The directive was signed and implemented by William H. Taft IV, who served as the Deputy Secretary of Defense under President Ronald Reagan. Taft, a prominent figure in defense and legal circles, was known for his role in shaping U.S. military policy during the Cold War era. His tenure included significant contributions to the strategic doctrines that governed the use of weapons of mass destruction.

According to the document release, which took more than four years to get completed, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) initially had no objections to releasing the directive in full. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff intervened, resulting in specific portions being redacted. The redactions were made under Executive Order 13526, 3.3(b)(5), which protects information that could potentially reveal active U.S. military war plans or operational elements of past plans that remain relevant.

The release of this document provides insight into U.S. chemical weapons policy during a critical period in the late 20th century. The directive explicitly details the U.S. strategy to deter the use of chemical, toxin, and biological weapons by maintaining military capabilities to retaliate effectively. It states, “The U.S. reservation to the Geneva Protocol of 1925… allows for retaliation with chemical weapons against a violator if chemical, toxin, or biological weapons are used against U.S. allies even if U.S. forces are not directly attacked.”

The directive also outlines the procedures for the deployment and employment of chemical weapons, emphasizing the importance of maintaining readiness and survivability of chemical-capable forces. For instance, it asserts that “Chemical weapons shall be employed only against suitable tactical targets of military value,” and underscores that the use of such weapons in response to enemy chemical attacks requires the approval of the President of the United States.

The redacted portions also would have seemed to have added more important context when it comes to the use of chemical weapons. For example:

In this particular portion above, you can see that the redacted portions outline the intended damage caused by a retaliatory chemical weapon strike. The paragraph later talks about the want to inflict “at least” but the next portion is redacted.

Another section talks about the “maximum effectiveness” of chemical capabilities, but the opening remarks are fully redacted.

The MDR process, which led to the release of this document, allows for the declassification of government records in response to a specific request. The Black Vault utilized this process to obtain the directive, shedding light on a piece of Cold War history that had remained hidden for decades.

The document is available below for download.

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Document Archive

 Release of the 1987 DoD Directive S-3145.2: Chemical Weapons Policy [10 Pages, 2MB]

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The post Release of the 1987 DoD Directive S-3145.2: Chemical Weapons Policy first appeared on The Black Vault.

According to the introduction of the audit:

“We performed the audit in response to allegations made to the Defense Hotline including the allegation that Sandia National Laboratory officials assigned to the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs) directed the Defense Special Weapons Agency to procure work from Department of Energy national laboratories. This is the second of two reports. The first report discusses two allegations related to Defense Special Weapons Agency procurements through the Department of Energy.”

Document Archive

Report 98-036, Intergovernmental Personnel Act Employees in the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs), December 11, 1997 [55 Pages, 13MB]

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The post Report 98-036, Intergovernmental Personnel Act Employees in the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs), December 11, 1997 first appeared on The Black Vault.

This instruction provides policy guidance concerning the nature and extent of Coast Guard hazardous chemical response activities. It describes the response functions that marine safety units shall carry out, subject to resource availability, and the training, equipment, staffing standards, and procedures associated with those functions.

Document Archive

 Policy Guidance for Response to Hazardous Chemical Releases, 12 March 1984 [229 Pages, 4.6MB]

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The post Policy Guidance for Response to Hazardous Chemical Releases, 12 March 1984 first appeared on The Black Vault.

This report is the first in a series of reports that discuss the acquisition of the Chemical Demilitarization Program (the Demilitarization Program). The mission of the Demilitarization Program is to destroy chemical munitions through incineration or other approved alternative technologies. In 1985, the Congress, in section 1521, title 50, United States Code, “Destruction of Existing Stockpile of Lethal Chemical Agents and Munitions,” (Public Law 99-145), directed DoD to oversee the destruction of the stockpile of lethal chemical agents and munitions because of concerns for the stockpile deterioration. The Army established the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization to manage the day-to-day operations of destroying the chemical weapons. In May 2001, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics designated the Demilitarization Program as a major Defense acquisition program (Acquisition Category ID) and assigned the Army as the Executive Agent. Through July 2002, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers awarded contracts for construction, systemization, operations, and closure of chemical destruction facilities at Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System, Johnston Island, Hawaii, and Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility, Tooele, Utah. The Office of the Secretary of Defense approved a cost estimate totaling $24 billion, of which the program office awarded $5.8 billion in contracts for the Demilitarization Program.

Who Should Read This Report and Why? This report should be read by all who are interested in the Army’s demilitarization of its chemical munitions stockpile. This report discusses why the Army needs to update its acquisition program baseline agreement and to obtain a documented threat assessment.

Document Archive

 A Revised Acquisition Program Baseline and Threat Assessment for the Chemical Demilitarization Program, October 2002 [34 Pages, 1.4MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/dod/D-2003-015).pdf

The post A Revised Acquisition Program Baseline and Threat Assessment for the Chemical Demilitarization Program, October 2002 first appeared on The Black Vault.

Naval Concepts of Chemical and Biological Warfare – A Department of Defense Motion Picture Film (1952).

This declassified Naval training video talks about the US Navy’s chemical & biological warfare experiments conducted in the early 1950s.

Video Archive

Special thanks to GovernmentAttic.org for getting this declassified.

The post Naval Concepts of Chemical and Biological Warfare – A Department of Defense Motion Picture Film (1952) first appeared on The Black Vault.

This document (without a title when I learned of it) appears in the DTIC Classified Document list. It was dated 1939, and did not think it would be this hard to get it declassified.

I was forced to appeal the decision to entirely withhold the document, and after my appeal was processed, I received the record partially redacted.

Hard to believe that this record could be so classified, as it was written when Adolf Hitler was still in power of Nazi Germany.

Declassified Document

 Report on Test of Bombs, Chemical, 100-LB, T6E1, Lots E-3685-127 and E-3685-128, December 15, 1939 [52 Pages, 11.3MB]

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The post Report on Test of Bombs, Chemical, 100-LB, T6E1, Lots E-3685-127 and E-3685-128, December 15, 1939 first appeared on The Black Vault.

Mr. Andrew Ghazee of the AFMC Restoration Office, requested that AFRLIHEST conduct an archival search, review, and analysis of existing records for the 1948 through 1970 time frame to determine the potential for the residual presence of BW/CW agents, munitions, and training devices at AFMC bases and related sites. This action was in response to a tasking received from AF/ILEVR in September 1997. In order to accomplish this research, AFRLIHEST contracted with STI under AF contract F41624-97 -D-6002 to examine any plans, records, and reports that may indicate the presence of BW/CW materiel on AFMC bases and related  sites during this time period.

Archival records and unit histories of the identified installations were reviewed at the base historian’s offices. Environmental reclamation officers and individuals at the Treaty Offices at each base were contacted for any information they may have on previous reclamations and studies.

The Defense Technical Information Center’s on-line technical reports data base was searched for relevant data.

Links to the Army Chemical Corps BW/CW program were identified and investigated. If necessary, the Edgewood Arsenal and Fort Detrick historians were contacted. Transfer of BW/CW materiel by the Army Technical Escort Unit was tracked as records permit. An assessment was made for the discovery potential of BW/CW materiel on the base as a result of the BW/CW program. A report was written for each installation; this final report consists of a compilation of all individual base reports.

Declassified Document

 Report of Investigation: The Presence of Biological and Chemical Warfare Materiel at AFMC Bases within the United States, June 2000 [235 Pages, 12.7MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/dtic/2016-03986-F.pdf

The post Report of Investigation: The Presence of Biological and Chemical Warfare Materiel at AFMC Bases within the United States, June 2000 first appeared on The Black Vault.

The AIAA convened a workshop to identify and quantify the key environmental issues that relate to the effects on the atmosphere of rocket testing and use, and to recommend actions to resolve the issues. Communities represented at the workshop included rocket propulsion engineers, environmental scientists, environmental regulatory agencies, and environmental action groups.

Based on careful evaluation of scientific studies performed in the U.S., Europe, and the Soviet Union, the workshop concluded that the effects of rocket propulsion on stratospheric ozone depletion, acid rain, toxicity, air quality, and global warming were minuscule compared to other anthropogenic impacts.
Nevertheless it was agreed that environmental concerns should become a major consideration in the design, development, and use of future rocket propulsion systems, and that every reasonable effort should be made to reduce undesirable environmental effects.

Also, both the data and the analytical models used to reach conclusions on the effects of rocket propulsion on the atmosphere need substantial improvement to attain satisfactory confidence levels. Further, it was agreed that due to the global nature of the issues the necessary research, formulation of standards and regulations, and efforts to reduce environmental effects be conducted on an international basis.

Specific research areas detailed by the workshop include improving atmospheric modeling, data gathering, and methods for monitoring environmental changes. These improvements should focus on heterogeneous and non-equilibrium chemistry, three-dimensional * I modeling, and full characterization of rocket exhaust plumes and  afterburning.

In addition to incorporating environmental considerations on an equal level with performance, cost, and reliability criteria from system conception to operation, potential avenues for consideration in future propulsion systems include formulation, testing, and demonstration of new and modified propellants, changing system operating parameters, modifying test facilities and protocols, and relocating test and launch facilities.

However, it is essential to conduct detailed analyses of the costs, the benefits, and the risks of implementing such actions to ensure that safety and reliability are not compromised, that economics receive proper consideration, and that the actions 4 taken do indeed reduce undesirable effects on the environment.

Declassified Document

 Atmospheric Effects of Chemical Rocket Propulsion, October 1991 [89 Pages, 5.5MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/dtic/ADB191722.pdf

The post Atmospheric Effects of Chemical Rocket Propulsion, October 1991 first appeared on The Black Vault.

Entomological warfare (EW) is a type of biological warfare that uses insects to attack the enemy. The concept has existed for centuries and research and development have continued into the modern era.

EW has been used in battle by Japan and several other nations have developed and been accused of using an entomological warfare program.

Below are documents pertaining to this research.

Document Archive

Entomological Field Test Technology,Bellwether II, BIO 531, December 1961 [92 Pages, 3.2MB]

Operation Big Itch

Operation Big Itch was a U.S. entomological warfare field test using uninfected fleas to determine their coverage and survivability as a vector for biological agents. The tests were conducted at Dugway Proving Ground in 1954.

Operation Big Itch, November 1954 [40 Pages, 5.42MB]

The post Entomological Warfare first appeared on The Black Vault.