In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the FBI’s Carnivore system drew considerable attention and debate. Unveiled during this period, Carnivore was a sophisticated email wiretapping system designed to intercept and analyze digital communications. The system’s capabilities and the implications for privacy and civil liberties were subjects of intense scrutiny and concern among privacy advocates, Internet service providers (ISPs), and the public at large.

Carnivore, officially known as DCS1000, was a network diagnostic tool utilized by the FBI to monitor and intercept email and other online communications. The system was installed at an ISP’s premises and was capable of scanning vast amounts of digital data passing through the ISP’s network. Carnivore specifically targeted communications of suspects under investigation, allowing the FBI to capture emails, chat sessions, and other forms of online interactions.

The Carnivore system operated by tapping into the ISP’s network and filtering the data packets that flowed through it. According to an internal FBI document, the system was designed to “ensure that only the exact communications authorized by the court to be intercepted are what is intercepted”​​. This meant that Carnivore could be configured to capture only the communications of a specific target while excluding all other traffic.

The deployment of Carnivore was subject to strict legal guidelines and required a court order based on probable cause. The FBI had to demonstrate that the interception of communications was necessary for an ongoing investigation and that it would yield evidence of criminal activity. The court order specified the scope of the surveillance, including the types of communications to be intercepted and the duration of the surveillance.

Despite these legal safeguards, privacy advocates raised significant concerns about the potential for abuse and the broader implications for digital privacy. A key issue was the transparency and accountability of the Carnivore system. ISPs and privacy groups worried that the system could be used for more extensive monitoring than intended, potentially capturing the communications of individuals not under investigation.

In a letter to Congress, John E. Collingwood, Assistant Director of the FBI’s Office of Public and Congressional Affairs, emphasized that Carnivore was used “only when Internet Service Providers are unable on their own to restrict interceptions within the narrow confines of the controlling court order”​​. However, ISPs expressed doubts about their ability to verify that the FBI adhered strictly to these limitations once Carnivore was installed on their networks.

The reaction from the Internet industry was mixed. Some ISPs resisted the installation of Carnivore on their networks, citing concerns about the system’s impact on network performance and the privacy of their customers. In one notable case, EarthLink, a major ISP, refused to install Carnivore, arguing that it could cause disruptions to their service and compromise customer privacy​​.

EarthLink’s concerns were not isolated. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and other privacy organizations filed Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to uncover more details about Carnivore’s technical capabilities and its use in investigations. The ACLU’s efforts aimed to obtain the source code of Carnivore, which would reveal the inner workings of the system and potentially confirm whether it could be used for broader surveillance than officially stated​​.

The controversy surrounding Carnivore led to calls for greater oversight and transparency in the deployment of digital surveillance tools. Critics argued that without independent verification of the system’s operations, there was no way to ensure that the FBI’s use of Carnivore was consistent with legal requirements and respected individual privacy rights.

In response to these concerns, the FBI conducted briefings with industry specialists and members of Congress to explain how Carnivore worked and the measures in place to prevent abuse. However, skepticism remained, and the debate over digital surveillance and privacy continued to evolve.

By circa 2005, it was reported that Carnivore had been replaced by more commercially available software​​. This shift indicated an evolution in the FBI’s approach to digital surveillance, moving away from proprietary systems like Carnivore to leveraging advancements in commercial technology.

Carnivore represented a significant development in law enforcement’s ability to monitor digital communications. While it provided a powerful tool for investigating and preventing criminal activity, it also raised critical questions about the balance between security and privacy in the digital age. As technology continues to advance and digital communication becomes even more integral to daily life, the need for clear legal frameworks and robust oversight mechanisms remains essential to protect civil liberties while enabling effective law enforcement.

In June of 2018, The Black Vault requested all FBI documents about the system. In July of 2018, the first release of records was received. In June of 2024, a second batch of records were released.

Document Archive

 FBI Release #1 on CARNIVORE – [608 Pages, 377MB] – Released July 2018

 FBI Release #2 on CARNIVORE – [468 Pages, 220MB] – Released June 2024

 FBI Release #3 on CARNIVORE – [443 Pages, 265MB] – Released August 2024

The post CARNIVORE (DCS1000): FBI Files on Their Email and Electronic Communication Monitoring Software first appeared on The Black Vault.

PRISM is a code name for a program under which the United States National Security Agency (NSA) collects internet communications from various U.S. internet companies. The program is also known by the SIGAD US-984XN. PRISM collects stored internet communications based on demands made to internet companies such as Google LLC under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 to turn over any data that match court-approved search terms. Among other things, the NSA can use these PRISM requests to target communications that were encrypted when they traveled across the internet backbone, to focus on stored data that telecommunication filtering systems discarded earlier, and to get data that is easier to handle.

PRISM began in 2007 in the wake of the passage of the Protect America Act under the Bush Administration. The program is operated under the supervision of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA Court, or FISC) pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Its existence was leaked six years later by NSA contractor Edward Snowden, who warned that the extent of mass data collection was far greater than the public knew and included what he characterized as “dangerous” and “criminal” activities. The disclosures were published by The Guardian and The Washington Post on June 6, 2013. Subsequent documents have demonstrated a financial arrangement between the NSA’s Special Source Operations (SSO) division and PRISM partners in the millions of dollars.

Documents indicate that PRISM is “the number one source of raw intelligence used for NSA analytic reports”, and it accounts for 91% of the NSA’s internet traffic acquired under FISA section 702 authority.” The leaked information came after the revelation that the FISA Court had been ordering a subsidiary of telecommunications company Verizon Communications to turn over to the NSA logs tracking all of its customers’ telephone calls.

U.S. government officials have disputed criticisms of PRISM in the Guardian and Washington Post articles and have defended the program, asserting that it cannot be used on domestic targets without a warrant, that it has helped to prevent acts of terrorism, and that it receives independent oversight from the federal government’s executive, judicial and legislative branches. On June 19, 2013, U.S. President Barack Obama, during a visit to Germany, stated that the NSA’s data gathering practices constitute “a circumscribed, narrow system directed at us being able to protect our people.”

Document Archive

NSA Email: FOIAs for PRISM Information [21 Pages, 5.5MB] – This was an attempt to get previously released records further redacted. In May of 2019, an MDR request was filed to get these e-mails reviewed. Sadly, this time, nothing new was uncovered.

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The post NSA Surveillance Program: PRISM first appeared on The Black Vault.

PROMIS is believed by some to be the forefunner to the now infamous “Prism” program by the National Security Agency (NSA).  The “Prism” program was brought to light by leaker Edward Snowden, yet it is now coming to light, that a program has existed long before this new revelation.  It was known as PROMIS.

PROMIS is also the name for a Department of Justice computer software program.  In the mid-1970s, Inslaw, Inc., a small Washington D.C. software development company, created for the a highly efficient, people-tracking, computer program known as Prosecutor’s Management Information System (Promis). Inslaw’s principal owners, William Anthony Hamilton and his wife, Nancy Burke Hamilton, later sued the United States Government (acting as principal to the Department of Justice) for not complying with the terms of the Promis contract and for refusing to pay for an enhanced version of Promis once delivered. This allegation of software piracy led to three trials in separate federal courts and two congressional hearings.

The following article excerpt is used to best explain the program as connected to the NSA – while the FOIA documents follow below.

The FOIA Documents

Department of Justice (DOJ)

 Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of INSLAW, Inc., March 1993, and the 1994 DOJ Report on INSLAW/PROMIS matter, released by the Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of Information Policy (OIP) [465 Pages, 11MB] – Special thanks to GovernmentAttic.org for this record.

National Security Agency (NSA)

 NSA Documents Regarding PROMIS, Released 4 October 2018 [17 Pages, 2.7MB] – In March of 2016, see below, the NSA required a $440 payment in order to continue to process my request on PROMIS. Although I did not respond, I was surprised to receive this in October of 2018. It appears that this is only part of what the NSA has on PROMIS, and additional records are still being processed. I will add them when they are released to me.

 NSA Documents Regarding PROMIS, Released 22 October 2018 [85 Pages, 8MB] – This release includes the user’s manual of the PROMIS system, various memorandums and more. One document was withheld entirely and this, according to the NSA, is now the final release of information.

 ARCHIVED (Read Above) Letter regarding the NSA use of the PROMIS System [4 Pages, 1.1MB] – The NSA did find a considerable amount of documents, however, they are requiring a payment of $440 for the release of the material.

The post NSA Surveillance Program: PROMIS first appeared on The Black Vault.

The following FBI was requested in May of 2014. In December of 2016, it was released.

It is believed this is the entire releasable portions of File #80-HQ-789 on “Tracing Telephone Calls.”

The approximate dates of the files within range from the 1950s through the 1970s.

Document Archive

 FBI File on Tracing Telephone Calls — File #80-HQ-789 [496 Pages, 302MB]

The post FBI File on Tracing Telephone Calls — File #80-HQ-789 first appeared on The Black Vault.