{"id":20604,"date":"2025-06-03T12:22:23","date_gmt":"2025-06-03T12:22:23","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.theblackvault.com\/documentarchive\/?p=20604"},"modified":"2025-06-03T12:30:08","modified_gmt":"2025-06-03T12:30:08","slug":"newly-released-navy-emails-reveal-uap-coordination-five-eyes-briefings-and-forgotten-redactions","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.theblackvault.com\/documentarchive\/newly-released-navy-emails-reveal-uap-coordination-five-eyes-briefings-and-forgotten-redactions\/","title":{"rendered":"Newly Released Navy Emails Reveal UAP Coordination, Five Eyes Briefings, and Forgotten Redactions"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"\"<\/a>In a newly released batch of internal U.S. Navy emails, obtained by The Black Vault through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request filed in January 2022, another behind-the-scenes view has emerged of official discussions on Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAP), intelligence coordination, and internal task force efforts to process incoming sightings — including those originating from civilian sources such as the FAA.<\/p>\n

The FOIA request targeted emails to and from Yasir Qureshi, identified through sources and publicly available LinkedIn information as a Navy Program Manager who was involved in the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force (UAPTF), led by Jay Stratton<\/a> and later Brennan McKernan<\/a>. As of December 2024, Qureshi now appears to be at the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence & Security (OUSD(I&S)) (this is solely using openly sourced information that is publicly available via LinkedIn<\/a>), suggesting possible<\/em> current involvement in the successor entity, the All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO)<\/a>, though this has not been confirmed. It does state “Deputy Director H&SA” as his current position (also available publicly on LinkedIn), but it is unclear exactly what “H&SA” is in this context.<\/p>\n

Although names were redacted throughout the release under FOIA Exemption (b)(6)<\/a>, the Navy mistakenly failed to apply those redactions correctly, inadvertently revealing email addresses, phone numbers, and also Qureshi’s identity in certain parts of the file upon release. The Black Vault chose to re-apply those redactions as originally intended by the Navy to protect privacy and as a courtesy to the U.S. Navy. Although The Black Vault was also going to withhold Qureshi’s name from publication once documents were released and published, a decision was made to publish Qureshi’s name in this, since it was used in the official FOIA response letter by the Navy, which becomes a matter of public record, and this case will be listed in the Navy’s FOIA case log.<\/p>\n

FAA Sightings, ODNI Coordination
\n<\/strong>
\nThe 17-page release includes internal discussions and email threads from October through December 2021 between various Navy components and other government agencies, including the Office of the Director of National Intelligence<\/a> (ODNI), addressing a civilian UAP sighting report submitted by an FAA<\/a> employee.<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>
A portion of the email from an FAA employee, seeking to get their UAP sightings to the UAP Task Force<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

\u201cI\u2019m thinking I\u2019d probably want to get this to the UAPTF,\u201d the FAA employee wrote in one email, providing dates and times of three separate UAP encounters observed \u201cfrom the ground,\u201d dating back to Christmas nights in 1991, 1992, and 1993. While noting hesitation in providing full detail, the sender emphasized they would feel more comfortable elaborating if historical radar data confirmed anomalous activity: \u201cIf there\u2019s historical radar data that says there was something odd going on… I\u2019d definitely feel a lot more comfortable describing what I saw.\u201d<\/p>\n

Emails show that the report was routed to ODNI Public Affairs before being passed along to Navy officials and ultimately to the UAPTF. \u201cThanks\u2026 much appreciated. I have actually spoken to him briefly, and he did pass me his report,\u201d one Navy official wrote in a reply.<\/p>\n

Five Eyes Briefings and AARO Transition<\/strong><\/p>\n

These newly released Navy emails also confirm high-level UAP coordination between the U.S. and its Five Eyes allies: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. On December 8, 2021, members of the UAP Task Force (UAPTF), including its director, were scheduled to meet with international counterparts for a classified discussion on unidentified aerial phenomena.<\/p>\n

“Re tomorrow\u2019s UAP briefing, I received confirmation from Australia and Canada they will be here … and of course UK,” one U.S. official wrote.<\/p>\n

The meeting, however, was ultimately rescheduled due to a last-minute calendar conflict. That decision prompted frustration from officials within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (OUSD(I&S)). \u201cI have to say, I\u2019m a bit disappointed this did not happen,\u201d wrote a U.S. official, who had encouraged partners to reserve time. A UAPTF counterpart responded, \u201cThe last thing we want to do is be dismissive of our allies and their time.\u201d<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>
Freedom of Information Act document courtesy of researcher Grant Lavac<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

But, later meetings between the Five Eyes<\/a> did indeed take place, and were confirmed through U.S. documents also released under the FOIA to Australian researcher Grant Lavac<\/a>, which listed a Five Eyes “caucus working group” with an explicit goal: \u201cto cultivate shared awareness of allies’ UAP issues, detection, and mitigation activities and challenges.\u201d The agenda included discussions of \u201cnetworks to share Five Eyes UAP reporting\u201d.<\/p>\n

The newly released emails contradict multiple public statements previously made by Australia\u2019s top military leadership. As recently highlighted by The Canberra Times<\/a>, Air Marshal Robert Chipman — then Chief of Air Force and now Vice Chief of Defence — twice denied that Australia had been briefed by the United States on UAPs. \u201cI\u2019m not aware of any formal discussions that we\u2019ve held with the US,\u201d he told Parliament in 2022. When asked again in 2023 if any Australian defence attach\u00e9s had received UAPTF briefings, Chipman replied flatly, \u201cNo.\u201d<\/p>\n

The Canberra Times article, authored by Jamieson Murphy<\/a>, credited independent UAP researcher Lavac for identifying the significance of the emails and exposing the contradiction. Lavac called the lack of transparency \u201cquite concerning,\u201d adding, \u201cThe Chief of Air Force leads all discussions on UAP in Australia, so if there\u2019s one person that needs to know what is happening on this topic in an Australian context and our discussions with allies, it\u2019s him.\u201d<\/p>\n

According to Lavac, there are only three explanations: \u201cHe\u2019s either uninformed because there is a complete lack of intelligence sharing, or there\u2019s a degree of incompetence, or it\u2019s something more sinister like plausible deniability. Any one of those three scenarios is concerning.\u201d<\/p>\n

The email release also occurred in the final weeks before the formal establishment of the All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO), the successor to the UAPTF. On November 23, 2021, Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks issued a directive for OUSD(I&S) to take over the UAPTF\u2019s responsibilities and create a permanent structure. Her memorandum, included in the FOIA release, emphasized the need to synchronize UAP data collection and analysis across the military and intelligence community, and to collaborate with non-DoD partners, including foreign allies.<\/p>\n

The documents confirm that international UAP cooperation was already underway, and they raise questions about why those efforts were denied in official forums. As The Canberra Times noted, the Department of Defence declined to answer when asked whether Australia had attended the Five Eyes briefing.<\/p>\n

Contracting, Budget Questions, and Transition to OUSD(I&S)
\n<\/strong>
\nAnother thread includes internal Navy discussions about whether to proceed with onboarding a knowledge management specialist to support the Task Force — possibly using contractor support. However, with the imminent shift of the portfolio to OUSD(I&S), officials voiced concern over wasting resources if funding was rerouted.<\/p>\n

\u201cWith OUSD(I&S) taking over the portfolio, this may be OBE [overcome by events],\u201d one official wrote. \u201cI don\u2019t want the company to hire an individual if\u2026 there is no money due to a CR [Continuing Resolution].\u201d<\/p>\n

###<\/p>\n

Document Archive<\/h3>\n

DON-NAVY-2022-003198 Release Package<\/a> [20 Pages, 1MB]<\/p>\n