Mr. John Greenewald, Jr.

Reference: F-2001-01033

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

This acknowledges receipt of your 24 April 2001 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request concerning the following:

"Records on Project Chatter"

For identification purposes we have assigned your request the number referenced above.

As you may be aware, Project Chatter was a Navy drug testing program. CIA has already conducted repeated thorough and diligent searches for records relating to all aspects of U.S. Government drug tests, and has released over 16,000 pages of records on the subject. CIA has found no document indexed to the term "Project Chatter," and further, a full-text search of our released records located only one document that mentions the project. That document, which contains the minutes and addenda of a 1977 Senate hearing, includes one brief reference to the program. We have enclosed that reference for your use.

Sincerely,

Kathryn I. Dyer
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosure
For Requester
John Greenewald
F-2001-01033
PROJECT MKULTRA, THE CIA'S PROGRAM OF RESEARCH IN BEHAVIORAL MODIFICATION

JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
AND THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
HEALTH AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

AUGUST 3, 1977

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
and Committee on Human Resources

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ties would have serious repercussions in political and diplomatic circles and would be detrimental to the accomplishment of its missions.

The research and development program, and particularly the\footnote{CIA Inspector General’s Survey of TSD: 1957, p. 227.} testing programs, resulted in massive abridgments of the rights of American citizens, sometimes with tragic consequences. The death of two Americans\footnote{Mr. Harold Baur died at circulatory collapse and heart failure following an intravenous injection of a synthetic metacaine derivative while a subject of tests conducted by New York State Psychiatric Institute under a contract let by the U.S. Army Chemical Corps. The Committee’s investigation into drug testing by U.S. intelligence agencies focused on the testing of TSD; however, the committee did receive a copy of the U.S. Army Inspector General Report, issued on October 1976, on the events and circumstances of Mr. Baur’s death. His death was directly attributable to the administration of the synthetic metacaine derivative.} can be attributed to these programs; other participants in the testing programs may still suffer from the residual effects. While some controlled testing of these substances might be defended, the nature of the tests, their scale, and the fact that they were continued for years after the danger of surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting individuals was known, demonstrate a fundamental disregard for the value of human life.

The Select Committee’s investigation of the testing and use of chemical and biological agents also raises serious questions about the adequacy of command and control procedures within the Central Intelligence Agency and military intelligence, and about the relationship among the intelligence agencies, other governmental agencies, and private institutions and individuals. The CIA’s normal administrative controls were waived for programs involving chemical and biological agents to protect their security. According to the head of the Audit Branch of the CIA, these waivers produced “gross administrative failures.” They prevented the CIA’s informal review mechanisms (the Office of General Counsel, the Inspector General, and the Audit Staff) from adequately supervising the programs. In general, the waivers had the paradoxical effect of providing less restrictive administrative controls and less effective internal review for controversial and highly sensitive projects than those governing normal Agency activities.

The security of the programs was protected not only by waivers of normal administrative controls, but also by a high degree of compartmentation within the CIA. This compartmentation included the CIA’s Medical Staff from the principal research and testing program employing chemical and biological agents.

It also may have led to agency policymakers receiving differing and inconsistent responses when they posed the questions to the CIA component involved.

Jurisdictional uncertainty within the CIA was matched by jurisdictional conflict among the various intelligence agencies. A spiraling cooperation and reciprocal exchanges of information which initially characterized the programs disappeared. Military testers withheld information from the CIA, ignoring suggestions for coordination from their superiors. The CIA similarly failed to provide information to the military on the CIA’s testing program. This failure to cooperate was conspicuously manifested in an attempt by the Army to construct their overseas testing program, which included surreptitious administration of LSD, from the CIA. Learning of the Army’s program, the Agency surreptitiously attempted to obtain details of it.

The decision to institute one of the Army’s LSD field testing projects had been based, at least in part, on the finding that no long-term residual effects had ever resulted from the drug’s administration. The CIA’s failure to inform the Army of a death which resulted from the surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting Americans, may well have resulted in the institution of an unnecessary and potentially lethal program.

The development, testing, and use of chemical and biological agents by intelligence agencies raises serious questions about the relationship between the intelligence community and foreign governments, other agencies of the Federal Government, and other institutions and individuals. The questions raised range from the legitimacy of American complicity in actions abroad which violate American and foreign laws to the possible compromise of the integrity of public and private institutions used as cover by intelligence agencies.

A. The Programs Investigated

1. Project CHATTER

Project CHATTER was a Navy program that began in the fall of 1955. Responding to reports of “amazing results” achieved by the Soviets in using “truth drugs,” the program focused on the identification and testing of such drugs for use in interrogations and in the recruitment of agents. The research included laboratory experiments on animals and humans, subjects involving Anabaseis aphylta, scopolamine, and meselaine in order to determine their speech-inducing qualities. Overseas experiments were conducted as part of the project.

The project expanded substantially during the Korean War, and ended shortly after the war, in 1958.

2. Project BLUEBIRD/ARTICHOKE

The earliest of the CIA’s major programs involving the use of chemical and biological agents, Project BLUEBIRD, was approved by the Director in 1950. Its objectives were:

(a) discovering means of conditioning personnel to prevent unauthorized extraction of information from them by known means,
(b) investigating the possibility of control of an individual by application of special interrogation techniques,
(c) memory enhancement, and (d) establishing defensive means for preventing hostile control of Agency personnel.

As a result of interrogations conducted overseas during the project, another goal was added—the evaluation of offensive uses of unconventional interrogation techniques, including hypnotic and drugs. In August 1961, the project was renamed ARTICHOKE. Project ARTICHOKE included in-house experiments on interrogation techniques, conducted under medical and security controls which would ensure...