1 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:01,590 Andre Carson: More than 50 years ago, 2 00:00:02,130 --> 00:00:04,500 John Greenewald: the US government ended project 3 00:00:04,590 --> 00:00:10,110 Bluebook. On May 17 2022, Congress held its first hearing 4 00:00:10,110 --> 00:00:15,600 on UFOs and more than 50 years. This video contains some of the 5 00:00:15,600 --> 00:00:19,410 highlights, at least, the highlights in the eyes of the 6 00:00:19,410 --> 00:00:23,670 black vault. Join me as we watch together some of the best 7 00:00:23,670 --> 00:00:28,260 moments and get some extra information and commentary along 8 00:00:28,260 --> 00:00:33,030 the way. Stay tuned, you're about to journey inside the 9 00:00:33,030 --> 00:00:33,900 black vault. 10 00:01:01,740 --> 00:01:04,320 That's right, everybody. As always, thank you so much for 11 00:01:04,320 --> 00:01:08,010 tuning in. And taking this journey inside the black vault 12 00:01:08,010 --> 00:01:10,710 with me. I'm your host, John Greenwald, Jr, founder and 13 00:01:10,710 --> 00:01:14,040 creator of the black vault.com. And first off, let me apologize, 14 00:01:14,040 --> 00:01:18,030 it took me a couple of days to get what I intended to do days 15 00:01:18,030 --> 00:01:21,600 ago. And that was do a live stream have a lot of fun, maybe 16 00:01:21,600 --> 00:01:24,810 open up the phone lines. While all of that came crashing down 17 00:01:24,810 --> 00:01:30,270 as the plan when Sadly, my three year old, had come down with a 18 00:01:30,270 --> 00:01:33,870 pretty high fever turned out to be a double ear infection. And 19 00:01:33,870 --> 00:01:37,020 although I'm never happy with those, it's a lot better than 20 00:01:37,020 --> 00:01:40,830 going through COVID. So I was a little bit of a afraid that she 21 00:01:41,040 --> 00:01:44,640 may be going through that. So this day and age of high fever, 22 00:01:44,670 --> 00:01:49,380 being lethargic for a dad and a mom. Not very fun. But when I 23 00:01:49,380 --> 00:01:52,170 could what I've done here in the last couple of days, and maybe 24 00:01:52,170 --> 00:01:56,430 it was a blessing in disguise was I was able to go through the 25 00:01:56,430 --> 00:02:00,510 UAP hearing more times than I want to count bits and pieces 26 00:02:00,510 --> 00:02:03,450 here and there when I could to try and figure out what the best 27 00:02:03,450 --> 00:02:07,830 pieces were to share with all of you. And also try and figure out 28 00:02:07,830 --> 00:02:11,310 what the best pieces were. For me as a researcher, what can I 29 00:02:11,310 --> 00:02:15,420 utilize? What can I use to my advantage and let's say FOIA 30 00:02:15,420 --> 00:02:19,920 requests or FOIA appeals things on the record and under oath, 31 00:02:19,920 --> 00:02:23,880 yes, really do speak volumes when you are, let's say fighting 32 00:02:23,880 --> 00:02:28,500 for something under FOIA, writing certain things in 33 00:02:28,500 --> 00:02:31,800 appeals and so on. So you always want to look for that kind of 34 00:02:31,800 --> 00:02:38,070 stuff. Going through, it really kind of made me see the value in 35 00:02:38,070 --> 00:02:41,070 what this hearing was. And to be honest with you, I'm pleasantly 36 00:02:41,070 --> 00:02:44,070 surprised. I see a lot of comments out there in social 37 00:02:44,070 --> 00:02:48,180 media land, where people were let down, they wanted more, they 38 00:02:48,180 --> 00:02:51,450 wanted more. And to be honest with you, I didn't expect this 39 00:02:51,450 --> 00:02:54,870 much. So I did put a video out the day or two before the 40 00:02:54,870 --> 00:02:58,980 hearing, put some thoughts out there. And of course, just 41 00:02:58,980 --> 00:03:03,360 speculation, I had no idea what to expect. But overall, I am 42 00:03:03,360 --> 00:03:08,370 pleasantly surprised at what we got, simply because it's a lot 43 00:03:08,370 --> 00:03:12,660 more than I thought. Reason is, is we've got some visuals now 44 00:03:12,690 --> 00:03:15,000 even though they weren't exciting. I'll go over those 45 00:03:15,000 --> 00:03:18,510 with you. But I was surprised that they went there. But then I 46 00:03:18,510 --> 00:03:22,560 think it was part of the plan. When you see what they're trying 47 00:03:22,560 --> 00:03:26,640 to do, I think that's a big motivator for me. So overall, 48 00:03:26,640 --> 00:03:30,420 generally speaking, I wanted to at least say, Look, this is a 49 00:03:30,420 --> 00:03:35,580 positive development. I always thought that it would be if a 50 00:03:35,580 --> 00:03:38,580 hearing ever came to pass. I didn't think it would happen 51 00:03:38,580 --> 00:03:42,300 this quickly. I figured we'd maybe be like a year plus out 52 00:03:42,300 --> 00:03:45,660 from that. And no matter what you might have the words UFOs on 53 00:03:45,660 --> 00:03:49,530 Capitol Hill in a hearing with people under oath. That's great, 54 00:03:49,530 --> 00:03:54,480 because that is all good stuff. But when you look at what 55 00:03:54,480 --> 00:03:57,360 actually went down and you look at at the people that were 56 00:03:57,360 --> 00:04:01,380 testifying and what they couldn't answer, that also is 57 00:04:01,380 --> 00:04:03,870 telling, you've heard me say on this channel before that 58 00:04:03,870 --> 00:04:06,690 sometimes you get a fully redacted page. And for many 59 00:04:06,690 --> 00:04:09,540 that's frustrating you thinking, hey, they couldn't release a 60 00:04:09,570 --> 00:04:13,200 single word. Why release it at all? Well, I want them to 61 00:04:13,200 --> 00:04:17,430 release it because those blacked out pages tell a story. The same 62 00:04:17,430 --> 00:04:22,320 with hearings like this silly answers, answers that they have 63 00:04:22,320 --> 00:04:26,280 to push to a closed or classified setting, meaning they 64 00:04:26,280 --> 00:04:30,330 can't let you or I hear it. All of those are frustrating, of 65 00:04:30,360 --> 00:04:34,650 course, but telling. And those are the things that you can 66 00:04:34,650 --> 00:04:38,040 utilize either in those FOIA appeals or FOIA requests or so 67 00:04:38,040 --> 00:04:41,430 on when you go after information. And you can see 68 00:04:41,430 --> 00:04:45,690 where the sensitive points are. So overall, I think that this 69 00:04:45,690 --> 00:04:49,410 was good. Will it happen again? I hope so. I know there's a lot 70 00:04:49,410 --> 00:04:52,650 of talk out there that it will and this is the first of many to 71 00:04:52,650 --> 00:04:56,100 come, and I won't be surprised. I think that that was one of the 72 00:04:56,100 --> 00:04:58,740 other things that I'll put generally speaking on the 73 00:04:58,740 --> 00:05:05,970 hearing that the congressmen that were there seemed generally 74 00:05:05,970 --> 00:05:10,320 interested. Most of one in particular, I felt just kind of 75 00:05:10,350 --> 00:05:14,250 winged it the whole way. But regardless, I mean, some of the 76 00:05:14,250 --> 00:05:18,030 questions were really solid. Some of them were really just 77 00:05:18,030 --> 00:05:21,240 Where did you come up with that. And other ones were kind of what 78 00:05:21,240 --> 00:05:25,710 I called facepalm. Where, which caused me to just go Oh, cheese, 79 00:05:25,710 --> 00:05:29,460 really. And we'll get to that as well. But some of you may have 80 00:05:29,490 --> 00:05:32,820 have seen my quote in Politico yesterday where I said just 81 00:05:32,820 --> 00:05:36,600 that, about the Wilson Davis documents Coming up, we'll go 82 00:05:36,600 --> 00:05:41,310 over that in this video. So here's the deal. I'm going to 83 00:05:41,310 --> 00:05:43,620 make this as quick as possible, but it's going to be long. This 84 00:05:43,620 --> 00:05:47,220 is one of those deep dive videos where I feel it's just warranted 85 00:05:47,220 --> 00:05:49,980 to go in deeper, go over the highlights, play the video for 86 00:05:49,980 --> 00:05:53,040 you. And then give some extra information where applicable, 87 00:05:53,250 --> 00:05:56,640 some commentary where I feel it's warranted, and go on from 88 00:05:56,640 --> 00:05:59,820 there. Normally, I have a PowerPoint presentation this 89 00:05:59,820 --> 00:06:02,730 time I have a video, what I'm going to go ahead and do is play 90 00:06:02,730 --> 00:06:06,450 the clips, pause at certain points. And we'll just go from 91 00:06:06,450 --> 00:06:10,440 there. Let me last say if you're really kind of not interested in 92 00:06:10,440 --> 00:06:14,520 any more commentary here, because you're you've seen it so 93 00:06:14,520 --> 00:06:16,770 many times here in the last few days from so many different 94 00:06:16,770 --> 00:06:20,100 people. Not a problem, I won't be offended if you turn it off. 95 00:06:20,310 --> 00:06:23,790 But if you are interested and want to take this journey with 96 00:06:23,790 --> 00:06:25,530 me, let's take a look. 97 00:06:27,330 --> 00:06:30,540 Scott Bray: Since the early 2000s, we have seen an 98 00:06:30,540 --> 00:06:34,080 increasing number of unauthorized and or unidentified 99 00:06:34,080 --> 00:06:37,440 aircraft or objects in military controlled training areas, and 100 00:06:37,440 --> 00:06:40,800 training ranges and other designated airspace, reports of 101 00:06:40,800 --> 00:06:44,610 sightings are frequent. And continuing. We attribute this 102 00:06:44,610 --> 00:06:47,520 increase in reporting to a number of factors including our 103 00:06:47,520 --> 00:06:51,390 work to D stigmatize reporting, an increase in the number of new 104 00:06:51,390 --> 00:06:54,420 systems such as quad copters, and unmanned aerial systems that 105 00:06:54,420 --> 00:06:57,240 are in our airspace, identification of what we can 106 00:06:57,240 --> 00:07:00,480 classify as clutter, mylar balloons and other types of of 107 00:07:00,480 --> 00:07:04,230 air trash, and improvements in the capabilities of our various 108 00:07:04,230 --> 00:07:06,810 sensors to detect things in our airspace. 109 00:07:08,100 --> 00:07:10,620 John Greenewald: Well, that all sounds great, right? And they 110 00:07:10,620 --> 00:07:14,400 give all of those mundane explanations for UFOs that we 111 00:07:14,400 --> 00:07:18,810 hear a lot from skeptics, and so on. So to congressmen who don't 112 00:07:18,810 --> 00:07:22,830 know any better, maybe that would fly. But to anybody that 113 00:07:22,830 --> 00:07:26,400 decides to actually look at the information and look at the data 114 00:07:26,400 --> 00:07:30,630 that's there and look what the government has already done, and 115 00:07:30,630 --> 00:07:35,310 said and explained almost a year ago, you'll realize that all of 116 00:07:35,310 --> 00:07:39,870 those explanations didn't fit into a single case, there was 117 00:07:39,870 --> 00:07:43,110 nothing they could attribute it to clutter, there was nothing 118 00:07:43,110 --> 00:07:46,560 that could they could attribute to those drones or quad copters. 119 00:07:46,920 --> 00:07:51,750 The increase in capability to detect, as Mr. Scott Bray just 120 00:07:51,750 --> 00:07:57,660 pointed out, didn't fit into the 143 Unidentified cases that they 121 00:07:57,660 --> 00:08:00,900 talked about in last year's report. What you're looking at 122 00:08:00,900 --> 00:08:04,470 now is a screenshot from the classified version that I got 123 00:08:04,470 --> 00:08:08,640 released from the Director of National Intelligence, and it 124 00:08:08,640 --> 00:08:12,780 reiterates exactly that now there was one case that they 125 00:08:12,780 --> 00:08:16,170 labeled a deflating balloon, and that's fine. Those are that's 126 00:08:16,170 --> 00:08:20,010 going to happen. But Scott praise leading off his opening 127 00:08:20,010 --> 00:08:24,600 statement by giving you a laundry list of explanations 128 00:08:24,600 --> 00:08:29,100 which sound perfectly plausible. But when you look at their own 129 00:08:29,100 --> 00:08:34,650 report, not a single one fit into any of those categories. 130 00:08:35,250 --> 00:08:36,930 But why didn't you tell Congress that? 131 00:08:40,350 --> 00:08:42,930 Scott Bray: In the early stages, the task force work to 132 00:08:42,930 --> 00:08:45,600 standardize the reporting mechanisms and processes to make 133 00:08:45,600 --> 00:08:48,720 it as easy as possible for personnel to report any 134 00:08:48,720 --> 00:08:51,240 engagement so that we were getting that wide range of 135 00:08:51,240 --> 00:08:54,990 reporting that we needed. We also spent considerable efforts 136 00:08:54,990 --> 00:08:57,570 engaging directly with our naval aviators and building 137 00:08:57,570 --> 00:09:00,390 relationships to help destigmatize the act of 138 00:09:00,390 --> 00:09:03,840 reporting sightings or encounters. And we work with 139 00:09:03,840 --> 00:09:06,810 naval aviation leadership to provide additional equipment to 140 00:09:06,810 --> 00:09:11,280 record any encounter Navy and Air Force crews now have step by 141 00:09:11,280 --> 00:09:15,420 step procedures for reporting on a UAP on their kneeboard in 142 00:09:15,420 --> 00:09:19,680 their in the cockpit and in their post flight debrief 143 00:09:19,680 --> 00:09:20,310 procedures. 144 00:09:22,020 --> 00:09:23,820 John Greenewald: Now, even though we knew that there were 145 00:09:23,820 --> 00:09:27,930 guidelines that were posted a few years ago for the Navy, this 146 00:09:27,930 --> 00:09:31,290 now solidifies an oath that there is a document outlining 147 00:09:31,290 --> 00:09:35,430 all the procedures for UAP. That is in every aircraft, well, at 148 00:09:35,430 --> 00:09:39,600 least according to Scott Bray. Now, why is that important? 149 00:09:39,840 --> 00:09:44,190 Well, we know now under oath that that document exists. Now 150 00:09:44,190 --> 00:09:48,330 even though we've safely assumed it. We've seen people talk about 151 00:09:48,330 --> 00:09:52,470 it in news articles and stuff again about the guidelines. Now 152 00:09:52,470 --> 00:09:56,760 it seems like there's a structured document that is in 153 00:09:56,790 --> 00:10:01,170 naval aviator in air force pilots aircraft Now for a long 154 00:10:01,170 --> 00:10:04,320 time, I've had FOIA requests going back about a year and a 155 00:10:04,320 --> 00:10:07,950 half, specifically with the United States Air Force under 156 00:10:07,950 --> 00:10:10,980 the assumption that they would have such a thing. But this is 157 00:10:10,980 --> 00:10:15,300 one of the examples of an under oath testimony, that now becomes 158 00:10:15,300 --> 00:10:18,360 gold. Many people not may not pick up on it, because you don't 159 00:10:18,360 --> 00:10:21,060 do FOIA is you really don't care whether or not that there's a 160 00:10:21,060 --> 00:10:25,950 manual or not. But for me, it's gold, because that will outline 161 00:10:25,980 --> 00:10:29,460 everything that they're looking at. Hopefully, we can get it and 162 00:10:29,460 --> 00:10:33,480 I believe we likely could. There might be some redactions in 163 00:10:33,480 --> 00:10:37,740 there. But regardless, the form itself that they fill out, or 164 00:10:37,740 --> 00:10:41,370 whatever it is that they're instructed to do, hopefully will 165 00:10:41,370 --> 00:10:44,610 be releasable. But this solidifies that it exists. So 166 00:10:44,610 --> 00:10:47,880 there's no way now it just cuts them off at the past of them 167 00:10:47,880 --> 00:10:50,190 coming out and saying, Hey, sorry, we don't have anything 168 00:10:50,190 --> 00:10:54,810 like that. Nothing like that exists. Sorry. Well, now we can 169 00:10:54,810 --> 00:10:58,830 solidify that it's there. Again, that may be something that 170 00:10:58,830 --> 00:11:01,710 doesn't sound too important to some people. But the moment you 171 00:11:01,710 --> 00:11:06,180 have that much, you start carving out the excuses, that 172 00:11:06,180 --> 00:11:09,270 the US military or the government can give you to deny 173 00:11:09,270 --> 00:11:10,980 you access to documents. 174 00:11:11,309 --> 00:11:13,229 Scott Bray: Additionally, subject matter experts from a 175 00:11:13,229 --> 00:11:16,679 wide variety of fields, including physics, optics, 176 00:11:16,709 --> 00:11:21,149 metallurgy, meteorology, just to name a few have been brought 177 00:11:21,149 --> 00:11:25,169 into to expand our understanding in areas where meet, we may not 178 00:11:25,169 --> 00:11:28,859 have organic expertise. In short, we've endeavored to bring 179 00:11:28,859 --> 00:11:32,219 an all hands on deck approach to the better understand this 180 00:11:32,219 --> 00:11:32,759 phenomenon. 181 00:11:34,440 --> 00:11:36,930 John Greenewald: That's fantastic. We really didn't hear 182 00:11:36,930 --> 00:11:41,760 a whole lot about what the UAP Task Force now aeoi MSG or what 183 00:11:41,760 --> 00:11:47,040 they call aim SOG what they were doing with the reports. But just 184 00:11:47,040 --> 00:11:49,200 to kind of connect this to a piece of the puzzle that I 185 00:11:49,200 --> 00:11:52,650 posted months ago when I got declassified records from the 186 00:11:52,650 --> 00:11:56,010 National Reconnaissance Office, that there is what's called a 187 00:11:56,010 --> 00:12:02,100 UAP TF UAP Task Force advisory panel. And we can see here in 188 00:12:02,100 --> 00:12:04,860 the middle, I can't do a pointer as I usually can with 189 00:12:04,860 --> 00:12:07,710 PowerPoints. But just look at the middle of this graphic here 190 00:12:07,710 --> 00:12:13,140 and NRO officer on the UAP Task Force advisory panel provided 191 00:12:13,140 --> 00:12:17,760 feedback on NRO platforms, sensors, data processing and 192 00:12:17,760 --> 00:12:21,390 information exploitation, and then a bunch of redactions, when 193 00:12:21,390 --> 00:12:24,990 I had received these documents, they were that was never 194 00:12:24,990 --> 00:12:28,140 acknowledged before, as far as I know, again, that's one of those 195 00:12:28,140 --> 00:12:32,070 things that's always assumed, we would hope that they would have 196 00:12:32,070 --> 00:12:35,400 a list of experts that they would go out and be able to call 197 00:12:35,400 --> 00:12:40,620 upon, should they should they need it. But this document 198 00:12:40,920 --> 00:12:44,520 solidified it. So I had immediately turned around, filed 199 00:12:44,520 --> 00:12:48,000 Freedom of Information Act requests for records relating to 200 00:12:48,000 --> 00:12:51,330 the advisory panel and who's on it. Now anybody who knows 201 00:12:51,330 --> 00:12:54,690 anything about FOIA, when it comes to who's on it may 202 00:12:54,690 --> 00:13:00,210 absolutely be redacted. That's exemption B six. So for privacy 203 00:13:00,210 --> 00:13:03,840 reasons, especially when you start naming an NRO officer, 204 00:13:04,380 --> 00:13:07,920 that becomes very problematic, not only would that fit into 205 00:13:07,920 --> 00:13:12,030 exemption B six of the FOIA, but there's also statutes with the 206 00:13:12,030 --> 00:13:17,880 NRO, with the CIA, with the DIA, which ties into exemption B 207 00:13:17,880 --> 00:13:21,240 three, that essentially warrants them to redact everything that 208 00:13:21,240 --> 00:13:25,680 connects a human to their agency. So they try and separate 209 00:13:25,800 --> 00:13:28,650 for protection for security reasons, the identity of 210 00:13:28,650 --> 00:13:33,210 individuals, so it may come redacted if I can get anything 211 00:13:33,210 --> 00:13:38,130 at all. But it will show how big it is. Because maybe the name 212 00:13:38,160 --> 00:13:44,190 will be redacted. But the specialty will be there. That 213 00:13:44,280 --> 00:13:48,480 maybe not redacted. I don't know I'm not a fortune teller. But 214 00:13:48,480 --> 00:13:51,810 you have a lot better chance to get that kind of identifier to 215 00:13:51,810 --> 00:13:55,680 somebody versus their name. And that to me is just as important 216 00:13:55,680 --> 00:14:00,060 as a name because it tells me and all of us the specialty that 217 00:14:00,060 --> 00:14:04,230 they are focusing on. And that could be incredibly telling for 218 00:14:04,230 --> 00:14:07,770 trying to unravel exactly what's going on with the advisory panel 219 00:14:08,010 --> 00:14:09,480 and what they're talking about. 220 00:14:10,620 --> 00:14:13,950 Scott Bray: So what have we learned so far? Any given 221 00:14:13,950 --> 00:14:19,740 observation may be fleeting, or longer. It may be recorded or 222 00:14:19,740 --> 00:14:25,800 not, it may be observable by one or multiple assets. In short, 223 00:14:25,830 --> 00:14:28,770 there's rarely an easy answer. For example, let me share with 224 00:14:28,770 --> 00:14:32,010 you the first video that we have here today, which shows an 225 00:14:32,010 --> 00:14:33,750 observation in real time. 226 00:14:36,300 --> 00:14:38,040 John Greenewald: I was pretty excited when the started go 227 00:14:38,040 --> 00:14:40,560 down. Didn't expect visuals. 228 00:14:43,260 --> 00:14:48,570 Scott Bray: There it was. That's in many cases. That's all that 229 00:14:48,570 --> 00:14:52,290 report may include. Then I started and in many other cases, 230 00:14:52,650 --> 00:14:54,960 we have far less than this. 231 00:14:56,910 --> 00:15:00,000 John Greenewald: So what you just saw was one of the video 232 00:15:00,000 --> 00:15:04,500 owes. And jokingly on Twitter I had posted the quote unquote 233 00:15:04,500 --> 00:15:07,980 Batman balloon was starting to make an appearance, simply 234 00:15:07,980 --> 00:15:10,920 because when you start to look at that it looks very similar. 235 00:15:10,920 --> 00:15:14,940 Now it ended up not being the same. But But regardless, it's 236 00:15:14,940 --> 00:15:20,160 the same, essentially quality. We'll get to one of the funniest 237 00:15:20,160 --> 00:15:24,810 parts in the hearing in a few minutes. But here is the full 238 00:15:24,990 --> 00:15:29,520 video file that was later released by the Pentagon. I was 239 00:15:29,520 --> 00:15:32,520 one of the recipients of it, I posted it immediately on the 240 00:15:32,520 --> 00:15:36,810 black vault, what I call the raw files, but they are not the raw 241 00:15:36,810 --> 00:15:41,520 files from the cockpit source, which is likely by the looks of 242 00:15:41,520 --> 00:15:46,350 it a phone of some kind, but rather the raw files when the 243 00:15:46,350 --> 00:15:50,580 DoD released them. So this is not screen grabs from the stream 244 00:15:50,580 --> 00:15:54,870 of the video, but rather, the full video itself, take a look. 245 00:16:04,440 --> 00:16:08,400 And it's that fast. Now, here I slowed it down for it comes in 246 00:16:08,400 --> 00:16:22,020 at three frames, frame one, frame two, frame three, then 247 00:16:22,020 --> 00:16:35,460 it's gone. I'll play it again. frame one, Frame to Frame three. 248 00:16:38,760 --> 00:16:42,180 Now, of course, a lot of people out there like Mick West are 249 00:16:42,180 --> 00:16:45,120 already analyzing that video, because although it's not the 250 00:16:45,120 --> 00:16:49,050 raw source, he can immediately go in and start dissecting 251 00:16:49,050 --> 00:16:53,010 what's there. Fans of this channel will know if you don't 252 00:16:53,010 --> 00:16:57,150 know Mick West. I mean, he's a self described debunker I don't 253 00:16:57,150 --> 00:17:01,080 like the word myself, I feel it's more of a demeaning term 254 00:17:01,110 --> 00:17:04,830 against somebody. Because I really respect Mick, we don't 255 00:17:04,830 --> 00:17:08,670 always agree. I've seen some stuff, especially of late of MIS 256 00:17:08,670 --> 00:17:13,950 that I really disagree with and have posted responses to, but 257 00:17:13,980 --> 00:17:17,760 but when it comes down to the end of the day, he's somebody of 258 00:17:17,760 --> 00:17:21,930 great value to this conversation he just is. So he immediately 259 00:17:21,930 --> 00:17:24,810 grabbed the video and starts, you know, analyzing it the best 260 00:17:24,810 --> 00:17:28,350 that he could, and you know, starts to make conclusions about 261 00:17:28,350 --> 00:17:31,500 it likely being either I think he said a balloon or something 262 00:17:31,530 --> 00:17:35,340 to that effect, regardless of what his going theory is, it 263 00:17:35,340 --> 00:17:39,210 really starts to make you wonder, number one, is this 264 00:17:39,210 --> 00:17:44,160 really the best that they have? And I highly doubt that. But 265 00:17:44,160 --> 00:17:48,270 number two, is this intentional? Is this intentional to put this 266 00:17:48,270 --> 00:17:51,960 out there that may be likely a balloon or weather balloon or, 267 00:17:52,260 --> 00:17:55,350 or something of that nature, just easily explainable whatever 268 00:17:55,350 --> 00:17:58,200 it may be. Don't don't write me hate mail. I'm not saying that 269 00:17:58,200 --> 00:18:03,390 it is. But But regardless, that what we're seeing already in the 270 00:18:03,390 --> 00:18:07,350 days that followed the hearing, was this intentional? Was this 271 00:18:07,350 --> 00:18:11,610 something that they want us to do? Where we see quote unquote, 272 00:18:11,820 --> 00:18:16,620 the evidence that many will assume that's the best they got? 273 00:18:16,800 --> 00:18:19,440 Because they're not showing anything else. They assume 274 00:18:19,440 --> 00:18:23,190 that's the best they got. And then people like MC, come out 275 00:18:23,250 --> 00:18:30,360 and conclusively show or maybe closely to conclusively, I'll 276 00:18:30,360 --> 00:18:33,540 select a better word than that. But really kind of put the doubt 277 00:18:33,540 --> 00:18:37,140 out there that this is anything spectacular. Maybe that's all 278 00:18:37,140 --> 00:18:41,100 part of the plan. Did they strategically choose the worst 279 00:18:41,100 --> 00:18:45,870 video that they could to put out there into this public public 280 00:18:45,870 --> 00:18:49,320 sphere, it's possible, and maybe it plays into a bigger plan 281 00:18:49,320 --> 00:18:49,590 we're getting 282 00:18:50,190 --> 00:18:52,920 Scott Bray: incidents are resolved, they likely fall into 283 00:18:52,920 --> 00:18:55,800 one of five potential explanatory categories, airborne 284 00:18:55,800 --> 00:18:59,610 clutter, natural atmospheric phenomena, US government or US 285 00:18:59,610 --> 00:19:04,530 industry developmental programs for an adversary systems or a 286 00:19:04,650 --> 00:19:08,340 other bin that allows for a holding bin of difficult cases. 287 00:19:08,550 --> 00:19:10,590 And for the possibility of surprise and potential 288 00:19:10,590 --> 00:19:15,210 scientific discovery. We stand by those initial results. Since 289 00:19:15,210 --> 00:19:18,420 the release of that preliminary report UAP Task Force database 290 00:19:18,420 --> 00:19:23,070 has now grown to contain approximately 400 reports. The 291 00:19:23,070 --> 00:19:25,080 stigma has been reduced. 292 00:19:26,610 --> 00:19:30,780 John Greenewald: Did you catch that? 400 reports in a database. 293 00:19:30,810 --> 00:19:33,240 Remember what I said earlier about picking up on the small 294 00:19:33,240 --> 00:19:37,380 things. Some may say great, 400 Cool. That's how many that's how 295 00:19:37,380 --> 00:19:40,320 many it's grown to. But he solidified that there is a 296 00:19:40,320 --> 00:19:44,280 central database. Again, all things that we can assume. And 297 00:19:44,280 --> 00:19:47,160 some of you may be wondering why I'm pushing points like these, 298 00:19:47,460 --> 00:19:50,940 because again, it locks in and with the backing of under oath 299 00:19:50,940 --> 00:19:56,220 testimony, there is a database with at least 400 reports in it. 300 00:19:56,910 --> 00:20:00,810 So what did I do? Well, you you probably Yesterday, I 301 00:20:00,810 --> 00:20:05,310 immediately filed a case, based on Scott braze testimony for the 302 00:20:05,310 --> 00:20:12,060 entire database 100% of it will also get into his we'll call it 303 00:20:12,060 --> 00:20:16,290 promise to Congress about transparency. So I think that 304 00:20:16,290 --> 00:20:19,890 with the testimony here under oath, about the database 305 00:20:19,890 --> 00:20:23,760 existence, and their drive for transparency, and we'll get to 306 00:20:23,760 --> 00:20:28,650 those clips, that will put up a good case for the majority, not 307 00:20:28,650 --> 00:20:32,520 everything. But hopefully the majority of these 400 cases to 308 00:20:32,520 --> 00:20:35,010 be released to the general public, because he said, that's 309 00:20:35,010 --> 00:20:40,980 what he wants to do. Now, I put a rather large agreement for the 310 00:20:41,010 --> 00:20:46,560 FOIA request of I think I did $300 to agree. So if they come 311 00:20:46,560 --> 00:20:49,140 back and say, well, it's voluminous and there's, you 312 00:20:49,140 --> 00:20:53,220 know, 400 reports times, however many pages, I've already locked 313 00:20:53,220 --> 00:20:57,990 in and allocated a few 100 bucks for that they may come back for 314 00:20:58,590 --> 00:21:02,550 extra money. Now, just so you guys know, I don't take any 315 00:21:02,580 --> 00:21:06,360 super chat donations from the YouTube channel, or donations on 316 00:21:06,360 --> 00:21:09,270 the website and go out to dinner, or buy my wife a 317 00:21:09,270 --> 00:21:14,760 present. What would I say it's 100% into this channel. That's 318 00:21:14,760 --> 00:21:17,910 what it goes. When I literally show receipts. You'll see 319 00:21:17,910 --> 00:21:20,760 recently I did a request with NASA, which stretched to about, 320 00:21:20,940 --> 00:21:25,200 I think it was $360, that is going to be the payment. And I 321 00:21:25,200 --> 00:21:28,410 literally show the receipts. So for those of you that support me 322 00:21:28,410 --> 00:21:33,450 on Patreon or decide to do those super chats, it is so incredibly 323 00:21:33,510 --> 00:21:36,900 helpful for situations like this, because that's what it 324 00:21:36,900 --> 00:21:39,930 goes to, of course, the black vaults a little bit expensive to 325 00:21:39,930 --> 00:21:43,290 run anyway. But just so you guys know, I always try and show you 326 00:21:43,290 --> 00:21:47,220 exactly what those dollars go to. And this is a prime example. 327 00:21:47,310 --> 00:21:52,530 So I put in a a confirmation to the US Navy for this database 328 00:21:52,710 --> 00:21:57,420 that at this point, will say $300, I'm happy to pay it, they 329 00:21:57,420 --> 00:22:00,030 may come back and say it's higher. And of course, I'll 330 00:22:00,030 --> 00:22:04,200 probably pay it regardless. But that I just wanted to kind of 331 00:22:04,200 --> 00:22:06,870 give you a quick point. If you're watching this on YouTube 332 00:22:06,870 --> 00:22:09,780 and wondering what those super chats go to this as a prime 333 00:22:09,780 --> 00:22:13,770 example, what you're looking at is my Twitter post that I that I 334 00:22:13,800 --> 00:22:16,770 made it public that I was requesting this database, and 335 00:22:16,770 --> 00:22:19,170 I'll keep you guys informed every step of the way, just like 336 00:22:19,170 --> 00:22:23,310 I did on that classified UAP report, which turned out to be 337 00:22:23,310 --> 00:22:26,430 pretty cool the way the way it turned out. By the way the 338 00:22:26,430 --> 00:22:28,410 appeal is still going. Let's keep going. 339 00:22:28,740 --> 00:22:30,240 Scott Bray: We've also made progress in resolving the 340 00:22:30,240 --> 00:22:33,060 character of a limited number of UAP encounters. For example, let 341 00:22:33,060 --> 00:22:36,960 me show you a couple of another video and image taken years 342 00:22:36,960 --> 00:22:42,690 apart in different areas. In this video, US Navy personnel 343 00:22:42,690 --> 00:22:45,810 recorded what appears to be triangle some flashing recorded 344 00:22:45,840 --> 00:22:49,650 several years ago, off the coast of the United States. This was 345 00:22:49,650 --> 00:22:53,070 recorded while the US Navy ship observed a number of small 346 00:22:53,070 --> 00:22:57,690 unmanned aerial systems in the area. And importantly, the video 347 00:22:57,750 --> 00:23:00,540 was taken through night vision goggles with a single lens 348 00:23:00,540 --> 00:23:04,860 reflex camera. These remained unresolved for several years. 349 00:23:18,240 --> 00:23:20,850 John Greenewald: Their psychology behind letting this 350 00:23:20,850 --> 00:23:26,670 play letting everybody see it. Kind of get like a little UAW. 351 00:23:26,730 --> 00:23:28,200 We've seen it in the media 352 00:23:28,410 --> 00:23:32,460 Scott Bray: several years later, but and off a different coast. 353 00:23:33,210 --> 00:23:37,110 US Navy personnel again, and a swarm of unmanned aerial systems 354 00:23:37,140 --> 00:23:40,620 and again through night vision goggles, and an SLR camera 355 00:23:41,400 --> 00:23:46,320 recorded this image. But this time, other US Navy assets also 356 00:23:46,320 --> 00:23:49,950 observed unmanned aerial systems nearby. And we're now reasonably 357 00:23:49,950 --> 00:23:53,070 confident that these triangles correlate to unmanned aerial 358 00:23:53,070 --> 00:23:56,970 systems in the area. The triangular appearance is a 359 00:23:56,970 --> 00:24:00,450 result of light passing through the night vision goggles, and 360 00:24:00,450 --> 00:24:04,080 then being recorded by an SLR camera. I don't mean to suggest 361 00:24:04,080 --> 00:24:11,670 that everything that we observe is is identifiable but the it 362 00:24:11,790 --> 00:24:15,210 but this is a great example of how it takes considerable effort 363 00:24:15,480 --> 00:24:19,890 to understand what we're seeing in the examples that we are able 364 00:24:19,890 --> 00:24:20,460 to collect 365 00:24:21,990 --> 00:24:25,890 John Greenewald: considerable effort now again to bring up 366 00:24:25,890 --> 00:24:30,150 Mick West, he nailed this one, pretty much from the get go and 367 00:24:30,150 --> 00:24:33,420 the leak of the video by Jeremy corbello. Now I know a lot of 368 00:24:33,420 --> 00:24:37,260 people are attacking Jeremy kohrville For for kind of 369 00:24:37,290 --> 00:24:41,550 talking about the pyramid UFOs and this and that. And I'll 370 00:24:41,550 --> 00:24:46,350 defend him on this point. Scott Bray just said under oath that 371 00:24:46,350 --> 00:24:50,070 they were unidentified, considered unidentified to them 372 00:24:50,070 --> 00:24:53,580 for a couple of years. It is quite possible that when Jeremy 373 00:24:53,580 --> 00:24:56,190 got them, he was under the impression that they were 374 00:24:56,190 --> 00:25:00,000 unidentified, and that's what he was being told. Scott Bray just 375 00:25:00,000 --> 00:25:03,420 Put it into the testimony that it was on identified for a 376 00:25:03,420 --> 00:25:06,900 couple of years. And it was not until they had, let's say, 377 00:25:06,900 --> 00:25:10,320 corroborating evidence, in addition to visual sightings of 378 00:25:10,320 --> 00:25:15,000 unmanned aerial systems, or drones, that they could say, oh, 379 00:25:15,660 --> 00:25:20,280 the combination of the night vision, the DSL, the DSL, the 380 00:25:20,700 --> 00:25:25,470 LSR camera, you know, that that combination, the way the light 381 00:25:25,470 --> 00:25:29,280 passes through the, the shape of the aperture of the lens, I'm 382 00:25:29,280 --> 00:25:33,990 into all that stuff, is what Mick said. But in the same 383 00:25:33,990 --> 00:25:37,050 respect, right, when I'll defend that that was the stance that 384 00:25:37,050 --> 00:25:40,770 was just given. It always bothered me that when the 385 00:25:40,770 --> 00:25:46,830 government actually came out, and said, Yes, it was a real 386 00:25:46,830 --> 00:25:51,360 video. Yes, it was being utilized, utilized by the UAP, 387 00:25:51,360 --> 00:25:56,880 TF. But they wouldn't comment on what they designated the UFO. 388 00:25:57,690 --> 00:26:01,680 That bothered me. And it was because I thought that there was 389 00:26:01,680 --> 00:26:05,040 some other plan, because they weren't doing anything about the 390 00:26:05,040 --> 00:26:09,480 leaks. So I thought, okay, if if they're letting this stuff leak, 391 00:26:09,840 --> 00:26:13,530 there's got to be an issue here. But there wasn't meaning they 392 00:26:13,530 --> 00:26:16,950 weren't concerned about it. They were they were quick like that, 393 00:26:17,130 --> 00:26:20,850 to confirm that UAP TF was utilizing these videos, that 394 00:26:20,850 --> 00:26:23,820 they were real authentic. They were shot by naval personnel. 395 00:26:24,300 --> 00:26:26,970 And yet they wouldn't tell me if they were considered 396 00:26:27,030 --> 00:26:32,580 unidentified. This is a tweet that I wrote in May of 2021. Let 397 00:26:32,580 --> 00:26:35,400 me see here almost a year, a little over a year ago, 398 00:26:35,430 --> 00:26:40,950 ironically, and almost to the day, why is it the Pentagon 399 00:26:40,950 --> 00:26:44,970 seemingly doesn't care about the leaks, will confirm the 400 00:26:44,970 --> 00:26:48,570 authenticity of the material will confirm it's taken by Navy 401 00:26:48,570 --> 00:26:53,280 personnel will confirm it's used by the UAP ATF, but won't 402 00:26:53,280 --> 00:26:57,480 comment on their designation. And my honest opinions, in my 403 00:26:57,720 --> 00:27:03,060 honest opinion, shenanigans are afoot. Stay tuned. That was May 404 00:27:03,060 --> 00:27:08,730 of 2021. Fast forward almost a year to the day. And now we have 405 00:27:08,730 --> 00:27:12,930 a UFO congressional hearing. And all of that comes to light 406 00:27:12,930 --> 00:27:18,060 again, where these triangle UFOs are nothing more than an 407 00:27:18,060 --> 00:27:21,060 artifact of the camera and the way that it was shot, that they 408 00:27:21,060 --> 00:27:23,940 weren't triangles at all, but they rather their best 409 00:27:23,940 --> 00:27:29,280 assessment was drone swarms. So for the last year, plus, we have 410 00:27:29,280 --> 00:27:32,820 seen these videos in the media time and time again, they've 411 00:27:32,820 --> 00:27:38,490 created this intrigue, behind UAP. And the fascination by the 412 00:27:38,490 --> 00:27:41,820 general public that doesn't do this stuff every day, like maybe 413 00:27:41,820 --> 00:27:44,970 you and I. But rather they're looking at this going, Wow, 414 00:27:44,970 --> 00:27:48,210 pyramid, triangle shape, whatever they are the so cool 415 00:27:48,210 --> 00:27:53,880 UFOs nightvision cameras. And it's been instilled for a year, 416 00:27:54,510 --> 00:27:58,020 just to be blown out of the water. But the one that they do 417 00:27:58,020 --> 00:28:02,190 show that they say we have no idea what this is right. And the 418 00:28:02,190 --> 00:28:04,500 public kind of seems like they're getting something cool. 419 00:28:04,620 --> 00:28:09,180 What happens, we get a video that has three frames of an 420 00:28:09,180 --> 00:28:14,160 object, that likely is potentially just a balloon of 421 00:28:14,160 --> 00:28:18,030 some kind, I said likely again, no hate mail. But regardless, 422 00:28:18,060 --> 00:28:22,980 it's nothing extraordinary based on the evidence that we have. So 423 00:28:22,980 --> 00:28:26,850 now the public completely blow that can blow out of the water, 424 00:28:27,390 --> 00:28:31,230 the stuff that they've seen for a year that has fascinated them, 425 00:28:31,320 --> 00:28:35,580 that turns out to be nothing. And the new stuff is shot on 426 00:28:35,580 --> 00:28:38,880 some cell phone and a cockpit that only captured three frames 427 00:28:38,880 --> 00:28:41,880 of an object that really isn't that mysterious looking or 428 00:28:42,150 --> 00:28:47,520 intriguing. All part of a plan. I don't know shenanigans. That's 429 00:28:47,520 --> 00:28:50,250 what I said last year. I stand by it. 430 00:28:50,880 --> 00:28:52,560 Scott Bray: And given the nature of our business national 431 00:28:52,560 --> 00:28:56,250 defense, we've had to sometimes be less forthcoming with 432 00:28:56,250 --> 00:29:00,180 information and open forums and many would hope no kidding. If 433 00:29:00,180 --> 00:29:03,570 UAP do indeed represent a potential threat to our security 434 00:29:03,600 --> 00:29:06,900 than the capabilities, systems, processes and sources we used to 435 00:29:06,900 --> 00:29:10,110 observe, record and study or analyze these phenomena need to 436 00:29:10,110 --> 00:29:14,700 be classified at appropriate levels. We do not want we do not 437 00:29:14,700 --> 00:29:18,420 want potential adversaries to know exactly what we're able to 438 00:29:18,420 --> 00:29:21,660 see or understand or how we come to the conclusions we make. 439 00:29:21,930 --> 00:29:26,070 Therefore, public disclosures must be carefully considered on 440 00:29:26,070 --> 00:29:27,390 a case by case basis. 441 00:29:29,010 --> 00:29:33,240 John Greenewald: Really, let me add one thing there, Scott. What 442 00:29:33,240 --> 00:29:37,020 happened last year when I tried to get all of the UAP cases that 443 00:29:37,020 --> 00:29:40,860 were being utilized by the UAP Task Force? They were denied to 444 00:29:40,860 --> 00:29:45,360 me under grounds of national security, each and every one. It 445 00:29:45,360 --> 00:29:50,940 was a blanket denial. There was no case by case basis at all. So 446 00:29:50,940 --> 00:29:57,510 based on what I knew then last year, I appealed and I won the 447 00:29:57,510 --> 00:30:01,260 appeal I told them based on the facts final determination that I 448 00:30:01,260 --> 00:30:05,940 got that all of those UAP cases that they denied in full across 449 00:30:05,940 --> 00:30:09,090 the board. However many they wanted to admit that they had at 450 00:30:09,090 --> 00:30:11,640 the time, which they didn't give me a number. But regardless, 451 00:30:11,640 --> 00:30:16,050 however many they had at the time 100% denied in full for 452 00:30:16,050 --> 00:30:19,650 exemption b one, which was national security information, I 453 00:30:19,650 --> 00:30:24,150 appealed it, put up a case and said, No, this is why you can't 454 00:30:24,150 --> 00:30:27,510 do that, and outlined all of the information that I could 455 00:30:27,510 --> 00:30:31,980 accumulate and won the appeal. It was remanded back to the 456 00:30:31,980 --> 00:30:37,020 Department of Navy. And they are being forced to review all of 457 00:30:37,020 --> 00:30:41,640 that information. So even though Scott here decided to tell 458 00:30:41,640 --> 00:30:44,700 Congress, it's a case by case basis, and they want to 459 00:30:45,360 --> 00:30:48,510 essentially be as open as possible. What he left out of 460 00:30:48,510 --> 00:30:52,140 that testimony is that was not the case that they wanted to 461 00:30:52,140 --> 00:30:57,330 deny 100% of it. He comes from the US Navy. And that was a US 462 00:30:57,330 --> 00:31:01,290 Navy decision. And I guarantee because he literally wrote the 463 00:31:01,290 --> 00:31:04,650 security classification guide, or excuse me, he literally 464 00:31:04,650 --> 00:31:07,380 approved the security classification guide that was 465 00:31:07,380 --> 00:31:12,600 written to give this enormous amount of secrecy surrounding 466 00:31:12,630 --> 00:31:16,800 UAP. He's the guy that approved it. What he just told Congress 467 00:31:16,830 --> 00:31:21,600 was definitely not the case. From the beginning. It was sugar 468 00:31:21,600 --> 00:31:23,610 coated, just for his testimony. 469 00:31:24,930 --> 00:31:26,820 Scott Bray: That's next, we're concentrating on a seamless 470 00:31:26,820 --> 00:31:30,030 transition to the new organization and future analysis 471 00:31:30,330 --> 00:31:34,500 of complicated issues of UAP issues will greatly benefit from 472 00:31:34,500 --> 00:31:37,350 the infrastructure, the process and the procedures that we've 473 00:31:37,350 --> 00:31:40,380 developed to date. I'm confident that the task force under Navy 474 00:31:40,380 --> 00:31:43,140 leadership has forged a path forward that will allow us to 475 00:31:43,140 --> 00:31:45,750 anchor assessments in science and engineering vise anecdotal 476 00:31:45,750 --> 00:31:50,220 evidence, we remain committed to that goal, as I know, the Usdi. 477 00:31:51,570 --> 00:31:52,980 organization does as well. 478 00:31:54,090 --> 00:31:56,070 John Greenewald: It didn't really sound too convincing 479 00:31:56,070 --> 00:31:57,480 there, Scott at the end, but 480 00:31:58,290 --> 00:32:00,480 Andre Carson: quickly before I pass it to the ranking member, 481 00:32:01,080 --> 00:32:04,110 and Chairman Schiff, I want to thank you both for taking the 482 00:32:04,110 --> 00:32:06,690 time and I had a good time meeting with you. Last week, 483 00:32:07,020 --> 00:32:12,750 Director Moultrie, Undersecretary Moultrie. It's 484 00:32:12,750 --> 00:32:15,750 fair to say that you are a science fiction fan, is that 485 00:32:15,750 --> 00:32:16,200 correct? 486 00:32:16,950 --> 00:32:19,680 Ronald Moultrie: It's fair to say that I'm an inquisitive 487 00:32:19,680 --> 00:32:24,180 mind, who has spent 40 years in the intelligence field and is 488 00:32:24,180 --> 00:32:26,970 focused on both science and science fiction atmosphere. 489 00:32:27,090 --> 00:32:29,100 Andre Carson: Could you tell us about it? Yeah. Well, 490 00:32:29,520 --> 00:32:33,300 Ronald Moultrie: look, my generation grew up looking at 491 00:32:33,930 --> 00:32:39,660 space sagas and the Apollo program. So all of us who grew 492 00:32:39,660 --> 00:32:45,060 up in the 60s, were just thrilled by watching our first 493 00:32:45,060 --> 00:32:47,250 astronaut land on the moon that was a man that momentous 494 00:32:47,250 --> 00:32:51,840 occasion to people who were of different generations. Some of 495 00:32:51,840 --> 00:32:54,720 them didn't believe that happen, I still have relatives and 496 00:32:54,720 --> 00:32:56,850 friends whose don't believe it happened, write science fiction 497 00:32:56,850 --> 00:32:59,700 to them. But to us, it was snow. That's the progress that we've 498 00:32:59,700 --> 00:33:03,960 made. And so I was enthralled by that. And I've taken that to 499 00:33:03,960 --> 00:33:09,750 heart, I enjoy the challenge of what may be out there. I have 500 00:33:09,780 --> 00:33:13,380 mentioned to you that, yes, I have all science fiction, I have 501 00:33:13,380 --> 00:33:17,640 gone to conventions, even I'll say it on the record. Got to 502 00:33:17,640 --> 00:33:20,880 break the ice somehow. But you know, I have done that. Right. 503 00:33:20,910 --> 00:33:23,880 But there's nothing wrong with that. Don't necessarily dress 504 00:33:23,880 --> 00:33:27,600 up. But I do. You know, I do believe that it's important to 505 00:33:27,600 --> 00:33:30,810 show that the Department of Defense has, you know, we have 506 00:33:30,810 --> 00:33:33,480 character, and where people just like you just like the American 507 00:33:33,480 --> 00:33:39,900 people. We have our we have our our inquisitiveness, we have our 508 00:33:39,900 --> 00:33:42,660 questions. We want to know what's out there. As much as you 509 00:33:42,660 --> 00:33:45,300 want to know what's out there. We get the questions not just 510 00:33:45,300 --> 00:33:47,820 from you, we get it from family members, and we get them night 511 00:33:47,820 --> 00:33:51,210 and day, not just in committee hearings. So finding what's out 512 00:33:51,210 --> 00:33:54,450 there is important. But first and foremost, it's important for 513 00:33:54,450 --> 00:33:58,110 us to do that. So we can ensure that our people, our personnel, 514 00:33:58,110 --> 00:34:02,340 our aviators, our bases and installations are safe. And then 515 00:34:02,340 --> 00:34:05,460 that curiosity factor is something else that that we just 516 00:34:05,460 --> 00:34:08,580 want to know because that's the human race. It's just you know, 517 00:34:08,580 --> 00:34:10,050 that insatiable desire to know 518 00:34:11,220 --> 00:34:14,700 John Greenewald: what a question from left field, but this is 519 00:34:14,700 --> 00:34:18,540 what they were doing. And let me first say I really was impressed 520 00:34:18,540 --> 00:34:23,070 by Ronald Moultrie I, he's a very likable guy. He was very 521 00:34:23,070 --> 00:34:25,770 impressive. I know he didn't give us all the answers that we 522 00:34:25,770 --> 00:34:29,580 wanted. I would venture to guess maybe the next five plus years 523 00:34:29,580 --> 00:34:33,930 afterwards, depending upon how his career goes within DOD. I 524 00:34:33,930 --> 00:34:36,450 wouldn't be surprised if you see him come come out of that kind 525 00:34:36,450 --> 00:34:39,510 of structure and go into politics, because he has that 526 00:34:39,510 --> 00:34:44,730 very likable quality. I wish he didn't tell everyone that we're 527 00:34:44,730 --> 00:34:49,740 just like you, like all of you. Because that is exactly what I 528 00:34:49,740 --> 00:34:53,400 think the intent was there was to humanize the Department of 529 00:34:53,400 --> 00:34:56,940 Defense, that there's this big. You want to talk about stigma. 530 00:34:57,960 --> 00:35:00,840 Essentially the stigma about the big bad government people that 531 00:35:00,840 --> 00:35:04,470 are trying to cover up all the UFO stuff. To me it was such a 532 00:35:04,470 --> 00:35:08,940 left from left field question, obviously planned. And although 533 00:35:08,940 --> 00:35:12,870 I love his answer, I think it's very cool. I wish he didn't have 534 00:35:12,870 --> 00:35:16,200 the comment part about hey, we're just like everyone else. 535 00:35:16,770 --> 00:35:20,040 Because to me that that really shows what the intention was 536 00:35:20,040 --> 00:35:23,220 there. But rather, he should have just left it at, hey, I'm a 537 00:35:23,220 --> 00:35:26,700 sci fi geek. I love going to conventions. I'm inquisitive, 538 00:35:26,700 --> 00:35:29,280 this and that. I know a lot of people thought that that was 539 00:35:29,280 --> 00:35:33,180 ridiculously silly and cheesy. I dug it, I didn't think it was a 540 00:35:33,180 --> 00:35:36,930 bad thing. But regardless, there's still psychology behind 541 00:35:36,930 --> 00:35:40,950 what these guys are doing up there. And that is creating this 542 00:35:40,980 --> 00:35:43,590 aura, that they are just like everyone else. They're 543 00:35:43,590 --> 00:35:46,890 humanizing the effort. They're trying to tell everybody they 544 00:35:46,890 --> 00:35:49,590 want to tell everyone else what's going on, but for 545 00:35:49,590 --> 00:35:53,010 national security on some of this stuff, hey, we need to sure 546 00:35:53,010 --> 00:35:57,240 that's understandable. But it just seems like a lot of that 547 00:35:57,240 --> 00:36:02,190 really was acting, which is a shame. 548 00:36:03,270 --> 00:36:06,630 Adam Schiff: Mr. Break, can you rerun that first image looked 549 00:36:06,630 --> 00:36:10,560 like it was outside of a plane window. And if you wouldn't mind 550 00:36:10,560 --> 00:36:14,010 going up to the screen and tell us what we're what we're seeing. 551 00:36:15,240 --> 00:36:17,670 Not that you can necessarily tell us what we're seeing, but 552 00:36:17,700 --> 00:36:20,820 right explain what we should be looking at in that first image. 553 00:36:20,879 --> 00:36:24,269 Scott Bray: Absolutely. Alexei, what I'll ask is if you can pour 554 00:36:24,269 --> 00:36:25,439 like stop it at 555 00:36:25,770 --> 00:36:27,360 John Greenewald: the whole world's can turn upside down 556 00:36:27,360 --> 00:36:34,380 right now. And Schiff has no idea what's going on. She was 557 00:36:34,380 --> 00:36:37,620 trying to pause the video where the UFO is, you can see on the 558 00:36:37,620 --> 00:36:40,620 screen there. They're using I think this is called a VLC 559 00:36:40,620 --> 00:36:44,070 player, the VLC software, which is pretty old. And she's trying 560 00:36:44,070 --> 00:36:47,550 to stop it right in those three frames that captures the UFL 561 00:36:48,270 --> 00:36:52,860 quit missed it. And this goes on for minutes. I'm going to speed 562 00:36:52,860 --> 00:36:55,350 it up in the video and I'll notate it where I'm speeding it 563 00:36:55,350 --> 00:36:56,310 up at and 564 00:36:56,310 --> 00:36:58,890 Adam Schiff: we're looking outside of a civilian aircraft 565 00:36:58,890 --> 00:37:02,430 window is that what we're looking at us maybe 566 00:37:03,330 --> 00:37:04,830 John Greenewald: so that didn't come through you're looking 567 00:37:04,830 --> 00:37:09,270 outside a US Navy F 18 I can verify that on the audio. I had 568 00:37:09,270 --> 00:37:12,330 to crank it way up. But you could see it just keeps going 569 00:37:12,360 --> 00:37:13,890 that's eight times that right there 570 00:37:17,460 --> 00:37:19,530 Adam Schiff: can you point to the screen again what we're 571 00:37:19,530 --> 00:37:20,310 supposed we're looking at 572 00:37:22,110 --> 00:37:24,270 John Greenewald: and Alexei is probably just sweating bullets 573 00:37:24,270 --> 00:37:26,610 right now trying to eight times the speed 574 00:37:26,730 --> 00:37:29,340 Adam Schiff: right. Okay, if you could stop that 575 00:37:29,370 --> 00:37:34,140 John Greenewald: frame I think she's trying to and still can't 576 00:37:34,140 --> 00:37:36,660 do it. Let's just push play. Let's see for Alexei. 577 00:37:41,310 --> 00:37:42,780 Scott Bray: You'll see coming. Is there. I 578 00:37:46,320 --> 00:37:48,120 John Greenewald: think this was part of the plan logic 579 00:37:48,360 --> 00:37:51,750 Scott Bray: right here zooms by the window, right where? Right 580 00:37:51,870 --> 00:37:52,650 in this area. Right 581 00:37:52,680 --> 00:37:53,460 John Greenewald: and it's gone. 582 00:37:57,150 --> 00:38:00,330 Scott Bray: There we go. There when you see that part right 583 00:38:00,330 --> 00:38:02,250 there again, going by I think we're having a hard time 584 00:38:02,250 --> 00:38:06,810 stopping at the right spot. No kidding. Okay, so as you can 585 00:38:06,810 --> 00:38:14,820 see, it's difficult to the laptop we're working with is not 586 00:38:14,820 --> 00:38:16,890 as easy for us stopping that video. But 587 00:38:17,730 --> 00:38:21,630 John Greenewald: yeah, poor Alexei. Makes you wonder, was 588 00:38:21,630 --> 00:38:26,040 that part of the plan? Let them see how difficult it was to work 589 00:38:26,040 --> 00:38:29,130 with three frames of a video. When she could have just one 590 00:38:29,130 --> 00:38:32,310 frame by frame with VLC. I think you can do that. But regardless, 591 00:38:32,580 --> 00:38:36,870 nobody thought ahead. These are the men and women that are 592 00:38:36,870 --> 00:38:40,560 likely investigating these UAP that are analyzing the videos 593 00:38:40,560 --> 00:38:44,790 that are collecting the data. And for a congressional UFO 594 00:38:44,790 --> 00:38:47,610 hearing one that they knew was gonna get a lot of attention. 595 00:38:48,720 --> 00:38:52,170 They couldn't figure out how to pause on those frames. How about 596 00:38:52,170 --> 00:38:54,900 just export the frames before you go into the hearing and show 597 00:38:54,900 --> 00:38:56,970 those who knows 598 00:38:56,970 --> 00:39:00,240 Adam Schiff: por Alexei, though? And is this a situation where it 599 00:39:00,240 --> 00:39:03,330 was observed by the pilot and it was also recorded by the 600 00:39:03,330 --> 00:39:04,440 aircraft's instruments. 601 00:39:05,310 --> 00:39:08,430 Scott Bray: We'll talk about the multisensor part in a later 602 00:39:08,430 --> 00:39:16,290 session. But in this case, we have at least that 603 00:39:16,980 --> 00:39:19,470 John Greenewald: weird time for that audio to count how it's 604 00:39:19,470 --> 00:39:23,610 got. Its it was I think one of the first times they said that 605 00:39:23,610 --> 00:39:27,660 they were going to push things to the classified session. And 606 00:39:27,660 --> 00:39:29,880 that's what they mean by closed hearing. So when you hear closed 607 00:39:29,880 --> 00:39:32,910 hearing for those who aren't aware, that means that whatever 608 00:39:32,910 --> 00:39:35,250 they're encroaching on there when they're talking about 609 00:39:35,310 --> 00:39:38,670 certain information, that's the classified stuff and they cannot 610 00:39:38,670 --> 00:39:40,560 talk about it to you and I 611 00:39:41,580 --> 00:39:45,720 Adam Schiff: last year's report also said that of those 144 18 612 00:39:45,720 --> 00:39:50,460 of them, reportedly appeared to exhibit unusual flight 613 00:39:50,460 --> 00:39:54,570 characteristics appear to demonstrate advanced technology 614 00:39:55,680 --> 00:39:59,280 and some of them appeared to remain stationary and winds 615 00:39:59,280 --> 00:40:02,760 aloft move Have against the wind maneuver abruptly or move at 616 00:40:02,760 --> 00:40:05,550 considerable speed without discernible means of propulsion. 617 00:40:07,680 --> 00:40:14,220 That's pretty intriguing. And if you're able to answer this in 618 00:40:14,220 --> 00:40:20,160 this setting, are we aware of any foreign adversary capable of 619 00:40:20,160 --> 00:40:24,840 moving objects without any discernible means of propulsion? 620 00:40:27,780 --> 00:40:30,300 Scott Bray: I think I would say without discernible means of 621 00:40:30,300 --> 00:40:34,140 propulsion, I would say that we're not aware of any adversary 622 00:40:34,140 --> 00:40:36,420 that can move an object without discernible means the 623 00:40:36,420 --> 00:40:40,650 propulsion. The question then becomes, in many of these cases, 624 00:40:40,650 --> 00:40:42,960 where we don't have a discernible meaning propulsion 625 00:40:42,990 --> 00:40:49,080 in the data that we have, in some cases, there is likely 626 00:40:49,110 --> 00:40:54,240 sensor artifacts, that that may be hiding some of that there's 627 00:40:54,240 --> 00:40:57,720 certainly some degree of, of something that looks like 628 00:40:57,720 --> 00:41:00,750 signature management that we have seen from some of these 629 00:41:01,890 --> 00:41:06,750 UAP. But I would, I would caution, I would simply say that 630 00:41:06,750 --> 00:41:10,650 there are a number of, of events in which we do not have an 631 00:41:10,650 --> 00:41:14,550 explanation in which the narrow, small handful in which there are 632 00:41:14,550 --> 00:41:17,910 flight characteristics or signature management, that we 633 00:41:17,910 --> 00:41:20,400 can't explain with the data that we have. 634 00:41:22,350 --> 00:41:23,940 John Greenewald: Part of that answer, I think, was written on 635 00:41:23,940 --> 00:41:26,400 the roof. But it's always fascinating to see people like 636 00:41:26,400 --> 00:41:30,270 Scott Bray, who you know, is highly clear to see probably 637 00:41:30,270 --> 00:41:34,800 quite a bit, try and answer some of these questions. And he just 638 00:41:35,040 --> 00:41:37,680 really has to choose his words carefully. 639 00:41:37,710 --> 00:41:40,500 Adam Schiff: Finally, with respect to the second two 640 00:41:40,500 --> 00:41:46,440 videos, showing the small triangles, the hypothesis is 641 00:41:46,440 --> 00:41:52,380 that those are commercial drones that because of the use of night 642 00:41:52,380 --> 00:41:55,800 vision goggles appear like triangles is that the operating 643 00:41:55,830 --> 00:41:56,400 assessment, 644 00:41:56,430 --> 00:41:59,850 Scott Bray: some type of of drone, some type of unmanned 645 00:41:59,850 --> 00:42:04,710 aerial system, and it is simply that that light source resolves 646 00:42:04,710 --> 00:42:08,640 itself through the, through the night vision goggles onto the 647 00:42:08,640 --> 00:42:10,440 SLR camera as a triangle. 648 00:42:10,710 --> 00:42:14,310 Adam Schiff: And have we in order to prove that hypothesis, 649 00:42:14,880 --> 00:42:19,800 flown a drone, and observed it with that same technology to see 650 00:42:19,800 --> 00:42:22,950 whether we can reproduce the effect UAV 651 00:42:22,950 --> 00:42:24,720 Scott Bray: Task Force is aware of studies that have done that 652 00:42:25,830 --> 00:42:28,800 John Greenewald: the UAP Task Force is aware of studies that 653 00:42:28,800 --> 00:42:32,700 have done that, it didn't say that the UAP Task Force has done 654 00:42:32,700 --> 00:42:36,810 that, Regardless though, if you look at the work of Mick West, 655 00:42:36,840 --> 00:42:42,090 they did do some experimentation on essentially cooperating that 656 00:42:42,090 --> 00:42:46,020 theory. And and I feel that they that they nailed it. And I think 657 00:42:46,020 --> 00:42:49,410 that the evidence in the video, if you look at the stars, versus 658 00:42:49,410 --> 00:42:53,520 those craft with the blinking light, the stars are triangular 659 00:42:53,550 --> 00:42:57,960 as well. So it very much coincide. So I think that it's a 660 00:42:57,960 --> 00:43:01,830 proper debunk. But regardless, it goes back to that was this 661 00:43:01,830 --> 00:43:05,790 part of a master plan to really let the public get really super 662 00:43:05,790 --> 00:43:09,270 excited about something for a year, let those things leak out, 663 00:43:09,540 --> 00:43:12,210 and then just destroy them in this hearing, you know, because 664 00:43:12,210 --> 00:43:15,300 it's one thing when Mick West says it, it's another thing when 665 00:43:15,300 --> 00:43:19,110 under oath and a congressional hearing, they tell you the exact 666 00:43:19,110 --> 00:43:22,740 same thing. So I do find it interesting the way he phrased 667 00:43:22,740 --> 00:43:26,310 that final word, or excuse me, final phrase where he just said 668 00:43:26,310 --> 00:43:29,250 we're aware of studies, but they said that they didn't conduct 669 00:43:29,250 --> 00:43:33,750 it. Regardless, I feel on that particular case, the evidence 670 00:43:33,750 --> 00:43:36,570 checks out, but it really does play into that question mark of 671 00:43:36,750 --> 00:43:37,980 was that part of the plan? 672 00:43:40,710 --> 00:43:42,840 Brad Wenstrup: Are we capable? Or have we made any 673 00:43:42,840 --> 00:43:46,530 breakthroughs or anyone made any breakthroughs to be able to cite 674 00:43:46,530 --> 00:43:51,510 something and make some determination at all of its 675 00:43:51,540 --> 00:43:57,000 composition? Whether it's a solid or a gas? Do Is there any 676 00:43:57,000 --> 00:44:04,290 such capability? From not asking what I've just read 677 00:44:04,410 --> 00:44:06,720 Scott Bray: from some of the returns, I mean, it's clear that 678 00:44:07,170 --> 00:44:10,050 that the majority Well, it's clear that many of the 679 00:44:10,050 --> 00:44:13,470 observations we have are physical objects from the sensor 680 00:44:13,470 --> 00:44:14,280 data that we have 681 00:44:15,630 --> 00:44:18,270 Brad Wenstrup: fit well, gases, physical is a physical object, 682 00:44:18,270 --> 00:44:21,690 watch the guy in the back. And so you see where I'm going with 683 00:44:21,690 --> 00:44:24,000 this. I'm trying to determine what it is we're looking at. So 684 00:44:24,000 --> 00:44:27,660 if we can decide if something is a solid or gas, and if there 685 00:44:27,660 --> 00:44:31,500 been any conclusion on its capabilities, like its 686 00:44:31,500 --> 00:44:37,050 capabilities of movement, of turning, going, you know, 180 687 00:44:37,050 --> 00:44:40,440 degrees or 90 degree turn anything along that line that 688 00:44:40,440 --> 00:44:41,580 we've been able to determine 689 00:44:42,180 --> 00:44:44,370 Scott Bray: within the and again, I should point out that 690 00:44:44,790 --> 00:44:48,060 you know that there is not a single explanation for UAP they 691 00:44:48,090 --> 00:44:51,390 make up there are a lot of different things that are 692 00:44:51,420 --> 00:44:52,080 unidentified, 693 00:44:52,530 --> 00:44:55,770 Brad Wenstrup: basically, we really don't know much on that. 694 00:44:55,800 --> 00:44:58,410 That's all I'm trying to get at. And I'm pleased that you have 695 00:44:58,410 --> 00:45:02,340 protocol right now for Our military, but are there any non 696 00:45:02,340 --> 00:45:06,090 military reports coming forward of similar events? Or is it all 697 00:45:06,090 --> 00:45:07,320 coming from military? 698 00:45:07,860 --> 00:45:09,660 Scott Bray: The UAP Task Force has a very good working 699 00:45:09,660 --> 00:45:12,750 relationship with the FAA. They have very good working 700 00:45:12,750 --> 00:45:16,260 relationship with other parts of the US government so that we can 701 00:45:16,260 --> 00:45:19,800 ingest reports from Do we have any 702 00:45:19,800 --> 00:45:23,400 Brad Wenstrup: reports non military? Yes. Thank you. 703 00:45:23,400 --> 00:45:27,120 That's, that's, that's my question. And do we need to put 704 00:45:27,120 --> 00:45:30,210 out protocol for civilians that may be in that arena, like 705 00:45:30,210 --> 00:45:32,850 through FAA? Do you think that would be appropriate and 706 00:45:32,850 --> 00:45:33,390 helpful? 707 00:45:33,780 --> 00:45:36,960 Scott Bray: I think standardize the reporting, without a doubt 708 00:45:36,990 --> 00:45:41,670 is key to helping us get to the, to ascertain what some of these 709 00:45:41,670 --> 00:45:41,970 are, 710 00:45:42,060 --> 00:45:44,760 Brad Wenstrup: I think it would be important as well, do we, 711 00:45:45,900 --> 00:45:49,800 there are other people besides the US that have had these 712 00:45:49,800 --> 00:45:52,650 experiences and reported them? Is that correct? 713 00:45:53,190 --> 00:45:54,120 Scott Bray: There are That's correct. 714 00:45:54,690 --> 00:45:59,220 Brad Wenstrup: Is it all of our allies? Or is it allies and 715 00:45:59,220 --> 00:46:01,770 adversaries? What have we learned publicly? 716 00:46:01,830 --> 00:46:03,810 Ronald Moultrie: So some of that, I think, sir, will say for 717 00:46:03,810 --> 00:46:04,440 closed session? 718 00:46:05,520 --> 00:46:08,220 Brad Wenstrup: Well, that goes my next question publicly have 719 00:46:08,220 --> 00:46:12,210 others made anything which would not have to be considered 720 00:46:12,210 --> 00:46:14,790 closed? So I don't want you to answer what they've said 721 00:46:14,790 --> 00:46:15,540 necessarily. 722 00:46:16,259 --> 00:46:19,469 Scott Bray: Allies have have seen these China has established 723 00:46:19,469 --> 00:46:23,279 its own version of the UAP task force. So clearly, a number of 724 00:46:23,279 --> 00:46:27,209 countries have observations of things in the airspace that they 725 00:46:27,209 --> 00:46:27,929 can identify. 726 00:46:28,259 --> 00:46:33,119 Brad Wenstrup: And do we share data with some with all? Are 727 00:46:33,119 --> 00:46:34,529 they sharing with us? 728 00:46:36,270 --> 00:46:38,340 Scott Bray: We share data with some and some share data with 729 00:46:38,340 --> 00:46:38,670 us. 730 00:46:39,570 --> 00:46:41,370 Brad Wenstrup: But not necessarily all that have 731 00:46:41,400 --> 00:46:42,900 publicly reported something? 732 00:46:42,960 --> 00:46:44,790 John Greenewald: That's correct. Okay, in the back. 733 00:46:46,170 --> 00:46:48,330 Brad Wenstrup: And I think that's an important thing. And 734 00:46:48,330 --> 00:46:52,770 for the other session, actually, that we don't discuss that now. 735 00:46:55,950 --> 00:46:57,630 John Greenewald: Tell me you didn't prepare for the hearing 736 00:46:57,630 --> 00:47:00,390 by not telling me you didn't prepare for the hearing, I just 737 00:47:00,390 --> 00:47:02,730 get a kick out of the guy in the back wondering what in the 738 00:47:02,730 --> 00:47:06,720 world, the guy in front of him is asking about. I laugh 739 00:47:06,720 --> 00:47:09,750 throughout that, throughout that testimony, but there was some 740 00:47:09,930 --> 00:47:13,590 important bits in there, especially about other countries 741 00:47:13,620 --> 00:47:17,670 sharing data with us, China having a UAP Task Force. I know 742 00:47:17,670 --> 00:47:20,130 that was reported, I believe through the debrief A little 743 00:47:20,130 --> 00:47:23,640 while back, but again, you know, just kind of solidifying that as 744 00:47:23,640 --> 00:47:27,840 fact, all that, you know, was was interesting. Nonetheless, I 745 00:47:27,840 --> 00:47:32,610 just loved the fact that gas got brought up again, and that whole 746 00:47:32,610 --> 00:47:36,690 message just very reminiscent of swamp gas from the 1950s, trying 747 00:47:36,690 --> 00:47:41,790 to explain UFOs and Bray, God bless them. How do you answer 748 00:47:41,790 --> 00:47:45,330 that when you're clearly not talking about a gas? But a 749 00:47:45,330 --> 00:47:49,200 congressman is trying to connect it as such? Who knows? 750 00:47:49,259 --> 00:47:51,029 Jim Hines: I think, Mr. Bray, you said something that I want 751 00:47:51,029 --> 00:47:56,729 to unpack a little bit. A number of these UAPs, you said we can't 752 00:47:56,729 --> 00:48:01,799 explain? Again, in the service of sort of reducing speculation 753 00:48:01,799 --> 00:48:07,289 and conspiracy theories, we can't explain can range from a 754 00:48:07,289 --> 00:48:10,169 visual observation that was distant on a foggy night, we 755 00:48:10,169 --> 00:48:14,999 don't know what it is to. We've found inorganic material that we 756 00:48:14,999 --> 00:48:18,299 can identify right? Those are radically different world world. 757 00:48:18,299 --> 00:48:22,409 So when you say we can't explain give the public a little bit 758 00:48:22,739 --> 00:48:26,699 better sense of where on that spectrum of we can't explain we 759 00:48:26,699 --> 00:48:30,449 are, are we holding materials organic or inorganic, that we 760 00:48:30,449 --> 00:48:33,689 don't know about? Are we, you know, picking up emanations that 761 00:48:33,689 --> 00:48:36,779 are something other than light or infrared that it could be 762 00:48:36,809 --> 00:48:39,479 deemed to be communications give us a sense for what you mean, 763 00:48:39,479 --> 00:48:41,279 when you say we can't explain? 764 00:48:41,310 --> 00:48:44,850 Scott Bray: Sure when I say we can't explain I mean, exactly as 765 00:48:44,850 --> 00:48:47,130 you described there, that there's a lot of information, 766 00:48:47,280 --> 00:48:49,830 like the video that we showed, in which there's simply too 767 00:48:49,830 --> 00:48:53,850 little data to create a reasonable explanation. There 768 00:48:53,850 --> 00:48:57,900 are a small handful of cases in which we have more data, that 769 00:48:57,900 --> 00:49:02,310 our analysis simply hasn't been able to, to fully pull together 770 00:49:02,310 --> 00:49:07,020 a picture of what happened. The and those are the cases where we 771 00:49:07,020 --> 00:49:10,140 talked about where we see some indications of flight 772 00:49:10,140 --> 00:49:13,500 characteristics or signature management, that are not what we 773 00:49:13,500 --> 00:49:16,920 had expected. When it comes to material that we have, we have 774 00:49:16,920 --> 00:49:21,780 no material. We have detected no emanations within the UAP. 775 00:49:21,780 --> 00:49:26,640 taskforce that that is that would suggest it's anything non 776 00:49:26,640 --> 00:49:31,350 terrestrial in origin. So there's, when I say unexplained 777 00:49:31,350 --> 00:49:35,490 I mean everything from too little too little data, to we 778 00:49:35,490 --> 00:49:38,340 simply the data that we have doesn't point us towards an 779 00:49:38,340 --> 00:49:41,040 explanation. But we'll go wherever the data takes us. 780 00:49:41,040 --> 00:49:43,230 Again, we've made no assumptions about what this is or isn't. 781 00:49:43,710 --> 00:49:46,680 We're committed to understanding these and so we'll go wherever 782 00:49:46,680 --> 00:49:47,580 that data takes us. 783 00:49:49,740 --> 00:49:51,510 John Greenewald: Tom somehow I don't believe that, but we'll 784 00:49:51,510 --> 00:49:52,500 give you the benefit of the 785 00:49:53,339 --> 00:49:55,139 Mike Gallagher: doubt there. Mr. Moultrie as the Chairman 786 00:49:55,409 --> 00:49:59,969 mentioned, DOD had initiative to study UFOs in the 1960s called 787 00:49:59,999 --> 00:50:04,199 Project Bluebook has also been well reported in our briefing 788 00:50:04,199 --> 00:50:07,259 and other places that we have more we have more recent 789 00:50:07,259 --> 00:50:11,399 projects, specifically a tip. Could you describe any other 790 00:50:11,399 --> 00:50:16,259 initiatives that the DoD or DOD contractors have managed after 791 00:50:16,259 --> 00:50:20,039 project Bluebook ended? And prior to a tip, beginning, did 792 00:50:20,039 --> 00:50:22,769 anything also predate project? Bluebook? 793 00:50:23,400 --> 00:50:26,040 Ronald Moultrie: So I can't speak to what may have predated 794 00:50:26,610 --> 00:50:29,670 project Bluebook. I mean, of course, there's Roswell and all 795 00:50:29,670 --> 00:50:31,380 these other things that people have talked about over the 796 00:50:31,380 --> 00:50:35,580 years. I'm familiar with blue book I'm familiar with, with a 797 00:50:35,580 --> 00:50:40,470 tip. I haven't seen other documented studies that have 798 00:50:40,470 --> 00:50:42,060 been done by DOD in that regard. 799 00:50:42,690 --> 00:50:44,340 Mike Gallagher: So you're not aware of anything in between 800 00:50:44,340 --> 00:50:46,140 project Bluebook. And a tip 801 00:50:46,200 --> 00:50:48,510 Ronald Moultrie: I'm not aware of anything that's official that 802 00:50:48,510 --> 00:50:51,660 was done in between those two hasn't been brought to my 803 00:50:51,660 --> 00:50:52,110 attention. 804 00:50:53,760 --> 00:50:57,330 John Greenewald: Okay, so let me unpack two things I'll first 805 00:50:57,330 --> 00:51:01,350 I'll deal with the the, well, we'll get to the official versus 806 00:51:01,350 --> 00:51:05,610 unofficial but unpack the the study in between, let's call it 807 00:51:05,640 --> 00:51:09,210 a tip the timeframe and project Bluebook. beyond a shadow of a 808 00:51:09,210 --> 00:51:12,720 doubt the US Air Force had on their manuals, how to report 809 00:51:12,720 --> 00:51:15,630 UFOs, they were being sent to the NORAD installation, 810 00:51:15,780 --> 00:51:19,290 generally, you don't create manuals like that, for nothing. 811 00:51:19,560 --> 00:51:23,700 I discovered this back in I believe it was 2000 talked about 812 00:51:23,700 --> 00:51:26,670 it for quite a few years, when the media was going to highlight 813 00:51:26,670 --> 00:51:30,330 it, it literally disappeared. It's a much longer story. But 814 00:51:30,330 --> 00:51:33,810 that's the nutshell. But it literally was rewritten. 48 815 00:51:33,810 --> 00:51:38,280 hours after the Huffington Post and journalist Lee Spiegel was 816 00:51:38,280 --> 00:51:41,640 profiling the black vault, and some of the top documents that I 817 00:51:41,640 --> 00:51:44,940 had given them, that was one of them. Specifically, it was Air 818 00:51:44,940 --> 00:51:50,790 Force manual, 10 Dash 206. And again, it outlined in chapter 819 00:51:50,790 --> 00:51:56,220 five, all about UFOs. And what to report and, and gave specific 820 00:51:56,220 --> 00:51:59,400 details on what the report needed, and then they sent it to 821 00:51:59,400 --> 00:52:03,270 NORAD, whether or not that that was a attach to an official 822 00:52:03,270 --> 00:52:08,970 program or not. In my opinion, there was probably more than one 823 00:52:08,970 --> 00:52:12,330 or two reports over the years that that was on the books by 824 00:52:12,330 --> 00:52:16,620 pilots. But the NORAD installation told me they had 825 00:52:16,620 --> 00:52:19,950 nothing. Canadian government gave me a pile of service 826 00:52:19,950 --> 00:52:24,870 reports that essentially tied into NORAD and the collection of 827 00:52:24,870 --> 00:52:28,470 this type of data. So I wanted to bring that up, because there 828 00:52:28,470 --> 00:52:31,740 is clearly an effort of some kind, or at least there was 829 00:52:32,040 --> 00:52:36,090 between what we consider a tip and that timeframe versus blue 830 00:52:36,090 --> 00:52:40,860 book. Now, I want to spend a minute or two based on I know a 831 00:52:40,860 --> 00:52:43,800 lot of things thrown my direction about a tip and its 832 00:52:43,800 --> 00:52:48,420 connection to being a UFO program. And whether it was or 833 00:52:48,420 --> 00:52:52,110 wasn't or was or whether it was a nickname or not, or whether it 834 00:52:52,110 --> 00:52:56,520 was real or not, or whether it was UFO related or not. All of 835 00:52:56,520 --> 00:52:59,580 that mess, and to be honest with you. 836 00:53:02,070 --> 00:53:06,180 I don't from this hearing anyway. But with that question, 837 00:53:06,180 --> 00:53:10,080 I think that we can really take a lot to the bank and go aha, 838 00:53:10,320 --> 00:53:14,430 it's settled with a tip. And I know that some of my haters out 839 00:53:14,430 --> 00:53:17,250 there are going to you know, clip this segment out and go 840 00:53:17,250 --> 00:53:21,570 Greenwald's in fill in the expletive because I'm saying 841 00:53:21,570 --> 00:53:26,490 this, but when you look at the question, and you look at the 842 00:53:26,490 --> 00:53:29,760 media, and he admitted in a podcast, he did about five, I 843 00:53:29,760 --> 00:53:32,370 think his quote was like five hours of research for this 844 00:53:32,370 --> 00:53:36,060 hearing. And kudos to him. It doesn't sound like a lot. But 845 00:53:36,090 --> 00:53:39,030 you know, I mean, he really looked into it and let's face 846 00:53:39,030 --> 00:53:42,780 it, I mean, a tip was a program according to the internet and 847 00:53:42,780 --> 00:53:46,710 and all of the media articles out there. So no matter what the 848 00:53:46,710 --> 00:53:50,730 truth is, right? Like take my personal finding out, take your 849 00:53:50,730 --> 00:53:53,970 personal finding out. If you are a newcomer, and you go to the 850 00:53:53,970 --> 00:53:58,890 internet, and you spent a few hours and you look, that was a 851 00:53:58,890 --> 00:54:03,240 documented timeframe of UFO quote unquote, UFO research. 852 00:54:03,240 --> 00:54:06,780 Yes. I'm saying quote, unquote, because that is what the what 853 00:54:06,780 --> 00:54:11,850 the stories were. And that was a point, you know, like a time 854 00:54:11,850 --> 00:54:14,760 point that he could he could reference Moultrie saying that 855 00:54:14,760 --> 00:54:18,090 he was familiar with a tip. That's great. That's, that's 856 00:54:18,090 --> 00:54:21,330 fascinating. But it doesn't really take away from the fact 857 00:54:21,330 --> 00:54:25,410 that it was either official or unofficial. In addition, let's 858 00:54:25,410 --> 00:54:29,250 say the DoD changes their stance tomorrow on a tip and that it 859 00:54:29,250 --> 00:54:33,150 was some UFO research effort, led by Luis Elizondo, I'll 860 00:54:33,150 --> 00:54:35,010 report it to you I'll bring it to you. I'll put it on this 861 00:54:35,010 --> 00:54:38,040 channel and put on my website. I don't hide from the fact that it 862 00:54:38,040 --> 00:54:42,030 doesn't, doesn't bother me at all. But as it stands right now, 863 00:54:42,030 --> 00:54:46,680 their stance is it wasn't a UFO program. It all stemmed back to 864 00:54:46,680 --> 00:54:50,790 the SAP program and wasn't paranormal or UFO related at 865 00:54:50,790 --> 00:54:53,640 all. That's what the official line is. Don't kill me for 866 00:54:53,640 --> 00:54:58,110 delivering it. But rather that is what the DoD is stance is 867 00:54:58,560 --> 00:55:01,080 what I think what that we're getting digging into from what 868 00:55:01,080 --> 00:55:05,160 I've kind of learned and seen and heard over and over and you 869 00:55:05,190 --> 00:55:10,440 dissect every syllable and character that that is that is 870 00:55:10,440 --> 00:55:13,290 used by the Department of Defense and Pentagon 871 00:55:13,290 --> 00:55:17,400 spokespeople and FOIA people. After researching this for so 872 00:55:17,400 --> 00:55:20,670 many years, here's what I think that this is really ultimately 873 00:55:20,670 --> 00:55:24,240 ending up in. And I know others have echoed very similar things 874 00:55:24,240 --> 00:55:29,070 as well, is that my guess is this wasn't an official effort 875 00:55:29,250 --> 00:55:32,760 sponsored by, you know, the Department of Defense to go out 876 00:55:32,760 --> 00:55:36,720 and look for UFOs like the media led us to believe I've said that 877 00:55:36,720 --> 00:55:40,530 for years now. I truly think that that's where this is going. 878 00:55:41,130 --> 00:55:44,700 Lewis Elizondo, I believe probably heard about what was 879 00:55:44,700 --> 00:55:49,200 going on probably saw the importance of UAP, the security 880 00:55:49,200 --> 00:55:53,790 issue behind them the question mark, and to his credit, and I 881 00:55:53,790 --> 00:55:57,090 and I would fully support this, took that under his wing to kind 882 00:55:57,090 --> 00:56:00,600 of pursue, and I think what's going to come out in the next 883 00:56:01,080 --> 00:56:05,250 year or maybe two, three years, is that this was just a group, a 884 00:56:05,250 --> 00:56:08,640 small group at this time of people that were not working on 885 00:56:08,640 --> 00:56:12,540 any official program whatsoever. I believe you'll see the term 886 00:56:12,540 --> 00:56:16,230 Friends of the program come up, that they essentially were 887 00:56:16,230 --> 00:56:20,850 people that had very similar beliefs, to Luis Elizondo, I 888 00:56:20,850 --> 00:56:23,550 know Brian Bender, from Politico has referred to it as a 889 00:56:23,550 --> 00:56:27,510 portfolio. I think that's probably over overstating it. 890 00:56:27,810 --> 00:56:30,630 Where are the reports? You know, it's these age old questions, 891 00:56:30,630 --> 00:56:33,570 like, where is everything? So I think that that's where we're 892 00:56:33,570 --> 00:56:36,300 gonna end up. Okay. And I want to do at least put that in this 893 00:56:36,300 --> 00:56:40,290 part of the hearing. Because now let me go back to Moultrie. Is 894 00:56:40,290 --> 00:56:44,430 this the setting for him to get into the weeds and the dirt? And 895 00:56:45,060 --> 00:56:49,080 well, it wasn't a program really, and a tip this or this 896 00:56:49,080 --> 00:56:53,970 guy did that or was all off the books. Nobody really cares about 897 00:56:53,970 --> 00:56:57,270 that, in this particular setting? They just don't. So 898 00:56:57,270 --> 00:57:00,840 Moultrie is just going to take this the Congressman's question, 899 00:57:01,170 --> 00:57:04,200 that that is the the timeframe that he's talking about that 900 00:57:04,200 --> 00:57:07,260 that is the effort that he's talking about the clearly the 901 00:57:07,260 --> 00:57:11,190 DOD has heard more than enough about and, and not get into the 902 00:57:11,190 --> 00:57:14,610 weeds of arguing what was or wasn't official, or a portfolio 903 00:57:14,610 --> 00:57:19,800 versus a program or a hobby or, you know, a lie even, he's just 904 00:57:19,800 --> 00:57:22,920 going to answer the question. So again, my haters out there, 905 00:57:22,920 --> 00:57:25,290 they're gonna hate this section. But I think that that's what 906 00:57:25,290 --> 00:57:28,110 we're gonna come down to. And I give Mr. Elizondo credit, 907 00:57:28,110 --> 00:57:31,560 despite the drama that's going on right now. Give him credit 908 00:57:31,560 --> 00:57:35,580 for taking that topic. Seriously. I just wish when he 909 00:57:35,820 --> 00:57:40,260 exited the shadows, so to speak that we heard that, that if they 910 00:57:40,260 --> 00:57:44,190 you know, and I'm 98% sure that that's how that this is going to 911 00:57:44,190 --> 00:57:47,040 play out that he did do work within the Pentagon, but it 912 00:57:47,040 --> 00:57:51,330 wasn't like nobody really cared that that as long as it didn't 913 00:57:51,330 --> 00:57:56,250 affect his other duties, that he had his job. And if he did this 914 00:57:56,250 --> 00:58:00,510 other effort to try and help out or do some extra stuff that, you 915 00:58:00,510 --> 00:58:03,600 know, the bosses that did no, because apparently a lot of 916 00:58:03,600 --> 00:58:06,690 people were left in the dark. They say, yeah, yeah, go, you 917 00:58:06,690 --> 00:58:08,940 know, as long as it doesn't interfere with your other 918 00:58:08,940 --> 00:58:13,590 duties. You go right ahead. And that's what this is. So I give 919 00:58:13,590 --> 00:58:15,540 them credit for that. I just wish we heard that from the 920 00:58:15,540 --> 00:58:19,830 beginning. But regardless that that going back to Moultrie, I 921 00:58:19,830 --> 00:58:22,020 think that that's the eight tip reference. This was not the 922 00:58:22,020 --> 00:58:24,420 setting to get into that. And to be honest with you, the 923 00:58:24,420 --> 00:58:27,120 congressman just doesn't care either. You know, I mean, he's 924 00:58:27,120 --> 00:58:29,670 just interested in what he's asking about, not the nitty 925 00:58:29,670 --> 00:58:30,630 gritty details. 926 00:58:31,920 --> 00:58:33,780 Mike Gallagher: So just to confirm, you're not aware of any 927 00:58:33,810 --> 00:58:36,600 technology or engineering resources that have been focused 928 00:58:36,600 --> 00:58:39,270 on these efforts besides what we've mentioned today. 929 00:58:39,960 --> 00:58:44,850 Ronald Moultrie: Once again, I'll say no contractual or 930 00:58:44,910 --> 00:58:49,050 programmatic efforts that are involved, the reason why I 931 00:58:49,200 --> 00:58:53,190 qualified. Yeah, let me qualify it that way. I can't speak to 932 00:58:53,190 --> 00:58:55,770 what people may be looking at in the department, somebody says 933 00:58:55,770 --> 00:58:58,290 I'm looking at something, I'm looking at something that may be 934 00:58:58,290 --> 00:59:01,710 identified, and I can't speak to that speak to official programs 935 00:59:01,710 --> 00:59:02,760 that we have on the record. 936 00:59:05,160 --> 00:59:07,830 John Greenewald: I think that that solidifies it a bit, in a 937 00:59:07,830 --> 00:59:11,340 nonchalant way that he can't really speak to those that were 938 00:59:11,370 --> 00:59:14,430 kind of doing this on their own free time that they became aware 939 00:59:14,430 --> 00:59:17,880 of a pilot's video or a photograph or a story, that 940 00:59:17,880 --> 00:59:21,210 they're sitting there and doing this on either their own free 941 00:59:21,210 --> 00:59:25,950 time, or their extra time that although it was considered DoD 942 00:59:25,950 --> 00:59:30,540 work was nothing official. So I think he recognizes that that 943 00:59:30,540 --> 00:59:33,750 that is something that you can't speak to, because he's not 944 00:59:33,750 --> 00:59:38,310 mandating it him as the head of Oh Usdi ins and and whomever 945 00:59:38,310 --> 00:59:41,880 that works alongside him is not saying you investigate this, you 946 00:59:41,880 --> 00:59:44,970 invested. Let's go, here's the manual. Here's the program name, 947 00:59:44,970 --> 00:59:48,900 I need a report by five. That's not necessarily what this was. 948 00:59:48,900 --> 00:59:51,930 And I think what he's essentially alluding to there Is 949 00:59:52,020 --> 00:59:55,980 there likely were people whether it be Mr. Elizondo or other 950 00:59:55,980 --> 01:00:00,090 people within the navy or open AI, or wherever they were By 951 01:00:00,240 --> 01:00:04,350 doing this that is not to diminish their work, but rather 952 01:00:04,350 --> 01:00:08,400 putting it and framing it in a proper context and that that's 953 01:00:08,400 --> 01:00:09,960 always what I've been interested in more than 954 01:00:09,990 --> 01:00:11,760 Mike Gallagher: it's also been reported that there have been 955 01:00:11,760 --> 01:00:15,390 UAP observed and interacting with and flying over sensitive 956 01:00:15,390 --> 01:00:17,520 military facilities, particularly not just ranges, 957 01:00:17,520 --> 01:00:21,270 but some facilities housing our strategic nuclear forces. One 958 01:00:21,270 --> 01:00:25,950 such incident allegedly occurred at Malmstrom Air Force Base in 959 01:00:25,950 --> 01:00:29,040 which 10 of our nuclear ICBMs were rendered inoperable. At the 960 01:00:29,040 --> 01:00:31,890 same time glowing red orb was observed overhead. I'm not 961 01:00:31,890 --> 01:00:34,800 commenting on the accuracy of this. I'm simply asking you 962 01:00:34,830 --> 01:00:37,080 whether you're aware of it and whether you have any comments on 963 01:00:37,080 --> 01:00:38,190 the accuracy of that reporting 964 01:00:38,190 --> 01:00:40,290 Ronald Moultrie: path. Mr. Bray, if you've been looking at the 965 01:00:40,290 --> 01:00:41,490 APS over the last three years, 966 01:00:41,550 --> 01:00:44,400 Scott Bray: that data is not within the holdings of the UAP 967 01:00:44,400 --> 01:00:45,090 Task Force. 968 01:00:46,440 --> 01:00:49,860 Mike Gallagher: Okay, but are you aware of the the report or 969 01:00:49,860 --> 01:00:52,320 that the data exists somewhere? 970 01:00:53,010 --> 01:00:56,670 Scott Bray: I have. I have heard stories, I have not seen the 971 01:00:56,670 --> 01:00:57,570 official data on that. 972 01:00:57,600 --> 01:01:00,630 Mike Gallagher: So you just seen informal stories, no official 973 01:01:00,630 --> 01:01:04,710 assessment that you've done or exists within DOD, that you're 974 01:01:04,710 --> 01:01:07,200 aware of regarding the Malmstrom incident. 975 01:01:08,790 --> 01:01:10,560 Scott Bray: All I can say because you know, what's within 976 01:01:10,560 --> 01:01:12,780 my cognizance, the UAP Task Force, and we have not looked at 977 01:01:12,780 --> 01:01:13,380 that incident. 978 01:01:14,430 --> 01:01:15,810 Mike Gallagher: While I was I missed a pretty high profile 979 01:01:15,810 --> 01:01:19,620 incident, I don't claim to be an expert on this. But that's out 980 01:01:19,620 --> 01:01:24,030 there in the ether. You're you're the guys investigating 981 01:01:24,030 --> 01:01:25,800 it. I mean, who else is doing it? 982 01:01:25,830 --> 01:01:27,420 Ronald Moultrie: If something was officially brought to our 983 01:01:27,420 --> 01:01:29,970 attention, we would look at it the there are many things that 984 01:01:29,970 --> 01:01:32,310 are out there in the ether that aren't officially brought to our 985 01:01:32,310 --> 01:01:33,120 attention how it has to 986 01:01:33,120 --> 01:01:35,280 Mike Gallagher: be officially brought to you and I'm bringing 987 01:01:35,280 --> 01:01:37,320 it to your tour. It's pretty official. 988 01:01:37,770 --> 01:01:39,510 Ronald Moultrie: So we'll go back and take a look at it. But 989 01:01:39,540 --> 01:01:43,290 certainly there is some authoritative figure that says 990 01:01:43,290 --> 01:01:45,270 there was an incident that occurred we'd like you to look 991 01:01:45,270 --> 01:01:48,360 at this. But in terms of just tracking what may be in the 992 01:01:48,360 --> 01:01:50,520 media that says that something occurred at this time at this 993 01:01:50,520 --> 01:01:53,820 place, there probably a lot of leads, and we would have to 994 01:01:53,820 --> 01:01:56,130 follow up on I don't think we're resourced to do that right now. 995 01:01:56,160 --> 01:01:57,540 Mike Gallagher: Well, I don't claim to be an authoritative 996 01:01:57,540 --> 01:02:00,270 figure. But for what it's worth, I would like you to look into 997 01:02:00,270 --> 01:02:02,580 it. And if for no other reason, you could dismiss it and say 998 01:02:02,580 --> 01:02:05,250 this is not worth wasting resources on. 999 01:02:06,270 --> 01:02:08,310 John Greenewald: This is one of those sections that all defend 1000 01:02:08,310 --> 01:02:12,750 Moultrie and bray here. And the reason is, is because what was 1001 01:02:12,750 --> 01:02:16,050 not asked by the senator or excuse me by the congressman, 1002 01:02:17,250 --> 01:02:22,290 was, or what was not in his question, I should say, was the 1003 01:02:22,290 --> 01:02:25,440 timeframe of the incident, and we're going back more than 50 1004 01:02:25,440 --> 01:02:28,290 years. Now, that doesn't mean that they shouldn't look at it. 1005 01:02:28,680 --> 01:02:31,080 But there's only a select few people that you're going to 1006 01:02:31,080 --> 01:02:33,000 speak with, right? And let's talk about this. From an 1007 01:02:33,000 --> 01:02:35,700 investigative standpoint, there's only a select few people 1008 01:02:35,700 --> 01:02:38,880 that you can likely speak with Robert solace being the top one. 1009 01:02:39,330 --> 01:02:43,410 And and that's, that's great. I like Robert, I think he should 1010 01:02:43,410 --> 01:02:47,700 have his story told. But what resources could the UAP Task 1011 01:02:47,700 --> 01:02:54,120 Force or aim SOG devote to that? Because on paper, whether you 1012 01:02:54,120 --> 01:02:56,130 agree with it or not, or whether I agree with it or not, it 1013 01:02:56,130 --> 01:02:59,490 doesn't matter. On paper, they already investigated the 1014 01:02:59,490 --> 01:03:03,420 incident more than 50 years ago. And they determined what they 1015 01:03:03,420 --> 01:03:08,190 did. And that was that it was a malfunction with the silos and 1016 01:03:08,190 --> 01:03:12,810 then flicking off. I've got the the official declassified 1017 01:03:12,930 --> 01:03:15,780 histories from the Air Force. Now again, I'm not saying I 1018 01:03:15,780 --> 01:03:19,470 believe it, but I'm saying on paper to somebody like Bray and 1019 01:03:19,470 --> 01:03:25,140 Moultrie, why would they go back 50 years? To what reopen it 1020 01:03:25,140 --> 01:03:28,380 like, where's that? Where is that data? What is that data? 1021 01:03:28,470 --> 01:03:30,840 You've got Roberts, Alice's testimony. That's great. 1022 01:03:30,840 --> 01:03:34,170 Nothing's taken away from that. But if they hear that, and 1023 01:03:34,170 --> 01:03:36,930 they're sitting there, and they're taking notes, what are 1024 01:03:36,930 --> 01:03:40,620 they going to do after there's not much that they can do on 1025 01:03:40,620 --> 01:03:44,460 that particular case? So I think that number one, it's 50 plus 1026 01:03:44,460 --> 01:03:47,550 years ago, we've got to understand that these guys are 1027 01:03:47,550 --> 01:03:51,840 not going to turn into instant you follow jurists, nor should 1028 01:03:51,840 --> 01:03:55,860 they I mean, for them to run around and do 5060 year old 1029 01:03:55,860 --> 01:04:01,620 cases, would be essentially a way from the mission here. And I 1030 01:04:01,620 --> 01:04:04,830 think that their that their aim is to figure out more of a 1031 01:04:04,830 --> 01:04:09,540 present day. And when you think that the Nimitz was almost 20 1032 01:04:09,540 --> 01:04:14,040 years ago. That's how long ago 20 years ago was the Nimitz 1033 01:04:14,040 --> 01:04:17,940 encounter, and that's relatively recent to go back more than two 1034 01:04:17,940 --> 01:04:22,710 times that timeframe. That's that's difficult to do. I wish 1035 01:04:22,710 --> 01:04:25,590 Gallagher put a timestamp on it because I think Moultrie and 1036 01:04:25,590 --> 01:04:29,340 bray may have had a better answer, just because they seem 1037 01:04:29,340 --> 01:04:31,590 like very educated guys, and they can think on their feet. 1038 01:04:31,830 --> 01:04:34,530 And they probably would have said something like that where, 1039 01:04:34,650 --> 01:04:38,880 although we've taken in cases, maybe into our database, what 1040 01:04:38,880 --> 01:04:42,600 are you going to do when you have an F 18 pilot with a cell 1041 01:04:42,600 --> 01:04:46,470 phone, camera, video and data from the sensors on board? That 1042 01:04:46,470 --> 01:04:50,430 may be classified, but they have access to all of that? When you 1043 01:04:50,430 --> 01:04:53,760 have that case sitting here? And then you have one that's over 50 1044 01:04:53,760 --> 01:04:57,780 years old, that's already been investigated. On paper the data 1045 01:04:57,780 --> 01:05:02,250 is shoddy at best meaning it's old Old and the data like what 1046 01:05:02,250 --> 01:05:05,640 data is there other than the testimony that is valuable? But 1047 01:05:05,640 --> 01:05:08,040 what can you do with that? They're gonna go here, they're 1048 01:05:08,040 --> 01:05:11,340 gonna go with that F 18. Encounter. And, look, let's face 1049 01:05:11,340 --> 01:05:14,760 it, they should. So I'll defend them on that one. I think that 1050 01:05:14,880 --> 01:05:19,470 they, they, of course, I want them to know, they didn't know, 1051 01:05:19,560 --> 01:05:20,460 it's not surprising. 1052 01:05:20,460 --> 01:05:21,630 Mike Gallagher: And then finally, are you aware of a 1053 01:05:21,630 --> 01:05:24,780 document that appeared around 2019? Sometimes called the 1054 01:05:24,780 --> 01:05:27,630 admiral Wilson memo, or ew notes memo? 1055 01:05:29,400 --> 01:05:30,600 Ronald Moultrie: I'm not. 1056 01:05:31,680 --> 01:05:33,270 Mike Gallagher: I'm not personally aware that. Okay. 1057 01:05:33,690 --> 01:05:36,060 This is a document in which again, I'm not commenting on the 1058 01:05:36,060 --> 01:05:39,090 veracity. I was hoping you would help me with that, in which the 1059 01:05:39,090 --> 01:05:41,850 former head of Dia claims to have had a conversation with the 1060 01:05:41,850 --> 01:05:45,750 doctor, Eric Wilson claims to have sort of been made aware of 1061 01:05:45,750 --> 01:05:51,060 certain contractors or DOD programs that he tried to get 1062 01:05:51,090 --> 01:05:55,800 full access to and was denied access to. So you're not aware 1063 01:05:55,830 --> 01:05:59,700 of that malware, Congressman, in my 10 seconds remaining, then I 1064 01:05:59,700 --> 01:06:01,980 guess I just would ask Mr. Chairman, unanimous consent to 1065 01:06:01,980 --> 01:06:03,450 enter that memo into the record. 1066 01:06:06,180 --> 01:06:07,920 Andre Carson: Without objection, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 1067 01:06:07,950 --> 01:06:08,400 Appreciate it. 1068 01:06:09,750 --> 01:06:12,270 John Greenewald: I'm wondering how many actually knew what 1069 01:06:12,270 --> 01:06:16,830 Gallagher was submitting into the record at that moment. Let's 1070 01:06:16,830 --> 01:06:21,360 just kind of break this down. First off the Eric W. Davis 1071 01:06:21,390 --> 01:06:25,380 notes, the Davis Wilson notes, whatever you want to refer to 1072 01:06:25,380 --> 01:06:28,890 him as got entered in the Congressional Record? 1073 01:06:30,570 --> 01:06:33,510 What exactly does that mean? Well, I tried to find an 1074 01:06:33,510 --> 01:06:37,170 official answer, like what exactly does that mean? It 1075 01:06:37,170 --> 01:06:39,330 really doesn't mean much of anything. I don't have an 1076 01:06:39,330 --> 01:06:42,840 official answer for you. Is it big? Of course it is. It's 1077 01:06:42,840 --> 01:06:45,870 interesting to see a congressman and pull up something, I'll be 1078 01:06:45,870 --> 01:06:48,780 it. I think it's a hoax. And there's, for those of you who 1079 01:06:48,780 --> 01:06:54,000 aren't aware, I've got extensive videos on this channel, that 1080 01:06:54,030 --> 01:06:58,440 dive deep into the background of the documents, and prove beyond 1081 01:06:58,440 --> 01:07:02,280 any shadow of a doubt in my mind, that the beginning part of 1082 01:07:02,280 --> 01:07:06,240 the story that set Admiral Wilson off to find these secret 1083 01:07:06,240 --> 01:07:12,360 programs was a fake, and no one. No one analyzed the document, 1084 01:07:12,390 --> 01:07:14,550 but they all had it as part of their story. So the biggest 1085 01:07:14,550 --> 01:07:19,110 advocates that this is a true real record, has always had that 1086 01:07:19,140 --> 01:07:23,580 document as part of the the overall story, this quote 1087 01:07:23,580 --> 01:07:28,500 unquote NRO document. And so once I finally just gave in a 1088 01:07:28,500 --> 01:07:31,860 year and a half ago, whatever it was, to just look into these 1089 01:07:31,860 --> 01:07:33,780 things, because I kept getting asked, and I didn't want to 1090 01:07:33,780 --> 01:07:37,530 touch it, because it just screamed, hoax to me, but I just 1091 01:07:37,530 --> 01:07:40,650 like, I'm like, you know, what am I going to figure out on him? 1092 01:07:40,890 --> 01:07:45,690 So I did. I mean, I did go in, I didn't expect to find anything, 1093 01:07:45,900 --> 01:07:49,320 but rather analyze the document. I think it's a provable hoax, in 1094 01:07:49,320 --> 01:07:52,200 my opinion, that takes off the whole beginning part of the 1095 01:07:52,200 --> 01:07:56,250 story. And the rest of the narrative falls apart naturally, 1096 01:07:56,250 --> 01:08:00,180 although parts of it sound very cool and intriguing and have 1097 01:08:00,180 --> 01:08:03,300 some real elements to it. Just don't think it's there. So when 1098 01:08:03,300 --> 01:08:07,260 I saw this in the Congressman's question, I told Politico this 1099 01:08:07,260 --> 01:08:11,040 yesterday, which was printed in, in their, in their article on 1100 01:08:11,040 --> 01:08:14,910 it, it was a facepalm moment, like, Oh my God, why would you 1101 01:08:15,270 --> 01:08:18,960 take time referencing this? Because to me, it harms the 1102 01:08:18,960 --> 01:08:24,090 conversation, if more evidence comes to light to me, and then 1103 01:08:24,090 --> 01:08:27,330 me personally, I would change my view. Great. I have no problem 1104 01:08:27,330 --> 01:08:30,420 admitting that I would change my view. But the only evidence that 1105 01:08:30,420 --> 01:08:33,480 people can cite to say that I'm wrong, are from anonymous 1106 01:08:33,480 --> 01:08:37,080 sources they can't tell me about. So that's silliness. 1107 01:08:37,080 --> 01:08:41,460 Right? I mean, like, I can't do anything with that. So my best 1108 01:08:41,940 --> 01:08:45,420 assessment on that, if, if that's worth anything, is that 1109 01:08:45,420 --> 01:08:49,680 it's a hoax. So seeing it facepalm. But now that it's done 1110 01:08:49,680 --> 01:08:54,270 and over. And now that I see Gallagher's post hearing 1111 01:08:54,300 --> 01:08:57,630 explanation, which was given to Politico, and I wish I knew that 1112 01:08:57,630 --> 01:09:00,060 before I gave statements to Politico, they didn't do 1113 01:09:00,060 --> 01:09:03,360 anything wrong, mind you. I just was not aware of Gallagher's 1114 01:09:03,360 --> 01:09:06,360 intent. And he was saying, essentially, he's submitting it 1115 01:09:06,360 --> 01:09:14,280 for the record, to either solidify its truth, or to just 1116 01:09:14,340 --> 01:09:17,730 destroy it and move on. I'm paraphrasing there. But 1117 01:09:17,730 --> 01:09:19,770 essentially, like if there's something to this great, if not, 1118 01:09:19,770 --> 01:09:22,560 let's move on. Let's move on to something else. Let's put it to 1119 01:09:22,560 --> 01:09:26,280 bed. And I think you know what, after hearing that, I would have 1120 01:09:26,280 --> 01:09:31,140 not recommended that, but it's done and over with. So you know 1121 01:09:31,140 --> 01:09:35,910 what, fine, if they want to take it seriously. Then let's get 1122 01:09:35,940 --> 01:09:40,050 Eric Davis. And Thomas Wilson who's already denied that this 1123 01:09:40,050 --> 01:09:44,220 happened. He says it's it's bunk. He's already he's already 1124 01:09:44,220 --> 01:09:47,070 went on the record like that and Eric Davis skirts around giving 1125 01:09:47,070 --> 01:09:50,760 official statements on it and can't comment and all that. Put 1126 01:09:50,760 --> 01:09:58,050 those two in a chair and put them under oath. I 150% agree 1127 01:09:58,050 --> 01:10:01,560 with that. Support it now that this is all said and done and 1128 01:10:01,770 --> 01:10:05,610 Congress has interest. Cool. Let's do it. And I would almost 1129 01:10:05,610 --> 01:10:11,430 bet. I would bet I give out bet $1 I'll bet $1 that at least one 1130 01:10:11,430 --> 01:10:17,640 of them, their stories will will fall apart. I don't think that 1131 01:10:17,640 --> 01:10:22,080 this will go anywhere. I will be surprised. But I want to be 1132 01:10:22,080 --> 01:10:25,170 proven wrong, because the validity behind these documents 1133 01:10:25,200 --> 01:10:28,620 would change the world, right? We all know that crashed alien 1134 01:10:28,620 --> 01:10:34,200 wreckage and MJ 12 references and all that stuff. That's fine 1135 01:10:34,200 --> 01:10:38,100 with me. Let's get it on the record. Put those guys under 1136 01:10:38,100 --> 01:10:41,790 oath. So now it's not a podcast, right? Where somebody asked Eric 1137 01:10:41,790 --> 01:10:46,770 Davis and I go, I can't comment on that. Which are silly 1138 01:10:46,770 --> 01:10:51,480 answers. I mean, some people read into that so much. It's not 1139 01:10:51,480 --> 01:10:54,000 surprising that he answers it that way. But I think he likes 1140 01:10:54,000 --> 01:10:57,300 the mystique behind all of this. But that's that's a different 1141 01:10:57,300 --> 01:11:00,570 show in different conferences of sation. Regardless, let's get 1142 01:11:00,570 --> 01:11:03,810 them under oath. I fully support that. Let's do it settle this 1143 01:11:03,810 --> 01:11:07,590 once and for all. And if I'm wrong, I will gladly accept that 1144 01:11:07,590 --> 01:11:10,620 why people think that I would fight it is wrong. If I am 1145 01:11:10,620 --> 01:11:16,350 proven wrong on this humanity changes. Why would I not accept 1146 01:11:16,350 --> 01:11:20,370 that? Right? If it comes out that there's some crashed alien 1147 01:11:20,670 --> 01:11:24,390 wreckage and MJ 12 is real or whatever other thing in the 1148 01:11:24,390 --> 01:11:27,420 notes was, I forget. I mean, I don't even care about him 1149 01:11:27,420 --> 01:11:31,050 anymore. But it was a lot of wild claims. If all that turns 1150 01:11:31,050 --> 01:11:34,230 out to be true and humanity changes. Do you think John 1151 01:11:34,230 --> 01:11:37,170 Greenwald is really going to fight and say now that the 1152 01:11:37,170 --> 01:11:41,130 documents or the documents are fake? No, because the world 1153 01:11:41,130 --> 01:11:45,420 changes? Why people put that argument against me. It's so 1154 01:11:45,420 --> 01:11:50,310 utterly ridiculous. But show me the proof. Put Wilson and Davis 1155 01:11:50,610 --> 01:11:55,590 under oath. And if they say that it's all true, great. Let's pave 1156 01:11:55,590 --> 01:11:58,830 the way to figuring out where the wreckage is. Show the bodies 1157 01:11:58,830 --> 01:12:01,680 so to speak, figuratively speaking. And let's go from 1158 01:12:01,680 --> 01:12:03,090 there. Until then, 1159 01:12:03,150 --> 01:12:06,030 Raja Krishnamoorthi: it's silly. First question is there have 1160 01:12:06,030 --> 01:12:11,490 been no collisions between any US assets and one of these UAPs? 1161 01:12:11,490 --> 01:12:11,970 Correct. 1162 01:12:12,810 --> 01:12:14,820 Scott Bray: We haven't had a collision. We've had at least 11 1163 01:12:14,820 --> 01:12:15,660 near misses, though. 1164 01:12:16,740 --> 01:12:18,690 John Greenewald: 11, near misses, I kind of raised my 1165 01:12:18,690 --> 01:12:20,850 eyebrows at that point. And then I realized, oh, wait, that was 1166 01:12:20,850 --> 01:12:23,550 in the public report. Also, this is the screenshot from the 1167 01:12:23,550 --> 01:12:27,690 classified version also echoed the same. The UAP ATF has 11 1168 01:12:27,690 --> 01:12:30,930 reports of documented instances in which pilots reported near 1169 01:12:30,930 --> 01:12:35,040 misses with UAP. Now they're echoing exactly what was in last 1170 01:12:35,070 --> 01:12:40,500 June last year, in June, June's report. Does that mean nothing 1171 01:12:40,500 --> 01:12:43,830 else has happened since then? I mean, have they done anything, 1172 01:12:44,100 --> 01:12:47,760 maybe near misses just really aren't that common. So maybe 1173 01:12:47,760 --> 01:12:50,700 that's explainable. But some of the other statistics that he 1174 01:12:50,700 --> 01:12:55,140 rattled off also echoes, the June report, so has literally 1175 01:12:55,140 --> 01:12:58,320 nothing changed. The only change that I can reference we already 1176 01:12:58,320 --> 01:13:01,950 went over, which was the database of 400 sightings. But 1177 01:13:01,950 --> 01:13:06,300 we also don't know if 400 sightings existed last year 1178 01:13:06,300 --> 01:13:10,980 also, and they only chose 144, because, according to the 1179 01:13:10,980 --> 01:13:14,400 report, they had the most supporting data to them, 1180 01:13:14,640 --> 01:13:19,320 multiple sensor observations, you know, more reliable 1181 01:13:19,320 --> 01:13:23,400 information. So so we don't know if that number is the same also, 1182 01:13:24,210 --> 01:13:27,840 at least as far as I'm aware. So not sure how much has really 1183 01:13:27,840 --> 01:13:32,370 changed, but kind of eager to see some updated numbers here as 1184 01:13:32,400 --> 01:13:34,410 aim SOG gets underway. 1185 01:13:35,820 --> 01:13:37,800 Raja Krishnamoorthi: Maybe we'll talk about those 11 near misses, 1186 01:13:37,800 --> 01:13:42,930 or any place where there's close proximity, I assume, or tell me 1187 01:13:42,930 --> 01:13:47,460 if I'm wrong, there has been no attempt. There's no 1188 01:13:47,460 --> 01:13:53,460 communications, or any kind of communication signals that 1189 01:13:53,460 --> 01:13:58,560 emanate from those objects that we've detected, correct? That's 1190 01:13:58,560 --> 01:14:01,050 correct. And have we attempted to communicate with those 1191 01:14:01,050 --> 01:14:01,740 objects? 1192 01:14:02,280 --> 01:14:05,670 Peter Welch: And no, so we 1193 01:14:05,670 --> 01:14:08,550 Raja Krishnamoorthi: don't we don't even put out a alert 1194 01:14:08,550 --> 01:14:15,480 saying, you know, us. Identity, you know, identify yourself, you 1195 01:14:15,480 --> 01:14:18,330 are, you know, within our flight path or something like that. We 1196 01:14:18,330 --> 01:14:19,500 haven't said anything like that. 1197 01:14:20,700 --> 01:14:22,710 Scott Bray: We've not put anything out like that, 1198 01:14:22,740 --> 01:14:26,160 generally speaking, what, you know, for example, in the video 1199 01:14:26,160 --> 01:14:29,370 that we showed earlier, it appears to be something that is 1200 01:14:29,790 --> 01:14:34,320 unmanned, appears to be something that may or may not be 1201 01:14:34,350 --> 01:14:37,830 in controlled flight, and so we've not attempted any 1202 01:14:37,830 --> 01:14:39,390 communication with them. 1203 01:14:41,340 --> 01:14:43,920 John Greenewald: You can't identify him, but you just 1204 01:14:43,920 --> 01:14:46,950 assume that they're unmanned. But wait a minute, Scott, you 1205 01:14:46,950 --> 01:14:49,710 told me that you were following the data and didn't make any 1206 01:14:49,710 --> 01:14:52,740 assumptions. What a fantastic question. Obviously they haven't 1207 01:14:52,980 --> 01:14:56,490 really thought about the the obvious like hey, why don't you 1208 01:14:56,490 --> 01:15:00,180 do a hail and see would they respond or some kind of Hey, 1209 01:15:00,180 --> 01:15:04,620 identify yourself such a simplistic answer. But I'll 1210 01:15:04,620 --> 01:15:07,530 admit it, I never really thought of it. So kudos to the 1211 01:15:07,530 --> 01:15:11,940 Congressman on that one. Because it's it's something that we 1212 01:15:11,940 --> 01:15:14,160 don't really talk about. We talked about capabilities. And 1213 01:15:14,160 --> 01:15:17,460 we talked about, could it be this? Or could it be that? Why 1214 01:15:17,460 --> 01:15:20,280 haven't we just tried to talk to them? And I thought that that 1215 01:15:20,280 --> 01:15:25,260 was just a fascinating question that that maybe a lot of you 1216 01:15:25,260 --> 01:15:27,870 have all thought about, for whatever stupid reason I 1217 01:15:27,870 --> 01:15:30,300 haven't. And then again, his answer was somewhere on the 1218 01:15:30,300 --> 01:15:34,110 ceiling. But regardless, well done. I thought that was that 1219 01:15:34,110 --> 01:15:34,860 was very cool. 1220 01:15:36,780 --> 01:15:39,420 Raja Krishnamoorthi: How about wreckage? Have we come across 1221 01:15:39,420 --> 01:15:46,500 any wreckage of any kind of object that has now been 1222 01:15:46,530 --> 01:15:47,580 examined by you? 1223 01:15:48,570 --> 01:15:50,790 Scott Bray: The UAP task force doesn't have any wreckage that 1224 01:15:50,790 --> 01:15:54,240 isn't explainable, that isn't consistent with being a 1225 01:15:54,240 --> 01:15:55,230 terrestrial origin. 1226 01:15:57,300 --> 01:15:59,490 John Greenewald: Well, that's neato, because now we can 1227 01:15:59,490 --> 01:16:03,630 solidify that there is wreckage, even though he kind of dismisses 1228 01:16:03,630 --> 01:16:06,600 it saying, well, it's terrestrial in origin. So 1229 01:16:06,600 --> 01:16:09,270 obviously, they're out there. They're collecting things. This 1230 01:16:09,270 --> 01:16:12,870 is where I hope the next generation UAP Taskforce, the 1231 01:16:13,140 --> 01:16:16,620 the aeoi MSG or a ame SOG, they said the name is going to 1232 01:16:16,620 --> 01:16:18,600 change, thank God because I don't want to keep saying ame 1233 01:16:18,600 --> 01:16:24,870 SOG in future videos. But there is a documented history that 1234 01:16:24,900 --> 01:16:29,670 that not many people really talk about this day and age of pieces 1235 01:16:29,700 --> 01:16:34,230 of in this particular case, flying saucers that had been 1236 01:16:34,230 --> 01:16:39,720 recovered from either crashes or something that fell off of 1237 01:16:39,720 --> 01:16:44,040 unknown craft or whatever. And these are documented in 1238 01:16:44,040 --> 01:16:49,110 classified files within namely the CIA. Also the Defense 1239 01:16:49,110 --> 01:16:52,320 Intelligence Agency through Project Moondust references, 1240 01:16:52,980 --> 01:16:55,890 that also has been done. And although a lot of that could be 1241 01:16:55,890 --> 01:16:59,580 like fallen satellite debris and stuff like that, I've made 1242 01:16:59,580 --> 01:17:03,120 discoveries in the past through FOIA of not only this debris, 1243 01:17:03,540 --> 01:17:06,840 but not only the realization that they don't really have an 1244 01:17:06,840 --> 01:17:10,500 explanation, at least for with what they've released. But on 1245 01:17:10,500 --> 01:17:14,700 top of that, they seemingly especially the CIA, keeps losing 1246 01:17:14,730 --> 01:17:17,670 these files. So when you try and get them to go back and say, 1247 01:17:17,670 --> 01:17:21,570 Okay, guys, this this was from 1950, whatever, 19, even 40, 1248 01:17:21,570 --> 01:17:27,510 whatever. It has redactions time to kind of review this, you 1249 01:17:27,510 --> 01:17:30,330 know, we've we've, we've passed quite a bit of time here, likely 1250 01:17:30,330 --> 01:17:34,200 not classified anymore. And then oops, they lost the document. 1251 01:17:34,200 --> 01:17:36,750 And that has happened on more than one occasion, and in a 1252 01:17:36,750 --> 01:17:40,530 couple of occasions, has dealt with references to physical 1253 01:17:40,800 --> 01:17:45,360 objects or debris that has been connected to UFOs. Or like what 1254 01:17:45,360 --> 01:17:49,140 you're seeing on the screen, flying saucers from Denmark. 1255 01:17:49,860 --> 01:17:53,850 This is actually a very kind of fun story that ties into a later 1256 01:17:54,330 --> 01:17:59,250 UFO case, where they found a very similar looking piece after 1257 01:17:59,250 --> 01:18:02,250 having their own UFO sighting. But these documents were 1258 01:18:02,250 --> 01:18:06,180 classified when the guy actually had his encounter, and didn't 1259 01:18:06,180 --> 01:18:12,420 realize that there was a case in the 1940s I think it was at a 1260 01:18:12,420 --> 01:18:17,130 very similar object as well. So very cool correlation there. 1261 01:18:17,130 --> 01:18:20,310 I've done a little bit of writing on it. So I'll link it 1262 01:18:20,310 --> 01:18:22,350 in the show notes below. But definitely take a look at it 1263 01:18:22,350 --> 01:18:24,510 because there's all sorts of cool stuff to find. 1264 01:18:28,710 --> 01:18:33,990 Raja Krishnamoorthi: Do we have any sensors underwater to detect 1265 01:18:33,990 --> 01:18:39,180 on submerged UAPs? Anything that is in the ocean or in the seas? 1266 01:18:39,210 --> 01:18:39,690 So I think 1267 01:18:39,960 --> 01:18:41,820 Ronald Moultrie: that would be more probably addressing close 1268 01:18:41,820 --> 01:18:43,170 assessments. Okay. 1269 01:18:44,070 --> 01:18:46,410 John Greenewald: Okay, so we shot that down member in the 1270 01:18:46,410 --> 01:18:49,260 video for those of you have watched it of my thought, my 1271 01:18:49,260 --> 01:18:52,800 preliminary thoughts prior to the hearing, and I said, you 1272 01:18:52,800 --> 01:18:56,220 probably will hear a lot of that referencing to the closed 1273 01:18:56,220 --> 01:18:58,590 session or the classified session that we can't talk about 1274 01:18:58,590 --> 01:19:02,130 that this was yet another instance. And also kudos to this 1275 01:19:02,130 --> 01:19:06,540 congressman for asking about underwater objects, unidentified 1276 01:19:06,810 --> 01:19:10,560 submersible objects or submerged objects UFOs, as they call them, 1277 01:19:10,560 --> 01:19:14,730 or refer to the acronym. So in a hearing on UAP, I bet you some 1278 01:19:14,730 --> 01:19:17,310 of the other congressmen that heard that question like her, is 1279 01:19:17,310 --> 01:19:21,300 that really set really an issue? Are we really and they're, you 1280 01:19:21,300 --> 01:19:23,520 know, write notes and stuff? Because that was a great 1281 01:19:23,520 --> 01:19:26,310 question. So obviously, you know, some of these are probably 1282 01:19:26,310 --> 01:19:29,400 fed through their staff and stuff that maybe asked some of 1283 01:19:29,400 --> 01:19:32,580 their constituents for answers or people wrote in and said, 1284 01:19:32,580 --> 01:19:35,310 Hey, you got to ask about this. It doesn't matter how those 1285 01:19:35,310 --> 01:19:38,430 questions came in kudos for the Congressman that asked those 1286 01:19:38,430 --> 01:19:41,790 types of great questions. And then by the way, the Pentagon 1287 01:19:42,300 --> 01:19:47,760 Press Secretary, he, John Kirby, he had addressed it later that 1288 01:19:47,760 --> 01:19:53,370 day, and by address it, I mean, would not touch it. That video 1289 01:19:53,370 --> 01:19:57,930 and that exchange from the journalist Jeff showgirl from 1290 01:19:57,930 --> 01:20:01,620 task and purpose and kudos to Jeff for members of the media 1291 01:20:01,800 --> 01:20:05,370 asked some great questions over the last year or two on UAP is 1292 01:20:05,370 --> 01:20:08,520 not afraid to jump in there. But he's the one that also wanted 1293 01:20:08,550 --> 01:20:14,250 John Kirby to expand on the UFO topic. And Kirby just quickly 1294 01:20:14,250 --> 01:20:17,340 shot it down. And it was like nine touching that they wanted 1295 01:20:17,340 --> 01:20:20,220 in a closed session. So there it's going to stay. So check out 1296 01:20:20,220 --> 01:20:22,410 that video that's also on the channel. I posted that in the 1297 01:20:22,410 --> 01:20:23,190 last couple days. 1298 01:20:23,580 --> 01:20:25,650 Raja Krishnamoorthi: So basically, it sounds like we 1299 01:20:25,680 --> 01:20:30,450 have a good partnership with FAA. But apart from FAA, we 1300 01:20:30,450 --> 01:20:34,890 don't have partnerships with other agencies or other entities 1301 01:20:34,980 --> 01:20:39,480 that might be tracking so that we could enlarge our data set to 1302 01:20:39,510 --> 01:20:40,620 make compare. So we 1303 01:20:40,620 --> 01:20:42,450 Ronald Moultrie: will. So that's the goal will be this nice 1304 01:20:42,450 --> 01:20:46,680 effort will be to expand that relationship with the rest of 1305 01:20:46,680 --> 01:20:49,410 government in the interagency so we can understand what they're 1306 01:20:49,410 --> 01:20:52,770 seeing what we're seeing we can correlate on each other's 1307 01:20:52,770 --> 01:20:53,610 holdings, because I 1308 01:20:53,610 --> 01:20:55,410 Raja Krishnamoorthi: think it's all this sorry to interrupt. But 1309 01:20:55,410 --> 01:20:58,950 I think that we're we might have a bias right now going on with 1310 01:20:58,950 --> 01:21:02,100 regard to just reporting on UAPs being in training areas when we 1311 01:21:02,100 --> 01:21:04,350 don't really track what's happening elsewhere. 1312 01:21:05,430 --> 01:21:07,500 John Greenewald: Now, this is one thing that I want to bring 1313 01:21:07,500 --> 01:21:10,350 up. And again, my haters out there will clip it and say that 1314 01:21:10,350 --> 01:21:13,380 I'm talking trash again about Luis Elizondo, and that's not 1315 01:21:13,380 --> 01:21:16,590 the intent with this. But we do have to look at this logically, 1316 01:21:16,770 --> 01:21:19,680 he just said, we will. Moultrie just said we will have 1317 01:21:19,680 --> 01:21:23,010 relationships with other agencies to essentially share 1318 01:21:23,010 --> 01:21:28,440 data understand UAP investigate, but whatever it is, why in an 1319 01:21:28,440 --> 01:21:31,530 effort that allegedly took place over the course of a decade, 1320 01:21:32,070 --> 01:21:36,360 where those relationships not solidified, and that, to me, 1321 01:21:36,360 --> 01:21:40,860 again, plays into that very miniscule effort not to diminish 1322 01:21:40,860 --> 01:21:44,370 results, if they got results, okay, but just framing it in 1323 01:21:44,370 --> 01:21:48,150 proper context, if you do something for 10, almost 10 1324 01:21:48,510 --> 01:21:52,770 years, because he says there's contradicting dates, but let's 1325 01:21:52,770 --> 01:21:57,930 just call it 2008. He goes into OS app. There's some weird stuff 1326 01:21:57,930 --> 01:22:01,170 about him saying he never had anything to do with OS app. But 1327 01:22:01,170 --> 01:22:04,410 later did and that came out and Steven green streets video I 1328 01:22:04,410 --> 01:22:06,810 just interviewed Steven green tree, but let's just call it 1329 01:22:06,810 --> 01:22:12,510 2008 takes over the program in again, contradicting dates, some 1330 01:22:12,510 --> 01:22:19,290 say 2009, some say 2010 All the way to his resignation 2017 in 1331 01:22:19,290 --> 01:22:24,330 that entire effort, he was never able to solidify any 1332 01:22:24,330 --> 01:22:27,600 relationships. And that's where again, I think that there's the 1333 01:22:27,600 --> 01:22:32,010 data is starting to support that this was that small effort based 1334 01:22:32,010 --> 01:22:35,340 on a couple people that that that knew there was a problem. 1335 01:22:35,610 --> 01:22:39,510 And again, there's nothing wrong with that. I want to stress 1336 01:22:39,510 --> 01:22:43,500 that. There's nothing wrong with it. I'm just trying to to frame 1337 01:22:43,500 --> 01:22:48,420 this properly. Why didn't they have any of those relationships 1338 01:22:48,450 --> 01:22:51,180 set up? And I hope that that comes out? You know, I mean, I, 1339 01:22:51,420 --> 01:22:55,860 I really do. Because if there were relationships, then go back 1340 01:22:55,860 --> 01:23:00,720 and exploit those if there were, let's say, sharing of data 1341 01:23:00,720 --> 01:23:04,410 protocols and stuff like that, where is that data and take the 1342 01:23:04,410 --> 01:23:07,920 next step. But if none of that happened, then we have to start 1343 01:23:07,920 --> 01:23:11,070 asking some of those logical questions that need answers. And 1344 01:23:11,070 --> 01:23:13,380 I think a lot of lot of things are still unanswered 1345 01:23:13,680 --> 01:23:15,690 Raja Krishnamoorthi: last question, have our encounters 1346 01:23:15,690 --> 01:23:19,650 with UAPs alter the development of our either our offensive, 1347 01:23:19,710 --> 01:23:22,620 offensive or defensive capabilities or even our sensor 1348 01:23:22,620 --> 01:23:23,520 capabilities? 1349 01:23:24,450 --> 01:23:27,060 Scott Bray: We'll save that for the closed session. Okay. 1350 01:23:27,960 --> 01:23:30,480 John Greenewald: Okay. So more of that classified stuff on 1351 01:23:30,480 --> 01:23:34,680 whether UAP has played a role in altering the way that we 1352 01:23:34,680 --> 01:23:37,410 essentially operate, sensor or otherwise. 1353 01:23:38,880 --> 01:23:42,420 Darin LaHood: Obviously, this topic of UAPs, has attracted a 1354 01:23:42,420 --> 01:23:48,180 lot of interest and people that are curious about this, this 1355 01:23:48,180 --> 01:23:54,120 hearing today, as we talk about, and I would say there's a lot of 1356 01:23:54,150 --> 01:23:57,690 what I would call amateur interest groups that are 1357 01:23:57,690 --> 01:24:03,450 involved in the UAP field. Mike, my question is, when there are 1358 01:24:03,480 --> 01:24:07,890 unsubstantiated claims or manufactured claims of UAPs, or 1359 01:24:08,310 --> 01:24:12,240 kind of false information that's put out there. What are the 1360 01:24:12,240 --> 01:24:15,780 consequences for people that are involved with that or groups 1361 01:24:15,780 --> 01:24:16,920 that are involved with that? 1362 01:24:20,490 --> 01:24:22,710 Ronald Moultrie: So one of the concerns that we have is that 1363 01:24:23,100 --> 01:24:29,220 there are a lot of individuals and groups that are putting 1364 01:24:29,220 --> 01:24:33,420 information out there that that could be considered to be 1365 01:24:33,420 --> 01:24:37,170 somewhat self serving. We're trying to do what's in what's in 1366 01:24:37,170 --> 01:24:40,470 the best interests of one, the Department of Defense and then 1367 01:24:40,470 --> 01:24:43,950 to what's in the best interest of the public to ensure that we 1368 01:24:43,950 --> 01:24:47,790 can put factual based information back into the 1369 01:24:47,790 --> 01:24:51,840 mainstream and back into the bloodstream, of the reporting 1370 01:24:52,200 --> 01:24:55,770 media that we have. So people understand what's there. It's 1371 01:24:55,770 --> 01:25:00,300 important because we are tempting, as this hearing As as 1372 01:25:00,300 --> 01:25:04,350 drawn out to understand, one what may just be natural 1373 01:25:04,350 --> 01:25:08,460 phenomenon to what may be sensory phenomenology or things 1374 01:25:08,460 --> 01:25:11,430 that were happening with sensors, three, what may be 1375 01:25:11,430 --> 01:25:15,930 legitimate counterintelligence threats to places that we have 1376 01:25:15,930 --> 01:25:18,930 or bases or installations or security threats to our 1377 01:25:18,930 --> 01:25:23,700 platforms. And anything that diverts us off of what we have 1378 01:25:23,700 --> 01:25:26,610 with the resources that have been allocated to us, send us 1379 01:25:26,610 --> 01:25:30,600 off, and the spurious chases and hunts that are just not helpful. 1380 01:25:30,600 --> 01:25:32,760 And they also help that way, they also contribute to the 1381 01:25:32,760 --> 01:25:36,840 undermining of the confidence that the Congress and the 1382 01:25:36,840 --> 01:25:40,890 American people have that we are are trying to get to the root 1383 01:25:40,890 --> 01:25:44,220 cause of what's happening here, report on that, and then feed 1384 01:25:44,220 --> 01:25:47,310 that back into our national security apparatus. So we are 1385 01:25:47,310 --> 01:25:50,970 able to protect the American people in our ally. So it is 1386 01:25:51,000 --> 01:25:53,730 harmful, it is hurtful. But hopefully, if we get more 1387 01:25:53,730 --> 01:25:56,910 information out there, we'll start to lessen the impact that 1388 01:25:56,910 --> 01:25:58,080 symbol spirits reports. 1389 01:25:58,140 --> 01:26:01,530 Darin LaHood: So just taking that a step further. So though, 1390 01:26:01,560 --> 01:26:04,860 that misinformation, false narratives manufactured, so what 1391 01:26:04,860 --> 01:26:07,650 are the consequences? Are there legal consequences? Are there 1392 01:26:07,650 --> 01:26:09,900 examples that you can give us where people have been held 1393 01:26:09,900 --> 01:26:12,120 accountable by this misinformation or 1394 01:26:12,120 --> 01:26:13,020 disinformation? 1395 01:26:13,050 --> 01:26:16,110 Ronald Moultrie: I can't give you any examples where somebody 1396 01:26:16,110 --> 01:26:20,280 has been legally held liable for putting something out there. But 1397 01:26:20,640 --> 01:26:22,650 Darin LaHood: well, I guess, what's the deterrent from people 1398 01:26:22,650 --> 01:26:24,240 engaging in this activity? 1399 01:26:25,710 --> 01:26:28,260 Ronald Moultrie: I don't I don't know. I don't have that answer. 1400 01:26:28,260 --> 01:26:31,350 I that's something that, you know, welcome to dialogue with 1401 01:26:31,380 --> 01:26:34,860 Congress to talk about that with the members who, you know, 1402 01:26:34,860 --> 01:26:38,850 helped legislate those laws that say, what should be the legal 1403 01:26:38,850 --> 01:26:42,690 ramifications that we could use to potentially hold individuals 1404 01:26:42,690 --> 01:26:46,740 accountable, whether it be citizens or information that 1405 01:26:46,740 --> 01:26:52,650 might be injected into our media by other other forces or other 1406 01:26:52,650 --> 01:26:53,490 countries, if you will? 1407 01:26:55,020 --> 01:26:57,390 John Greenewald: It was a fascinating exchange about 1408 01:26:57,390 --> 01:26:59,880 misinformation and disinformation. And let me just 1409 01:26:59,880 --> 01:27:02,400 say, before I get into the comments on this section, that I 1410 01:27:02,400 --> 01:27:05,100 believe it should go both ways that I believe that the 1411 01:27:05,100 --> 01:27:07,920 Department of Defense or the government as a whole the CIA, 1412 01:27:07,920 --> 01:27:12,180 the NSA, whomever it is, gives out maliciously false 1413 01:27:12,180 --> 01:27:16,080 information about UFOs that there should be consequences, 1414 01:27:16,080 --> 01:27:19,140 there should be repercussions. But that wasn't the root of the 1415 01:27:19,140 --> 01:27:21,690 Congressman's question. Rather, he was on the other side, the 1416 01:27:21,690 --> 01:27:26,160 public side of people that we're giving away disinformation, 1417 01:27:26,160 --> 01:27:30,630 misinformation, false information, about UAP. And I'm 1418 01:27:30,660 --> 01:27:34,020 really intrigued by that, because I want to know the root 1419 01:27:34,380 --> 01:27:38,700 of what he is talking about. Are you talking about somebody who 1420 01:27:38,730 --> 01:27:42,090 is making up a claim that they saw a UFO, so they call the 1421 01:27:42,090 --> 01:27:45,390 government? And they say you have to investigate this? And 1422 01:27:45,600 --> 01:27:49,860 they've let's just say they fly out and do an investigation and 1423 01:27:49,860 --> 01:27:53,640 realize that they were making it up? I mean, how would you prove 1424 01:27:53,640 --> 01:27:58,620 any type of criminal negligence on wasting the government's 1425 01:27:58,620 --> 01:28:01,860 time? I mean, maybe they drank too much. Maybe they took a 1426 01:28:01,860 --> 01:28:05,280 hallucinogenic of some kind, or maybe they just really did see 1427 01:28:05,280 --> 01:28:07,830 something, but they have no evidence to back it up. How 1428 01:28:07,830 --> 01:28:12,660 would you ever prove that? And then hold them criminally 1429 01:28:12,660 --> 01:28:16,020 negligent or, or have a consequence from a legal sense 1430 01:28:16,020 --> 01:28:20,430 for that? So my question, then, in my own mind, lean towards, 1431 01:28:20,670 --> 01:28:24,000 are you talking about people that are making certain claims 1432 01:28:24,360 --> 01:28:30,570 against the government and making certain claims that they 1433 01:28:30,780 --> 01:28:33,870 let say, have knowledge of something that they can't 1434 01:28:33,870 --> 01:28:40,200 confirm to you exactly what, but lead you to believe that they 1435 01:28:40,230 --> 01:28:45,240 know more than they'll give you based on maybe past employment 1436 01:28:45,240 --> 01:28:48,420 or something like that, that then creates an issue for the 1437 01:28:48,420 --> 01:28:52,230 government in the sense that you're creating and cultivating 1438 01:28:52,560 --> 01:28:58,260 a distrust in a department that may be unfounded, that I'm not a 1439 01:28:58,260 --> 01:29:01,680 lawyer. But that sounds like more of what LaHood was 1440 01:29:01,710 --> 01:29:05,190 potentially talking about. We're now you're cultivating something 1441 01:29:05,190 --> 01:29:08,940 that may or may not be true, but creating an issue for the 1442 01:29:08,940 --> 01:29:12,930 Department of Defense, that now they have to allocate resources 1443 01:29:13,170 --> 01:29:17,640 to combat that if the allegation is made against dam have some 1444 01:29:17,640 --> 01:29:23,580 major malicious intent when it comes to informing the public 1445 01:29:23,580 --> 01:29:27,810 that may or may not be grounded. But if if that is considered 1446 01:29:27,930 --> 01:29:32,370 false, could there be criminal negligence on something like 1447 01:29:32,370 --> 01:29:37,020 that, that I found that a fascinating possibility, and if 1448 01:29:37,020 --> 01:29:39,930 I, you know, if I had the opportunity, I would love to ask 1449 01:29:39,930 --> 01:29:43,260 the congressman, what the root of that question was, when you 1450 01:29:43,260 --> 01:29:46,770 listen to military's response. I believe they were on two 1451 01:29:46,770 --> 01:29:50,310 different pages. Meaning like, I think Moultrie kind of 1452 01:29:50,310 --> 01:29:53,880 interpreted it one way, and LaHood meant it another way and 1453 01:29:53,880 --> 01:29:56,460 they just kind of ended up going this direction in the 1454 01:29:56,460 --> 01:29:59,700 conversation and I don't think they quite clicked at least that 1455 01:29:59,700 --> 01:30:04,470 was my A my impression. But Moultrie did make reference to 1456 01:30:04,680 --> 01:30:07,890 that type of misinformation or disinformation being, I think he 1457 01:30:07,890 --> 01:30:11,820 said self serving or something to that effect. So essentially 1458 01:30:12,930 --> 01:30:18,600 putting out that information and benefiting from it. And again, 1459 01:30:18,630 --> 01:30:22,080 fascinating exchange that I think maybe some people just 1460 01:30:22,080 --> 01:30:25,020 kind of tuned out on. And I don't blame me these hearings 1461 01:30:25,020 --> 01:30:28,410 are really awful sometimes. But regardless, I think it was a 1462 01:30:28,410 --> 01:30:31,650 fascinating exchange, because congressmen don't utilize their 1463 01:30:31,650 --> 01:30:34,920 five minutes, just to utilize them, generally speaking, I 1464 01:30:34,920 --> 01:30:37,170 mean, that they have roots to why they are asking these 1465 01:30:37,170 --> 01:30:39,870 questions. Sometimes it's just to get certain angles on the 1466 01:30:39,870 --> 01:30:42,810 record, if you watch enough of these hearings, and I am one of 1467 01:30:42,810 --> 01:30:46,650 those geeks that loves to watch them, even on non UFO related 1468 01:30:46,650 --> 01:30:49,710 topics, you see them utilize their five minutes, not 1469 01:30:49,710 --> 01:30:52,860 necessarily to ask any questions, but to sometimes just 1470 01:30:52,860 --> 01:30:56,040 chastise the person that's in the chair, it becomes very 1471 01:30:56,040 --> 01:30:59,700 political. You see a lot of fireworks sometimes in these in 1472 01:30:59,700 --> 01:31:03,360 these hearings. So they are fascinating to watch. But when 1473 01:31:03,360 --> 01:31:06,540 they ask questions, they generally have them rooted in 1474 01:31:06,540 --> 01:31:10,380 something. So I would love to ask the Congressman one day, if 1475 01:31:10,380 --> 01:31:14,070 I ever had the opportunity, what that was last point on this 1476 01:31:14,070 --> 01:31:18,990 before we move on, it was actually kind of funny I, I only 1477 01:31:18,990 --> 01:31:21,780 name names when I talk about people when I have to, and I'm 1478 01:31:21,780 --> 01:31:24,240 not going to I'm not going to try and embarrass anybody here. 1479 01:31:24,240 --> 01:31:27,870 But there's a very popular YouTube channel out there that 1480 01:31:27,870 --> 01:31:31,710 I'm guessing maybe some of you watch. But regardless, who was 1481 01:31:31,860 --> 01:31:35,610 so upset that this exchange took place? And how could they, you 1482 01:31:35,610 --> 01:31:39,420 know, potentially have this conversation and squash people, 1483 01:31:39,690 --> 01:31:42,810 I'm paraphrasing, but squash, people would coming forward with 1484 01:31:42,810 --> 01:31:46,140 stories and this and that. And it always makes you makes you 1485 01:31:46,140 --> 01:31:49,320 kind of scratch your head that if there's talk about people 1486 01:31:49,320 --> 01:31:50,460 trying to 1487 01:31:52,380 --> 01:31:55,350 decrease the amount of misinformation or disinformation 1488 01:31:55,350 --> 01:32:02,910 out there, and people fight that or think that's a bad thing. It 1489 01:32:02,910 --> 01:32:05,190 makes you kind of wonder, doesn't it? Like why wouldn't 1490 01:32:05,190 --> 01:32:08,220 you want less myths or disinformation out there. And 1491 01:32:08,220 --> 01:32:12,120 again, I preface this whole kind of sidebar with I think that it 1492 01:32:12,120 --> 01:32:16,080 should apply to the government as well, equally. So if there is 1493 01:32:16,080 --> 01:32:19,620 malicious intent from either side with myths or 1494 01:32:19,620 --> 01:32:23,220 disinformation, then there should be consequences. Again, 1495 01:32:23,460 --> 01:32:27,240 both sides, but why would people be afraid of that? They wouldn't 1496 01:32:27,240 --> 01:32:31,320 circumvent the First Amendment. So I think that if somebody came 1497 01:32:31,320 --> 01:32:35,880 out and said, I saw this UFO, and this is what it was, they're 1498 01:32:35,880 --> 01:32:38,640 not going to say, Go get them. He didn't really see that. 1499 01:32:38,820 --> 01:32:41,490 That's not what that was about. That's not how I took that. So 1500 01:32:41,490 --> 01:32:46,080 they're not going to encroach on a constitutional right. So why 1501 01:32:46,080 --> 01:32:52,410 the why the upset tone on the talk of diminishing, decreasing 1502 01:32:52,530 --> 01:32:55,320 or trying to get rid of misinformation boggles my mind. 1503 01:32:55,320 --> 01:32:57,930 But it really does make you think, because I welcome it, you 1504 01:32:57,930 --> 01:33:01,170 know, anything I put out there, when it comes to saying the 1505 01:33:01,170 --> 01:33:04,470 government has done this or has done that? I have information to 1506 01:33:04,470 --> 01:33:07,560 back that up in the form of evidence I'll give you I don't 1507 01:33:07,560 --> 01:33:12,570 do anonymous sources, as many of you know. Or I should say that I 1508 01:33:12,570 --> 01:33:16,920 don't hinge what I tell you on anonymous sources. Rather, I 1509 01:33:16,920 --> 01:33:20,070 produce evidence. So if I say the government was not truthful 1510 01:33:20,070 --> 01:33:23,580 with this, I can prove that. So they're not going to come after 1511 01:33:23,580 --> 01:33:26,370 me. I don't care. And if they do, great, let's go under oath. 1512 01:33:26,670 --> 01:33:29,970 I would love that opportunity. So you know, that kind of talk 1513 01:33:29,970 --> 01:33:33,540 is silly. So to be upset at that man should make us all think 1514 01:33:34,320 --> 01:33:38,010 Peter Welch: briefing of that going into the details of what 1515 01:33:38,010 --> 01:33:44,610 kinds of secrets that we can't share here. What is it? What are 1516 01:33:44,610 --> 01:33:49,770 we protecting? I don't know if you can answer this question in 1517 01:33:49,770 --> 01:33:55,260 this open forum, but in fact, your perception of what it is we 1518 01:33:55,260 --> 01:33:56,100 have to quote do I 1519 01:33:56,100 --> 01:33:57,990 Ronald Moultrie: think right now, what's really important for 1520 01:33:57,990 --> 01:34:01,650 us to protect is how we know certain things. So there are a 1521 01:34:01,650 --> 01:34:06,330 lot of things that we know whether it'd be about the 1522 01:34:06,330 --> 01:34:09,570 thinking of other leaders around the world, the weapon systems 1523 01:34:09,570 --> 01:34:12,270 that are being developed or how we detect things that may be 1524 01:34:12,270 --> 01:34:16,320 threats to us. Many of those things are the result of some of 1525 01:34:16,320 --> 01:34:18,900 our most sensitive sources and methods. And we'll use those 1526 01:34:18,900 --> 01:34:22,290 things not just for this effort, but those same sources and 1527 01:34:22,290 --> 01:34:26,370 methods are used to help protect us from Abbott's Ares and from 1528 01:34:26,370 --> 01:34:30,420 others who might mean to do us harm. There aren't separate UAP 1529 01:34:30,420 --> 01:34:34,470 sensors is not a separate UAP processing computer. It is not a 1530 01:34:34,470 --> 01:34:38,100 separate UAP dissemination chain or whatever. So it's the same 1531 01:34:38,100 --> 01:34:40,980 process. It's the same system that we have that helps us do 1532 01:34:40,980 --> 01:34:41,370 all that. 1533 01:34:42,780 --> 01:34:45,270 John Greenewald: sources and methods. For those who aren't 1534 01:34:45,270 --> 01:34:49,500 aware in the late 1970s, early 1980s. There were multiple court 1535 01:34:49,500 --> 01:34:54,120 cases that were brought up to fight UFO secrecy, namely by the 1536 01:34:54,270 --> 01:34:58,530 citizens against UFO secrecy or cause I actually wrote them 1537 01:34:58,530 --> 01:35:02,850 about some of the documents in my book here shameless plug. But 1538 01:35:02,850 --> 01:35:05,580 I wrote a book called inside the black vault and I break down 1539 01:35:05,580 --> 01:35:09,990 some of the the documentation that was fought for back then, 1540 01:35:10,260 --> 01:35:14,010 and what came out years and years later. So the judge 1541 01:35:14,010 --> 01:35:17,580 actually agreed with the government, namely the the NSA 1542 01:35:17,580 --> 01:35:20,790 in one particular case, that all of this information should be 1543 01:35:20,790 --> 01:35:24,570 withheld at the excuse was primarily sources and methods. 1544 01:35:24,570 --> 01:35:27,390 And that was what they kept referring to sources of methods, 1545 01:35:27,390 --> 01:35:30,090 sources and methods. So we can't tell you because of sources and 1546 01:35:30,090 --> 01:35:34,620 methods. So it's interesting here that now approximately 40 1547 01:35:34,620 --> 01:35:38,100 plus years from those court cases, that we're hearing the 1548 01:35:38,100 --> 01:35:42,810 exact same excuse that its sources and methods. Now, here's 1549 01:35:42,810 --> 01:35:46,530 where I wrestle, because keep in mind, I don't only do UFO 1550 01:35:46,530 --> 01:35:50,280 requests or UFO information, in fact, I don't have an exact 1551 01:35:50,280 --> 01:35:54,390 percentage, but UFO is probably encompass about 10% of my entire 1552 01:35:54,390 --> 01:35:58,440 archive of of more than 3 million pages, and in fact, is 1553 01:35:58,440 --> 01:36:02,190 probably not even that high. But that being said, I deal with 1554 01:36:02,190 --> 01:36:06,900 quite a bit. And I do support some level of secrecy, including 1555 01:36:06,900 --> 01:36:09,660 sources and methods that there are certain things that we 1556 01:36:09,660 --> 01:36:12,570 shouldn't hear about. But when it comes to UFOs, that has 1557 01:36:12,570 --> 01:36:17,070 seemingly been the fallback for many, many decades. And is it 1558 01:36:17,070 --> 01:36:21,060 warranted, because we have seen these full denials of of 1559 01:36:21,060 --> 01:36:24,090 documents and cases and information and they say now, we 1560 01:36:24,090 --> 01:36:27,060 can't give you sources and methods. So again, I wanted to 1561 01:36:27,060 --> 01:36:30,510 give you that historical tidbit that none of that is new, that 1562 01:36:30,510 --> 01:36:34,650 that is from the playbook back from legal court cases that were 1563 01:36:34,650 --> 01:36:39,090 fought 40 ish years ago by citizens against UFO secrecy. 1564 01:36:39,270 --> 01:36:42,120 And it was sources and methods that ultimately convinced the 1565 01:36:42,120 --> 01:36:47,460 judge in a top secret in camera off a David that was affidavit 1566 01:36:47,460 --> 01:36:51,420 that was given to the judge, it convinced them now we can't 1567 01:36:51,420 --> 01:36:54,810 release those those documents. So little bit of history there 1568 01:36:54,810 --> 01:36:57,300 for you. But something I wanted to stress that what you are 1569 01:36:57,300 --> 01:37:02,340 hearing is something that has been been fallen back on now for 1570 01:37:02,340 --> 01:37:03,060 decades. 1571 01:37:05,130 --> 01:37:08,400 Andre Carson: Gentlemen, beyond videos, is there a range of 1572 01:37:08,400 --> 01:37:12,540 other information that the executive branch has that will 1573 01:37:12,540 --> 01:37:16,140 be valuable to the American people, while protecting sources 1574 01:37:16,140 --> 01:37:19,410 and methods? Obviously, the details of individual 1575 01:37:19,410 --> 01:37:22,710 encounters, including the time place and details of an 1576 01:37:22,710 --> 01:37:27,450 encounter? And does the aim sock have a clear and repeatable 1577 01:37:27,450 --> 01:37:34,020 process? For considering public release? As part of the process? 1578 01:37:34,710 --> 01:37:37,800 John Carson, do you commit to building that process if it's 1579 01:37:37,800 --> 01:37:39,810 not in place, the UAP Task 1580 01:37:39,810 --> 01:37:42,750 Scott Bray: Force, you know, the security classification guide 1581 01:37:43,020 --> 01:37:46,590 that the UAP Task Force has been operating under that I approved, 1582 01:37:47,430 --> 01:37:49,740 really, it was meant to protect those sources and methods are 1583 01:37:49,740 --> 01:37:54,750 meant to protect any knowledge that an adversary intelligence 1584 01:37:55,230 --> 01:37:59,010 entity may gain, from unders from understanding what we're 1585 01:37:59,010 --> 01:38:03,420 tracking how we track it, or when we're tracking it, or if 1586 01:38:03,420 --> 01:38:07,770 we're not. And so that has been an important piece in the 1587 01:38:07,770 --> 01:38:12,060 balance between transparency and preserving our warfighting 1588 01:38:12,060 --> 01:38:15,540 advantage because the US military does train as it would 1589 01:38:15,540 --> 01:38:21,480 fight. What I will commit to is, at least for that material, it's 1590 01:38:21,480 --> 01:38:24,720 under my authority, as the deputy director of Naval 1591 01:38:24,720 --> 01:38:30,840 Intelligence, for information that we have when it does not 1592 01:38:30,840 --> 01:38:35,640 involve sources and methods, or and when we can, with a 1593 01:38:35,640 --> 01:38:39,450 reasonable degree of confidence determine that it does not pose 1594 01:38:39,480 --> 01:38:42,630 a foreign intelligence or national security threat. And 1595 01:38:42,630 --> 01:38:45,240 it's within my authority to do so I commit to declassifying 1596 01:38:45,240 --> 01:38:49,470 that. So I, I believe very much in the transparency of this, and 1597 01:38:49,470 --> 01:38:52,470 we work very hard to balance that with our national security 1598 01:38:52,470 --> 01:38:52,830 needs. 1599 01:38:54,120 --> 01:38:56,640 John Greenewald: Well, we're about to find out whether or not 1600 01:38:56,640 --> 01:38:59,520 Scott really does support such transparency, because here's 1601 01:38:59,520 --> 01:39:03,210 why. Here's a page from that security classification guide 1602 01:39:03,210 --> 01:39:06,750 that I've talked about in the precursor video, kind of my 1603 01:39:06,780 --> 01:39:12,210 again, four thoughts before the hearing took place. I put that 1604 01:39:12,210 --> 01:39:14,880 on Twitter as well, that I think a lot of people didn't realize 1605 01:39:14,880 --> 01:39:18,840 that Scott Bray was the guy who had approved this, this 1606 01:39:18,840 --> 01:39:23,610 document, and that essentially, encapsulates UAP. In such a 1607 01:39:23,610 --> 01:39:27,540 level of secrecy. It makes it very hard for people like me to 1608 01:39:27,570 --> 01:39:31,530 get a hold of it. So we're committing to transparency. 1609 01:39:32,100 --> 01:39:35,100 Well, that the jury's still out on that one. And we're about to 1610 01:39:35,100 --> 01:39:39,180 see, it sounds good in a hearing. But again, I go back to 1611 01:39:39,180 --> 01:39:42,390 that Navy appeal where they said, No, everything is 1612 01:39:42,390 --> 01:39:45,330 classified, and I won that appeal. Now he's saying he 1613 01:39:45,330 --> 01:39:48,780 commits to secrecy, but this is what we're faced with on the 1614 01:39:48,780 --> 01:39:52,140 level of secrecy for that classification guide and what it 1615 01:39:52,170 --> 01:39:59,310 encapsulates UAP. So it's going to be very, very challenging to 1616 01:39:59,310 --> 01:40:04,440 essentially extract this information and see them doing 1617 01:40:04,440 --> 01:40:07,920 that willingly sharing with the public. I kind of laughed when 1618 01:40:08,100 --> 01:40:10,740 he said that if it didn't encroach on sources and methods 1619 01:40:10,740 --> 01:40:14,370 and so on and so forth, essentially, if they with with 1620 01:40:14,370 --> 01:40:18,360 certainty could not connect it to a foreign adversary, which I 1621 01:40:18,360 --> 01:40:21,390 understand not releasing information so if the Russians 1622 01:40:21,390 --> 01:40:22,170 knew they had some