1 00:00:23,940 --> 00:00:25,800 John Greenewald: That's right, everybody. As always, thank you 2 00:00:25,800 --> 00:00:29,850 so much for tuning in and making this your podcast or your live 3 00:00:29,850 --> 00:00:32,760 stream of choice. I'm your host, John Greenewald, Jr. and today 4 00:00:32,760 --> 00:00:36,480 we're talking about a brand new story, or at least as of last 5 00:00:36,480 --> 00:00:40,710 week that I wrote that has received a avalanche of media 6 00:00:40,710 --> 00:00:44,340 coverage. Now, what I had reported last week was something 7 00:00:44,340 --> 00:00:49,020 that although may upset some of you was a very important story, 8 00:00:49,230 --> 00:00:54,810 as we continue to unfold this saga about learning more on UAP, 9 00:00:54,960 --> 00:00:59,370 UFO, whatever acronym you want to use, and how Congress is 10 00:00:59,370 --> 00:01:04,590 approaching this topic? And Will their language in these bills 11 00:01:04,590 --> 00:01:07,710 that they've been passing around and then passing in the chamber 12 00:01:07,710 --> 00:01:12,300 and so on and so forth? Will they help us? And I'm not so 13 00:01:12,300 --> 00:01:18,060 sure if the general public really grasps the importance of 14 00:01:18,060 --> 00:01:22,350 a national security denial, because generally, you're not 15 00:01:22,350 --> 00:01:25,950 going to see Congress or congressional language, Trump 16 00:01:25,980 --> 00:01:29,670 that I won't get into it in this video. But you've seen in the 17 00:01:29,670 --> 00:01:33,270 past, where I've talked about how Congress has been very 18 00:01:33,660 --> 00:01:39,030 accepting of the quote, unquote, we can talk more about that in a 19 00:01:39,030 --> 00:01:42,630 closed session, which means we're encroaching on territory 20 00:01:42,630 --> 00:01:46,380 that's classified. We can't do this in a public hearing. And 21 00:01:46,380 --> 00:01:49,770 all the congressman, as I said in the previous video, kind of 22 00:01:49,770 --> 00:01:52,140 sit back and go, Yeah, all right, no problem. And they 23 00:01:52,140 --> 00:01:55,140 don't fight it. But it will be interesting to see how all of 24 00:01:55,140 --> 00:01:59,970 this unfolds, because it leads into this story, and how the 25 00:02:00,000 --> 00:02:03,600 appeal, which I'll get into later, can potentially fight it. 26 00:02:03,870 --> 00:02:06,720 Now, here's the nutshell version. About two and a half 27 00:02:06,720 --> 00:02:13,590 years ago, I went after all other UFO and UAP related 28 00:02:13,620 --> 00:02:18,750 videos, videos only that the US Navy held in their their 29 00:02:18,750 --> 00:02:24,150 holdings. And essentially what I was requesting was every video 30 00:02:24,150 --> 00:02:29,580 that holds a degs designation of unidentified aerial phenomena. 31 00:02:30,330 --> 00:02:37,080 What I did was I filed it the day after the Navy released the 32 00:02:37,080 --> 00:02:41,070 three videos that we've all seen a million times now in the last 33 00:02:41,250 --> 00:02:46,800 four and a half, five years, the FLIR, the gimbal and go fast, I 34 00:02:46,800 --> 00:02:51,360 was excited to be the one to bring to you all back in. I 35 00:02:51,360 --> 00:02:58,260 think it was now 2019 The designator of unidentified 36 00:02:58,260 --> 00:03:01,860 aerial phenomena and the Navy admitting that those three 37 00:03:01,860 --> 00:03:06,240 videos depicted UAP. That was a huge story back then when I 38 00:03:06,240 --> 00:03:10,680 first wrote that, and that as well had received quite a bit of 39 00:03:10,680 --> 00:03:13,800 media coverage. So it's nice to see the progression that the 40 00:03:13,800 --> 00:03:19,110 media is sticking with this, and watching as we all learn more as 41 00:03:19,110 --> 00:03:22,560 we go. Now fast forward to again, about two and a half 42 00:03:22,560 --> 00:03:24,450 years ago, I don't have the exact dates in front of me. But 43 00:03:24,480 --> 00:03:27,420 regardless, it's in the article, if you'd like to click on the 44 00:03:27,420 --> 00:03:30,360 links, they're all time stamped and so on. But about two and a 45 00:03:30,360 --> 00:03:34,650 half years ago, when they officially released the video, 46 00:03:34,650 --> 00:03:37,590 so they had already said what the designation was, they 47 00:03:37,620 --> 00:03:41,790 officially released them the moment that happens in my world, 48 00:03:41,790 --> 00:03:46,140 in my view, in my personal opinion. When that happens, they 49 00:03:46,140 --> 00:03:50,730 essentially set a precedent that I can call on to say you have 50 00:03:50,760 --> 00:03:55,530 UAP related videos, and you've released them. So even though 51 00:03:55,530 --> 00:03:59,190 there are likely more, and on top of that there probably are 52 00:03:59,190 --> 00:04:07,440 classified videos that aren't as as I guess, low quality as the 53 00:04:07,440 --> 00:04:10,920 FLIR was because obviously, that didn't show a whole lot of 54 00:04:10,920 --> 00:04:14,910 detail. It was more of the story that went along with it. So when 55 00:04:14,910 --> 00:04:20,010 as your technology progresses from 2004, you're getting clear 56 00:04:20,010 --> 00:04:24,570 images, you can see identifying markings if there are any. So 57 00:04:24,570 --> 00:04:27,390 obviously, you're encroaching on a much more sensitive piece of 58 00:04:27,390 --> 00:04:32,400 material. But there are ways to safeguard the sensitive material 59 00:04:32,580 --> 00:04:35,640 and still have a little bit of transparency to go along with 60 00:04:35,640 --> 00:04:40,110 it. So when I filed the case, I had said you guys are now 61 00:04:40,110 --> 00:04:43,800 releasing these videos. So there's got to be more and that 62 00:04:43,800 --> 00:04:47,430 had started a what I didn't know at the time would ultimately be 63 00:04:47,430 --> 00:04:52,290 roughly a two and a half year journey that resulted in me 64 00:04:52,380 --> 00:04:56,580 having to file numerous FOIA cases. It wasn't just one and 65 00:04:56,580 --> 00:05:01,140 finally in the end, the Navy said nope, so Sorry, we are not 66 00:05:01,140 --> 00:05:05,760 releasing any of them, because they will will harm national 67 00:05:05,760 --> 00:05:06,660 security. Let 68 00:05:06,660 --> 00:05:08,970 me go ahead and pull up some visuals here so you can kind of 69 00:05:08,970 --> 00:05:12,090 see what I'm talking about. I'll come back to the screen. This is 70 00:05:12,090 --> 00:05:15,300 all the media coverage. This is the story that I originally 71 00:05:15,300 --> 00:05:20,610 wrote dropped it on September 8. Let me scroll down here. I won't 72 00:05:20,610 --> 00:05:24,810 read it to you. But I Please welcome you to visit the link in 73 00:05:24,810 --> 00:05:27,510 the show notes below. That way you guys can see all the anchor 74 00:05:27,510 --> 00:05:31,230 links, all the timestamp articles I wrote prior to this, 75 00:05:31,440 --> 00:05:35,040 kind of leading up to this to this story. But I go through all 76 00:05:35,040 --> 00:05:37,620 the different cases that I filed, I list all the case 77 00:05:37,620 --> 00:05:40,680 numbers, for all of you that love to take notes and challenge 78 00:05:40,680 --> 00:05:44,700 what I may or may not be saying what I do is make sure that you 79 00:05:44,700 --> 00:05:49,050 guys have a paper trail to track as well. But let me go ahead and 80 00:05:49,050 --> 00:05:52,590 jump down to the denial letter. Hopefully you can see this good 81 00:05:52,590 --> 00:05:56,550 on your screens, if I can maybe zoom in and a little bit more 82 00:05:56,550 --> 00:06:02,130 there. So what they do in this appeal, let me go to the right 83 00:06:02,130 --> 00:06:07,170 language. So this is essentially just more boilerplate stuff, you 84 00:06:07,170 --> 00:06:12,240 know that they searched for what I have requested, and it says 85 00:06:12,240 --> 00:06:16,980 the UAP Task Force has responded back to DNS 36, and have stated 86 00:06:16,980 --> 00:06:20,520 that the requested videos contain sensitive information 87 00:06:20,520 --> 00:06:24,780 pertaining to unidentified aerial phenomena, or UAP, and 88 00:06:24,810 --> 00:06:28,950 are classified and are exempt from disclosure in their 89 00:06:28,950 --> 00:06:35,670 entirety. Under exemption B five, US Code section 552. B one 90 00:06:35,700 --> 00:06:40,380 in accordance with executive order 13526, and the UAP 91 00:06:40,380 --> 00:06:44,220 security classification guide. The release of this information 92 00:06:44,220 --> 00:06:47,130 will harm national security as it may provide adversaries 93 00:06:47,130 --> 00:06:50,640 valuable information regarding Department of Defense slash Navy 94 00:06:50,640 --> 00:06:55,290 operations, vulnerabilities and our capabilities. No portions of 95 00:06:55,290 --> 00:06:59,430 the videos can be segregated for release, while three UAP videos 96 00:06:59,430 --> 00:07:03,180 were released in the past, the facts specific to those three 97 00:07:03,180 --> 00:07:07,560 videos are unique in that the those videos were initially 98 00:07:07,560 --> 00:07:11,280 released via unofficial channels. Before official 99 00:07:11,280 --> 00:07:14,970 release. Those events were discussed extensively in the 100 00:07:14,970 --> 00:07:18,720 public domain. In fact, major news outlets conducted specials 101 00:07:18,720 --> 00:07:21,540 on these events. Given the amount of information in the 102 00:07:21,540 --> 00:07:25,050 public domain regarding these encounters, it was possible to 103 00:07:25,050 --> 00:07:30,090 release the files without further damage to national 104 00:07:30,090 --> 00:07:34,500 security. The rest is kind of boilerplate. So I want to kind 105 00:07:34,500 --> 00:07:37,710 of drill down on a few things here. So again, to kind of 106 00:07:38,010 --> 00:07:43,110 summarize that nutshell part. They said no. And they said 107 00:07:43,110 --> 00:07:46,230 everything is classified and everything would harm national 108 00:07:46,230 --> 00:07:51,660 security, if released. So diving a little bit deeper and breaking 109 00:07:51,660 --> 00:07:57,540 this down. That last line stuck out to me without further damage 110 00:07:57,540 --> 00:08:02,100 to national security. As far as we're aware, the videos were 111 00:08:02,100 --> 00:08:06,390 deemed as unclassified. I had written a story where I got a 112 00:08:06,390 --> 00:08:11,820 statement from the Navy, I even looked back to verify, and I go 113 00:08:11,820 --> 00:08:13,950 over it in the story. But essentially, they were 114 00:08:13,950 --> 00:08:21,660 confirming that the videos were and are unclassified. And so 115 00:08:21,660 --> 00:08:25,230 what they were confirming was there was no such sensitivity 116 00:08:25,230 --> 00:08:29,250 that resulted in classification. Rather, they were unclassified. 117 00:08:29,550 --> 00:08:32,670 Now, one point that I will make is that even though stuff is 118 00:08:32,670 --> 00:08:36,090 unclassified, that does not mean that it can be released to the 119 00:08:36,090 --> 00:08:39,990 public, unclassified for official use only is a 120 00:08:39,990 --> 00:08:44,070 designator they use, it requires a review to make sure that 121 00:08:44,610 --> 00:08:47,280 although something may not be classified, it could still 122 00:08:47,280 --> 00:08:50,430 potentially be exempt from release for a multitude of 123 00:08:50,430 --> 00:08:53,310 reasons. That's a story for another day. But just know that 124 00:08:53,310 --> 00:08:57,780 that that just doesn't automatically allow it to go out 125 00:08:57,780 --> 00:09:02,430 into the open, but harming national security if information 126 00:09:02,460 --> 00:09:06,480 harms national security. That's essentially when you get into 127 00:09:06,510 --> 00:09:11,850 classified territory. So how much harm it can do. And there 128 00:09:11,850 --> 00:09:14,790 are definitions for this, which are quite fascinating. Maybe 129 00:09:14,790 --> 00:09:17,610 I'll go over them in another video. But essentially, a breaks 130 00:09:17,610 --> 00:09:22,350 down the level of harm, which then essentially defines the 131 00:09:22,350 --> 00:09:27,000 level of classification. So going back to this further 132 00:09:27,000 --> 00:09:30,000 damage to national security, are they implying that there was 133 00:09:30,180 --> 00:09:35,190 damage to national security from the beginning? I have seen no 134 00:09:35,190 --> 00:09:40,230 evidence of that in my appeal, which I'll go over in a little 135 00:09:40,230 --> 00:09:40,560 bit. 136 00:09:41,279 --> 00:09:45,389 I break that down even more, so we'll go over it then. But in 137 00:09:45,389 --> 00:09:49,259 short here, there's no there's no sign that there was a damage 138 00:09:49,259 --> 00:09:52,619 to national security now, whether they were their concerns 139 00:09:52,649 --> 00:09:58,109 over the leaks. I would say yes. The Air Force Office of Special 140 00:09:58,109 --> 00:10:02,009 Investigations did a The investigation into the leaked of 141 00:10:02,009 --> 00:10:06,029 the leak of the material and essentially determined they were 142 00:10:06,029 --> 00:10:10,919 unclassified. And that there was there was no, I guess, reason to 143 00:10:10,919 --> 00:10:12,989 continue, you know, I mean, like, what were they going to 144 00:10:12,989 --> 00:10:17,069 do? Essentially, the information was unclassified. So there was 145 00:10:17,189 --> 00:10:20,309 no classified information that was out in the public. So there 146 00:10:20,309 --> 00:10:24,839 was nothing ultimately to do. Arguably, there may have been a 147 00:10:24,839 --> 00:10:28,379 concern about the person that leaked them. And I think that 148 00:10:28,379 --> 00:10:34,649 that may have been the DISA di s a investigation that was 149 00:10:34,649 --> 00:10:38,729 referenced by Luis Elizondo that he said he was being interviewed 150 00:10:38,729 --> 00:10:42,119 and kind of scrutinized over. So there may have been a concern 151 00:10:42,119 --> 00:10:45,899 about how the protocols weren't followed correctly, and how 152 00:10:45,899 --> 00:10:49,139 people with security clearances that are supposed to safeguard 153 00:10:49,139 --> 00:10:52,619 information. Again, even though these were unclassified, it 154 00:10:52,619 --> 00:10:57,749 wound up in the open, how did that happen? And who was 155 00:10:57,809 --> 00:11:00,659 essentially responsible. So there were subsequent 156 00:11:00,659 --> 00:11:05,699 investigations, in my opinion, that tie into the AF OSI 157 00:11:05,699 --> 00:11:10,049 investigation, but to kind of close that part of it. It was 158 00:11:10,049 --> 00:11:13,109 unclassified. There was no classified information in the in 159 00:11:13,109 --> 00:11:17,039 the open, and they didn't have a concern beyond that. So what is 160 00:11:17,039 --> 00:11:20,039 that further damage to national security, and we don't really 161 00:11:20,039 --> 00:11:23,549 know. The other part that I want to quickly mention before we get 162 00:11:23,549 --> 00:11:27,479 on to the appeal is that it's an in accordance with executive 163 00:11:27,479 --> 00:11:30,479 order 13526. This is an executive order that kind of 164 00:11:30,479 --> 00:11:33,929 essentially, defines national security, classified 165 00:11:33,929 --> 00:11:36,719 information. So on a lot of legal jargon in there, there's 166 00:11:36,719 --> 00:11:40,739 been a couple executive orders that kind of get overwritten as 167 00:11:40,769 --> 00:11:45,479 new protocols are put into place signed by the President. Before 168 00:11:45,479 --> 00:11:49,529 this, it was Executive Order 12958, if I remember correctly, 169 00:11:49,709 --> 00:11:54,299 so they do a lot of these kind of revisions and updates to how 170 00:11:54,299 --> 00:11:59,759 they handle classified information. But in addition to 171 00:12:00,749 --> 00:12:05,519 135 to six, it also mentions UAP security classification guide. 172 00:12:05,909 --> 00:12:09,479 If you're new to this channel, just know I did a full video 173 00:12:09,479 --> 00:12:12,839 breakdown. Ironically, there's no connection to this about a 174 00:12:12,839 --> 00:12:17,189 week prior to me writing the story. Now, why is that 175 00:12:17,189 --> 00:12:21,149 important? Well, I profiled the security classification guide as 176 00:12:21,149 --> 00:12:26,609 proof of again, my opinion. But what I felt was proof that UAP 177 00:12:26,609 --> 00:12:32,819 and UFO secrecy is deepening, not lessening, everybody thinks 178 00:12:32,819 --> 00:12:35,459 that we're in this era of transparency. And even though we 179 00:12:35,459 --> 00:12:39,869 hear about UAP, and UFOs, a lot more, I feel that it is 180 00:12:39,869 --> 00:12:43,409 deepening. So I've said that a lot publicly and people have 181 00:12:43,409 --> 00:12:45,479 always asked me, well, what are you talking about, like, 182 00:12:45,869 --> 00:12:48,839 Congress is getting involved, and there's hearings, and so on, 183 00:12:48,839 --> 00:12:52,919 and so forth. So without, again, doubling that video, please know 184 00:12:53,069 --> 00:12:56,309 that I have done a full breakdown of that guide. But why 185 00:12:56,309 --> 00:13:00,119 I wanted to bring it up here is to punch the note. That is the 186 00:13:00,119 --> 00:13:03,359 authority along with that executive order. But that is the 187 00:13:03,359 --> 00:13:07,709 authority which allows the Navy to say, John, through FOIA, you 188 00:13:07,709 --> 00:13:12,989 can't access a single video nope, done over with your app. 189 00:13:13,409 --> 00:13:19,049 Now. I'm appealing. So we'll get to that now. But that authority, 190 00:13:19,049 --> 00:13:22,619 they call it the the authority to classify something came from 191 00:13:22,619 --> 00:13:26,489 that UAP security classification guide. So we are now seeing the 192 00:13:26,489 --> 00:13:31,049 repercussions of that guide of that security that was put in 193 00:13:31,049 --> 00:13:36,239 place by that document. And in that previous video, I go over 194 00:13:36,239 --> 00:13:41,309 some other examples. Well, here is the prime example. The prime 195 00:13:41,309 --> 00:13:45,569 example that they won't even release a small portion of the 196 00:13:45,569 --> 00:13:51,509 video, a redacted frame a screengrab nothing, they 100% 197 00:13:51,509 --> 00:13:56,999 classify it due to that guide. So that I think really drives 198 00:13:56,999 --> 00:14:02,219 the point home that this is the major roadblock the problem with 199 00:14:02,219 --> 00:14:05,969 today's secrecy and the proof that it's not getting any 200 00:14:05,969 --> 00:14:11,069 better. Now, let me go ahead and go over a few things on the 201 00:14:11,069 --> 00:14:11,549 appeal. 202 00:14:12,750 --> 00:14:15,690 I'm reading a little bit more on this channel, as some of you 203 00:14:15,690 --> 00:14:19,350 guys that have followed me for a while, never huge fan of reading 204 00:14:19,350 --> 00:14:22,380 to you. But I think for the audio version, it's important. 205 00:14:22,530 --> 00:14:27,420 But on top of that, I want you to see how i Not that it's right 206 00:14:27,420 --> 00:14:31,140 or wrong. But how I approach appeals, especially in cases 207 00:14:31,140 --> 00:14:34,710 like this, and what I said to them, If I tried to paraphrase 208 00:14:34,710 --> 00:14:39,030 it, I may like completely change the meaning of something. And I 209 00:14:39,030 --> 00:14:42,270 didn't mean to so i want to make sure that you guys see how I 210 00:14:42,270 --> 00:14:45,360 approached it. But on top of that this is something I don't 211 00:14:45,360 --> 00:14:49,410 normally do. I may mention an appeal. If I write a story and I 212 00:14:49,410 --> 00:14:54,210 say I'm appealing the decision. I very rarely, I think if ever 213 00:14:54,870 --> 00:14:59,190 have published a full appeal prior to a decision. There's no 214 00:14:59,190 --> 00:15:03,780 real reason Why it's just kind of a quirk of mine. I I'm a 215 00:15:03,780 --> 00:15:07,650 little superstitious. So I don't like jinxing things like putting 216 00:15:07,650 --> 00:15:10,290 it out there going, Hey, look, what's going to win this appeal. 217 00:15:10,770 --> 00:15:14,520 I don't like doing that. I just like to kind of let it ride. But 218 00:15:14,520 --> 00:15:18,810 in this one with the popularity of the story, and in fact, maybe 219 00:15:18,810 --> 00:15:21,690 that's a good segue to this page. This is Google News that 220 00:15:21,690 --> 00:15:25,440 shows the mainstream coverage, pretty much every article here, 221 00:15:25,440 --> 00:15:29,460 not all, a couple other snuck in but this is the national 222 00:15:29,460 --> 00:15:33,810 security concern over the release of video stories, and 223 00:15:33,810 --> 00:15:37,560 quite a few mainstream outlets picked it up the independent 224 00:15:37,560 --> 00:15:43,230 life science. Some of the other ones here you've got a lot of 225 00:15:43,230 --> 00:15:46,710 the British papers that are always an on UFO stuff, but they 226 00:15:46,710 --> 00:15:50,820 obviously get a lot of traffic to them. You'll see them like 227 00:15:50,820 --> 00:15:54,090 the sun, the Daily Mail is in their salon just wrote a big 228 00:15:54,090 --> 00:16:00,570 one. VICE News, I want to take a moment to recognize them, they 229 00:16:00,570 --> 00:16:05,130 were the first to write the story. And so they saw what I 230 00:16:05,130 --> 00:16:08,970 had written felt it was newsworthy, and wrote that so my 231 00:16:09,000 --> 00:16:13,200 my special thanks to Vice News who has covered the black vault 232 00:16:13,200 --> 00:16:17,820 before but on this one was first yet again, to cover it, see the 233 00:16:17,820 --> 00:16:20,910 value of a cover it and then all of this other coverage. So the 234 00:16:20,910 --> 00:16:23,670 reason why I like to show you guys this is to show that there 235 00:16:23,670 --> 00:16:27,510 is a huge public interest to this. It's not just like a 236 00:16:27,630 --> 00:16:32,790 hashtag, UFO, Twitter or some Facebook groups. Rather, this is 237 00:16:32,790 --> 00:16:40,110 a major worldwide focal point, and concern and interest that 238 00:16:40,110 --> 00:16:45,510 people are watching. So it is really nice to see that my 239 00:16:45,510 --> 00:16:48,420 appeal ended up being four pages long, I'm not going to read the 240 00:16:48,420 --> 00:16:51,780 whole thing to you. I've highlighted some sections, I 241 00:16:51,810 --> 00:16:54,270 again, invite you to download the whole thing if you're 242 00:16:54,270 --> 00:16:57,840 curious about the language. But what I want to kind of go 243 00:16:57,840 --> 00:17:03,210 through here is how I approached it, and what the government is 244 00:17:03,210 --> 00:17:06,960 getting from me. Now will this automatically get my appeal 245 00:17:06,960 --> 00:17:10,740 granted, I don't know. And before I start reading some of 246 00:17:10,740 --> 00:17:15,660 these sections, a granted appeal is a big win, I call it a win. 247 00:17:16,560 --> 00:17:20,580 However, it does not mean that the Navy then is required to 248 00:17:20,580 --> 00:17:25,380 release those videos, what they what they do, meaning the 249 00:17:25,410 --> 00:17:29,700 appellate authority those that got my letter here at the US 250 00:17:29,700 --> 00:17:33,300 Navy and the Department of Defense, it is a want to say 251 00:17:33,300 --> 00:17:36,810 higher office, another set of eyes from the Freedom of 252 00:17:36,810 --> 00:17:40,740 Information Act, personnel that denied me originally, they take 253 00:17:40,740 --> 00:17:43,500 a look at this. And the case that I put up which I'm going to 254 00:17:43,500 --> 00:17:47,310 go over, and then they make a decision, we grant it or we deny 255 00:17:47,310 --> 00:17:52,140 it if we deny it pretty obvious. Sorry, John, you can go seek a 256 00:17:52,140 --> 00:17:55,740 judge in a judicial review, which is the third step in a 257 00:17:55,740 --> 00:18:00,240 FOIA process. Or they granted, if they granted, it goes back to 258 00:18:00,240 --> 00:18:05,130 that FOIA office for another review, again, doesn't guarantee 259 00:18:05,130 --> 00:18:07,800 that I'll get anything. But generally, you're not going to 260 00:18:07,800 --> 00:18:11,130 get the same response. Because you've already got a granted 261 00:18:11,130 --> 00:18:14,040 appeal on that original response. So they can't go back 262 00:18:14,040 --> 00:18:16,890 and go, Oh, just give John the same exact response. Because 263 00:18:16,890 --> 00:18:19,920 then you're in a legal loop. And then I would just appeal again, 264 00:18:19,920 --> 00:18:23,460 because I once you're granted appeal rights, they are granted 265 00:18:23,460 --> 00:18:27,810 back to you. So then you maintain them for them that next 266 00:18:27,810 --> 00:18:30,720 response. So hopefully, I'm not getting too much in the legal 267 00:18:30,720 --> 00:18:33,420 weeds, but for your for your people out there who are just 268 00:18:33,420 --> 00:18:36,840 experimenting with maybe appeals. That's how that works. 269 00:18:37,680 --> 00:18:41,970 So with that granted appeal, I will maintain rights to appeal 270 00:18:41,970 --> 00:18:45,900 again, and then we'll see what they give me. Now, here's the 271 00:18:45,900 --> 00:18:47,340 reasoning that I came up with. 272 00:18:48,599 --> 00:18:51,299 And this is more of an introduction to the breakdown of 273 00:18:51,299 --> 00:18:54,539 the reasons but I want to read this to you. I believe the 274 00:18:54,539 --> 00:18:56,939 decision to withhold all responsive records is a gross 275 00:18:56,939 --> 00:19:00,059 violation of the true nature of the Freedom of Information Act, 276 00:19:00,329 --> 00:19:02,969 along with the public promises made under oath by 277 00:19:02,969 --> 00:19:06,299 Undersecretary of Defense for intelligence and security Ronald 278 00:19:06,299 --> 00:19:10,799 Moultrie, and Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence slash 279 00:19:11,069 --> 00:19:16,439 director naval intelligence activity Scott Bray. During the 280 00:19:16,439 --> 00:19:22,229 UAP hearing held on May 17 2022, Mr. Moultrie stated, quote, with 281 00:19:22,229 --> 00:19:26,159 regard to the importance of transparency, the department is 282 00:19:26,159 --> 00:19:30,419 fully committed to the principle of openness and accountability 283 00:19:30,419 --> 00:19:36,029 to the American people. This four year response and the full 284 00:19:36,029 --> 00:19:39,599 denial of all responsive records goes completely against the 285 00:19:39,599 --> 00:19:44,399 commitment stated by Mr. Moultrie in the hearing. During 286 00:19:44,399 --> 00:19:48,539 that same hearing, Bray stated quote, what I will commit to is 287 00:19:48,539 --> 00:19:51,779 this, at least for that material, that's under my 288 00:19:51,779 --> 00:19:54,929 authority as the deputy director of Naval Intelligence for 289 00:19:54,929 --> 00:19:59,069 information that we have, when it does not involve sources and 290 00:19:59,069 --> 00:20:03,149 methods and when We can, with a reasonable degree of confidence, 291 00:20:03,389 --> 00:20:06,839 determined that it does not pose a foreign intelligence or 292 00:20:06,839 --> 00:20:10,739 national security threat. And it's within my authority to do 293 00:20:10,739 --> 00:20:17,789 so I commit to declassifying that. This for your response, 294 00:20:17,849 --> 00:20:20,369 and the full denial of all responsive records goes 295 00:20:20,369 --> 00:20:23,939 completely against the commitment stated by Mr. Bray at 296 00:20:23,939 --> 00:20:26,849 this hearing. So essentially, what I'm doing there, if you 297 00:20:26,849 --> 00:20:30,209 guys are gonna start crafting appeals, as I'm setting up the 298 00:20:30,779 --> 00:20:35,699 commitment that the gentleman made at the UAP hearing for 299 00:20:35,699 --> 00:20:39,089 transparency and declassification that if the 300 00:20:39,089 --> 00:20:43,649 FOIA offices want to counter that, then they they kind of 301 00:20:43,649 --> 00:20:47,669 have a little bit of a tight road to weave around, because we 302 00:20:47,669 --> 00:20:50,729 have these public commitments to Congress and the American 303 00:20:50,729 --> 00:20:53,789 people. And then the FOIA guys go up that Sorry, can't have 304 00:20:53,789 --> 00:20:58,019 anything. So does it fit into the national security as Bray, 305 00:20:58,349 --> 00:21:02,339 kind of set up, maybe. But that doesn't mean that we shouldn't 306 00:21:02,339 --> 00:21:07,919 try to set it up with that commitment, and then tear down 307 00:21:07,919 --> 00:21:12,029 their decision. With my breakdown here. Let me go back 308 00:21:12,029 --> 00:21:15,389 to reading to you. These are the bullet point lists. This is the 309 00:21:15,389 --> 00:21:20,699 bullet point list that I made, to show them why I felt their 310 00:21:20,699 --> 00:21:25,139 decision was wrong. And why I felt the appeal should be 311 00:21:25,139 --> 00:21:31,199 granted, and at least a portion of the videos released. So let 312 00:21:31,199 --> 00:21:35,879 me read. Number one, metadata can be stripped likely 313 00:21:35,879 --> 00:21:39,239 information within this metadata embedded within each video would 314 00:21:39,239 --> 00:21:42,629 contain sensitive information and likely be exempt from 315 00:21:42,629 --> 00:21:47,099 release. However, this data can be stripped and removed from the 316 00:21:47,099 --> 00:21:50,969 video files, thus removing the need for secrecy when it comes 317 00:21:50,969 --> 00:21:55,379 to the information that metadata could reveal. This is a 318 00:21:55,499 --> 00:21:58,919 interesting note because obviously, the FLIR the gimbal 319 00:21:58,919 --> 00:22:02,339 and the go fast were not redacted visually, the metadata 320 00:22:02,339 --> 00:22:06,359 was stripped. Once the metadata was stripped, that sensitivity 321 00:22:06,359 --> 00:22:09,419 went to nothing and they were released to the general public. 322 00:22:11,609 --> 00:22:15,719 Hu D or heads up display or HUD information can be redacted, as 323 00:22:15,719 --> 00:22:19,799 indicated by numerous DoD videos released in the past should any 324 00:22:19,799 --> 00:22:22,499 videos that are within the responsive records for this case 325 00:22:22,499 --> 00:22:26,609 have sensitive information displayed on screen, it can be 326 00:22:26,609 --> 00:22:31,349 redacted. Also, as indicated by numerous releases by the DoD 327 00:22:31,379 --> 00:22:35,639 have videos containing sensitive info information that had 328 00:22:35,639 --> 00:22:39,179 information being redacted, allowed for the public release 329 00:22:39,179 --> 00:22:43,049 of the video, along with it being downgraded to an 330 00:22:43,049 --> 00:22:47,009 unclassified level, please reference released videos housed 331 00:22:47,009 --> 00:22:51,689 on dividends, to see more to see numerous examples of redactions 332 00:22:51,689 --> 00:22:56,579 within videos. I didn't list them for the Department of 333 00:22:56,579 --> 00:22:59,669 Defense in the Navy, because I don't have to, there's so many 334 00:22:59,669 --> 00:23:04,979 of them that have come out where the heads up display, or 335 00:23:04,979 --> 00:23:08,249 whatever that information is that they want to call it. If 336 00:23:08,249 --> 00:23:12,329 it's burned onto the screen, they can redact it. And that has 337 00:23:12,329 --> 00:23:16,349 been a practice, like, I found videos from the Iraq War, the 338 00:23:16,349 --> 00:23:21,209 first Iraq war where they were releasing videos but you know, 339 00:23:21,209 --> 00:23:24,989 in that old school tech kind of way, finding a way to obscure 340 00:23:24,989 --> 00:23:28,169 the information that was burned on screen. So any of that type 341 00:23:28,169 --> 00:23:31,559 of information I was using HUD is a little bit more generic and 342 00:23:31,559 --> 00:23:36,239 broad. But regardless, whatever is burned in Data Wise, from a 343 00:23:36,239 --> 00:23:41,009 FLIR video or whatever can be removed, and the DOD has 344 00:23:41,009 --> 00:23:42,569 numerous examples of that. 345 00:23:43,589 --> 00:23:47,249 Number three, a precedent has been set over the course of the 346 00:23:47,249 --> 00:23:50,429 past couple of years where in numerous UAP related videos were 347 00:23:50,429 --> 00:23:54,269 either released officially or leaked but confirmed as real by 348 00:23:54,269 --> 00:23:58,319 the Department of Defense. As my four year case with the Navy and 349 00:23:58,349 --> 00:24:02,639 less than the case number shows, the FLIR gimbal and go fast 350 00:24:02,639 --> 00:24:06,629 videos were released officially after a review. Although 351 00:24:06,629 --> 00:24:10,139 previously leaked, that fact does not automatically 352 00:24:10,139 --> 00:24:14,459 declassified or mark them at an unclassified slash unrestricted 353 00:24:14,459 --> 00:24:19,349 release status. Rather, a review needed to be done, and they were 354 00:24:19,349 --> 00:24:24,059 released in full after that security review. This fact shows 355 00:24:24,059 --> 00:24:29,369 that once metadata is removed UAP videos can absolutely not be 356 00:24:29,369 --> 00:24:33,389 a threat to national security if released, the likelihood that 357 00:24:33,389 --> 00:24:39,149 those three leaked UAP videos referenced are the only UAP 358 00:24:39,149 --> 00:24:43,289 videos in the Navy's holdings that can be released in full or 359 00:24:43,319 --> 00:24:49,049 even just in part is likely nil. What I'm trying to say is the 360 00:24:49,049 --> 00:24:53,489 FLIR the gimbal and the go fast just by chance are the only ones 361 00:24:53,489 --> 00:24:56,609 that they could release in full or in part and their entire 362 00:24:56,609 --> 00:25:02,939 holdings. The likelihood of that is No. So that was my point with 363 00:25:02,939 --> 00:25:07,109 this, which leads into the next. The Navy has also released other 364 00:25:07,109 --> 00:25:10,619 UAP related videos as they connected to mysterious drone 365 00:25:10,619 --> 00:25:14,369 swarms that appeared off the coast of California. Although 366 00:25:14,369 --> 00:25:18,269 identified as drones, it is my belief that these videos still 367 00:25:18,269 --> 00:25:22,319 hold a UAP designation, and would likely be a part or 368 00:25:22,319 --> 00:25:26,129 something similar to this, the responsive records denied in my 369 00:25:26,129 --> 00:25:30,239 case, as chronicled here, and that's the drive article that 370 00:25:30,269 --> 00:25:32,639 has profiled this. So shout out to all those guys over there 371 00:25:32,639 --> 00:25:36,329 covering this, they've done a great job. The Navy's release of 372 00:25:36,329 --> 00:25:41,369 such a video proves yet again, that UAP visual imagery, once 373 00:25:41,399 --> 00:25:45,899 sensitive metadata is removed, can be released in full. That 374 00:25:45,899 --> 00:25:50,249 point is pretty obvious. But just to clarify, for those who 375 00:25:50,249 --> 00:25:54,209 don't quite understand objects that that are like a quadcopter 376 00:25:54,209 --> 00:25:58,079 can absolutely hold the label unidentified aerial phenomena. 377 00:25:58,409 --> 00:26:03,329 We know this for a fact. Because one case in particular, I've 378 00:26:03,329 --> 00:26:06,149 written about it on the black vault.com. You don't have to 379 00:26:06,149 --> 00:26:09,809 take my word for it though. If you go to the Freedom of 380 00:26:09,809 --> 00:26:14,249 Information Act Reading Room for the US Navy, and you go into 381 00:26:14,249 --> 00:26:18,359 their UFO information and UAP information folders, you will 382 00:26:18,359 --> 00:26:23,669 find a clear photograph of a quadcopter. Although it was 383 00:26:23,729 --> 00:26:29,489 origin identified, if I recall, this thing was was labeled UAP. 384 00:26:29,999 --> 00:26:34,589 So that designation even though we can see oh, that's a drone or 385 00:26:34,589 --> 00:26:39,839 a quadcopter or whatever, not an alien spaceship, that designator 386 00:26:39,839 --> 00:26:43,499 can still be there. And so what I was trying to say with this 387 00:26:43,499 --> 00:26:47,189 was, Look, you guys are releasing this you have set a 388 00:26:47,189 --> 00:26:51,119 precedent, so you can't tell me with my request. Sorry, John, 389 00:26:51,119 --> 00:26:55,979 you're all done. But they have released other videos like this 390 00:26:55,979 --> 00:27:01,349 before. So that was my argument with that point. Next point 391 00:27:01,349 --> 00:27:06,359 during the UAP hearing, Bray revealed numerous UAP related 392 00:27:06,359 --> 00:27:11,459 videos previously unseen by the general public. These videos 393 00:27:11,459 --> 00:27:14,129 were later published by dividends and archived here and 394 00:27:14,129 --> 00:27:18,929 I offered the link. This yet again proves that UAP related 395 00:27:18,929 --> 00:27:23,369 visuals in the form of videos, can one sensitive metadata is 396 00:27:23,369 --> 00:27:26,399 stripped be released to the public. I would like to state 397 00:27:26,399 --> 00:27:30,569 again that out of the hundreds and likely by now well over 1000 398 00:27:30,569 --> 00:27:34,109 cases collected by the US Navy, the likelihood that out of 399 00:27:34,109 --> 00:27:38,009 everything collected these videos referenced above are the 400 00:27:38,009 --> 00:27:43,859 only releasable videos is nil. Again, another obvious point, I 401 00:27:43,859 --> 00:27:46,919 don't think that every UFO case that they have is going to have 402 00:27:46,919 --> 00:27:50,369 a video attached. But what I was trying to say was that the 403 00:27:50,369 --> 00:27:54,809 likelihood that they have such a number of them likely, and that 404 00:27:54,809 --> 00:27:58,049 these are the only ones that can be released either in full or in 405 00:27:58,049 --> 00:28:02,309 part is likely nil. So I'm just trying to drive those points 406 00:28:02,309 --> 00:28:08,819 home. In April of 2021, multiple leaks of UAP related information 407 00:28:08,819 --> 00:28:12,539 appeared online, as released by investigative filmmaker Jeremy 408 00:28:12,539 --> 00:28:13,169 Korbel. 409 00:28:14,520 --> 00:28:17,010 I reached out to the Pentagon which quickly confirmed that the 410 00:28:17,010 --> 00:28:21,210 video and photos published by Mr. Core Bell were quote taken 411 00:28:21,210 --> 00:28:25,740 by Navy personnel. Susan golf Pentagon spokesperson added 412 00:28:25,740 --> 00:28:30,240 quote, The UAP ATF has included these incidents in their ongoing 413 00:28:30,240 --> 00:28:34,530 examinations. I believe this confirmation of leaked material 414 00:28:34,530 --> 00:28:38,730 shows the lack of sensitivity and classification for UAP 415 00:28:38,730 --> 00:28:43,470 related material. I would think as indicated by the Edward 416 00:28:43,470 --> 00:28:47,160 Snowden leaks of classified material, that the DoD would 417 00:28:47,160 --> 00:28:52,020 maintain a Glomar approach, and neither confirm or deny the 418 00:28:52,020 --> 00:28:56,040 authenticity very much like the NSA did when the Snowden leaks 419 00:28:56,040 --> 00:29:01,290 happened. However, that did not happen. Rather, they confirmed 420 00:29:01,290 --> 00:29:04,950 the material as authentic and stated that they were utilizing 421 00:29:04,950 --> 00:29:09,330 material and their investigative efforts. I believe what that 422 00:29:09,330 --> 00:29:13,530 said, it shows that a blanket classification laid over all UAP 423 00:29:13,530 --> 00:29:18,570 videos is not warranted. As yet again, in this example, it is 424 00:29:18,570 --> 00:29:22,470 shown that the information is not as sensitive as the US Navy 425 00:29:22,470 --> 00:29:25,830 is claiming in my four year response letter, which led the 426 00:29:25,830 --> 00:29:30,810 way to the responsive records being denied and Toto meaning in 427 00:29:30,810 --> 00:29:35,850 total, all of them. So what I'm showing here is even leaked 428 00:29:35,850 --> 00:29:40,200 information, stuff that come came out years after the FLIR 429 00:29:40,200 --> 00:29:45,120 gimbal and go fast, much clearer, and clearly, in my 430 00:29:45,120 --> 00:29:47,880 opinion would show a kind of a threat to national security 431 00:29:47,880 --> 00:29:50,580 where these things are encroaching on naval training 432 00:29:50,580 --> 00:29:55,200 exercises. They quickly said Yep, those are taken by Navy 433 00:29:55,200 --> 00:29:58,950 personnel. Yep, we have them utilized by the UAP Task Force. 434 00:29:59,310 --> 00:30:04,320 Well That's not very sensitive. And I use the Edward Snowden 435 00:30:04,320 --> 00:30:08,700 example as proof of what really is sensitive. And that Glomar 436 00:30:08,700 --> 00:30:14,100 response, we can neither confirm nor deny. I saw that and saw 437 00:30:14,100 --> 00:30:17,700 that used for many, many years. And in fact, with some stuff, it 438 00:30:17,700 --> 00:30:21,330 is still utilized. So they Glomar stuff that's already out 439 00:30:21,330 --> 00:30:26,250 in the open, which seems silly, but that's what they do yet with 440 00:30:26,250 --> 00:30:29,370 UAP stuff. It was very quick, that confirmation came 441 00:30:29,370 --> 00:30:32,340 incredibly quick. And for those of you who have followed my work 442 00:30:32,340 --> 00:30:36,540 for a while, you'll recall I made a deal out of that. I was 443 00:30:36,540 --> 00:30:39,720 shocked that they were just like, within a day, I forget how 444 00:30:39,720 --> 00:30:42,960 many there was one that was a couple hours or within same day 445 00:30:42,960 --> 00:30:47,190 or something like that. Ridiculous. So Something's fishy 446 00:30:47,190 --> 00:30:50,550 about that. But regardless, that's the precedent set and in 447 00:30:50,550 --> 00:30:54,090 an in an appeal, what may seem silly to us, you know, and we 448 00:30:54,090 --> 00:30:57,870 banter about on Twitter, social media, whatever, the minute they 449 00:30:57,870 --> 00:31:01,020 make those actions, the minute they do stuff like that on an 450 00:31:01,020 --> 00:31:04,830 official level, you can use it so that's why I'm using it in my 451 00:31:04,860 --> 00:31:08,340 in my appeal here to show why I think they made that wrong 452 00:31:08,340 --> 00:31:11,970 decision. Almost done here. Although the four year release 453 00:31:11,970 --> 00:31:14,700 letter signed by Mr. Case, and I believe is how you pronounce it, 454 00:31:14,730 --> 00:31:17,400 Mr. Case, and stated the justification for the release of 455 00:31:17,400 --> 00:31:21,270 the three leaked you UAP videos, and he said that by the Navy 456 00:31:21,270 --> 00:31:24,990 doing so it would be done quote, without further damage to 457 00:31:24,990 --> 00:31:28,110 national security, unquote. I believe this is entirely 458 00:31:28,110 --> 00:31:33,750 inaccurate, and not a justified statement. I also link to the 459 00:31:33,900 --> 00:31:37,230 Air Force Office of Special Investigation file, I referenced 460 00:31:37,230 --> 00:31:40,860 the file number so they can look it up themselves. And the fact 461 00:31:40,860 --> 00:31:44,520 that there was really kind of no damage because there was no 462 00:31:44,520 --> 00:31:47,370 sensitive or discernible imagery. Let me go back to 463 00:31:47,370 --> 00:31:52,890 reading with the with the appeal set. I believe based on Air 464 00:31:52,890 --> 00:31:56,340 Force Office investigation file number so on, as archived here 465 00:31:56,340 --> 00:31:59,130 and being released to be a FOIA it was determined that there 466 00:31:59,130 --> 00:32:06,540 were was no damage given. Forgive me I kind of miss worded 467 00:32:06,540 --> 00:32:09,270 this, but it was determined that there was no damage given the 468 00:32:09,720 --> 00:32:13,140 there was no damage. Given the fact that the videos were 469 00:32:13,140 --> 00:32:16,650 unclassified and held no sensitive slash discernible 470 00:32:16,650 --> 00:32:21,570 imagery. Sorry, forgot to comment there. So essentially, 471 00:32:21,570 --> 00:32:24,300 that that statement given to me in the FOIA letter just isn't 472 00:32:24,300 --> 00:32:27,960 justified, and that was proof. So I referenced that 473 00:32:28,200 --> 00:32:32,850 investigation file as proof of that. This conclusion by Air 474 00:32:32,850 --> 00:32:35,520 Force Office of Special Investigations coincides with a 475 00:32:35,520 --> 00:32:40,650 September 9 2019 statement by the US Navy, as given to the 476 00:32:40,650 --> 00:32:43,440 black vault by Navy spokesperson, Joseph grant 477 00:32:43,440 --> 00:32:43,830 Usher, 478 00:32:44,279 --> 00:32:49,109 he stated, quote, the three videos were slash are designated 479 00:32:49,109 --> 00:32:53,759 as unclassified. This statement was given after being asked what 480 00:32:53,759 --> 00:32:57,779 classification the three videos were When originally requested 481 00:32:57,779 --> 00:33:01,289 for release, in other words, their original classification 482 00:33:01,559 --> 00:33:06,329 and what they were at the time meaning at the time that I asked 483 00:33:06,329 --> 00:33:12,059 Joseph grad Usher. In both cases, he stated unclassified, I 484 00:33:12,059 --> 00:33:15,479 believe these facts beyond a doubt prove that just because 485 00:33:15,479 --> 00:33:19,469 videos are designated UAP, this should not put a blanket 486 00:33:19,469 --> 00:33:24,389 classification on them. Despite the UAP security classification 487 00:33:24,389 --> 00:33:29,219 guide, likely giving authority to do so. I believe that five US 488 00:33:29,219 --> 00:33:34,769 Code section 552 mandates that a proper review is conducted. And 489 00:33:34,769 --> 00:33:38,219 although a blanket classification may be justified 490 00:33:38,369 --> 00:33:43,529 on the onset of archiving such a video by the Navy, I believe the 491 00:33:43,529 --> 00:33:47,819 FOIA will trump that should no reason to keep the videos 492 00:33:47,819 --> 00:33:53,309 classified be presented. With reason stated through my appeal 493 00:33:53,309 --> 00:33:56,669 here, I believe it shows that there are no reasons to keep the 494 00:33:56,669 --> 00:34:00,029 videos classified, once sensitive information is 495 00:34:00,029 --> 00:34:05,429 stripped, blurred, or redacted. And then I go on to sign the 496 00:34:05,429 --> 00:34:08,159 letter. Don't worry, everybody always freaks out when I show my 497 00:34:08,159 --> 00:34:11,189 address. It's a public address. It's just a Private Mailbox. 498 00:34:11,969 --> 00:34:15,479 That said that is the appeal. That's how I did it. That's how 499 00:34:15,479 --> 00:34:17,879 I approached it Forgive the reading, but I wanted to at 500 00:34:17,879 --> 00:34:23,189 least have you guys see and hear how I approached it with the 501 00:34:23,189 --> 00:34:26,069 Department of Defense. What happens from here, I have no 502 00:34:26,069 --> 00:34:31,319 idea how long it will take. I have no idea. So I will see what 503 00:34:31,319 --> 00:34:35,969 happens. And I will keep you guys absolutely informed of the 504 00:34:35,969 --> 00:34:39,149 process. Now one thing I really want to stress to you guys is 505 00:34:39,149 --> 00:34:43,079 something that I've seen thrown at me on Twitter and social 506 00:34:43,079 --> 00:34:47,639 media chatter, but also into the conversation as a whole. And 507 00:34:47,669 --> 00:34:52,169 that was based on the letter the fact that it would and I'll go 508 00:34:52,169 --> 00:34:55,499 to the language here. The release of this information will 509 00:34:55,499 --> 00:34:59,669 harm national security as it may provide adversaries valuable 510 00:34:59,669 --> 00:35:01,949 information ation regarding Department of Defense Navy 511 00:35:01,949 --> 00:35:08,339 operations, vulnerabilities and or capabilities. A lot of 512 00:35:08,339 --> 00:35:12,149 people, or at least a strong number of them read that and 513 00:35:12,149 --> 00:35:15,719 just automatically said, aha, we're dealing with our own tech, 514 00:35:15,749 --> 00:35:21,869 this is Black tech, our own capabilities. You guys know me 515 00:35:21,899 --> 00:35:28,199 where I nitpick every word. And I laugh because you have to, you 516 00:35:28,199 --> 00:35:31,829 have to do it in every case, it doesn't matter if it goes to 517 00:35:31,829 --> 00:35:35,009 support your theory, or if it goes to crush your theory, you 518 00:35:35,009 --> 00:35:39,539 have to nitpick. And in this case, I do not agree with the 519 00:35:39,539 --> 00:35:43,439 automatic dismissal that this is now black tech, even though I 520 00:35:43,439 --> 00:35:47,009 get a lot of heat for bringing up the fact that that's part of 521 00:35:47,009 --> 00:35:50,249 the conversation. And that it's possible that some of these 522 00:35:50,249 --> 00:35:56,669 cases absolutely are our black budget programs, technology that 523 00:35:56,669 --> 00:36:01,139 we don't know about yet, that even maybe certain people high 524 00:36:01,139 --> 00:36:03,959 ranking in the military don't even know yet and are 525 00:36:03,959 --> 00:36:07,259 encountering them on training ranges. I think all that's a 526 00:36:07,259 --> 00:36:11,549 possibility. But I can't just look at this and go, I told you 527 00:36:11,549 --> 00:36:15,449 guys, because I don't think that it just fully supports my 528 00:36:16,469 --> 00:36:17,489 approach here. 529 00:36:18,900 --> 00:36:22,770 And by breaking down the sentence, and nitpicking, I 530 00:36:22,770 --> 00:36:26,790 believe it is incredibly broad, even though some people think, 531 00:36:26,790 --> 00:36:29,520 wow, it's clear as day John, they're telling you it's their 532 00:36:29,520 --> 00:36:32,850 own capabilities. No. Why? Because you break it down word 533 00:36:32,850 --> 00:36:36,870 by word. The release of this information will harm national 534 00:36:36,870 --> 00:36:42,270 security as it may, not will but may so legal jargon is like 535 00:36:42,270 --> 00:36:47,130 them, maybe, maybe not. That's the way to look at it from a non 536 00:36:47,130 --> 00:36:51,060 legal jargon way. And that's truly what legal verbiage does 537 00:36:51,090 --> 00:36:55,710 is that it just leaves it all wide open that may be could, so 538 00:36:55,710 --> 00:36:58,680 we have to do the blanket denial. So it may provide 539 00:36:58,680 --> 00:37:02,850 adversaries adversaries valuable information regarding Department 540 00:37:02,850 --> 00:37:08,700 of Defense, Navy operations, vulnerabilities and or meaning 541 00:37:08,700 --> 00:37:13,530 not all of the above, not some, but maybe one if not two, if not 542 00:37:13,530 --> 00:37:18,270 three of the three capabilities. Now why am I making such a big 543 00:37:18,270 --> 00:37:21,810 deal out of that? Well, you have to nitpick that and realize that 544 00:37:21,810 --> 00:37:27,540 the true root cause of these UAP cases and pick your explanation 545 00:37:27,540 --> 00:37:32,820 of choice, a balloon, a seagull I posted on Twitter. And this is 546 00:37:32,820 --> 00:37:37,170 actually true, a turtle can be what's called a range valor. And 547 00:37:37,170 --> 00:37:40,080 then by definition, they're including range valor reports 548 00:37:40,080 --> 00:37:44,490 and UAP cases. So hey, maybe even a turtle underwater, who 549 00:37:44,490 --> 00:37:49,950 knows. But joking aside, pick your explanation all the way to 550 00:37:49,980 --> 00:37:54,270 aliens, right. And you have a wide range of causes for 551 00:37:54,270 --> 00:38:02,910 potential UAP. This explanation, you can fill in the variable of 552 00:38:02,910 --> 00:38:08,070 your choice. And this will make sense. Meaning a vulnerability 553 00:38:08,070 --> 00:38:14,280 can be exposed by a balloon, it just can for if it's encroaching 554 00:38:14,280 --> 00:38:18,120 onto a training exercise. And it makes them divert for whatever 555 00:38:18,120 --> 00:38:21,450 reason, then that shows the vulnerability of what they have 556 00:38:21,450 --> 00:38:26,280 to do when an object goes into their particular region. And 557 00:38:26,280 --> 00:38:29,850 they have to adjust. And they have to make changes, course 558 00:38:29,850 --> 00:38:33,930 corrections, so on and so forth, that that's a vulnerability, or 559 00:38:33,930 --> 00:38:37,110 drones. Lots of people like to say why UAP are just the 560 00:38:37,110 --> 00:38:40,980 advanced drones of the world. And they're able to encroach on 561 00:38:40,980 --> 00:38:45,090 naval training exercises. That's a vulnerability as well. But 562 00:38:45,090 --> 00:38:50,190 also capturing those drones on camera shows our capability. So 563 00:38:50,490 --> 00:38:54,120 obviously, that is something that is exposed as well if they 564 00:38:54,120 --> 00:39:03,960 were to release everything. What about aliens? People love that 565 00:39:03,960 --> 00:39:06,660 theory, too. Now, I'm not here to argue that it's alien. But 566 00:39:06,660 --> 00:39:12,090 let's just say that it is a extraterrestrial craft of some 567 00:39:12,090 --> 00:39:19,020 kind. Could that expose our capabilities to track or to not 568 00:39:19,170 --> 00:39:24,600 track such advanced technology? Absolutely. Could it expose our 569 00:39:24,600 --> 00:39:28,860 vulnerability, wherein they are able to come in? Why could they 570 00:39:28,860 --> 00:39:31,980 come in because we have no certain defenses when they come 571 00:39:31,980 --> 00:39:36,720 in at a certain angle, or a certain altitude or a certain 572 00:39:36,720 --> 00:39:43,350 altitude way above? There are so many explanations on how it can 573 00:39:43,380 --> 00:39:45,900 maybe expose our vulnerabilities, our 574 00:39:45,900 --> 00:39:48,900 capabilities or operations. 575 00:39:50,220 --> 00:39:54,210 So whatever variable you want, and I'm not here to tell you 576 00:39:54,210 --> 00:39:58,620 which one to choose, personally, I think I'm undecided. But 577 00:39:58,620 --> 00:40:01,080 everything is on the table of what I just went over and I 578 00:40:01,080 --> 00:40:04,290 think it's a mix of, of everything with aliens being 579 00:40:04,290 --> 00:40:08,580 that big kind of question mark, does it go that far. But let's 580 00:40:08,580 --> 00:40:11,580 say again, for this little thought exercise, if it did 581 00:40:11,730 --> 00:40:17,670 every variable from a balloon, Seagull or turtle to an alien 582 00:40:17,670 --> 00:40:21,240 spaceship from Zetta, particularly, it will fit into 583 00:40:21,240 --> 00:40:28,050 that statement as the potential cause maybe, and or the cause to 584 00:40:28,050 --> 00:40:32,880 expose to our adversaries, our operations, our vulnerabilities, 585 00:40:33,000 --> 00:40:38,580 and our capabilities. So I respectfully disagree to all of 586 00:40:38,580 --> 00:40:42,120 those who say, this letter proves that it's all black tech, 587 00:40:42,330 --> 00:40:45,690 because I hope my little thought exercise there proves that it 588 00:40:45,690 --> 00:40:49,620 does not matter the root cause of UAP, it could be any one of 589 00:40:49,620 --> 00:40:54,660 those things, this will apply in the broad scope, that it was 590 00:40:54,660 --> 00:40:59,820 written. And that, for me, is why you nitpick. And you take, 591 00:40:59,970 --> 00:41:04,050 try to, you take your personal bias out of it, you stop looking 592 00:41:04,050 --> 00:41:07,080 for support of your statement, you stop looking to tear other 593 00:41:07,080 --> 00:41:11,790 people down, you just look for what it says. And that's what 594 00:41:11,790 --> 00:41:15,150 this says. So those who are arguing about this is Black 595 00:41:15,150 --> 00:41:18,960 tech. Now based on this, I think it's a lost cause, because it 596 00:41:18,960 --> 00:41:23,010 just isn't proven based on that breakdown. But I'm always 597 00:41:23,010 --> 00:41:25,620 interested in your thoughts, especially if you disagree with 598 00:41:25,620 --> 00:41:29,940 me, not a problem. Just keep it respectful. That's all I asked. 599 00:41:30,030 --> 00:41:33,060 Lots of voices come into these channels. If you're watching on 600 00:41:33,060 --> 00:41:36,450 YouTube, thank you for doing that. A thumbs up is absolutely 601 00:41:36,450 --> 00:41:38,820 the biggest help that you can do. Make sure that you're 602 00:41:38,820 --> 00:41:41,220 subscribed to the channel. And of course, turn the 603 00:41:41,220 --> 00:41:45,450 notifications on. But if you want to voice your opinion, or 604 00:41:45,450 --> 00:41:49,680 disagreement with my own, put that in the comments below, 605 00:41:49,710 --> 00:41:52,260 always a big help share the videos as one of the biggest 606 00:41:52,260 --> 00:41:57,240 helps that you can give me and in those comments. Make sure you 607 00:41:57,270 --> 00:42:01,260 tell everybody what you think, and how you disagree. But again, 608 00:42:01,260 --> 00:42:03,750 please keep respectful. If you're watching on the audio, or 609 00:42:03,750 --> 00:42:06,480 excuse me, if you're listening on the audio podcast version, or 610 00:42:06,480 --> 00:42:09,750 don't know that I have one. A lot of these presentations, not 611 00:42:09,750 --> 00:42:13,530 all but a lot on YouTube dropped, get dropped to an audio 612 00:42:13,530 --> 00:42:19,170 podcast form. It's pretty much on any podcast aggregator from 613 00:42:19,770 --> 00:42:26,100 Spotify, iTunes, whatever you listen to, under the black vault 614 00:42:26,130 --> 00:42:30,360 radio, make sure you subscribe to the feeds there as well. And 615 00:42:30,390 --> 00:42:33,840 if you can take a few seconds, please give the show a rating. 616 00:42:34,020 --> 00:42:36,720 It's a huge help, I won't tell you what to put. But as you 617 00:42:36,720 --> 00:42:39,840 know, I aim for five stars. That's always my aim. But please 618 00:42:39,840 --> 00:42:42,180 be honest in the review, but just add one if you could, 619 00:42:42,180 --> 00:42:44,850 because I really do appreciate it. Other than that there are 620 00:42:44,850 --> 00:42:48,330 other ways to support the black vault should you decide to do so 621 00:42:48,450 --> 00:42:51,870 those links are also below or in the show notes. You can go to 622 00:42:51,870 --> 00:42:57,720 www dot the black vault.com/live to go to the YouTube channel or 623 00:42:57,720 --> 00:43:01,530 the black vault.com. There's a podcast link at the top. And 624 00:43:01,530 --> 00:43:05,280 lastly, I have to put in there I've got all sorts of social 625 00:43:05,280 --> 00:43:08,430 media, depending upon what you use. I know a lot of you here on 626 00:43:08,430 --> 00:43:11,400 YouTube, if you're watching, you don't even use social media 627 00:43:11,430 --> 00:43:15,390 always surprises me. But just know that by popular request, it 628 00:43:15,390 --> 00:43:20,610 sounds like it's being revived a little bit parlor. I've decided 629 00:43:20,610 --> 00:43:24,090 to rejoin that a lot of you were asking me was I going to go over 630 00:43:24,090 --> 00:43:27,000 there. They've changed a lot. I know that there was some 631 00:43:27,000 --> 00:43:29,850 controversy there in the beginning a few years back, but 632 00:43:29,850 --> 00:43:32,700 it seems like they've changed a lot tried to re scope their 633 00:43:32,700 --> 00:43:35,490 their angle and stuff. So I've decided to rejoin over there. 634 00:43:35,610 --> 00:43:39,360 Make sure you join me on parler link below. Also on Twitter, 635 00:43:39,420 --> 00:43:42,840 Facebook, most active probably on Twitter, just simply because 636 00:43:42,840 --> 00:43:47,010 that is the easiest way to blast out the messages to kind of keep 637 00:43:47,010 --> 00:43:49,770 you guys updated. And for those who do follow me on social 638 00:43:49,770 --> 00:43:53,250 media. You found out about this story already. So there are 639 00:43:53,250 --> 00:43:57,180 there are values to connecting with me on there. And if you 640 00:43:57,180 --> 00:43:59,970 don't use social media, all the more power to you. You guys are 641 00:43:59,970 --> 00:44:03,720 awesome. Because sometimes it can get toxic out there may come 642 00:44:03,720 --> 00:44:06,600 as a shock to some of you but yes, it's pretty awful in some 643 00:44:06,600 --> 00:44:09,810 corners of the discussion. So keep it clean on this channel, 644 00:44:09,810 --> 00:44:12,900 especially in those comments, but post them really big help. 645 00:44:12,930 --> 00:44:15,480 This is John Greenewald Jr signing off. And I'll see you 646 00:44:15,480 --> 00:44:16,020 next time