1 00:00:10,710 --> 00:00:14,460 John Greenewald: In October of 2017, this counter intelligence 2 00:00:14,460 --> 00:00:18,390 officer and train Special Agent by the name of Luis Elizondo 3 00:00:18,720 --> 00:00:22,320 stepped out of the shadowed halls of the Pentagon and in to 4 00:00:22,320 --> 00:00:27,240 the public spotlight, whether he intended it or not. By doing so 5 00:00:27,240 --> 00:00:31,380 he would become an instant celebrity to UFO enthusiasts for 6 00:00:31,380 --> 00:00:34,620 saying something that would soon shake the entire world. 7 00:00:34,740 --> 00:00:36,840 Luis Elizondo: For nearly the last decade, I ran a sensitive 8 00:00:36,840 --> 00:00:40,320 aerospace threat identification program, focusing on 9 00:00:40,410 --> 00:00:44,040 unidentified aerial technologies. It was in this 10 00:00:44,040 --> 00:00:49,620 position, I learned that the phenomenon is indeed real. 11 00:00:49,950 --> 00:00:52,590 John Greenewald: Within minutes of speaking these words, the 12 00:00:52,590 --> 00:00:56,220 black vault use this once insider information to file 13 00:00:56,220 --> 00:00:59,700 numerous Freedom of Information Act requests to see what 14 00:00:59,700 --> 00:01:04,050 documents could be dug up. The idea was that in the eyes of the 15 00:01:04,050 --> 00:01:08,250 law, if this former government agent was talking about it, then 16 00:01:08,250 --> 00:01:11,640 the documents may just be right for the picking, if one were to 17 00:01:11,640 --> 00:01:18,210 ask for them. So that's exactly what I did. This unfolding saga 18 00:01:18,210 --> 00:01:21,330 brought me hope that after more than 20 years of pushing for the 19 00:01:21,330 --> 00:01:25,260 truth, the veil of secrecy surrounding the UFO phenomenon 20 00:01:25,440 --> 00:01:29,190 might just be lifting once and for all, and things were 21 00:01:29,190 --> 00:01:33,090 drastically changing. Ever evidence of that change was 22 00:01:33,090 --> 00:01:36,090 revealed just two months after Elizondo stepped foot on that 23 00:01:36,090 --> 00:01:39,450 stage. That is when the mainstream media covered 24 00:01:39,450 --> 00:01:44,100 Elizondo, along with his story, and it became a viral sensation 25 00:01:44,220 --> 00:01:45,390 all over the world. 26 00:01:45,990 --> 00:01:47,310 CNN News Anchor: Right now the former Pentagon military 27 00:01:47,310 --> 00:01:49,500 officials who ran the covert government program up until this 28 00:01:49,500 --> 00:01:53,730 last November, Luis Elizondo, we thank you so much for your time 29 00:01:53,730 --> 00:01:54,210 tonight 30 00:01:54,300 --> 00:01:57,090 George Knapp: Until he stepped out on stage last October 31 00:01:57,090 --> 00:02:00,630 alongside rock star Tom DeLonge. And other former government 32 00:02:00,630 --> 00:02:03,660 insiders that most of the world had never heard of Luis 33 00:02:03,720 --> 00:02:05,850 Elizondo, which is how he liked it. 34 00:02:09,120 --> 00:02:11,490 John Greenewald: But as excitement exploded worldwide 35 00:02:11,490 --> 00:02:15,420 about this secret Pentagon UFO study known as the advanced 36 00:02:15,420 --> 00:02:20,730 aerospace threat identification program, or a tip, controversy 37 00:02:20,730 --> 00:02:25,080 had already begun to percolate inside the black vault about 38 00:02:25,080 --> 00:02:29,730 what was really going on. Just three weeks prior to the New 39 00:02:29,730 --> 00:02:33,090 York Times running there now world famous headline, the 40 00:02:33,090 --> 00:02:36,540 Pentagon told the black vault they had no records on any 41 00:02:36,540 --> 00:02:40,680 program that Elizondo had described, not a single piece of 42 00:02:40,680 --> 00:02:45,360 evidence whatsoever. A couple months after that, the Navy 43 00:02:45,360 --> 00:02:49,290 denied they gave anything to the a tip program, despite what 44 00:02:49,290 --> 00:02:53,520 Elizondo had claimed. And then, just months after that, the 45 00:02:53,520 --> 00:02:56,580 Pentagon issued a statement that was the most damning of all. 46 00:02:57,270 --> 00:03:00,510 They claimed that Elizondo had no assigned responsibilities on 47 00:03:00,510 --> 00:03:05,130 the a tip program that he had brought into the spotlight. As 48 00:03:05,130 --> 00:03:08,370 the months and years passed since the initial headlines, the 49 00:03:08,370 --> 00:03:11,490 black vault became highly critical of Elizondo his claims. 50 00:03:12,090 --> 00:03:15,540 This is not a popular stance to take, and a social media can 51 00:03:15,570 --> 00:03:19,470 easily prove that type of stance can come with a little bit of 52 00:03:19,470 --> 00:03:24,090 heat. But it wasn't just Elizondo on the receiving end of 53 00:03:24,090 --> 00:03:27,660 criticism. The Pentagon and the entire US government has had a 54 00:03:27,660 --> 00:03:32,340 history of covering up UFO data for decades. And it appeared 55 00:03:32,550 --> 00:03:36,690 that's exactly what they may be doing again. But to what extent. 56 00:03:38,490 --> 00:03:42,660 My guest today is the man who started it all, Luis Elizondo 57 00:03:42,660 --> 00:03:47,040 himself. Despite the black vaults criticism, and admittedly 58 00:03:47,040 --> 00:03:50,040 the nitpicking of every single detail in order to find the 59 00:03:50,040 --> 00:03:53,610 Absolute Truth. Elizondo has agreed to step into the vault 60 00:03:54,000 --> 00:03:56,910 and share his side of the story in a special one on one 61 00:03:56,910 --> 00:04:01,470 interview. Stay tuned. You're about to journey inside the 62 00:04:01,470 --> 00:04:02,280 black vault. 63 00:04:42,150 --> 00:04:44,970 That's right everybody. As always, thank you so much for 64 00:04:44,970 --> 00:04:48,600 tuning in and making this your podcast or your live stream of 65 00:04:48,600 --> 00:04:51,840 choice. I'm your host john Greenwald, Jr. And to say that I 66 00:04:51,840 --> 00:04:56,340 am well beyond excited about the next hour or so. That would be 67 00:04:56,340 --> 00:04:59,400 an understatement. I've been looking forward to doing this 68 00:04:59,430 --> 00:05:03,300 with my guessed doing a sit down for quite some time now, I guess 69 00:05:03,300 --> 00:05:07,650 approaching probably about three years. And he has been nothing 70 00:05:07,890 --> 00:05:12,690 but gracious and a gentleman despite my high criticism and my 71 00:05:12,690 --> 00:05:16,140 skepticism about some things that have come out, I don't want 72 00:05:16,140 --> 00:05:19,770 to waste any time I want to bring on to the show Mr. Luis 73 00:05:19,800 --> 00:05:23,700 Elizondo, I really on behalf of everybody watching and 74 00:05:23,700 --> 00:05:26,700 listening. Thank you for taking the time today to talk to all of 75 00:05:26,700 --> 00:05:27,000 us. 76 00:05:28,080 --> 00:05:30,390 Luis Elizondo: Well, john, thank you, I appreciate it very much. 77 00:05:31,050 --> 00:05:35,340 You know, I certainly appreciate your audience as well. And I 78 00:05:35,340 --> 00:05:38,670 don't say this frivolously. And I've told you this before 79 00:05:38,670 --> 00:05:44,730 privately, you have managed to do things in this this arena 80 00:05:45,060 --> 00:05:48,360 that very few other individuals have have ever been able to 81 00:05:48,360 --> 00:05:52,920 accomplish, particularly your working employer. You know, for 82 00:05:52,920 --> 00:05:55,890 those who may not know, for you a Freedom of Information Act was 83 00:05:55,890 --> 00:05:59,520 enacted in order to ensure transparency for the American 84 00:05:59,520 --> 00:06:03,510 public and to government workings, if you will, because 85 00:06:03,510 --> 00:06:06,990 in the past, there had been some some issues with that where the 86 00:06:06,990 --> 00:06:10,380 government may have overstepped its its authorities and as a 87 00:06:10,380 --> 00:06:13,980 result, so Congress enacts FOIA process, and I think there has 88 00:06:13,980 --> 00:06:18,270 probably never been anybody who has sat who has been as savvy in 89 00:06:18,270 --> 00:06:23,310 the FOIA process than you. So thank you also, for what you do, 90 00:06:23,310 --> 00:06:27,150 it's sincerely appreciated. I know not just for folks like me, 91 00:06:27,150 --> 00:06:31,050 but on behalf of everybody out there. Your work over the past, 92 00:06:31,080 --> 00:06:34,050 well, past few decades really has been been pretty incredible. 93 00:06:34,439 --> 00:06:36,929 John Greenewald: I really appreciate those kind words, and 94 00:06:36,929 --> 00:06:40,409 as my audience is already seeing, and I'll say it again, 95 00:06:40,409 --> 00:06:44,579 despite that, that that skepticism from me, you have 96 00:06:44,579 --> 00:06:47,069 always been that that gentleman and a scholar, you've always 97 00:06:47,069 --> 00:06:51,209 been open to me. You've spoken to me on the telephone, and now 98 00:06:51,209 --> 00:06:54,629 you're doing this. But But I want to return that respect to 99 00:06:54,629 --> 00:06:57,179 you. And I hope everybody realizes that I've tried to say 100 00:06:57,179 --> 00:07:01,529 that on social media, but also the fact that you're here. And I 101 00:07:01,529 --> 00:07:03,749 want this as kind of a housekeeping note for those 102 00:07:03,749 --> 00:07:07,289 listening and watching. I asked all my guests this and all of 103 00:07:07,289 --> 00:07:11,039 them can attest to it. However, I did ask the same question to 104 00:07:11,039 --> 00:07:13,649 you, which was, is there anything you don't want me to go 105 00:07:13,649 --> 00:07:17,309 into? And you have never once told me even though I've asked 106 00:07:17,309 --> 00:07:21,389 you quadruple check that through the last few months, as we've 107 00:07:21,389 --> 00:07:24,629 set this up, you've never once said, Nope, don't go here. Nope, 108 00:07:24,629 --> 00:07:27,389 don't go there, you've always said the same thing, which was, 109 00:07:27,509 --> 00:07:31,169 everything's on the table. So My respect to you for that, and for 110 00:07:31,169 --> 00:07:34,139 being here. And let's just kind of jump right right into it. 111 00:07:34,259 --> 00:07:36,689 What I want to do and how I structured This interview is, 112 00:07:36,869 --> 00:07:41,189 essentially take a chronological look at some of maybe some stuff 113 00:07:41,189 --> 00:07:43,379 that you've already talked about, but also filling in the 114 00:07:43,379 --> 00:07:46,799 holes, some questions may be a little bit sensitive, we might 115 00:07:46,799 --> 00:07:49,019 get into some areas where you go, sorry, john, I'm going to 116 00:07:49,019 --> 00:07:53,549 talk to you about that. And and, and so I'll apologize in advance 117 00:07:53,549 --> 00:07:56,669 if I start pushing those buttons. But that's who I am, I 118 00:07:56,669 --> 00:07:59,669 have to push them. So take me back to the beginning, if you 119 00:07:59,669 --> 00:08:04,829 could, on how you became involved in a tip and exactly 120 00:08:04,859 --> 00:08:06,029 how that came to be. 121 00:08:07,140 --> 00:08:09,960 Luis Elizondo: Yeah, I'm gonna do that. And but before I do 122 00:08:09,960 --> 00:08:13,560 that, john, let me also offer one one, Mia Copeland apology 123 00:08:13,560 --> 00:08:16,830 also to you, and I'm not sure that, that we really ever had a 124 00:08:16,830 --> 00:08:19,920 chance to address this. But the bottom line is that years ago, 125 00:08:19,950 --> 00:08:23,580 you try, I tried to make myself as approachable as possible. And 126 00:08:24,090 --> 00:08:28,410 years ago, I know, several years ago, you tried to reach out and 127 00:08:28,980 --> 00:08:32,730 try to have a conversation with me. And unfortunately, that 128 00:08:32,730 --> 00:08:37,020 message never got to me. And I want to apologize, because I do. 129 00:08:37,440 --> 00:08:39,630 I do think we should have probably had this conversation 130 00:08:39,630 --> 00:08:43,740 three years ago, and probably through every year after that as 131 00:08:43,740 --> 00:08:47,970 well. And because that information never got to me. 132 00:08:49,800 --> 00:08:53,190 Unfortunately, we never gave you a reply or response that you 133 00:08:53,190 --> 00:08:56,430 deserved. And so I want to, I want to say here, and now I'm 134 00:08:56,430 --> 00:08:59,550 really, really sorry, we never had a chance to do this earlier. 135 00:08:59,580 --> 00:09:03,450 I think this conversation is a longtime company coming and I 136 00:09:03,450 --> 00:09:07,140 really do appreciate sincerely your patience. Thus far, I 137 00:09:07,140 --> 00:09:10,680 promise you it was not intentional on my part. I just 138 00:09:10,680 --> 00:09:14,730 never knew you had even inquired to speak with me until after you 139 00:09:14,730 --> 00:09:16,920 know, we actually talked the first time and you had said, 140 00:09:16,920 --> 00:09:19,230 Hey, Lou, I've been trying to get ahold of you for, you know, 141 00:09:19,320 --> 00:09:23,250 X amount of months. And, and I had no idea. So I want to 142 00:09:23,250 --> 00:09:27,000 apologize here, you know, on air, just so you know, that was 143 00:09:27,000 --> 00:09:27,660 never intention. 144 00:09:27,720 --> 00:09:29,580 John Greenewald: Well, I appreciate that. No, you. 145 00:09:29,820 --> 00:09:31,740 Somebody taught me a long time ago. You don't know what you 146 00:09:31,740 --> 00:09:34,590 don't know. And there's no need to apologize but accepted 147 00:09:34,620 --> 00:09:37,740 anyway. But I appreciate you pointing that out. Thank you. 148 00:09:38,730 --> 00:09:42,480 Luis Elizondo: So back to at&t, how did I get involved? Let's 149 00:09:42,480 --> 00:09:45,540 rewind the clock to about 2008. Now give you kind of the 150 00:09:45,840 --> 00:09:50,040 synopsis of how all this evolved. I was working prior to 151 00:09:50,040 --> 00:09:52,380 that at the Office of the Director of National 152 00:09:52,380 --> 00:09:56,820 Intelligence. I was a senior intelligence officer working 153 00:09:57,480 --> 00:10:01,740 policy strategy, things like that. To be quite frankly, frank 154 00:10:01,740 --> 00:10:04,410 with you, the drive was killing me. I was living on Maryland's 155 00:10:04,440 --> 00:10:07,140 Eastern Shore at the time, and you're looking at a three hour 156 00:10:07,140 --> 00:10:10,410 commute one way. I love my job. I love the people, but the 157 00:10:10,410 --> 00:10:15,000 commute was killing me. So at the time, it was then 158 00:10:15,000 --> 00:10:18,270 Undersecretary of defense for intelligence, Jim Clapper was 159 00:10:18,270 --> 00:10:22,800 over at the usdi. And he was the undersecretary of defense for 160 00:10:22,800 --> 00:10:26,730 intelligence at the time, and a man I respected greatly. And I 161 00:10:26,730 --> 00:10:31,200 was given an opportunity to come back to God for about a year to 162 00:10:31,230 --> 00:10:34,890 to work some some new efforts, particularly in intelligence 163 00:10:34,890 --> 00:10:38,100 sharing, law enforcement, information integration. And so 164 00:10:38,100 --> 00:10:42,300 I came back very eager, because my, my daily commute was cut 165 00:10:42,300 --> 00:10:45,930 about half all of a sudden, and I had my little bit more of my 166 00:10:45,930 --> 00:10:50,400 life back. So I went back to God. And it was at that time, I 167 00:10:50,400 --> 00:10:54,090 was working in the National Capital Region, NCR region, 168 00:10:54,450 --> 00:10:58,020 where some people would come to my to my desk, we were working, 169 00:10:58,020 --> 00:11:00,810 I wasn't in the Pentagon at the time, we were working at a 170 00:11:00,810 --> 00:11:02,970 remote location, but still connected to the Pentagon. 171 00:11:04,410 --> 00:11:08,040 And, you know, it's kind of bizarre because like out of out 172 00:11:08,040 --> 00:11:08,610 of a movie. 173 00:11:09,750 --> 00:11:11,970 These two people I still remember today very clearly from 174 00:11:11,970 --> 00:11:15,900 what they were wearing, very nicely dressed. And I remember 175 00:11:15,900 --> 00:11:18,390 someone knocking on the door and Mr. Elizondo, there's some 176 00:11:18,390 --> 00:11:20,790 people here to see you, which is not uncommon, you know, you, 177 00:11:21,030 --> 00:11:24,240 you're always working issues, so you're trying to fix things. So 178 00:11:24,240 --> 00:11:27,870 sure, bring them on. And they came in, and they said, hey, 179 00:11:28,170 --> 00:11:33,960 you're you're Luis Elizondo, and Yes. Can we talk to you? And I 180 00:11:33,960 --> 00:11:38,370 said, Sure. And one of them shut the door behind my door. Okay. 181 00:11:38,790 --> 00:11:42,150 This is probably not a good. You know, I often joke, you know, 182 00:11:42,150 --> 00:11:47,130 what did I do now? Right? I probably upset somebody. And 183 00:11:47,160 --> 00:11:51,540 they sat down. And they started to say, you know, hey, look, we 184 00:11:51,540 --> 00:11:54,870 are part of the intelligence community. We're part of a 185 00:11:54,870 --> 00:11:58,050 program, we're not going to tell you much about it. But do you 186 00:11:58,050 --> 00:12:02,070 mind telling us a little bit about yourself? And I probably 187 00:12:02,070 --> 00:12:04,530 was a little rude. I probably was a little bit standoffish. 188 00:12:04,530 --> 00:12:07,770 But I don't particularly like talking about myself, especially 189 00:12:07,770 --> 00:12:11,910 if I don't know who you are. And they start asking very pointed 190 00:12:11,910 --> 00:12:14,430 questions, specifically about you know, we hear that your 191 00:12:14,430 --> 00:12:17,130 your, your counter intelligence guy, we hear that you did some 192 00:12:17,130 --> 00:12:21,540 background, before you have some background, in advanced avionics 193 00:12:21,540 --> 00:12:25,920 and aerospace industry. Is that true? Yes. Do you mind sharing 194 00:12:25,920 --> 00:12:27,810 with us? I said, Well, I'll share with you at the 195 00:12:27,810 --> 00:12:30,480 unclassified level, the type of systems I've worked on, but I'm 196 00:12:30,480 --> 00:12:33,810 really not comfortable going into any more detail. It's a 197 00:12:33,810 --> 00:12:37,290 long story short, they agreed to to, they would come back and 198 00:12:37,290 --> 00:12:41,130 have another discussion with me. And so when they left, I ran 199 00:12:41,130 --> 00:12:43,740 some trap lines to find out that they were legit, they were part 200 00:12:43,740 --> 00:12:47,370 of a special program, but I didn't have clearance into it. 201 00:12:47,370 --> 00:12:49,770 So I really didn't know. But they really were who they said 202 00:12:49,770 --> 00:12:52,440 they were, they were part of a small organization. And I 203 00:12:52,440 --> 00:12:54,750 presumed that the time had something to do with aerospace. 204 00:12:55,560 --> 00:12:58,800 But I really didn't know. And then a couple more trips, they 205 00:12:58,800 --> 00:13:01,500 came by we talked, got a little bit more comfortable. They got 206 00:13:01,500 --> 00:13:03,390 more comfortable with me, I certainly got more comfortable 207 00:13:03,390 --> 00:13:07,110 with them. And finally, they said we'd like to have you meet 208 00:13:07,140 --> 00:13:12,420 our director. And I said, Okay, sure, no problem. It might have 209 00:13:12,420 --> 00:13:16,620 been john, probably, seven or 10 days later, we had an 210 00:13:16,620 --> 00:13:19,140 appointment to go meet that I was hoping the director would 211 00:13:19,140 --> 00:13:22,950 come see me, I thought I was sufficiently senior enough where 212 00:13:23,160 --> 00:13:25,500 you know, you want to come see me, you can come see me instead 213 00:13:25,500 --> 00:13:28,440 of like, okay, be at this location at this time at this 214 00:13:28,440 --> 00:13:31,560 place. And don't tell anybody, you're coming. So again, a 215 00:13:31,560 --> 00:13:33,960 little bit unusual. I'm like, you know, I'm sorry, who are 216 00:13:33,960 --> 00:13:38,400 you? So I decided to go ahead and do it. And I told my deputy 217 00:13:38,400 --> 00:13:41,250 that time, hey, I'm going to go go to this meeting. I went to 218 00:13:41,250 --> 00:13:45,180 it. And it was an undisclosed location, and also the National 219 00:13:45,180 --> 00:13:48,870 Capital Region. look just like a normal office building, really, 220 00:13:49,020 --> 00:13:51,660 until you go inside. And then you realize that you have, you 221 00:13:51,660 --> 00:13:54,690 know, guards and whatnot, you're like, Okay, this is probably a 222 00:13:54,690 --> 00:13:58,320 little bit more more sensitive. I remember going up the elevator 223 00:13:58,320 --> 00:14:02,370 up to the floor, and it looked like it looked like an office 224 00:14:02,370 --> 00:14:05,490 building you would see like on Wall Street, really, you know, 225 00:14:05,490 --> 00:14:09,480 cubicles all over the place, and people kind of making copies and 226 00:14:09,510 --> 00:14:12,660 doing work diligently on their computers. And there was just 227 00:14:12,660 --> 00:14:17,040 corner office kind of looked like that. Well, last, you know, 228 00:14:17,040 --> 00:14:20,010 the individual sitting back in there. And what struck me is 229 00:14:20,010 --> 00:14:24,450 that the individual was I don't want to stereotype but if you 230 00:14:24,450 --> 00:14:28,080 would ever think of what a rocket scientist looks like. He 231 00:14:28,080 --> 00:14:32,190 was your quintessential rocket scientist glasses. You know, 232 00:14:32,190 --> 00:14:35,220 very, very lewd, appeared very astute 233 00:14:36,539 --> 00:14:41,609 and very, no nonsense. So I went I introduced myself should 234 00:14:41,609 --> 00:14:44,309 contain, hey, glad you're here. He didn't smile. He was just 235 00:14:44,309 --> 00:14:48,269 very serious. And he was mad. He looked at me, he was staring at 236 00:14:48,269 --> 00:14:51,629 me. I felt almost a little uncomfortable because I know he 237 00:14:51,629 --> 00:14:54,269 was assessing the hell out of me. And I was trying to assess 238 00:14:54,269 --> 00:14:57,119 him as well. But obviously, he probably knew a little bit more 239 00:14:57,119 --> 00:15:00,449 about me than I knew about him. Which is never really Good to go 240 00:15:00,449 --> 00:15:02,669 into a meeting like that, as an intelligence officer, you know, 241 00:15:02,669 --> 00:15:06,839 you're kind of one, if you will know thy enemy, not saying he 242 00:15:06,839 --> 00:15:09,389 was my enemy by any stretch, but you know, you want one who 243 00:15:09,389 --> 00:15:14,609 you're dealing with. And he introduced himself. And I'm sure 244 00:15:14,609 --> 00:15:17,129 at some point, his name will become become very public I 245 00:15:17,129 --> 00:15:19,679 have, I have a lot of respect for him. I've never mentioned 246 00:15:19,679 --> 00:15:23,099 his name. He's asked me never to mention it. until he's 247 00:15:23,099 --> 00:15:28,319 comfortable with with his name being out, so I won't. But we 248 00:15:28,319 --> 00:15:30,719 talked, we had a very good candid conversation. And that's 249 00:15:30,719 --> 00:15:33,389 when he asked me, I mean, started, he started with my 250 00:15:33,389 --> 00:15:37,499 background in, in aerospace and the type of technologies I've 251 00:15:37,499 --> 00:15:42,839 worked on. And you know, this is a guy who I really knew his 252 00:15:42,839 --> 00:15:45,299 stuff. And he was like, literally a rock literally, by 253 00:15:45,299 --> 00:15:47,969 definition, a rocket scientists, and probably one of the best 254 00:15:47,969 --> 00:15:51,959 ones that we had in the government. And that's when, you 255 00:15:51,959 --> 00:15:56,789 know, he asked me said, what do you what do you think about? No, 256 00:15:57,239 --> 00:16:00,959 john, he looking straight in the face. And looking back, it was 257 00:16:00,959 --> 00:16:04,139 so weird, because I wasn't sure if he was like, testing me, or 258 00:16:04,139 --> 00:16:06,929 if it was legit, but he said, What do you think about the 259 00:16:06,929 --> 00:16:12,209 topic of UFOs? Now coming from my world, you know, will to test 260 00:16:12,209 --> 00:16:14,759 somebody, we will use provocative statements 261 00:16:14,759 --> 00:16:17,579 sometimes, and then gauge their body language and, you know, 262 00:16:17,579 --> 00:16:20,999 micro behaviors and neuro linguistics to see if, you know, 263 00:16:20,999 --> 00:16:24,479 they're prone to, you know, flights of fancy and things like 264 00:16:24,479 --> 00:16:28,559 that. And, but he wasn't listening very serious. And they 265 00:16:28,559 --> 00:16:33,539 said, Well, I, I don't really think about UFOs This is what 266 00:16:33,539 --> 00:16:35,639 you don't think they're real. I said, No, no, I didn't say that. 267 00:16:35,639 --> 00:16:39,269 I just, I never really had the luxury to think about UFOs. You 268 00:16:39,269 --> 00:16:41,849 know, I'm not particularly a huge science fiction fan. I 269 00:16:41,849 --> 00:16:45,869 never really watched X Files or anything like that. And I've 270 00:16:45,869 --> 00:16:48,569 been so consumed with my work that when I'm not working at my 271 00:16:48,569 --> 00:16:52,169 home, and I'm a father, but those are really the only things 272 00:16:52,169 --> 00:16:55,589 I ever have time for work, and which didn't involve anything at 273 00:16:55,589 --> 00:16:59,519 all involved in the photos clearly, and, and raising a 274 00:16:59,519 --> 00:17:04,859 family. So he said, Okay, that's, that's fair. And he 275 00:17:04,859 --> 00:17:08,849 said, but let me let me just caution you, to caution you at 276 00:17:08,849 --> 00:17:11,939 warning something to that effect, let me caution you that, 277 00:17:12,329 --> 00:17:18,959 don't let your analytic bias get in the way. And he said, you're 278 00:17:18,959 --> 00:17:22,049 gonna, you're gonna see things that you may not, you may have a 279 00:17:22,049 --> 00:17:24,269 hard time reconciling. Now, at this point, I hadn't even 280 00:17:24,269 --> 00:17:26,939 accepted it, I think hadn't been offered even really a job, 281 00:17:26,939 --> 00:17:30,539 right? Yeah. I'm thinking to myself, are you? Are you just a 282 00:17:30,539 --> 00:17:34,109 pitcher, you offer me a job, or this just is just just advice 283 00:17:34,109 --> 00:17:37,439 for life, you know, to take with me and what the hell's really 284 00:17:37,439 --> 00:17:41,759 going on here? So I've not ever had to know. But I've, you know, 285 00:17:41,759 --> 00:17:45,719 very, very fair point, right? I don't really have an opinion yet 286 00:17:45,839 --> 00:17:49,259 on it. And then we agreed, have another conversation. But he 287 00:17:49,259 --> 00:17:54,089 said, Look, I'm looking for a counterintelligence guy. For 288 00:17:54,089 --> 00:17:55,739 those in your audience who may not know what really 289 00:17:55,739 --> 00:17:58,319 counterintelligence is, and a lot of people think they know 290 00:17:58,319 --> 00:18:02,879 what CIA CIA is, is really knowing what the enemy knows 291 00:18:02,879 --> 00:18:06,509 about you. Right? So so foreign intelligence collection is, is 292 00:18:06,509 --> 00:18:09,419 learning what the bad guys know, counterintelligence is knowing 293 00:18:09,419 --> 00:18:11,639 what the bad guys know about you. So if you think of a 294 00:18:11,639 --> 00:18:17,939 chessboard, if you are playing chess against an opponent, you 295 00:18:17,939 --> 00:18:21,029 know, foreign intelligence is knowing what their pieces can do 296 00:18:21,029 --> 00:18:23,789 on the chessboard and how they plan to move. Counter 297 00:18:23,789 --> 00:18:26,309 intelligence is knowing what they know about your pieces, 298 00:18:26,339 --> 00:18:31,169 right, and how you can move. So it's yet another layer of 299 00:18:31,409 --> 00:18:34,619 playing chess to some degree, I guess, you know, not any better 300 00:18:34,619 --> 00:18:36,959 or worse in other forms of intelligence. It's just, it's a 301 00:18:36,959 --> 00:18:40,649 very nice way of doing business from an intelligence 302 00:18:40,649 --> 00:18:43,979 perspective. So instead of looking for a counter 303 00:18:43,979 --> 00:18:46,919 intelligence guy, because we know that there are some foreign 304 00:18:46,919 --> 00:18:49,919 countries, foreign adversaries out there that probably know 305 00:18:49,919 --> 00:18:53,489 what we're doing. And I need a good counterintelligence and 306 00:18:53,489 --> 00:18:56,879 security program, which, by the way, it's not unusual. Anytime 307 00:18:56,879 --> 00:19:00,929 you have a sensitive program, you know, you you want to have, 308 00:19:01,019 --> 00:19:03,029 you want to have good security and counterintelligence 309 00:19:03,029 --> 00:19:06,869 expertise. It's just, it's just an extra layer of, if you will, 310 00:19:07,469 --> 00:19:11,699 insurance to have to protect your program. So it wasn't 311 00:19:11,699 --> 00:19:14,129 unusual that I was that I was being asked to provide 312 00:19:14,129 --> 00:19:16,499 counterintelligence expertise, I wasn't being asked to do 313 00:19:16,499 --> 00:19:19,709 anything with UFOs, per se, it was just to come in and provide, 314 00:19:19,889 --> 00:19:22,889 you know, the background that I already have just used that in 315 00:19:22,889 --> 00:19:27,149 this capacity. So ultimately, long story short, it was 316 00:19:27,149 --> 00:19:31,499 obviously the rest is history. No pun intended, I secure 317 00:19:31,499 --> 00:19:33,149 alcohol, I'll accept the job. 318 00:19:34,560 --> 00:19:38,280 And it was at that point, through through various 319 00:19:38,280 --> 00:19:41,580 conversations afterwards, I began to realize that these guys 320 00:19:41,580 --> 00:19:44,610 are legit. They're real. I mean, they have like real data. And 321 00:19:45,450 --> 00:19:48,420 the individuals at the started that were part of this effort, I 322 00:19:48,420 --> 00:19:51,360 knew from before, like people like help food off and whatnot 323 00:19:51,360 --> 00:19:53,790 that were, you know, they were kind of legends in their own 324 00:19:53,790 --> 00:19:58,530 time anyways. So I knew this was a serious legitimate effort, and 325 00:19:58,530 --> 00:20:02,160 then I began to see the documentation. From the Senate 326 00:20:02,160 --> 00:20:05,820 and Congress, and I really began to recognize that this was a 327 00:20:05,820 --> 00:20:08,370 full fledged program. But they really didn't need 328 00:20:08,370 --> 00:20:10,980 counterintelligence expertise. They didn't have anything. So 329 00:20:10,980 --> 00:20:12,990 they were kind of they were kind of vulnerable from that 330 00:20:12,990 --> 00:20:17,760 perspective. Yeah, I know, it's probably a long winded 331 00:20:17,760 --> 00:20:19,590 explanation. No, that's okay. Um, yeah, that's, 332 00:20:19,620 --> 00:20:21,930 John Greenewald: I mean, yeah, yeah. No, I appreciate it. 333 00:20:21,930 --> 00:20:26,310 Because I want the groundwork here. Now, in this next 334 00:20:26,310 --> 00:20:28,710 question, I want you to kind of clarify, you can do it quickly, 335 00:20:28,740 --> 00:20:33,120 if you could, the difference between what we learned of the 336 00:20:33,120 --> 00:20:38,670 advanced aerospace weapons. Now I'm drawn on that. Yeah, thank 337 00:20:38,670 --> 00:20:42,030 you the offset program and I get tongue tongue tied, versus the 338 00:20:42,030 --> 00:20:44,700 program that you joined, that you just described the advanced 339 00:20:44,910 --> 00:20:49,080 aerospace threat identification program or a tip. What was the 340 00:20:49,080 --> 00:20:52,530 difference between the two? Because this has been an area of 341 00:20:52,530 --> 00:20:56,220 much confusion not only by myself, but it seems like those 342 00:20:56,220 --> 00:20:58,260 that even worked on the program, which I'll explain in 343 00:20:58,290 --> 00:21:00,180 Luis Elizondo: a moment, absolutely not, not not only 344 00:21:00,180 --> 00:21:02,730 you, but I mean, honestly, probably to all of us, to some 345 00:21:02,730 --> 00:21:05,400 degree in the beginning. So in the in the, in the very 346 00:21:05,400 --> 00:21:07,950 beginning days, there was very little difference between all 347 00:21:07,950 --> 00:21:12,480 seven, eight, there really wasn't a clear line distinction. 348 00:21:12,960 --> 00:21:18,720 There were there were focuses of the same effort. And what it was 349 00:21:18,720 --> 00:21:21,690 you had portions of all SAP, which of course, now know, 350 00:21:21,690 --> 00:21:25,380 Bigelow Aerospace was part of had some incredible scientists 351 00:21:25,380 --> 00:21:28,620 working at at the at the ranch facility. And by the way, other 352 00:21:28,620 --> 00:21:30,120 places, it wasn't just the ranch. 353 00:21:31,380 --> 00:21:33,420 John Greenewald: And it just jumps. Just to clarify, you're 354 00:21:33,420 --> 00:21:38,220 talking about skinwalker Ranch. Okay, so so you're, and this is 355 00:21:38,220 --> 00:21:40,410 another one, but since you brought it up, I'll just ask it 356 00:21:40,410 --> 00:21:47,010 really quick. So so a tip or OS app are both operated on the 357 00:21:47,010 --> 00:21:48,810 grounds of skinwalker Ranch in Utah? 358 00:21:50,220 --> 00:21:51,960 Luis Elizondo: I want to be clear, I don't want to answer 359 00:21:51,960 --> 00:21:56,100 for Bob Bigelow, or the former director of the program, because 360 00:21:56,130 --> 00:21:59,790 those are probably nuances, you'd have to ask them, I will 361 00:21:59,790 --> 00:22:04,410 say that it didn't involve the ranch, all SAP was that it was 362 00:22:04,410 --> 00:22:08,790 looking at looking at the phenomenon through through a 363 00:22:08,790 --> 00:22:13,950 very broad lens. And, you know, that's, that's what they were 364 00:22:13,950 --> 00:22:17,670 doing. And by the way, there was some pretty compelling data. And 365 00:22:17,670 --> 00:22:20,550 I'll share with you that it was there was some fairly compelling 366 00:22:20,550 --> 00:22:23,880 data. Some of it was was a little bit disturbing, to be 367 00:22:23,880 --> 00:22:30,600 honest with you. But in 2009, a decision was really made to 368 00:22:30,600 --> 00:22:38,100 formally if you will, partition off that that part of the study 369 00:22:38,490 --> 00:22:42,030 involving the UAP phenomenon under a tip and the reason why 370 00:22:42,030 --> 00:22:45,330 is because we were getting data from all different sensor 371 00:22:45,330 --> 00:22:48,690 platforms that weren't necessarily ranch related. These 372 00:22:48,690 --> 00:22:50,820 were, you know, of course, everybody knows Nimitz and all 373 00:22:50,820 --> 00:22:54,960 these other other cases. But, you know, you had, you know, 374 00:22:54,960 --> 00:23:01,230 strategic carrier groups out in, in, in certain ao ours, areas of 375 00:23:01,230 --> 00:23:05,010 operation, if you will, were where we were picking up UAP 376 00:23:05,010 --> 00:23:08,790 activity. And so we realized that there was a really a 377 00:23:09,180 --> 00:23:15,720 concerted need to, to focus on the topic of ua peas, from a 378 00:23:15,720 --> 00:23:19,260 nuts and bolts perspective. Now, let me caveat a lot of people 379 00:23:19,260 --> 00:23:21,600 when I say that they kind of retract and say, Yeah, but you 380 00:23:21,600 --> 00:23:23,760 can't look at these from a nuts and bolts perspective, you have 381 00:23:23,760 --> 00:23:26,040 to, you know, look at this from this perspective and that 382 00:23:26,040 --> 00:23:28,560 perspective. And you know, that that could be absolutely right. 383 00:23:29,040 --> 00:23:33,000 But in the Department of Defense, we had to be able to, 384 00:23:33,300 --> 00:23:37,440 to do two things, and that's qualified and quantify data. 385 00:23:37,830 --> 00:23:40,470 Otherwise, for us, it was useless. I'm not saying it is 386 00:23:40,470 --> 00:23:43,020 useless. I'm saying, for our purposes, and Department of 387 00:23:43,020 --> 00:23:46,620 Defense briefing, senior leadership, that unless I can 388 00:23:46,620 --> 00:23:51,240 qualify and quantify data, it's it's conjecture. There's, 389 00:23:51,300 --> 00:23:55,260 there's no there there, I can't do anything with it. So. And 390 00:23:55,260 --> 00:23:57,930 there was enough sufficient data coming in where we could, I 391 00:23:57,930 --> 00:23:59,940 mean, we could say there were these many incidents occurring 392 00:23:59,940 --> 00:24:01,920 in this particular month, and these particular parts of the 393 00:24:01,920 --> 00:24:05,580 waters with these particular assets, you know, these are 394 00:24:05,640 --> 00:24:09,450 videos or pictures that were taken and radar information. So 395 00:24:09,600 --> 00:24:17,640 it helps you paint a compelling picture to leadership, an event 396 00:24:17,640 --> 00:24:20,700 that is occurring or events that are occurring. And so that 397 00:24:20,730 --> 00:24:24,450 decision really started to occur started to solidify 2009 and 398 00:24:24,870 --> 00:24:28,290 that's why you see I think in the in Senator Reid's now now 399 00:24:28,320 --> 00:24:31,530 infamous letter that came out everybody's now knows about all 400 00:24:31,530 --> 00:24:36,870 way back in 2009. He then Deputy Secretary land that he wants to 401 00:24:36,870 --> 00:24:39,630 take this portion of eight tip that you actually see the 402 00:24:39,630 --> 00:24:41,610 advanced aerospace threat identification program become a 403 00:24:41,610 --> 00:24:45,780 formalized effort and put that into into SAP channels to 404 00:24:45,780 --> 00:24:49,500 protect it. Because we knew based upon the efforts that were 405 00:24:49,500 --> 00:24:53,400 going on with Aw, SAP, that you had two camps, you had some 406 00:24:53,400 --> 00:24:55,950 people that really supported the effort. And then you had some 407 00:24:55,950 --> 00:24:58,110 people that really didn't support the effort. And by the 408 00:24:58,110 --> 00:25:01,020 way, this is just a loss at least All this before with how 409 00:25:01,020 --> 00:25:03,960 poodles program with Stargate and the remote viewing program 410 00:25:03,960 --> 00:25:07,650 that, you know, anytime the government was dealing with 411 00:25:07,650 --> 00:25:14,250 something that was maybe maybe a bit unconventional fringe, it 412 00:25:14,250 --> 00:25:18,210 would tend to be considered by some fringe, it ruffled a lot of 413 00:25:18,210 --> 00:25:22,110 feathers. And so, you know, the, I guess the solution, then the 414 00:25:22,110 --> 00:25:24,810 mindset was let's, let's take this program that's kind of 415 00:25:24,810 --> 00:25:28,530 exposed, and let's put it under this umbrella of sapper, we can 416 00:25:28,530 --> 00:25:32,160 protect it. And, you know, we can still continue to collect 417 00:25:32,160 --> 00:25:35,490 the information without fear of people on the outside not 418 00:25:35,490 --> 00:25:37,920 understanding what we're doing, and having this knee jerk 419 00:25:37,920 --> 00:25:42,270 reaction to just shut it down. So that's, that's kind of how 420 00:25:42,270 --> 00:25:43,410 that all evolved. Gotcha. 421 00:25:43,500 --> 00:25:46,470 John Greenewald: So then all SAP, from what it sounds like, 422 00:25:46,500 --> 00:25:50,910 was was completely different. A tip was branching off on just 423 00:25:50,910 --> 00:25:54,600 UAP investigations fair to say that 424 00:25:54,599 --> 00:25:56,699 Luis Elizondo: I mean, from my perspective, I mean, I'm sure if 425 00:25:56,699 --> 00:25:59,309 you talk to people that were in all SAP that were still doing 426 00:25:59,309 --> 00:26:02,849 stump stuff in the a tip side of the house, and vice versa, they 427 00:26:02,849 --> 00:26:06,029 would probably tell you, it was more of a gray area, there 428 00:26:06,029 --> 00:26:08,879 wasn't really a heart and the early days, and yet it was but 429 00:26:09,089 --> 00:26:11,759 in the early days, there wasn't really a hard transition, or if 430 00:26:11,759 --> 00:26:15,629 you if you will have an event horizon. Yeah, separating the 431 00:26:15,629 --> 00:26:19,199 offset program and the a tip, there was kind of a blurry line 432 00:26:19,229 --> 00:26:24,149 there. That's sometimes shifted, but by 2010, we were firmly by 433 00:26:24,149 --> 00:26:27,839 2010. Nine, really, but 10. It was, there was no question about 434 00:26:27,839 --> 00:26:30,449 it. A tip was its own focus area, 435 00:26:30,810 --> 00:26:33,030 John Greenewald: I want to ask you about the some of the public 436 00:26:33,030 --> 00:26:35,850 documentation, the verified information that has come out. 437 00:26:36,150 --> 00:26:39,960 And that is involving aos app. Now, I know that you didn't lead 438 00:26:39,960 --> 00:26:42,960 aos app, and sometimes you don't like to talk about it. But I do 439 00:26:42,960 --> 00:26:46,890 want to ask you something that also encompasses a tip, which is 440 00:26:46,890 --> 00:26:52,080 that public documentation has absolutely zero mention of 441 00:26:52,080 --> 00:26:56,370 paranormal UFOs uaps unidentified craft and so on 442 00:26:56,370 --> 00:26:59,490 that rather it was more of a forward looking program. At 443 00:26:59,490 --> 00:27:04,890 least that's what the public bid solicitation stated. Where I 444 00:27:04,890 --> 00:27:10,980 have a very big question on this is that disconnect from what we 445 00:27:10,980 --> 00:27:16,140 know, to then bass getting the contract? It's a UAP study. And 446 00:27:16,140 --> 00:27:20,160 then that bores out? A tip, and voila, we have the rest is is 447 00:27:20,160 --> 00:27:24,420 history? What What am I missing just by looking at that 448 00:27:24,420 --> 00:27:25,590 documentation? So 449 00:27:25,620 --> 00:27:27,720 Luis Elizondo: what? That's a great question. So anytime you 450 00:27:27,720 --> 00:27:30,210 look at any governmental solicitation, we call these 451 00:27:30,210 --> 00:27:33,450 service contracts elicitation. This goes out to the public 452 00:27:33,450 --> 00:27:36,150 sphere, right. And that means anybody and everybody can look 453 00:27:36,150 --> 00:27:38,370 at it to include Russians because the contract you're 454 00:27:38,370 --> 00:27:42,090 spending american taxpayer dollars to do job XYZ. So even 455 00:27:42,090 --> 00:27:45,270 when you want to build a B two bomber, right? In Air Force 456 00:27:45,270 --> 00:27:47,610 contracts, you don't put out a contract saying, Hey, we want 457 00:27:47,610 --> 00:27:51,150 somebody come up, build a super secret spell the space, stealth, 458 00:27:51,180 --> 00:27:54,330 you know, technology. Let me repeat that again. Sorry about 459 00:27:54,330 --> 00:27:57,600 that. Even when you're doing the B two bomber, and you want to do 460 00:27:57,600 --> 00:28:00,600 a solicitation for someone to build you a super secret stealth 461 00:28:00,600 --> 00:28:05,220 bomber, right? You don't you don't in the solicitation that 462 00:28:05,220 --> 00:28:09,660 will never say that. It will say very nebulous, ambiguous 463 00:28:09,660 --> 00:28:12,450 language, because you don't want to tip off to your foreign 464 00:28:12,450 --> 00:28:16,320 adversaries key technology that you're trying to develop a bill. 465 00:28:16,590 --> 00:28:21,210 So it's the same thing with this. When when the solicitation 466 00:28:21,210 --> 00:28:23,550 which by the way, for the record, I wasn't part of Sure, 467 00:28:23,580 --> 00:28:26,940 yeah. But I can tell you from general perspective, how we do 468 00:28:26,940 --> 00:28:30,930 this. At the unclassified level, you're going to see these 469 00:28:30,930 --> 00:28:34,500 solicitations always very generalized. And that is 470 00:28:34,500 --> 00:28:37,500 specifically because you don't want to tip your hand 471 00:28:37,500 --> 00:28:41,040 unnecessarily to your foreign adversaries that you're working 472 00:28:41,040 --> 00:28:45,720 on project ABC are doing. So that's why you said I would I 473 00:28:45,720 --> 00:28:48,480 would I would challenge anybody in your audience to go ahead and 474 00:28:48,480 --> 00:28:51,810 look at other solicitations. You know, now we can look back and 475 00:28:51,840 --> 00:28:54,840 you know, look back 1015 years, look at some of those 476 00:28:54,840 --> 00:28:58,230 technologies back then that were really protecting whether it's 477 00:28:58,230 --> 00:29:01,230 drone technology, right for to help us on the Global War on 478 00:29:01,230 --> 00:29:05,040 Terror. Those solicitations when you read those unclassified 479 00:29:05,040 --> 00:29:08,520 solicitations, almost read nothing like the classified 480 00:29:08,520 --> 00:29:11,400 portion of what the job really is you In fact, when you look at 481 00:29:11,400 --> 00:29:14,490 it, you're gonna see, you know, I've read this solicitation six 482 00:29:14,490 --> 00:29:15,930 times, I still have no idea what it's for. 483 00:29:16,020 --> 00:29:18,630 John Greenewald: So ambiguous in general, and let me jump in 484 00:29:18,630 --> 00:29:21,930 there because I get a lot of heat for bringing this up. And I 485 00:29:21,930 --> 00:29:25,020 don't think it's as bad of an act, quote, unquote, accusation. 486 00:29:25,020 --> 00:29:27,870 I'm not accusing anybody, but I don't think it's as bad of a 487 00:29:27,870 --> 00:29:31,950 thing as people make it sound like when I posed this, but if 488 00:29:31,950 --> 00:29:36,120 there's a classified portion of a bid solicitation, right, and 489 00:29:36,150 --> 00:29:38,760 you have that public setting, and then you have something 490 00:29:38,760 --> 00:29:42,060 behind the scenes that only cleared personnel can see when 491 00:29:42,210 --> 00:29:46,650 contractors come in. I'm with you on all of that. However, in 492 00:29:46,650 --> 00:29:50,340 kind of digging into that area, where I get myself into trouble 493 00:29:50,340 --> 00:29:54,270 from some people, is that Bigelow Aerospace, who obviously 494 00:29:54,270 --> 00:29:58,260 has a vested interest in this personal interest has invested a 495 00:29:58,260 --> 00:30:02,160 lot of his own money away from A tip and OS app and all that into 496 00:30:02,160 --> 00:30:06,630 the UAP phenomena. If he's not right upfront, getting that 497 00:30:06,630 --> 00:30:10,110 classified description, he sees the public part they bid on it. 498 00:30:10,530 --> 00:30:15,270 What are the odds that that organization gets this contract 499 00:30:15,270 --> 00:30:20,100 to secretly? In a classified setting? Investigate uaps. And 500 00:30:20,100 --> 00:30:22,290 according to the Defense Intelligence Agency, he's the 501 00:30:22,290 --> 00:30:27,300 only one out of every government contract IE that contract or 502 00:30:27,300 --> 00:30:32,250 that that could actually bid on this. He's the only one. And 503 00:30:32,340 --> 00:30:35,460 that leads to a discussion about a sweetheart deal. I doubt you 504 00:30:35,460 --> 00:30:38,730 want to comment on that. But I bring it up just simply because 505 00:30:38,730 --> 00:30:41,970 that's the disconnect that I still don't understand. Because 506 00:30:42,120 --> 00:30:46,230 he can't grab that classified portion of the solicitation, or 507 00:30:46,230 --> 00:30:50,130 correct me if I'm wrong, before he gets granted the contract. 508 00:30:50,609 --> 00:30:53,459 Luis Elizondo: Right? Well, I can't comment on it, because I 509 00:30:53,459 --> 00:30:56,609 wasn't there. But I can come at it from the perspective of a 510 00:30:56,609 --> 00:31:00,659 couple things. So first of all, I do know, Mr. Bigelow personal. 511 00:31:00,779 --> 00:31:04,769 He's an amazing human being anybody who who's never had the 512 00:31:04,769 --> 00:31:09,179 chance to meet this guy. He really is an American hero. He 513 00:31:09,179 --> 00:31:13,529 has he has contributed more to this topic. Behind the scenes, I 514 00:31:13,529 --> 00:31:16,679 think that done just about anybody, certainly even more 515 00:31:16,679 --> 00:31:20,369 than certainly more than I have. So that's the first thing. 516 00:31:20,369 --> 00:31:23,819 Second of all, I think if you look at aerospace, in general, 517 00:31:23,819 --> 00:31:27,299 look at Lockheed Martin, look at Boeing, look at Northrop Grumman 518 00:31:27,299 --> 00:31:31,049 and all these others. You know, there's only certain companies 519 00:31:31,079 --> 00:31:34,829 that can build an F 22. Right. And at the end of the day, it's 520 00:31:34,829 --> 00:31:38,009 up to two companies. I think you had Lockheed, and then you had, 521 00:31:38,009 --> 00:31:41,939 you know, the other guys that they wind up going with. You 522 00:31:41,939 --> 00:31:46,109 know, a lot of times there are contracts where you might tell 523 00:31:46,109 --> 00:31:49,409 somebody ahead of time, look, we're gonna write this contract, 524 00:31:50,159 --> 00:31:55,229 you're probably the only company that can do it. So just be 525 00:31:55,229 --> 00:31:58,079 advised that this contract may be coming out at some point. 526 00:31:59,159 --> 00:32:02,279 Because there's only certain amount of certain certain 527 00:32:02,279 --> 00:32:04,469 companies that can do certain things you wouldn't expect, for 528 00:32:04,469 --> 00:32:09,059 example, look at the early days when we had Jeep, I'm a Jeep 529 00:32:09,059 --> 00:32:12,389 guy, right. So I love old war, Jeeps, Korean War and World War 530 00:32:12,389 --> 00:32:15,269 Two jeeps. A lot of people don't realize people look at a jeep 531 00:32:15,269 --> 00:32:19,289 and say, Oh, that was you know, that was a Jeep product. But 532 00:32:19,469 --> 00:32:21,329 there were a lot of companies that were making jeeps in the 533 00:32:21,329 --> 00:32:24,419 early days of World War Two, you had Ford making them. And then 534 00:32:24,419 --> 00:32:26,849 you had, of course, you know, the overland Jeep overland 535 00:32:26,849 --> 00:32:29,069 company, and you had some other organization that were bidding 536 00:32:29,069 --> 00:32:31,499 for a contract. And at the end of the day, it turned out to be 537 00:32:31,499 --> 00:32:34,079 only only two companies from my understanding that actually got 538 00:32:34,079 --> 00:32:37,199 the Jeep contract, and then later want to be just one, 539 00:32:37,409 --> 00:32:42,179 believe it or not. So it's it's a bit convoluted the way that 540 00:32:42,179 --> 00:32:48,029 contracting world works. It's not perfect. But at the same 541 00:32:48,029 --> 00:32:50,729 time, I think there's enough oversight. Now, when you look at 542 00:32:50,729 --> 00:32:55,289 how, how contracts are selected. They're not selected by anybody 543 00:32:55,289 --> 00:32:57,839 who's connected really to the contract or connected by an 544 00:32:57,869 --> 00:33:01,049 outside independent organization. And there's a 545 00:33:01,049 --> 00:33:03,509 reason for that, because you have to be fair and unbiased. 546 00:33:03,779 --> 00:33:07,319 Now, I don't know this to be true. But I've been told that 547 00:33:07,349 --> 00:33:11,849 apparently, Bigelow was the only one Bigelow, bass was the only 548 00:33:11,849 --> 00:33:16,049 one to actually bid for the contract. So, you know, 549 00:33:16,169 --> 00:33:18,089 naturally, if you only have one bidder, and they have the 550 00:33:18,089 --> 00:33:22,109 qualifications are probably at the contract. But I, 551 00:33:22,349 --> 00:33:26,039 unfortunately, like I said, that occurred before my time. Sure, I 552 00:33:26,039 --> 00:33:29,549 came in really in 2008, that that ship had sailed back in 553 00:33:29,549 --> 00:33:35,189 2007. So I, I truly, honestly can't tell you exactly how it 554 00:33:35,189 --> 00:33:37,589 went down. Only because I wasn't there for 555 00:33:37,650 --> 00:33:41,070 John Greenewald: I gotcha. Fair enough. During the a tip days, I 556 00:33:41,070 --> 00:33:43,980 want to talk a little bit about the the controversy. We're about 557 00:33:43,980 --> 00:33:46,140 halfway through the interview, and I want to make sure that I 558 00:33:46,140 --> 00:33:49,440 give you ample time to address some of this. And that is the 559 00:33:49,440 --> 00:33:53,940 government's reaction to you coming out, you resign, you come 560 00:33:53,940 --> 00:33:59,370 out, you become a part of to the stars Academy, you bring videos 561 00:33:59,370 --> 00:34:02,730 along with you. I'm going to combine like 700 of the 562 00:34:02,730 --> 00:34:07,530 questions that I have here for for, for time reasons. But I 563 00:34:07,530 --> 00:34:10,800 want to talk about that controversy. Let me ask first 564 00:34:10,800 --> 00:34:14,790 quickly, if I may, at what point you were resigned October 565 00:34:14,790 --> 00:34:19,320 4 2017. If I remember correctly, you had submitted your your 566 00:34:19,320 --> 00:34:22,950 resignation letter. At what point did you meet Tom DeLonge 567 00:34:22,950 --> 00:34:27,120 and plan to join to the stars Academy and bring all of this 568 00:34:27,120 --> 00:34:28,380 information to light? 569 00:34:29,190 --> 00:34:31,950 Luis Elizondo: Yeah, I had made a decision to leave actually, 570 00:34:31,950 --> 00:34:35,340 I'd spoke with my dear My dear colleague and friend Chris 571 00:34:35,340 --> 00:34:38,370 Mellon. And it was you know, it was a soul searching moment for 572 00:34:38,370 --> 00:34:42,840 me. And finally, I made the decision. I said, Look, you 573 00:34:42,840 --> 00:34:48,030 know, I I can't fix this. On the inside. I can. This is a guy 574 00:34:48,060 --> 00:34:51,180 this is Secretary Mattis is a guy that I had been been in 575 00:34:51,180 --> 00:34:54,720 combat with, served with and just an amazing human being. 576 00:34:55,590 --> 00:34:58,890 And, and, you know, the bureaucracy unfortunately was 577 00:34:58,890 --> 00:35:03,150 such It just wasn't getting the information to the right people. 578 00:35:03,330 --> 00:35:08,850 And so sometimes, you know, in a situation like that, you do what 579 00:35:08,850 --> 00:35:14,310 you have to do. And in order to fix the problem, I, I felt that 580 00:35:14,310 --> 00:35:16,740 I had to I had to leave the organization, because I knew 581 00:35:16,740 --> 00:35:18,510 they wouldn't be able to stop, the one thing they couldn't stop 582 00:35:18,510 --> 00:35:21,750 would be my resignation memo. And, by the way, let's let's not 583 00:35:21,780 --> 00:35:25,740 forget that almost a year later, to the day, Secretary Mattis did 584 00:35:25,740 --> 00:35:28,350 the same thing he resigned, right. So rather than cause 585 00:35:28,350 --> 00:35:32,310 problems inside the system, in the Department of Defense, you 586 00:35:32,310 --> 00:35:34,950 know, if if you can't solve it, you need to get out of the way. 587 00:35:35,100 --> 00:35:38,880 And don't don't stay in a system that you don't don't agree with. 588 00:35:38,880 --> 00:35:43,590 If it's if it's really problematic, then resign. So the 589 00:35:43,620 --> 00:35:46,350 organization organization can continue doing what it's 590 00:35:46,350 --> 00:35:50,340 supposed to do, and you don't become, if you will, a friction 591 00:35:50,340 --> 00:35:54,840 point. That's just kind of a code of honor we have in the 592 00:35:54,840 --> 00:35:57,810 department, it's common, you see it in all the services, it's 593 00:35:57,810 --> 00:36:02,160 just what happens. As far as meeting Tom DeLonge. It wasn't 594 00:36:02,160 --> 00:36:06,210 till afterwards, actually, once I resigned, it's when I was 595 00:36:06,210 --> 00:36:08,610 approached to say, hey, Lou, you know, there's this little 596 00:36:08,640 --> 00:36:12,960 organization over here, led by some guy, some some rock star, 597 00:36:12,960 --> 00:36:15,750 which, for the record, when you're when you're a guy like me 598 00:36:15,750 --> 00:36:18,510 used to living in the shadows, that's the last thing you want 599 00:36:18,510 --> 00:36:20,970 to do is ever be in any kind of spotlight or it's just, it's not 600 00:36:20,970 --> 00:36:25,020 our character, the way we operate. But what I realized 601 00:36:25,020 --> 00:36:28,830 that it was how and Steve justice and Chris mallet and Jim 602 00:36:28,830 --> 00:36:32,670 semi van onboard, whoa, now, those are people I do know, now 603 00:36:32,670 --> 00:36:35,730 don't get me wrong. Tom's a great guy. But I never knew the 604 00:36:35,730 --> 00:36:38,010 guy, you know, for that I'm being in the intelligence 605 00:36:38,010 --> 00:36:41,220 community, you know, I might been able to pick out a song, 606 00:36:41,940 --> 00:36:45,690 but had no idea who this guy was, and really didn't pay 607 00:36:45,690 --> 00:36:50,070 attention to it. But when I saw who else was on, and you had the 608 00:36:50,070 --> 00:36:54,780 advisors like Dr. Norm Khan, and some of these other really big 609 00:36:54,780 --> 00:36:57,180 names that I had a chance to work with, while I was in the 610 00:36:57,180 --> 00:37:01,650 intelligence community. Whoa, now that's, that's significant. 611 00:37:01,650 --> 00:37:05,340 This guy may be a punk rocker, but he managed to get these 612 00:37:05,340 --> 00:37:10,380 folks together in the same room and support this cost. You know, 613 00:37:11,550 --> 00:37:15,000 that's, that's, that's a hell of an accomplishment. You know, so 614 00:37:15,000 --> 00:37:19,710 I was like, wow, that's, that's really hard to say no to. 615 00:37:21,330 --> 00:37:25,170 Especially when you have those people on board, that, and there 616 00:37:25,170 --> 00:37:28,470 was a lot more people that were affiliated with ttsa. That's not 617 00:37:28,470 --> 00:37:32,250 publicly known. But again, some some pretty significant people 618 00:37:32,250 --> 00:37:34,920 who had the honor and pleasure to serve with back in my day in 619 00:37:34,920 --> 00:37:37,650 military and Department of Defense, and later on in, in the 620 00:37:37,650 --> 00:37:41,340 intelligence community. So that was really for me, I had a 621 00:37:41,370 --> 00:37:44,640 conversation with my wife and said, Look, you know, what do 622 00:37:44,640 --> 00:37:47,250 you think and, you know, she says, Well, you know, these 623 00:37:47,250 --> 00:37:49,530 people and you know, do you trust them? And the answer is, 624 00:37:49,620 --> 00:37:54,600 you know, and statically Yes, I do. trust them with my life. So 625 00:37:54,600 --> 00:37:56,160 that was kind of an easy decision for me. 626 00:37:56,759 --> 00:37:58,769 John Greenewald: So you had known Christopher Mellon prior 627 00:37:58,769 --> 00:38:01,349 to resigning. It sounds like you had a conversation with him but 628 00:38:01,349 --> 00:38:05,639 did not did not know anyone else. When it came to to the 629 00:38:05,639 --> 00:38:08,729 stars Academy until after he resigned. And it was it seems 630 00:38:08,729 --> 00:38:09,119 like no, I 631 00:38:09,120 --> 00:38:12,840 Luis Elizondo: knew how put up I knew how it worked. For sure. He 632 00:38:12,840 --> 00:38:15,810 John Greenewald: was part Yeah, and I'm sorry. backtrack. Did 633 00:38:15,840 --> 00:38:18,540 Then did you know that he tell you about to the stars. 634 00:38:19,500 --> 00:38:24,030 Luis Elizondo: Before you it was Jim semi van. Who, who actually 635 00:38:24,030 --> 00:38:27,660 said hey, why don't you consider jumping on board with us? If I 636 00:38:27,660 --> 00:38:30,540 we met up Don't hold me to it. But and we were going back three 637 00:38:30,540 --> 00:38:35,310 years now. I'm pretty certain it was Jim who who actually was one 638 00:38:35,310 --> 00:38:37,680 to offer me a position, 639 00:38:38,340 --> 00:38:41,670 John Greenewald: pre resignation or post just for chronological 640 00:38:41,670 --> 00:38:42,090 post 641 00:38:42,120 --> 00:38:42,840 Luis Elizondo: post post. 642 00:38:43,560 --> 00:38:44,940 John Greenewald: I gotcha. So you 643 00:38:44,970 --> 00:38:46,620 Luis Elizondo: Yeah, cuz I think they knew that I was gonna wind 644 00:38:46,620 --> 00:38:49,650 up working at I gotta be careful, though. I don't want to 645 00:38:49,650 --> 00:38:52,350 put a plug in for it. I was gonna wind up working, you know, 646 00:38:52,350 --> 00:38:57,600 at a probably at a supermarket, just to just to pay my bills 647 00:38:57,600 --> 00:39:00,030 afterwards. Because, you know, even though I had left the 648 00:39:00,030 --> 00:39:04,410 department, I'm not the age of retirement yet. I can't collect 649 00:39:04,410 --> 00:39:07,920 my pension. So you know, I still I still needed employment. 650 00:39:08,040 --> 00:39:11,070 John Greenewald: Gotcha. Okay. So you joined to the stars 651 00:39:11,070 --> 00:39:13,620 Academy. It all seems to happen pretty quick after you had 652 00:39:13,620 --> 00:39:17,010 resigned because a couple of weeks go by and you're on so 653 00:39:17,010 --> 00:39:20,850 very fast. Yeah, it was very fast. Sounds like it. So and you 654 00:39:20,850 --> 00:39:22,950 brought with you a couple videos. I want to focus in on 655 00:39:22,950 --> 00:39:26,220 that now. And then we'll we'll get more to the do. 656 00:39:26,670 --> 00:39:28,890 Luis Elizondo: Just to be clear, I didn't actually bring those 657 00:39:28,890 --> 00:39:32,880 videos. That wasn't me. I did not I facilitated the process of 658 00:39:32,880 --> 00:39:36,330 getting them releasable through Department of Defense channels, 659 00:39:36,480 --> 00:39:39,180 but I didn't actually bring them that was somebody else. 660 00:39:40,530 --> 00:39:42,150 John Greenewald: Okay, so you would file the paperwork, 661 00:39:42,150 --> 00:39:42,990 obviously, that 662 00:39:43,020 --> 00:39:46,110 Luis Elizondo: yes. Okay. Good. And, and by the way, with after 663 00:39:46,110 --> 00:39:49,800 having a long discussion with my team, because I was a senior 664 00:39:49,800 --> 00:39:52,950 guy, I'm the one who had to request it, but it was a mutual 665 00:39:52,950 --> 00:39:56,550 decision that we would go with. So the initial intent, john was 666 00:39:56,550 --> 00:40:00,000 to have a unclassified repository because that was my 667 00:40:00,000 --> 00:40:02,520 experience before when I've worked in department events is 668 00:40:02,520 --> 00:40:05,400 really setting up these special enclaves, where you could share 669 00:40:05,400 --> 00:40:08,850 a very sensitive national level intelligence via what we call a 670 00:40:08,850 --> 00:40:12,840 terror line. And getting that information down to a level 671 00:40:12,870 --> 00:40:16,530 could be consumable by by anybody out there. That's, you 672 00:40:16,530 --> 00:40:19,890 know, local law enforcement, state authorities, anybody like 673 00:40:19,890 --> 00:40:23,040 that? That's, that's actionable information. But it was super 674 00:40:23,040 --> 00:40:25,860 classified. So you have to come up with a mechanism where people 675 00:40:25,860 --> 00:40:28,260 who don't necessarily have security clearance can access 676 00:40:28,260 --> 00:40:30,600 really, really classified information. So there's a 677 00:40:30,660 --> 00:40:34,350 mechanism to do that. So that kind of was my forte for some 678 00:40:34,350 --> 00:40:38,460 time. So we wanted to build an unclassified repository where 679 00:40:38,700 --> 00:40:44,070 information could be put on that was not super, super, super 680 00:40:44,070 --> 00:40:47,670 sensitive. There wasn't any like, classified metadata, or 681 00:40:48,210 --> 00:40:52,260 call signs or locational information. But we could create 682 00:40:52,260 --> 00:40:54,720 this database that allowed other people from the outside to look 683 00:40:54,720 --> 00:40:59,220 at this and say, oh, because we didn't we really, we went 684 00:40:59,220 --> 00:41:01,590 through analysis after analysis, and we were still coming up with 685 00:41:01,590 --> 00:41:04,440 a goose egg. We had no idea what the hell the things were. We 686 00:41:04,440 --> 00:41:06,990 were hoping that maybe some other people say, yeah, you know 687 00:41:06,990 --> 00:41:12,030 what, we picked that up too, and, and maybe some some state 688 00:41:12,030 --> 00:41:15,060 authorities and you know, Kansas said, Yeah, actually, we've been 689 00:41:15,060 --> 00:41:18,270 seeing these things over our nuclear facilities, or just as 690 00:41:18,270 --> 00:41:21,750 an example, let's say just Kansas, a nuclear facility where 691 00:41:21,750 --> 00:41:23,100 I got to give you this example, 692 00:41:23,130 --> 00:41:24,750 John Greenewald: a lot of people are going to read into that and 693 00:41:24,750 --> 00:41:25,800 go in Kansas nuclear. 694 00:41:26,220 --> 00:41:27,960 Luis Elizondo: Right. That's what I'm saying. It's anecdotal. 695 00:41:28,830 --> 00:41:29,910 anecdotal. Yeah, 696 00:41:29,910 --> 00:41:31,530 John Greenewald: there's gonna be blogs about this in about an 697 00:41:31,530 --> 00:41:32,280 hour. So 698 00:41:34,620 --> 00:41:37,110 Luis Elizondo: I know God, I promise you, I don't really mean 699 00:41:37,110 --> 00:41:43,080 can't ya say? compensation. But my point being is that we're 700 00:41:43,080 --> 00:41:46,950 trying to create a an enclave that allowed us to share this 701 00:41:46,950 --> 00:41:51,510 information that came from US government sources, to a broader 702 00:41:51,510 --> 00:41:55,800 audience in industry, the, you know, the big boys, Boeing's of 703 00:41:55,800 --> 00:41:59,130 the world and the Raytheon's and try to get more people into the 704 00:41:59,130 --> 00:42:03,270 conversation because we really had no idea what we were dealing 705 00:42:03,270 --> 00:42:05,970 with, and and even the folks that we're working with, and 706 00:42:05,970 --> 00:42:08,910 other agencies, were scratching your head. I mean, to the point 707 00:42:08,910 --> 00:42:14,190 where I remember one meeting, john, we we, we did such mental 708 00:42:14,190 --> 00:42:17,280 gymnastics, trying to come up with there was one particular 709 00:42:17,280 --> 00:42:21,270 video I won't go into detail, but it was so so incredible that 710 00:42:21,270 --> 00:42:23,910 we were doing these mental gymnastics trying to come up 711 00:42:23,910 --> 00:42:29,010 with a what if scenario, what technology? would this have to 712 00:42:29,010 --> 00:42:31,860 be to be able to do this? Yeah. And it was one of being so 713 00:42:31,860 --> 00:42:36,660 preposterous, so so ridiculously over the top, we all just kind 714 00:42:36,660 --> 00:42:39,930 of looked at ourselves and said, All right, that's, there's no 715 00:42:39,930 --> 00:42:44,250 way that that was, you know, that could be what it is. So 716 00:42:44,250 --> 00:42:47,670 that was, again, a long, probably a much longer winded 717 00:42:47,670 --> 00:42:49,560 response that you were looking for, but that Oh, no, 718 00:42:49,560 --> 00:42:52,470 John Greenewald: you mentioned a video. Lou, can you tell me what 719 00:42:52,500 --> 00:42:53,610 video that was? 720 00:42:56,790 --> 00:42:58,710 Luis Elizondo: The ones that we got released? Yes. 721 00:42:58,740 --> 00:43:01,380 John Greenewald: So it was one of the ones that you came up 722 00:43:01,380 --> 00:43:03,450 with the explanation not to step on you. 723 00:43:03,870 --> 00:43:06,690 Luis Elizondo: Oh, oh, unfortunately. Can I? 724 00:43:07,410 --> 00:43:09,720 John Greenewald: I knew I'd get let her know if I didn't try 725 00:43:09,720 --> 00:43:14,010 Luis Elizondo: no longer the US government now. Yeah, I, I I 726 00:43:14,010 --> 00:43:18,150 have to be careful. Those those, you know, I want to be be very 727 00:43:18,150 --> 00:43:23,520 clear that. You know, the, it's US government's business to 728 00:43:23,520 --> 00:43:27,600 determine what is releasable and not not mine? Okay. I gotcha. 729 00:43:27,630 --> 00:43:31,350 And anything that I may have been then exposed to back in a 730 00:43:31,350 --> 00:43:34,950 tip I really, until the government is gives the green 731 00:43:34,950 --> 00:43:36,120 light. I just, I just, 732 00:43:36,270 --> 00:43:38,370 John Greenewald: I just had to push on that one. You mentioned. 733 00:43:38,910 --> 00:43:42,300 I had to I had to go. So let me ask you, one of the few 734 00:43:42,300 --> 00:43:45,270 sensitive questions that that I talked about in the beginning, 735 00:43:45,270 --> 00:43:48,030 and that is the paperwork that came out through FOIA. I went 736 00:43:48,030 --> 00:43:51,240 after those documents, as you know, we've talked about this 737 00:43:51,240 --> 00:43:53,880 privately. But I went after those documents for those 738 00:43:53,880 --> 00:43:56,280 listening and watching that aren't aware and found the 739 00:43:56,310 --> 00:43:59,730 emails that you were sharing back and forth with what is 740 00:43:59,730 --> 00:44:02,100 called Doppler and that is the arm that essentially will 741 00:44:02,100 --> 00:44:07,050 authorize either public use or essentially them declassifying 742 00:44:07,050 --> 00:44:08,940 something or something's unclassified and clearing it for 743 00:44:08,940 --> 00:44:12,570 release, and so on. Just kind of quickly summarize it. Those 744 00:44:12,570 --> 00:44:16,710 documents come out in the form that had already leaked in part 745 00:44:16,710 --> 00:44:20,700 had come out. But that was kind of re verified on an official 746 00:44:20,700 --> 00:44:26,040 level. And the way you would describe the videos is what what 747 00:44:26,040 --> 00:44:31,020 really kind of intrigues me in a way that is a big fat question 748 00:44:31,020 --> 00:44:34,350 mark. And that is that you described the FLIR, the gimbal, 749 00:44:34,350 --> 00:44:41,070 and the go fast as balloons, drones and UAS is and what kind 750 00:44:41,070 --> 00:44:44,910 of confuses me about that is Doppler is cleared at the top 751 00:44:44,910 --> 00:44:48,180 secret level. So they've got the, you know, J, which 752 00:44:48,180 --> 00:44:52,020 protocols to send them to, let's say top secret data, and they 753 00:44:52,020 --> 00:44:54,960 review it. They can say Nope, you can't use this whatsoever. 754 00:44:55,350 --> 00:44:58,710 But they have those channels. I've heard but I want to ask 755 00:44:58,710 --> 00:45:01,650 from you because I don't think I I've ever asked you this part 756 00:45:01,650 --> 00:45:04,830 before, I've only heard from others through, you know, third 757 00:45:04,830 --> 00:45:09,630 hand info, that you felt that you couldn't inform them 758 00:45:09,930 --> 00:45:14,520 properly. But again, I want to ask you this, why were the 759 00:45:14,520 --> 00:45:18,600 videos described in that way if they would be cleared at the top 760 00:45:18,600 --> 00:45:19,350 secret level? 761 00:45:20,340 --> 00:45:22,980 Luis Elizondo: Sure. So if you look at the way dogs are worked, 762 00:45:22,980 --> 00:45:25,890 you're actually supposed to do the request at the unclassified 763 00:45:25,890 --> 00:45:29,910 level. So there's several God instructions and direct actions, 764 00:45:29,910 --> 00:45:33,780 instructions, and manuals, and then there's some some brochures 765 00:45:33,780 --> 00:45:36,930 on how you're supposed to request something for 766 00:45:36,990 --> 00:45:41,130 publication of meaning that can be disseminated out. And that is 767 00:45:41,130 --> 00:45:45,960 through an unclassified document. 1910. And when you ask 768 00:45:45,960 --> 00:45:49,890 Dr. They say please send it to us unclassified level. So we had 769 00:45:49,890 --> 00:45:53,760 just gotten over the this this awful situation with Wikileaks, 770 00:45:53,760 --> 00:45:57,060 where we knew for analysis adversaries were hacking our 771 00:45:57,060 --> 00:46:00,390 systems. That's a fact that's, that's that's not conjecture. 772 00:46:00,420 --> 00:46:03,090 And the US government acknowledged that. And then, of 773 00:46:03,090 --> 00:46:07,470 course, you had insider threats where you had I don't want to 774 00:46:07,470 --> 00:46:09,630 get political here. But there's, you know, whether you're for or 775 00:46:09,630 --> 00:46:14,100 against folks like like, private Manning, that that took some 776 00:46:14,100 --> 00:46:16,560 very sensitive information and released in an unauthorized 777 00:46:16,560 --> 00:46:19,530 manner. So because we were dealing with something that was 778 00:46:19,530 --> 00:46:22,470 so sensitive, and there was so few people that were read onto 779 00:46:22,470 --> 00:46:26,160 the program, and I couldn't even brief my boss at the time about 780 00:46:26,160 --> 00:46:30,990 this, this program. I couldn't very well, brief doctor who's 781 00:46:31,020 --> 00:46:35,340 two and three degrees removed from my own chain of command. 782 00:46:35,790 --> 00:46:42,840 And mentioned the word UFO. So, the UAS, we had coined for 783 00:46:42,840 --> 00:46:46,710 unidentified aerial systems, some say unmanned aerial 784 00:46:46,710 --> 00:46:54,900 systems, but literally a UAS is an unmanned or system that's not 785 00:46:55,110 --> 00:46:59,010 manned by a human being. So that's, that's actually a 786 00:46:59,010 --> 00:47:04,530 legitimate term that we could use without saying UFO or UAP. 787 00:47:04,800 --> 00:47:07,740 Knowing that the OCA, the original classification 788 00:47:07,740 --> 00:47:10,500 authority, who adopts would have to go back to anyways, right to 789 00:47:10,500 --> 00:47:14,640 get the approval was read onto the program, and knew exactly 790 00:47:14,640 --> 00:47:18,150 what this was about. So So, you know, a lot of people say, well, 791 00:47:18,150 --> 00:47:20,520 was that disingenuous? We're trying to mislead? No, no, no, 792 00:47:20,520 --> 00:47:22,860 everybody was about everybody knew what we were talking about. 793 00:47:23,220 --> 00:47:25,860 But it was a way that we could protect this from having some 794 00:47:25,860 --> 00:47:28,110 sort of what we call an inadvertent disclosure, this 795 00:47:28,110 --> 00:47:32,640 information getting out to somebody who wasn't read on. And 796 00:47:32,640 --> 00:47:35,160 all of a sudden now the whole department is aware of what's 797 00:47:35,160 --> 00:47:40,620 going on. So that's, that's how that's how that if you will that 798 00:47:40,620 --> 00:47:42,060 process, gotcha occur. 799 00:47:42,390 --> 00:47:44,790 John Greenewald: Okay. So one of the other things on the the same 800 00:47:44,790 --> 00:47:49,050 form was your intended use. Now, for those just tuning in or 801 00:47:49,050 --> 00:47:52,350 maybe missed the part earlier in the show, you had said you did 802 00:47:52,350 --> 00:47:55,500 not bring these videos out? Somebody else did. So I want to 803 00:47:55,500 --> 00:47:58,800 make sure that I repeat that. But internally, the paperwork 804 00:47:58,800 --> 00:48:02,370 showed that you only intended this for internal government use 805 00:48:02,400 --> 00:48:03,450 only not in 806 00:48:03,450 --> 00:48:05,670 Luis Elizondo: corrected initially correct initially. 807 00:48:05,670 --> 00:48:09,930 That's what we were, we wanted to create a an internal enclave 808 00:48:09,960 --> 00:48:14,820 unclassified. So you know, the public, could we put industry 809 00:48:14,820 --> 00:48:18,060 partners, because that's broad enough, where if you're working 810 00:48:18,060 --> 00:48:19,980 with the United States government, in any type of 811 00:48:19,980 --> 00:48:22,920 capacity, you could be labeled as a type of industry partner. 812 00:48:22,950 --> 00:48:28,110 So whether you're local law enforcement, or your FAA, or 813 00:48:28,110 --> 00:48:32,220 you're one of the services or, you know, whoever, if you're 814 00:48:32,220 --> 00:48:35,730 working in some sort of kind of official capacity, we wanted to 815 00:48:35,730 --> 00:48:39,210 get people who had a had certain expertise, open the aperture so 816 00:48:39,210 --> 00:48:42,420 we could get more scientists, more people to look at this data 817 00:48:42,420 --> 00:48:43,770 and help us try to figure it out. And 818 00:48:43,770 --> 00:48:45,780 John Greenewald: that was what you internally called the 819 00:48:45,780 --> 00:48:49,080 community of interest REITs or COI, which, 820 00:48:49,110 --> 00:48:50,160 Luis Elizondo: which was Yeah, 821 00:48:50,160 --> 00:48:52,170 John Greenewald: I've always once those emails kind of 822 00:48:52,170 --> 00:48:54,900 revealed themselves through FOIA. I was always intrigued by 823 00:48:54,900 --> 00:48:57,600 that, because that sounds like wow, why didn't they do this 824 00:48:57,600 --> 00:49:02,610 prior? So you know, I've as Yeah, one would think right. So 825 00:49:02,610 --> 00:49:05,190 that in, by the way, I've gone after, I think I may have told 826 00:49:05,190 --> 00:49:07,950 you privately, but trying to find more information, if any, 827 00:49:07,950 --> 00:49:11,190 is there that they take that idea? Because from what I've 828 00:49:11,190 --> 00:49:12,960 seen, when you look at these types, there's a 829 00:49:12,960 --> 00:49:13,890 Luis Elizondo: lot more info john? 830 00:49:14,460 --> 00:49:16,290 John Greenewald: Well, that plugging away That's right. 831 00:49:16,320 --> 00:49:20,010 That's what I'm, that's what I'm going for. So, so but at very 832 00:49:20,010 --> 00:49:22,590 admirable intention there. But again, I just wanted to ask, 833 00:49:23,640 --> 00:49:29,160 according to the do D anyway, that those videos had to adhere 834 00:49:29,160 --> 00:49:32,010 to what was on that what they call the DD Form 1910, which we 835 00:49:32,010 --> 00:49:36,660 didn't label it yet. But the DD Form 1910 was, again for that 836 00:49:36,690 --> 00:49:41,700 that private, US government use only and when Christopher Mellon 837 00:49:41,700 --> 00:49:44,970 had come out recently, he had said that he supplied those 838 00:49:44,970 --> 00:49:48,240 videos to the New York Times. Then in the James Fox has great 839 00:49:48,240 --> 00:49:51,750 documentary getting rave reviews around the world. James, I've 840 00:49:51,750 --> 00:49:55,410 known for a very long time. So quick shout out to him. Make 841 00:49:55,410 --> 00:49:57,090 sure you watch his new documentary called Yeah, 842 00:49:57,090 --> 00:49:58,770 Luis Elizondo: he did a fantastic job. He really did. 843 00:49:58,799 --> 00:50:00,779 John Greenewald: Yeah, he's he's a he's a Great human being, I 844 00:50:00,779 --> 00:50:03,239 know how much blood sweat and tears went into that just from 845 00:50:03,239 --> 00:50:06,629 knowing him personally. So my kudos to him. But in that 846 00:50:06,629 --> 00:50:09,719 Christopher Mellon came out and said somebody didn't name them. 847 00:50:09,719 --> 00:50:15,359 But somebody bent the rules. That was, what his wording was. 848 00:50:15,659 --> 00:50:19,019 Which I want to juxtapose that with how we were shown the 849 00:50:19,019 --> 00:50:21,989 videos from to the stars Academy. I don't expect you to 850 00:50:21,989 --> 00:50:25,589 speak for to the stars. I'm not asking you to, but I do want to 851 00:50:25,589 --> 00:50:29,129 ask about what they called the chain of custody, because that's 852 00:50:29,129 --> 00:50:32,489 another one of those disconnects where paperwork says internal 853 00:50:32,489 --> 00:50:37,169 use only cleared for that, then we see the videos, and they were 854 00:50:37,169 --> 00:50:40,709 kind of advertised at Well, not kind of they were advertised as 855 00:50:41,039 --> 00:50:43,319 going through the declassification process through 856 00:50:43,319 --> 00:50:49,739 God. And they had Chain of Custody documentation. And that 857 00:50:49,739 --> 00:50:55,409 has always confused me because that, for me anyway, I found the 858 00:50:55,409 --> 00:50:58,109 do D Chain of Custody forums and stuff like that. It just 859 00:50:58,139 --> 00:51:02,309 wouldn't apply. Is that accurate? So what is that show? 860 00:51:02,310 --> 00:51:04,710 Luis Elizondo: study? You know, I can't speak for Chris Mellon. 861 00:51:04,710 --> 00:51:07,050 And quite frankly, I've never asked Chris I don't want to 862 00:51:07,050 --> 00:51:11,430 know, you know, there's a just a plausible deniability is 863 00:51:11,430 --> 00:51:15,240 sometimes a good thing. But out of respect to Chris, I, I've 864 00:51:15,240 --> 00:51:19,290 never asked him this source. And I don't really plan to to be 865 00:51:19,290 --> 00:51:23,280 honest with you. That's between Chris and whoever he talked to, 866 00:51:24,990 --> 00:51:33,240 you know, the, how ttsa wound up putting them forward? I will 867 00:51:33,240 --> 00:51:37,380 tell you, if you were to ask me, you know, I, I probably would 868 00:51:37,380 --> 00:51:40,770 have been more hesitant to do that. But, you know, it 869 00:51:40,770 --> 00:51:45,750 happened. And it happened without me knowing that really 870 00:51:45,750 --> 00:51:45,960 what do 871 00:51:45,960 --> 00:51:47,910 John Greenewald: you had no idea that they that they were going 872 00:51:47,910 --> 00:51:49,050 to release those videos? 873 00:51:50,790 --> 00:51:55,740 Luis Elizondo: Not until the New York Times article. Yeah. That 874 00:51:55,740 --> 00:51:59,670 was not I was not, I was not aware. 875 00:52:02,610 --> 00:52:04,980 John Greenewald: Were you aware they had them? If I can ask 876 00:52:04,980 --> 00:52:05,340 that. 877 00:52:10,620 --> 00:52:18,270 Luis Elizondo: Now, actually, let me think. JOHN, I don't 878 00:52:18,270 --> 00:52:21,360 recall I really don't i don't think because I remember being 879 00:52:21,360 --> 00:52:26,340 very surprised. Because the intent originally was for a 880 00:52:26,370 --> 00:52:29,700 community of interest and unclassified. But for official 881 00:52:29,700 --> 00:52:35,100 use only, if you will, community of interest. And I didn't, I 882 00:52:35,100 --> 00:52:39,240 wasn't the one who provided them. So I really don't know 883 00:52:39,630 --> 00:52:42,420 what ttsa was thinking you probably want to talk to them as 884 00:52:42,420 --> 00:52:47,730 you know, I no longer publicly affiliated with with ttsa. 885 00:52:47,730 --> 00:52:50,430 They're, they're great people. Tom's great guy, you know, it 886 00:52:50,430 --> 00:52:54,780 was Yeah, they'll talk. But I can't speak for teachers, 887 00:52:54,810 --> 00:52:56,910 John Greenewald: I got you know, I and I understand that and 888 00:52:56,910 --> 00:52:59,820 respect that. And and I want to actually ask you about that. But 889 00:52:59,820 --> 00:53:04,020 I do want to make sure I have enough time to ask you this kind 890 00:53:04,020 --> 00:53:08,310 of round of questions, which is the do Dee's reaction to all of 891 00:53:08,310 --> 00:53:11,220 this that after you resigned after these videos came out in 892 00:53:11,220 --> 00:53:13,830 the way that you did, which you've already outlined? 893 00:53:14,250 --> 00:53:18,120 Obviously, internally, this created kind of a riff we can 894 00:53:18,120 --> 00:53:19,140 see Oh, yeah. 895 00:53:19,650 --> 00:53:22,770 Luis Elizondo: Oh, hey, listen, life was very uncomfortable for 896 00:53:22,770 --> 00:53:27,690 Lou Elizondo for a long time, I would imagine. It was, well, 897 00:53:27,690 --> 00:53:29,460 first of all, you had the problem. Most people didn't know 898 00:53:29,460 --> 00:53:33,210 the program is real. So they thought blue went deep sex, he 899 00:53:33,210 --> 00:53:38,550 went blue went crazy. And then as I started to unfold 900 00:53:38,550 --> 00:53:42,210 internally, they're like, Oh, crap, this program was real. 901 00:53:42,210 --> 00:53:45,390 And, you know, we never got briefed on it. Because Lou was 902 00:53:45,840 --> 00:53:50,190 going to the much higher levels with this program. Then they got 903 00:53:50,280 --> 00:53:54,000 some some people in there, well, to two camps, one said, oh, wow, 904 00:53:54,030 --> 00:53:58,800 you know what? Yeah, we better we better not treat them so 905 00:53:58,800 --> 00:54:02,310 harshly. Because he had very, very senior people in the loop. 906 00:54:02,310 --> 00:54:05,070 He was actually doing his job. Then you had another faction of 907 00:54:05,070 --> 00:54:07,320 people say, Well, he still should have told me, so let's 908 00:54:07,320 --> 00:54:10,500 burn him to the ground. Let's launch an investigation. Let's 909 00:54:10,680 --> 00:54:14,550 pull his security clearance. And let's, you know, let's do 910 00:54:14,550 --> 00:54:19,890 everything we can to blow up his credibility. And there are still 911 00:54:19,890 --> 00:54:23,220 some pockets of those that are those individuals that exist. I 912 00:54:23,220 --> 00:54:26,130 think that's probably why you see, you know, despite the 913 00:54:26,130 --> 00:54:28,620 senator and all these people coming up saying, Yeah, it was 914 00:54:28,620 --> 00:54:32,430 real and yeah, we would push the guy running it and all these now 915 00:54:32,430 --> 00:54:34,590 obvious things that people look back and say, well, that's 916 00:54:34,590 --> 00:54:38,580 obvious back then. It wasn't Yeah. And there were people 917 00:54:38,580 --> 00:54:41,280 there were factions in the in the d. o. t, that were not very 918 00:54:41,280 --> 00:54:44,490 happy with me. And those are the same factions that are still 919 00:54:44,490 --> 00:54:47,760 influencing some of your FOIA process, where you know, 920 00:54:47,760 --> 00:54:50,700 something exists, but they come back saying, Man, nothing to see 921 00:54:50,700 --> 00:54:52,980 here. Yeah, and you might have to try three or four times 922 00:54:52,980 --> 00:54:56,490 before you finally get something and you're like, you know, what 923 00:54:56,490 --> 00:54:59,370 the heck hockey puck I'm now believe. I'm only getting this 924 00:54:59,370 --> 00:55:02,940 when I requested. Did you know two years ago? Yeah. During a 925 00:55:02,940 --> 00:55:06,060 tough spot, and I don't want to disparage the DMV, because I do 926 00:55:06,060 --> 00:55:10,770 think I don't think we can hold accountable a few people there 927 00:55:11,220 --> 00:55:15,420 for for that dysfunction and blame the entire department 928 00:55:15,420 --> 00:55:18,060 because because the Department of Defense is very, very good at 929 00:55:18,060 --> 00:55:21,930 what it does. The Acting Secretary right now is a 930 00:55:21,930 --> 00:55:26,130 fantastic human being the guys is a national hero, I won't go 931 00:55:26,130 --> 00:55:29,130 into details, because you may be watching this, but but the guy 932 00:55:29,130 --> 00:55:32,160 was there in the early days of Afghanistan, I mean, super, 933 00:55:32,190 --> 00:55:38,520 super key person. And, and that is representative of most of the 934 00:55:38,520 --> 00:55:41,250 Department of Defense. They're good people that want to do a 935 00:55:41,250 --> 00:55:44,520 good job for the American people. The problem is, you get 936 00:55:45,030 --> 00:55:50,100 some bureaucrats in there and people that are, are political. 937 00:55:50,730 --> 00:55:55,260 And, you know, there, there becomes an issue about ego. And 938 00:55:55,260 --> 00:55:58,200 just because I wasn't told about something, therefore, it must 939 00:55:58,200 --> 00:56:02,340 not exist. Well, that's not necessarily so. And it wasn't up 940 00:56:02,340 --> 00:56:05,790 to me to tell because when you look at that 2009 memo from the 941 00:56:05,790 --> 00:56:11,190 Senate, the access list to that program was super, super small. 942 00:56:11,760 --> 00:56:15,390 I can't just go out and brief somebody, I know the authority 943 00:56:15,390 --> 00:56:19,770 to do that, again, trouble. So that created a lot of a lot of 944 00:56:19,770 --> 00:56:23,280 challenges for me. And, you know, I often tell people say, 945 00:56:23,280 --> 00:56:27,030 Well, why don't you just back then say A, B, and C? Well, 946 00:56:27,060 --> 00:56:30,000 because I made a promise to certain people. And I wasn't 947 00:56:30,000 --> 00:56:34,170 going to, to violate that trust, I knew damn well, getting into 948 00:56:34,170 --> 00:56:37,740 this, that this was going to be an uphill battle, I had probably 949 00:56:37,740 --> 00:56:41,670 a 5% chance of mission success, which isn't very good. Those are 950 00:56:41,670 --> 00:56:45,960 not good odds. Don't go to Vegas with those odds. But I had a 951 00:56:45,960 --> 00:56:48,720 heart to heart with my team members. And we in order for 952 00:56:48,720 --> 00:56:54,060 this, for this topic to to finally get the light that it 953 00:56:54,060 --> 00:56:59,610 deserved. Someone had to step out. And that's someone I being 954 00:56:59,610 --> 00:57:04,740 a military guy had to be me, I was a senior guy. So and let me 955 00:57:04,740 --> 00:57:04,980 ask 956 00:57:05,040 --> 00:57:07,770 John Greenewald: you, this, focusing in on the do D what I 957 00:57:07,770 --> 00:57:11,130 call they took a shot at you. And I apologize if that phrasing 958 00:57:11,130 --> 00:57:14,580 is not appropriate. But essentially, you know, they took 959 00:57:14,580 --> 00:57:19,230 a shot at your credibility. And they're challenging you as a 960 00:57:19,230 --> 00:57:25,410 person as a dedicated military, then later civilian employee of 961 00:57:25,410 --> 00:57:29,910 the Department of Defense, they are by name, taking this 962 00:57:30,090 --> 00:57:34,770 credibility shot at you. And I will admit, when that story 963 00:57:34,770 --> 00:57:38,820 broke, I was surprised it despite my again that that 964 00:57:38,820 --> 00:57:42,720 criticism, which you have not shied away from that you've 965 00:57:42,720 --> 00:57:45,600 always spoken to me about. And I want to point out again, for 966 00:57:45,600 --> 00:57:48,540 those who missed it in the beginning how admirable that is 967 00:57:48,540 --> 00:57:51,990 to you because you're not afraid of these questions. Nor were you 968 00:57:51,990 --> 00:57:55,710 privately when we chatted on the phone or through email. But when 969 00:57:55,710 --> 00:57:58,950 they did that, I just kind of like took a step back and like, 970 00:57:58,980 --> 00:58:03,420 Okay, I'm not this isn't about Lewis Elizondo, for me. This is 971 00:58:03,420 --> 00:58:06,420 about what is the truth behind what I believe is this active 972 00:58:06,420 --> 00:58:11,250 UFO cover up. After they did that? This let's zero in on the 973 00:58:11,250 --> 00:58:13,530 spokespeople because they did that we don't have to name names 974 00:58:13,530 --> 00:58:16,650 or make accusations. But sure, you know, the spokespeople did 975 00:58:16,650 --> 00:58:21,780 this. And they took that essential shot. Why? Why don't 976 00:58:21,780 --> 00:58:26,370 you take a shot back and just say, look, here is the 977 00:58:26,400 --> 00:58:29,820 irrefutable proof. And let me just quickly preface why I'm 978 00:58:29,820 --> 00:58:33,630 asking that is that I've seen that there are a very, and this 979 00:58:33,630 --> 00:58:37,860 is posted posted publicly, a small list of people that 980 00:58:37,860 --> 00:58:41,280 include a couple journalists and at one UFO what I would call 981 00:58:41,280 --> 00:58:45,660 like a UFO blogger, in particular, that have made 982 00:58:45,660 --> 00:58:49,290 reference to you showing them documentation or what they call 983 00:58:49,320 --> 00:58:53,580 irrefutable proof that you are who you say you are. Now, I'm 984 00:58:53,580 --> 00:58:57,630 not challenging that. I believe that they saw something. Let me 985 00:58:57,630 --> 00:59:01,110 just quickly ask yes or no. Is that classified information? 986 00:59:02,219 --> 00:59:04,379 Luis Elizondo: It's not classified. No, but understand 987 00:59:04,379 --> 00:59:08,279 that I'm not going to give up the identities of other 988 00:59:08,279 --> 00:59:10,949 individuals just to save my skin. I've never been really I'm 989 00:59:10,949 --> 00:59:14,249 not that guy. What I could have I could have settled this three 990 00:59:14,249 --> 00:59:18,809 years ago. And you know, there when you talk to Senator Reid 991 00:59:18,809 --> 00:59:22,469 himself, that for the record, he's telling you, yeah, Lou is 992 00:59:22,469 --> 00:59:24,509 the guy running the program. When you talk to how put off who 993 00:59:24,509 --> 00:59:27,299 was working for me? Who's clearly part of it. Yeah, I 994 00:59:27,299 --> 00:59:30,929 worked for Lou. I mean, these are I don't need to go toe to 995 00:59:30,929 --> 00:59:34,559 toe and get into a mudslinging contest with the Pentagon when 996 00:59:34,559 --> 00:59:37,109 they've already flipped flopped on the position six times. 997 00:59:37,349 --> 00:59:40,229 Firstly came out said yeah, he was real about UFOs. And Lou ran 998 00:59:40,229 --> 00:59:43,319 it. Then they came back and said, Well, no, he wasn't about 999 00:59:43,319 --> 00:59:46,319 UFOs. Then they said, Well, he was about UFOs. But he didn't 1000 00:59:46,319 --> 00:59:49,229 run it. I mean, it's, if you look at the track record, and I 1001 00:59:49,229 --> 00:59:52,469 know, I know, you've seen this over and over again. Sure. You 1002 00:59:52,469 --> 00:59:56,159 know, my position has been consistent and I've been backed 1003 00:59:56,159 --> 00:59:59,579 up by by everybody that needs to back me up. This isn't about 1004 00:59:59,579 --> 01:00:03,029 Lewis It's not about me if I make it about Lou Elizondo, then 1005 01:00:03,029 --> 01:00:05,579 we take away from the progress we've made. Look how far we've 1006 01:00:05,579 --> 01:00:11,459 come in three years. In just three years. JOHN, we have now 1007 01:00:11,639 --> 01:00:14,849 the videos coming out that were official government videos never 1008 01:00:14,849 --> 01:00:16,769 before release the acknowledgement that they're 1009 01:00:16,769 --> 01:00:18,839 real, the acknowledgement that they are some sort of 1010 01:00:18,839 --> 01:00:22,469 unidentified aerial phenomenon, the establishment of a UAP Task 1011 01:00:22,469 --> 01:00:25,589 Force Congress being briefed at the classified levels. By the 1012 01:00:25,589 --> 01:00:28,199 way, if you don't think I was part of that program, How the 1013 01:00:28,199 --> 01:00:31,739 hell do you think ever made it on the hill to brief people? I 1014 01:00:31,739 --> 01:00:34,379 mean, it's, it's at this point, it's kind of silly I know and I 1015 01:00:34,379 --> 01:00:37,439 don't need to rehash all this because if you go for half an 1016 01:00:37,439 --> 01:00:40,589 hour a laundry list of laundry lists the bottom line john, it's 1017 01:00:40,589 --> 01:00:43,319 not about me. I don't really care what people think about me 1018 01:00:43,349 --> 01:00:49,019 never have never will. This is about this is about this, this 1019 01:00:49,049 --> 01:00:55,979 incredible movement for for transparency and real meaningful 1020 01:00:55,979 --> 01:00:59,189 disclosure. Yeah, I mean, that's what's more important me going 1021 01:00:59,189 --> 01:01:01,829 up and saying, hey, look at me and I'm you know, gonna go ahead 1022 01:01:01,829 --> 01:01:05,069 and, and make the government look silly now, because we still 1023 01:01:05,069 --> 01:01:07,589 need to work with the government. If I did that, then 1024 01:01:07,589 --> 01:01:11,969 we run the chance of just to just so I can go ahead and quote 1025 01:01:11,969 --> 01:01:14,669 unquote, prove who I am, which I don't need to prove anybody 1026 01:01:14,669 --> 01:01:16,919 don't really give a damn what Sure. Yeah, I guess just to 1027 01:01:16,919 --> 01:01:20,609 prove that I risk now putting my guys that are still there in the 1028 01:01:20,609 --> 01:01:25,019 program, where now all of a sudden, it gets shut down 1029 01:01:25,019 --> 01:01:27,959 because it becomes too hot of a topic. Yeah. Now the Pentagon's 1030 01:01:27,959 --> 01:01:30,479 getting sued by Lou Elizondo, now there's defamation, Karen 1031 01:01:30,479 --> 01:01:34,079 and others this, nobody wants to touch that hot potato. Nobody 1032 01:01:34,079 --> 01:01:37,319 does. So and by the way to come out and say, Here's document 1033 01:01:37,319 --> 01:01:42,749 12345. It's not classified, but it's legit of what it is, with 1034 01:01:42,749 --> 01:01:45,989 with there's people on those emails that are still engaged in 1035 01:01:45,989 --> 01:01:48,869 those efforts. And I can't compromise them. I won't do it. 1036 01:01:49,199 --> 01:01:52,619 I never have I never will. So until those people come out, 1037 01:01:52,619 --> 01:01:55,799 which at some point, I'm sure they will, then people come 1038 01:01:55,829 --> 01:01:57,989 under documents, and oh, wow, look at that, that isn't that 1039 01:01:57,989 --> 01:02:01,499 interesting. But until that occurs, I'm not I'm not going to 1040 01:02:01,499 --> 01:02:06,359 do it just to say face. I'm not that guy never happened. I'm not 1041 01:02:06,359 --> 01:02:08,849 going to come out there and say that, because this isn't about 1042 01:02:08,849 --> 01:02:11,459 Lou never has been about blue. And this is why I try to tell 1043 01:02:11,459 --> 01:02:15,689 people, you know, people say well lose. Now the face of these 1044 01:02:15,689 --> 01:02:19,289 UFOs I'm not the face. Look in the mirror, you're the face. 1045 01:02:19,739 --> 01:02:22,079 It's everybody out there in your audience. They're the face of 1046 01:02:22,079 --> 01:02:25,019 this. I just happened to be one of the tools in the tool bag, 1047 01:02:25,169 --> 01:02:28,979 like Chris Mellon and other people. But this is this is a 1048 01:02:28,979 --> 01:02:32,099 long game we are. You know, I hate to say we're in a running 1049 01:02:32,099 --> 01:02:35,999 gun battle here. But this is this is a long war. Not a short 1050 01:02:35,999 --> 01:02:39,299 word. This isn't about instant gratification. This isn't about, 1051 01:02:39,419 --> 01:02:42,629 you know, Lou going up there and making the Department of Defense 1052 01:02:42,629 --> 01:02:45,149 looks stupid. They've already had they've already put 1053 01:02:45,149 --> 01:02:47,669 themselves in that box. I don't need to help them with that. 1054 01:02:47,699 --> 01:02:50,369 Yeah, you know, in fact, what they need is a solution. So they 1055 01:02:50,369 --> 01:02:53,699 can continue to tackle this problem without people coming in 1056 01:02:53,699 --> 01:02:56,159 and getting mad at because that's, that's really what they 1057 01:02:56,159 --> 01:02:59,789 need. And if I do anything to poke the bear, all it's going to 1058 01:02:59,789 --> 01:03:03,269 do is, is make the situation worse, when really we're trying 1059 01:03:03,269 --> 01:03:05,849 to help find a solution. I got, by the way, if it's at my 1060 01:03:05,849 --> 01:03:09,839 expense, I'll take it, john, I'm okay with it. If the cost of us 1061 01:03:09,839 --> 01:03:13,769 getting this far in three years, if people say man, loose full of 1062 01:03:13,769 --> 01:03:17,339 it, you know what? Fine, I'll take it, because enough people 1063 01:03:17,339 --> 01:03:21,419 know exactly who I am. And what I did. And by the way, this 1064 01:03:21,419 --> 01:03:25,739 story is still unfolding. It's just not over. So there's a lot 1065 01:03:25,739 --> 01:03:28,529 more to this narrative that when comes out, people are gonna go. 1066 01:03:29,339 --> 01:03:32,339 Wow, okay, that's interesting. I had no idea 1067 01:03:33,360 --> 01:03:36,030 John Greenewald: what I only have a couple minutes left, I 1068 01:03:36,120 --> 01:03:42,090 again, appreciate your time. And I want to work this in if my 1069 01:03:42,090 --> 01:03:45,420 audience has heard me talk about these types of issues a lot. 1070 01:03:46,320 --> 01:03:49,500 passing it to you. If there's one thing that I haven't 1071 01:03:49,500 --> 01:03:53,430 covered, but you want to talk about or say, or a message or 1072 01:03:53,460 --> 01:03:54,720 anything, what would that be? 1073 01:03:59,550 --> 01:04:10,590 Luis Elizondo: You know, boy, let me let me say this. I 1074 01:04:10,590 --> 01:04:17,820 believe as dysfunctional as our family of UFO enthusiasts are, 1075 01:04:18,390 --> 01:04:22,680 whether it's UFO, Twitter or UAP, research group, etc, etc. 1076 01:04:24,240 --> 01:04:29,370 We have achieved this together. And yes, even the naysayers, 1077 01:04:29,400 --> 01:04:34,110 even those contrarians, even those skeptics, we need you. We 1078 01:04:34,110 --> 01:04:37,980 need them all. come on board because this is a conversation 1079 01:04:37,980 --> 01:04:42,120 that affects all of us. And no one owns the narrative. I'm not 1080 01:04:42,120 --> 01:04:45,660 out pushing the book. I'm not just anybody who wants to have a 1081 01:04:45,660 --> 01:04:48,990 conversation with we can have a conversation. We are achieving 1082 01:04:48,990 --> 01:04:53,670 this together. And that is the success here. It's not that john 1083 01:04:53,670 --> 01:04:57,300 Greenwald is doing the foil or Lou Elizondo is out there, doing 1084 01:04:57,300 --> 01:05:01,050 TV shows or anybody else. It's everything. Buddy doing what 1085 01:05:01,050 --> 01:05:06,210 they do best in this sphere that is creating this moment in time 1086 01:05:06,450 --> 01:05:10,290 that we have never seen the likes before. We need it and 1087 01:05:10,290 --> 01:05:13,590 it's okay. I don't mind if I have haters. That's okay. If 1088 01:05:13,590 --> 01:05:15,390 that's the cost of doing business. And that's the cost of 1089 01:05:15,390 --> 01:05:19,440 doing business, the truth has nothing to fear. So I would 1090 01:05:19,440 --> 01:05:24,240 encourage people to to know that, that the second success we 1091 01:05:24,240 --> 01:05:28,200 are seeing right now is a result of all of our contributions, not 1092 01:05:28,200 --> 01:05:33,090 just one person. And, and I think everybody plays a vital 1093 01:05:33,090 --> 01:05:38,220 role in this. You know, we would not be where we are today, john, 1094 01:05:38,220 --> 01:05:41,070 if you hadn't done and are doing the things you're doing, from 1095 01:05:41,070 --> 01:05:43,650 your perspective, that by the way, nobody's as good as doing 1096 01:05:43,650 --> 01:05:46,590 it as you are. Just like, there are certain things that I can do 1097 01:05:47,730 --> 01:05:52,590 because of my access to to help happen and Chris Mellon and and 1098 01:05:52,590 --> 01:05:57,090 yes, even everybody on out there in the in the UAP, Twitter 1099 01:05:57,090 --> 01:05:59,490 world, they're making a difference there. They're 1100 01:05:59,490 --> 01:06:02,760 campaigning, the look at Marco Rubio when he just came out and 1101 01:06:02,760 --> 01:06:05,580 said not too long ago. That's because people are telling him, 1102 01:06:05,580 --> 01:06:08,070 it's okay to have this conversation. We want to know, 1103 01:06:08,280 --> 01:06:11,040 it's interesting, right? We're not going to talk about Elvis on 1104 01:06:11,040 --> 01:06:14,100 the mothership anymore in tinfoil hats. This is a serious 1105 01:06:14,100 --> 01:06:17,910 topic that deserves serious attention. And, and whether you 1106 01:06:17,910 --> 01:06:21,750 realize it or not, john, people begin to look at you. And if you 1107 01:06:21,750 --> 01:06:25,470 want to know what the face of disclosure looks like, you're 1108 01:06:25,470 --> 01:06:28,410 looking at it. It's it's, I'm looking at it right now, you're 1109 01:06:28,410 --> 01:06:33,780 part of that people out there, like, you know, the I gotta be 1110 01:06:33,780 --> 01:06:35,880 careful. I don't want to plug any particular people out there. 1111 01:06:35,880 --> 01:06:42,840 But there's a there's a huge sea of of advocates out there in 1112 01:06:42,840 --> 01:06:45,720 social media that are writing the congressman writing the 1113 01:06:45,720 --> 01:06:48,120 government they're doing they're learning from you. I mean, how 1114 01:06:48,120 --> 01:06:50,370 amazing is that? Right? People are now learning from john 1115 01:06:50,370 --> 01:06:53,670 Greenwald's playbook and FOIA. And it's working. I mean, it's 1116 01:06:53,670 --> 01:06:58,620 at some point, you know, you can't stop the tidal wave. So I 1117 01:06:58,620 --> 01:07:03,570 would, I guess my, my final thought on this would be, don't 1118 01:07:03,570 --> 01:07:06,660 stop doing what you're doing. You know, you don't have to be 1119 01:07:06,660 --> 01:07:09,990 in anyone's camp. Just keep doing what you're doing. And 1120 01:07:09,990 --> 01:07:13,920 then I would also say, beware of those selling the snake oil, 1121 01:07:13,980 --> 01:07:17,700 beware of those who are telling you about these preconceived 1122 01:07:17,700 --> 01:07:20,940 narratives that they have in their mind, and are saying, 1123 01:07:20,970 --> 01:07:23,580 Don't pay attention to those guys. That's the real threat, 1124 01:07:23,610 --> 01:07:27,270 when someone tells you don't listen to that person. That's 1125 01:07:27,270 --> 01:07:30,150 the real threat. I encourage you, you know what, listen to 1126 01:07:30,150 --> 01:07:32,400 anybody and everybody you want to listen to, and then make up 1127 01:07:32,400 --> 01:07:36,450 your own mind. That's my word of advice to anybody out there who 1128 01:07:36,450 --> 01:07:39,630 wants to know about this topic? And by the way, no, there is no 1129 01:07:39,630 --> 01:07:42,780 expert out there. I don't care who you are what you say, I was 1130 01:07:42,780 --> 01:07:45,270 in it for 10 years working for the US government, and I'm not 1131 01:07:45,270 --> 01:07:49,710 an expert. So that would be my advice to people. And by the 1132 01:07:49,710 --> 01:07:51,420 way, when they say, well, do you're pushing the threat 1133 01:07:51,420 --> 01:07:54,240 narrative? No, I'm not pushing a narrative that they could be a 1134 01:07:54,240 --> 01:07:55,860 threat if they want it to be because we don't have enough 1135 01:07:55,860 --> 01:07:58,890 information. That's what I've always maintained. And if you 1136 01:07:58,890 --> 01:08:01,830 think it's fear mongering, well, then fine. I mean, if you think 1137 01:08:01,830 --> 01:08:04,590 you have some sort of special relationship with a UFO, and, 1138 01:08:05,040 --> 01:08:07,260 you know, you want to charge people money, so they can have 1139 01:08:07,260 --> 01:08:11,670 a, you know, close encounter, you know, while you're paying 1140 01:08:11,670 --> 01:08:15,210 pilots to drop flares, okay, fine. I don't know, do whatever 1141 01:08:15,210 --> 01:08:20,040 you want. I just, I think I think we need to, I think we 1142 01:08:20,040 --> 01:08:25,230 need to have a conversation where everybody has a voice. And 1143 01:08:25,230 --> 01:08:28,380 we stop trying to mute each other. I think that's the real 1144 01:08:28,380 --> 01:08:28,800 danger 1145 01:08:29,130 --> 01:08:30,630 John Greenewald: of the great words. And by the way, the 1146 01:08:30,630 --> 01:08:34,230 threat potential narrative. I have agreed since day one with 1147 01:08:34,230 --> 01:08:38,190 you guys that ttsa as a whole, obviously has dealt with that a 1148 01:08:38,190 --> 01:08:43,470 lot. I've done FOIA requests upon FOIA requests on that, but 1149 01:08:43,470 --> 01:08:46,800 that threat potential, it's very real. I don't know why people 1150 01:08:46,800 --> 01:08:49,830 are afraid of the T word. I know I'm out of time. If I could ask 1151 01:08:49,830 --> 01:08:52,650 you just one more question. Yeah, absolutely. Because I want 1152 01:08:52,650 --> 01:08:55,560 you to have the opportunity to respond, because this is all 1153 01:08:55,560 --> 01:08:59,370 kind of unfolding right now. As you mentioned, you've decided to 1154 01:08:59,370 --> 01:09:03,600 as you put it, not be affiliated with ttsa. Although you still 1155 01:09:03,690 --> 01:09:06,540 have high respect for them. I've been kind of waiting. I've 1156 01:09:06,540 --> 01:09:10,110 reached out to them unrelated to the show, but reached out to 1157 01:09:10,110 --> 01:09:14,160 them to get like some type of, you know, risk response press 1158 01:09:14,160 --> 01:09:16,980 release. Are they informing their investors only because I 1159 01:09:16,980 --> 01:09:20,970 know my listeners and watchers want to be updated on that. So 1160 01:09:21,000 --> 01:09:26,250 can I ask you just kind of a two parter here. Is there a reason 1161 01:09:26,280 --> 01:09:29,700 why you've decided to not be affiliated anymore? And the 1162 01:09:29,700 --> 01:09:33,120 second part which is the most important to me, is where does 1163 01:09:33,120 --> 01:09:38,520 that leave off on the credo agreement with the US Army where 1164 01:09:38,520 --> 01:09:43,410 you guys are taking pieces of uaps that you have collected 1165 01:09:43,740 --> 01:09:47,160 over the last couple of years? created legend? We 1166 01:09:47,160 --> 01:09:49,710 Luis Elizondo: don't know let you get there. Actually. I just 1167 01:09:49,710 --> 01:09:53,310 want to be fair, but let's, let's have you out that you 1168 01:09:53,310 --> 01:09:56,670 know, we really don't know we want to just make we're doing 1169 01:09:56,670 --> 01:09:57,420 our due diligence. We're 1170 01:09:57,420 --> 01:09:59,520 John Greenewald: trying to find out gotcha and and thank you for 1171 01:09:59,520 --> 01:10:03,600 that and So you've got these these alleged pieces of UAP that 1172 01:10:03,600 --> 01:10:06,570 you're going to have analyzed through this army agreement 1173 01:10:06,570 --> 01:10:09,690 you're listed on there, you're the main contact, I forget what 1174 01:10:09,690 --> 01:10:12,120 the exact wording was, and the agreements Been a while. So 1175 01:10:12,120 --> 01:10:14,640 that's my last question to you is, why did you choose to leave 1176 01:10:14,640 --> 01:10:17,580 them? Where does that leave us with that crater agreement? And 1177 01:10:17,580 --> 01:10:19,800 was there anything that transpired thus far? Yep. 1178 01:10:20,340 --> 01:10:23,970 Luis Elizondo: So I, again, I people are gonna get mad at me 1179 01:10:23,970 --> 01:10:26,550 for saying this, I can't speak for ttsa can only speak for 1180 01:10:26,550 --> 01:10:31,230 myself. What I have mentioned before is that ttsa is a company 1181 01:10:31,380 --> 01:10:36,570 and they owe their investors a results, right. She's all good 1182 01:10:36,570 --> 01:10:40,800 companies should do the storage of investment. Where my 1183 01:10:40,830 --> 01:10:45,270 expertise lies, specifically me and reselling. shondo is not 1184 01:10:45,270 --> 01:10:50,100 necessarily in the entertainment division, which is where ttsa 1185 01:10:50,100 --> 01:10:56,760 does a lot of its focus areas on and for me, my skill sets are 1186 01:10:56,760 --> 01:11:01,830 probably better used in a different capacity. So that 1187 01:11:01,830 --> 01:11:06,870 decision was made. My, again, all my friends at ttsa I love 1188 01:11:06,870 --> 01:11:12,480 them dearly, great people, great human beings. But, you know, 1189 01:11:12,510 --> 01:11:16,290 this is battlefields evolve. battlefields change, they're not 1190 01:11:16,290 --> 01:11:19,260 static, right? They're an evolving situation. And 1191 01:11:19,260 --> 01:11:21,900 sometimes you have to move troops around the battlefield, 1192 01:11:22,230 --> 01:11:26,190 in order to, to, to to win the battle, right? That's not 1193 01:11:26,190 --> 01:11:30,720 uncommon. You don't just sit there in rank and file and just 1194 01:11:30,720 --> 01:11:34,170 march forward, you have to adapt with the environment and the 1195 01:11:34,170 --> 01:11:38,160 situation as its evolving. And that's very much what what I'm 1196 01:11:38,160 --> 01:11:41,460 doing this is, again, a long game, let me remind people that, 1197 01:11:42,000 --> 01:11:45,120 you know, we have achieved a lot in three years, but I think if 1198 01:11:45,120 --> 01:11:48,060 we want to achieve more in the next three years, we have to 1199 01:11:48,060 --> 01:11:51,330 adapt, we have to adapt, we have to continue moving the ball 1200 01:11:51,330 --> 01:11:55,770 forward, and sometimes look at a football game, right? The 1201 01:11:55,770 --> 01:11:58,920 quarterback doesn't do the same thing every time. The 1202 01:11:58,920 --> 01:12:01,890 quarterbacks got to change plays, otherwise, you know that 1203 01:12:01,890 --> 01:12:04,080 the guys know what you're doing, and then they figure you out and 1204 01:12:04,080 --> 01:12:09,960 you lose the game. So you got to you got to you can't ever take 1205 01:12:09,960 --> 01:12:14,160 for granted the battlespace that we're operating in. And I say 1206 01:12:14,160 --> 01:12:16,440 battle spaces. Again, people say, oh, there's a threat 1207 01:12:16,440 --> 01:12:18,210 narrative again. No, no, that's just the way I talk. I'm a 1208 01:12:18,210 --> 01:12:21,930 military guy. Right? So I look at everything as a military 1209 01:12:21,930 --> 01:12:24,690 style campaign or an intelligence campaign. Right? 1210 01:12:24,990 --> 01:12:28,110 It's a multi pronged, it's it's a multi dimensional battle 1211 01:12:28,110 --> 01:12:32,040 space. I tell people, you know, there's several ways you can 1212 01:12:32,040 --> 01:12:34,470 look at the battle space, some people look at battle space, 1213 01:12:34,470 --> 01:12:37,680 like the game Connect for some people look at the battle space 1214 01:12:37,680 --> 01:12:40,980 like checkers, some people look at the battle space, like three 1215 01:12:40,980 --> 01:12:44,730 dimensional chess. And that's kind of the way I think, you 1216 01:12:44,730 --> 01:12:48,360 know, we need to look at this, this, this is no different. This 1217 01:12:48,360 --> 01:12:52,230 is a very complex, highly evolving topic where we're 1218 01:12:52,230 --> 01:12:56,880 learning every day more and more and more. So we have to maintain 1219 01:12:56,910 --> 01:13:02,400 our our momentum by always adapting to to the environment, 1220 01:13:02,400 --> 01:13:05,850 anticipating not just the environment of tomorrow, but the 1221 01:13:05,850 --> 01:13:09,120 environment next week, next month, next year. So we can stay 1222 01:13:09,120 --> 01:13:09,450 ahead. 1223 01:13:09,960 --> 01:13:12,060 John Greenewald: When you ask me another question I didn't want 1224 01:13:12,060 --> 01:13:15,780 Will you stay connected with that crater agreement? Or are 1225 01:13:15,780 --> 01:13:18,060 you essentially out of that out? 1226 01:13:18,779 --> 01:13:23,009 Luis Elizondo: Well, okay. So, again, as it relates to ttsa, I 1227 01:13:23,009 --> 01:13:25,979 can't speak about that, I can tell you that we're always 1228 01:13:25,979 --> 01:13:29,069 looking for opportunities for new partnerships, right? This 1229 01:13:29,069 --> 01:13:31,649 being perfect example, you and I are having this conversation. 1230 01:13:31,649 --> 01:13:34,739 This is a partnership. This is this is what it is, you know, 1231 01:13:34,979 --> 01:13:37,379 whether you like me or hate me, or I like you or hate you or 1232 01:13:37,379 --> 01:13:42,209 whatever. We're working with each other because you realize, 1233 01:13:42,479 --> 01:13:42,929 I'm sorry, 1234 01:13:42,989 --> 01:13:45,839 John Greenewald: I said you hate me. No, no, no, no. 1235 01:13:46,380 --> 01:13:48,540 Luis Elizondo: I'm just saying I'm just general terms. Either 1236 01:13:48,570 --> 01:13:50,400 way, you know, whether we like or hate each other. No, 1237 01:13:50,400 --> 01:13:52,980 actually, for the record, actually, I like it. But that's 1238 01:13:52,980 --> 01:13:55,230 inconsequential. Doesn't matter if I like you. That's my point. 1239 01:13:55,470 --> 01:14:00,420 The point is that we each have a role to play and and we we need 1240 01:14:00,420 --> 01:14:03,390 each other if we want to continue to push the ball down, 1241 01:14:03,720 --> 01:14:06,180 down the field, just like we need everybody else right now, 1242 01:14:06,390 --> 01:14:11,550 on social media in this in this crazy grassroots effort. We need 1243 01:14:11,550 --> 01:14:16,380 to call UFO Twitter, right or, or the UAP research enclave? I 1244 01:14:16,380 --> 01:14:19,650 mean, it's working. It's working. Again, I can tell you 1245 01:14:19,650 --> 01:14:22,470 don't look now but you're achieving what you what you're 1246 01:14:22,470 --> 01:14:27,090 setting out to do. So I think people shouldn't be surprised 1247 01:14:27,090 --> 01:14:31,200 that by continue to, to engage certain elements of the US 1248 01:14:31,200 --> 01:14:35,160 government for the purposes of research, that that that's 1249 01:14:35,160 --> 01:14:38,310 probably a no brainer. I think most people should if they see 1250 01:14:38,310 --> 01:14:40,830 that, that shouldn't be a surprise. 1251 01:14:41,639 --> 01:14:43,469 John Greenewald: Well, look, I can ask you questions all day, 1252 01:14:43,499 --> 01:14:49,109 I'm down to 6437 left to go. My guess is we're probably not you 1253 01:14:49,109 --> 01:14:52,109 know, in a position to ask them all right now. So tell you what, 1254 01:14:52,529 --> 01:14:57,809 I hope that after this last hour or so that you will come back 1255 01:14:58,319 --> 01:15:04,349 that that you will continue this conversation with me because I 1256 01:15:04,349 --> 01:15:06,839 hope that you've realized not only through this last hour, but 1257 01:15:06,839 --> 01:15:09,839 obviously we've shared a lot of conversations privately. You 1258 01:15:09,839 --> 01:15:14,129 know, and I hope you know where I'm coming from. And you started 1259 01:15:14,159 --> 01:15:16,979 with an apology to me, and I want to end it with one to you. 1260 01:15:17,729 --> 01:15:22,019 I caught myself by critiquing the story that was coming out, 1261 01:15:22,979 --> 01:15:27,299 then starting to shift towards it being personal, not by 1262 01:15:27,299 --> 01:15:31,409 intent, but it came off that way. And for you, I apologize. 1263 01:15:31,409 --> 01:15:34,199 I've already done it privately. But I want to do it publicly. 1264 01:15:34,230 --> 01:15:37,650 Luis Elizondo: No worries, no worries. Where this is, we're in 1265 01:15:37,650 --> 01:15:40,680 this together, man. And and this is something that I think, you 1266 01:15:40,680 --> 01:15:42,930 know, my concern for you My biggest concern, I told you this 1267 01:15:42,930 --> 01:15:46,440 privately, just having me on your show, I'm concerned that 1268 01:15:46,440 --> 01:15:50,070 there going to be some of your your followers fans. You know, 1269 01:15:50,070 --> 01:15:53,310 folks, your associates, that may criticize you for this. They may 1270 01:15:53,310 --> 01:15:56,850 say, oh, you're drinking the Kool Aid. Oh, you know, you're, 1271 01:15:57,630 --> 01:16:00,420 you're falling for misinformation for Lou, I hope 1272 01:16:00,420 --> 01:16:04,110 that's not the case for you. I really hope that by doing having 1273 01:16:04,110 --> 01:16:08,280 this conversation together, people realize on both sides 1274 01:16:08,280 --> 01:16:11,550 that, you know, we we can work together, we should be working 1275 01:16:11,550 --> 01:16:16,290 together. I hope this doesn't have any negative impacts for 1276 01:16:16,290 --> 01:16:18,930 you. If anybody out there is listening, and they think that 1277 01:16:19,260 --> 01:16:22,590 this is some sort of scheme you and I came up with. It's not 1278 01:16:23,220 --> 01:16:28,020 what you see is what you get. This is very frank. JOHN Did not 1279 01:16:28,020 --> 01:16:31,950 you did not load me with any questions beforehand. Everything 1280 01:16:31,950 --> 01:16:34,830 you've asked me, you've asked me without me knowing ahead of 1281 01:16:34,830 --> 01:16:40,110 time. So hopefully people see that level of transparency. And, 1282 01:16:40,560 --> 01:16:45,840 you know, maybe we can show them that, you know, we all can work 1283 01:16:45,840 --> 01:16:46,140 together. 1284 01:16:46,170 --> 01:16:48,060 John Greenewald: Yeah, we should be working. And I hope that this 1285 01:16:48,060 --> 01:16:50,520 serves as an example of that. You've been so gracious with 1286 01:16:50,520 --> 01:16:53,910 your time I blew through the agreed amount. So I appreciate 1287 01:16:53,910 --> 01:16:56,700 your willingness to take a little bit more time with me. 1288 01:16:56,760 --> 01:16:59,040 You're welcome back anytime you know my number, you know, my 1289 01:16:59,040 --> 01:17:00,810 email, please know, 1290 01:17:01,020 --> 01:17:03,300 Luis Elizondo: you got mine. So I think people know Just give me 1291 01:17:03,300 --> 01:17:06,300 a call give me give me a couple days head notice because I do 1292 01:17:06,300 --> 01:17:11,880 have a honey do list I have to stay on top of but I'm happy to 1293 01:17:11,880 --> 01:17:14,430 have a conversation anytime. Absolutely been my honor and 1294 01:17:14,430 --> 01:17:16,320 pleasure. And I really appreciate it. By the way. Thank 1295 01:17:16,320 --> 01:17:19,530 you for what you do. I'm telling you you are and I've told people 1296 01:17:19,530 --> 01:17:22,410 this privately I told him publicly. There is only one john 1297 01:17:22,410 --> 01:17:26,790 Greenwald that can do what that does what you do. It's it's 1298 01:17:26,790 --> 01:17:30,510 amazing what you've been able to achieve and accomplish using the 1299 01:17:30,510 --> 01:17:35,130 government system against itself. That takes a high degree 1300 01:17:35,130 --> 01:17:38,910 of savvy and sophistication that not everybody really understands 1301 01:17:38,910 --> 01:17:44,310 and appreciates. But, you know, I see it with you and you play a 1302 01:17:44,310 --> 01:17:45,810 vital role. So thank you for what you do. 1303 01:17:45,839 --> 01:17:47,399 John Greenewald: Well, I appreciate that. I always love 1304 01:17:47,399 --> 01:17:50,909 ruffling feathers wherever those feathers may lie. So thank you 1305 01:17:50,909 --> 01:17:51,449 for that. 1306 01:17:51,660 --> 01:17:53,670 Luis Elizondo: And you're really good at it. Thanks. 1307 01:17:53,969 --> 01:17:56,279 John Greenewald: I appreciate that. And thanks again for your 1308 01:17:56,279 --> 01:18:00,389 time and your graciousness, and thank you all for listening and 1309 01:18:00,389 --> 01:18:02,879 or watching this is John Greenewald, Jr signing off. 1310 01:18:02,999 --> 01:18:04,019 We'll see you next time.