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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535

May 5, 2004

MR JOHN GREENEWALD JR  
THE BLACK VAULT HEADQUARTERS  
~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~  
NORTHRIDGE, CA 91325

Request No.: 0997068- 000  
Subject:"ROLE OF THE COMMUNIST  
PARTY, USA IN SOVIET INTELLIGENCE"/FEBRUARY 1953

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

- This acknowledges receipt of your Freedom of Information-Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request to the FBI. The FOIPA number listed above has been assigned to your request.
- For an accurate search of our records, please provide the complete name, alias, date and place of birth for the subject of your request. Any other specific data you could provide such as prior addresses, or employment information would also be helpful. If your subject is deceased, please include date and proof of death.
- To make sure information about you is not released to someone else, we require your notarized signature or, in place of a notarized signature, a declaration pursuant to Title 28, United States Code 1746. For your convenience, the reverse side of this letter contains a form which may be used for this purpose.
- If you want the FBI's Criminal Justice Information System (CJIS) to perform a search for your arrest record, please follow the enclosed instructions in Attorney General Order 556-73. You must submit fingerprint impressions so a comparison can be made with the records kept by CJIS. This is to make sure your information is not released to an unauthorized person.
- We are searching the indices to our central records system at FBI Headquarters for the information you requested, and will inform you of the results as soon as possible.
- Processing delays have been caused by the large number of requests received by the FOIPA. We will process your request(s) as soon as possible.

Your request has been assigned the number indicated above. Please use this number in all correspondence with us. Your patience is appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

David M. Hardy  
Section Chief,  
Record/Information  
Dissemination Section  
Records Management Division



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535

September 13, 2004

JOHN GREENEWALD JR  
THE BLACK VAULT HEADQUARTERS  
8512 NEWCASTLE AVENUE  
NORTHRIDGE, CA 91325

Subject: "ROLE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, USA IN  
SOVIET INTELIGENCE"/FEBRUARY 1953

FOIPA No. 0997068- 001

Dear Mr. Greenwald:

The enclosed documents were reviewed under the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA), Title 5, United States Code, Section 552/552a. Deletions have been made to protect information which is exempt from disclosure, with the appropriate exemptions noted on the page next to the excision. In addition, a deleted page information sheet was inserted in the file to indicate where pages were withheld entirely. The exemptions used to withhold information are marked below and explained on the enclosed Form OPCA-16a:

**Section 552**

**Section 552a**

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58 **page(s)** were reviewed and 58 **page(s)** are being released.

- Document(s) were located which originated with, or contained information concerning other Government agency(ies) [OGA]. This information has been:
  - referred to the OGA for review and direct response to you.
  - referred to the OGA for consultation. The FBI will correspond with you regarding this information when the consultation is finished.

You have the right to appeal any denials in this release. Appeals should be directed in writing to the Co-Director, Office of Information and Privacy, U.S. Department of Justice, Flag Building, Suite 570, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001 within sixty days from the date of this letter. The envelope and the letter should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal" or "Information Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA number assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

The enclosed material is from the main investigative file(s) in which the subject(s) of your request was the focus of the investigation. Our search located additional references, in files relating to other individuals, or matters, which may or may not be about your subject(s). Our experience has shown, when ident, references usually contain information similar to the information processed in the main file(s). Because of our significant backlog, we have given priority to processing only the main investigative file(s). If you want the references, you must submit a separate request for them in writing, and they will be reviewed at a later date, as time and resources permit.

See additional information which follows.

Sincerely yours,



David M. Hardy  
Section Chief  
Record/Information  
Dissemination Section  
Records Management Division

Enclosure(s)

## EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

## SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

- (b) (1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order
- (b) (2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b) (3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld
- (b) (4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b) (5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency
- (b) (6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
- (b) (7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual
- (b) (8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions, or
- (b) (9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

## SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

- (d) (5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding.
- (j) (2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals.
- (k) (1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy; for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k) (2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.
- (k) (3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k) (4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k) (5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k) (6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process.
- (k) (7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.

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ROLE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, USA,  
IN  
SOVIET INTELLIGENCE

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
John Edgar Hoover, Director

SECURITY INFORMATION--SECRET

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(C) ROLE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, IN SOVIET INTELLIGENCE -- This study has been prepared by the Central Research Desk for the information and use of all Special Agents who are assigned to internal security and counterintelligence investigations. The purpose of this study is to present in a brief form the ideological predication, historical background and case illustrations reflecting the Party's role in Soviet Intelligence. This may serve to develop the individual agent's scope of knowledge and thus his capabilities in handling investigations of this nature.

Copies of this study are classified "Security Information - Secret" and should be afforded adequate security. For purposes of control each copy is numbered and a record of the recipients of these numbered copies maintained at the Bureau. This study should be readily available to all Special Agents assigned to internal security and counterintelligence investigations.

Two copies of this document are being sent to the Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Los Angeles, Minneapolis, Newark, New Haven, New York, Philadelphia, San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington Field Offices. One copy is being sent to all other offices.

SAC Letter 53-14 2-17-53

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### INTRODUCTION

This is a study of material relating to the ideological premise and historical background of the relationship between the Communist Party, USA, and the Soviet Union. This material gives the predication for the resulting role of the Communist Party, USA, in Soviet Intelligence.

In order to clearly depict this specific role of the Communist Party, USA, pertinent portions of various cases in point have been utilized as illustrations. The cases chosen to illustrate this role of the Communist Party, USA, do not constitute a complete listing of cases within this scope, but are cases considered to be illustrative of the various categories of cooperation supplied by the Communist Party, USA, in the past.

This study is only concerned with the Soviet Intelligence services collectively and not in regard to their individual organizational breakdowns.

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## IDEOLOGICAL PREMISE

### Soviet Doctrine

The emotional appeal of the successful Russian Bolshevik Revolution in October, 1917\* aroused the common anticipation, sympathy, and support of many revolutionaries who held divergent ideas in regard to the organization and application of revolutionary socialism in the United States. In order to consolidate and sustain this support in the direction of a world revolutionary movement, it became necessary that the Russian Bolsheviks should initiate and propagate a doctrine toward these ends.

Vladimir I. Lenin, the leader of the Russian Bolshevik Revolution and Soviet Russia, laid an early foundation for this doctrine in his Letter to American Workers dated August 20, 1918. This letter sought to make a report on the Russian Bolshevik Revolution and to enlist the support of the "American workers" in a common revolutionary cause. This early doctrine of Lenin relative to the relationship between Soviet Russia and its sympathizers in the United States is quoted as follows:

\*November, according to our own calender.

"The American workers will not follow the bourgeoisie. They will be with us for civil war against the bourgeoisie. The whole history of the world and the American labour movement strengthens my conviction...."

"We know that help from you, comrades American workers, will probably not come soon, for the development of the revolution proceeds with a different tempo and in different forms in different countries (and it cannot be otherwise)...." (1)

In order to further consolidate and sustain the leadership of Soviet Russia in the world revolutionary Socialist movement, Lenin initiated the formation of the Third Communist International (Comintern) in early 1919. The Second Congress of the Third Communist International in July-August, 1920, adopted 21 points or conditions of membership in the Third Communist International. These points provided for an international revolutionary party in regard to its membership, leadership, policy, press, and discipline. Of particular interest are two of these points, translations of which are quoted as follows:

"In almost all countries of Europe and America the class war is entering upon the stage of civil war. Under such conditions Communists can place little trust in the stability of bourgeois law. They must create everywhere an unofficial, underground machinery which in the decisive moment could be of assistance to the party in discharging its duty in the cause of revolutions."

1. V. I. Lenin, A Letter to American Workers (International Publishers, New York, 1934), pp. 17, 21.

"Every Party desirous of belonging to the Communist International shall be bound to render all possible assistance to any Soviet Republic which may need support in its struggle against counter-revolutionary forces."

The Communist International climaxed its doctrine of centralizing the sovereignty of the international Communist movement in the Soviet Union, at the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International at Moscow in July-August of 1928. A resolution adopted by this Congress which clearly and definitely sets forth this doctrine is quoted in part as follows:

"The Red Army is not an 'enemy' army, but the army of the international proletariat. In the event of a war against the Soviet Union, the workers in capitalist countries must not allow themselves to be scared from supporting the Red Army and from expressing this support by fighting against their own bourgeoisie, by the charges of treason that the bourgeoisie may hurl against them." (2)

This exalted position of the Soviet Union among the "world proletariat" is again reiterated by Georgi Dimitroff, General Secretary of the Communist International, on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the Russian Bolshevik Revolution.

"The land of victorious socialism, which is playing an outstanding part in uniting the international proletariat,

2. "The Struggle Against Imperialist War and the Tasks of the Communists" (Workers Library Publishers, New York City, 1934, p. 31.

is rallying all sincere supporters of the workers' cause still more closely around the U.S.S.R. In the present international situation there is not, nor can there be any other, more certain criterion, than one's attitude toward the Soviet Union, in determining who is the friend and who the enemy of the cause of the working class and socialism, of determining who is a supporter and who an opponent of democracy and peace. . . . You cannot carry on a real struggle against fascism if you do not render all possible assistance in strengthening the most important buttress of this struggle, the Soviet Union." (3)

We again see this doctrine enunciated in a modern disguise at the Nineteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1952) in a speech delivered by Joseph Stalin, Premier of the Soviet Union. Pertinent quotations giving a basis for reciprocal obligations and affection between the Soviet Union and foreign Communist Party organizations are set out as follows:

"Our Party and our country have always needed, and will need, the confidence, the sympathy and the support of fraternal peoples abroad."

"Naturally, our Party cannot remain indebted to the fraternal parties, and it must in its turn render support to them and also to their peoples in their struggle for emancipation, and in their struggle for the preservation of peace." (4)

3. Georgi Dimitroff, The United Front (International Publishers, New York, 1938), p. 279.
4. Joseph Stalin, "Speech by J. V. Stalin At the Nineteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," New Times, Published in the Soviet Union, No. 42, 1952, pp. 1, 2.

## Communist Party, USA, Doctrine

The doctrine of the Communist movement in the United States has been a clear reflection of doctrine formulated in the Soviet Union. An early newspaper of the Communist Party of America, The Communist, published a resolution adopted by the Second Convention of the Communist Party of America concerning the "Relation of Communist Parties to Soviet Government Representatives." This resolution makes little distinction between Comintern and official representatives of Soviet Russia.

"The Communist Parties of the various countries are the direct representatives of the Communist International, and thus, indirectly of the aims and policies of Soviet Russia.

"Representatives of Soviet Russia in various countries, engaging in political activities, should co-ordinate these activities in some form or other with the activities and policies of the respective Communist Parties. . . ." (5)

This doctrine of removing the allegiance of Communists in the United States to their government and, instead, placing this allegiance with the Soviet Union was extended by the Workers (Communist) Party of America in the late 1920's. A directive issued by Bertram D. Wolfe, National Agitprop Director, Workers (Communist) Party of America, exemplified this doctrine. This directive captioned "Introduction to Speakers Outline on the Controversy in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union" included the following under the heading, "Our Task."

5. The Communist, August 1, 1920, p. 8.

"An intensive campaign to counteract the slanders of the opposition against the CPSU, the Soviet Government and the achievements of the Russian workers. A positive propaganda in favor of the Comintern as the leader of the workers and oppressed masses of the world, as the enemy of imperialism and capitalism. Positive propaganda to show that the Soviet government is building socialism, that the workers are getting along better without their bosses and that the tenth year is better than the ninth, that Soviet economy is marching forward, that the workers of the world have a country to defend, that in the next war the workers of America must rally to the defense of the Soviet Union and not only fraternize with but actively support the Red Army and propaganda to rouse the entire American class to the defense of the Soviet Union is the best method of fighting the slanders of the opposition and counteracting the evil effects their propaganda would otherwise have."

William Z. Foster, Chairman of the Communist Party, USA, has recorded his views reflecting a direct support of this doctrine. The following is extracted from a book authored by Foster and copyrighted in 1937:

"In nearly all countries there are now strong Communist Parties, under the leadership of the Communist International and ready to apply Lenin's decisive revolutionary slogan of transforming the imperialist war into a revolutionary war against capitalism. And behind it all stands the great fortress of Socialism, the Soviet Union with its powerful revolutionary Red Army." (6)

During the reign of the now deposed Earl Browder as General Secretary of the Communist Party, USA, the Party further expressed its foreign ideology. The Eleventh National Convention of the Communist

6. William Z. Foster, From Bryan to Stalin (International Publishers, New York, 1937), p. 344.

Party, USA, in session from May 30 to June 2, 1940, adopted a resolution which expressed in a reverent tone its proud association with foreign Communist leaders. The great leaders in the history of the United States are disregarded as if they were representatives of a foreign ideology. This approach may be clearly seen in the following quotation from this resolution:

"We are proud to bear the high title of member of the Communist Party of the United States of America. Let us raise high the banner of proletarian internationalism. We are proud to be associated with the Communist International. . . . We are proud to be associated in the ranks of proletarian internationalism with the greatest thinker, leader and builder of our time, who carried the work of Marx, Engels and Lenin to new heights, to the victorious establishment of socialism, to the period of transition to Communism, to the safeguarding of the Soviet Union and its achievements against the furious dying struggles of a hostile capitalistic world--the great Stalin." (7)

By 1952, Earl Browder had been purged from the American Party; however, William Z. Foster continued as Party Chairman and repeated the earlier doctrine of a projected anti-Soviet war in less direct terms. In this connection, Foster is quoted as follows:

"If, despite the efforts of the peace forces of America and the world, Wall Street should succeed in plunging the world into war, we would oppose it as an unjust, aggressive, imperialist war, as an undemocratic and an anti-Socialist war, destructive of the deepest interests of the American people and humanity."

7. The Communist, July, 1940, p. 618.

Foster also reiterates the position of the Soviet Union by calling it the "strong center of the international peace movement" and the "vanguard of the world movement toward Socialism." (8)

It is interesting to note that a more positive approach is taken in connection with this doctrine for the same general period in connection with material issued by the Party, but not for public consumption. A recent educational outline issued by the Communist Party, USA, declares that among the major tasks confronting American Communists today are the defense of the Soviet Union and aid to the Soviet Union as the fatherland to the proletariat.

Thus from the preceding pages we see evidence of a doctrine propagated by the Soviet Union and clearly accepted by the Communist Party, USA, which in effect makes the Communist Party, USA, a "Soviet Satellite" within the borders of the United States. Party members are instilled with the idea that they can not in reality commit treason against the United States because their true allegiance is with a higher sovereign, the "international proletariat" and their center of operations, the Soviet Union. With this we may understand the ideological predication for the role of the Communist Party, USA, in Soviet Intelligence activities.

8. William Z. Foster, History of the Communist Party of the United States (International Publishers, New York, 1952), pp. 458, 529, 538.

## HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

### Early Revolutionary Legislation

Despite chaotic conditions in domestic Soviet Russia immediately following the October Revolution, the Russian Bolshevik leaders did not neglect their ideological obligation of world revolution. The Sovnarcom (Council of People's Commissaries) on December 24, 1917, allocated two million rubles to the foreign representatives of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs "for needs of the international revolutionary movement." (9)

### Prerevolutionary Russian Bolshevik Influence in The United States

Russian Bolshevik leaders were busy with their organization and propaganda in the United States, even prior to the October Revolution. A review of some letters written by Lenin reveals that he was being represented in the United States by Madame Alexandra M. Kollontay, a native Russian and who became subsequently the first Minister of Social Welfare in Soviet Russia. As illustrations of Lenin's instructions to Madame Kollontay, the following brief quotations are taken from Lenin's letters of November 9, 1915, and March 19, 1916, respectively:

9. David Shub, Lenin, A Biography (Doubleday and Company, Inc., Garden City, 1948), p. 340.

"Try everywhere to see (if only for five minutes) the local Bolsheviks, in order to encourage them and link them up with us,"

"You must definitely concentrate on links with America." (10)

Other prominent Russian Bolsheviks who were in the United States in the period immediately prior to the October Revolution included Leon Trotsky, Nikolai I. Bukharin, and Ludwig Alexander Karlovitch (Carlovitch) Martens, all of whom were identified with the Russian-language Socialist newspaper in New York City, Novy Mir. The significance of the presence of these persons in the United States may be judged somewhat by their official positions in the new Soviet Russia. Trotsky became the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs; Bukharin became editor of Pravda, the Bolshevik organ in Soviet Russia; and Martens was designated the first "official" representative of Soviet Russia to the United States.

#### Ludwig Martens and The Communist Movement In The United States

A glance at the activities of Ludwig Martens as the first Soviet "official" representative to the United States gives an interesting preview of a developing relationship between Soviet representatives and the Communist movement in the United States. In January, 1919, Martens was appointed the representative to the United States for the People's Commissariat of

10. Elizabeth Hill and Doris Mudie, The Letters of Lenin (Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc., New York, 1937), pp. 381, 390.

Foreign Affairs, Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic. In March, 1919, Martens sent his credentials to the State Department of the United States along with a memorandum which in part advocated "material and intellectual intercourse" with Russia. Martens is best known for developing this advocated objective along commercial and propaganda lines. It is interesting to note, however, that Martens and his Soviet Bureau Staff became involved in a security or counterintelligence situation with leaders of the Communist movement in the United States.

In 1920, Louis Fraina, a Communist functionary in the United States, was subjected to a "trial" by representatives of the Communist movement and Martens' Soviet Bureau relative to the charge that Fraina was a United States Government "spy" in the Communist movement. Martens, an official of Soviet Russia, was present at this hearing. Fraina was cleared of this charge and allowed to proceed to the Soviet Union as the International Secretary of the Communist Party of America and delegate to the Communist International.

#### Early Comintern Influence In The United States

During the formative years of the Communist Party, USA, the 1920's, Comintern and Soviet Intelligence representatives in the United States were confronted with a Communist movement beset by dissension and weakness of organization. The Soviet-dominated Comintern molded into the

Communist movement an organization and a discipline which absorbed Soviet-directed doctrine and developed into a Soviet "Trojan Horse" in the United States. In addition to assuming the potentialities of a disciplined offensive revolutionary arm of the Soviet-directed world Communist movement, the Communist Party, USA, became a responsible ally of the Soviet Union within the United States with the resultant potentialities of such an ally.

The organizational functions of the Comintern in the United States offered a ready means for the exchange of information between Communist sources in the United States and Comintern offices in the Soviet Union. Benjamin Gitlow, a former member of the Secretariat, Workers (Communist) Party of America, has supplied illustrations of this technique for gathering intelligence in the United States. Of particular interest in this regard are minutes of Workers (Communist) Party of America, Political Bureau meeting in May, 1927. These minutes revealed that a Comintern agent, Comrade Loaf, was present in the United States and Max Bedacht, Acting General Secretary of the Party, made a motion in this connection which is quoted as follows:

"The Pol Bureau takes note of the request of the Secretariat of the CI (Communist International) to assist Comrade Loaf in his task of collecting information for the Information Bureau of the CI on the American Labor movement. It will assist Comrade Loaf in the accomplishment of this task to the best of its ability."

On another occasion, according to Gitlow, William Z. Foster, as a member of the Party Secretariat, submitted a lengthy report to the Comintern which analyzed economic and political conditions in the United States. Gitlow also stated that copies of this report were designated for the Profintern (Red International of Trade Unions), the Russian Party, and Soviet Intelligence.

Regardless of any stated purpose relative to the utilization of information obtained by the Comintern, the end attained was potentially the same, i. e., the supplying of intelligence to the Soviet Union.

#### Soviet Intelligence - 1924

The year 1924 might well be considered a landmark for formal Soviet Intelligence activities in the United States. It was in this year that the first broad "legal" base for Soviet Intelligence operations in the United States was established, namely, the Amtorg Trading Corporation. Walter Krivitsky, a former Soviet Military Intelligence Agent, said Soviet Military Intelligence's interest in the United States dated back to 1924. Other evidence in this category may be seen in the report of President of the Supreme Council of the People's Economy, Dzerzhinsky, made to the Sovnarcom (Council of People's Commissaries of Soviet Russia) on December 9, 1924. A portion of this report relating to the work of Soviet Intelligence is quoted as follows:

"The O. G. P. U. not only works energetically at paralyzing the espionage of foreign states in the U. S. S. R. , but it has also succeeded in creating a network of information-intelligence agencies in all the large centers of Europe and North America. Responsible workers of the O. G. P. U. are detailed to all the diplomatic and trade missions of the U. S. S. R. abroad. The total strength of the Foreign Department of the O. G. P. U. is 1,300 persons, including the employees of the Foreign Department in Moscow. The O. G. P. U. has repeatedly rendered service to the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the Staff of the Red Army in supplying secret information both of a political and military nature."

Aside from the year 1924 being an operational landmark, it was also the year of an interesting prediction made by the sinking Soviet leader, Leon Trotsky. In a speech made on June 21, 1924, Trotsky stated:

"We have every reason to believe that the American revolution will take place much later than the European one. Historically it is quite possible that the development of events, by which the East will free itself from the imperialistic yoke, will be such that the proletariat will gain the power in Europe, but America will remain, as before, the stronghold of capital. In that sense the United States can and will become the chief counterrevolutionary force in history. (Underscoring added for emphasis - ed.)

ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY'S ROLE  
IN SOVIET INTELLIGENCE

After considering the preceding information, it would appear that the Communist Party, USA, could logically assume a role in Soviet Intelligence activities; but has this role actually been taken by the Party? The answer to this question lies in the succeeding pages with illustrations of the role of the Communist Party, USA, in Soviet Intelligence.

JAY LOVESTONE

This illustration of the role played by the Communist Party, USA, in Soviet Intelligence describes the early relationship between the Party Secretariat and Soviet Intelligence representatives. This relationship revolved around the ability and willingness of the Party Secretariat to supply Soviet Intelligence ideological recruits, both from Party and non-Party ranks. The desire of Soviet Intelligence to conceal the Party affiliation of their Party recruits is also evident during this early period.

According to Benjamin Gitlow, former General Secretary of the Workers (Communist) Party of America, the organizational structure of the Party provided for liaison with Soviet representatives in the United States, including the "O. G. P. U." Gitlow identified Jay Lovestone as the member of the Party Secretariat who was in liaison with Soviet Intelligence.

We shall see in the recorded activities of Lovestone and subsequent Party officials evidence of a continuing pattern of liaison with Soviet Intelligence representatives in the United States.

Theodore MacLean Switz, a resident of the United States and a non-Party member, was an early contribution of Lovestone to Soviet Intelligence operations. As a sincere Communist sympathizer, Switz obtained an introduction to Lovestone and expressed to Lovestone his desire to be of assistance to the Communist cause. In early 1927, Lovestone introduced Switz to Jacob Moness. Switz soon realized that Moness was not engaged just in Communist activity but was acting as an espionage agent for the Soviet Union. In connection with the espionage operations of Moness, Switz also came into contact with a Soviet girl, Zinaida Antipova, who was employed by the Russian Red Cross organization in New York City. This did not mark the last time that a humanitarian agency was utilized by Soviet Intelligence in the United States.

Moness carried on his operations under the cover of the Moness Chemical Company, 426 Broome Street, New York City. Moness was recorded as the sole owner and operator of this firm from 1923 to early 1927. Material left by Moness, upon the occasion of his hasty return to the Soviet Union in 1927, indicated that Moness might have been collecting intelligence information for the Soviets as early as 1924. In a communication

received by Moness in January, 1926, his Soviet Intelligence contact complained of the absence of information relating to naval technique in 1924-25. In 1926, the assignments of Moness included information regarding organizational, technical, political, tactical and training topics as they related to the United States Army and Navy.

This illustrates the capability of the Party apparatus to channel a Communist sympathizer into Soviet Intelligence. Switz was motivated not by a Party discipline, but by a desire to aid the Communist cause.

Jan Alfred Tilton who has been identified with Soviet Intelligence activities in the United States also received valuable aid from the Communist Party in connection with his operations. Among the American Communists recruited by Tilton was Nicholas Dozenberg, employed in the national office of the Workers (Communist) Party of America as manager of the Literature Department. Dozenberg was recruited by Tilton in late 1927 or early 1928. Of particular interest is the function of the Party Secretariat in connection with this recruitment. Jay Lovestone presented the matter of Dozenberg's recruitment or proposed recruitment by Soviet Intelligence to the Party Secretariat composed of William Z. Foster, Benjamin Gitlow, and Lovestone. The Party Secretariat approved the selection of Dozenberg for Soviet Intelligence duties.

Another example of a similar recruitment during this period involving a person close to Party leadership circles concerns Jay Lovestone and George Andrew Meyler. Meyler was the husband of Elsa Bloch who was employed in Party headquarters in Chicago in approximately 1926-1927. Lovestone released Meyler from the Party for Soviet Intelligence activities. It is noted that Meyler was subsequently placed in contact with Whittaker Chambers by Chambers' Soviet superior "Ulrich."

According to Dozenberg, Soviet Intelligence agents in his category were specifically instructed to conceal their Party affiliation and make only discreet contact with the Party. Dozenberg also stated that Soviet Intelligence frequently utilized the services of Party members; however, the contacts were made through an intermediary.

Although Dozenberg performed miscellaneous duties such as supplying certain publications to Soviet Intelligence, he identified his primary activity as establishing "business covers" for Soviet Intelligence operations outside of the United States.

#### HENRY FELIX AND ELIZABETH MINS

A simple matter such as a Communist-owned address has a story of various categories of cooperation between the Communist Party, its members and Soviet Intelligence operations. This address was utilized as temporary housing and a rendezvous by Soviet Intelligence. In addition, this address, as a mail drop, was involved in the travel of a Soviet agent who,

with Party support, was attempting to bring into the United States in a clandestine manner funds or sources of funds as well as equipment for preparing false identification papers. This address, 410 West 154th Street, New York City, was owned and occupied by Henry Felix and Elizabeth Mins who were identified with underground Party activities in the 1920's.

Lydia Stahl, a Soviet Intelligence photographer, was met by her Soviet Intelligence contact, Jan Alfred Tilton, on the occasion of her arrival in the United States in 1928 and referred to the Mins address for temporary residence. This address was subsequently used as a meeting place by Lydia Stahl and a subsequent Soviet superior, Moische Stern. On several occasions in 1931, Stern was seen to enter this address immediately after collecting information from an espionage contact.

In addition to being utilized as temporary housing for a newly arrived Soviet agent in the United States and as a rendezvous for Soviet Intelligence operators, this address was involved in an illegally utilized United States passport issued in the name of Ksavier Augustus Szpokas. This passport of Szpokas was fraudulently used by Albert Feierabend when re-entering the United States in 1933.

Nicholas Dozenberg has identified Feierabend as the person who succeeded him in his initial Soviet Intelligence duties in approximately

the Spring of 1928 or 1929. The task assumed by Feierabend was to purchase, pack, and ship to Russia all industrial books, legal publications, and magazines dealing with industry and industrial methods in the United States. In July, 1930, Feierabend was arrested while entering the United States at New York City, on a charge of complicity in smuggling Swiss watch movements into the United States. At the time of the arrest, Feierabend had in his possession equipment for preparing false identification papers. Feierabend was again arrested on a passport fraud charge when entering the United States at New York City in April, 1933. When arrested, Feierabend had concealed on his person \$28,700 in currency.

The activities of Feierabend on behalf of the Soviets is of particular interest in view of a white ribbon which was found to be in his possession during this period. This ribbon, bearing the date July 18, 1930, is quoted as follows: "The bearer of this credential is thoroughly trustworthy and should be given all possible support, so that he may effectively accomplish the mission he is engaged in." This ribbon was signed by Max Bedacht, "For the Secretariat."

In this connection it is noted that Benjamin Gitlow has advised that Bedacht temporarily succeeded him as General Secretary of the Party and was the Party liaison man with the "OGPU."

Here we see a fairly complex example of interrelation between the Party organization and Soviet Intelligence, involving transmission of funds or other assets, a fraudulent passport, material for preparing false identification certificates and the residence of a Communist utilized for varying purposes by Soviet Intelligence.

J. PETERS - WHITTAKER CHAMBERS

This example gives us various phases and categories of relationships between the organized Communist Party underground and Soviet Intelligence. Here we see Party assistance in recruitment for Soviet Intelligence originating with both the Party and Soviet Intelligence. The scope of Party leadership involved in these recruitments extends from the local state organizer to the national office. The Party has been involved in both oral and written methods of recruiting members or sympathizers for Soviet Intelligence.

In addition to this all-important category of the Party's cooperation with Soviet Intelligence, we have illustrations of the Party's collusion in a two-way exchange of information, transfer of funds, obtaining clandestine quarters for photography work, assisting in photography work, providing fraudulent documents of identification, providing business cover and requesting Party aid in establishing a seaman courier apparatus. Party cooperation was not restricted to Soviet Intelligence operations in the United States, but also extends to operations abroad.

## Background

Alexander Goldberger, now better known as J. Peters or Alexander Stevens, first entered the United States on February 10, 1924. Peters subsequently became prominent in the Hungarian Section of the Workers (Communist) Party of America. Peters became National Secretary of the Hungarian Section during the approximate period of 1925 to 1928 and was aligned politically with the Jay Lovestone faction in the Party. In 1929 when the Lovestone faction was eliminated from the Party in the United States, Peters seized the opportunity to defect from the Lovestone faction and allied himself and his following in the Hungarian Section of the Party with the Foster-Browder group. According to Whittaker Chambers, who has admitted working for Peters in the Communist underground, Peters attributed his subsequent power in the conspiratorial apparatus of the Party to his action in bringing over a substantial portion of the Hungarian Section to the Foster-Browder group.

A review of the activities of Peters reveals that he was deeply involved in both organizational and conspiratorial aspects of the Party's operations. In 1930, he contacted a member-at-large of the Party relative to that person's operating a travel bureau in New York City, both as a legitimate business and as a cover for his operations. In 1932, Peters was seen in the Soviet Union as the Party representative to the Comintern.

It was during this latter period that one of the more prominent associates of Peters in Party conspiratorial work, the previously mentioned Whittaker Chambers, was introduced to Soviet Intelligence activity.

Chambers became a member of the Party in 1925. He has indicated that his subsequent contributions to the Communist movement, until the Spring of 1932, centered around his editorial work for the Communist publications, Daily Worker and New Masses. While working in his office at New Masses during the Spring of 1932, Chambers was telephonically contacted by Max Bedacht and summoned to the National Headquarters of the Communist Party in New York City. Upon arrival at Bedacht's office, Chambers was advised by Bedacht that he had been selected to work in one of the Party's "special institutions." Chambers was instructed by Bedacht to sever his relationship with New Masses and the open Communist Party organization. Bedacht subsequently introduced Chambers to "Don," who in turn introduced Chambers to a Russian identified as "Herbert." At this meeting with "Herbert" and "Don," Chambers was again instructed to sever his relationship with the Party and New Masses. "Herbert" also advised Chambers that he was to receive subsequent instructions from "Don."

Communist Party Representatives and The "Ulrich" Apparatus

Chambers had previously known "Don" as John Loomis Sherman, a member of the Communist Party and the Daily Worker staff. Sherman described Chambers' new duty as liaison between the Communist Party, personified by Bedacht, and the "underground." Sherman indicated that he had previously held this liaison position assigned to Chambers. This previous activity of Sherman was verified by a former member of the Moische Stern apparatus who identified John Loomis Sherman as the "Frank" who was loaned to the Stern apparatus by the Communist Party as a liaison man between the Party and the apparatus in 1931-32. According to this former Soviet agent, Sherman also assisted the apparatus by leasing an apartment for photographic work and assisted in the actual photographic work of the apparatus.

Sherman soon introduced Chambers to another Russian contact, [redacted] and disappeared from the operation. Chambers continued his liaison activities between [redacted] and Bedacht. As an indication of the continuing close relationship between the Party and Soviet Intelligence, Chambers cited some examples involving [redacted] and Bedacht. On one occasion Chambers introduced [redacted] to Bedacht and witnessed [redacted] passing money to Bedacht. On another occasion [redacted] instructed Chambers to advise Bedacht that a courier (unidentified) who was crossing the United States was being shadowed. b7C

According to Chambers, Bedacht was to get in contact with this courier. On still another occasion, Bedacht introduced Chambers to an individual whom he described as being of interest to [redacted] Chambers placed this person, Arvid Jacobson, in contact with [redacted] Jacobson was subsequently arrested in Finland in connection with the Soviet espionage operations of Maria Tilton.

While working with [redacted] Chambers also began to contact J. Peters who gradually replaced Bedacht as Chambers' Party contact. Chambers described Peters as eager to cooperate with the [redacted] apparatus. Peters occasionally suggested potential recruits for the apparatus. On one occasion, Peters instructed Chambers to advise [redacted] of a valuable source at the Electric Boat Company in Connecticut. After conveying this information to [redacted] who instructed him to investigate the possibilities of this source, Chambers accompanied Peters to New Haven, Connecticut. There Peters placed Chambers in contact with Isadore Wofsey, who at that time was District Organizer of the Communist Party in Connecticut; and Wofsey, in turn, introduced Chambers to his contact at the Electric Boat Company. This contact, a Party member, made an arrangement to supply Chambers with certain blueprints for photographing. Inasmuch as Chambers subsequently encountered difficulty in making photographic copies of this material for the apparatus, [redacted] took the initiative and introduced Chambers to "Frank," whom he described as an "experienced" b7C

member of the apparatus. "Frank" was to assume the duty of photographing the material from the source at the Electric Boat Company. Chambers identified "Frank" as George Andrew Meyler who has been mentioned previously as a Soviet Intelligence recruit from the Party.

As an indication of the Soviet Union's interest in the Electric Boat Company, it is interesting to note that Soviet trade representatives were negotiating with this concern prior to January 13, 1937, in an attempt to obtain the assistance of the Electric Boat Company for the production of a submarine in the Soviet Union.

Still another illustration of [redacted] dependency on the Party occurred with Adolf Hitler's assumption to power in Germany in 1933 and Communist purge. The German seaman courier line of communication to the [redacted] apparatus was broken and [redacted] found it necessary to call upon the American Party, through Chambers, to determine whether the Party had any contacts which he might use to establish a new courier system. b7C

In the Spring of 1934, according to Chambers, his Soviet contact, [redacted] advised him that the apparatus was being disbanded and Chambers should return to the Communist Party. Actually, Chambers stated, he was turned back to work with J. Peters in the underground Communist Party. During this period, the Spring of 1934, Peters

introduced Chambers to Harold Ware, who was described as heading an underground Communist group in Washington, D. C. According to Chambers, the "Ware group" became the base for his underground Communist activity from this period of introduction until his break with the Communist Party in mid-April 1938.

#### Independent Phases of Peters' Operations

In order to more clearly understand the relationship of J. Peters and his clandestine Party operations with Soviet Intelligence, particularly in the early 1930's, some attention should be given to other phases of his activity which were independent of Whittaker Chambers.

A former Communist Party organizer, whom we shall call "Jacob," has advised of another phase of Peters' activity which fits into the category of intelligence-gathering activity. In approximately 1934, "Jacob" saw Peters and "Charles Wilson" at Party headquarters in New York City. At that time Peters instructed "Jacob" to proceed to a military field in Texas, organize a Communist unit at this field and secure intelligence information regarding military activities. In addition, "Jacob" was instructed to complete a personal history questionnaire which was to be transmitted to the Soviet Union. "Jacob" identified "Charles Wilson" as Peters' assistant in the military field.

In connection with the collection of military intelligence information by J. Peters and "Charles Wilson" in the early 1930's, another category of cooperation with Soviet Intelligence is indicated by the Robert Osman case.

Osman, a former member of the Young Communist League, joined the United States Army in 1931 and was sent to the Panama Canal Zone. While stationed there, Osman received a communication from "Charles Wilson" whom he knew as a former fellow member of the Young Communist League. This communication advised Osman that he would be visited by a mutual friend. The person who subsequently contacted Osman was identified as Robert Gordon Switz, a professed Soviet agent. According to Switz, his contact with Osman was on the instruction of his Soviet Intelligence superior and not Peters or "Charles Wilson."

Other information regarding the scope of the intelligence activity of Peters is included subsequently in this study under the caption "Hede Massing." At this point we shall turn to a new period of the Chambers-Peters relationship.

Operations Following Dissolution of [redacted] Apparatus

b7C

After the departure of [redacted] Chambers was engaged in a maze of operations involving independent operations for his new Soviet contacts, liaison between Peters and these Soviet contacts, and contact with the Communist underground apparatus of Peters.

During this new period of activity, Peters and his Communist underground researchers and contacts were utilized in connection with arranging business covers and false documents of identification for a proposed Soviet operation in England involving Chambers. This Chambers' operation did not materialize and the business cover was subsequently utilized by Soviet Intelligence in connection with the Japanese operation of John Loomis Sherman. In connection with the Sherman assignment in Japan, two Communists in California were also involved, Isaac Folkoff and "Keith." "Keith" also was subsequently operated by Peters and Chambers' last Soviet superior, Colonel Boris Bykov. In 1937, "Keith" was allowed to return to open Communist Party work.

The activities of Chambers in connection with the Communist underground apparatus in Washington, D. C., involved both organizational functions and the collecting of intelligence. It is of a particular interest to note that during this period of activity Peters attempted to make an arrangement with the Soviet agent, "Bill" to sell the intelligence product from Peters' Washington, D. C., underground apparatus. "Bill" was allegedly not interested in the proposition. However, a Soviet successor, Colonel Boris Bykov arranged through Chambers to take over the direct operation of the better sources in this apparatus. These sources included Communist Party members and sympathizers in the employ of the United States Government.

A review of these pertinent phases of J. Peters' activities and certain activities closely related to Peters gives us some appreciation of the scope and nature of the Party's relationship to Soviet Intelligence. In this illustration we may clearly see that the role of the Communist Party, USA, in Soviet Intelligence is not a hypothetical proposition, but is a fact.

THE MARINE WORKER, BEN

A former Communist Party member, whom we shall call "Ben," has supplied information relative to still other categories of assistance given to Soviet Intelligence by Communists in the United States. This brief example reveals that a Communist was utilized as a translator for conversations between a Soviet agent and his new Communist Party recruit. This case also illustrates a combination sabotage and intelligence gathering cooperation and again emphasizes the use of the Party and its sympathizers as a recruiting ground for Soviet Intelligence.

In 1935, "Ben" was placed in contact with his first Soviet superior. In view of the inability of this Soviet contact to speak English, [redacted] a Communist and [redacted] the previously mentioned Isaac Folkoff, acted as an interpreter at meetings between "Ben" and his Soviet contact. According to "Ben," this Soviet asked him to set up an apparatus in San Francisco which would operate in a campaign of terror against Japanese, German, and Italian shipping.

b7C

After a few meetings, this Soviet contact disappeared and he was succeeded by a second Soviet, "Albert." This second Soviet contact instructed "Ben" to maintain contact with the Communist Party and the marine workers in order that he might observe potential recruits for the apparatus. During "Ben's" association with this apparatus, he occasionally attended Communist Party meetings but paid no dues and did not openly engage in Party organizational work. In February, 1938, "Ben" was sent to Seattle, Washington, for the purpose of organizing a similar apparatus for intelligence and sabotage purposes. In connection with this assignment, "Ben" was given the status of organizer by the Party. He was not successful in forming the second apparatus. °

It may be of interest to note in connection with this operation that Isaac Folkoff and Whittaker Chambers' contact, "Keith," were involved with another west coast Communist, John Loomis Sherman, in operations directed against Japan during this approximate period.

#### HEDE MASSING

The professed espionage activities of Hede Massing, who operated as a Soviet agent in the United States during the period October, 1933, to October, 1937, supply us with a different pattern for study, in connection with the utilization of the Communist Party, USA, by the Soviet

Intelligence services. Mrs. Massing was instructed by her Soviet contact, prior to her arrival in the United States in 1933, to avoid contacts with known Communists in the United States. After her arrival in the United States, Mrs. Massing did not follow these instructions. Instead, she took what appeared to be the path of least resistance and accepted the cooperation of her friends and acquaintances among the "Communist intellectuals." This provided her with the personal assurance of cooperation by the General Secretary of the Communist Party, USA, and the utilization of Party and the Party ideology for fraudulent papers and recruiting. This case also illustrates the precedence given to Soviet Intelligence operations over those of the Communist underground.

In order to clearly understand the seemingly spontaneous cooperation afforded Mrs. Massing by the Communists in the United States, one should consider certain points of Mrs. Massing's background. Mrs. Massing was introduced into the Communist movements in Austria and Germany by her first husband, Gerhart Eisler, who was identified as a Comintern representative in the United States. Shortly after the arrival of Mrs. Massing in the United States for her espionage assignment, Earl Browder, General Secretary of the Communist Party, USA, contacted her, in line with the request of Eisler, and offered his personal cooperation and that of the Party.

In addition to this entree, Mrs. Massing was already acquainted with members and sympathizers of the Party in the United States. She became acquainted with these individuals in connection with her previous brief residence in the United States in 1926-1927 with her second husband, Julian Gumperz, whom she described as a well-known Communist. Finally, her stature in the Communist movement was enhanced by her known identification as the wife of the "anti-Nazi" writer, Paul Massing, who was incarcerated in a Nazi concentration camp. These natural entrees with the Communist movement in the United States, were recognized and utilized by Mrs. Massing in connection with her Soviet espionage assignments in the United States.

A short period after her arrival in the United States in October, 1933, Hede Massing was contacted by her Soviet superior, William Joseph Berman. Mrs. Massing reported to Berman matters of interest appearing in the New York City and Washington, D. C., newspapers. Her next Soviet contact in the United States, "Bill Grinke," was initiated in the latter part of 1934. In early 1935, "Bill Grinke" asked Mrs. Massing for assistance in getting some special birth certificates for his purposes. Mrs. Massing advised that she suggested J. Peters, a Communist Party official, as the best available source for the required birth certificates. According to Mrs. Massing, "Bill" was reluctant to approach Peters inasmuch as he hesitated to have any dealing whatever with the Communist Party in the United States.

According to Mrs. Massing, she persuaded "Bill" that there was no other way to accomplish this task and he, therefore, allowed her to contact Peters. Mrs. Massing eventually received the desired birth certificates from Peters and supplied them to "Bill." This transaction is of interest inasmuch as it was necessary for "Bill," representing a Soviet Intelligence organization, to pay J. Peters, a cooperating Party representative, for this service or the expense incurred in providing this service.

In May or June, 1935, "Bill's" supervision of Mrs. Massing was supplemented by an additional Soviet, "Fred," whom she identified as Boris Bazarov. According to Mrs. Massing, she was then attempting to develop as a source of information Noel Field of the United States Department of State. Mrs. Massing claims that the introduction to Field was arranged through Marguerite Young, the Washington, D. C., correspondent for the Daily Worker. In attempting to recruit Noel Field, Mrs. Massing did not disclose to Field her connection with a Soviet Intelligence service but, instead, attempted to capitalize upon their common sympathy for the Communist movement. In the early summer of 1935, Field indicated to Mrs. Massing that another person was also soliciting his services in a like manner to that of Mrs. Massing. According to Mrs. Massing, a meeting with this person, Alger Hiss, was subsequently held in the residence of Noel Field. Mrs. Massing advised that her Soviet superior, "Fred" instructed her to forget her meeting with Hiss and not to see him again.

In connection with this particular incident, Whittaker Chambers also has indicated that he had made attempts to draw Noel Field into his apparatus but discovered that he was connected with another apparatus. When Chambers reported the meeting of Alger Hiss with Noel Field to his superior, J. Peters, Chambers was instructed by Peters to relinquish Field to the Massing apparatus.

Another example of conflict in recruiting between the Peters apparatus and the Massing apparatus occurred in connection with the recruitment of Laurence Duggan in Washington, D. C. Again, after the confusion subsided, the Soviet-directed apparatus of Massing held precedence over the Communist underground apparatus of J. Peters. The preferential position of the Soviet Intelligence operations over the Communist Party operations is clearly illustrated by other examples cited elsewhere in this study.

JACOB GOLOS - LOUIS FRANCIS BUDENZ - ELIZABETH BENTLEY

In considering the material presented to this point, it is apparent that the role of the Communist Party, USA, in Soviet Intelligence activities is not a product of chance. This role has been nurtured through the Soviet domination of the American Party leadership through ideological and organizational devices. However, there is still another consideration in this role of the Communist Party, namely, its ability to produce in the

intelligence field. We have seen in J. Peters, particularly, an illustration of the adaptability of the Party's underground apparatus to Soviet Intelligence operations. A comprehensive confirmation of this role of the Party may be seen in the operations of Jacob Golos (Jacob Raisin), Louis Francis Budenz, and Miss Elizabeth Bentley.

This illustration brings out the utilization of covertly financed Communist Party enterprises by persons engaged in Soviet Intelligence activities. In the following material we again see the Party apparatus utilized in recruiting Soviet Intelligence agents and sources, both from the low Party membership level and the national leadership. We have illustrated a Party apparatus which was utilized in supplying information simultaneously to Party leadership and Soviet Intelligence, the growing control over this apparatus by Soviet Intelligence, and negotiations in regard to this and related matters between the Party and Soviet Intelligence. The potential of the Party in supplying fraudulent passports and mail drops is again illustrated.

Jacob Golos - World Tourists, Incorporated

World Tourists was incorporated in the County of New York on June 10, 1927, with an authorized capital of \$50,000 for the stated purpose: "to arrange and map out travel tours between the United States and foreign

countries and in connection therewith prepare, buy, purchase and distribute booklets and information rates, travelling facilities between the United States and foreign countries." A former official of World Tourists has advised, however, that World Tourists was primarily formed by the Party as a source of funds for the Party press. World Tourists subsequently served as an instrumentality of Soviet Intelligence in connection with the activities of Golos.

Jacob Golos, a native of Russia, was identified with Communist activities in the United States in the early 1920's. During this period, Golos also was actively assisting the Soviet Union through his activities in the Society for Technical Aid to Soviet Russia. Golos was elected Secretary of the Central Bureau of this organization located in New York City during the course of a convention commencing June 23, 1923. At this convention, the name of this organization was changed to the Society for Technical Aid to the USSR. On December 5, 1923, Golos departed for the Soviet Union as Secretary of this organization's Central Bureau to make a report relative to organizational activities. This report was the subject of a hearing conducted by the "Commission of Labor and Defense on Immigration" in the Soviet Union.

The relationship of Golos with World Tourists, Incorporated, brings forth some interesting factors for consideration. Golos has testified that he

became president of World Tourists in 1932. Earl Browder, General Secretary of the Party, allegedly certified on September 19, 1933, that Golos had been authorized to do special work for the "Secretariat" and was to be given every possible assistance. Of further interest, in regard to Golos' connection with World Tourists, is the information supplied by Miss Bentley, a former courier for Golos. According to Miss Bentley, Browder advised her that World Tourists was wholly owned by Communist Party funds but that Golos had commandeered this concern for his purposes.

Louis Francis Budenz - Jack Stachel

Louis Francis Budenz, former editor of the Daily Worker and Communist Party member, came into contact with Jacob Golos soon after becoming a Party member in 1935. Golos was in contact with Budenz as a member of the Party Control Commission to execute intra-Party discipline and also in connection with the relationship of Budenz and Soviet Intelligence.

In December, 1936, Budenz was called to the office of Jack Stachel at Party Headquarters in New York City. As a result of the ensuing conversation between Stachel, Golos and Budenz at that time, Budenz was introduced to his first Soviet contact, "Richards." According to Budenz, "Richards" was interested in developing information concerning enemies of the Soviet Union and solicited the assistance of Budenz in this connection.

In addition to being involved in the arrangement whereby Budenz was placed in contact with the Soviets and subsequently acting as a communication belt between Budenz and a Soviet contact, Golos had, prior to the aforementioned meeting, contacted Budenz to determine his potentiality as a source of information relative to the Trotsky movement.

Soviet Intelligence contacts of Budenz in the late 1930's included "Roberts," who was subsequently identified as Dr. Gregory Lvovich Rabinovitch, official of the Russian Red Cross who was assigned to the United States. Budenz has professed that while serving as a member of the National Committee of the Communist Party, USA, he supplied information and the identities of potential recruits, some from the Communist Party, to his Soviet contact "Roberts." Among these recruits was Ruby Weil who subsequently became involved in the assassination of Leon Trotsky in Mexico.

Miss Elizabeth Bentley and Louis Budenz knew Jacob Golos as a member of the Party Control Commission during the period of their Soviet Intelligence connections. At the time Jack Stachel initiated the steps leading to the introduction of Budenz to his first Soviet contact, "Richards," Stachel was a member of the National Board of the Party. This example clearly demonstrates close cooperation with Soviet Intelligence by national officers of the Party while they also were performing their regular Party duties.

Elizabeth Bentley - Earl Browder

The operations of Jacob Golos and World Tourists, Incorporated, are depicted in more detail in connection with the professed activities of Miss Elizabeth Bentley. As a result of her indoctrination as a Communist Party member, Miss Bentley became alarmed at information in the possession of her employer, the Italian Library of Information in New York City, and was of the opinion that this information should be made available to Party leaders. In an effort to assist the Party, Miss Bentley took steps in 1938 or 1939 to place herself in contact with a person at the National Headquarters of the Party identified as "F. Brown." "F. Brown," better known as Ferruccio Marini, head of the Italian Section of the Communist Party, USA, subsequently placed Miss Bentley in contact with Golos.

The early activities of Miss Bentley on behalf of Golos involved various miscellaneous intelligence assignments, including the functioning as a mail drop for certain communications from Canada. Meanwhile, Golos was busy developing new intelligence sources, providing travel documents and accommodations for covert Party purposes, and on one occasion was contacted by a Soviet agent, who was not otherwise in contact with Golos, for a fraudulent passport to facilitate the return of this Soviet agent to the Soviet Union.

In 1940, Golos and World Tourists, Incorporated, were convicted of not registering as agents of the Soviet Government in the United States

in connection with their activities on behalf of the Soviet principal, Intourist. In order to isolate World Tourists, Incorporated, from a Soviet principal, Golos with the assistance of Earl Browder, General Secretary of the Party, organized the concern, United States Shipping and Service Corporation in 1941. This concern became the direct agent in the United States for the Soviet principal, Intourist, and World Tourists, Incorporated, became a subagent for United States Shipping and Service Corporation. Miss Bentley became associated with this firm in an official capacity and used it as a cover employment for her Communist and Soviet Intelligence activity.

The core of Miss Bentley's subsequent operations revolved around the contacts of Golos in U.S. Government circles in Washington, D. C. In addition to collecting intelligence information from these sources, which was passed on to Golos and then to the Soviets, Miss Bentley collected Communist Party dues from several of these sources and supplied them with Party literature. According to Miss Bentley, Party members involved in intelligence activity should have been divorced from the Party; however, Golos had made an arrangement with Earl Browder to continue these apparatus members in a covert Party status. In addition, Miss Bentley indicated that in the late summer or early fall of 1941, she began to realize that Jacob Golos was making available to Earl Browder some of the information collected, prior to turning it over to Soviet Intelligence.

Miss Bentley followed the policy of Golos in this regard when she succeeded him after his death on November 25, 1943. Starting just prior to the death of Golos and proceeding with increasing tempo, the Soviet contacts of Golos and Miss Bentley demanded that their Washington, D. C., contacts be turned over to the direct operation of the Soviets. Backed by the support of Earl Browder, General Secretary of the Communist Party, USA, Golos and Miss Bentley for a time succeeded in retaining control of their contacts. In December, 1944, after Browder would no longer support her position of retaining these contacts, Miss Bentley made the necessary arrangements for turning over her contacts to a new Soviet agent. In addition to her duties relative to the collection of information for her Soviet Intelligence contacts, subsequent to the death of Jacob Golos, she served as liaison between her Soviet Intelligence contacts and Earl Browder, General Secretary of the Communist Party.

Miss Bentley has provided some interesting and pertinent illustrations of this relationship. On one occasion, Miss Bentley's Soviet Intelligence superior, "Jack," requested her to discuss with Browder the possibility of setting up a cover company to serve as a front for the activities of an unidentified Soviet agent. On another occasion "Jack" was concerned with a young man who was about to be inducted into the armed forces of the United States. "Jack" wanted Browder to effect the entrance of this individual

into the merchant marine. On still other occasions, Miss Bentley was in contact with Browder on behalf of her Soviet contact, "Al," Anatoli Borisovich Gromov, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, relative to the disposition of the cover concerns, World Tourists, Incorporated, and the United States Shipping and Service Corporation, and the resulting financial settlements.

This story of Jacob Golos presents a "packaged" illustration of the Party's role in Soviet Intelligence with illuminating ramifications of background, organization, and direction.

#### JULIUS AND ETHEL ROSENBERG - MORTON SOBELL

While Elizabeth Bentley's Soviet contacts were in the final stages of assuming direct control over her Communist apparatus, other Communists, Julius Rosenberg, and his wife, Ethel, were busy developing or attempting to develop additional intelligence sources among persons deemed sympathetic to Communism. The following material illustrates the continued utilization of the Party as a source of recruitment for Soviet Intelligence; however, this material also interposes the question: "Have more recent factors dictated a change in this historic role of the Communist Party in Soviet Intelligence?"

#### Julius and Ethel Rosenberg - David Greenglass

Julius Rosenberg has been identified as being a member of the Young Communist League and the Communist Party. Ethel Rosenberg was

also a member of the Communist Party. It would appear from the following information that Julius Rosenberg was so indoctrinated by his experience in the Communist Party that he had taken the initiative to place himself in contact with Soviet Intelligence in order that he might be of direct assistance to the Soviet Union. This type of conditioning by the Party certainly simplifies the recruiting by Soviet Intelligence.

David Greenglass, brother-in-law of Julius Rosenberg and an admitted coconspirator in Soviet espionage activities, has supplied some pertinent details relative to his involvement in Soviet espionage activities. Greenglass has stated that he participated in discussions concerning political matters with his sister, Ethel Rosenberg, and her husband, Julius Rosenberg, during the period 1935 to 1945 or 1946. According to Greenglass, the Rosenbergs indicated a preference for "Russian Socialism."

The original approach relative to the involvement of Greenglass in Soviet espionage was initiated by Julius and Ethel Rosenberg through Ruth Greenglass, the wife of David Greenglass. Just prior to November, 1944, on the occasion of a visit of Ruth Greenglass to the residence of the Rosenbergs, the attempt to recruit David Greenglass was initiated. During the course of the conversation on this occasion, Ethel Rosenberg indicated that she was no longer involved in Communist Party activity, that she did not attend Party meetings, and that she did not buy the Daily Worker at her usual newsstand.

The Rosenbergs elaborated by stating that these circumstances were occasioned by the activity of Julius Rosenberg, supplying information to the Soviet Union. Also on this occasion, Julius Rosenberg advised Ruth Greenglass that her husband, David Greenglass, was working on the atomic bomb project at Los Alamos, New Mexico, a fact heretofore unknown to Ruth and David Greenglass. In this connection, Julius Rosenberg stated that he wanted David Greenglass to supply information, relative to this project, to the Russians and asked Ruth Greenglass to convey this request to her husband.

On the occasion of a visit made by Ruth Greenglass with David Greenglass in November, 1944, at Albuquerque, New Mexico, Ruth Greenglass relayed the request of the Rosenbergs. David Greenglass agreed to submit to this request and, in addition, supplied information available to him at that time to his wife, which she was to transmit to Julius Rosenberg upon her return to New York City. David Greenglass visited the Julius Rosenbergs in January, 1945, and supplied Julius with atomic data in his possession, as well as names of possible recruits for Soviet espionage activities. According to Greenglass, Julius Rosenberg had indicated previously that he wanted a list of people who seemed sympathetic to Communism and would help furnish information to the Russians.

During the course of this visit to New York City, Julius Rosenberg arranged with Greenglass tentative plans for future contacts with Greenglass

in New Mexico. The arrangements made at this time were subsequently consummated when Harry Gold, a professed Soviet espionage agent, contacted Greenglass in New Mexico for atomic data. Harry Gold has admitted collecting atomic data from Greenglass in accordance with instructions from his Soviet espionage superior, Anatoli Antonovich Yakovlev, who held the positions of clerk and vice consul at the Soviet Consulate in New York City during the period of February 8, 1941, to December 27, 1946.

Morton Sobell - Max Elitcher

The espionage conspiracy of the Rosenbergs also included Morton Sobell, a Communist Party member. Max Elitcher, an employee at the United States Navy Ordnance Bureau, Washington, D. C., during the period 1938 to late 1948, has stated that Morton Sobell introduced him to his first Communist Party meeting. Subsequently Elitcher and Sobell attended meetings of the Communist Party cell formed in this naval establishment at which the Daily Worker was read and the theories of Karl Marx and V. I. Lenin were discussed. While so employed by this naval establishment, Elitcher was solicited by Sobell and Julius Rosenberg for information coming to his attention in connection with this employment.

Of particular interest were the requests of Sobell for the names of potential recruits. According to Elitcher, Sobell made these requests

during the course of Elitcher's employment at the naval establishment and also in 1949, when Elitcher was employed by the Reeves Instrument Company in New York City. On the occasion of Sobell's request for recruitment in 1949, Sobell told Elitcher that, in view of the increased security measures being taken by "the government," it was necessary to recruit young engineers for this work who were just starting engineering school and who had not as yet become involved in any "progressive" activity. This statement of Sobell illustrates another variation in recruitment. In this illustration Max Elitcher, a person who was deemed to be ideologically sound, was expected to suggest for recruitment into Soviet Intelligence persons not identified with the Party's store of potential ideological recruits.

#### CURRENT ROLE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, USA

In view of the information developed in this study, it is apparent that the potentialities of the Communist Party, USA, have been recognized and utilized by Soviet Intelligence. It should be noted, however, that this Party cooperation has not been unreservedly accepted in connection with Soviet Intelligence operations.

In 1929, Richard Sorge, a Soviet Agent, recognized the threat to his operational security occasioned by his Party activities and made his

views known to the Comintern. In connection with the subsequent espionage operations of the Sorge network in Japan, members of this network were strictly forbidden to become involved in local Party activities. The reluctance of Soviet Intelligence to become identified with the Communist Party, USA, also is illustrated in the preceding pages of this study.

In connection with this study another factor should be given consideration, viz., the many Soviet Intelligence operations, not within the purview of this study, in which the potentialities of the Party were not utilized. This factor may be considered by some as an indication of opposition or limitations applied to the utilization of the Party by Soviet Intelligence.

The daily developments determined by constant security and counter-intelligence investigations make impossible any conclusive appraisal regarding the scope of the Party's role in Soviet Intelligence today. There is no conclusive indication that the Communist Party, USA, is playing an important role in this regard at this time. This possible modification of the Party's role may be due to several factors which have developed or crystallized in recent years. Such important defections as Elizabeth Bentley and Igor Gouzenko, the Soviet code clerk assigned to Canada, certainly have given the Soviets cause to question the security of Party cooperation with Soviet Intelligence in the United States

and Canada. Another factor in this category may be the recent trials and convictions of Communist Party, USA, leadership which revealed through Government witnesses a decided penetration of the Party's security. This theme may be referred to in the previously noted statement attributed to Morton Sobell which indicated that due to increased security measures being taken by "the government" it was necessary to recruit persons for Soviet Intelligence who were not involved in any "progressive" activity.

This statement attributed to Sobell deserves some appraisal. If credence is given to Sobell's statement, it would appear that the functioning of Government security, during the approximate period of this statement, was successful in driving at least a partial wedge into the historic pattern of cooperation between the Party and Soviet Intelligence. Carrying this note of optimism another step for appraisal, the question could be asked: "Will it be possible to sustain or enlarge any wedge existing in this pattern of cooperation?"

Efforts to achieve the objective in question are currently becoming increasingly difficult in view of the growing underground complexion of Party activities. The disappearing physical evidences of Party membership, the decentralization of the functioning Party organization, increasing Party discipline and security measures and the organized underground apparatus

of "hard core" members present a maze of difficulties to security and counterintelligence investigations. This, in the absence of other factors, may make more attractive to Soviet Intelligence the continued cooperation of the Communist Party, USA, in connection with the operations of Soviet Intelligence in the United States.

## CONCLUSION

Some former Communist Party members who were engaged in Soviet Intelligence activities in the United States have recorded for public appraisal certain pertinent information and thoughts relative to the role of the Communist Party, USA, in Soviet Intelligence. Several of the more illuminating statements are quoted as follows:

"Faced with the opportunity of espionage, a Communist, although he may sometimes hesitate momentarily, will always, exactly to the degree that he is a Communist, engage in espionage...."(11)

"Out of my experiences of ten years in Communist leadership, I hope...to make the American people understand the extent and character of the Communist conspiracy for world conquest...."

"I want to show beyond question that the Communist party is not a political party in the American or democratic sense, but solely a fifth column of the Kremlin." (12)

Miss Elizabeth Bentley attributed the following quotation to her last Soviet Intelligence superior, Anatoli Borisovich Gromov, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C.:

11. Whittaker Chambers, Witness (Random House, Inc., New York, 1952), p. 420.
12. Louis Francis Budenz, Men Without Faces (Harper and Brothers, New York, 1950), pp. xi, xii.

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"The Soviet Union is in a bad position in regard to finding undercover agents... Of course, we can always buy people-- and we do when necessary--but it is better to have people with the right ideology. That's the function of the American Communist Party; it's the reservoir from which we draw most of our agents...' (13)

As may be seen from the illustrated cases, the categories of cooperation between the Communist Party, USA, and Soviet Intelligence are numerous and complex. The cases cited by no means include all categories or potential categories of cooperation in this regard. In view of the information developed, it would appear that the scope of the Party's utilization by Soviet Intelligence would be limited only to the potentialities of the Communist Party organization, its membership, its dupes, and its sympathizers.

The role of the Communist Party, USA, in Soviet Intelligence may vary according to both domestic and international developments just as other Party tactics vary to conform with strategy. This continuing threat of the Communist Party, USA, in the Soviet Intelligence field will continue to be most successfully exposed and neutralized by vigorous and skilled security and counterintelligence investigations.

13. Elizabeth Bentley, Out of Bondage (The Devin-Adair Company, 1951), p. 257.

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