Two studies were conducted employing both innocent and guilty Ss. the guilty condition was established by having Ss play the role of an enemy espionage agent (courier). Innocent and guilty Ss were separately tested in groups of six or seven Ss. Both relevant-irrelevant (RI) and peak of tension (PT) methods were employed. GSR response to each question was separately recorded for each S. In addition, a composite GSR was also derived from all the Ss in each group. In the first study, separate subgroups were given differential feedback of information regarding the polygraph’s effectiveness during a preliminary phase of the interrogation. Results indicated that those Ss receiving information that the polygraph was effective in detecting their lies were detected more readily during the subsequent actual interrogation than were those Ss receiving information that the polygraph was ineffective. In the second study, no differential treatment of innocent and guilty Ss was included in the design in order to provide a clearer interpretation of the effectiveness of the courier paradigm itself. The design was also modified to allow a more adequate comparison of RI and PT methods of interrogation. In addition, information was sought relative to the question of whether a S can be detected when he is informed that his responses are not being evaluated. Results of the second study confirmed the findings of the previous experiment relative to the effectiveness of both the courier paradigm and the group GSR.

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Methodological Studies in Detection of Deception, January 1964 [58 Pages, 2MB]

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The post Methodological Studies in Detection of Deception, January 1964 first appeared on The Black Vault.

Abstract:

When the blind seek to leak the blind, a cautionary note is in order. This report is written in blissful ignorance of whatever systematic efforts the United States Government has made to construct a counter-deception capability, designed to detect, neutralize and undermine those foreign deception operations that degrade governmental performance through U.S. intelligence channels. To the extent that such a  capability exists, what follows may be superfluous. Neither the public literature on intelligence activities nor the public record of intelligence predictions confirms the existence of such a counter-deception capability, but the public record is notoriously murky and subject to correction.

This report explores the effects of deception upon strategic warning systems, and possible protective efforts for the detection of strategic foreign deception. The report excludes from consideration evaluation of organizational alternatives for counter-deception systems. Drawing only upon public sources, this report is designed to serve as a background reference for readers interested in methodologies for coping with deception, or in references to the literature of deception and cognition.

This report was obtained from the CIA CREST system, and the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).

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 On Countering Strategic Deception, by William R. Harris, November 1973 [100 Pages, 41.5MB]

The post On Countering Strategic Deception, by William R. Harris, November 1973 first appeared on The Black Vault.