Mr. John R. Greenewald, Jr.
8512 Newcastle Avenue
Northridge, CA 91325

Dear Mr. Greenewald, Jr.:

This is in response to your letter of October 23, 2001, which was received in this office October 30, 2001, requesting information under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (enclosure 1). Under Department of Defense rules implementing the FOIA, published at 32 CFR 286, your request was categorized as "commercial."

Release of the document ADC034207, entitled Summary of Naval Nuclear Weapon Accidents and Incidents (1981, 1982 and 1983 Supplement) can only be performed by the responsible controlling activity. Therefore, your request has been forwarded to the appropriate controlling activity listed below:

Chief of Naval Operations
ATTN: N09B30
2000 Navy Pentagon
Washington, DC 20350-2000

Please direct all future correspondence related to document ADC034207 to this activity.

The search efforts related to your request did not exceed the 2 hours provided to "commercial" category requesters at no charge and reproduction was not required; therefore, there are no assessable fees for services from the Defense Technical Information Center at this time.
Please understand that other members of the public may submit a FOIA request for copies of FOIA requests received by this office or the names of those who have submitted requests. Should such occur, your name and, if asked for, a copy of your request will be released; however, home addresses and home telephone numbers will not be released. Other private citizens who have obtained your name by using such a request may contact you. Be advised, however, correspondence from the Defense Department about your request will be on official letterhead. Please call me at (703) 767-9194 if you have any questions.

Sincerely,

Kelly D. Akers
KELLY D. AKERS
FOIA Program Manager
Mr. John Greenewald, Jr.
Northridge, CA 91325

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

As you were previously apprised by the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Program Manager for the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), your October 23, 2001, FOIA request for a copy of a report entitled "Summary of Naval Nuclear Weapon Accidents and Incidents (1981, 1982, and 1983 Supplement)," prepared by the Naval Weapons Evaluation Facility, Albuquerque, NM, in February 1984 (DTIC AD Number C034207), was recently referred to this Department for action. That referral was received in this office on January 25, 2001, and was assigned file number 200200314.

In an effort to assist you, I have referred the responsive document to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics (N4S), 2000 Navy Pentagon, Washington, DC 20350-2000, for review by the Nuclear Weapons Division (N411C) and for direct response to you regarding its releasability under the FOIA.

Should you require further assistance, please contact Ms. Tracy Ross of my staff at (202) 685-6546.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

DORIS M. LAMA
Head, DON PA/FOIA Policy Branch
By direction of the
Chief of Naval Operations
(202) 685-6545

NAVAL WEAPONS EVALUATION FACILITY

ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO 87117
NAVAL WEAPONS EVALUATION FACILITY

CAPT R. C. KAUP, USN
Commanding Officer

SUMMARY OF NAVY NUCLEAR WEAPON

Prepared by
NUCLEAR WEAPONS SAFETY DEPARTMENT

Classified by: [Redacted]
Classification approved by:
G. H. GRIFFIN
Security Manager

(CONTENTS OF THIS PAGE ARE UNCLASSIFIED)
FORWARD (U)

(U) This report is a compilation of the incidents (BENT SPEARs and DULL SWORDs) submitted during 1981, 1982, and 1983 by U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps units in accordance with OPNAVINST 3100.6 Series and received by the Naval Weapons Evaluation Facility (NWEF).

(U) NWEF Reports 1070, 1070-1, 1070-2, and 1070-3 contain information relative to previous accidents/incidents. NWEF Report 1070 covers the years 1965 through 1972, NWEF Report 1070-1 covers the years 1973 and 1974, NWEF Report 1070-2 covers the years 1975 through 1977, and NWEF Report 1070-3 covers the years 1978 through 1980.

(U) Authority: This report is published under the authority of SEATASK 643-018/212-5/DCA 3401 of 19 October 1982.

(U) All material in this report, regardless of classification, is

L. G. Moore
Head, Nuclear Weapons Safety Department
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(CONTENTS OF THIS PAGE ARE UNCLASSIFIED)
GUIDE TO NWEF
INCIDENT SUMMARY FORM (U)

(U) GENERAL

(U) This guide is intended as an aid to users of the report and may be
helpful to those who must report the occurrence of incidents. As will be
seen, information on particular accidents/incidents is sometimes incomplete.
Hopefully, future reports can be made more meaningful by a study of the com-
pilation of the information and guidance found in this publication.

(U) Following are specific details about the kind of information to be
found under each heading on both sides of the summary form, an explanation
and discussion of the various types of incidents, and the meaning of the
more frequently used abbreviations in the individual summaries.

(U) CLASSIFICATION

(U) Indicated on the classification line is the overall classification
of the combination of information on the form. Classification is also indi-
cated on other parts of the form as appropriate. The classification symbols
used are as specified by the OPNAVINST 5510.1 series.

Unclassified: U
Confidential: C
Restricted Data: CRD
Formerly Restricted Data: CFRD
Secret: S
Restricted Data: SRD
Formerly Restricted Data: SFRD
Top Secret: TS

(U) NWEF CODE

(U) The first number in the NWEF code indicates the calendar year. The
number following the dash is a serial number assigned by NWEF for identifica-
tion. The code word BROKEN ARROW is not used because there were no BROKEN
ARROWS during the period covered by this report.
(U) TYPE INCIDENT

(U) Incidents are categorized into seven types: flooding, handling, logistics, storage, maintenance/assembly, monitoring/testing, and inadvertent release. Each is defined as follows:

a. Flooding - Incidents in which weapons or components are subjected to flooding, for any reason, such as by activation of sprinkler systems, rough seas, etc.

b. Handling - Incidents in which weapons or components are damaged while being handled or transported, with no intent to change custody of the weapons, regardless of the equipment being used or the evolutions involved. Equipment items include hand- or power-propelled bomb trucks, automatic handling systems, hoists, cranes, conveyors, etc. Typical evolutions include loading on aircraft; movement to the launcher, and strikedown.

c. Logistics - Incidents during movement of nuclear weapons from one activity/storage location to another with the intent of changing custody from one U.S. Navy or U.S. Marine Corps unit to another, or between government agencies if it involves a U.S. Navy or U.S. Marine Corps unit. This category also includes incidents that involve problems with weapons or components resulting from a supply action, or an unserviceable or incorrect weapon being issued.

d. Storage - This category includes incidents that occur while the weapon or component is a permanent storage, such as in a magazine or igloo.

e. Maintenance/Assembly - This category includes incidents that occur during maintenance, assembly, disassembly, etc. Incidents in this category include those associated with improper installation of batteries, failure to check limited-life components and other components, improper containerizing; those that could cause the loss of internal pressure or overpressurization; and any occurrence that could result in an unsafe or unreliable weapon, either immediately or at some later time.

f. Monitoring/Testing - Incidents in which the weapon fails an electrical monitoring test fall into this category. Monitoring includes storage monitoring and all continuity checks of the bomb or warhead, but not of the aircraft. Shorts in wiring, cables, and connectors are also included. In addition to preload and postload tests, there are many special tests, such as the final assembly test (FAT), missile electrical systems test (MEST), quality assurance service test (QAST), weapon system readiness test (WSRT), etc.
(U) g. Inadvertent Release - This category includes incidents in which release, launch, or firing is other than planned. Rack malfunctions, both mechanical and electrical, are included. Hung weapons, broken Tugs, and jettisoned weapons are also included.

(U) CAUSE

(U) Cause includes personnel error, material/equipment failure, act of God, and document error. Occasionally the cause may not be readily determined and must be stated as unknown.

(U) BASIC WEAPON

(U) The basic weapon involved in each incident is identified. These weapons, some of which have been retired, include the B29, B43, B57, and B61, Mk 101, MADM (W45), SADM (B54), ASROC, ASTOR, POLARIS, SUEROC, Atomic Projectile, TRIDENT, TALOS, TERRIER, and POSEIDON. This listing, of course, will change as new weapons are added to the Navy stockpile.

(U) WEAPON VERSION OR COMPONENT

(U) The weapon version or a component of the basic weapon is identified by a Mk/Mod or other nomenclature and whether it is a complete weapon, warhead, reentry body, or reentry system. Additional version/component identifications include: bomb dummy unit (BDU), quality assurance service test (QAST) unit, rocket-thrown depth charge (RTDC), rocket-thrown torpedo (RTT), trainer, war reserve (WR), training surface-to-air missile (TSAM), etc. The number of units involved, if more than one, is also given, i.e., W30 warhead (7 units).

(U) SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED

(U) Examples of activity designations are: NAS Whidbey or NAS Whidbey (VA-115) if a squadron is involved. In the case of ships, the following information is given: name of ship (USS DALE), type of class (DLC, SSBN, etc.), and hull number (19, 623, etc.).

(U) FLEET INVOLVED

(U) The fleet involved is either the Atlantic Fleet (LANT) or the Pacific Fleet (PAC).
(U) GENERAL LOCATION

(U) Location indicated is general, such as at sea, in port, ashore, or in flight.

(U) ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT

(U) Associated equipment is equipment other than a weapon component involved in the incident, whether directly or indirectly. Mk/Mod number or other nomenclature is given if known. Some examples of associated equipment are: aircraft, bomb rack, bomb truck, container, elevator, hoist, launcher, sling, sprinkler system, etc.

(U) DATE

(U) This is the date on which the incident occurred.

(U) INITIAL REPORT

(U) The initial report is the first message, speedletter, or other communication received at NWEF about the incident. The originator (ship/activity) and the date-time group are given for messages; the originator, serial number, and date are given for other correspondence.

(U) ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS

(U) These are supplemental reports received at NWEF which provide additional information about the incident itself, disposition of the weapon, results of investigations, etc. Supplemental and final reports if any, from the ship/activity which first reported the incident are also listed.

(U) DISCUSSION

(U) The discussion is a brief description of what happened.

(U) WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS

(U) The condition of the weapon after the incident is described. The disposition of the weapon is reported if known.
(U) ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP

(U) Information provided here includes any action taken by the reporting activity, follow-up action by high authority, or other investigating activities. It also includes submission and disposition of Unsatisfactory Reports (URs), repairs to the weapon or equipment by the reporting activity, and the final disposition of the weapon or equipment if returned to an issuing activity for repair.
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(Contents of this page are unclassified)
INTRODUCTION (U)

(U) PURPOSE

(U) The purpose of this report is to present information on Navy significant incidents (BENT SPEARS) and incidents (DULL SWORDS) which occurred during calendar years 1981, 1982, and 1983. No accidents (BROKEN ARROWS) occurred in this timeframe.

(U) SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS

(U) The information in this report is in consonance with the definitions and reporting procedures of OPMANINST 3100.6 series, first issued 12 February 1974. The current issue of this instruction, OPMANINST 3100.6C dated 16 July 1981, defines three types of occurrences: an accident (BROKEN ARROW), a significant incident (BENT SPEAR), and an incident (DULL SWORD). All are included here for completeness.

(U) Nuclear Weapon Accident (BROKEN ARROW):

a. A nuclear detonation or possible detonation other than a risk detonation.

b. Nonnuclear detonation or burning of a nuclear weapon.

c. Radioactive contamination.

d. Seizure, theft, or loss of a nuclear weapon component, including jettisoning.

e. Public hazard, actual or implied.

(U) Nuclear Weapon Significant Incident (BENT SPEAR). An unexpected event involving war reserve nuclear weapons or nuclear components which does not fall into the category of a nuclear weapon accident but:

a. Results in damage to a nuclear weapon or requiring major rework, complete replacement, or examination/recertification by the Department of Energy (DOE).

b. Requires immediate action in the interest of safety.

c. May generate adverse public reaction (national or international) or premature release of information.
(U) d. The potential consequences are such as to warrant interest or action by the recipients or OPREP-3 NAVY BLUE/BENT SPEAR messages.

(U) Nuclear Weapon Incident (DULL SWORD). An unexpected event involving a nuclear weapon/component (including war reserve, test, training weapons or BDU's) or associated test and handling equipment which is not a nuclear significant incident or nuclear accident but meets one of the following criteria:

a. The possibility of detonation or radioactive contamination is increased.

b. Errors are committed in the assembly, testing, loading or transporting of equipment which could lead to substantially reduced yield, increased dud probability, or to unintentional operation of all or part of a weapon's arming and/or firing sequence.

c. The malfunctioning of equipment and material which could lead to a substantially reduced yield, increased dud probability, or to unintentional operation of all or part of a weapon's arming and/or firing sequence.

d. Any natural phenomena over which man has no control which results in damage to a weapon or component.

e. Any unfavorable environment or condition, however produced, which subjects a nuclear weapon to vibration, shock, stress, extreme temperature, or other environment sufficient to cause questioning of the reliability or safety of the weapon. This includes exposure or suspected exposure of the weapon or major components to electrical or electromagnetic energy which could energize or damage weapon components.

(U) In the summary chart, and in the individual summary forms on the following pages there is a distinction made between significant incidents (BENT SPEARS) and incidents (DULL SWORDS).

(U) Indexes of the BENT SPEARS/DULL SWORDS by weapon system and by ship/activity facilitate locating the page for each occurrence.
INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCCURRENCE</th>
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<th>1983</th>
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<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>DULL SWORD</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(U) Categorization by type follows. BENT SPEARS and DULL SWORDS are combined in the next three charts. Logistical movement beginning with 1981 has been changed to Logistics. A further breakdown was appropriate due to incidents occurring as a result of supply actions. Logistics now includes incidents which take place during the transfer of a weapon from one activity to another, and incidents that involve problems with weapons or components resulting from a supply action, or an unserviceable or incorrect weapon being issued.

INCIDENTS BY TYPE (U)

<table>
<thead>
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<th>TYPE</th>
<th>1981</th>
<th>1982</th>
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<td>Handling</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maintenance/Assembly</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
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INCIDENTS BY CAUSE (U)

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<tr>
<td>Personnel Error</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material/Equipment Failure</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
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(CONTENTS OF THIS PAGE ARE UNCLASSIFIED)
**INCIDENTS BY SHIP/ACTIVITY (U)**

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Aircraft Carriers</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
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(Contents of this page are unclassified)
NAVY NUCLEAR WEAPON INCIDENT SUMMARIES
FOR 1981 (U)

(CONTENTS OF THIS PAGE ARE UNCLASSIFIED)
NWF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION:  

TYPE INCIDENT: Maintenance/Assembly

BASIC WEAPON: 861

VERSION/COMPONENT: Type 3A Trainer

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED:  

FLEET INVOLVED: PAC

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT:  

DATE: 3 February 1981

INITIAL REPORT: msg 031237Z Feb 81

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS:  

DISCUSSION:

While conducting assembly training on a Type 3A Trainer, the P-2 actuator pulse battery assembly cable was found to be misrouted from a prior training evolution.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The P-2 cable was crushed and wires were broken approximately 4 inches from the end of the cable connector.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

A training program was initiated to emphasize proper cable routing.
NWF REPORT 1270-4

NWF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: [redacted]  
TYPE INCIDENT: Handling  
BASIC WEAPON: B43  
VERSION/COMPONENT: BDU-24C  
SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED: [redacted]  
FLEET INVOLVED: LANT  
ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT:  
DATE: 13 February 1981  
INITIAL REPORT: 132215Z Feb 81

NWF CODE: DULL SWORD 81-2  
CAUSE: Personnel Error  
GENERAL LOCATION: Ashore

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS:

DISCUSSION:

During the downloading evolution of a BDU-24C, the handling team was performing the rack unlatching operation. The hoist operator started to lower the weapon before the rear hook was released. This caused the aft end of the weapon to strike the lower side of the bomb rack pylon, putting a dent in the tail of the weapon.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The BDU received a small dent on the shape component section and was returned to the issuing activity for repair.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

Unknown
NWF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: *

TYPE INCIDENT: Handling

BASIC WEAPON: 843

VERSION/COMPONENT: Type 3A Trainer

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED: *

FLEET INVOLVED: PAC

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: *

DATE: 18 February 1981

INITIAL REPORT: msg 18185GZ Feb 8

FOIA (b) (3)

GENERAL LOCATION: At Sea

NWF CODE: DULL SWORD 81-3

CAUSE: Personnel Error

DISCUSSION:

During a technical assist visit, while performing routine maintenance training on a Type 3A Trainer, the P-6 switch-pack connector was caught on the firing set support during removal, breaking the connector shell. The evolution was stopped and the switch pack replaced. There was no impact on the ship's operations and the technical assistance training continued.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The P-6 switch-pack connector shell was broken, but was considered repairable by ship's personnel.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

Replaced the switch pack and continued the evolution.
NWUF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: [redacted]

TYPE INCIDENT: Handling

BASIC WEAPON: B43

VERSION/COMPONENT: BDU-6/E-1

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED: [redacted]

FLEET INVOLVED: PAC

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: Aero 33 Bomb Truck

DATE: 24 February 1981

INITIAL REPORT: msg 240338Z Feb 81

GENERAL LOCATION: At Sea

DISCUSSION:

While attempting to download a BDU-6/E-1 using an Aero 33 bomb truck, the hydraulics failed on the bomb truck. The weapon dropped approximately six inches. As the weapon dropped, it tilted, allowing the nose to strike the aircraft. The nose section of the weapon received three minor dents.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The BDU received three dents in the nose section at the 12 o'clock position. The largest dent was 3" X 2" by 1/8" deep. The BDU was returned to the issuing activity for repair.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

Unknown
NWAF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: [Redacted]

NWAF CODE: DULL SWORD 81-5

TYPE INCIDENT: Handling

CAUSE: Unknown

BASIC WEAPON: B-43

VERSION/COMPONENT: Type 3A Trainer

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: A-7E Aircraft and DCK-143 AMAC

DATE: 25 February 1981

FLEET INVOLVED: PAC

GENERAL LOCATION: At Sea

INITIAL REPORT: msg 261512Z Feb 81

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS: msg 180356Z Mar 81
NWAF msg 091730Z Mar 81

DISCUSSION:

While conducting proficiency loading of an A-7E aircraft, using a Type 3A Trainer, the SAFE and ARM lamps intermittently flashed when step 7C of the checklist was performed. The weapon READY/SAFE switch was in the "SAFE" position. Procedures outlined in the checklist, NAVAIR 01-45SAE-75.51, were repeated with the same results and the loading operation was stopped. The crew then performed an aircraft wire check with satisfactory results. The cause of the incident could not be determined.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The Type 3A Trainer was downloaded and returned to the storage space.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

An Unsatisfactory Report (UR) was submitted to NOSIH DET, McAlester requesting disposition instructions. The Naval Weapons Evaluation Facility recommended the ship return the DCX-143 AMAC to their Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Facility for inspection. This was done; however, no discrepancies were found.
NW EF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: [Redacted]
TYPE INCIDENT: Monitoring/Testing
BASIC WEAPON: ASROC
VERSION/COMPONENT: Four RTDCs
SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED: [Redacted]
FLEET INVOLVED: LANT
ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: ASROC Launcher
DATE: 27 February 1981
INITIAL REPORT: msg 280121Z Feb 81
ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS: msg 280247Z Feb 81

DISCUSSION:

While conducting training at a fleet weapons range on the ASROC weapon system, using a Rocket Thrown Depth Charge (RTDC) (tactical round), damage was noted on the plenum lip of one of the forward Mk 26 Guided Missile Launcher System (GMLS) ready service ring stations. Closer examination revealed that a wire screen cover protecting the plenum had warped or flexed, making contact with the booster baseplate lip of the RTDC. As the ready service ring rotated over the plenum cover, the pressure created by the contact caused the plenum cover to flip into the path of the oncoming RTDC. The RTDC wedged the plenum cover into the plenum lip. As the ready service ring continued to rotate, the asbestos lip of the plenum crumbled and allowed the plenum to be crushed by the RTDC. Investigation revealed that three other RTDCs in the forward ready service ring apparently had been damaged similarly.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The minor scratches on the boosters were not considered to affect the performance capabilities of the RDOLCs. No hazardous conditions existed in the launcher, and there was no damage to the water injection system protecting the missile magazine.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

The ready service ring was repaired and returned to an operational status.
NWAF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: 

TYPE INCIDENT: Flooding

BASIC WEAPON: ASROC

VERSION/COMPONENT: Four RTDCs and Three RTTs

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED: 

FLEET INVOLVED: LANT

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: 

DATE: 3 March 1981

INITIAL REPORT: 

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS: 

msg 04030z Mar 81
CNO/NASURFLANT msg 041750z Mar 81
msg 051603z Mar 81

DISCUSSION:

While troubleshooting the air pressurization system for an air leak, technicians closed the wrong valve. Approximately thirty minutes later, while the technicians were bleeding air from the fresh water accumulation tank, the fresh water suction pressure dropped and triggered the magazine sprinkler control valve. Fresh water followed by salt water entered the magazine area. The sprinkler system was secured in seven minutes. The magazine itself was not flooded, but water did accumulate in the forward missile service space below the magazine and covered the tail sections of four Rocket Thrown Depth Charges (RTDCs) and three Rocket Thrown Torpedoes (RTTs) in that area.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The weapons were not damaged. They were washed down with fresh water and dried.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

A complete inspection of all weapons revealed no major damage. The missile magazine sprinkler system was repaired and returned to service.
NWF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: 

TYPE INCIDENT: Maintenance/Assembly

BASIC WEAPON: TRIDENT

VERSION/COMPONENT: WR

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED:

FLEET INVOLVED: LANT

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT:

DATE: 12 April 1981

INITIAL REPORT: COMSUBRON-16 msg 120439Z Apr 81

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS:
COMSUBRON-16 msg 120855Z Apr 81
NOSIM DET, McAlester msg 171816Z Apr 81
NAVPRO Sunnyvale msg 202332Z Apr 81
NAVPRO Sunnyvale msg 242327Z Apr 81
NAVPRO Sunnyvale msg 282300Z Apr 81

DISCUSSION:

When a TRIDENT missile hatch was opened to clean the seating surface, a ruptured closure on the tube containing a tactical weapon was discovered. Further investigation revealed a cracked nose fairing and nose cap on the missile. The cause was traced to a leaking missile compensation gas-isolation valve. This resulted in a pressure build-up below the hatch and a downward implosion of the closure.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The nose fairing and nose cap were cracked.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

Assistance and disposition instructions were requested, following which the Reentry Body Assembly (RBA) was returned to the Department of Energy for teardown and evaluation.
CLASSIFICATION: [Redacted]  
TYPE INCIDENT: Handling  
BASIC WEAPON: 857  
VERSIGN/COMPONENT: BDU-11A/E  
SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED:  
FLEET INVOLVED: PAC  
ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: P-38 Aircraft  
DATE: 13 April 1981  
INITIAL REPORT: [Redacted] msg 130230Z Apr 81  

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS: NOSIH OET, McAlester msg 141645Z Apr 81  

DISCUSSION:  
During the downloading evolution of a P-38 aircraft using a BDU-11A/E, while performing step 12 of the checklist, the internal collar of the pulse plug came out when the CF cable was removed. The Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team was notified, and the Strike Enabling Plug (SEP) was removed. There was no power on the aircraft at the time of the incident. The cause was traced to failure of a pulse plug retaining pin.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The pulse plug retaining pin was damaged.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

Permission was requested and obtained to locally manufacture a replacement pin using aluminum alloy wire.
NWF Incident Summary (U)

Classification: 

Type Incident: Logistics

Basic Weapon: 857

Version/Component: BDU-20/C

Ship/Activity Involved: 

Fleet Involved: LANT

Associated Equipment: International Harvester Loadster, Model T766, N-45 Ammunition Handling Truck

Date: 15 April 1981

Initial Report: 151735Z Apr 81

Additional/Related Reports:

Discussion:

The bottom lift of an ammunition handling truck had been used to place a BDU-20/C on the bomb trailer. The boom was being returned to the stowed position when a weld between the hydraulic lift and the boom failed, allowing the boom to fall to the bed of the ammunition handling truck. The BDU had been safely stowed on the bomb trailer and was not damaged.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The weapon was not damaged.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

suspended the use of all International Harvester Model 1700, Ammunition Trucks until an investigation was completed.
NWES REPORT 1070-4

NWES INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: [redacted]

TYPE INCIDENT: Handling

BASIC WEAPON: B61

VERSION/COMPONENT: Type 3E Trainer

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED:

FLEET INVOLVED: LANT

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: Mk 21 Bomb Handling Skid and A-6E Aircraft

DATE: 30 Apr 1981

INITIAL REPORT: msg 300535

FOIA (b) (3)

GENERAL LOCATION: At Sea

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS:

DISCUSSION:

During downloading operations, a B61 type 3E trainer fell from an A-6E aircraft bomb rack onto a Mk 21 bomb handling skid. The fall damaged the bomb tail assembly and the center bomb subassembly. The incident report did not reveal the cause of the incident. (It would appear that the incident could have been caused by material/equipment failure or due to personnel error.) The weapon was secured. There were no personnel injuries.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The BDU received two 3/4-inch dents on the bomb tail assembly, and one minor gouge on the center bomb assembly. The BDU was returned to the issuing activity for repair.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

Unknown
CLASSIFICATION: 

TYPE INCIDENT: Handling

BASIC WEAPON: TERRIER

VERSION/COMPONENT: 

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED: 

FLEET INVOLVED: PAC

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: 

DATE: 4 May 1981

INITIAL REPORT: msg 041900Z May 81

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS: msg 050650Z May 81

DISCUSSION:

During the receipt inspection of a Quality Assurance Service Test (CAST) TERRIER missile, the missile retaining nut for the receiver code plug receptacle was found damaged.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The weapon was rejected and returned to the issuing activity.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

Unknown
NWEF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: [Redacted]  
TYPE INCIDENT: Handling  
BASIC WEAPON: B57  
VERSION/COMPONENT: BDU-11A/E  
SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED:  
FLEET INVOLVED: PAC  
ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: A-7E Aircraft  
DATE: 1 July 1981

INITIAL REPORT: msg 010816Z Jul 1981

FOIA (b) (3)

GENERAL LOCATION: At Sea

DISCUSSION:

While performing the post-load test of a Nuclear Ordnance Exercise (NOREX) on an A-7E aircraft using a BDU-11A/E, the Aircraft Monitor and Control (AMAC) panel switch was rotated to the "MONITOR" position. Both the SAFE and ARM lamps illuminated. The load was aborted and the weapon downloaded. A wire check of the AMAC system was then conducted. The system checked out satisfactorily and, thus, gave no insight into the cause.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The BDU was not damaged and was downloaded and returned to the storage magazine.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

An Unsatisfactory Report (UR) was submitted to NOSIH DET, McAlester requesting instructions. The AMAC panel was shipped to the Naval Avionics Center, Indianapolis, Indiana.

The Naval Avionics Center traced the problem to a loose Option Selector Switch in the AMAC panel. An aviation armament change to better secure the switch has been released and is currently being implemented.
NWEF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: [redacted]

TYPE INCIDENT: Flooding

BASIC WEAPON: ASROC

VERSION/COMPONENT: RTDCs

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED:

FLEET INVOLVED: LANT

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT:

DATE: 9 July 1981

INITIAL REPORT: msg 091534Z Jul 81

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS: NOSIH DET, McAlester msg 101337Z Jul 81

DISCUSSION:

While conducting Planned Maintenance Systems (PMS) checks in the ASROC magazine, the Pressure Reducing Pilot (PRP) valve in the group two magazine was accidently tripped, activating the magazine sprinkler system. Approximately 100 gallons of water flooded the magazine, wetting all ASROC Rocket Thrown Depth Charges (RTDCs) and associated handling equipment.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The weapons were not damaged. They were immediately washed down with fresh water and dried.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

Unknown
NWEF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: [Redacted]

TYPE INCIDENT: Handling

BASIC WEAPON: 857

VERSION/COMPONENT: BDU-20C

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED:

FLEET INVOLVED: LANT

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: DCK-143 AMAC

DATE: 12 July 1981

INITIAL REPORT: msg 121704Z Jul 81

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS:

DISCUSSION:

While conducting an HTPI, a BDU-20C was rejected. During the post-load quality assurance check, the DCK-143 Aircraft Monitor and Control (AMAC) panel showed both an ARMED and SAFE condition. The report did not indicate the cause, nor were any follow-up reports received.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

Unknown, but apparently unuseable.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

The weapon was downloaded and returned to the storage magazine.
Damage to a Mk 21 cable and associated Ignition Separation Assembly (ISA) receptacle and housing occurred when the Mk 21 cable worked loose from the cable connector plug and collided with the leading edge of the aft snubber assembly. The incident occurred while the ASROC missile was being extracted from its cell during an unloading evolution. The snubbers were verified to be retracted prior to attempting the extraction and clearance appeared to be normal. No damage was sustained by the launcher or the loader crane being used to extract the missile.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The weapon was not damaged.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

All handling check sheets were inspected and found to be correct. The Mk 21 cable was returned to the issuing activity for repair.
NWF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: C
TYPE INCIDENT: Maintenance/Assembly
BASIC WEAPON: B57
VERSION/COMPONENT: Type 3A Trainer
SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED: LANT
FLEET INVOLVED: LANT
ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: 
DATE: 11 August 1981
INITIAL REPORT: msg 111831Z Aug 81

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS:

DISCUSSION:

While a B57 type 3A trainer was disassembled for Limited Life Component (LLC) exchange training, the shorting plug was improperly installed. The technicians failed to notice the improper installation of the shorting plug when the reassembly evolution began. Following proper reassembly procedures, the P-12 connector was installed. This resulted in a puncture of the insulation on the P-12 connector by a bent pin of the
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The trainer received a puncture to the insulation on the P-12 connector and a bent pin on the ______.  

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

The bent pin on the ______ connector was straightened and a new P-12 connector was requisitioned.
NWF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: [Redacted]

TYPE INCIDENT: Handling

BASIC WEAPON: 857

VERSION/COMPONENT: BDU-11A/E

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED:

FLEET INVOLVED: PAC

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: Mk 7 Loading Trailer

DATE: 1 October 1981

INITIAL REPORT: [Redacted]

FOIA (b) (3)

GENERAL LOCATION: Ashore

DISCUSSION:

While performing technical operations during an MTP, technicians placed a BDU-11A/E too far forward on the Mk 7 bomb loader trailer. The misalignment resulted in a dent on the exterior of the BDU.

FOIA (b) (3)
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The BDU received a small dent on the subassembly.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

The BDU was returned to the issuing activity for repair.
While attempting to load an ASROC Guided Missile Training Round (GMTR) on the launcher rail, the loading system failed and the GMTR dropped 15 feet into the missile magazine. An investigation of the incident traced the cause to a faulty diode matrix card which created electronic failures in the cable connector when the hoist was in the raised position. The faulty logic mechanically disengaged the power drive and opened the drive shaft brake, thus allowing the GMTR to fall, rendering it inoperable. There were no personnel injuries.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The missile was considered unserviceable and was returned to the issuing activity.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

requested and received assistance from NAVSEA in locating the cause of the incident.

A new diode matrix card was manufactured and installed which corrected the problem.
NWF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: 

NWEF CODE: DULL SWORD 81-20

TYPE INCIDENT: Handling

CAUSE: Personnel Error

BASIC WEAPON: 857

VERSION/COMPONENT: BDU-11A/E

GENERAL LOCATION: Ashore

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED: 

FLEET INVOLVED: LANT

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: HLU-196 Bomb Hoist Aero 21 Bomb Skid and A-6E aircraft

DATE: 22 October 1981

INITIAL REPORT: msg 222239Z Oct 81

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS:

DISCUSSION:

While downloading a BDU-11A/E from an A-6E aircraft, the hoist operator placed the hoist clutch in the "free spool" position before the bomb rack was unlatched. This allowed the weapon to free spool down onto the Aero 21 bomb skid when the bomb rack was unlatched. This incident was considered a hoist operator error.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The BDU was not damaged and was downloaded and returned to the storage magazine.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

The hoist operator's license was revoked and all personnel were re-briefed on proper operation of the HLU-196 bomb hoist. An Unsatisfactory Report (UR) was submitted recommending that a warning statement be included in the applicable SWOP to preclude a repetition of this type of incident.

A second generation bomb hoist is now in development to replace the HLU-196.
NWF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: [Redacted]

TYPE INCIDENT: Handling

BASIC WEAPON: POSEIDON

VERSION/COMPONENT:

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED:

FLEET INVOLVED: LANT

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: Missile Loading Crane

DATE: 2 November 1981

INITIAL REPORT: [Redacted]

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS: COMSUBRON-14 msg 021547Z Nov 81
CNO msg 021551Z Nov 81
NOSIH DET, McAlester msg 021955Z Nov 81
CNO msg 022309Z Nov 81
COMSUBRON-14 msg 040829Z Nov 81
COMSUBRON-14 msg 191209Z Nov 81
COMSUBRON-14 msg 201155Z Nov 81
COMSUBLANM msg 252102Z Nov 81

DISCUSSION:

While transferring a POSEIDON missile from a submarine tender to an SSBN, the brakes of the tender missile crane failed, allowing the missile to descend rapidly back into the tender missile magazine. The missile dropped approximately 12 feet in 14 seconds. A visual inspection of the missile at the tender indicated no damage to the missile or its equipment.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The missile did not appear to be damaged, however, the missile in its liner were returned to the issuing activity for further inspection.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

The follow-up inspection by the issuing activity revealed no damage to the reentry body.
NAVY NUCLEAR WEAPON INCIDENT SUMMARIES

FOR 1982 (U)

(CONTENTS OF THIS PAGE ARE UNCLASSIFIED)
NWOF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)  

CLASSIFICATION: [classified]  
NWEP CODE: DULL SWORD 82-1  
CAUSE: Personnel Error  

TYPE INCIDENT: Logistics  
BASIC WEAPON: ASROC  
VERSION/COMPONENT:  
SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED:  
FLEET INVOLVED: PAC  
ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: Mk 99 Sling and Mk 183 Missile Container  
DATE: 25 January 1982  
INITIAL REPORT:  
GENERAL LOCATION: Ashore  

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS:  

DISCUSSION:  

While offloading an empty Mk 183 ASROC missile container from a service ship using a Mk 99 sling, only three legs of the sling had been disconnected from the container when the crane operator started moving the crane. The remaining leg of the sling, which was still connected, overturned the container.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

No weapon was involved. The container was not broken open and did not appear to be damaged.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

The Mk 183 missile container was returned to the issuing activity for a thorough inspection. No report of its exact condition was received.
NWCF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: 

TYPE INCIDENT: Handling

BASIC WEAPON: ASROC

VERSION/COMPONENT: 

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED: 

FLEET INVOLVED: PAC

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: Mk 10 Cable Restraining Assembly

DATE: 19 February 1982

INITIAL REPORT: msg 190200Z Feb 82

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS: 

DISCUSSION:

While loading the ASROC magazine from the launcher, the Mk 10 cable restraining assembly caught on an undetermined obstruction. The obstruction pulled the Mk 10 cable out of the ASROC training weapon, damaging the pins of the Ignition Separation Assembly (ISA) receptacle. The incident report did not indicate the exact cause of the incident; however, other similar incidents have resulted from the Mk 10 cable connector working partially out of the ISA receptacle.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

There was no damage to the missile; however, as indicated the pins of the ISA receptacle were damaged.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

The Mk 10 cable was replaced from local assets. The pins on the ISA receptacle were straightened and training continued.
NWES INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: U
TYPE INCIDENT: Maintenance/Assembly
BASIC WEAPON: B61
VERSION/COMPONENT: BDU-36/C
SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED:
FLEET INVOLVED: PAC
ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT:
DATE: 23 February 1982
INITIAL REPORT: msg 042122Z Mar 82
ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS: NSC Oakland msg 042122Z Mar 82

DISCUSSION:

While refurbishing a BDU/36C, technicians, following normal procedures, removed the warning flag safety pin from the delay initiator. This caused the entire delay initiator assembly firing sequence to accidentally actuate. Activation of the conventional assembly firing sequence resulted in parachute ejection. The parachute was driven through a work bench and a six-inch wall located approximately 15 feet behind the BDU. The cause of this incident was undetermined. There were no deviations in the procedures and skilled technicians were performing the operation.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The BDU was damaged beyond repair.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

Recommended an extensive investigation to determine the cause of the incident. The investigation failed to reveal the exact cause of the incident. It was considered possible that the incident could have been caused by an error made during assembly or that there could have been a system malfunction. The probability of recurrence was considered remote; however, it was recommended that extreme care be taken during assembly.
NWEF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: [redacted]

TYPE INCIDENT: Handling

BASIC WEAPON: TERRIER

VERSION/COMPONENT:

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED:

FLEET INVOLVED: LANT

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT:

DATE: 2 March 1982

INITIAL REPORT:

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS:

DISCUSSION:

While offloading a TERRIER missile, the code plug receptacle rotated as the code plug was being removed, shearing off the mounting bracket. The cause of the incident was undetermined.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The code plug receptacle mounting bracket was broken off. The missile was considered serviceable and was returned to the issuing activity for repair.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

See above.
NWEF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: [Redacted]

TYPE INCIDENT: Maintenance/Assembly

BASIC WEAPON: B43

VERSION/COMPONENT: Type 3A Trainer

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED:

FLEET INVOLVED: PAC

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT:

DATE: 9 March 1982

INITIAL REPORT msg 090735Z Mar 82

FOIA (b) (3)

GENERAL LOCATION: At Sea

DISCUSSION:

During Limited Life Component (LLC) maintenance training on a B43 Type 3A Trainer, technicians failed to disconnect the detonator cables before removing the foam deck support in accordance with paragraph 5.4.4.12. of the B43 1A Manual. When the foam deck support was removed, the detonator cables were pulled from the coaxial cable connectors. There was no damage to the fire/reset or fire/reset connectors being used during the training.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The coaxial cable connectors received only minor damage.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

The coaxial cable connectors were repaired by ship's technicians.
NWF Incidents Summary (U)

Classification: [Redacted]

Type Incident: Handling

Basic Weapon: BS7

Version/Component: BDU-20C

Ship/Activity Involved:

Fleet Involved: LANT

Associated Equipment:

Date: 16 March 1982

INITIAL REPORT: msg 161930 14 Jul 82

Discussion:

During an NWAI, the pulse plug on a BDU-20C was discovered partially pulled loose, disrupting the firing circuitry. The incident report did not indicate the cause of the incident and no further messages were received.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The BDU was not damaged.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

Unknown
NWF REPORT 1070-4

NWF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: [black]

TYPE INCIDENT: Flooding

BASIC WEAPON: ASROC

VERSION/COMPONENT: Four RTDCs

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED:

FLEET INVOLVED: PAC

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT:

DATE: 22 March 1982

INITIAL REPORT

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS:

msg 220145Z Mar 82

NOSIH DET, McAlester msg 131738Z Apr 82

DISCUSSION:

The salt water sprinkler system activated, spraying four ASROC Rocket Thrown Depth Charge (RTDC) weapons with salt water. The sprinkler system was deactivated. The exact cause was not determined. It was assumed that the system somehow malfunctioned.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The weapons were drenched with salt water.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

The weapons were washed down with fresh water, cleaned and dried. As directed by NOSIH DET, McAlester, they were inspected for salt water damage. No apparent damage was found.
NWEF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: CLASSIFIED
TYPE INCIDENT: Maintenance/Assembly
BASIC WEAPON: B57
VERSION/COMPONENT: BDU-11A/E
SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED:
FLEET INVOLVED: PAC
ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT:
DATE: 2 April 1982

INITIAL REPORT: msg 201227Z Apr 82

DISCUSSION:

During a parachute exchange on a BDU-11A/E, the parachute cable connector was twisted off when the technician removed the dust cover of the 61C14148-3 wire assembly. Proper procedures were followed. It was later determined that the cable connector was badly worn due to extensive use.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The cable connector was worn due to extensive use.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

The cable connector was returned to the issuing activity for repair.
NWFR INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: [REDACTED]

TYPE INCIDENT: Flooding

BASIC WEAPON: ASROC

VERSION/COMPONENT: Four RTDCs and Four RTTs

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED:

FLEET INVOLVED: LANT

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT:

DATE: 7 April 1982

INITIAL REPORT: msg 072310Z Apr 82

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS: msg 080200Z Apr 82

DISCUSSION:

During moderate to heavy sea conditions, the shear bolt on an ASROC ple- num blow-out door sheared off, flooding the plenum. Water from the plenum worked its way up the exhaust ports and entered the ASROC magazine through the base ring of the rocket stowage assembly. There was approximately 2 feet of water in the magazine. No water was found on the Rocket Thrown Depth Charges (RTDCs), but water was found on some Rocket Thrown Torpedos (RTTs).
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

There was no apparent damage to the weapons.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

The magazine was drained and the weapons were washed down with fresh water and dried.
NWF INCIDENT SUMMARY

CLASSIFICATION: [redacted]
TYPE INCIDENT: Logistics
BASIC WEAPON: 843
VERSION/COMPONENT: Mk 43
SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED:
FLEET INVOLVED: LAN
ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT:
DATE: 28 April 1982

NWF CODE: CULL SKORO 82-10
CAUSE: Unknown

GENERAL LOCATION: In Port

INITIAL REPORT: msg 051738Z May 82

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS:

DISCUSSION:

During unloading operations, personnel noticed a yellowish liquid leaking from the nose section of a Mk 43 bomb. Loading operations were halted and a thorough inspection was conducted of all weapons being loaded. Another weapon was found to have the same yellowish liquid. No subsequent reports were received and it is not known if the nature or cause associated with the yellowish liquid was determined.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

There was no evidence of permanent damage to the weapons.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOOLLOW-UP:

The affected bombs were washed down, dried and returned to the issuing activity.

All other Mk 43 bombs were inspected by the issuing activity. No additional bombs were found to contain the yellowish liquid.
NWF Incident Summary (U)

Classification: [Redacted]
Type Incident: Handling
Basic Weapon: B57
Version/Component: BDU-20C
Ship/Activity Involved:
Fleet Involved: LANT
Associated Equipment:
Date: 22 May 1982

Initial Report: msg 221205Z May 82

Discussion:

While performing a proficiency aircraft loading exercise using a BDU-20C, technicians failed to disconnect the CF cable before beginning the download. The connected CF cable caused the pulse plug to be pulled from its connector.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The BOU was not damaged. The pulse plug received minor damage.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

The pulse plug was replaced.
NWF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: [Redacted]

NWF CODE: DULL SWORD 82-12

TYPE INCIDENT: Handling

CAUSE: Material/Equipment Failure

BASIC WEAPON: ASROC

VERSION/COMPONENT: RTT

GENERAL LOCATION: In Port

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED:

FLEET INVOLVED: LANT

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: ASROC Direct Loader Rail

DATE: 4 June 1982

INITIAL REPORT: msg 041630Z Jun 82

msg 042242Z Jun 82

msg 051600Z Jun 82

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS:

DISCUSSION:

While handling an ASROC Rocket Thrown Torpedo (RTT), the loader brakes failed, releasing the RTT. The RTT slid down the entire length of the ASROC Direct Loader Rail, causing serious damage to the Direct Loader Latch Housing. One individual in the path of the RTT was struck on the left shoulder. An investigation revealed that all bypass valves were closed, the manual reset brake was engaged, and no deviations from prescribed procedures were evident. The injured man returned to duty with a bruised left shoulder.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The RTT received minor damage but was considered repairable, and was later returned to the issuing activity.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

It was recommended that a thorough investigation be conducted by shipyard personnel to determine the cause of the malfunction.

Personnel from the Navy shipyard came aboard to troubleshoot the faulty brake and to repair the Direct Loader Latch Housing. The exact cause of the malfunction was not determined. Shipyard personnel suspected that a temporary blockage of the loader brake discharge orifice could have caused the brakes to fail. A continued investigation to isolate the cause was recommended. No further information was received.
NWF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: [Redacted]

TYPE INCIDENT: Logistics

BASIC WEAPON: B57

VERSION/COMPONENT: BDU-11A/E

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED:

FLEET INVOLVED: PAC

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT:

DATE: 4 June 1982

INITIAL REPORT: 042250Z Jun 82

msg 091736Z Jun 82

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS:

DISCUSSION:

A BDU-11A/E was being delivered from the Naval Air Station (NAS) to a tenant command for training. Upon arrival at the tenant command, a receipt inspection was conducted which disclosed that the pull-out plug assembly was missing from the BDU. An investigation revealed that the pull-out plug assembly was inside the BDU. The BDU had been issued to another unit for training two days earlier and the pull-out plug assembly was reported to be in place upon return to the NAS. Although not specifically stated in the incident report, it would appear that the incident cause was personnel error at the unit which had custody previously or that the BDU had been tampered with at the issuing activity.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

Repairable at local level - see below.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

The pull-out plug assembly was properly installed on the BDU by the issuing activity and the BDU was returned to storage for reissue. Closer inspection procedures were implemented.
NWF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: **[redacted]**

TYPE INCIDENT: Logistics

BASIC WEAPON: 857

VERSION/COMPONENT: BDU-20C

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED:

FLEET INVOLVED: PAC

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: Aero 21 Bomb Skid, H-1026 Handling Gear, H-1004 Strongback, Mk 85 Adapter and Forklift Truck

DATE: 9 June 1982

INITIAL REPORT: 091735Z Jun 82

msg 092050Z Jun 82

DISCUSSION:

A BDU-20C was being transferred from its H-Gear (H-1026A/H-1012) to an Aero 21 Bomb Skid using an H-1004 Strongback, an Mk 85 adapter, and a forklift. The BDU in its H-Gear had been previously loaded on a 7½ ton truck and had been transported from the NAS storage area to a squadron to use for training. As the BDU was raised to clear the H-Gear, it assumed a nose down attitude and slide out of the strongback and fell approximately 10 feet to the ground. The nose of the BDU sheared from the remainder of the BDU. It was found that the latch assembly between the BCU and the strongback had not been properly seated.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The BDU nose assembly was sheared off and damaged.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

Personnel directly involved in the incident were temporarily decertified from the Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) until they could be retrained. All NAS personnel were rebriefed on handling procedures and safety requirements.

The BDU was returned to a Naval Weapons Station where it was repaired and returned to the NAS for future issue.
NWEF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: [black redacted]

TYPE INCIDENT: Monitoring/Testing

BASIC WEAPON: ASROC

VERSION/COMPONENT: RTT

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED:

FLEET INVOLVED: LANT

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT:

DATE: 10 June 1982

INITIAL REPORT:

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS:

msg 102125Z Jun 82
msg 102340Z Jun 82
msg 112210Z Jun 82
msg 112230Z Jun 82
msg 121830Z Jun 82

COMNAVSURFLANT msg 150125Z Jun 82
COMNAVSURFLANT msg 150130Z Jun 82
NUSC msg 211735Z Jul 82

DISCUSSION:

Technicians were performing the Missile Electrical Systems Test (MEST) using a conventional ASROC Rocket Thrown Torpedo (RTT). While performing the power-on power-off sequence checks, the snubbers were retracted and the restraining latch that holds the RTT in its cell did not function properly. The RTT was released and slid backwards out of the elevated launcher guide. The snubbers had been retracted twice before during the MEST without incident. One individual received lacerations on his leg and was hospitalized.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The aft end of the rocket casing was dented and two lower aft fins were damaged. The weapon was returned to the issuing activity for repair.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

Initiated an immediate JAG investigation to determine the cause, and requested assistance from higher headquarters.

The cause of the incident was traced to a solenoid that was installed as part of Ordnance Alteration (ORDALT) 867 in the ASROC loader interlock system. The solenoid was inadvertently actuated by stray voltage in the hydraulic supply motor circuit, releasing the restraining latch. Equipment design changes are being made to correct the problem.
NWF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: [Redacted]

TYPE INCIDENT: Logistics

BASIC WEAPON: POSEIDON

VERSION/COMPONENT:

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED:

FLEET INVOLVED: LANT

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: Missile Hoisting Unit (WEC Hoist)

DATE: 13 June 1982

INITIAL REPORT: Jun 82 msg 131810Z

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS:

DISCUSSION:

While transferring a POSEIDON missile from a submarine tender to the SSBN, the aft missile skirt adapter caught on the edge of the missile tube support ring as the missile was being seated in the missile tube. This caused deformation of the aft missile skirt adapter and damage to the four liquid spring leveling cylinders for the support ring. A complete visual inspection of the missile revealed no other damage.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

There was no damage to the reentry bodies (RBs), however, the aft skirt adapter was damaged and the four liquid spring leveling cylinders for the support ring were bottomed. The missile was offloaded and returned to the submarine tender magazine. The missile was later offloaded and returned to the issuing activity for repair.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

See above.
NWFT INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: 

TYPE INCIDENT: Handling

BASIC WEAPON: ASROC

VERSION/COMPONENT: RTDC

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED:

FLEET INVOLVED: PAC

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: Mk 10 Cable Assembly

DATE: 9 July 1982

INITIAL REPORT: msg 092345Z

DISCUSSION:

During a practice handling operation, when technicians were performing the unloading evolution, the Mk 10 cable assembly was incorrectly installed on the Rocket Thrown Depth Charge (RTDC). While unloading the RTDC from the launcher, the cable assembly popped out of the Ignition Separation Assembly (ISA) receptacle, bending the Mk 10 cable fingers. There was no damage to the ISA receptacle.

Note: The incident report stated that the Mk 10 cable assembly had been incorrectly installed, thus, it appears that the incident resulted from a personnel error. It should be noted however, that similar incidents have occurred wherein the cable assembly slipped out of the receptacle. The Naval Sea Systems Command investigated the design of the Mk 10 cable assembly/ISA receptacle some years ago and concluded that the expense of redesigning and retrofitting could not be justified.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

There was only minor damage to the Mk 10 cable fingers. The missile was returned to the issuing activity for repair.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

See above.
NWEF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: 

TYPE INCIDENT: Maintenance/Assembly

BASIC WEAPON: TRIDENT

VERSION/COMPONENT:

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED:

FLEET INVOLVED: PAC

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: ICT2PAB Portable Air Monitor

DATE: 12 July 1982

INITIAL REPORT: msg 131813Z

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS:

DISCUSSION:

When the rear cover of a TRIDENT missile was removed for routine cable replacement, the ICT2PAB Portable Air Monitor alarm sounded, indicating that contamination was present. The building was evacuated. A monitoring team reentered the building with a back-up ICT2PAB which indicated that no radiation was present. An investigation of the incident revealed that the ICT2PAB in use had developed an air leak at the air inlet valve. It was replaced with no other problems.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The missile was not damaged.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

Although not specifically stated, it is assumed that arrangements were made to have the faulty air monitor repaired.
NWF REPORT 1070-4

NWF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: [Redacted]  
TYPE INCIDENT: Handling  
BASIC WEAPON: ASROC  
VERSION/COMPONENT: RTDC Trainer  
SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED:  
FLEET INVOLVED: PAC  
ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: ASROC Launcher

DATE: 28 July 1982  
INITIAL REPORT: msg 2823407 Jul 82

FOIA (b) (3)  
GENERAL LOCATION: In Port

DISCUSSION:

The lower fin tip extension of an ASROC Rocket Thrown Depth Charge (RTDC) was sheared off when the RTDC was misaligned with either the launcher snubber assembly or the guide rail. The incident occurred when the RTDC was being downloaded from an ASROC launcher during a training exercise.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The lower fin-tip extension of the RTDC was sheared off. The RTDC was returned to the missile magazine for repair.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

Requested assistance from NAVSEA to inspect the launcher prior to future use.

The launcher was repaired and returned to operational status.
NWIF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: [redacted] 

TYPE INCIDENT: Logistics 

BASIC WEAPON: ASROC 

VERSION/COMPONENT: Two RTDCs 

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED 

FLEET INVOLVED: LANT 

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: ASROC Forward Handling Truck 

DATE: 13 August 1982 

INITIAL REPORT: msg 1313122 M 0122 

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS: 

DISCUSSION: 

While offloading two ASROC Rocket Thrown Depth Charge (RTDC), the aluminum screws on the wing tip extensions were sheared off. When the RTDC containers were being positioned for offload, technicians did not allow sufficient space between the containers and the suspended RTDCs. As a result, the forward handling truck ratchet assembly struck the tip extensions, shearing off the screws.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The aluminum screws on the wing tip extensions of the RTDCs were sheared off. The RTDCs were returned to the issuing activity for repair.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

Technicians were rebriefed on safety and handling procedures during loading and unloading operations.
CLASSIFICATION:  
TYPE INCIDENT:  Handling  
BASIC WEAPON:  TERRIER  
VERSION/COMPONENT:  Type 3A Mod 1 Trainer  
SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED:  
FLEET INVOLVED:  PAC  
ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT:  
DATE:  15 September 1982  
INITIAL REPORT:  T616472 Sep 82  
ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS:  
DISCUSSION:  
During routine maintenance training, technicians discovered a crushed P-1 generator cable on a W45 Mod 1 Type 3A TERRIER trainer. The damaged cable was found while performing disassembly operations. The report indicated that the probable cause was personnel error during a previous assembly operation. Damage to the cable did not preclude its use for future training.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The weapon was not damaged.

ACTION-BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

An Unsatisfactory Report (UR) was submitted to NOSIH DET, McAlester requesting disposition instructions or replacement authority for the damaged P-1 generator cable. NOSIH DET, McAlester UR Control No. 2432

NOSIH DET, McAlester directed it to continue using the P-1 generator cable in its current condition for training only.
NWES INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION:  

TYPE INCIDENT: Flooding

BASIC WEAPON: B43

VERSION/COMPONENT: Two BDU-11A/Es

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED

FLEET INVOLVED: PAC

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT:

DATE: 22 September 1982

INITIAL REPORT: msg 220706Z Sep 82

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS:

DISCUSSION:

The high-capacity fog foam station in hangar bay one accidently tripped, washing down two BDU-11A/Es. The BDUc were covered with canvas and the only contact with the foam was from the bottom of the trainers. No damage was discovered.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

No damage was apparent.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

The BDUs were moved to hangar bay two, washed down, dried and inspected.
NWF Incident Summary (U)

Classification: [Redacted]

Type Incident: Maintenance/Assembly

Basic Weapon: ASROC

Version/Component: RTR-5A-3

Ship/Activity Involved:

Fleet Involved: PAC

Associated Equipment:

Date: 12 October 1982

Initial Report: [Redacted]

Additional/Related Reports:

Discussion:

During an NWAI, the triangular insulator in an ASROC RTR-5A-3 was broken off as the Ignition Separation Assembly Shorting Plug was being removed.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The triangular insulator was broken but was considered repairable. The RTR was returned to the issuing activity for repair.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

See above.
NWEF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: 
TYPE INCIDENT: Handling 
BASIC WEAPON: SUBROC 
VERSION/COMPONENT: QAST Missile 
SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED: 
FLEET INVOLVED: PAC 
ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: 
DATE: 19 October 1982 
INITIAL REPORT: msg 200019Z Oct 82 
ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS: 

DISCUSSION:

Technicians were performing "READY" (R) to "COMPLETE ASSEMBLY FOR LAUNCH" (CAL) procedures on a SUBROC Quality Assurance Service Test (QAST) missile. The QAST missile was in the torpedo tube. The sequence was changed from "STANDBY" to "ALERT" and the torpedo tube was flooded. Approximately two minutes after flooding, the missile indicated a loss of input signals and power. Power to the missile was removed and the missile was taken from the tube and inspected. The inspection revealed that the "Y" cable connector "O" ring was pinched during installation, allowing the "Y" cable connector to fill with water when the torpedo tube was flooded. The blackening of the warhead and the Adaption Kit Section showed a definite sign that the Auxiliary Propulsion Unit (APU) had ignited.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

A closer investigation disclosed that the APU was partially burned, and two amplifier cards on the Mk 129 leveling computer were damaged. The Mk 129 cards were replaced from onboard supply. The QAST missile was cleaned and stowed in the torpedo tube until offload could be accomplished. The missile was later returned to the issuing activity for repair.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

See above.
NWFIC INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: U

TYPE INCIDENT: Monitoring/Testing

BASIC WEAPON: 857

VERSION/COMPONENT: BDU-11A/E

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED:

FLEET INVOLVED: PAC

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: P-3C Aircraft and T-414 AMAC

DATE: 2 November 1982

INITIAL REPORT: msg 021955Z Nov 82

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS: HOSIH DET, McAlester msg 031525Z Nov 82
msg 101745Z Nov 82

DISCUSSION:

During postload operations on a P-3C aircraft using a BDU-11A/E, technicians were performing a Quality Assurance Check (QAC) on the BDU. "WEAPONS MONITOR" was selected on the T-414 Aircraft Monitor and Control (AMAC) panel. The red "ARM" lamp did not illuminate.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

See below.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

The BDU was downloaded and returned to the Naval Air Station (NAS) for inspection.

An Unsatisfactory Report (UR) was submitted to NOSIH DET, McAlester requesting disposition instructions.

NOSIH DET, McAlester suspected a faulty CF cable or BDU simulator and directed the BDU and CF cable be shipped to the Naval Supply Center, Oakland for testing. No discrepancies were noted during the tests. The BDU and CF cable were returned to the NAS and again loaded on a F-3C aircraft. No discrepancies were noted during the postload QAC. The BDU and CF cable will remain at the NAS and continue to be used for routine training.
NWEF INCIDENT SUMMARY: (U)

CLASSIFICATION:  

TYPE INCIDENT: Maintenance/Assembly  

BASIC WEAPON: B43  

VERSION/COMPONENT: MC903  

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED:  

FLEET INVOLVED: LANT  

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: Bi-rail Hoist  

DATE: 25 November 1982  

INITIAL REPORT:  

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS:  

COMMNAVAIRANT msg 270134Z Nov 82  
301828Z Nov 82  
msg 281223Z Nov 82  
NOSIH DET, McAlester msg 301642Z Nov 82  
NOSIH DET, McAlester msg 131433Z Jan 83

FOIA (b) (3)  

GENERAL LOCATION: At Sea  

FOIA (b) (3)  

DISCUSSION:

During routine maintenance on the bi-rail hoist in the Special Aviation Storage Space (SASS), a technician dropped an electric hand drill on a B43 bomb. When the technician was replacing the pneumatic hose on the take-up reel assembly, he encountered a frozen fitting. While using the electric hand drill to free the fitting, the drill slipped from his hand, striking the top bomb in a double stack of B43s.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The B43 bomb received several minor dents and a small gouge on the aft rear edge of the MC903 radome. No additional damage was discovered.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

All maintenance procedures were reviewed and personnel rebriefed on prescribed maintenance procedures and safety requirements in SASS magazines. The submitted an Unsatisfactory Report to NOSIH DET, McAlester requesting disposition instructions (NOSIH DET, McAlester UR Control No. 2771). NOSIH DET, McAlester passed the UR to Field Command, Defense Nuclear Agency (FDNA). FDNA then initiated FDNA UR Control No. 1048112 which stated the following:

a. The damaged MC903 should be rejected and replaced from Base spares. Forces imparted when the drill struck the MC903 are unknown, therefore, the effect on internal components is unknown. Dispose of the MC903 in accordance with procedures in TP 100-1.

b. FDNA and Sandia Labs were very concerned that any work was being performed over a nuclear weapon. The use of an electric tool where it can contact a nuclear weapon, and possibly apply voltage to the weapon case, is a definite violation of DOE safety requirements. It is urged that immediate and positive steps be taken to prevent similar situations in the future.

The weapon was ultimately returned to the NAS for demilitarization.
NWIF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: [Redacted]

TYPE INCIDENT: Handling

BASIC WEAPON: TERRIER

VERSION/COMPONENT: TSAM

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED:

FLEET INVOLVED: LANT

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT:

DATE: 9 December 1982

INITIAL REPORT: msg 100040Z Dec 82

FOIA (b) (3)

GENERAL LOCATION: In Port

DISCUSSION:

While preparing a TSAM for downloading into the missile magazine, technicians failed to remove the missile and booster fins. This resulted in severe damage to the fins when the TSAM was lowered into the magazine.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The missile and booster fins were damaged beyond repair and were returned to the issuing activity for disposition. There was no damage to the missile or booster.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

A JAG investigation was initiated; however, the findings of the investigation are not known.
NWEF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION:  

TYPE INCIDENT: Handling

BASIC WEAPON: B57

VERSION/COMPONENT: BDU-11A/E

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED:

FLEET INVOLVED: PAC

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: A-7E Aircraft

DATE: 13 December 1982

INITIAL REPORT: msg 130423Z 82-8

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS:

DISCUSSION:

While performing the downloading evolution from an A-7E aircraft using a BDU-11A/E, the shear pin of the connector broke off when the CF cable was being disconnected.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The broken shear pin was considered minor damage and could be repaired aboard ship. The BDU was downloaded and returned to the SASS magazine awaiting disposition instructions from NOSIH DET, McAlester.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

An Unsatisfactory Report (UR) was submitted to NOSIH DET, McAlester requesting disposition instructions. NOSIH DET, McAlester UR Control No. 3030.

NOSIH DET, McAlester directed that the BDU be repaired by the ship's crew.
NWF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION:  
TYPE INCIDENT: Handling  
BASIC WEAPON: ASROC  
VERSION/COMPONENT: Training Weapon  
SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED:  
FLEET INVOLVED: PAC  
ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: ASROC Loader Crane  
DATE: 16 December 1982  
INITIAL REPORT: msg 160231Z Dec 82  
NWF CODE: DULL SWORD 82-29  
CAUSE: Personnel Error  
GENERAL LOCATION: Ashore  

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS:

DISCUSSION:

During a routine training evolution, after placing the weapon on the chocks, the loader crane operator lowered the crane when it should have been raised. This caused the loader crane pick-up lugs to come in contact with the weapon. The pressure exerted from the pick-up lugs resulted in several scratches on the weapon.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The weapon received three minor scratches approximately 1/4-inch long, which were repaired by the ship's crew.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

The handling team was rebriefed on prescribed handling procedures and safety requirements.
NWFB INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION:

TYPE INCIDENT: Handling

BASIC WEAPON: ASROC

VERSION/COMPONENT: RUR-SC 1/w SM-1

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED:

FLEET INVOLVED: LANT

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: ASROC Launcher

DATE: 16 December 1982

INITIAL REPORT: msg 162056Z Dec 82

FOIA (b) (3)

GENERAL LOCATION: At Sea

NWFB CODE: DULL SWORD 82-30

CAUSE: Personnel Error

FOIA (a) (3)

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS: COMDESRON TWO msg 162250Z Dec 82

DISCUSSION:

While performing routine Planned Maintenance Service (PMS) on the Mk 26 Guided Missile Launcher System (GMLS), a standard missile (SM-1) was damaged. When the "B" side of the ready service ring was being rotated, the tail control surface of the SM-1 inadvertently opened. This resulted in the missile control surface colliding with the maintenance ladder assembly. The collision ruptured two sprinkler sensing lines causing the sprinkler system to activate, spraying fresh water on a tactical round. The salt water side of the sprinkler system was secured before activation. There were no personnel casualties. Equipment damage was limited to the SM-1 missile, the sprinkler sensing lines, and the maintenance ladder assembly. The incident was categorized as Handling due to the initial movement of the launcher, which caused the incident.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The control section of the SM-1 was damaged, and the missile was returned to the issuing activity for repair.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

See above.
NAVY NUCLEAR WEAPON INCIDENT SUMMARIES
FOR 1983 (U)

(CONTENTS OF THIS PAGE ARE UNCLASSIFIED)
NWEF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: [Redacted]

TYPE INCIDENT: Flooding

BASIC WEAPON: ASROC

VERSION/COMPONENT: Four RTDCs and Six RTTs

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED:

FLEET INVOLVED: LANT

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT:

DATE: 7 February 1983

INITIAL REPORT: msg 07TI40Z Feb 83

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS: msg 072230Z Feb 83
                          COMDAYSURFLANT msg 080216Z Feb 83
                          msg 081305Z Feb 83
                          msg 091450Z Feb 83
                          msg 102210Z Feb 83
                          msg 151850Z Feb 83

DISCUSSION:

The forward magazine sprinkler system activated for some reason not determined, releasing 5,000 gallons of water which flooded the entire magazine. All ASROC weapons, the launcher, and all associated equipment were covered with salt water. The space was dewatered, all weapons and equipment were wiped down, cleaned, and an electrical receipt inspection performed. After dewatering, a visual inspection produced no evidence of the sprinkler system being tampered with, and all lead wire seals were in place. It would appear that the system malfunctioned. There was no visual evidence of weapon or equipment damage.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

No salt water damage was apparent.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

The weapons were cleaned and wiped down. An electrical receipt inspection was performed on all weapons with satisfactory results.
The pilot of an A-6E aircraft delivered a BDU-36/C in a high-angle loft maneuver during a freefall weapon training mission. The hit was called "off target" by the scoring facility. The pilot did not see the BDU impact. Base Operations was notified and a search party was dispatched to locate the BDU. The BDU was found 9,000 feet from the target area with a parachute attached. A BDU that is used in the freefall mode should have a simulated weight Vice a parachute.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The weapon was returned to the issuing activity.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

An investigation of the incident confirmed that the BDU issued by the Naval Air Station (NAS) was a serial numbered BDU that contained a retarding parachute instead of a simulated weight as required for the training mission.

It was recommended that all units inspect the BDUs issued to them to ensure that they receive the right BDU for the assigned training mission.
NWEF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: 

TYPE INCIDENT: Handling

BASIC WEAPON: B57

VERSION/COMPONENT: BDU-11A/E

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED:

FLEET INVOLVED: PAC

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: Aero 21 Weapons Skid and S-3A Aircraft

DATE: 14 February 1983

INITIAL REPORT: .msg 142u502 Feb 83

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS:

DISCUSSION:

During a routine loading evolution of an S-3A aircraft using a BDU-11A/E, the BDU was positioned too far forward on the Aero 21 weapons skid. As the BDU was rotated on the skid, the preflight plexiglass inspection window struck the tiedown straps, cracking the window glass.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The preflight plexiglass inspection window was cracked, but repairable.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

The BDU was returned to the issuing activity where it was repaired and reissued.
NWF Incident Summary (U)

Classification: 

Type Incident: Handling

Basic Weapon: B57

Version/Component: BDU-11A/E

Ship/Activity Involved:

Fleet Involved: PAC

Associated Equipment: SH-3H Aircraft and Aero 21 Weapons Skid

Date: 14 February 1983

Initial Report: msg 141950Z Feb 83

FOIA (b) (3)

Discussion:

During a preload evolution of an SH-3H aircraft using a BDU-11A/E, the BDU was improperly positioned on the Aero 21 weapons skid. When the BDU was raised to adjust the skid, the BDU struck the skid and cracked the preflight plexiglass inspection window.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The preflight plexiglass inspection window was cracked, but repairable.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

The BDU was returned to the issuing activity for repair.
NWEF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: [Redacted]

TYPE INCIDENT: Handling

BASIC WEAPON: B57

VERSION/COMPONENT: BDU-11A/E

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED: 

FLEET INVOLVED: PAC

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: Mk 8 Bomb Hoist and P-3C Aircraft

DATE: 18 February 1983

INITIAL REPORT: msg 180503Z Feb 83

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS: msg 181130Z Feb 83
msg 210230Z Feb 83

DISCUSSION:

During a routine loading operation of a P-3C aircraft using a BDU-11A/E, the hoist operator lost control of the bomb hoist. His hand slipped from the hoist, causing the BDU to move forward and strike the roller end of the Mk 8 bomb hoist, breaking the preflight plexiglass inspection window.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The preflight plexiglass inspection window was cracked, but repairable.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

The BDU was returned to the issuing activity for repair.
NWEF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION:  

TYPE INCIDENT:  Handling

BASIC WEAPON:  ASROC

VERSION/COMPONENT:

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED:

FLEET INVOLVED:  PAC

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT:  ASROC Loader Crane and Rammer Rail Stow-Trolley

DATE:  26 February 1983

INITIAL REPORT:  msg 261247Z Feb 83

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS:

DISCUSSION:

The ASROC loader crane and rammer rail were damaged when technicians were performing their routine Planned Maintenance Service (PMS). The incident occurred when the pivot head on the loader crane was positioned in alignment with the monorail. The monorail beam assembly and rammer rail were released from the stow position, and locked in the operating position. The aft securing plate was released and the entire monorail beam assembly was pushed toward the pivot head mating position. At this point, the stow-trolley lock slipped, allowing the rammer rail to slip out of the after cam followers and off the rollers. Technicians failed to notice the slippage and allowed the sequence to proceed. The forward end of the rammer rail fell approximately three feet and caused the upper end of the rammer rail track plate to be forced into the rollers and brake assembly. The track plate also forced the stow-trolley sides apart, damaging the trolley side.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

No weapon was involved.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

NAVSEACENPAC was requested to investigate the incident and recommend necessary repairs. The results of this investigation are not known.
NWEP INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: 

TYPE INCIDENT: Monitoring/Testing

BASIC WEAPON: B57

VERSION/COMPONENT: BDU-20/C

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED: 

FLEET INVOLVED: LANT

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: P-3C Aircraft and T-414 AMAC

DATE: 11 March 1983

INITIAL REPORT: msg 112307Z Mar 83

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS: msg 112117Z Mar 83

NOSIH DET, McAlester msg 171813Z Mar 83

DISCUSSION:

During a routine parachute retardation test drop of two BDU-20/Cs from a P-3C aircraft, one BDU failed to arm. When the pilot rotated the Option Selector Switch on the T-414 Aircraft Monitor and Control (AMAC) panel to the "ARM" position, only the red "ARM" lamp for Station 2C illuminated. The red "ARM" lamp for Station 4C did not illuminate, indicating that only the BDU on Station 2C had received the "ARM" signal. The pilot delivered the BDU from Station 2C. Immediately following its release, the red "ARM" lamp for the BDU on Station 4C illuminated. The Option Selector Switch on the AMAC was then rotated to the "SAFE" position (as directed by the Special Weapons Delivery Checklist). The Station 4C "SAFE" lamp illuminated and the "ARM" lamp extinguished (a normal indication). The off-line procedures were then reinitiated for Station 4C in accordance with the checklist. The Option Selector Switch was again rotated to the "ARM" position and the red "ARM" lamp failed to illuminate. Abort procedures were immediately initiated and the pilot landed the aircraft. After landing, the BDU was downloaded and a wire check was conducted on the aircraft which did not reveal any discrepancies with the weapon delivery system.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The BDU was considered non-operational and was returned to the issuing activity for examination.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

Unknown
NWEF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION:  

TYPE INCIDENT: Maintenance/Assembly  

BASIC WEAPON: 843  

VERSION/COMPONENT: 

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED: 

FLEET INVOLVED: LANT  

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: ICT-2PAB Tritium Monitor  

DATE: 21 March 1983  

INITIAL REPORT: 

NWEF CODE: BENT SPEAR 83-8  

CAUSE: Material/Equipment Failure  

GENERAL LOCATION: At Sea  

FOIA (b) (3)  

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS: 

msg 220524Z Mar 83  

FC DNA msg 222120Z Mar 83  

msg 241312Z Mar 83  

NOSIH DET, McAlester msg 251941Z Mar 83  

DNA msg 271936Z Mar 83  

FC DNA msg 282002Z Mar 83  

NOSIH DET, McAlester msg 291433Z Mar 83  

DISCUSSION:

During routine maintenance of a 843, the ICT-2PAB Tritium Monitor Alarm sounded. The incident occurred while technicians were rescaling the aft section of the weapon after replacing the Limited Life Components (LLCs). Readings on the monitor indicated that the area was contaminated and the magazine was evacuated. Emergency procedures, including the blow-out system, were initiated and personnel reentered the magazine in protective clothing and obtained additional readings which also indicated the space was contaminated. The magazine was vented and the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Team was called. The EOD Team reentered the magazine with a second ICT-2PAB. Their readings also indicated that the magazine was contaminated. The emergency blow-out system was operated again—for one hour. The EOD Team reentered the magazine and still obtained positive readings on their instrument. A swipe was then taken of the deck area around the weapon and analyzed, using their ICT-2PAB and an AN/PDR-27. There was no detectable radiation on the cotton swab. It was ultimately concluded that both monitoring instruments were faulty—see next page.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

Safe and operational.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

The reporting unit was directed to isolate the weapon and provide continuous monitoring until reaching their CONUS port. After a thorough investigation of the incident, it was determined that both ICT-2PABs were faulty. The initial report of this incident was a PINNACLE/BROKEN ARROW. It was subsequently downgraded to a BENT SPEAR.

The Navy is currently testing the AN/PDR-73 Portable Tritium Air Monitor to replace the ICT-2PAB.
NWF Institute Summary (U)

CLASSIFICATION: 

TYPE INCIDENT: Monitoring/Testing

BASIC WEAPON: B57

VERSION/COMPONENT: BDU-20/C

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED: 

FLEET INVOLVED: LANT

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: P-3C Aircraft and T-414 AMAC

DATE: 21 March 1983

INITIAL REPORT: msg 212000Z Mar 83

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS: msg 212100Z Mar 83

DISCUSSION:

While performing a Postload Quality Assurance Check (QAC) of a BDU-20/C, the BDU failed to monitor on a P-3C Aircraft T-414 Aircraft Monitor and Control (AMAC) panel. The BDU was downloaded and an AMAC wire check was initiated. The wire check was completed without discrepancies. Further investigations revealed a faulty BDU.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The BDU was considered non-operational and was returned to the issuing activity for repair.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

See above.
NWEF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: [redacted]

TYPE INCIDENT: Maintenance/Assembly

BASIC WEAPON: B61

VERSION/COMPONENT: Type 3A Trainer

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED: [redacted]

FLEET INVOLVED: LANT

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: ICT-2PAB Tritium Monitor

DATE: 5 April 1983

INITIAL REPORT: msg 051357Z Apr 83

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS: msg 051429Z Apr 83

DISCUSSION:

During a Technical Assist Visit (TAV), technicians were performing a Limited Life Component (LLC) condition test on a B61 when the ICT-2PAB Tritium Monitor Alarm sounded. There was no tritium on board, but a second reading was taken as a precautionary measure. No tritium was indicated by the second reading. It was concluded that the ICT-2PAB had malfunctioned.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:
Safe

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:
Unknown
CLASSIFICATION: [Censored]

TYPE INCIDENT: Maintenance/Assembly

BASIC WEAPON: 861

VERSION/COMPONENT: Type 3A Trainer

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED:

FLEET INVOLVED: LANT

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT:

DATE: 5 April 1983

INITIAL REPORT:  msg 051335Z Apr 83

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS:  msg 051357Z Apr 83
                                msg 051429Z Apr 83

DISCUSSION:

While performing a routine Limited Life Component (LLC) exchange on a
861, the stud on the J-3 connector would not torque, and technicians were
unable to obtain an electrical connection. Further investigations revealed
a faulty Electrical Connection Assembly (ECA).
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The weapon had a damaged Electrical Connection Assembly (ECA), but was considered repairable by shipboard personnel.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

The ECA was repaired by shipboard personnel and an Unsatisfactory Report (UR) was submitted to NOSIH DET, McAlester (NOSIH DET, McAlester UR Control No. 0886). NOSIH DET, McAlester concurred in action taken by
Technicians were removing a Type 3A Trainer from its storage location when the bottom right fin struck the ground, causing slight damage to the fin.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The weapon sustained minor scratches to the bottom right fin.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

It was recommended that the two bottom fins be detached before removing weapons from the storage area.

The damaged fin was repaired by unit personnel and returned to the storage area for future use.
During a routine loading evolution of a P-3B aircraft using a BDU-11A/E, the locking ring on the CF cable was discovered loose while attempting to seat the "O" ring. The safety observer stopped the load and tried to remove the CF cable and discovered that the entire pulse plug connector assembly was loose. It is not known if the pulse plug connector assembly was improperly installed or if it failed in some manner.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The BDU was considered non-operational but repairable.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

The BDU was downloaded and returned to the issuing activity where it was repaired.
NWF REPORT 1070-4

NWF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION:

TYPE INCIDENT: Handling

BASIC WEAPON: TERRIER

VERSION/COMPONENT: TSAM

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED: Launcher Port Rail

FLEET INVOLVED: PAC

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: Launcher Port Rail

DATE: 12 May 1983

INITIAL REPORT: msg 120610Z May 83

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS:

msg 120610Z May 83
msg 122737Z May 83
msg 125856Z May 83
msg 140130Z May 83
msg 172209Z May 83
msg 180032Z May 83
NAVSHIPWPNSYSENGSTA msg 191500Z May 83
NAVSHIPWPNSYSENGSTA msg 201301Z May 83
msg 212237Z May 83
msg 221933Z May 83
msg 250206Z May 83
msg 021531Z Jun 83
msg 040310Z Jun 83
msg 181617Z Jul 83

DISCUSSION:

During a Combat Systems Ships Qualification Test (CSSQT) missile firing simulation exercise, a Training Surface to Air Missile (TSAM) fell off the number one launcher port rail. The incident occurred during the loading sequence when the loader power drive assembly failed to decelerate on the extend-to-launch cycle, allowing the TSAM to travel off the A-side of the launcher. Upon contact with the deck, the TSAM booster separated from the missile. An investigation revealed that a locking nut had backed off the spur gear shaft and had fallen between the gear set and the B-end response housing, causing the B-end response shaft to bind. This resulted in the spur gear shaft being sheared off.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The TSAM and booster separated upon impact with the deck and were severely damaged. The TSAM and booster were returned to the issuing activity, and replacement parts ordered to repair the launcher.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

Shipboard personnel recommended that a SHIPALT be developed to provide access to the air chamber to properly accomplish a required PMS.

Action is being taken by NAVSHIPWPNSYSENGSTA, Port Hueneme to provide an engineering change proposal in modifying the deck support I-Beam to provide access to dud jettison bottles. An interim waiver has been granted to omit that portion of the testing on the Maintenance Requirement Card (MRC) until the SHIPALT has been accomplished.
NWEF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: [Redacted]

TYPE INCIDENT: Maintenance/Assembly

BASIC WEAPON: Two B57s & 2 ASROCs

VERSION/COMPONENT:

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED:

FLEET INVOLVED: LANT

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: ICT-2PAB Tritium Monitor

DATE: 18 May 1983

INITIAL REPORT: May 83

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS:

DISCUSSION:

When the production bay doors were opened for daily operations at the maintenance building, the ICT-2PAB Tritium Monitor Alarm sounded. The building was evacuated and the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Team was called. Upon arrival, the EOD Team reentered the building with a second ICT-2PAB and found no evidence of contamination. The building was vented and personnel were allowed to return. As a precautionary measure, a medical examination was performed on all personnel. It was concluded that the first ICT-2PAB had malfunctioned.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:
The weapons were not damaged.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:
Unknown
NWAF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: [Redacted]

TYPE INCIDENT: Logistics

BASIC WEAPON: POSEIDON

VERSION/COMPONENT:

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED:

FLEET INVOLVED: LANT

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT:

DATE: 21 June 1983

INITIAL REPORT: msg 212012Z Jun 83

GENERAL LOCATION: In Port

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS: msg 212247Z Jun 83

DISCUSSION:

While loading a POSEIDON missile on the SSBN, the first- and second-stage missile housing was scratched. The incident occurred while raising the missile in the tube during the alignment process. During the alignment process, a scraping noise was heard in the vicinity of the 45-degree missile compartment middle level door. While investigating the cause of the scraping noise, it was discovered that water coolant hoses were in the tube between the missile and the tube pads, scratching the missile as it was being aligned in the tube.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The missile received a scratch 1/32-inch deep to the first- and second-stage and the inter-stage section.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

The missile was returned to the issuing activity for repair.
NWEF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: [Redacted]

TYPE INCIDENT: Handling

BASIC WEAPON: B57

VERSION/COMPONENT: BDU-11

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED:

FLEET INVOLVED: PAC

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: S-3A Aircraft

DATE: 29 June 1983

INITIAL REPORT: msg 292310Z Jun

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS:

DISCUSSION:

While performing the downloading evolution from an S-3A aircraft using a BDU-11, the CF cable receptacle barrel pulled loose from the BDU. The incident occurred when the technician was unscrewing the CF cable from the receptacle. The barrel began turning with the CF cable collar and pulled free from the BDU with the cable. An examination of the receptacle barrel revealed a 1/16-inch wide crack extending from the set screw hole upward approximately one inch.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The BOU was considered non-operational but repairable.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

The BOU was returned to the issuing activity for repair.
NWEF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: [redacted]

TYPE INCIDENT: Handling

BASIC WEAPON: B43

VERSION/COMPONENT: BDU-6E

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED: [redacted]

FLEET INVOLVED: LANT

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: HLU-196 Bomb Hoist, Aero 21 Bomb Skid, and A-7E Aircraft

DATE: 17 July 1983

INITIAL REPORT: msg 171431Z Jul 83

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS:

msg 180231Z Jul 83
NAVAIRENGCEN msg 202016Z Jul 83
NAVAIRENGCEN msg 222054Z Jul 83
NAVWPNEVALFAC msg 291713Z Jul 83

DISCUSSION:

While downloading a BDU-6E from an A-7E aircraft using an HLU-196 bomb hoist, the BDU-6E was dropped. The incident occurred about 15 seconds after the bomb rack had been released. The clutch assembly in the HLU-196 bomb hoist failed, allowing the BDU to freefall approximately four feet to the Aero 21 bomb skid which was positioned directly under the BDU.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

Damage to the BDU consisted of chipped paint and minor scratches on the exterior.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

The BDU was repaired by shipboard personnel. Ship's personnel were aware of the failure history of the HLU-196. For this reason, the HLU-196 was personally hand carried to the Naval Air Engineering Center (NAEC), Lakehurst, New Jersey.

The findings of the NAEC were inconclusive. A second generation bomb hoist with a power-up, power-down drive and an emergency brake is now in development. This new hoist is expected to be in the Test and Evaluation (TEE) stage sometime in the spring of 1984.
NWEF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: CIN...

TYPE INCIDENT: Handling

BASIC WEAPON: B57

VERSION/COMPONENT: Two BDU-20Cs

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED: 

FLEET INVOLVED: LANT

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: P-3C Aircraft

DATE: 4 August 1983

INITIAL REPORT: msg 040231Z Aug 83

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS: msg 051145Z Aug 83

FOIA (b) (3)

NWEF CODE: DULL SWORD 83-19

CAUSE: Material/Equipment Failure

GENERAL LOCATION: Ashore

FOIA (b) (3)

DISCUSSION:

Three BDU-20Cs were loaded on a P-3C aircraft in preparation for an exercise. One each was loaded on Stations 2C, 4C, and 8C. A successful wire check of the aircraft had previously been completed, but during the postload Quality Assurance Check (QAC), the BDU on Station 8C failed. The BDUs on Stations 2C and 4C successfully completed their QAC. After troubleshooting in an attempt to ascertain the problem, the BDUs were downloaded. The stations were loaded a second time using a replacement BDU on Station 8C. The replacement BDU on Station 8C also failed the QAC. This indicated either a second defective BDU or a problem associated with Station 8C. All BDUs were again downloaded, the two BDUs which had failed were loaded on Stations 2C and 4C, and one of the BDUs which had successfully passed the QAC was loaded on Station 8C. A QAC on these three BDUs resulted in failures on Stations 2C and 4C and a success on Station 8C. Following this, three other BDUs confirmed to be operational by previous QACs were loaded on the three stations of the aircraft and each was subjected to a QAC, all of which were successful. This isolated the problem to the two suspected BDUs which, along with the associated CF cable, were returned to the issuing activity for repair.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The two BDU-20Cs were considered non-operational and were returned to the issuing activity for repair.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

See above.
NWETF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: DULL SWORD 83-20
TYPE INCIDENT: Handling
BASIC WEAPON: TERRIER
VERSION/COMPONENT:
SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED:
FLEET INVOLVED: LANT
ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: TERRIER Missile Storage Ring
DATE: 9 August 1983
INITIAL REPORT:
msg 091648 Jul 83
ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS:
msg 091930Z Aug 83

DISCUSSION:

While rotating a TERRIER missile in the forward missile house, it was noticed that the missile in Position One (the hoist position) was missing its nose section. An investigation of the lower-level magazine revealed that the missile nose section had struck a one-half inch copper line and snapped off. The copper line was a steam supply line to the magazine space heaters which had been relocated during a routine overhaul to make room for a six-inch chilled water line. The steam supply line was reposition to provide clear passage for the rotating missiles.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The missile required major repair.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

The missile was returned to the issuing activity for repair.
NWEP INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: 

TYPE INCIDENT: Inadvertent Release

BASIC WEAPON: B61

VERSION/COMPONENT: BDU-36C

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED:

FLEET INVOLVED: LANT

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: A-7E Aircraft

DATE: 15 August 1983

INITIAL REPORT: 

msg 151245Z Aug 83

msg 160100Z Aug 83

msg 171600Z Aug 83

msg 201900Z Mar 84

FOIA (b) (3)

GENERAL LOCATION: In Flight

DISCUSSION:

During a routine practice BDU delivery, a BDU-36C was inadvertently released from an A-7E aircraft. The incident occurred when the pilot turned the Master Arm Switch to the "ON" position. The BDU impacted in a heavily wooded and swampy area. A two-day air and ground search failed to recover the BDU. The aircraft had been completely wire checked on the day preceding the incident, and the day of the incident. Both wire checks were satisfactory. The aircraft was flown again on the day following the incident, simulating the same configuration with negative results. The armament station control unit was completely inspected and determined to be functioning properly. Pilot error is considered the probable cause.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The BDU was not recovered during the initial search of 15-17 August 1983.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

The BDU was found on private property by a civilian on 18 March 1984 and was turned over to the Weapons Department on 20 March 1984. Damage to the BDU was only normal air drop damage. No evidence of compromise was apparent. The BDU was refurbished and returned to supply channels for reissue.
NWFIC INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: [redacted]

TYPE INCIDENT: Handling

BASIC WEAPON: B57

VERSION/COMPONENT: BDU-11A/E

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED:

FLEET INVOLVED: PAC

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT:

DATE: 9 September 1983

INITIAL REPORT: msg 092026Z Sep 83

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS:

DISCUSSION:

During nuclear weapons loading refresher training at a Naval Air Station, the pulse plug assembly separated from a BDU-11A/E. The incident occurred when technicians were removing the CF cable from the BDU. The CF cable "O" ring did not unseat properly from the pulse plug. An attempt to unseat the "O" ring resulted in the entire assembly separating from the BDU with the CF cable still attached.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

Damage to BDU was minimal.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

The BDU was returned to the issuing activity for repair.
NWFR REPORT 1070-4

NWFR INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: [Redacted]

TYPE INCIDENT: Handling

BASIC WEAPON: ASROC

VERSION/COMPONENT: ASROC Training Shape

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED: [Redacted]

FLEET INVOLVED: LANT

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: [Redacted]

DATE: 13 September 1983

INITIAL REPORT: __________ msg 1317502 Sep 83

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS: [Redacted]

DISCUSSION:

During a routine handling evolution of an ASROC trainer, it was discovered that the Ignition Separation Assembly (ISA) plug insulator pin separator was damaged. A piece of the insulator had been broken off and had come out when the connector cable was disconnected. The incident occurred during a Defense Nuclear Security Inspection (DNSI). A NAVSEA technical representative was called onboard to evaluate the ability to continue operations with the trainer. He authorized continuation of the operations.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The training weapon, although adequate for use to complete the inspection, required repair.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

The trainer was returned to the issuing activity for repair.

Ships personnel submitted an Unsatisfactory Report (UR) to NOSIH DET, McAlester (NOSIH DET, McAlester, Control No. 2602). NOSIH DET, McAlester concurred in action taken by ____. No further action was necessary.
NWEF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: 
TYPE INCIDENT: Logistics
BASIC WEAPON: 8-inch Projectile
VERSION/COMPONENT: Four W79s (HR)
SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED:
FLEET INVOLVED: PAC
ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: Air Force C-141
DATE: 16 September 1983

INITIAL REPORT: __________msg 160830Z Sep 83

FOIA (b) (3)

GENERAL LOCATION: Ashore

FOIA (b) (3)

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS: 

msg 161100Z Sep 83

FOIA (b) (3)

DISCUSSION:

An Air Force C-141 aircraft loaded with four 8-inch projectiles, landed at a Naval Air Station for refueling. During the refueling operations, the JP5 fuel hose ruptured spilling approximately 25 gallons of JP5 fuel on the ramp. The weapons remained onboard and were not affected. The ramp was washed down and the aircraft departed on schedule.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:
The weapons were not damaged.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:
Unknown - fuel hose was no doubt repaired.
NWFF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: [redacted]

TYPE INCIDENT: Handling

BASIC WEAPON: 957

VERSION/COMPONENT: BDU-11A/E

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED: 

FLEET INVOLVED: PAC

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: A-7E Aircraft

DATE: 4 October 1983

INITIAL REPORT msg 0521072

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS:

DISCUSSION:

While performing the downloading evolution from an A-7E aircraft using a BDU-11A/E, the electrical connector pulled loose from the BDU. The incident occurred when the technician was removing the CF cable from the connector. An examination of the connector indicated excessive wear from extended use.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The BDU had a damaged Electrical Connector Assembly (ECA) but was considered repairable.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

The BDU was returned to the issuing activity for repair.
NWEF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: [Redacted]
TYPE INCIDENT: Handling
BASIC WEAPON: SUBROC
VERSION/COMPONENT: Mk 36 Trainer
SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED: [Redacted]
FLEET INVOLVED: PAC
ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT:
DATE: 11 October 1983

INITIAL REPORT. msg 112332Z Oct 8

FOIA (b) (3)

GENERAL LOCATION: In Port

DISCUSSION:

While demating a warhead section from a SUBROC trainer, the technicians removed the forward warhead clampbands vice the aft warhead clampbands. This caused the warhead section to move forward approximately three inches in the assembly stand. The forward movement of the warhead section stretched the retractable electrical connector on the adaption kit, tearing the insulation. No other damage was caused to the trainer.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The weapon itself was not damaged. Only the insulation on the retractable electrical connector of the adaption kit was torn.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

Technicians involved with the operation were relieved of duties pending additional training in operating procedures. An Unsatisfactory Report (UR) was submitted to NOSIH DET, McAlester (NOSIH DET, McAlester UR Control No. 2929).

NOSIH DET, McAlester directed that the adaption kit be returned to McAlester for repair. This was done.
During a routine Postload Quality Assurance Check (QAC) of three BDU-2OCs, loaded on a P-3C aircraft, incorrect indications were observed on the T-414 Aircraft Monitor and Control (AMAC) panel. When the option selector switch on the panel was placed in the "SAFE" position, the SAFE lamp on Station 2C did not illuminate. The SAFE lamps on Stations 4C and 8C illuminated as required. Normal troubleshooting procedures were followed. The abnormal condition was not corrected and the three BDU's were downloaded from the aircraft. The BDU that gave the incorrect indication on Station 2C was then tested on Stations 4C and 8C with alternating CF cables. Incorrect indications were observed at each station. Information as to the exact cause was never received. Material/equipment failure appears to be the most likely cause.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The BDU was considered non-operational.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

The BDU was returned to the issuing activity for repair.
CLASSIFICATION: [Redacted]

TYPE INCIDENT: Logistics

BASIC WEAPON: SUBROC

VERSION/COMPONENT: Mk 55

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED: [Redacted]

FLEET INVOLVED: PAC

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: ICT-2/FA Fixed Tritium Monitor

DATE: 21 October 1983

INITIAL REPORT: NAVMAG Lualualei msg 212325Z Oct 83

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS: 
- NAVMAG Lualualei msg 220015Z Oct 83
- NAVMAG Lualualei msg 220303Z Oct 83
- NAVMAG Lualualei msg 220337Z Oct 83
- NOSIH DET, McAlester msg 021855Z Nov 83

DISCUSSION:

While loading a SUBROC missile, after the weapon had been lowered into the torpedo room, the ICT-2/FA Fixed Tritium Monitor alarm sounded. Readings on the monitor indicated the torpedo room was contaminated and the area was evacuated. Emergency procedures were initiated and personnel in protective clothing reentered the area. The readings on the fixed monitor were confirmed. The weapon was bagged and the Explosive Ordnance (EOD) Team was called. The EOD Team reentered the torpedo room with a second monitor. Their readings also indicated that the area was contaminated.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

See below.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

As directed by NOSIH DET, McAlester, the contaminated weapon was off-loaded and returned to the issuing activity.

Personnel from the storage facility monitored the weapon holding the monitor next to the warhead and obtained similar readings. The monitor hose was then extended approximately three feet from the weapon and a zero reading was obtained. This process was repeated on other weapons with the same results. Further investigation of the incident revealed the following:

a. There are internal components in the ICT-2PAB that compensate for GAMMA.

b. The distance and orientation of the instrument from the warhead while taking readings are critical.

c. The instrument is considered GAMMA sensitive and may give false readings under certain circumstances.

It was therefore determined that no anomalous radiation readings existed on the SSN, and the weapon was considered safe for reissue. It was also noted that current operating procedures for the ICT-2PAB do not contain a warning to indicate the instrument is sensitive to GAMMA or that the distance and orientation to the warhead is a factor. Corrections to the operating procedures were to be provided to NAVELEX for inclusion to current manuals.
NWEF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: [Redacted]  
TYPE INCIDENT: Monitoring/Testing  
BASIC WEAPON: B57  
VERSION/COMPONENT: BDU-11A/E  
SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED:  
FLEET INVOLVED: LANT  
ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: P-38 Aircraft  
DATE: 24 October 1983  
INITIAL REPORT: msg 241050Z Oct 83

FOIA (b) (3)  
GENERAL LOCATION: Ashore

DISCUSSION:

While performing a Postload Quality Assurance Check (QAC) of a BDU-11A/E, the BDU failed to monitor on a P-38 Aircraft Monitor and Control (AMAC) panel. The BDU was downloaded and an AMAC wire check was performed. No discrepancies were found, indicating that the problem was most likely in the BDU.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The BDU was considered non-operational.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

The BDU was returned to the issuing activity for repair.
NWF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: U

TYPE INCIDENT: Flooding

NWF CODE: DULL SWORD 83-30

WEAPON: 857 and 843

CAUSE: Personnel Error

VERSION/COMPONENT: Five BDU-24Cs and One BDU-20C

GENERAL LOCATION: In Port

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED:

FLEET INVOLVED: LANT

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT:

DATE: 25 October 1983

INITIAL REPORT: msg 251300Z oct 83

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS:

DISCUSSION:

While performing routine monthly maintenance of the magazine sprinkler system, the sprinkler system was inadvertently activated. Approximately 50 gallons of salt water was released in the magazine, covering five BDU-24Cs and one BDU-20C. The sprinkler system was secured and the BDU's wiped down. Personnel from a Naval Air Station (NAS) were requested to go aboard and inspect the BDU's.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

There was no damage to the BDU's. They were washed down, dried and were considered safe.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

Unknown
NWIF REPORT 1070-4

NWIF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: [redacted]

TYPE INCIDENT: Flooding

BASIC WEAPON: TERRIER

VERSION/COMPONENT: Thirty-two RIM-67As, One RIM-2EX, and two TSAMs

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED: [redacted]

FLEET INVOLVED: LANT

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: [redacted]

DATE: 4 November 1983

INITIAL REPORT: msg 042130Z Nov 83

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS: msg 05022Z Nov 83
                              msg 090222Z Nov 83
                              msg 161810Z Nov 83

DISCUSSION:

A missile magazine sprinkler system inadvertently activated, spraying salt water over 35 TERRIER missiles. No sprinkler system maintenance was in progress at the time of the incident and no personnel were near the system's controls. The system was immediately secured by use of the manual shutoff valve. Further investigation and tests of the incident revealed a faulty Pressure Relief Pilot (PRP) valve.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The weapons were not damaged. They were washed down with fresh water, dried, and a thin coat of an anti-corrosive compound applied.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

The PRP valve was replaced and the sprinkler system was again operational. A certified magazine sprinkler system inspector was requested to inspect the system to ensure its reliability.
NWF Incident Summary (U)

Classification: 

Type Incident: Handling

Basic Weapon: B57

Version/Component: BDU-20C

Ship/Activity Involved: 

Fleet Involved: LANT

Associated Equipment: P-3C Aircraft

Date: 16 November 1983

Initial Report: msg 161920Z Nov 83

Additional/Related Reports: msg 231846Z Nov 83

Discussion:

While performing the downloading evolution from a P-3C aircraft using a BDU-20C, technicians could not remove the CF cable from the BDU. The team completed the ground-abort checklist with the CF cable still attached to the BDU. It was determined later that the cable connector had been cross-threaded during hookup.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The BDU was considered non-operational.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

The BDU was returned to the issuing activity for repair.
NWEF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: [Redacted]

TYPE INCIDENT: Monitoring/Testing

BASIC WEAPON: B57

VERSION/COMPONENT: BDU-20C

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED: [Redacted]

FLEET INVOLVED: LANT

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: A-7 Aircraft and DCK-143 AMAC

DATE: 6 December 1983

INITIAL REPORT: msg 061857Z 1283

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS:

DISCUSSION:

During a routine postload Quality Assurance Check (QAC) of a BDU-20C loaded on an A-7 aircraft, both the "READY" and "SAFE" lamps illuminated on the DCK-143 Aircraft Monitor and Control (AMAC) panel. Further inspection by the safety observer revealed that the breakaway pulse connector subassembly was elevated approximately 1/4 inch.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The BDU was considered non-operational and was downloaded and returned to the storage magazine awaiting disposition instructions.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

An Unsatisfactory Report (UR) requesting disposition instructions was submitted. Instructions directed the BDU be shipped to the supporting Naval Supply Center.

The inspection by the Navy Supply Center revealed that the breakaway pulse connector subassembly was flush with the exterior surface and not elevated as reported. Further tests of the BDU confirmed proper assembly and the BDU functioned according to specifications.
NWIF INCIDENT SUMMARY: (U)

CLASSIFICATION: [REDACTED]
TYPE INCIDENT: Logistics
BASIC WEAPON: B61
VERSION/COMPONENT: BDU-36C
SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED: [REDACTED]
FLEET INVOLVED: PAC
ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: A-6E Aircraft
DATE: 7 December 1983
INITIAL REPORT: [FOIA REDACTED]
ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS: msg 092049Z Dec 83
msg 192328Z Dec 83
[FOIA REDACTED]

DISCUSSION:

During a routine parachute retardation test drop of a BDU-36C from an A-6E aircraft, the parachute failed to open. The pilot did not see the BDU impact. The BDU was found within the target area on U.S. Navy property.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

Not indicated, but apparently unusable in its present condition.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

The unit requested that an investigation of the incident be conducted. It is not known if the investigation was or was not conducted.
NWF REPORT 1070-4

NWF INCIDENT SUMMARY (U)

CLASSIFICATION: [REDACTED]

TYPE INCIDENT: Monitoring/Testing

BASIC WEAPON: B57

VERSION/COMPONENT: BDU-11A/E

SHIP/ACTIVITY INVOLVED: [REDACTED]

FLEET INVOLVED: LANT

ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT: P-3B Aircraft and T-414 AMAC

DATE: 28 December 1983

INITIAL REPORT: msg 2815127 Dec 83

FOIA (b) (3)

GENERAL LOCATION: Ashore

FOIA (b) (3)

ADDITIONAL/RELATED REPORTS:

DISCUSSION:

During a routine Postload Quality Assurance Check (QAC) of a BDU-11A/E, loaded on a P-3B aircraft, incorrect indications were observed on the T-414 Aircraft Monitor and Control (AMAC) panel. Normal troubleshooting procedures were followed and the abnormal condition was not corrected. Ground-abort procedures were completed, and the BDU was downloaded. The problem appeared to be in the BDU.
WEAPON CONDITION/STATUS:

The BDU was considered non-operational.

ACTION BY REPORTING ACTIVITY/FOLLOW-UP:

The BDU was returned to the issuing activity for repair.
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The numbers in the above chart indicate the number of incidents associated with the particular weapons. Some incidents involved more than one weapon or the same type. Others involved no weapons. The chart reflects involvement of different type weapons, but not involvement of the same or no weapons.

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