From the document:

“The design elements, or visual language, that make up our house style attempt to convey — through imagery, color and appearance — the qualities that we want the Department of Homeland Security to be known for: being innovative and proactive in our mission and being accessible and direct with our public.

We are entrusted with the relentless protection and defense of America, its ideals, its way of life and its people. We are the trusted and authoritative partner to the state, local and private sector entities that share our mission. We are a 21st-century form of government and proud to protect our homeland.

And our communications must reflect our convictions.

The following pages introduce the foundations of our house style. The hallmarks of this visual language are the distinctive color palettes, the complementary typefaces, standardized uses of imagery and consistent placement of our signature. Our house style will ensure maximum recognition and a clean, contemporary look for all our communications.

These house style guidelines should be used in conjunction with the Seal and Signature Usage Guidelines, which provide more detailed information on usage of the DHS signature and its variations.”

Document Archive

 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) House Style Guidelines, October 2003 [39 Pages, 22.2MB]

The post Department of Homeland Security (DHS) House Style Guidelines, October 2003 first appeared on The Black Vault.

The Top Officials Exercise (TOPOFF) is a congressionally mandated biennial cycle of seminars, planning events, and national exercises designed to strengthen the Unites States’ capacity to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from large scale terrorist attacks. Every two years, the cycle culminates in an exercise that simulates a coordinated terrorist attack involving biological, chemical, radiological, or weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The exercises seek to draw the participation of top officials and key personnel from all levels of government who have domestic response and consequence management roles and responsibilities in actual terrorist events. The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness (SLGCP) sponsors the TOPOFF series plus manages the design, planning, conduct, and evaluation of the exercises.

TOPOFF 2

Top Officials 2 (TOPOFF 2) was a Congressionally-mandated, national terrorism exercise that was designed to identify vulnerabilities in the nation’s domestic incident management capability by exercising the plans, policies, procedures, systems, and facilities of federal, state, and local response organizations against a series of integrated terrorist threats and acts in separate regions of the country.

TOPOFF 2 was the largest and most comprehensive terrorism response exercise ever conducted in the United States.  The exercise scenario, which was played out from May 12 to May 16, 2003, depicted a fictitious, foreign terrorist organization that detonated a simulated radiological dispersal device (RDD) in Seattle, Washington, and released the Pneumonic Plague (Yersinia pestis) in several Chicago metropolitan area locations.  There was also significant pre-exercise intelligence play, a cyber-attack, and credible terrorism threats against other locations.  The exercise brought together top government officials from 25 federal, state, and local agencies and departments, and the Canadian Government to test the domestic incident management in response to WMD terrorist attacks in the United States.

Document Archive

 Top Officials (TOPOFF) Exercise Series, TOPOFF 2 (T2) After Action Report, September 30, 2003 [437 Pages, 92.4MB]

TOPOFF 3

The TOPOFF 3 full scale exercise, conducted from April 4–8, 2005, was the third in the series, and by any measure the most ambitious civilian terrorism response exercise ever conducted. The design incorporated many more elements, roles, and participants than in previous exercises and the extent of play involved new challenges. For example, the recently released National Response Plan (NRP) and National Incident Management System (NIMS) were used as both the framework and approach for response and incident management. For the first time, pre-exercise intelligence play was also added. In addition, the exercise sought to synchronize national goals and objectives, improve international coordination and cooperation during a linked terrorist incident response, and assess as well as strengthen government, nongovernment, and private sector partnerships in response to WMD incidents.

TOPOFF 3  involved a biological attack in New Jersey and a chemical attack in Connecticut. Over 20,000 participants were involved representing more than 250 federal, state, and local agencies, private businesses, volunteer groups, and international organizations. Canada and the United Kingdom joined the simulation as international partners that conducted simultaneous, related exercises in concert with U.S. efforts. DOS took the lead in organizing the international component by managing the interface among the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. The benefit of international participation in the TOPOFF exercises cannot be overstated. The United Kingdom’s efficient response and management of the London subway bombing of July 2005 were due in part to the lessons learned from their participation in TOPOFF 3.

Document Archive

 Top Officials 3 (TOPOFF 3) Full Scale Exercise After-Action Report, April 4-10, 2005 [398 Pages, 84.2MB]

TOPOFF 4

TOPOFF 4 involved over 23,000 participants from Federal, international, State, territorial, regional, tribal, local, volunteer, and private sector organizations. TOPOFF 4 was conducted from October 15-24, 2007, and simulated Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD), or “dirty bomb” attacks in the Territory of Guam, Portland, Oregon, and Phoenix, Arizona. The scenario simulated casualties and widespread contamination, and although real weapons were not used, the response was mounted as if they had been. Three international partners participated in TOPOFF 4: Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom. As in previous TOPOFF exercises, S/CT managed the international aspects of the exercise, which focused on crisis management, information sharing, consular operations, and public messaging. International activities focused on border issues, commercial aviation to and from the United States, and U.S. acceptance of international offers of assistance. Teams from Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom deployed to exercise locations to assist their citizens, and to interact with local and Federal authorities. In Washington DC, DOS activated an Exercise Task Force and participated in high level meetings with other Department and Agency decision-makers. In addition, DOS deployed a representative to the Joint Field Office in Portland to coordinate with the international teams and domestic interagency responders. American Embassies in Canberra, Ottawa and London convened Emergency Action Committees and worked closely with host governments and the DOS Task Force.

Document Archive

 TOPOFF 4 Evaluation Handbook [30 Pages, 3.8MB]

 T4 Command Post Exercise After-Action Report, June 19-22, 2006 [180 Pages, 40.3MB]

The post TOPOFF Operations, US Department of Homeland Security first appeared on The Black Vault.

Fifteen years after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, the terrorist threat remains in the United States and abroad, as evidenced by recent attacks in Paris, France; San Bernardino, California; Brussels, Belgium; Orlando, Florida; and Nice, France. The U.S.’s national security depends on the ability to share the right information with the right people at the right time. This requires sustained and responsible collaboration among federal, state, local, and tribal entities, as well as the private sector and international partners.

In response to a request from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, and the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Offices of Inspector General (OIG) of the Intelligence Community (IC), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) conducted a review of the domestic sharing of counterterrorism information. The OIGs concluded that the partners in the terrorism-related
Information Sharing Environment components of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), DHS, DOJ, and their state and local partners are committed to sharing counterterrorism information. The partners’ commitment to protecting the nation is illustrated by the actions taken before, during, and following terrorism-related incidents, as well as by programs and initiatives designed to improve sharing of counterterrorism information.

However, the OIGs also identified several areas in which improvements could enhance information sharing.

To share information effectively, the federal, state, and local entities actively involved in counterterrorism efforts must understand each other’s roles,  responsibilities, and contributions, especially with the involvement of multiple agencies, such as the DOJ’s Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and DHS’ U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), in complex investigations. Updating or establishing new information sharing agreements among such entities should enhance coordination and collaboration, and reaffirm and formalize the roles and responsibilities of partners in the current information sharing environment. Similarly, although there is a national information sharing strategy, its implementation has been viewed to be uneven. The OIGs believe that the ODNI, DHS, and DOJ should review the interagency information sharing memorandum of understanding (MOU) and take necessary actions to update intelligence information sharing standards and processes among the departments, which we believe would result in better implementation of the strategy.

The OIGs also identified improvements in various practices and processes of the partners involved in counterterrorism. At DHS, a lack of unity in its Intelligence Enterprise, issues in the field related to staffing and access to classified systems and facilities, as well as problems with intelligence reporting processes, have made the DHS Intelligence Enterprise less effective and valuable to the IC than it could be. DOJ can improve its counterterrorism information sharing efforts by developing and implementing a consolidated internal DOJ strategy, and evaluating the continued need and most effective utilization for the United States Attorney’s Offices’ Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council (ATAC) meetings. Further, the FBI should spur participation associated with Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) and improve its efforts to obtain partners’ input in the process of identifying and prioritizing counterterrorism threats. Within the ODNI, the Domestic DNI Representative program is hindered by large geographic regions, as well as the lack of a clear strategic vision and guidance. In addition, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Domestic Representative program, although well received in the field, has also struggled to sufficiently cover its regions. At the state and local level, due to unpredictable federal support, fusion centers are focused on sustaining operations rather than enhancing capabilities. Further, varying requirements for state and local security clearances sponsored by federal agencies can impede access to classified systems and facilities.

Our review resulted in 23 recommendations to help improve the sharing of counterterrorism information and ultimately, enhance the Nation’s ability to
prevent terrorist attacks. We discuss our findings in detail in the Findings and Recommendations section of the report.

The Investigation

 Review of Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information, March 2017 [85 Pages, 6.7MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/ig/a1721.pdf

The post Review of Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information, March 2017 first appeared on The Black Vault.

The Weekly Inventory List of Detained Cases (WILDC) report was established as a process to achieve consistency, accuracy, improve on the tracking of detained cases and decrease average length of stay.

In each weekly published document, ICE tallied the number of “detained” cases throughout their various field offices.

In April of 2016, a FOIA request was submitted that requested, “the four most recent WILDC reports at ICE.”  In June of 2016, the below were released.

Although there is still being research done on these reports by The Black Vault, it appears they may no longer be published by ICE, since the request yielded reports from 2010 (and the request was for the most recent, and filed in 2016.)

More information will be added, when available, but these documents are made available:

Declassified Documents

 Memorandum Dated March 12, 2008, entitled, “Establishment of the Weekly Inventory List of Detained Cases (WILDC) Report [2 Pages, 0.4MB]

 FOIA Response from ICE, dated June 21, 2016 [2 Pages, 0.95MB]

       CUMULATIVE MASTER WILDC FY10 (09-03-10).xls 20-Jul-2016 14:05  1.0M  
       WILDC SUMMARY 08 20 10.xls                  20-Jul-2016 14:05   71K  
       WILDC SUMMARY 08 27 10.xls                  20-Jul-2016 14:05   71K  
       WILDC SUMMARY 08.13.10.xls                  20-Jul-2016 14:05   71K  
       WILDC SUMMARY 09 03 10.xls                  20-Jul-2016 14:05   71K

The post Weekly Inventory List of Detained Cases – U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) first appeared on The Black Vault.

Below are the contents of a CD-ROM obtained from the DHS, after filing a request for the “DHS Employee manual / handbook.”

Department of Homeland Security Employee Manual [62 Pages, 4.34mb]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/manuals/dhsmanual.pdf

The post Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Employee Manual first appeared on The Black Vault.

The Canadian activist group Adbusters initiated the protest, which has led to Occupy protests and movements around the world. The main issues are social and economic inequality, greed, corruption and the perceived undue influence of corporations on government—particularly from the financial services sector. The OWS slogan, We are the 99%, addresses the growing income inequality and wealth distribution in the U.S. between the wealthiest 1% and the rest of the population. To achieve their goals, protesters act on consensus-based decision made in general assemblies which emphasize direct action over petitioning authorities for redress.

Protesters were forced out of Zuccotti Park on November 15, 2011. After several unsuccessful attempts to re-occupy the original location, protesters turned their focus to occupying banks, corporate headquarters, board meetings, college and university campuses.

Department of Homeland Security Released Documents on Occupy Wall Street – Release #1 [398 Pages, 20.81 MB]

Department of Homeland Security Released Documents on Occupy Wall Street – Release #2 [335 Pages, 14.71 MB]

The post Occupy Wall Street first appeared on The Black Vault.