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14 August 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Soviet Intelligence on Iraq

1. Moscow has detailed information about Iraq's air, ground, air defense, and naval forces. The bulk of these forces are equipped with Soviet-made weaponry. The Soviets maintain roughly 1,000 military advisers in Iraq who almost certainly know the state of repair of this weaponry and Iraq's ability to use and maintain it. [redacted]

2. Moscow has entered into several weapons coproduction agreements--Baghdad is now assembling T-72 tanks and reportedly plans to coproduce BMP-2s, some surface-to-air missiles, and possibly some fighter aircraft--with Iraq and probably could provide a good estimate of Baghdad's ability to manufacture what it can't buy as a result of the embargo. The Soviets may also know if Iraq has customized any Soviet-made weaponry in its inventory, and what impact this customization might have on the weapons' performance. [redacted]

[redacted]

4. Moscow probably has a good understanding of Iraqi internal politics by virtue of its long relationship with Baghdad. The Soviets probably have an estimate of the likelihood of leadership turnover and possible successors to Saddam. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted]

**SUBJECT: Soviet Intelligence on Iraq**

[redacted]

Moscow probably had little or no knowledge of Iraq's plans for the invasion of Kuwait, and the Soviets probably have no direct knowledge of Saddam's planning for future military operations. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]  
George Kolt  
Director of Soviet Analysis, DI

**Distribution:**  
1 - DDCI

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

# ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Soviet Intelligence on Iraq

FROM: George Kolt  
Director of Soviet Analysis, DI

EXTENSION

NO

14 August 1990

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

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COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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This MFR the sort of information the Soviets could have acquired on Iraq through their advisory and liaison relationships.

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