In May 2021, Luis Elizondo, a former Department of Defense (DoD) intelligence officer who has claimed to be the former director of the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP) and investigated UFOs for the Pentagon, submitted a formal complaint to the DoD Inspector General (DoD IG). The complaint alleged misconduct, coordinated disinformation, and whistleblower retaliation by senior Pentagon officials, including the former Director of Defense Intelligence for Intelligence and Security (DDIIS), Garry Reid, Public Affairs Officer Susan Gough, and former Director for Defense Intelligence, Collection and Special Programs Neill Tipton.

Elizondo’s complaint sought an official DoD IG inquiry into what he described as “malicious activities, coordinated disinformation, professional misconduct, whistleblower reprisal and explicit threats”. According to his complaint, these actions not only misrepresented his work within the DoD but also sought to undermine his credibility following his departure from government service. The complaint, which has since been previously published in redacted form by the NY Post, includes a detailed chronology of Elizondo’s alleged involvement in AATIP, his interactions with senior defense officials, and what he characterizes as a broader effort to suppress information on UAP. Elizondo stated in the complaint that attempts to clear the record by some senior officials, serving as witnesses to this abuse, have been ignored by certain elements within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He further alleged that actions taken against him directly erode the very foundation of national security ethos and the public trust instilled by the American people.

The Black Vault has pursued multiple Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to uncover records related to Elizondo’s complaint and the DoD’s handling of the allegations. These efforts have resulted in the release of various documents, including a heavily redacted transcript of an interview with Elizondo, as well as internal correspondence about the UAP investigation; emails obtained via FOIA that reference the DoD’s internal UAP evaluation efforts, including discussions about Elizondo’s claims and the Pentagon’s public messaging strategy; and two additional FOIA cases released in March 2025 that shed new light on internal deliberations regarding Elizondo’s allegations.

Among the most notable revelations from the FOIA releases are details about the DoD IG’s handling of the complaint. Internal correspondence indicates that the DoD IG assigned multiple case numbers to different aspects of Elizondo’s complaint. Some cases were forwarded to the Directorate for Investigations of Senior Officials, while others were categorized under whistleblower reprisal investigations. Emails reveal internal discussions on how the DoD should respond to media inquiries regarding Elizondo’s involvement in AATIP, with indications that officials sought to discredit his role or diminish the importance of the program.

The Black Vault continues to pursue additional FOIA requests related to Elizondo’s complaint and the broader DoD approach to UAP transparency. With each release, more details emerge about how Elizondo’s allegations were handled internally and how the Pentagon sought to manage both internal and external narratives surrounding UAP research. This archive serves as a central repository for all released documents and ongoing developments related to Elizondo’s DoD IG complaint.

Document Archive

 DoD’s Inspector General Office Releases Additional Records Pertaining to Luis Elizondo’s OIG Complaint [40 Pages, 4.0MB] (Released: March 17, 2025)

 DoD’s Inspector General Office Releases Emails About UAP, Their UAP Evaluation Effort, Luis Elizondo, and More [126 Pages, 6.5MB] (Released: February 8, 2024)

 DoD Inspector General Releases Transcript of Luis Elizondo Interview & Much More [103 Pages, 4.1MB] (Released: February 9, 2023)

 DoD Inspector General Releases Emails in Different FOIA Case. Repeats from above. Archived for reference. [10 Pages, 2MB]

 FOIA Case Files for above FOIA Requests [64 Pages, 17.9MB]

The post The DoD Inspector General Complaint of Luis Elizondo: A Document Archive first appeared on The Black Vault.

On May 3, 2021, a memorandum was published by the Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General. It announced the subject evaluation of Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAP) and the actions taken by the DOD.

Pressing for additional details on the DOD/OIG UAP “Evaluation”, which I asked about WHY and WHO requested it, came up empty. According to their statement, “The DoD OIG does not have any additional information to offer beyond what is published in our project announcement.”

However, despite the DOD/OIG denying to release additional information, some rumors went around that stemmed from anonymous sources that the DOD/OIG “evaluation” was prompted by complaints from members of the Senate Armed Services Committee on how the DOD was handling the UAP issue.

So, I went through the FOIA to see what type of correspondence came from Congress, regarding the topic, even going back to the beginning of 2017. This type of correspondence is meticulously logged and archived by every agency. So, if the anonymous sources were right, there should be something to find.

This was their response…

SHOW NOTES
——————–

o DOD/OIG Announces Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAP) Evaluation for May 2021 

The post Did the DOD/OIG Get Correspondence From Congress That Initiated Their “Evaluation” on UAPs? first appeared on The Black Vault.

Objective

The objective of this evaluation was to determine whether Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) officials complied with the Air Force Launch Services New Entrant Certification Guide (NECG) when certifying the launch system designs for the National Security Space Launch (NSSL)‑class (formerly known as the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle‑class) SpaceX Falcon family of launch vehicles. Additionally, during the evaluation we expanded the objective to also determine whether SMC officials applied the design validation approach in the NECG to three other space launch providers’ new entrant launch vehicles that were in development: Northrop Grumman Innovation Systems, United Launch Alliance, and Blue Origin, LLC. During the evaluation, these three launch providers’ certification processes were still in progress.

Background

The NECG is a technical guide that provides a risk‑based approach that the SMC uses to certify the capabilities of prospective new entrant launch service providers, as well as new launch vehicle configurations proposed by existing launch services providers, to launch safe and reliable national security space missions. The Space Exploration Technologies Corporation (SpaceX) was the first launch service provider to have a launch vehicle certified by the SMC in accordance with NECG criteria. Following SpaceX, three other prospective launch service providers submitted proposed launch vehicles for certification by the SMC in accordance with the NECG—Northrop Grumman Innovation Systems, United Launch Alliance, and Blue Origin, LLC.

SMC implements the NECG through Launch Enterprise Directorate Operating Instruction 17‑001, “Air Force Launch Systems Maturity Assessment Process.” According to SMC Operating Instruction 17‑001, SMC officials may certify a new launch vehicle configuration based on a risk assessment. SMC Operating Instruction 17‑001 also states that the NECG‑required design validation assessments should be completed 12 months before the first launch of an operational payload.

Finding

SMC officials generally complied with the Air Force’s Launch Services NECG and its implementing instruction, SMC Operating Instruction 17‑001, when certifying the capabilities of SpaceX and its Falcon family of launch vehicles. Additionally, in preparation for future launch vehicle contract competitions, SMC officials generally complied with the NECG to accomplish the design validation assessments of the three other potential launch vehicle providers’ new entrant launch vehicles that were still in development. Those three additional providers were Northrop Grumman, ULA, and Blue Origin.

In May 2015 and June 2018, SMC officials certified two SpaceX Falcon family launch vehicles for NSSL missions. As a result, SpaceX is currently an approved launch vehicle provider. However, based on SMC’s experience with SpaceX, we identified two areas where SMC officials could improve their oversight of future, potential launch vehicle providers and their assessment of launch vehicles with reused components.

Limiting the time to conduct independent verification and validation of a provider’s launch vehicle could constrain SMC in determining whether a launch vehicle can reliably launch NSSL payloads at acceptable risk. Such constraints remain a concern for the SMC’s independent verification and validation of other new launch vehicle configurations that have not yet been certified.

Second, SMC officials did not assess the risk of allowing the use of previously used launch vehicle components on subsequent space launches with SpaceX’s Falcon family of launch vehicles. This occurred because the SMC and SpaceX did not agree to reuse launch vehicle components on any NSSL missions to date although SpaceX’s Falcon family of launch vehicles are designed for reuse. Additionally, SMC officials did not establish standards for assessing the reliability of reusable launch vehicle components until March 2019. If the Air Force intends to authorize SpaceX to include reused launch vehicle components on any future Air Force launch missions, the SMC should be proactive and perform the necessary NRDV assessments in accordance with the SMC launch vehicle reusability standards.

Management Comments and Our Response

In response to the draft report, the Director provided a copy of an Air Force Space Command Instruction that solidified the conditions upon which the SMC Commander makes a certification decision.

Deleted Recommendations

In a draft report provided to the Air Force for management comments, we made two recommendations to the Director of the SMC Launch Enterprise Directorate: 1) develop a plan to review the impact of a potential launch vehicle provider’s noncompliance with negotiated timelines for the delivery of technical data to the SMC in support of flight worthiness certifications for NSSL missions; and 2) develop procedures to complete the mission assurance activities necessary to fully assess the risk of authorizing launch vehicle providers to reuse launch vehicle components on NSSL missions. In addition to his response to the draft report, the SMC Director also provided documentation that was not provided to us during the evaluation. We reviewed the documentation and concluded that, had we received and reviewed the documents during the evaluation, we would not have made these two recommendations in the draft report. Therefore, we deleted the recommendations.

This report is the result of Proj. No. D2019-D000PT-0059.000

Document Archive

Evaluation of the Air Force’s Certification of Space Launch Vehicles (DODIG-2020-126) [48 Pages, 3.89MB]

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The post Evaluation of the Air Force’s Certification of Space Launch Vehicles (DODIG-2020-126) first appeared on The Black Vault.

Objective

The objective of this evaluation was to determine the extent to which DoD Components provided access to DoD information technology and communications during the coronavirus disease–2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.

Background

In May 2006, the President issued the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan that requires Federal agencies to develop plans to maintain information technology and communications systems to continue operations during a pandemic. In response, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security (ASD[HD&GS]) issued the DoD Implementation Plan for Pandemic Influenza (DoD Implementation Plan) in August 2006 to ensure the continuity of essential functions in the event of a pandemic. The DoD Implementation Plan states that during a pandemic, special consideration must be given to social distancing in the workplace through teleworking. DoD Components’ pandemic plans should include the use of laptops, high-speed telecommunications links, and other systems that enable personnel to perform essential functions while teleworking. The plans should also include the requirement to test telework procedures, the impact of Government-wide mandated telework on internal networks, and backup plans for communications infrastructure.

Apart from DoD pandemic planning, the DoD Telework Policy states that telework will be actively promoted and implemented throughout the DoD in support of emergency preparedness. The policy recognizes that during a pandemic, essential and non-essential personnel and Service members may be asked to telework; therefore, periodic telework exercises are required to ensure its effectiveness in continuing operations and an efficient transition to telework in the event of a pandemic.

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, DoD Components began transitioning to maximum telework in mid-March 2020. On March 18, 2020, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum stating that DoD Components could execute their pandemic plans, or portions of their plans, at any time to ensure the ability to perform their essential functions.

To determine the extent to which DoD Components provided access to DoD information technology and communications during maximum telework in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, we administered a 43-question survey to a sample of DoD military and civilian personnel. In August 2020, we invited 269,282 DoD military and civilian personnel to respond to our survey to share their teleworking experiences from March 15 through August 26, 2020. We received a total of 56,057 responses, comprising 7,323 military and 48,734 civilian personnel, for a 20.8 percent overall response rate. We also conducted interviews with officials from the DoD Office of the Chief Information Officer, the DoD COVID-19 Telework Readiness Task Force, and the Offices of the Chief Information Officer for 10 DoD Components to obtain their perspectives on the infrastructure established to support the increased number of teleworking personnel.

Finding

According to the 54,665 respondents who reported their telework status, the DoD transitioned 88.2 percent of respondents to full- or part-time telework from March 15, 2020 through August 26, 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic. Of the 11.8 percent of respondents who continued to work on site, the most common reasons provided by survey respondents for not teleworking were that their work could not be performed while teleworking, or they were not eligible to telework. Of those who teleworked, survey respondents reported problems accessing DoD Component networks, voice and video teleconference applications, and identified shortfalls in Government-furnished equipment available to DoD personnel when their Components first transitioned to maximum telework in mid-March 2020. However, the problems cited in survey responses lessened over time as the DoD increased its network availability and capacity, added voice and video conferencing applications, and purchased and distributed computer and communications equipment.

Based on the results of the survey and interviews with DoD officials, the DoD’s initial challenges occurred because some DoD Components had not fully tested whether their information systems could support Government-wide mandated telework and had not conducted telework exercises with their personnel before March 2020 as required by the DoD Implementation Plan and the DoD Telework Policy. Therefore, some DoD Components were unprepared for the network and communications limitations, as well as equipment and application shortfalls, uncovered by the transition to maximum telework. While the Marine Corps, Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA), Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) were able to immediately transition to maximum telework, the Army, Navy, Air Force, Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), Defense Finance Accounting Service (DFAS), and Defense Health Agency (DHA) faced challenges during the transition.

The ability of DoD personnel to perform essential and non-essential tasks while on maximum telework depends on DoD Components’ ability to provide enough network capacity, communication tools, and equipment to enable the DoD’s essential and non-essential personnel to stay mission-ready and productive while in a telework status. Some teleworking personnel reported that they found their own alternative solutions including the use of unauthorized video conferencing applications and personal laptops, printers, and cell phones to complete their work because some DoD Components were unprepared for maximum telework. However, using unauthorized applications or sharing DoD information over improperly secured devices, even temporarily, increases the risk of exposing sensitive departmental information that could impact national security and DoD missions.

Overall, DoD Components and the majority of survey respondents expressed positive maximum telework experiences. Specifically, 88.1 percent of survey respondents stated that their productivity level remained the same or increased during maximum telework, regardless of their Component’s initial telework challenges. Many survey respondents reported a desire to telework regularly in the future (37,146 responses) and expressed appreciation for commuting less often (27,711 responses), better work‑life balance (25,508 responses), and more flexible work hours (22,461 responses).

Recommendations

We recommend that the ASD(HD&GS) revise the DoD Implementation Plan for Pandemic Influenza to update planning assumptions with the use of telework for essential and non-essential personnel, align the DoD Implementation Plan with the DoD Telework Policy, and require DoD Components to update their plans to include revised assumptions regarding telework for personnel and the resources required to support the teleworking workforce.

We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]), in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, establish management oversight procedures to verify that DoD Components have performed the testing, training, and exercise requirements of the DoD Implementation Plan and the DoD Telework Policy. The oversight procedures should assess the ability of DoD Components to support Government-wide mandated telework, including the results of tests of network and communications systems and telework exercises with personnel.

Management Comments and Our Response

The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (DUSD[P]), responding for the USD(P) and the ASD(HD&GS) did not respond to the recommendation to require DoD Components to update their Pandemic Plans to include revised assumptions regarding telework for personnel and the resources required to support the teleworking workforce. Therefore, the recommendation is unresolved. We request that the ASD(HD&GS) provide comments on the final report.

The DUSD(P) did not agree or disagree with the other two recommendations in the report. However, the DUSD(P) stated that the ASD(HD&GS) would work with the Joint Staff and the U.S. Northern Command to include the use of telework for essential and non‑essential personnel in the Functional Campaign Plan–Pandemics and Infectious Diseases, which will replace the DoD Implementation Plan for Pandemic Influenza, and align the plan with the DoD Telework Policy. In addition, the DUSD(P) stated that the ASD(HD&GS) would also work with the Joint Staff to include the use of telework for essential and non-essential personnel in the Global Integration Framework-Pandemics and Infectious Diseases.

Furthermore, the DUSD(P) stated that her office would support and advocate for oversight procedures to verify that DoD Components performed the testing, training, and exercise requirements of the Global Integration Framework–Pandemics and Infectious Diseases, the Functional Campaign Plan–Pandemics and Infectious Diseases, the DoD Telework Policy, and the Pandemic Plans. Therefore, the recommendations are resolved, but will remain open until the ASD(HD&GS) updates the Functional Campaign Plan–Pandemics and Infectious Diseases and the Global Integration Framework-Pandemics and Infectious Diseases to include the use of telework for essential and non-essential personnel and USD(P) provides oversight procedures for verifying that DoD Components performed the required testing, training, and exercises.

This report is the product of Proj. No. D2020-D000CU-0125.000.

Document Archive

Evaluation of Access to Department of Defense Information Technology and Communications During the Coronavirus Disease-2019 Pandemic (DODIG-2021-065) [100 Pages, 6MB]

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The post Evaluation of Access to Department of Defense Information Technology and Communications During the Coronavirus Disease-2019 Pandemic (DODIG-2021-065) first appeared on The Black Vault.

The following case was investigated by the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, and involved the following:

The full report is available below, as received under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

Document Archive

Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community Report Case Number 2013-0034, September 10, 2014 [33 Pages, 13MB]

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The post Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community Report Case Number 2013-0034, September 10, 2014 first appeared on The Black Vault.

Press Release from Department of Justice, published June 14, 2018:

Department of Justice (DOJ) Inspector General Michael E. Horowitz announced today the release of a report examining various actions by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the DOJ in advance of the 2016 election in connection with the investigation into former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s use of a private email server (referred to by the FBI and DOJ as the “Midyear” investigation).

The DOJ Office of the Inspector General’s (OIG) findings are summarized in detail in the report’s Executive Summary, which is included below. The scope of the OIG’s review included:

– Allegations that DOJ or FBI policies or procedures were not followed in connection with, or in actions leading up to or related to, former FBI Director James Comey’s public announcement on July 5, 2016, and his letters to Congress on October 28 and November 6, 2016, and that certain underlying investigative decisions were based on improper considerations (Chapters 3-11);

– Allegations that DOJ and FBI employees improperly disclosed non-public information (Chapter 12, and as noted in our report, the OIG will separately report on related investigations as they are concluded, consistent with the Inspector General Act, other applicable statutes, and OIG policy);

– Allegations that former FBI Deputy Director Andrew McCabe should have been recused from participating in certain investigative matters (Chapter 13);

– Allegations that former Assistant Attorney General for the DOJ’s Office of Legislative Affairs, Peter Kadzik, improperly disclosed non-public information to the Clinton campaign and/or
should have been recused from participating in certain Clinton-related matters (Chapter 14); and

– Allegations that the timing of the FBI’s release of certain Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) documents on October 30 and November 1, 2016, and the use of a Twitter account to publicize
the same, were influenced by improper considerations (Chapter 15). During the course of the review, the OIG discovered text messages and instant messages between some FBI employees on the investigative team, conducted using FBI mobile devices and computers, that expressed statements of hostility toward then candidate Donald Trump and statements of support for Clinton. We also identified messages that expressed opinions that were critical of the conduct and quality of the investigation. We included in our review an assessment of these messages and actions by the FBI employees (Chapter 12, and as noted in our report, the OIG is preparing a separate report describing the OIG’s efforts to recover text messages during this review).

The OIG’s conclusions and nine recommendations to the DOJ and FBI appear in Chapter 16. The DOJ’s and FBI’s responses the OIG’s draft report are included in the report as attachments. As noted in the report, a non-public classified appendix was delivered to Congress, DOJ leadership, and the FBI. In addition, the report includes a non-public Law Enforcement Sensitive (LES) appendix containing a version of Chapter 13 that includes LES information.

The OIG’s report is the result of more than 100 witness interviews, including former Director Comey, former Attorney General (AG) Loretta Lynch, former Deputy Attorney General (DAG) Sally Yates, members of the former AG’s and DAG’s staffs, FBI agents and supervisors and DOJ attorneys and supervisors who conducted the Midyear investigation, personnel from the FBI’s New York Field Office and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York involved in the Anthony Weiner investigation, former and current members of the FBI’s senior executive leadership, and former President Bill Clinton. In addition, the OIG did an independent review of significantly more than 1.2 million documents, including interview reports, agent and attorney notes, memoranda, emails, text messages, and instant messages.

Please note that this review is separate from the review the OIG announced on March 28, 2018, concerning the DOJ’s and FBI’s compliance with legal requirements, and with applicable DOJ and FBI policies and procedures, in applications filed with the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court relating to a certain U.S. person. That review is ongoing and the OIG will issue a separate report relating to those issues at a future date when our investigative work is complete.

The Report

 A Review of Various Actions by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Justice in Advance of the 2016 Election, June 2018 [568 Pages, 8.4MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/doj/2016_election_final_report_06-14-18_0.pdf

The post A Review of Various Actions by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Justice in Advance of the 2016 Election, June 2018 first appeared on The Black Vault.

According to the document:

“On December 2, 2015, a terror attack in San Bernardino, California killed 14 people and injured 17 others. The next day, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) seized pursuant to a search warrant the iPhone of one of the subjects believed to have been responsible for the attack, Syed Rizwan Farook. Thereafter, on February 9 and March 1, 2016, then-FBI Director James Comey testified before Congress, in substance, that the FBI was not able to obtain access to data on the Farook iPhone, and then that it would require assistance from the manufacturer, Apple, to do so. To accomplish this, on February 16, 2016, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Central District of California (USAO) sought and obtained an ex parte court order requiring Apple to assist the FBI in its effort to search the iPhone.

A few days later, the USAO filed a motion with the Court seeking to compel Apple’s compliance with the ex parte order, and Apple filed a motion to vacate the order. However, on March 21, 2016, before the District Judge ruled on these pending motions, the USAO reported to the Court that an outside party had  demonstrated to the FBI a possible method for unlocking the iPhone. One week later, on March 28, 2016, the USAO reported back to the Court that the FBI had successfully accessed the iPhone and no longer required assistance from Apple. On April 19, 2016, then- FBI Executive Assistant Director (EAD) Amy Hess testified about the matter before Congress and cited rapidly changing technology as a reason the FBI was not able to exploit the iPhone without the assistance of a third party.

On August 31, 2016, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) received a referral from the FBI Inspection Division after former EAD Hess expressed concern about an alleged disagreement between units within the FBI Operational Technology Division (OTD) over the “capabilities available to the national security programs” to access the Farook iPhone following its seizure, and concerns that this may have resulted in her or Comey giving inaccurate testimony to Congress on the FBI’s capabilities. Specifically, EAD Hess expressed concerns that an OTD unit may have had techniques available to exploit the Farook iPhone that certain unidentified OTD officials did not employ and that these officials were indifferent to the fact that FBI leadership and others were testifying to Congress, and filing affidavits in court, that the FBI had no such capability. The OIG has conducted inquiries into the situation, including interviewing relevant key participants, and found no evidence that OTO had the capability to exploit the Farook iPhone at the time of the Congressional testimony and initial court filings. We therefore determined that neither the Congressional testimony nor the submissions to the Court were inaccurate when made. However, we found that inadequate communication and coordination within OTO caused a delay in engaging all relevant OTO personnel in t he search for a technical solution to the Farook iPhone problem, as well as the outside party that ultimately developed the method that unlocked the phone, issues that we learned the FBI has since taken steps to address.”

Document Archive

 A Special Inquiry Regarding the Accuracy of FBI Statements Concerning its Capabilities to Exploit an iPhone Seized During the San Bernardino Terror Attack Investigation, March 2018 [17 Pages, 2.5MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/fbifiles/o1803.pdf

The post A Special Inquiry Regarding the Accuracy of FBI Statements Concerning its Capabilities to Exploit an iPhone Seized During the San Bernardino Terror Attack Investigation, March 2018 first appeared on The Black Vault.

According to the report:

On September 21, 2015, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Office of the Inspector General (OIG), discovered that [ REDACTED ] Office of the Chief Accountant (OCA), may have transmitted nonpublic information from his personal Gmail e-mail account to his official SEC work e-mail account. Specifically, during the course of investigative activities related to OIG Case #15-COM-0419-I, the OIG found [ REDACTED ] forwarded an internal SEC e-mail and attachment dated April 12, 2015, [ REDACTED ]  

It appeared [ REDACTED ] forwarded this e-mail from his personal Gmail address on April 12, 2015. The content in the e-mail attachment included a narrative of highlights of [ REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED ] and recommendations to the Commission. As a result, on January 13, 2016, the OIG initiated a separate investigation concerning [ REDACTED ] improper handling of nonpublic SEC information.

The Investigation

 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) CASE# 16-COM-0209-1, Employee Emailed Non Public Information to Personal GMAIL Account [10 Pages, 2.0MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/ig/16-COM-0209-I-SEC.pdf

The post Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) CASE# 16-COM-0209-1, Employee Emailed Non Public Information to Personal GMAIL Account first appeared on The Black Vault.

This report contains the attestation review reports of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Assets Forfeiture Fund, Criminal Division, Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Office of Justice Programs, Offices of the United States Attorneys, Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces Program, and United States Marshals Service’s annual accounting of drug control funds and related performance for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2016.

The Office of the Inspector General performed the attestation reviews. The report and annual detailed accounting of funds obligated by each drug control program agency are required by 21 U.S.C. §1704(d), as implemented by the Office of National Drug Control Policy Circular, Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary, dated January 18, 2013. The Department of Justice components reviewed, reported approximately $7.8 billion of drug control obligations and 23 related performance measures for fiscal year 2016.

The Office of the Inspector General prepared the attestation review reports in accordance with attestation standards contained in Government Auditing Standards, issued by the Comptroller General of the United States. An attestation review is substantially less in scope than an examination and, therefore, does not result in the expression of an opinion. We reported that nothing came to our attention that caused us to believe the submissions were not presented, in all material respects, in accordance with the requirements of the Office of National Drug Control Policy Circular, and as otherwise agreed to with the Office of National Drug Control Policy.

The Investigation

 Reviews of the  Annual Accounting of Drug Control Funds and Related Performance  Fiscal Year 2016, January 2017 [164 Pages, 4.7MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/ig/a1711.pdf

The post Reviews of the Annual Accounting of Drug Control Funds and Related Performance Fiscal Year 2016, January 2017 first appeared on The Black Vault.