIRLIFT THAT CAN BE EARMARKED IN PLACE FOR DEPLOYMENT OF '73RD ABN BDE. CINCUSARPAC WILL ARRANGE FOR MATS AIRLIFT TO SATISFY REMAINING AIRLIFE REQUIREMENTS. FOR COMUSMACV.

8. BE PREPARED TO ASSUME OPERATIONAL COMMAND/CONTROL OF DEPLOYED FORCES UPON ARRIVAL RVN AND TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS AS DIRECTED. 6 OF MEB WILL BE NAVY COP CDR UPON ARRIVAL MEB IN RVN.

9. ADVISE ASAP INFO JCS AIRCRAFT AND BASE SUPPORT CAPACITY DANANG IN RELATION TO PLANNED FORCE POSTURE OUTLINED ABOVE. FOR COMUSMACV.

10. BE PREPARED TO ASSUME OP COMD/CONTROL USA, & USAF (THROUGH CMDR 2ND ADIV) AND SUPPORT COMUSMACV OPERATIONS.

FOR AL:

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

11. SUBMIT SITREPS EVERY 6 HRS BEGINNING 050800Z REPORTING  
PROGRESS TOWARD ACCOMPLISHMENT ABOVE OBJECTIVES. ~~GP-3~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Ø5Ø445Z

FM CINCPAC

TO RUEKDA/JCS

INFO RUEKDL/CINCSTRIKE

RUCSBB/CINCSAC

RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

RUMBAJ/COMUSMACTHAI

RUCDAA/COMATS

RUHPCR/COMSTS

RUHPB/CINCPACFLT

RUHPHR/CINCUSARPAC

RUHLKM/PACAF

RUKC/ANMCC

RUEKMJ/NECPAG

RUEKVDA/NEACP

RUAUAL/CHWTO TACHIKALA

TAB 66

~~TOP SECRET~~

ALERTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF CINCPAC OPLAN 37-64 FORCES (U)

A. YOUR 7729 DTG Ø5ØØ43Z.

1. RECOMMEND ADDITIONAL ALERTING AND DEPLOYMENT OVER AND ABOVE THOSE CITED IN REF A.

A. CINCPACFLT:

(1) ALERT 1ST MARINE BRIGADE IN HAWAII AND POSITION 1 PHIBRON HAWAII FOR MOVEMENT THAT BRIGADE HAWAII TO OKINAWA/CUBI.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

(2) ALERT 1 MCS, 5 MSO AND 9 MSC FOR MOVE FROM JAPAN TO SOUTH CHINA SEA.

PAGE 2 TUHPA 540 ~~TOP SECRET~~

(3) ALERT 1 VP RON LAND AV AS RETIRED, IN WESTPAC FOR MOVEMENT TO S. CHINA SEA AREA.

(4) ALERT 1 ASW SUPPORT CARRIER GROUP, 1 CRUISER TYPE, 2 DESDIVS, 1 MINDIV, 1 VPRON (P2) AND NECESSARY ADDITIONAL SERVICE AND SUPPORT FORCES FOR POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT FROM 1STFLT TO WESTPAC.

B. CINCUSARPAC:

(1) ALERT 2 BRIGADES OF 25TH DIVISION VICE ONE AS SET FORTH REF A. ONE TO BE TAILORED TO SEC II DAFD AT KORAT; THE OTHER FOR THE DA FLOATING DEPOT.

(2) IF DEPLOYMENT DIRECTED, HAWAII BRIGADES SHOULD BE FIRST DEPLOYED AND 173D AIRBORNE HELD IN PACOM RESERVE. MOREOVER, RETAINING THEATER AIRLIFT IN PLACE FOR 173D AS STATED PARA 1.CU OF REF A WILL INHIBIT CURRENT OPERATIONS OF 315AD, AND IS NOT RECOMMENDED. IF STECDOWN ESSENTIAL, REQUEST IT BE ALL MATS.

C. CINCSTRIKE:

(1) ALERT 1 TC TERMINAL SERVICE CO FOR AIRLIFT TO BANGKOK FOR OFF-LOAD FFD.

(2) ALERT AUGMENTATION FOR DEPLOYMENTS:

1 ENGR BN CBT (622)

2 ASA V1J PLAT (INF) (96)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE 3 RUHPA 540 ~~TOP SECRET~~

HQ & HQ DET, SIG GP (64)

SUG BN CORPS (707)

RADIO RELAY CO VHF (64)

(3) ALSAT AUGMENTATION OF IX LOG CMD TO SUPPORT

ALERTED BRIGADES:

1 ENGR DET FM (22)

1 PREV MED SVC UNIT (-) (80)

1 MED DET JA, VET (5)

JQ MED DET, OA DISP (9)

1 MED DET HEL COMB (29)

1 MP DET (CID) (12)

2 DYXL PLATOONS (90)

1 ORDSUBSDYG (181)

1 ORD CO FTD SUPPLY (158)

1 ORD DET KA, EXPL DIS

1 QM CO DS (238)

SIG BN SUP & MAINT

HQ & HQ DET, S&M BN (67)

SIG CO, FWD S&M GRPOYL

SUX PO, DEPOT (169)

PAGE 4 RUHPA 540 ~~TOP SECRET~~

1 TC LIGHT TRK CO (168)

1 TC HEL CO (H-37) (178)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

2 TC DETS MOVEMENT CTL (12)

1 FINSEC DISB (31)

1 APU, TYPE E (13)

(4) DEPLOY TWO C-130 SQDNS ASAP TO WESTPAC.

(5) ALERT ONE ADDITIONAL C-130 SQDN FOR MOVEMENT  
TO WESTPAC.

(6) ALERT 2 ADDITIONAL TFS OVER AND ABOVE THOSE CITED  
REF A.

(7) ALERT ONE USAF COMMUNICATION AND CONTROL GROUP.

D. COMUSMACF:

(1) ALERT 2 AIR MOBILE COS, 1 AVIATION CO (CARIBOU)  
AND 1 AVIATION MAINTENANCE CO FBA DEPLOYMENT FROM RVN TO KORAT  
IN THAILAND FOR SUPPORT OF ARMY UNITS WHICH MAY BE DEPLOYED TO  
THAILAND. ~~GP-3~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

P 051553Z

FROM JCS

TO CINCPAC

~~TOP SECRET~~ JCS 7742 JCS SENDS.

1. TO BE PREPARED WITH FULL RANGE OF ACTION CAPABILITIES AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM, INCLUDING READINESS TO EXECUTE SELECTIVE STRIKES OR INITIATE COORDINATED AIR CAMPAIGN ALONG LINES OPLAN 37-64 AND OPLAN 99-64 ON SHORTEST POSSIBLE NOTICE IF AND WHEN DIRECTED, JCS DESIRE THAT YOU COMPLETE ASAP DETAILED OPERATIONAL PLANNING AND PREPARATIONS FOR EMPLOYMENT US AIR RESOURCES NOW BEING PROVIDED. THE "94 TARGET LIST" SHOULD BE UTILIZED AS BASIS FOR THE PLANS, IN ORDER TO FACILITATE DECISION

PAGE 2 RUEPPR 205 ~~TOP SECRET~~

OF HIGHER AUTHORITY AS TO SCALE, TEMMO, TARGET CATEGORIES TO BE STRUCK.

TAB 67

2. REQUEST YOU ADVISE EXPECTED DATE OF READINESS TO EXECUTE, AND HOW MANY HOURS NEEDED FROM TIME OF NOTICE BY JCS OF DECISION TO TIME ON TARGET. ALSO ADVISE WHETHER ANY DELAY IS IMPOSED BY RETENTION IN PRESENT LOCATION OF UNITS ALERTED BUT NOT MOVED PER PARAGRAPH 1B JCS 7729, OR WHETHER AIR ATTACK OPERATIONS COULD BE STARTED, WHILE CONCURRENTLY MOVING THESE UNITS FORWARD. GP-4

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

O 052303Z

FM JCS

TO AIG 936

RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE

RUEHCR/STATE

RUEPCR/NSA

RUEPIA/CIA

RUEADX/AFSTRIKE

RUHPC/CINCPACFLT

RUEHCR/AMEMB VIETNAM

RUMTBK/AMEMB THAILAND

RUEHCR/AMEMB CAMBODIA

RUMJFS/AMEMB LAOS

~~TOP SECRET~~/JOPREP/08003/JCS/SITREP/DTG 052250Z

~~TOP SECRET~~ JCS 7762

1. THIS IS A PIERCE ARROW SITREP.

2. STRIKE RESULTS FOLLOW:

VIEN/BEN THUY. TWO STRIKES WERE FLOWN FROM TICONDEROGA AGAINST POL STORAGE AREA. FIRST STRIKE DESTROYED AT LEAST 8 POL TANKS AND SET STORAGE AREA ABLAZE. SECOND STRIKE DESTROYED 2 TO 4 MORE TANKS. SIX AA GUNS ESTIMATED DESTROYED.

QUANG KHE. ONE STRIKE OF 6 ACFT FROM TICONDEROGA

PAGE 2 RUEPCR 279 ~~TOP SECRET~~

WERE FLOWN AGAINST TORPEDO BOAT CONCENTRATIONS. ONE BOAT ESTIMATED DESTROYED AND 3 DAMAGED.

~~TOP SECRET~~

TAB 68

~~TOP SECRET~~

ONE ARFED COASTAL RECCE FLIGHT FROM TICONDEROGA ATTACKED 3 PT BOATS INFLECTING LIGHT TO MODERATE DAMAGE TO ALL 3. TWO ADDITIONAL PT BOATS STRUCK AS TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY WERE DESTROYED.

HON GAY. SIXTEEN AIRCRAFT FROM CONSTELLATION PARTICIPATED IN STRIKE. PHOTOS TAKEN AFTER STRIKE BY 10 A-4 AIRCRAFT CONFIRMED ONE SWATOW AGROUND AND BURNING INSIDE HARBOR; SECOND SWATOW BURNING BUT UNDERWAY; ONE P-4 VERY SLOWLY UNDERWAY TOWARD HARBOR; ONE P-4 UNDERWAY FULL SPEED AWAY FROM HARBOR. SUBSEQUENTLY 4 AIRCRAFT ATTACKED ALL BOATS RESULTING IN ONE SWATOW DIW BURNING, ONE PGM BURNING AND SLOWLY CIRCLING. THREE PT BOATS WERE STRAFED AND HIT WITH ROCKETS.

LOC CHSO ESTUARY. FIVE PT BOATS OBSERVED EN ROUTE TO TARGET BY AIRCRAFT FROM CONSTELLATION. TWO WERE TAKEN UNDER ATTACK BY A-1 AIRCRAFT. BOTH WERE LEFT DIW SMOKING. 9 A-4 ATTACKED REMAINING 3 PT TYPE BOATS. ONE PT WAS HIT AND SET AFIRE, AND ONE DAMAGED IN STERN. PHOTOGRAPHY CONFIRMS ONE SWATOW DIW BURNING; ONE SWATOW DIW SMOKING, ONE SWATOW DAMAGED

PAGE 3 RUEPCR 279 TOP SECRET

IN STERN, ONE P-4 PT DIW, AND ONE P-4 PT LAYING TO DIW NEAR SHORE OF THE HON NE ISLAND.

3. US LOSSES AND DAMAGE:

ONE A4C, PILOT LTJG EVERETT ALVAREZ HIT BY AA AND DOWNED IN VICINITY OF HON GAY HARBOR. PILOT REPORTED AIRCRAFT HIT, UNABLE TO CONTROL AIRCRAFT AND EJECTING. IF EJECTION WAS ACCOMPLISHED SAFELY PILOT WOULD HAVE LANDED ON PENINSULA OF NVN.

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

ONE A1H, PILOT LTJG RICHARD C. SATHER PRESUMED HIT BY GUNFIRE AND IMPACTED BETWEEN 2 PT CRAFT UNDER ATTACK IN VICINITY OF 19-55N 106-00E. PARACHUTE WAS NOT OBSERVED. NO SURVIVOR.

ONE A1H RECEIVED THREE HITS CAUSING HYDRAULIC FAILURE. AIRCRAFT RECOVERED ON BOARD SAFELY.

ONE F-8 SUSTAINED A SINGLE 30 CALIBER HIT.

4. AIR STRIKE SUMMARY: TOTAL SOLTIES 64, VINH POL ESTIMATE 90 PERCENT DAMAGE. ESTIMATE 12 OF 14 LARGE TANKS DESTROYED.

30 PGM/PT SIGHTED.

8 PGM/PT DESTROYED.

6 PGM/PT SEVERELY DAMAGED

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10 PGM/PT MODERATELY DAMAGED.

4 PGM/PT LIGHTLY DAMAGED.

1 PC BEACHED. AE QUANT KHE.

1 SIX GUN AAA INSTALLATION SEVERELY DAMAGED. ~~GP-3~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

3/O/VHN/R04-64 ST 220  
SPOT REPORT  
6 AUGUST 1964  
DIST: OSCAR/VICTOR XRAY

GULF OF TONKIN SIGINT SITUATION REPORT NO. 2

DRV NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS CONTINUE TO BE SPARSE FOLLOWING THE U.S. CARRIER-BASED ATTACK ON THEIR PT BOAT BASES ON 5 AUGUST. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT TRAFFIC VOLUMES ARE ON THE RISE AS RESULT OF DRV NAVAL AUTHORITIES REQUESTING DAMAGE REPORTS. NEVERTHELESS, COMMUNICATIONS AVAILABLE SINCE THE ATTACK HAVE BEEN CONCERNED PRIMARILY WITH ASSESSING THE DAMAGE INCURRED BY THEIR VESSELS AND COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST FUTURE AIR ATTACKS. THUS FAR NINE CRAFT HAVE BEEN REPORTED AS EITHER DAMAGED OR LOST DURING THE ATTACK. THIS IS FAR BELOW CURRENT ESTIMATES.

DRV NAVAL AUTHORITIES APPARENTLY FEAR ANOTHER ATTACK. WHILE CLAIMING TO HAVE SHOT DOWN A TOTAL OF SIX AIRCRAFT THEY EXHORTED THEIR PERSONNEL TO BE READY IN CASE OF ANOTHER ATTACK. NAVAL HQ AT HAIPHONG ORDERED UNITS TO DISPERSE AND CAMOUFLAGE THEIR VESSELS. APPARENTLY, IN RESPONSE, VESSELS WERE BEING DISPERSED AROUND THE ISLANDS AND CHANNELS NEAR HON GAY. TAB 69

EXTENT OF DAMAGES INCURRED BY DRV NAVAL VESSELS DURING THE 5 AUGUST AIR ATTACK AS REFLECTED IN THEIR COMMUNICATIONS SINCE THAT DATE:

ONE UNIDENTIFIED VESSEL IN THE BEN THUY AREA REPORTED Ø8ØØZ, 5 AUGUST, AS PROBABLY LOST.

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

ONE UNIDENTIFIED, UNLOCATED VESSEL REPORTED 0823Z, 5 AUGUST  
AS PROBABLY DAMAGED.

T336 IN HON NE AREA REPORTED 0845Z, 5 AUGUST IS DISABLED  
(THIS CRAFT WAS DAMAGED DURING THE FIRST ATTACK ON THE USS MADDOX  
ON 2 AUGUST).

T125, SWATOW CLASS PGM, UNLOCATED, REPORTED 1210Z, 5 AUGUST  
AS DAMAGED.

FIVE UNIDENTIFIED VESSELS SUBORDINATE TO A PROBABLE FLOTILLA  
27 REPORTED 1210Z 5 AUGUST AS DAMAGED.

VINH OIL STORAGE FACILITIES REPORTED BOMBED BUT EXTENT OF  
DAMAGES NOT REPORTS.

(DIST: OSCAR/VICTOR XRAY)

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~