John Greenewald: Did you miss it? The DoD Inspector General
Office released their report summarizing what they called
their evaluation into how the DOD has handled the UAP issue.
But what, if anything, can we learn? Well, to my surprise, a
lot more than you might think, let's explore the highs, and the
lows, and everything in between. Join me, John Greenwald, Jr, as
we take a deep dive into what we can all take away. So stay
tuned, you're about to journey inside the black vault.
That's right, everybody. As always, thank you so much for
tuning in and taking this journey inside the black vault
with me. I'm your host, John Greenewald, Jr, founder, creator
of the black vault.com. And today, we're taking a deep dive
into that new DoD inspector general report that summarizes
their what they call evaluation into how the DoD handled the UAP
issue. Now, there was very, very little known about this, and I
tried through FOIA to get more, we got a little bit of a
glimpse, I'm gonna go through some of those documents to give
you a little bit better of a background. But then go over the
report itself. I know deep dives are not for everybody. So after
the live version of this, I'm gonna put channel markers so
that way, if you want to skip around, you can do so. Because
again, a lot of detail is not for everybody. But in this
instance, it's absolutely worthwhile to take a little bit
of extra time to truly understand this. So let's just
go ahead and get get into it here. Let me go ahead and pull
up the PowerPoint presentation. I've got a bunch of slides to go
over with you. So let's just go ahead and dive in. If you missed
it, here is the cover page of the report that was was released
on January 24 2024, titled unclassified summary of Report
Number DoD IG Dash 2023 Dash 109 evaluation of the DoD actions
regarding unidentified anomalous phenomena, August 15 2023. Now,
what's the date difference there? August 15 2023, was when
they finally came out and said that they finished their
evaluation, which was first started in May of 2021. That
classified report that came out in August of last year. But we
we the people had to wait until a unclassified version or
summary, if you will, of those findings came out. So that's
what we're gonna go over. Now, just so you're aware, in August,
the moment that this was announced, I went after that
through what's called a mandatory declassification
review, or MDR, that essentially mandates them to review that
classified product and hopefully in hopes that will get some type
of release, whether or not that's going to happen. Your
guess is as good as mine. But let's before we dive into that
report, let's get a little bit of history, in case you guys
have not followed this. Don't know what I'm talking about.
Let's go ahead and take a look at this. May 3 2021 was when we
all found out about it. And again, when I say all the
general public, this was something that was announced on
the website. This was something that the DoD IG talked about
openly but details were very thin about what exactly it was
that they were doing. You can see from this memo dated May
3 2021. Evaluation of DOD actions regarding the
unidentified aerial phenomena and then it gives a long project
number we plan to begin the subject evaluation in May 2021.
The objective of this evaluation is to determine the extent to
which the DOD has taken actions regarding unidentified aerial
phenomena or UAP. We may revise the objective as the evaluation
proceeds and we will consider suggestions for management for
additional or revised objections object objectives, excuse me.
So, in other words, there was not a whole lot known there
really wasn't. And this was it. This was all we were allowed to
to essentially understand about it. And when this was announced,
I immediately started going after records. And I've, as I've
already mentioned, we'll get into some of those that came
out. But looking at the original announcement, very, very little
was known about it. This was the distribution of this memo. So
this memo essentially instructed them, hey, we need some liaisons
from your agencies for this evaluation. That way we can take
a look at the UAP Issue. Issue, you know, essentially how the IG
works is they'll evaluate the issue, and then submit some
recommendations or whatever their findings are, and go from
there. So they needed those liaisons that were connected to
those agencies. And here's a list of those agencies. I won't
go over all of them. Everything is linked in the show notes
below. So you can follow along with me with the documents or
take your time and read it more in detail at your leisure. But
you can see here, CENTCOM was on there North calm, Special
Operations Command, DARPA, dia DTRA, the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency, Missile Defense Agency, the NSA, the
NRO, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, so essentially, they were
going across the gamut on who they wanted to speak with during
the course of their evaluation. Again, what did that evaluation
entail other than what was in the memo? Well, I tried shortly
after that memo was issued to contact the IGs office at the
DOD, and say that I was covering the topic which I was not only
on this YouTube channel, but but on my website, the black
vault.com as well, trying to inform all of you what is going
on, because there was a lot of rumors at this time to one of
the one of which being that they were evaluating how they were
treating Luis Elizondo. As time went on, it was known that he
submitted a inspector general complaint. So some people
believe that this was part of that. So what was it so I
reached out to them. And as you can see here, the DOD does not
have any additional information to offer, beyond what is
published on our project announcement that gives the big
old long address. And here was the announcement page. I already
read to you, very briefly the memo. But this is where you
could download that memo. You see down here, the related
documents. That number here is for that that memorandum that I
went over, but essentially, it was the same very scant detail
announcement where they say we plan to begin the subject in May
of 2021. The objective is the evaluation to determine the
extent to which the DOD has taken actions regarding
unidentified aerial phenomena UAP, the exact same wording. So
there was absolutely nothing helpful of trying to figure out
what this was. So that's when I started hammering through FOIA.
Later that year, in 2021, I was able to get out some documents
that shed not much, but a little bit more light on it now going
over this, not only for the history, but to show you guys,
this is how you piece together the puzzle, and try and figure
out and unfold what they're doing behind the scenes. Because
as I got the response from the IG, a little bit more again
unfolded where they declassified a
PowerPoint presentation that talked about the evaluation. Now
I say declassified actually wasn't classified it was CUI or
controlled unclassified information. But essentially,
you know, has to go through a review process, not everything
is able to be released to the public. So you still have that
review process. The FOIA yielded it. There's a video on this
channel if you want to go ahead and see even more of what was
revealed. But I'm just going to show you a couple key points.
This was that cover of the PowerPoint presentation, you can
see that it was made in June of 2021, only took them about a
month to create this presentation. Not exactly known.
Exactly what for it was exactly what it was for. But rather it
gave a little bit more detail on this evaluation. You can see
here by this slide the evaluation process it this was
the little more light I was talking about, on what they were
going to do. They were going to be doing data requests,
interviews, site visits, documentation, review and
analysis during their evaluation, fieldwork, so
doesn't really tell us much, but at least it tells us that they
were going to be actively looking into things,
interviewing people and so on. They were going to create a
draft report to where they were going to have official
management, look at it, have about a month to review it,
submit comments, so on and so forth. The final response, same
deal, they were going to make sure that everybody had their
two cents in there. So it just gave a little bit of an idea of
how it was going to unfold. The other thing that was fairly
interesting about this was the list of people that were
involved in this evaluation from the IGs office, the majority of
them were redacted. Now, that's not too uncommon. A lot of times
these agencies will redact for privacy reasons, people that
work for their agency or that are involved in projects. Why?
Well, we're seeing a little bit of a glimpse of it. Now, if
you're paying attention to NASA's different meetings and
broadcasts that they've talked about their UFO personnel that
were studying these phenomena for the depth for that agency,
and were subjected to quite a bit of harassment from the
general public. Dr. Shawn Kirkpatrick has come out, he was
talking about harassment from the general public, to him in
his office, and even his family. Apparently, somebody showed up
at his house and was arrested, I guess they got federal
authorities involved. So there's a lot of reason to cover up. But
I don't mean that in a negative way, but to cover up and redact
those types of names, you did have a couple though Randolph
stone, he was the one that that signed the original memo. So
when you have more public figures, that's when you more
get a glimpse, Michael Ruark, the Deputy Inspector General for
evaluations, his name was on there, again, obviously much
more public name. And then stone was the Assistant Inspector
General for space, intelligence, engineering, and oversight. Now,
even though these names here were all redacted, you can at
least see where they came from, again, shedding that little more
light space missile and nuclear division, sensitive activities,
division, intelligence, division, research and
engineering division, and then all these project managers and
evaluators and an auditor in there as well. So you get an
idea of how big the team was, where they were coming from, and
again, just those different types of offices that they were
coming from. So that was a little bit of a help, before
this report came out to see how it was going on behind the
scenes. Now, fast forward to August of 2023. You can see here
on the website, this was a public posting of the classified
report from that evaluation. So So we've gone over the 2021
material, but it probably but but you know, there was
absolutely nothing else until August 15 2023, when they
announced that the classified report was done. But it was just
done. That was it, we didn't get to see it. And we didn't get to
understand anything about what they found, what they concluded
what they recommended, what they wanted to do next. Nothing,
nothing was given to the general public. All we were told was
that at a later date, a unclassified report would come
out. Now, as I've already mentioned, I'm going after that
classified report, some of you may say, Hey, that's a big fat
chance, there's no way you're gonna get that. Well, I've
gotten the previous one of any way the classified UA UAP
reports submitted to Congress, although it was partially
released, it still spoke volumes about the classified level of
what they were talking about. Same here, I hope to have the
same luck. And there's other cases as well, which will
probably have very similar outcomes where he won't see
everything, but you'll start to get a better understanding of
what's in that classified version. So now, last week, now
we're caught up. Now that unclassified version came out.
And we get a idea about the evaluation, what they did, what
they talked about, and what they recommended for the Department
of Defense. So let's get back into that report. Again, this is
the cover page, all linked in the show show notes below. So
you have it this to the classified version of the
evaluation, or excuse me, a classified version of the
evaluation of the DoD is actions regarding unidentified anomalous
phenomena form the basis of this unclassified summary. So just
pointing out a punching the note, this takes from that
classified version, and puts on there, essentially, the, the
shield, if you will, for the classified information softens
everything makes it a lot less interesting and boring. And
that's why it's unclassified. I'm not going to read the whole
report to you, it's not really long. But for the sake of time
here, we're just going to kind of focus in on the most
important parts, but the way that it did start was a
historical background. And it gives you all the way back to
the 1940s of how the US government collected UFO
information looked into case files, talked about Project
Bluebook and then they themselves fast forwarded into
the year 2000. That's what I'm going to zoom in on because I
know that this created quite a firestorm when it first came out
a lot of our has a lot of I told you so and all of that good
stuff. Specifically, people really honed in on this Hi lated
portion. The DoD did not officially look at UAP again
until mid 2000. When select members of Congress initiated
and funded a program to study UAP called the advanced
aerospace Weapon System Applications Program, or all
SAP, as many of you have heard it referred to, well look, this
yet adds another muddy layer on a already very muddy and
convoluted story. I have followed this since day one
since October of 2017. When we learned of what what Luis
Elizondo called a aerial threat Research Program, never said a
tip never said OS app, and rather just more talked about
aerial threats. So I've followed it since then, and have tried to
unravel the mystery. It wasn't till the next year that we
learned about this offset program. And as we continued to
dig, then we realized that December 2017, New York Times
article was wrong in a lot of areas. And don't take my word
for that. You know, I'm not trying to take a shot at them,
but rather take the director of offset that's not disputed. Dr.
James McCaskey from the DIA take his word for it, that he
published a book and in there, I'm paraphrasing this part. But
essentially, he said I'm here to set the record straight. So he
said that the New York Times was not accurate when they portrayed
what they had labeled a tip. But in reality that $22 million went
to OS app. Well, here's where it gets even kind of more muddy is
that the government has denied that OS app, which was nicknamed
a tip nine unless you listen to Luis Elizondo, and he says it
was a program but regardless, because it gets really, really
bad when it comes to the confusion. But back to the
government, they say no, these were not UFO research programs.
But what a lot of people forget is the government finally
amended their statement and stance. This was an article I
published in 2021, the government made kind of a
cobbled together but much larger statement about a tip. Now why
is that messy? Well, they're really calling it. They're
calling it a tip, but really, it was all SAP. And that's just by
their own documentation. But regardless, they gave this
longer statement of the A tip program, and
essentially said that they utilized some UAP material for
OS app, but it was not a UAP research program. Rather, it was
aimed to investigate foreign advanced aerospace weapon system
applications with future technology progress projections
over the next 40 years. And to create a center of expertise for
advanced aerospace technologies. The goal was to help understand
the threat posed by unconventional or leap ahead
aerospace vehicles and technologies that could have
national security implications for the United States. It goes
into much more details. But down here is obviously kind of like
that, I would say one at a little bit, where they kept
saying no, it did not deal with UAP. And then all of a sudden,
they say in developing the reports and exploring how to
create a center of expertise. The contract allowed for
research drawn from a wide variety of sources, including
reports of UAPs. However, the examination of UAP observations
was not the purpose of a tip. Now again, kind of confusing,
but this is something that they were referring to as a tip, but
in reality was more so awesome. Now, this was submitted in 2021.
But even as early as last year, in 2023, The New York Post's
specifically Stephen Green Street, got more statements in
detail from the Pentagon on all of these issues. And
essentially, they reinforced that these types of programs off
SAP, a tip were not UFO or UAP. specifics. So this seems to be
the current stance of the Department of Defense in the
Pentagon. So where did that thing go arrive in this new
report? Or is it arrived? Meaning is it now accurate that
these were created for UAP research purposes? We only know
what has come out thus far. So in addition to this report, I
went over the PowerPoint presentation. Well, in other
FOIA requests, I was able to determine that during the course
of this evaluation, they spoke with Luis Elizondo, and they
spoke with David grush, both of which were connected to the
evaluation. So how much did they dig? Did they listen to these
guys and formulate that section of The report based on the
testimony there and just not fact, check it beyond. Is this
the absolute gospel? I don't know, I don't know the answer to
that. All we know is this material came out, and we know
who they spoke with. So I reached out to the Inspector
General's office again, tried to figure out the answer to that
stated that the official Pentagon stance has been X, why
are you guys stating why? They told me that they are working on
that, but by the recording of this, they have not given me any
answer whatsoever. And I've tried to follow up a couple
times. It's why it took me nearly a week or so to record
this video piece. Because I can't I can't get an answer. And
I wanted to get an answer for you guys. Regardless of what the
answer is, I'll bring it to you, and I'll report it. But it's
just so weird, right? It doesn't matter what you believe you
could think that it was a UFO research programming, you think
it wasn't? It doesn't matter. We should all agree on how
absolutely horrible the government has been describing
these programs. Why is that? What, what's wrong with it? And
whose fault is that? If anybody's why are we getting
mixed messages? I don't have an answer for you on that. But it
is fascinating to see unfold, because here we are years after
we first heard the acronym ative, and they still can't keep
their story straight. Who knows what's right or wrong. But we
can't keep our stories straight here on the side of the
government. And and that's absolutely ridiculous. It
really, truly is. So hopefully, somebody will add clarity and
maybe I can do an update video to this. But as of now,
absolutely nothing has been clarified. I also wrote to Susan
Goff in the Pentagon, but but also the IGs office and their
media affairs and said, Hey, you guys are completely
contradicting each other. Can you please tell me what's going
on? And well, nothing yet. So back to the report. We have this
section here chapter six, title 10. United States Code
establishes the authorities of combatant commanders who are
responsible for detecting, deterring, and preventing
threats and attacks against the US and its territories,
possessions and bases. After a review of the laws, policies and
guidance issued by Congress, the DOD and other federal agencies,
we determined that while the services and components have an
important role to play, the combatant commands would be the
logical organizations to detect, report, collect and identify UAP
incidents to arrow, it was kind of an interesting thing to put
into this report, to note that the combatant commands would be
kind of at the forefront of this, because maybe they aren't,
maybe they haven't submitted that. And it's kind of
interesting that, for example, some of these commands are where
the UAP material has leaked from especially the Middle East
material over Baghdad or over Missoula. So we're obviously
talking about a very interesting point on top of that's where the
leaks are coming from. So not really sure if there's a
correlation there. But it should be interesting to note, but if
you're not familiar with the combatant commands, here they
are, here's a list of them, including Africa Command,
CENTCOM, Cyber Command, Space Command, Strategic Command, full
list is on your screen there. So that's, that's an idea of, of
maybe where they're going with this, that maybe it's the war
zones, the active military presences that really are the
ones that are driving a lot of these sightings. Obviously,
that's been their focus from what we've been told. But it
sounds like that they want a little bit more coordination out
there with their commands, in the introduction part give a
little bit more detail on the objective, not much. The
objective of this evaluation was to determine the extent to which
the DoD military services, defense agencies and military
department counter intelligent counter intelligence
organizations took intelligence, counterintelligence and force
protection actions to detect, report, collect, analyze, and
identify UAP. Not a whole lot different than then the very,
very, I would say, brief objectives that they originally
published. But it shows you that they really didn't update their
objectives. They did note in the past, especially in that
original memo, they may actually update. It's clear they didn't
they were just looking at how the DoD was handling the UAP
issue. Now, one thing and this is primarily for all my FOIA
people out there that you're kind of exploring documents,
these are the best things to look for. And generally, they're
in finer print, buried at the bottom of the pages. These are
the citations. It gives, in some cases, gives FOIA fodder,
meaning stuff to go after, or start Just to paint pictures
about things that we didn't know a whole lot or and all about
prior, for example, some of the citations in the beginning of
the report, look at this classified annex to the Senate
Armed Services Committee report on the fiscal fiscal year 2020
NDAA. enclosure two entitled advanced operational
capabilities, collection, exploitation, and research.
That's from July of 2019. Another citation references the
same document, but enclosure 13 unidentified aerial phenomena,
that would be an excuse me, not the same report. Exactly. But
same report, but that one for fiscal year 2022. Sorry about
that. And that was from October 19 2021. So you start to see a
little bit of a picture. Obviously, that's very minimal,
we don't get to see the classified annex, or at least
not yet. But now we know it's there. Now we start to see what
the enclosures are about. And you piece these puzzles
together, to move forward and see if you can get a hold of it
at a later date. So I could be wrong. But I don't believe that
report was ever known before. I searched to see if maybe there
was a public annex that was out there a public report that may
have had this kind of stuff. And know the only references that
come up, especially when you're using search engines are
actually going right back to this report. So there's not a
whole lot known about this report, if at all. So very
interesting to take a look at those citations. So I bring that
up, because those are great things to look for. When you're
trying to piece together, things to look for later, through FOIA
or at least trying to get a picture of those classified
annexes and reports and so on. This was a very important part
of the IG report and one that really deserves a mention. The
DOD does not have a comprehensive coordinated
approach to address UAP. We reviewed the DOD has policies,
procedures and actions for detecting, reporting,
collecting, analyzing and identifying UAP and determined
that, among other things, the DOD has not used a coordinated
approach to detect, report, collect, analyze and identify
UAP DoD components have largely excluded geographic combatant
commands, which are responsible for detecting, deterring, and
preventing threats and attacks against the US and its
territories possessions and bases in their respective areas
of
responsibility, and developing UAP policies and procedures.
That's obviously the combatant commands we talked about earlier
and how they've kind of been it seems like excluded from all of
this. And finally, DOD components develop varying
processes to collect, analyze and identify UAP incidents. As a
result, the DoD may not have developed a comprehensive and
coordinated strategy for understanding identifying and
protecting against the UAP that may present a safety threat to
military personnel and territory. The DoD has not
issued a comprehensive UAP response plan. The DoD has not
issued a comprehensive UAP response plan that identifies
roles, responsibilities, requirements and coordination,
procedures for detecting, reporting, collecting, analyzing
and identifying UAP incidents. As a result, the DoD response to
UAP incidents is uncoordinated and concentrated within each
military department. Officials from the military services and
MD CEOs stated that they have been waiting for the DOD to
issue comprehensive UAP guidance before developing their own
guidance. Essentially, what they're saying there, the DoD as
a whole should create some type of central procedure, something
that all the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, can model their
procedures after and the DoD never did it. We'll touch on
that again in a second. DOD components have largely excluded
geographic combatant commands and UAP processes. So they're
punching this point again. We interviewed senior officials at
Oh USD ins, the military services, the MDC o's and the
defense agencies to learn how their organizations detect,
report, collect, analyze and identify UAP incidents. We
concluded that these organizations generally adapted
existing systems and that the DoD components existing UAP
processes largely exclude the role of the geographic combatant
commands. We also reviewed the geographic combatant commands
processes for responding to UAP incidents, and determine that
the commands processes also generally adapted existing
systems to report UAP incidents. Chapter Six title 10 US Code
establishes the authorities of combatant commanders who are
responsible for detecting, deterring and preventing threats
and attacks against the US and its territories possessions
basis. Therefore, the combatant commands would be the logical
organizations to detect, report collect and identify UAP
incidents to arrow. So they're really punching that point. And
you'll see there's a lot of repetitiveness here also. So the
report kind of would have been better served to be trimmed down
even more. But hey, that's just, you know, that's just me.
footnote here at the bottom though don't miss this. We made
other classified observations and findings that are not
included in this unclassified summary. So obviously, there's a
lot more here that's kind of a given, but it's always good to
see it in writing. So let me ask you something. And this is
something I think that we have to deal with. Take yourself out
of the storyline that we've heard from some of these
individuals and look at it with a broader lens from 2007 to
2008, depending upon who you listen to, all the way to 2023.
These guys here on the screen, which includes Luis Elizondo
with a tip excuse me, there we go, Luis Elizondo with a tip,
you've got Dr. Shawn Kirkpatrick with Arrow you've got Dr. James
McCaskey with us AP, you've got John J. Stratton, J. Stratton is
generally how he's referred to with the UAP Task Force. All of
these guys collectively have 16 years of leadership. And if you
believe all of them and take the controversy of whether or not
this is a UAP, you know, research effort with or SAP or a
tip or was a tip a program, take all of that out of the equation
for purposes of this. For 16 years, none of these guys were
able to develop any type of program policy or procedure that
the DoD could utilize. Now, let's just say some of these
individuals were in on the ground floor, and their
intentions were 100% genuine and they wanted to make this happen.
Fine. But why is it that no one was able to make it happen all
through those 16 years, that these guys lead their respective
programs, even those that aren't disputed as being UAP? specific
efforts? What happened during those years? Now, I'm not trying
to specifically blame these guys, but they are the leaders.
A lot of people out there throw a lot of hate at Dr. Shawn
Kirkpatrick. And you know what, maybe, and I would even say
myself that it is deserved. But if you blame him, you have to
blame the others that came before him. What did they do? It
should be noted. Now, I'm sorry, it has to be noted that there is
not a single UAP research report from our SAP, or from a tip that
leads us to believe that they did anything from a
investigative standpoint, the material that came out through
the offset program was all things that were non UFO
related. The exception was the one dird report that talked
about UAP effects. But the one that leaked out and was
published, I believe, first by Popular Mechanics was actually
different from the one that dia submitted and released out via a
FOIA request. So what happened there? Are they hiding it? Well,
maybe. But let's just say for a moment that there was UAP angles
to all SAP? Where is that material? And this is an age old
question that some out there are so sick and tired of me asking,
but we have to keep asking it. What happened to the 10s of
millions of dollars if this really was a research program
devoted to UAP where's that material? And if it's sitting in
the private sector, well, they don't own it, the DIA and the
taxpayers do. So you know, I can go off on a whole tangent on on
OS app alone. And the idea and concept and allegation and rumor
that they with taxpayer money, meaning bass, the contractor
purchased databases like MUFON, which, you know, I know that
Bigelow did get involved with that. But was it taxpayer money?
Was this something that the DIA wanted? Fast forward to a tip?
Was it a continuation of all SAP? Specific to UAP? Nuts and
Bolts, aerial threats, not the paranormal stuff that Skinwalker
Ranch, but specifically to that, okay, let's say it is where is
there any supporting documentation to support that?
And what were they doing for years, it wasn't just Luis
Elizondo, he had other people, right. It wasn't just James
kasky. He
had other people, right. What happened there fast forward to
the UAP taskforce and J. Stratton. What happened there?
So there's a lot of unanswered questions here that yeah, I've
asked for years, but we need to continue asking them because
it's a fascinating tale to see unfold. And the story is not
told yet. And it doesn't matter if you believe me or support the
questions that I asked. The bottom line is we still don't
have the answers. And what's even more interesting about this
is those that you see on the screen here, don't agree about
the relationship between their own programs. For example, if
you read and hear and listen to James McCaskey from the DIA, DIA
and his leadership of OSS app, he contradicts Luis Elizondo.
Why is that why why don't more people care about that? What
happened there? What's the disconnect? So those types of
things? Yeah, I mean, may have an easy answer. But you know
what, the longer it goes without answers, without these gentlemen
actually addressing it, the more interested I get, and the more
loud I will become asking the questions because there's
something there, there's something there that they don't
want us to see. Not about UAP, but about these programs
themselves, and what is that? And we can speculate until our
eyes fall out. But until we get those answers, that's all what
we're left to do. So let's just keep asking, keep pushing. And
hopefully, we'll get some clarity. Because yes, it is
absolutely important to these topics. And yes, it is important
because it shows how we got here today. It's the foundation, we
can all at least agree to that right. It was the foundation
that led us to Congress doing what they're doing today, and
creating the legislation, the legislation that they have. And
so if this is the foundation, then let's understand how strong
or how weak it is. That's why it's important. Some people just
want to shove it to the side. They're like, yeah, yeah, leave
it alone, John, you're really annoying. Well, maybe. But I'm
not going to leave it alone. Because again, this is the
foundation that everything that we talked about, in 2024 and
beyond, is built on. And if that starts to crumble, then
everything else will crumble along with it. And are we seeing
that as we speak? Is that something that's going on? Is
Congress losing interest? I said it a little while ago, to be
honest with you, I'll stand by that. There's not a whole lot of
people that are out here advocating for the issue.
There's some, but there's not a lot. And some of those that were
champions a year and a half ago, kind of fall off the map. They
haven't really been around. You've had some others that have
come forward. But their strength, let's just say and
that's not supposed to be disrespectful. But the power,
the strength of the power they they yield within the Senate or
Congress is not necessarily as strong as it was maybe a year
and a half ago. So what's going on? What what are we? What are
we seeing unfold here. So that's why a lot of that history is
important. And that's why we need to figure it out because it
makes a lot of these other things that makes it a lot
easier to understand and grasp. Back to the report and some of
the findings, DOD components developed varying processes to
detect and report UAP incidents. The NDAA of 2022 assigns arrow
under the Oh USD ins responsibility for synchronizing
and standardizing the collection analysis and identification of
UAP incidents. However, the DOD has not yet issued comprehensive
UAP guidance. So again, Kirkpatrick is just to blame
just as those other guys in the early days. In the absence of
DOD level guidance, the DoD components have developed
varying informal processes to detect and report UAP incidents.
For example, an Air Force remotely piloted aircraft, and
airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
technical adviser, stated that the Air Force designated UAP as
a special interest item, which requires air crews to document
and report UAP observations within 24 hours of engine
shutdown and mission completion using the Marauder system. An
army Senior Advisor for Science and Technology and Innovation,
stated that army personnel also use the Air Force's Murata
system to document and report UAP observations. Because the
army has not developed its own UAP specific processes. The
military services and MTC O's have sent some UAP incident
reports to arrow, but the DOD does not currently currently
formally require them to do so. That is an explosive and in my
opinion, one of the more important parts of this report
all that stuff about the Air Force and how the Air Force is
collecting even informally, the UAP incidents and reports. So,
the one military branch that has mysteriously been mum, for
years, they don't talk Got this kind of stuff, really at all.
Now all of a sudden, we find out that they've got this special
interest item label over UAP. And that they are using systems
to catalog these reports and in some cases, or maybe all, send
them over to arrow. So that that to me was a pretty interesting
part of this because when you look at the citation on the same
page, US Air Force Special Interest item, unidentified
aerial phenomena reporting April 8 2022, Air Force Lifecycle
Management Center Marauder mission reporting User Guide,
September 2021. The broader system provides the Global
Mission reporting capability on the secret Internet Protocol
router network, including report drafting, quality control,
rejection and approval pipeline to ensure fidelity of reporting,
publication of reports for Global Access and export of
published reports for analysis. In other words, they're using a
established system that ties into this Marauder mission, and
labeling UAP special interest items and gender and using that
system to generate the reports and potentially get them over to
arrow for analysis. So even though it's all in formal,
they're taking action, and they have been proactive to do their
own reporting procedure. To me, that's absolutely fascinating
because again, this is the Air Force, that military branch that
denied any interest for decades since project Bluebook, then was
mysteriously mom when the Navy's just blurting out stuff. Every
day, it seemed like there for a little bit. On UAP, the Air
Force was quiet now we're seeing that they were actually doing a
lot behind the scenes. The DoD is lack of a comprehensive
coordinated approach to address UAP may pose a threat to
military forces and US national security. We determined that the
DOD has no overarching UAV policy. And as a result, it
lacks assurance that national security and flight safety
threats to the US from UAP have been identified and mitigated.
So obviously, they're not doing much. They're doing these
informal things. But beyond that, not so much. Now,
according to the press release for this report, there were 11
recommendations that were generated by the IGs office five
of which were listed in the report itself. Now, I know it
gets a little bit tedious reading these, but I think it's
important not only for the audio version of this particular
podcast, but on top of this to really hear it out loud and to
understand exactly what the IG determined what they want done
and whether or not anything was done about it. Recommendation
one, we recommend that the Undersecretary of Defense for
intelligence and security, in coordination with the all domain
anomaly Research Office Director, issue a Department of
Defense Policy to integrate unidentified anomalous phenomena
roles, responsibilities and requirements and coordination
procedures into existing intelligence,
counterintelligence, and force protection policy and
procedures. The policy should include methods and address
unidentified anomalous phenomena incidents, and should align with
policies and procedures for the protection of the US person's
civil liberties. So now they're just trying to address
everything that we've gone over. And it seems again, like it's
pretty repetitive in this report. They're trying to
address it create some kind of, you know, uniform system for
this Undersecretary of Defense for intelligence and security
and all domain anomaly resolution office comments.
The Undersecretary of Defense for intelligence and security
responding for the owe us the ins and the arrow director
agreed with the recommendation. The Undersecretary noted that
the findings that inform excuse me, that informed the
recommendation appear to be based on observations that
largely predate the established of air the establishment of aro
organizationally aligned under the Oh USD ins on July 2020 22.
The Undersecretary also commented that the report
describes aro as having been operational at the time of its
established establishment, when in fact, the office was not at
initial operational capability. The Undersecretary stated that
arrow will achieve full operational capability using the
resources provided in the in the future year defense plan,
beginning in fiscal year 2020. For the under the undersecretary
also stated that arrows progress and detecting, identifying and
resolving UAP includes the development of analytic
framework science plan, operational framework of
strategic communications plan, and implementing guidance on the
UAP related roles and responsibilities of the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, arrow, combatant commands,
military services and combat support agencies. The
Undersecretary stated that arrow is developing policy guidance
including Recently released General Administration guidance
through the Joint Staff to the combatant commands to delineate
UAP roles, responsibilities, requirements and coordination
efforts, or excuse me procedures. This guidance will
modify existing intelligence, counterintelligence and force
protection policies and procedures as well as adhere to
all policies and procedures for the protection of US persons
civil liberties. Our response are the IG comments from the
Undersecretary of Defense for intelligence and security fully
addressed the recommendation. Therefore, the recommendation is
resolved but open. We will close the recommendation when the Oh
USD ins in coordination with Arrow provides us with the issue
of DOD policy to integrate UAP roles, responsibilities,
requirements, and coordination procedures into existing
intelligence, counterintelligence and force
protection policies and procedures and procedures. A
mouthful from top to bottom. But you can see that it looks like
the DoD is starting to take action. The second
recommendation we recommend that the Secretary of the Army issue
interim guidance for unidentified anomalous phenomena
while waiting for the Department of Defense to issue policy at a
minimum, this guidance for unidentified anomalous phenomena
should a integrate existing intelligence counterintelligence
and force protection policies and procedures be integrate
procedures for coordinating with geographic combatant commands,
see incorporate roles, responsibilities and
requirements for the military services and their respective
military department counterintelligence operations.
The Secretary of the Army comments, the Senior Advisor for
Counter Intelligence Deputy Chief of Staff of army G to
responding for the Secretary of the Army agreed in principle
with the recommendation, the Senior Advisor stated that army
counterintelligence plans to integrate existing intelligence,
counterintelligence, and force protection policies and
procedures into interim guidance for UAP IGS comments from the
Senior Advisor for counter-intelligence Deputy
Chief of Staff of the Army G to fully address the
recommendation, therefore, the recommendation is resolved. But
open. We will close the recommendation when the
Secretary of the Army provides us with the issued interim UAP
guidance. The third recommendation, we recommend
that the Secretary of the Navy issue interim guidance for UAP
while waiting for DOD to issue policy at a minimum, and it goes
through essentially the same points again. So I'll jump down
to Secretary of the Navy comments. The Secretary of the
Navy did not provide official comments for inclusion in our
final report, as requested. However, the director of
intelligence Deputy Undersecretary of the Navy,
intelligence and security responding for the Secretary of
the Navy after our final report issuance agreed with the
recommendation and stated in the response that the Navy began
developing interim guidance for UAP. Here's what's odd about
this. The Navy years ago, already had UAP guidelines. That
story was first broken by Politico and Brian bender. I
went after it through FOIA, I'll have to look back, I actually
forgot to look at it. But regardless, that case is still
open. I don't have an ETA, I don't think that's what I wanted
to check. But the case is still open. So clearly, there's
there's kind of a disconnect there, where they have this
guidance years ago about how the Navy was going to report UAP.
And then fast forward, IG recommends them to do it again,
and they're going to do it again. So it's like, Well, what
happened to all that stuff from years ago? It's just really
weird when you try and truly unraveled some of these details,
and how you thought certain things were done. And it was
reported as being done and then all of a sudden, we find out
it's not or it's being redone. Who knows. But IG stated in the
report, comments from the director of intelligence Deputy
Undersecretary of the Navy Intelligence and Security,
Department of the Navy fully addressed the recommendation.
Therefore, the recommendation is resolved. But open we will close
the recommendation when the Security Secretary of the Navy
provides us with the issued interim UAP guidance. We
recommend that the Secretary of the Air Force issue interim
guidance for UAP get I'm gonna jump down it's again, just a
recommendation that the Air Force do the same as the Navy
and the Army and previous recommendations. Secretary of
the Air Force comments. The Secretary of the Air Force did
not provide official comments for inclusion in this report, as
we requested in our draft. However, the strategic programs
and Policy Associate Director Secretary of the Air Force
Inspector General, responding for the Secretary of the Air
Force provided us in formal comments, stating quote in
coordination with OSI and our Secretary of the Air Force
inspector general's special investigate shins directorate,
Deputy Director. We concur without comment and look forward
to the final published report. Man, these titles get so
difficult and wordy. So sorry about that. But obviously
they're they're acknowledging it in a informal comment way. IG
responds the strategic programs and policy. Associate Directors
in formal response stated that the Air Force agreed with the
recommendation. However, this response did not provide the
specific actions that the Air Force would take and the dates
for for those actions. Therefore, this recommendation
is resolved. But open, we will close the recommendation when
the Secretary of the Air Force provides us with the issued
interim UAP guidance. Here's the last recommendation that they
have. In this particular report. We recommend that the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued guidance to the
geographic combatant commanders regarding UAP detection,
reporting, collection, analysis and identification with their
area within their area of responsibility. At a minimum,
the guidance should include tools to help commands determine
the threats posed by UAP. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff did not provide official comments for inclusion in our
final report, as we requested, however, in official from the
Joint Staff J three responded and agreed with the
recommendation. Further, the Joint Staff issued guidance to
the geographic combatant commanders on UAP detection,
reporting, collection, analysis and identification within their
area of responsibility. Our response, the formal response
from the joint staff fully addressed the recommendation,
therefore the recommendation is resolved and closed. Yet one
thing that it's always fun to see, but frustrating to see. And
interesting all at the same time, is how the Office of the
Inspector General within the DOD can't get their own military
branches to respond properly. And obviously, they have ample
opportunity to do so. So it seems like these offices have
power that again, wield a lot of power in their respective ways
cannot get answers. You look at the Senate, you look at the
house, you look at politicians that also wield their own
respective power. And they try and get answers from different
either, and even the inspector general. But other military
branches and offices and the Pentagon itself, you look at
that and you realize, man, our own government will not talk to
each other. They will not help with reports that are aimed to
help pilots be safer in the skies to help Americans be safer
where they live to help national security concerns. They don't
talk. So you see it. And like every recommendation, we asked
for this, but we didn't get it. It's like come on, like try and
talk to each other to help us understand what's going on
number one, but number two, what are you doing about it. And
that's something that's really important to look at. The last
slide that I want to talk to you guys about is the scope and
methodology. And you look again, won't read the whole page here
but we interviewed senior officials and requested UAP
related data and organizational policies, procedures and
guidance from the following DoD organizations, oh Usdi and s
arrow military services like the Army, Navy and Air Force,
military service intelligence command components army G to
Navy and to Air Force A to MDC owes, which include the army
counter intelligence NCIS Office of Special Investigations, that
would be for the Air Force, Defense Intelligence agencies
which included the DIA, the National Geospatial Intelligence
Agency, or NGA, the National Reconnaissance Office or NRO and
NSA, the National Security Agency. You know what that is,
that is a list. Now that we have a a roadmap for someone like me,
and any of you that are watching on who was directly involved
with this particular evaluation, spoiler alert, I have filed
requests to each and every one of those that I just went over
to look at what was the coordination between the IG
during this evaluation and those respective branches, offices and
so on. That will help us so a lot of people were let down at
this report, you know, I don't know what they expected. I'm not
sure what they wanted to see. I don't know I think it's across
the gamut when you when you talk to to various people and, and
and groups and so on, that they they have their heart set on
something. For me. I always I've learned over the years learned
over the decades actually don't have any expectations, because
you never know what you're gonna get. And that's kind of why I
wanted To do this particular deep dive, when you look at that
information, and you look at what they have told us, your
expectations, if you have them way, way too high, it's going to
be blown out of the water. But when you look at it for what it
is, you look at it for, for, for trying to get some more puzzle
pieces and put this picture together. That's when it becomes
really interesting. And in this respect, there was so much that
someone like me and all of you out there that do FOIA requests
and look for things. There were so many leads in this. And that
was actually unexpected. Again, I try not to have expectations,
but I didn't expect that many leads. Because this now offers
an opportunity to go and dissect not only that list I just went
over. But all those citations that I said, Hey, look, look at
look at these, I can't go after congressional records. But I can
go after Air Force policy and procedure, I can dig in there, I
can go into communication between the IGs office and these
respective agencies. Because keep in mind that classified
report may take a while to get that MDR case that I talked to
you earlier about in this presentation. But what won't
take as much time is the information that was passed on,
let's say, from the army, or the Navy, or NCIS or aft OSI, that
information is processed at the agency itself, not the IGs
office. So the report itself is going to take a while because it
has to coordinate with all of those offices. And then it has
to wait until the end. But the information I can go after
directly with AF OSI or the navy or whatever, specific to this
DoD IG evaluation, that will not take as long and why am I
telling you that because I know some of you are bored stiff,
it's the way you have to look at this. And and I always try and
throw in those FOIA tips and hints if I can, for those that
may be thinking about using it or may maybe you've started but
you're not entirely sure what to look for. That's what you look
for. You look at every single word and character in reports
like these, because it's not the main brunt of the report, that's
the most interesting, it's the fine print. And it's those
little things that you can pick up on and used to create one or
two, or 10 or 20 other FOIA cases, to all of these other
agencies. So that's something to look out for. Overall, again,
this was a great, I think, a great report for the research
end, not necessarily for telling the public anything other than
the DoD hasn't done anything to set up UAP policies, procedures
that are uniform, DOD wide. That's the bottom line. So the
general public is going to walk away with very little from this,
again, other than the DOD has failed. And we do have to ask
that one question 10s of millions of dollars at least
have gone into these programs over the course of that 16
years. So what is it that they've done? These are a lot of
failure marks from the Inspector General's office. And those
recommendations, the ones that we could read should never be in
there if everybody else was doing their job. And let's just
say the most structured effort, likely or arguably, being arrow,
what have they been doing? Like, why can't they get some type of
a system down? As the general public, we are not privy to
everything? So again, maybe there is a fair answer. Maybe
there's a fair answer with why a tip didn't do it or why OSS app
didn't do it. There's a lot of, you know, question marks there.
But the bottom line is they didn't do their job. And that's
what we have to look into and ask why and how are we going to
fix it? Obviously, the IG issued their recommendations, will the
DoD take action? Time will tell. But I had a lot of fun going
over this report with you guys. Hopefully, you learned at least
one thing in the past hour or so. So thank you for joining me.
If you can, if you're watching the live stream version or the
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guys for listening and or watching. This is John
Greenewald, Jr, signing off, and we'll see you next time.