One of the primary focuses of the emails was the draft report titled “Evaluation of the Screening of Displaced Persons From Afghanistan.” This report, identified by Project No. D2021-DEV0PD-0161.000, examined the screening processes for Afghans arriving in the U.S. after the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in 2021. Internal emails reveal extensive coordination between various DoD offices to review and comment on the draft.

On January 7, 2022, an email from a DoD OIG auditor reminded recipients to submit their comments on the draft by the end of the day. The draft report titled “DoD Efforts to Address Ideological Extremism in the Armed Forces” was also circulated, requesting factual accuracy reviews and security marking checks.

Subsequent emails, exchanged from January 20 to January 24, 2022, highlight discussions between the DoD OIG and Garry Reid’s office to schedule conference calls addressing feedback on the draft reports. Notably, the emails discussed a policy change requiring Afghan arrivals to complete mandatory medical processing at government facilities before leaving Safe Havens. This policy shift occurred after initial guidance allowed for self-administered vaccines, which led to concerns about individuals “walking off” the bases.

The draft report on ideological extremism within the armed forces, identified by Project No. D2021-DEV0PB-0079.000, was another focal point. This report aimed to evaluate the DoD’s efforts to combat extremism within its ranks and provided recommendations for policy and procedural changes. Recipients were asked to ensure the draft’s factual accuracy and review its security markings.

The 31 pages withheld from the release consisted of a discussion draft of the report “DODIG-2022-095, Evaluation of Department of Defense Efforts to Address Ideological Extremism Within the Armed Forces.” The final report, included in the release, offered a comprehensive evaluation of the DoD’s measures to address extremism and detailed policy recommendations.

These documents shed light on the DoD’s internal review processes and the steps taken to improve both the screening of displaced persons from Afghanistan and efforts to counter ideological extremism within the military.

###

Document Archive

DODOIG-2024-000309 Document Release [134 Pages, 7.5MB]

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The post DoD’s Private Discussions on 2022 Afghan Screening and Extremism IG Reports first appeared on The Black Vault.

The inspector general investigation focused on an audit of Crane & Co. Inc. (referred to as Crane Currency), a subsidiary of Crane Co., which supplies banknotes and banknote security features to central banks globally, and is a significant supplier of paper for U.S. currency. This audit was prompted by a Department of Treasury Office of Inspector General request to examine Crane’s firm-fixed-price proposal. The proposal was in response to a solicitation for a ten-year contract for currency paper and security paper meeting the specifications of the U.S. Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP)​​​​.

The audit questioned certain proposed prices by Crane based on the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) criteria. The questioned costs were due to various reasons, including errors in the proposal, the contractor’s failure to provide support for proposed amounts, costs not associated with the proposal, and unreasonable methods used to estimate costs​​.

The report lays out the responsibilities of both the management and the auditors. Crane’s management was responsible for preparing the proposed amounts in compliance with solicitation terms, including maintaining internal controls to prevent, detect, and correct noncompliance. On the other hand, the auditors were responsible for expressing an opinion on Crane’s compliance based on the examination, which was conducted in accordance with Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS). These standards required planning and performing the examination to obtain reasonable assurance about whether Crane’s proposed amounts materially complied with the criteria. The audit concluded that, except for the noncompliances described, Crane’s proposed amounts complied in all material respects with the solicitation terms related to pricing as of August 19, 2020​​.

Document Archive

Independent Audit Report on Proposed Amounts in Crane & Co., Inc.’s Price Proposal dated February 19, 2020 (Audit Report No. 1901-2020A21000003) [82 Pages, 4.2MB]

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The post Independent Audit Report on Proposed Amounts in Crane & Co., Inc.’s Price Proposal dated February 19, 2020 (Audit Report No. 1901-2020A21000003) first appeared on The Black Vault.

Agencies periodically conduct their own special investigations and produce reports about certain allegations against their respective departments.

For example, the CIA Inspector General produced a report regarding the allegations of the connection between the CIA and drug trafficking.  Each agency will do the same types of investigations.

Below, you will find reports and indexes that are relevant.  I decided to compile them here in one archive, as it is interesting to show a complete set of allegations/investigations.

Declassified Documents

Air Force

Air Force Office of the Inspector General Closed Investigations, 2017-2020 [5 Pages, 2.3MB]

AMTRAK

 AMTRAK/OIG Closed Investigations, 2016 [5 Pages, 2.3MB]

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Inspector General

CIA Inspector General Report of Investigation: Improper Handling of Classified Information by John M. Deutch, February 18, 2000 [84 Pages, 266kb]

 CIA Inspector General Report of Dumping Hazardous Material into Potomac at CIA HQ, February 2, 2000 [33 Pages, 4.14MB]

List of CIA/IG Closed Investigations, June 2014 – December 2016 [15 Pages, 6MB]

List of CIA/IG Closed Investigations, January 1, 2005 – May 2014 [33 Pages, 4.4MB]

List of CIA/IG Closed Investigations, January 1, 1997 – October 5, 2004 [57 Pages, 15.1MB]

List of CIA Inspections and Special Studies, 1994-1997 [26 Pages, 2.49MB]

List of CIA Inspections and Special Studies, 1990-1994 [16 Pages, 4.2MB]

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

 DIA/IG Closed Investigations, 2016 [2 Pages, 1.5MB]
 DIA/IG Closed Investigations, 2014-2015 [5 Pages, 1.3MB]
 DIA/IG Closed Investigations, 2011-2013 [5 Pages, 1.2MB]
 DIA/IG Closed Investigations, 2005-2008 [12 Pages, 4.6MB]

Department of Agriculture Inspector General (USDA)

 Department of Agriculture Closed Investigation Logs, 2016 [13 Pages, 1.8MB]
 Department of Agriculture Closed Investigation Logs, 2014-2015 [22 Pages, 7.7MB]

Department of the Army (ARMY)

 Department of the Army Closed Investigation Logs, January 2010 – September 2016 [100 Pages, 21.9MB]

Department of Commerce Inspector General

 Department of Commerce Closed Investigation Logs, 2016 [21 Pages, 4.2MB]

 Department of Commerce Closed Investigation Logs, 2014-2015 [17 Pages, 2.3MB]

 Department of Commerce Closed Investigation Logs, 2000-2005 [28 Pages, 1.1MB]

Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General

 Department of Defense Closed Investigation Logs, 2016 [21 Pages, 4.2MB]

Department of Education (ED) Inspector General

 Department of Education Closed Investigation Logs, 2016 [4 Pages, 1.8MB]

Department of Energy (DOE) Inspector General

 Department of Energy Closed Investigation Logs, 2014-2015 [11 Pages, 1.7MB]

 DOE/IG Investigation into Fisker Automotive, 2012 [32 Pages, 1.96MB] – On 26 March 2012, the DOE was notified about a misuse of funds and questionable business practices by Fisker Automotive.  They previously had received DOE Loan Program Office financing.  These files are the first release relating to their investigation.

 National Nuclear Security Administration Nuclear Weapons Systems Configuration Management, March 2014 [30 Pages, 0.8MB] – The Office of Inspector General received multiple allegations regarding the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) management of configuration management (CM) information.  The allegations related to incomplete product definitions for NNSA nuclear weapons, and ineffective management of classified nuclear weapons drawings, a situation that could lead to unauthorized changes to the drawings.  In response, we initiated this audit to determine whether NNSA had maintained accurate and complete CM information for nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons components to support safe, sound and timely decisions related to these devices. The review substantiated the allegations and identified instances in which NNSA had not maintained accurate and complete CM information for its nuclear weapons and components.

 DOE/IG Finds 6 BILLION U.S. Dollars MISSING, March 20, 2014 [9 Pages, 1.78MB] – The Office of Inspector General (OIG), in recent audits, investigations, and inspections, has identified significant vulnerabilities in the management of contract file documentation that could expose the Department to substantial financial losses. Specifically, over the past 6 years, OIG has identified Department of State (Department) contracts with a total value of more than $6 billion in which contract files were incomplete or could not be located at all. The failure to maintain contract files adequately creates significant financial risk and demonstrates a lack of internal control over the Department’s contract actions.

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Inspector General

2016 [87 Pages – 1.87MB]

April 1, 2009 – September 30, 2009 [87 Pages – 1.87MB]

October 1, 2008 – March 31, 2009 [71 Pages – 2.66MB]

April 1, 2008 – September 30, 2008 [72 Pages – 2.70MB]

October 1, 2007 – March 31, 2008 [56 Pages – 3.5MB]

April 1, 2007 – September 30, 2007 [56 Pages – 2.8MB]

October 1, 2006 – March 31, 2007 [104 Pages – 2MB]

April 1, 2006 – September 30, 2006 [102 Pages – 8.76MB]

October 1, 2005 – March 31, 2006 [88 Pages – 413kb]

April 1, 2005 to September 30, 2005 [74 Pages – 62MB]

October 1, 2004 to March 31, 2005 [60 Pages – 1.32MB]

April 1, 2004 to September 30, 2004 [86 Pages – 3.53MB]

October 1, 2003 to March 31, 2004 [86 Pages – 3.53MB]

April 1, 2003 to September 30, 2003 [62 Pages – 1.24MB]

October 1, 2002 to March 31, 2003 [54 Pages – 963kb]

Department of Housing and Urban Development

HUD/OIG Congressional Response – 2015-2016 [121 Pages – 1.4MB] – HUD OIG response to a Congressional Request for a list of closed investigations not disclosed to the public – 2015-2016.

HUD/OIG Investigations Regarding HUD Employees – 2015 [3 Pages – 1.1MB] – This is an interim release, and is an index of potentially responsive records. The actual case files will be sent to me in the future, and once received, I will add them here.

Department of Interior (DOI) Inspector General

 DOI/IG Closed Investigation Logs, 2016 [6 Pages, 1.2MB]
 DOI/IG Closed Investigation Logs, 2014-2015 [32 Pages, 1.96MB]

Department of Justice (DOJ) Inspector General

 DOI/IG Closed Investigation Logs, 2017-2020 [30 Pages, 0.4MB]
 DOI/IG Closed Investigation Logs, 2014-2015 [16 Pages, 2.1MB]

Department of State

 DOS/IG Closed Investigations, 2013-2015 [8 Pages, 3.6MB]

Department of Transportation (DOT)

 DOT/IG Closed Investigations, 2016 [8 Pages, 0.7MB]

Department of Treasury Inspector General (TOIG)

 DOT/IG Closed Investigations, 2016 [7 Pages, 0.8MB]

Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)

 VA/IG Closed Investigations, 2014-2015 [111 Pages, 17.4MB]

Director of National Intelligence Inspector General

 ODNI OIG Semi-Annual Reports, published in 2013 [98 Pages – 8.82MB]
 ODNI OIG Semi-Annual Reports, 1 April – 30 September 2014 & 1 October – 31 March 2015 [104 Pages – 32MB]
 ODNI OIG Closed Investigations, 2016-2019 [7 Pages – 2.0MB]
 ODNI OIG Closed Investigations, 2014-2015 [4 Pages – 1.0MB]

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

 EPA/IG Closed Investigations, 2016 [3 Pages, 1.1MB]

The Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM)

EXIM OIG IG Investigations, 2016 [4 Pages – 2.8MB]
EXIM OIG IG Investigations, 2014-2015 [6 Pages – 2.8MB]

Farm Credit Administration (FCA) Inspector General

 FCA/IG Investigations Closed 2015-2016 [3 Pages, 0.5MB]

Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Inspector General

 FCC/IG Investigations Closed 2016 [6 Pages, 0.6MB]
 FCC/IG Investigations Closed 2014-2015 [4 Pages, 0.9MB]
 FCC/IG Investigations Closed 2005-2013 [11 Pages, 1.8MB]

Federal Election Commission (FEC) Inspector General

 FEC/IG Investigations Closed 2014-2015 [1 Page, 0.4MB] – I did confirm – the FEC only did one IG investigation during this time period.

Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) Inspector General

 FHFA/IG Investigations Closed 2016 [18 Pages, 7.5MB]

Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Inspector General

 FTC/IG Investigations Closed 2016 [65 Pages, 10.7MB] – The FTC gave their semi annual reports for Congress, when responding for a log. I have written for clarification since this differs greatly from other agency responses.

General Services Administration (GSA) Inspector General

 GSA/IG Investigations Closed 2016 [12 Pages, 0.8MB]

Government Accountability Office (GAO) Inspector General

 GAO/IG Investigations Closed 2014-2015 [4 Pages, 0.7MB]

Health and Human Services (HHS) Inspector General

 IG Investigations Closed 2016 [24 Pages – 1.1MB]
 IG Investigations Closed 2005-2008 [150 Pages – 3.37MB]

Housing and Urban Development Inspector General

IG Investigations Involving HUD Employees Closed 2015

      16-IGF-OIG-00148.pdf             968K  
      2011HQ002041I_roi_Redacted.pdf   3.1M  
      2014SI000850I_roi_Redacted.pdf   1.1M  
      2014SI001273I_roi_Redacted.pdf   1.8M  
      2014SI001671I_roi_Redacted.pdf   3.9M  
      2014SI001699I_roi_Redacted.pdf   1.0M  
      2015SI000137I_roi_Redacted.pdf   2.5M  
      2015SI000166I_roi_Redacted.pdf   692K  
      2015SI000238I_roi_Redacted.pdf   2.1M  
      2015SI000239I_roi_Redacted.pdf    14M  
      2015SI000251I_roi_Redacted.pdf   1.2M  
      2015SI000289I_roi_Redacted.pdf   476K  
      2015SI000290I_roi_Redacted.pdf   4.2M  
      2015SI000412I_roi_Redacted.pdf   2.4M  
      2015SI000423I_roi_Redacted.pdf   2.8M  
      2015SI000444I_roi_Redacted.pdf   2.6M  
      2015s1000474i_roi_Redacted.pdf   3.1M

National Archives and Records Administration (NARA)

NARA/IG Investigations Closed 2016 [12 Pages – 2.3MB]

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)

NASA/IG Investigations Closed 2016 [10 Pages – 3.4MB]

National Credit Union Administration (NCUA)

NCUA/IG Investigations Closed 2016 [2 Pages – 0.4MB]

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)

NGA/IG Investigations Closed 2016 [12 Pages – 2.9MB]
NGA/IG Investigations Closed 2014-2015 [12 Pages – 2.3MB]

National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)

NLRB/IG Investigations Closed 2016 [3 Pages – 1.9MB]

National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Inspector General

 IG Investigations Closed 2016  [3 Pages – 1.0MB]
 IG Investigations Closed 2014-2015  [6 Pages – 3.5MB]
 Inspection of the National Reconnaissance Office Declassification Activities, 22 October 2014 [34 Pages – 4.1MB]

National Security Agency (NSA) Inspector General

IG Investigations Closed 2017-2020  [23 Pages – 6.5MB]
 IG Investigations Closed 2010-2017  [23 Pages – 6.5MB]
 IG Investigations Closed 2014-2015  [5 Pages – 1.9MB] – (This duplicated the above release, but is archived here for reference)
 IG Investigations Closed 2005-2008  [10 Pages – 2.1MB]

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Inspector General

 NRC/IG Investigations Closed 2016 [6 Pages – 0.6MB]
 NRC/IG Investigations Closed 2014-2015 [6 Pages – 3.5MB]

Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Inspector General

 OPM/IG Investigations Closed 2016 [7 Pages – 0.6MB]
 OPM/IG Investigations Closed 2014-2015 [8 Pages – 0.5MB]

Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) Inspector General

 SEC/IG Investigations Closed 2016 [3 Pages – 0.6MB]

 SEC/IG Investigations Closed 2014-2015 [2 Pages – 0.5MB]

Small Business Administration (SBA) Inspector General

SBA/IG Investigations Closed 2014-2015 [4 Pages – 0.6MB]
 SBA/IG Investigations Closed 2016 [4 Pages – 0.6MB] – Still seeking an index that has case names, or summaries, or anything more than what was released here.

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR)

 SIGAR/IG Investigations Closed 01/01/2011 – 08/01/2013 [16 Pages – 2.4MB]

The Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA)

 TIGTA Investigations Closed 2016 [186 Pages – 35.9MB]

United States Postal Service (USPS) Inspector General

 OIG Management Alert HR-MA-14-002, Mail Isolation, Control, and Tracking, December 3, 2013 [15 Pages – 2.4MB]

The post Agency Inspector General Reports and Investigations first appeared on The Black Vault.

The Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (IC IG) Investigations Division investigated the alleged disclosure of classified talking points for the Presidential candidate briefings ahead of the 2016 Presidential elections to NBC News and TIME Magazine by an unknown individual.

Based on our analysis of available information, interviews of individuals tasked with preparation, briefing, and knowledge of the classified talking points, we did not identify any individual who was responsible for the alleged unauthorized disclosures. Therefore, this matter is unsubstantiated.

Document Archive

Alleged Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information – Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community – Case: INV-17-0002 – 2017 [29 Pages, 9.5MB]

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The post Alleged Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information – Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community – Case: INV-17-0002 – 2017 first appeared on The Black Vault.

The United States Office of Government Ethics (OGE) is a separate agency within the executive branch of the U.S. Federal Government which is responsible for directing executive branch policies relating to the prevention of conflicts of interest on the part of Federal executive branch officers and employees. Primary duties include establishing the executive branch standards of conduct; issuing rules and regulations interpreting the criminal conflict of interest restrictions; establishing the framework for the public and confidential financial disclosure systems for executive branch employees; developing training and education programs for use by executive branch ethics officials and employees; and setting the requirements for, supporting, and reviewing individual agency ethics programs to ensure they are functioning properly.

Document Archive

 U.S. Postal Service Ethics Program Reviews for 2006, 2000, 1995, 1993, 1991, 1987 and 1981 [88 Pages, 2.5MB]

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The post U.S. Postal Service Ethics Program Reviews first appeared on The Black Vault.

According to the document:

“The Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency conducted a joint inspection of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) from October through December 1995. The goal of the inspection was to determine the efficiency and effectiveness of the processes and mechanisms to manage and administer NRO resources and administrative programs. The objectives to: evaluate the authorities and delegations of thc NRO and oversight organizations; evaluate the processes to identify mission requirements and plan and organize resources for them; evaluate internal  administrative and management programs; and, evaluate internal management oversight processes.”

I requested the document under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in June of 2016, and it was finally released in April of 2018.

Note: Strangely, the letter erred on multiple dates. It said the date of the letter was April 27, 2017, but was actually sent the same day in 2018. It also notes my request was from 2006, but actually, it was 2016. Unclear why the mistakes, but alas, I wanted to point them out for clarity.

Document Archive

 1996 Joint Inspection of the National Reconnaissance Office, Inspection Report No. 96-014, 23 July 1996 [166 Pages, 15.1MB]

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The post 1996 Joint Inspection of the National Reconnaissance Office, Inspection Report No. 96-014, 23 July 1996 first appeared on The Black Vault.

According to the report:

“We have audited the accompanying financial statements of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), which comprise the balance sheet as of September 30, 2015, the related statement of net cost and changes in net position, and the combined statement of budgetary resources (hereinafter referred to as the “financial statements”) for the year then ended, as well as the related notes to the financial statements.

Management is responsible for the preparation and fair presentation of the financial statements in accordance with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States of America; this includes the design, implementation, and maintenance of internal control relevant to the preparation and fair presentation of financial statements that are free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error.

Our responsibility is to express an opinion on the financial statements based on our audit. We conducted our audit in accordance with auditing standards generally accepted in the United States of America; the standards applicable to financial audits contained in Government Auditing Standards, issued by the Comptroller General of the United States; and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Bulletin No. 15-02, Audit Requirements for Federal Financial Statements. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free from material misstatement.”

The Audit

 Audit of the National Reconnaissance Office Fiscal Year 2015 Financial Statements, 13 November 2015 [20 Pages, 2.9MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/nro/F-2017-00040.pdf

The post Audit of the National Reconnaissance Office Fiscal Year 2015 Financial Statements, 13 November 2015 first appeared on The Black Vault.

The Intelligence Community (IC) defines the term insider threat as an insider using her/his authorized access, wittingly or unwittingly, to do harm to the security of the United States. As recently experienced by the IC and the Department of Defense, this harm can take many forms, including industrial espionage, unauthorized disclosure of classified information, or even violent acts. This is an organization-wide risk that is not limited to information technology or counterintelligence (CI).

To address the magnitude of this risk, in October 2011, the President released an Executive Order (E.0.)1 requiring departments and agencies to establish an insider threat program. The President subsequently issued several additional memoranda that established the National Insider Threat Policy clarifying his expectations for protecting federal entities.

Under Presidential direction, the National Insider Threat Task Force (NIITF) issued guidance on how to comply with the National Insider Threat Policy and specified what must be included in an insider threat program. It prescribed a coordinated effort across multiple disciplines. Examples ofthese disciplines include Personnel Security, Law Enforcement, Privacy and Civil Liberties, Human Resources, Information Assurance, CI, and Office of Inspector General (OIG). These interrelated disciplines are supposed to form an agency-wide safety net, including government and contractors, to deter, detect, and mitigate actions by employees who may represent a threat to national security.

Accepting that an insider threat program takes time to mature, the President provided a timeline for agencies to reach initial operating capability with their respective Insider Threat Programs. The NITTF, with White House concurrence, clarified that by 20 May 2013, all agencies must

1. (U) designate an insider threat senior official(s ),
2. (U) issue an insider threat policy signed by the department or agency head, and
3. (U) submit to department or agency leadership an insider threat program
implementation plan that addresses how the organization intends to meet the
requirements set forth in the minimum standards.

The Investigation

 Audit of the National Reconnaissance Office Insider Threat Program (Project Number 2015-002 A), 30 April 2015 [9 Pages, 1.8MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/nro/F-2017-00045.pdf

The post Audit of the National Reconnaissance Office Insider Threat Program (Project Number 2015-002 A), 30 April 2015 first appeared on The Black Vault.

The DoD OIG conducted this audit, the third in a series of audits on property accountability in support of OIR, to determine whether the Army had effective controls for processing and transferring ITEF equipment to the Iraqi government. The audit found that Army commands documented procedures for processing and transferring ITEF equipment to the Iraqi government. However, the 1st Theater Sustainment Command did not have effective controls to maintain complete visibility and accountability of the ITEF equipment in Kuwait and Iraq prior to transfer to the Iraqi government, and could not provide complete data for the quantity and dollar value of equipment on hand, including rolling stock and ammunition. As a result, the 1st Theater Sustainment Command did not have accurate, up-to-date records on the quantity and location of ITEF equipment on hand in Kuwait and Iraq, and did not have effective controls because it did not use centralized systems to maintain visibility and accountability of ITEF equipment. Instead, the 1st Theater Sustainment Command relied on multiple spreadsheets developed by different commands in both Kuwait and Iraq to provide it with visibility and accountability of equipment and did not consistently account for equipment in Iraq.

The DoD OIG recommended that the Commander, 1st Theater Sustainment Command, use automated systems to account for and provide complete visibility of ITEF equipment. The Command agreed with the recommendation and initiated steps to implement corrective actions.

Objective

The document states the objective of this investigation as:

We determined whether the Army had effective controls for processing and transferring Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF) equipment to the Government of Iraq.

This is the third in a series of audits on property accountability in support of Operation Inherent Resolve. ITEF, created by the FY 2015 National Defense Authorization Act, assists the Government of Iraq to combat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Examples of ITEF equipment provided to the Government of Iraq include body armor, navigation sets, magazine pouches, ambulances, and cargo trucks.

The Army’s 1st Theater Sustainment Command (1st TSC) maintains visibility and property accountability of ITEF equipment until transferred to the Government of Iraq.

Findings

Army commands documented procedures for processing and transferring ITEF equipment to the Government of Iraq. For example, the 1st TSC developed a standard operating procedure that includes step-by-step instructions for processing and transferring ITEF equipment. However, the 1st TSC did not have effective controls to maintain complete visibility and accountability of ITEF equipment in Kuwait and Iraq prior to transfer to the Government of Iraq.

Equipment visibility provides users with equipment location, movement, and status. Army Regulation 735-5 states that all property acquired by the Army will be continuously accounted for from the time of acquisition until the ultimate consumption or disposal of the property.

However, the 1st TSC could not provide complete data for the quantity and dollar value of equipment on hand, including rolling stock and ammunition. Rolling stock refers to vehicles. Examples include Mine Clearance Systems, ambulances, and wrecker trucks. 

The 1st TSC did not have effective controls because it did not use centralized systems to maintain visibility and accountability of ITEF equipment. Instead, the 1st TSC relied on multiple spreadsheets developed by different commands in both Kuwait and Iraq to provide it with visibility and accountability of equipment and did not consistently account for equipment in Iraq.

As a result, the 1st TSC did not have accurate, up-to-date records on the quantity and location of ITEF equipment on hand in Kuwait and Iraq. Accurate, up-to-date records of equipment on hand in Kuwait and Iraq are critical for filling equipment requests. The process to contact multiple commands and reference multiple spreadsheets to determine equipment quantities and location could delay the fulfillment of a request or delay the development of future requests. In addition, not having accurate records of equipment on hand could result in duplicate equipment requests. Further, the use of manually populated spreadsheets increased the risk for human-error when inputting and updating equipment data.

Document Archive

 The Army Did Not Implement Effective Controls To Maintain Visibility and Accountability of Iraq Train and Equip Fund Equipment, September 14, 2016 [27 Pages, 2.9MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/dod/DODIG-2016-00799.pdf

The post The Army Did Not Implement Effective Controls To Maintain Visibility and Accountability of Iraq Train and Equip Fund Equipment, September 14, 2016 first appeared on The Black Vault.

Fifteen years after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, the terrorist threat remains in the United States and abroad, as evidenced by recent attacks in Paris, France; San Bernardino, California; Brussels, Belgium; Orlando, Florida; and Nice, France. The U.S.’s national security depends on the ability to share the right information with the right people at the right time. This requires sustained and responsible collaboration among federal, state, local, and tribal entities, as well as the private sector and international partners.

In response to a request from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, and the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Offices of Inspector General (OIG) of the Intelligence Community (IC), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) conducted a review of the domestic sharing of counterterrorism information. The OIGs concluded that the partners in the terrorism-related
Information Sharing Environment components of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), DHS, DOJ, and their state and local partners are committed to sharing counterterrorism information. The partners’ commitment to protecting the nation is illustrated by the actions taken before, during, and following terrorism-related incidents, as well as by programs and initiatives designed to improve sharing of counterterrorism information.

However, the OIGs also identified several areas in which improvements could enhance information sharing.

To share information effectively, the federal, state, and local entities actively involved in counterterrorism efforts must understand each other’s roles,  responsibilities, and contributions, especially with the involvement of multiple agencies, such as the DOJ’s Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and DHS’ U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), in complex investigations. Updating or establishing new information sharing agreements among such entities should enhance coordination and collaboration, and reaffirm and formalize the roles and responsibilities of partners in the current information sharing environment. Similarly, although there is a national information sharing strategy, its implementation has been viewed to be uneven. The OIGs believe that the ODNI, DHS, and DOJ should review the interagency information sharing memorandum of understanding (MOU) and take necessary actions to update intelligence information sharing standards and processes among the departments, which we believe would result in better implementation of the strategy.

The OIGs also identified improvements in various practices and processes of the partners involved in counterterrorism. At DHS, a lack of unity in its Intelligence Enterprise, issues in the field related to staffing and access to classified systems and facilities, as well as problems with intelligence reporting processes, have made the DHS Intelligence Enterprise less effective and valuable to the IC than it could be. DOJ can improve its counterterrorism information sharing efforts by developing and implementing a consolidated internal DOJ strategy, and evaluating the continued need and most effective utilization for the United States Attorney’s Offices’ Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council (ATAC) meetings. Further, the FBI should spur participation associated with Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) and improve its efforts to obtain partners’ input in the process of identifying and prioritizing counterterrorism threats. Within the ODNI, the Domestic DNI Representative program is hindered by large geographic regions, as well as the lack of a clear strategic vision and guidance. In addition, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Domestic Representative program, although well received in the field, has also struggled to sufficiently cover its regions. At the state and local level, due to unpredictable federal support, fusion centers are focused on sustaining operations rather than enhancing capabilities. Further, varying requirements for state and local security clearances sponsored by federal agencies can impede access to classified systems and facilities.

Our review resulted in 23 recommendations to help improve the sharing of counterterrorism information and ultimately, enhance the Nation’s ability to
prevent terrorist attacks. We discuss our findings in detail in the Findings and Recommendations section of the report.

The Investigation

 Review of Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information, March 2017 [85 Pages, 6.7MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/ig/a1721.pdf

The post Review of Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information, March 2017 first appeared on The Black Vault.

The NRO OIG engaged the independent public accounting firm of PWC to audit the NRO FY 2014 financial statements in order to express an independent opinion regarding those statements.

The contract between PwC and the NRO OIG requires that the audit be performed in accordance with Government Auditing Standards, issued by the Comptroller General of the United States’ Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Bulletin No. 14-02, Audit Requirements for Federal Financial Statements; and the Government Accountability Office/President’s Countcil on Integrity and Efficiency Financial Audit Manual.

Declassified Audit

 Office of Inspector General Audit of the National Reconnaissance Office Fiscal Year 2014 Financial Statements [34 Pages, 4.8MB]

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The post Office of Inspector General Audit of the National Reconnaissance Office Fiscal Year 2014 Financial Statements first appeared on The Black Vault.

The U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General’s risk modeling identified the South Florida District as the _________ based on collected data showing malicious software programs on district computer systems. These security incidents can damage information system hardware and software and affect the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of data.

The South Florida District serves more than 14 million customers, delivers mail to more than 3.1. million homes, and generates annual revenue of about
$1.1 billion. Districts are responsible for adhering to. U.S. Postal Service policies for maintaining and securing their information systems. The (b)(3) 39 usc 410
Service Center is responsible or updating all South Florida District information systems, including installing security dates. Engineering personnel in ______ manage the applications supporting the mail processing environment in the district.

What the OIG Found

Security controls in the South Florida District did not adequately protect Postal Service data and infrastructure against potential corruption and unauthorized access. Of ___ Internet addresses that operated as servers, databases, and workstations at three mail processing plants, we found significant security control weaknesses on ___ of them. Administrators did not consistently install security updates (patches) and configure all operating systems and
databases as required by policy.

What the OIG Recommended

We recommended management implement vendor recommendations for patching and Postal Service configuration standards, correctly configure the _________ and ensure personnel with access to Postal Service resources receive annual security awareness training.

The Report

The following document was received under the USPS/IG FOIA Case 2017-IGFP-00029.

 Report Number IT-AR-14-001- South Florida District Vulnerability Assessment Audit Report – dated October 22, 2013 [29 Pages, 5.3MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/ig/IT-AR-14-001.pdf

The post USPS Investigation: South Florida District Vulnerability Assessment Audit Report, October 22, 2013 first appeared on The Black Vault.

Executive Summary

Over the course of 1 week in June 2007, a 15-year old high school student emailed a series of bomb threats to administrators and staff at Timberline High School, near Seattle, Washington. The threats caused daily school evacuations. The individual used “proxy servers” to e-mail the bomb threats in order to hide his location. When local law enforcement officials were unable to identify or locate the individual, they requested assistance from a cybercrime task force supervised by the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Seattle Field Division.

FBI agents on the task force, working with FBI technology and behavioral experts at Headquarters (FBIHQ), developed a plan to surreptitiously insert a computer program into the individual’s computer that would identify his location. An FBI undercover agent posed as an editor for the Associated Press (AP) and attempted to contact the individual through e-mail. During subsequent online communications, the undercover agent sent the individual links to a fake news article and photographs that had the computer program concealed within them.

The individual activated the computer program when he clicked on the link to the photographs, thereby revealing his location to the FBI. FBI and local law enforcement agents subsequently arrested the individual and he confessed to emailing the bomb threats.

The FBI did not publicize the assistance its agents provided local law enforcement. However, on July 18, 2007, 2 days after the individual pleaded guilty, an online technology news website published an article that detailed the method by which the FBI identified the individual. Seven years later, in October 2014, The Seattle Times published an article that disclosed the fact that an FBI employee posed as a member of the news media when it contacted and then identified the subject as the author of the bomb threats.

Later that same month the AP sent a letter to then-Attorney General Eric Holder protesting the FBI’s impersonation of a member of the news media in connection with the FBI’s investigation of the bomb threats. In addition, several newspapers wrote articles questioning the tactics the FBI used to identify and arrest the subject who sent the threats.

One week later, on November 6, 2014, FBI Director James Comey wrote a letter to the editor of The New York Times defending the FBI’s actions. In particular, Comey stated that the “technique [the FBI used to identify and apprehend the individual who sent the threats]was proper and appropriate under Justice Department and F.B.I. guidelines at the time” and that “[t]oday, the use of such an unusual technique would probably require higher level approvals than in 2007, but it would still be lawful and, in a rare case, appropriate.”

That same day, the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, on behalf of 25 other news organizations, wrote a letter to Comey and Holder voicing its objection to the practice of FBI agents impersonating journalists, saying the practice endangers the media’s credibility and undermines its independence, and that it appeared to violate FBI guidelines for when such tactics were permissible.

We initiated this review to examine whether under Department of Justice and FBI policies in effect at the time of the 2007 investigation, agents obtained the appropriate approval for the undercover activities the FBI conducted to locate the individual e-mailing the bomb threats. We also examined whether the undercover activities in 2007 would require a higher level of approval if conducted today under current Department and FBI polices.

As described in our full report, we concluded that FBI policies in 2007 did not expressly address the tactic of agents impersonating journalists. We further found that the FBI’s undercover policies then in effect provided some relevant guidance, but were less than clear. As a result, we believe that the judgments agents made about aspects of the planned undercover activity in 2007 to pose as an editor for the AP did not violate the undercover policies in place at the time.

We also determined that once the undercover plan was launched, certain investigative decisions were made concerning communications the undercover agent sent to the individual suspected of making the bomb threats that could have increased the level of approval required under FBI policy, a possibility the investigative team did not appear to fully consider. As we were finalizing this report, the FBI adopted a new interim policy in June 2016 that provides guidance to FBI employees regarding their impersonation of members of the news media during undercover activity or an undercover operation (defined as a series of related undercover activities over a period of time). We found that prior to the adoption of this new interim policy, FBI policy would not have prohibited FBI employees from engaging in the undercover activities agents conducted during the 2007 Timberline investigation.

The new interim policy, however, clearly prohibits FBI employees from engaging in undercover activity in which they represent, pose, or claim to be members of the news media, unless the activity is authorized as part of an undercover operation. In order for such an operation to be authorized, an application must first be approved by the head of the FBI field office submitting the application to FBIHQ, reviewed by the Undercover Review Committee at FBIHQ, and approved by the Deputy Director, after consultation with the Deputy Attorney General.

We believe the FBI’s new interim policy is a significant improvement to policies that existed in 2007 during the Timberline investigation, as well as to those policies that would have governed similar undercover activities prior to June 2016. The new interim policy also is an important extension of policies the Department of Justice has previously implemented to regulate certain law enforcement activities that affect members of the news media, such as obtaining information from or about members of the news media in criminal and civil investigations.

The FBI should move expeditiously to update its undercover policy guide to incorporate this new interim policy, and widely inform and educate FBI employees about the policy’s existence and application. Based upon our review, we made three recommendations to help ensure that FBI policies governing certain undercover activities and operations are well known, clear, and understood. The FBI concurred with the recommendations.

Download the Report

 A Review of the FBI’s Impersonation of a Journalist in a Criminal Investigation, September 2016 [30 Pages, 0.7MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/ig/o1607.pdf

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Excerpt from report:

In fiscal year (FY) 2010, Congress passed Public Law 111–258 (2010), the Reducing Over-Classification Act, which required the Inspectors General for all federal agencies and departments with officers and employees possessing original classification authority to conduct two evaluations – one in FY 2013 and another in FY 2016. In September 2013, the Department of Justice (DOJ or Department) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) issued its audit report on DOJ’s Implementation of and Compliance with Certain Classification Requirements.

For that first evaluation, Congress directed the Inspectors General to: (1) assess whether applicable classification policies, procedures, rules, and regulations have been adopted, followed, and are effectively administered within departments, agencies, or components; and (2) identify policies, procedures, rules, regulations, or practices that may contribute to persistent misclassification of material within such departments, agencies, or components. The OIG found that DOJ, through the Justice Management Division’s (JMD) Security and Emergency Planning Staff (SEPS), had established classification policies and procedures, but had not effectively administered them to ensure that information was classified and disseminated appropriately.

Although we did not find indications of widespread misclassification, we identified deficiencies relating to the implementation of DOJ’s classification program, including a persistent misunderstanding and lack of knowledge of certain classification processes by DOJ officials. We also identified weaknesses in DOJ’s implementation of classification standards, the limited distribution of automated tools designed to improve DOJ’s classification and marking processes, and weaknesses in the application of information security education and training programs.

In our FY 2013 report, we made 14 recommendations to help improve DOJ’s classification management program and its implementation of classification procedures. Pursuant to the requirements of the Reducing Over-Classification Act, in this report we evaluate DOJ’s progress made pursuant to the results of our FY 2013 report. We found that since our last audit SEPS has improved its administration of classification policies and procedures and enhanced the DOJ’s classification management program.

These improvements were evident in our review of DOJ’s classification authority delegations, classification decision designations, updated classification guidance, and classification reports. We believe that DOJ achieved these improvements because SEPS provided updated classification guidance, instruction, and training to DOJ components, which resulted in components having a clearer understanding of classification policies and procedures. As a result of SEPS’s progress in these areas, we have closed 11 of the 14 recommendations identified in our FY 2013 audit.

The appropriate use of original classification authority (OCA) reduces the risks of misclassifying and overclassifying information. In our FY 2013 report, we found that several DOJ components improperly classified information as “original” classification decisions, when the classification of this type of information previously had been decided. The improper use of original classification authority increases the risk that individuals could classify the same piece of information differently, resulting in the misclassification of information. In our current audit, we found significant improvements in this area, as evidenced by DOJ reducing the number of officials with Original Classification Authority from 64 in FY 2013 to 46 in FY 2016 and eliminating original classification decisions, as shown in the number of reported original classification decisions decreasing from 4,455 in FY 2013 to 0 in FY 2015. In our FY 2013 audit, we found that the high number of original classification decisions was primarily due to a misunderstanding of the differences between original and derivative classification decisions within several Department components. We believe that the dramatic reductions are indicative of DOJ personnel now having a better understanding of the classification types, as well as an improved knowledge of how to classify information using security classification guides. In addition, in 2015 SEPS incorporated comprehensive classification marking instructions in the DOJ Marking Classified National Security Information, implemented a software application to improve classified marking procedures for electronic files processed on classified information systems, and mandated usage of these tools for all DOJ classifiers. Security Programs Managers throughout the Department told us that these changes have resulted in classifiers more appropriately marking classified work products, in particular electronic documents.

The IG Investigation

 Follow-up Audit of the Department of Justice’s Implementation of and Compliance with Certain Classification Requirements, September 2016 [45 Pages, 0.8MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/ig/a1626.pdf

The post Follow-up Audit of the Department of Justice’s Implementation of and Compliance with Certain Classification Requirements, September 2016 first appeared on The Black Vault.

The Chairman of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs requested that the DoD Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) determine whether noncareer officials (political appointees or persons nominated by the President and confirmed by the U.S. Senate) were adversely affecting the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) process at the DoD between January 2007 and July 2015.

In response, we determined whether DoD noncareer officials unduly influenced the FOIA response process through unnecessary delays or withholding of information that would have otherwise been released absent the noncareer official’s involvement.

Finding

Our evaluation did not disclose any instances of DoD noncareer officials unduly influencing t he F OIA r esponse p rocess. On November 9, 2015, we advised the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of our evaluation results (see Appendix D). During the course of this evaluation, however, we determined that DoD FOIA policies a re outdated.

The DoD Deputy Chief Management Officer (DCMO) had not updated DoD FOIA policies, as required by DoD Instruction 5025.01, “DoD Issuance Program,” to ensure currency and accuracy. The DoD FOIA policies did not include requirements established in Executive Order 13392, “Improving Agency Disclosure of Information,” and the “OPEN Government Act of 2007.”

According to the Executive Order and the Act, agencies must review their FOIA processing operations, report on their FOIA improvement plan implementation, and strengthen procedures related to FOIA administration. Additionally, the DCMO did not incorporate guidance being used for “significant” FOIA releases into DoD Regulation 5400.7-R, “DoD Freedom of Information Act Program.”

A “significant” FOIA request is defined as any FOIA request in which the subject matter of the released documents may be of interest to DoD senior leadership, the public, the media, or Congress.

Full Report

 DOD/IG Report: DoD Freedom of Information Act Policies Need Improvement, August 16, 2016 [34 Pages, 3.1MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/ig/DODIG-2016-124.pdf

The post DOD/IG Report: DoD Freedom of Information Act Policies Need Improvement, August 16, 2016 first appeared on The Black Vault.

In carrying out this mission and to promote market integrity, the Commission polices the derivatives markets for various abuses and works to ensure the protection of customer funds. Further, the agency seeks to lower the risk of the futures and swaps markets to the economy and the public.

The following are documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act.

 2014 Complaints Received by the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Office of the Inspector General [137 Pages, 17.2MB]

The post U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Office of the Inspector General Reports / Complaints first appeared on The Black Vault.