It was first released in 2009, with numerous redactions. But then in August 2019, The Black Vault filed a Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) to get it reviewed. The result, as received in June of 2022, was that many redactions were lifted, but clearly, not all.

Document Archive

Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack, 26 October 1972 [99 Pages, 27MB]

The post Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack, 26 October 1972 first appeared on The Black Vault.

On September 11, 2012 in Libya, a heavily armed group executed an attack on the U.S. diplomatic mission in Benghazi. The attack began at night in a U.S. diplomatic compound for the consulate, and ended at another diplomatic compound nearby where the U.S. intelligence was posted. Killed were U.S. Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and three other members of his diplomatic mission, U.S. Foreign Service Information Management Officer Sean Smith and U.S. embassy security personnel Glen Doherty and Tyrone Woods. Two other Americans and seven Libyans were also injured. The Benghazi attack was strongly condemned by the governments of Libya, the United States and other countries around the world.

Libyans held demonstrations in Benghazi and Tripoli, condemning the violence and holding signs such as, “Chris Stevens was a friend to all Libyans”, and apologizing to Americans for the actions in their name and in the name of Muslims. On September 21, about 30,000 Libyans protested against armed militias in their country including Ansar al-Sharia, an Islamist militia alleged to have played a role in the attack, and stormed several militia headquarters, forcing the occupants to flee. On September 23, the Libyan president ordered that all unauthorized militias either disband or come under government control. Militias across the country began surrendering to the government and submitting to its authority. Hundreds of Libyans gathered in Tripoli and Benghazi to hand over their weapons to the government.

The attack followed the mobbing of the U.S. embassy in Cairo, Egypt, which was in reaction to the anti-Islamic film Innocence of Muslims. On September 28, U.S. intelligence revised their initial assessment to indicate that it “was a deliberate and organized terrorist attack carried out by extremists”. Questions about whether the White House should have stated or did state this conclusion earlier and whether the site of the assault was adequately secured before and after the attack created political controversy during the US 2012 Presidential election then underway. The United States investigation of the attack is being conducted separately by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the State Department, the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Source: Wikipedia

Note from The Black Vault: I have filed FOIA requests to multiple agencies regarding this attack. I am still awaiting additional records responsive to the attack, but have included the below records from my archives for research.

FOIA Search for Documents on Benghazi

The following are documents received under the FOIA regarding Benghazi. I still have MULTIPLE requests still open and being processed, and they will be made available here when I get them.

Did the U.S. Government receive warnings of a threat on 9/11/12?  

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

DIA Response for Records – Records Released, January 21, 2022- [9 Pages, 0.6MB]

Department of Defense (DoD)

DoD Response for Records – Original Denial, 2013 – [2 Pages, 0.6MB]

DoD Response for Records – Records Released, 2019 – [52 Pages, 0.6MB] Note: The records were obtained electronically, and they were this compressed upon receipt (looking blurry and of poor quality.)

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

 FBI Response to FOIA request for all warnings / threats of terrorism on or around 9/11/12 [5 Pages, 1MB] – The FBI found 72 pages of responsive records to this search, but each of them were classified and exempt from release.  Could these pages potentially show the Obama Administration was negligent and ignored warnings of a terrorist attack on 9/11/12?

 FBI Response to FOIA request for all warnings / threats of terrorism on or around 9/11/12, on documents originating with a “Other Government Agency” [3 Pages, 0.2MB] – The FBI had sent 4 pages to a “Other Government Agency” that was responsible for the documents. They determined that these, as well, were entirely classified and exempt from release.

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

 CIA Response to FOIA request for all warnings / threats of terrorism on or around 9/11/12 [2 Pages, 0.2MB] – The CIA responded on behalf of the Department of State, when they found multiple pages responsive to my request.  The CIA says that each document is classified, and exempt from release.

 CIA Response to Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) request for all warnings / threats of terrorism on or around 9/11/12 [1 Page, 0.2MB] – After four years from the above case, I requested a Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) request of all the files found, but previously exempt, in 2014. Yet again, the CIA denied access to the files.

National Security Agency (NSA)

 NSA Response to FOIA request for all warnings / threats of terrorism on or around 9/11/12 [ 70 Pages, 6.1MB ] – This request took more than 5 years to complete. The keys (to me) to this specific release are, first, I got the official internal messages sent updating on the situation, many sent while Ambassador Stevens was not even found or his whereabouts known. Second, there is a “declassified” Top Secret briefing from April of 2012. This must contain information about the situation in and around Benghazi, but the question about this briefing, is why is it STILL so classified since much of the situation and CIA presence became known when the attack took place? The reasons why are cited as FOIA Exemption (b)(1) having to deal with national security information and (b)(3) information exempted by statute.

Related FOIA Documents

DoD Response for Records [2 Pages, 0.6mb]

 State Department “Rapid Response: Hot Topics” Newsletter for the month of September 2012 [ 37 Pages, 1.6MB ] – These newsletters are issued daily by the State Department, and circulated internally. I requested the entire month of September 2012 to show the days leading up to and following the Benghazi attack.

 FBI Response to FOIA request for all transcripts from interviews with Benghazi survivors [4 Pages, 2.35MB] –

Benghazi “Talking Point” Timeline revisions [8 Pages, 1.7mb] – This document, released by ABC News, shows the different versions of the “talking points” relating to Benghazi. There is a drastic change over the course of 12 revisions.

 Benghazi “Talking Point” Revision — Emails from the White House, released April 2014 [113 Pages, 43.76mb] – These records come from my friends over at Judicial Watch, who do great work obtaining hard to get documents.  To quote FoxNews on their release, “Newly released emails on the Benghazi terror attack suggest a senior White House aide played a central role in preparing former U.N. ambassador Susan Rice for her controversial Sunday show appearances — where she wrongly blamed protests over an Internet video.”

Benghazi “Talking Point” Revision — Emails from the DNI, State Dept. CIA and others [100 Pages, 36.71mb] – These pages were released to The Black Vault from the Director of National Intelligence in a request for all emails pertaining to the “talking points” and how they were revised behind the scenes before Susan Rice and others used them in the days after the attack.  Very interesting to see what went into it, and how they knew from the start the bullet point about it being over a protest would be an issue.  You will also see where the information about the “warnings” given PRIOR to 9/11/12, along with the terrorist ties, were completely cut out of the final version.

Benghazi Attack Scene Photos [8 Pages, 1.6mb] – Thanks to my friends over at Judicial Watch, photos from the scene of the Benghazi attack were released under the FOIA after originally being deemed classified, and exempt from disclosure under FOIA exemption (b)(7). These are the first photos to have been officially released from the scene of the Benghazi attack.

 FBI Response for Benghazi “threats” towards the consulate, or to the US on or around 9/11/12 [3 Pages, 1.02MB] – In a search for records relating to a threat towards either the United States, or the Benghazi consulate, I filed a FOIA request to the FBI for records relating to anything that may indicate we had prior knowledge that an attack was imminent around 9/11/12.  The response? FOIA exemption (b)(7) – law enforcement information, which if released, would interfere with an ongoing proceeding.

White House Releases Emails Regarding Benghazi [100 Pages, 29.12mb] – On 5/15/2013, The White House released 100 pages of emails regarding the ‘talking points’ that would be discussed in the days that followed the attack in Benghazi.  Up until this date, the White House refused to release them to congressional investigators.

 Blue Mountain Group (BMG) Security Firm Repeatedly Abandoned Their Posts in Benghazi due to “fear” for their safety [ 130 Pages, 39.28MB ] – On September 10th, 2014, Judicial Watch announced that it had obtained 130 pages of new State Department documents revealing that local security guards working for Blue Mountain Group (BMG), the firm hired to protect the U.S. Special Mission in Benghazi, repeatedly abandoned their posts “out of fear of their safety” in the months leading up to the deadly terrorist attack on the special mission compound. Source and special thanks: Judicial Watch

Report of the Select Committee on the Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi

Published 6/28/2016

Washington, D.C. – Select Committee on Benghazi Chairman Trey Gowdy (SC-04) released the following statement after the committee’s Majority released a mark of its investigative report:

“Chris Stevens, Sean Smith, Glen Doherty and Tyrone Woods were heroes who gave their lives in service to our country. Their bravery and the courageous actions of so many others on the ground that night should be honored.

“When the Select Committee was formed, I promised to conduct this investigation in a manner worthy of the American people’s respect, and worthy of the memory of those who died. That is exactly what my colleagues and I have done.

“Now, I simply ask the American people to read this report for themselves, look at the evidence we have collected, and reach their own conclusions. You can read this report in less time than our fellow citizens were taking fire and fighting for their lives on the rooftops and in the streets of Benghazi.”

The committee’s proposed report is just over 800 pages long and is comprised of five primary sections and 12 appendices. It details relevant events in 2011 and 2012.

The following facts are among the many new revelations in Part I:

• Despite President Obama and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta’s clear orders to deploy military assets, nothing was sent to Benghazi, and nothing was en route to Libya at the time the last two Americans were killed almost 8 hours after the attacks began. [pg. 141]

• With Ambassador Stevens missing, the White House convened a roughly two-hour meeting at 7:30 PM, which resulted in action items focused on a YouTube video, and others containing the phrases “[i]f any deployment is made,” and “Libya must agree to any deployment,” and “[w]ill not deploy until order comes to go to either Tripoli or Benghazi.” [pg. 115]

• The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff typically would have participated in the White House meeting, but did not attend because he went home to host a dinner party for foreign dignitaries. [pg. 107]

• A Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST) sat on a plane in Rota, Spain, for three hours, and changed in and out of their uniforms four times. [pg. 154]

• None of the relevant military forces met their required deployment timelines. [pg. 150]

• The Libyan forces that evacuated Americans from the CIA Annex to the Benghazi airport was not affiliated with any of the militias the CIA or State Department had developed a relationship with during the prior 18 months. Instead, it was comprised of former Qadhafi loyalists who the U.S. had helped remove from power during the Libyan revolution. [pg. 144]

Rep. Mike Pompeo (KS-04) released the following statement regarding these findings:

“We expect our government to make every effort to save the lives of Americans who serve in harm’s way. That did not happen in Benghazi. Politics were put ahead of the lives of Americans, and while the administration had made excuses and blamed the challenges posed by time and distance, the truth is that they did not try.”

Rep. Martha Roby (AL-02) released the following statement regarding these findings:

“Our committee’s insistence on additional information about the military’s response to the Benghazi attacks was met with strong opposition from the Defense Department, and now we know why. Instead of attempting to hide deficiencies in our posture and performance, it’s my hope our report will help ensure we fix what went wrong so that a tragedy like this never happens again.” 

The following facts are among the many new revelations in Part II:

• Five of the 10 action items from the 7:30 PM White House meeting referenced the video, but no direct link or solid evidence existed connecting the attacks in Benghazi and the video at the time the meeting took place. The State Department senior officials at the meeting had access to eyewitness accounts to the attack in real time. The Diplomatic Security Command Center was in direct contact with the Diplomatic Security Agents on the ground in Benghazi and sent out multiple updates about the situation, including a “Terrorism Event Notification.” The State Department Watch Center had also notified Jake Sullivan and Cheryl Mills that it had set up a direct telephone line to Tripoli. There was no mention of the video from the agents on the ground. Greg Hicks—one of the last people to talk to Chris Stevens before he died—said there was virtually no discussion about the video in Libya leading up to the attacks. [pg. 28]

• The morning after the attacks, the National Security Council’s Deputy Spokesperson sent an email to nearly two dozen people from the White House, Defense Department, State Department, and intelligence community, stating: “Both the President and Secretary Clinton released statements this morning. … Please refer to those for any comments for the time being. To ensure we are all in sync on messaging for the rest of the day, Ben Rhodes will host a conference call for USG communicators on this chain at 9:15 ET today.” [pg. 39]

• Minutes before the President delivered his speech in the Rose Garden, Jake Sullivan wrote in an email to Ben Rhodes and others: “There was not really much violence in Egypt. And we are not saying that the violence in Libya erupted ‘over inflammatory videos.’” [pg. 44]

• According to Susan Rice, both Ben Rhodes and David Plouffe prepared her for her appearances on the Sunday morning talk shows following the attacks. Nobody from the FBI, Department of Defense, or CIA participated in her prep call. While Rhodes testified Plouffe would “normally” appear on the Sunday show prep calls, Rice testified she did not recall Plouffe being on prior calls and did not understand why he was on the call in this instance. [pg.98]

• On the Sunday shows, Susan Rice stated the FBI had “already begun looking at all sorts of evidence” and “FBI has a lead in this investigation.” But on Monday, the Deputy Director, Office of Maghreb Affairs sent an email stating: “McDonough apparently told the SVTS [Secure Video Teleconference] group today that everyone was required to ‘shut their pieholes’ about the Benghazi attack in light of the FBI investigation, due to start tomorrow.” [pg. 135]

• After Susan Rice’s Sunday show appearances, Jake Sullivan assured the Secretary of the State that Rice “wasn’t asked about whether we had any intel. But she did make clear our view that this started spontaneously and then evolved.” [pg. 128]

• Susan Rice’s comments on the Sunday talk shows were met with shock and disbelief by State Department employees in Washington. The Senior Libya Desk Officer, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, State Department, wrote: “I think Rice was off the reservation on this one.” The Deputy Director, Office of Press and Public Diplomacy, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, State Department, responded: “Off the reservation on five networks!” The Senior Advisor for Strategic Communications, Bureau of Near East Affairs, State Department, wrote: “WH [White House] very worried about the politics. This was all their doing.” [pg. 132]

• The CIA’s September 13, 2012, intelligence assessment was rife with errors. On the first page, there is a single mention of “the early stages of the protest” buried in one of the bullet points. The article cited to support the mention of a protest in this instance was actually from September 4. In other words, the analysts used an article from a full week before the attacks to support the premise that a protest had occurred just prior to the attack on September 11. [pg. 47]

• A headline on the following page of the CIA’s September 13 intelligence assessment stated “Extremists Capitalized on Benghazi Protests,” but nothing in the actual text box supports that title. As it turns out, the title of the text box was supposed to be “Extremists Capitalized on Cairo Protests.” That small but vital difference—from Cairo to Benghazi—had major implications in how people in the administration were able to message the attacks. [pg. 52]

Rep. Jim Jordan (OH-04) released the following statement regarding these findings:

“Obama Administration officials, including the Secretary of State, learned almost in real time that the attack in Benghazi was a terrorist attack. Rather than tell the American people the truth, the administration told one story privately and a different story publicly.”

Rep. Peter Roskam (IL-06) released the following statement regarding these findings:

“In the days and weeks after the attacks, the White House worked to pin all of the blame for their misleading and incorrect statements on officials within the intelligence community, but in reality, political operatives like Ben Rhodes and David Plouffe were spinning the false narrative and prepping Susan Rice for her interviews.”

The following facts are among the many new revelations in Part III:

• During deliberations within the State Department about whether and how to intervene in Libya in March 2011, Jake Sullivan listed the first goal as “avoid[ing]a failed state, particularly one in which al-Qaeda and other extremists might take safe haven.” [pg. 9]

• The administration’s policy of no boots on the ground shaped the type of military assistance provided to State Department personnel in Libya. The Executive Secretariats for both the Defense Department and State Department exchanged communications outlining the diplomatic capacity in which the Defense Department SST security team members would serve, which included wearing civilian clothes so as not to offend the Libyans. [pg. 60]

• When the State Department’s presence in Benghazi was extended in December 2012, senior officials from the Bureau of Diplomatic Security were excluded from the discussion. [pg. 74]

• In February 2012, the lead Diplomatic Security Agent at Embassy Tripoli informed his counterpart in Benghazi that more DS agents would not be provided by decision makers, because “substantive reporting” was not Benghazi’s purpose. [pg. 77]

• Emails indicate senior State Department officials, including Cheryl Mills, Jake Sullivan, and Huma Abedin were preparing for a trip by the Secretary of State to Libya in October 2012. According to testimony, Chris Stevens wanted to have a “deliverable” for the Secretary for her trip to Libya, and that “deliverable” would be making the Mission in Benghazi a permanent Consulate. [pg. 96]

• In August 2012—roughly a month before the Benghazi attacks—security on the ground worsened significantly. Ambassador Stevens initially planned to travel to Benghazi in early August, but cancelled the trip “primarily for Ramadan/security reasons.” [pg. 99]

• Former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta bluntly told the committee “an intelligence failure” occurred with respect to Benghazi. Former CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell also acknowledged multiple times an intelligence failure did in fact occur prior to the Benghazi attacks. [pg. 129]

Rep. Susan Brooks (IN-05) released the following statement regarding these findings:

“President Obama has said his worst mistake was ‘failing to plan for the day after … intervening in Libya.’ As a result of this ‘lead from behind’ foreign policy, the Libyan people were forced to make the dismal trade of the tyranny of Qadhafi for the terror of ISIS, Al-Qaeda and others. Although the State Department considered Libya a grave risk to American diplomats in 2011 and 2012, our people remained in a largely unprotected, unofficial facility that one diplomatic security agent the committee interviewed characterized as ‘a suicide mission.’”

Rep. Lynn Westmoreland (GA-03) released the following statement regarding these findings:

“One of the most concerning parts of the State Department’s policy in Libya was its reliance upon the militias of an unstable nation to protect our men and women in Benghazi. These were by no means forces that could adequately protect Americans on the ground, and the State Department knew it. But the appearance of no boots on the ground was more important to the administration.”

Part IV of the report reveals new information about the Select Committee’s requests and subpoenas seeking documents and witnesses regarding Benghazi and Libya, and details what the Obama administration provided to Congress, what it is still withholding, and how its serial delays hindered the committee’s efforts to uncover the truth.

Part V proposes 25 recommendations for the Pentagon, State Department, Intelligence Community, and Congress aimed at strengthening security for American personnel serving abroad and doing everything possible to ensure something like Benghazi never happens again, and if it does, that we are better prepared to respond.

The Select Committee intends to convene a bipartisan markup to discuss and vote on the proposed report on July 8, 2016. All members of the committee will have the opportunity to offer changes in a manner consistent with the rules of the House.

 Read the Report [853 Pages, 10.7MB]

Honoring Courage, Improving Security and Fighting the Exploitation of a Tragedy

Published June 2016

As the report states, “The Democratic Members of the Benghazi Select Committee submit this report in honor of the memories of Ambassador Christopher Stevens, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and Glen Doherty; the other extraordinary heroes in Benghazi and Tripoli who risked life and limb to help their fellow Americans; and the men and women of the Defense Department, State Department, and Intelligence Community who serve the United States every day around the world.”

Why can’t our elected officials work together? Why can’t they do an unbiased investigation into ANY event, including Benghazi?  Regardless of the answers, this report is included here for reference and fairness.

 Read the Report [344 Pages, 4.3MB]

U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

Published 11/21/2014

The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (“HPSCI” or “the Committee”) conducted a comprehensive and exhaustive investigation into the tragic attacks against two U.S. facilities in Benghazi, Libya on September 11-12, 2012. The nearly two-year investigation focused on the activities of the Intelligence Community (“IC”) before, during, and after the attacks. During the course of thousands of hours of detailed investigation, HPSCI reviewed thousands of pages of intelligence assessments, cables, notes, and emails; held 20 Committee events and hearings; and conducted detailed interviews with senior intelligence officials and eyewitnesses to the attacks, including eight security personnel on the ground in Benghazi that night.

 Read the Report [37 Pages, 2.5MB]

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Releases Report on DOD Response to Benghazi

Published 2/11/2014

WASHINGTON – The House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations released a comprehensive report today evaluating the response of the Department of Defense (DOD) to the terrorist attack in Benghazi, Libya on September 11, 2012. Read the Report

To undertake the committee’s review, Chairman Howard P. “Buck” McKeon directed the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations to work alongside the full committee. As a result, this report expresses the views of Chairman McKeon, Vice Chairman Mac Thornberry, Rep. Martha Roby (who was the chairman of the Oversight and Investigations subcommittee until December 2013), and the five majority members of that subcommittee.

To date, committee staff has reviewed thousands of pages of written material (including classified emails and situation reports) made available by DOD. Staff has also held three classified staff briefings, and two classified interviews. Members have participated in two open hearings, and seven additional classified briefings. In undertaking this work, the committee has met with and received information from military personnel in the entire chain of command in connection with Benghazi: from those on the ground at the time of the attack to the nation’s senior-most uniformed leader.

While the committee’s inquiry continues, the majority members believe that information gathered to date reaffirm the relevant findings in the Interim Progress Report for the Members of the Republican Conference on the Events Surrounding the September 11, 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi, Libya issued in April 2013 by the five committees with jurisdiction in the U.S. House of Representatives.

Based on its activities undertaken since the release of that report, majority members make the six findings listed below:

 Read the Report [31 Pages, 0.4MB]

Documents about the Benghazi Aftermath

The following are documents received under the FOIA regarding Benghazi, and the aftermath in the days, weeks and months after the attack.

• Correspondence Between Office of the Director of National Intelligence and Members of Congress, 09/01/2012 – 12/31/2012, Released March 2015 [47 Pages, 17.3MB]
• Director of National Intelligence E-Mails Regarding Benghazi, Released December of 2015 [26 Pages, 3.5MB] – After being told there were no documents relating to my request for correspondence to or from the consulate in Benghazi. After appealing their decision, I was asked to withdraw it, and they would do another search for responsive records. As a result, there were responsive records, and they were redacted and released. This is another example of being told one thing, but after pushing and exercising my appeal rights, there is another picture that unfolds.  FOIA Case Processing Notes, [18 Pages, 6MB]
• A Trainee Demand Analysis for the Expansion of the Marine Corps Embassy Security Group, March 2013, Master’s Thesis [95 Pages, 4.54mb] – On September 11, 2012, the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya, was attacked, resulting in the death of four United States citizens, including Ambassador Christopher Stevens. Prior to Bengazi, the Marine Corps Embassy Security Group (MCESG) held a total strength of about 1,400 Marines, of which 1,196 were Marine Security Guards (MSG). In response to the deadly attack, Congress authorized 1,000 new MSGs through the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act, creating additional protection for U.S. diplomatic facilities worldwide. This thesis examines the growth requirements needed to support MCESG’s expansion demands to produce MSGs at maximum capacity in the coming three to four years. The study analyzes trainee demands, proposing a methodology to assist MCESG operation personnel plans for expansion and future force sustainment. The proposed methodology is founded on an Excel-based analytical approach that relies heavily on simulation and is interfaced through a Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) UserForm. The model is easily manipulated, as operational needs dictate. Once developed, VBA UserForm is a simple and effective tool that can assist planners in standardizing procedures at the operational level. Research-based analysis indicates that the proposed methodology could yield significant savings in terms of manpower and training requirements for MCESG.
• CTC Sentinel – Volume 6, Issue 2, February 2013 [25 Pages, 1.51MB] – Islamist Militant Groups in Post-Qadhafi Libya.

Declassified Transcripts of Benghazi Briefings Released

January 13th, 2014 – The House Armed Services Committee today released a series of recently declassified transcripts of briefings on the September 11th 2012 attack on Americans in Benghazi, Libya. The briefings were conducted by the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations then chaired by Rep. Martha Roby (R-AL), though they were open to all members of the Committee and attended by Members off the Committee. The briefings, which took place over the course of several months, were part of the Committee’s examination of the actions of the military chain of command before, during, and after the attack. A report summarizing the conclusion of the HASC Oversight & Investigations majority Members draw from these briefings is expected to be released later this week.

•  Transcript #1

  1_Briefing transcript (redacted), “DOD’s preparation for the terrorist attacks in Benghazi,” (Part I, Session I, DOD), May 21, 2013.pdf (3.7 MBs)

•  Transcript #2

  2_Briefing transcript (redacted), “DOD’s preparation for the terrorist attacks in Benghazi,” (Part I, Session II DOD), May 21, 2013.pdf (642.4 KBs)

•  Transcript #3

  3_Briefing transcript (redacted), “DOD’s preparation for the terrorist attacks in Benghazi,” (Part II, AFRICOM), June 26, 2013.pdf (9.2 MBs)

•  Transcript #4

  4_Briefing transcript (redacted), “DOD’s preparation for the terrorist attacks in Benghazi,” (Part III, Colonel Bristol), July 31, 2013.pdf (10.8 MBs)

•  Transcript #5

  5_Hearing transcript, “DOD’s posture for September 11, 2013,” (Part IV, Force Posture), September 19, 2013.pdf (691.9 KBs)

•  Transcript #6

  6_Briefing transcript (redacted), “DOD’s force posture in anticipation of September 11, 2012,” (Part V, General Dempsey), October 10, 2013.pdf (2.3 MBs)

Progress Report on Benghazi Terror Attack Investigation

Last year, Speaker John Boehner asked the House committees on Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, Intelligence, Judiciary, and Oversight & Government Reform to investigate the terrorist attack in Benghazi, Libya that killed four Americans. On 4/23/13, these five committees released their progress report, which outlines their findings and the next steps in the investigation.

• Progress Report on Benghazi Terror Attack Investigation [46 Pages, 0.99mb]

Timeline of Documents and Events Relating to the Benghazi Attack

1. 8/27/12 – Travel Warning, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Bureau of Consular Affairs, in regards to Libya [2 Pages, 113kb] – Specifically mentions Benghazi with increased violence.
2. 9/11/12 – Statement on the Attack in Benghazi, Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, Department of State [1 Page, 90kb] – Blames internet video for attack. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”
3. 9/12/12 – Statement by the President on the Attack in Benghazi [1 Page, 96kb] – Written Statement released by the President. No mention of video. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”
4. 9/12/12 – Statement by the President on the Attack in Benghazi, Rose Garden Speech [Video] – No mention of “terror” or “terrorism” in relation to Benghazi. Says “No acts of terror will ever shake the resolve on this great nation…” at the end of the speech, however, he was speaking about the 9/11/01 attacks, and his visits to victims and family members.
5. 9/12/12 – Remarks on the Deaths of American Personnel in Benghazi, Libya, Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, Department of State [3 Pages, 90kb] – The video of this speech, is below in the Video Archive. Blames internet video for attack. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”
6. 9/12/12 – Press Statement on the Deaths of American Personnel in Benghazi, Libya, Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, Department of State [2 Pages, 101kb]-
   Blames internet video for attack. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”
7. 9/12/12 – Remarks on the Deaths of American Personnel in Benghazi, Libya, Susan Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations , U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Department of State [3 Pages, 98kb] –Blames internet video for attack. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”
8. 9/12/12 – Briefing by Senior Administration Officials to Update Recent Events in Libya [3 Pages, 98kb] – Will not answer if internet video was cause of attack. Will not answer if there is a “terrorism” link.
9. 9/13/12 – State Department Daily Press Briefing [21 Pages, 180kb] – Confirms blaming internet video for attack. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”
10. 9/13/12 – Statement on the Deaths of Tyrone S. Woods and Glen A. Doherty in Benghazi, Libya, Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, Department of State [2 Pages, 101kb]- No mention of video. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”
11. 9/14/12 – Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney [17 Pages, 166kb] Blames internet video as attack. Denies any “concrete evidence” of a “terror” link that would show “[the attack]to not being in response to the film.”
12. 9/14/12 – Remarks at the Transfer of Remains Ceremony to Honor Those Lost in Attacks in Benghazi, Libya, Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State [3 Pages, 99kb] Blames internet video as attack. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”
13. 9/14/12 – Remarks at the Transfer of Remains Ceremony to Honor Those Lost in Attacks in Benghazi, Libya, President Barack Obama [2 Pages, 125kb]- No mention of video. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”
14. 10/09/12 – Background Briefing on Libya [13 Pages, 140kb]-
    Said video was not their conclusion for attack..No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”
15. 10/10/12 – On-The-Record Briefing by Under Secretary Kennedy [4 Pages, 110kb] – WATCH VIDEO – No mention of video. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”
16. 10/12/12 – Hearing on Benghazi Security Issues, Testimony Before the House Oversight Subcommittee, Patrick Kennedy, Under Secretary for Management [4 Pages, 108kb]- No mention of video. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”
17. 10/12/12 – Hearing on Benghazi Security Issues, Testimony Before the House Oversight Subcommittee, Charlene Lamb, Deputy Assistant, Secretary of State [8 Pages, 124kb] – No mention of video. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”
18. 10/12/12 – Hearing on Benghazi Security Issues, Prepared Statement Before the House Oversight Subcommittee, Eric Allan Nordstrom, Regional Security Officer, Tripoli, Libya from September 21, 2011-July 26, 2012 [12 Pages, 191kb]-
    No mention of video. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”
19. 10/15/12 – Interview With Margaret Brennan of CBS, Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State [4 Pages, 108kb] -No mention of video. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”
20. 11/09/12 – Daily Press Briefing, Victoria Nuland, Spokesperson [19 Pages, 190kb]- No mention of video. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”

Flashing Red: A Special Report on the Terrorist Attack At Benghazi (Official Senate Report)

1. Flashing Red: A Special Report on the Terrorist Attack At Benghazi [31 Pages, 0.4mb] – While our country spent September 11, 2012, remembering the terrorist attacks that took place 11 years earlier, brave Americans posted at U.S. government facilities in Benghazi, Libya, were fighting for their lives against a terrorist assault. When the fight ended, U.S. Ambassador to Libya John C. (Chris) Stevens and three other Americans were dead and U.S. facilities in Benghazi were left in ruin. We must remember the sacrifice that these selfless public servants made to support the struggle for freedom in Libya and to improve our own national security. While we mourn their deaths, it is also crucial that we learn from how they died. By examining the circumstances of the attack in Benghazi on September 11th, we hope to gain a better understanding of what went wrong and what we must do now to ensure better protection for American diplomatic personnel who must sometimes operate in dangerous places abroad.

Historical government records, detailing the highly volatile situation in Libya and Benghazi

1.  America Strikes Back, April 1987 [44 Pages, 16.53mb] – After repeated warnings from the United States government, elements of the U.S. Sixth Fleet and the USAF bombed targets in and around the Libyan cities of Benghazi and Tripoli on 14 April 1986. The attack came in retaliation to several Libyan sponsored terrorist attacks on U.S. concerns in the weeks preceding. This paper examines the effects of the bombing as a deterrent of future terrorist attacks and further examines current and projected U.S. counterterrorist policies.
2. Conflict with Libya: Use of Military Force Against Terrorism, 8 Feb 1994 [30 Pages, 1.1mb] – The United States attack on Libya on April 15, 1986 was the culmination of a series of developments in U.S. foreign policy and military strategy intended to combat international terrorism. It was the culmination of the U.S. attempt to use both non- military and military methods to combat terrorism. This paper examines the use of military force as an appropriate means to combat terrorism. In particular, the 1986 conflict with Libya is examined concentrating on the following aspects: whether operational level objectives contributed to achievement of strategic goals; and the use of military force as an effective instrument in the war against terrorism. This paper concludes that the use of military force (along with the European non- military responses) was an effective instrument in the war against terrorism as measured by the decrease in Libyan sponsored attacks from 1986 to 1991. However, the U.S. attack on Libya is still an isolated event and does not provide a sufficient basis for a doctrine of military retaliation against terrorism.
3. Deterring Libya: The Strategic Culture of Muammar Qaddafi, October 2000 [31 Pages, 0.2mb] – In September of 1969, Muammar al-Qaddafi then a virtually unknown army officer in his late twenties rose to the leadership of Libya. Armed with a vision of Arab unity and anti-colonialism, he led a small group of his fellow officers who called themselves the Free Officers Movement. In a virtually bloodless coup, they ousted the aging (and absent) King Idris Al-Sanusi and established Libya as a republic. During the 30 years since, Qaddafi has emerged as a charismatic and complicated leader. Considered by Westerners to be bizarre and irrational, he has been branded a terrorist and a rogue. Among some of his fellow Arabs, he is praised as a virulent anti-Zionist and anti-imperialist, while others condemn him as a plotter and an adventurer whose zealous pursuit of Arab, African, and Islamic unity has only resulted in destabilization. Qaddafi remarked in 1976 that atomic weapons will be like traditional ones, possessed by every state according to its potential. We will have our share of this new weapon. In 1987 Reuters quoted him as saying: The Arabs must possess the atom bomb to defend themselves, until their numbers reach one thousand million and they learn to desalinate water and until they liberate Palestine. 1 Qaddafi places little faith in his armed forces and dreads a repeat of the 1986 U.S. air strikes against Tripoli and Benghazi. Reflecting on the air strikes, Qaddafi has wistfully spoken of possessing a ballistic missile capability that could threaten New York.2 Few state leaders have expressed such single-minded determination to obtain chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. This determination, coupled with Qaddafi s long-term association with terrorism, has caused grave concern among other nations especially the United States and Israel.
4. Libya: A Future Arab Democracy [43 Pages, 0.6mb] – Libya has overthrown its long time dictator Muammar Gadhafi with the aid of both Western and Arab militaries. The United States acted under the authority of U.N. mandate 1973 as part of a broad coalition of both NATO and Arab Nations primarily in a supporting role. In Libya, as in its neighbors Egypt and Tunisia, the successful revolution has now established transitional governments who’s effectiveness is yet to be determined. Unlike other Arab nations, Libya possesses a combination of vast oil reserves, a small and balanced population, and a relatively high education level in its citizens. These factors all bode well for the establishment of a lasting representative government. If successful, Libya can not only secure its borders, and deny safe haven to terrorism as is the declared interest of the United States, but also serve as a positive economic and political influence on the region. Egypt remains the most significant and strategic nation in the region, but the benefits of a successful Libya and the relatively low cost at which it may be achieved should not be overlooked.
5. Libya: Unrest and US Policy [43 Pages, 0.7mb] – Over 40 years ago, Muammar al Qadhafi led a revolt against the Libyan monarchy in the name of nationalism, self-determination, and popular sovereignty. Opposition groups citing the same principles are now revolting against Qadhafi to bring an end to the authoritarian political system he has controlled in Libya for the last four decades. The Libyan government’s use of force against civilians and opposition forces seeking Qadhafi’s overthrow sparked an international outcry and led the United Nations Security Council to adopt Resolution 1973, which authorizes “all necessary measures” to protect Libyan civilians. The United States military is participating in Operation Unified Protector, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military operation to enforce the resolution. Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and other partner governments also are participating. Qadhafi and his supporters have described the uprising as a foreign and Islamist conspiracy and are attempting to outlast their opponents. Qadhafi remains defiant amid continuing coalition air strikes, and his forces continue to attack opposition-held areas. Some opposition figures have formed an Interim Transitional National Council (ITNC), which claims to represent all areas of the country. They seek foreign political recognition and material support.
6. A Nation at the Periphery: Libyan Regionalism Revisited [43 Pages, 0.6mb] – This article places the current Libyan conflict in historical perspective by focusing on the dynamics between the country’s two main regions (Tripolitania and Cyrenaica) during key moments of the 20th century. Particular attention is given to the different way each of the two regions approached the early period of Italian colonialism, from 1911 to 1923. The paper shows that historical relations between the two regions are characterized by both independence and interdependence and that this pattern is reemerging as the country transitions to a new era.
7. Personnel Recovery: Strategic Importance and Impact, December 2012 [31 Pages, 0.6mb] – The breaking news from countless media venues in March 2011 was captivating and compelling: while taking part in coalition operations in Libya, a US Air Force F-15E, call sign Bolar 34 had gone down east of Benghazi. The two crew members had ejected into a chaotic battle between the despotic Libyan regime and opposition forces supported by the coalition. As our nation prayed for the two Airmen, President Barack Obama heard a briefing on the event and monitored the situation as rescue forces from a US Marine task force in the area and opposition ground forces quickly dashed in to recover both men. In many ways, this heartwarming story resembled accounts of other rescues performed in earlier conflicts. The saga of Bolar 34 joined the lore of rescue missions that grace the proud history of our nation.

The post Benghazi Attack, 9/11/2012 first appeared on The Black Vault.

Below you will find documents regarding 9/11/01, from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Document Archive

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Records on 9/11

The following documents have been declassified by the FBI pertaining to 9/11.

The 11 September Hijacker Cell Model, February 2003 [10 Pages, 9MB]
The 11 September Hijacker Cell Model, February 2003 [13 Pages, 6.5MB] – This was an attempt at a Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) of the same document, but appears to be a re-release of the same information as nothing else could be revealed.

A Review of the FBI’s Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks, (November 2004), Released Publicly June 2006 [449 Pages, 9.07mb]

A Review of the FBI’s Handling of Intelligence Information Prior to the September 11 Attacks, (released publicly June 2005) (Redacted and Unclassified), November 2004 [328 Pages, 32.43mb]

The September 11 Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in Connection with the Investigation of the September 11 Attacks, June 2003 [239 Pages, 12.5mb]

The Immigration and Naturalization Service’s Contacts With Two September 11 Terrorists: A Review of the INS’s Admissions of Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi, its Processing of their Change of Status Applications, and its Efforts to Track Foreign Students in the United States, May 2002 [212 Pages, 1.6mb]

The post Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Records first appeared on The Black Vault.

The USS Liberty incident was an attack on a United States Navy technical research ship, USS Liberty, by Israeli Air Force jet fighter aircraft and Israeli Navy motor torpedo boats, on June 8, 1967, during the Six-Day War. The combined air and sea attack killed 34 crew members (naval officers, seamen, two Marines, and one civilian), wounded 171 crew members, and severely damaged the ship. At the time, the ship was in international waters north of the Sinai Peninsula, about 25.5 nmi (29.3 mi; 47.2 km) northwest from the Egyptian city of Arish.

Israel apologized for the attack, saying that the USS Liberty had been attacked in error after being mistaken for an Egyptian ship. Both the Israeli and U.S. governments conducted inquiries and issued reports that concluded the attack was a mistake due to Israeli confusion about the ship’s identity, though others, including survivors of the attack, have rejected these conclusions and maintain that the attack was deliberate.

In May 1968, the Israeli government paid US$3,323,500 (US$22.2 million in 2013) as full payment to the families of the 34 men killed in the attack. In March 1969, Israel paid a further $3,566,457 in compensation to the men who had been wounded. On 18 December 1980, it agreed to pay $6 million as settlement for the final U.S. bill of $17,132,709 for material damage to the Liberty itself plus 13 years’ interest. (Source: Wikipedia)

Document Archive

National Security Agency Collection

On 02 July 2003, the National Security Agency (NSA) released additional information relative to the 08 June 1967 attack on the U.S.S. Liberty. This release includes three audio recordings, transcripts (in English), three follow-up reports, and a U.S. Cryptologic History Report entitled “Attack on a SIGINT Collector, the U.S.S. Liberty.” The recordings are in Hebrew and contain time counts in English that were added by the intercept operator. The follow-up reports are summaries of the three transcripts with non-substantive chatter omitted and a compiled report that summarizes the activity and contains the text of the transcripts. The U.S. Cryptologic History Report is a less redacted version of the same document originally released in 1999.

How the information was obtained:

Within an hour of learning that the Liberty had been torpedoed the Director, NSA, LTG Marshall S. Carter, USA, sent a message to all intercept sites requesting a special search of all communications that might reflect the attack or reaction. No communications were available. However, one of the airborne platforms, a U.S. Navy EC-121, had collected voice conversations between two Israeli helicopter pilots and the control tower at Hazor Airfield following the attack on the Liberty.

Audio Recording Labeled 104 (.wav)
Transcript

Audio Recording Labeled 105
Transcript

Audio Recording Labeled 130
Transcript

Follow-up Report No. 1, dated 9 June 1967, 0831Z

Follow-up Report No. 2, dated 9 June 1967, 1422Z

Aftermath of Israeli Attack on U.S.S. Liberty, 22 June 1967, 1454Z

U.S.Cryptologic History Report, “Attack on a SIGINT Collector, the U.S.S. Liberty”, dated 1981

A Review of the Technical Research Ship Program 1961-1969 (1989 release – see below link for 2017 release) [138 Pages, 3.84mb]

A Review of the Technical Research Ship Program 1961-1969 (2017 Release) [137 Pages, 25.5MB] – In September of 2016, I requested a Mandatory Declassification Review of this document. Although previously released, it had a lot of redactions. In February of 2017, the NSA released this version of the document, after another review was conducted. (It appears I was not the only one who requested an MDR of the record — not sure who the other requester(s) were.

Office of the Secretary of Defense Collection

Formal Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Attack of the USS Stark in 1987 [46 Pages, 1.6mb]

Messages Concerning U.S. Liberty Attack [5 Pages, 0.3mb]

USS Liberty Incident [194 Pages, 5.3mb]

USS Liberty Incident Chronology of Significant Events relating to the Employment of US Forces in Lebanon [4 Pages, 0.4mb]

USS Pueblo [15 Pages, 0.8mb]

The post USS Liberty Attack, June 8, 1967 first appeared on The Black Vault.

Entwined in the many conspiracy theories that state 9/11 was something other than what we were told, there is a story about 5 Israeli men that were arrested on the George Washington Bridge, who had a van full of explosives and were going to detonate it.

Here is one example of the report that ran on the mainstream media, reported by Dan Rather on the night of September 11, 2001:

Admittedly, this story by Rather did not label them as “Israeli,” but many “conspiracy theories” linked these men to Israeli intelligence known as Mossad. None of these claims really had much evidence, and the tie in was linked largely to conspiracy sites and those attempting to advanced the 9/11 “inside job” conspiracy. It is interesting to note, that shortly after many of the stories appeared about these men on the bridge — no follow up reports were ever made.

What does this prove?  Many claim that allegedly, Israel (an ally of the United States) had foreknowledge of the attack, and may have even played a role in the events.  The public story we were told, which led to the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, was that it was Al-Qaeda.  Of course, this all would contradict that narrative.

This story also relates to what has been dubbed the “Five Dancing Israelis” who were found to be videotaping the aftermath of the attack on 9/11, and were shouting joyous praises and dancing in the streets, but that story is also highly controversial on whether or not it ever occurred.

I filed a FOIA request to multiple agencies regarding the above, to see if they may have anything specifically on the explosive found on the George Washington Bridge. To be blatantly honest, I did not expect to find much about this, at all.  Most agencies denied that documents existed, but the NSA produced a very interesting result.

Below, you will find the results.

Document Archive

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Records

 FBI Response – No Records October 2014 [ 2 Pages, 0.3MB ] – The FBI claims that they have no records pertaining to this incident.

National Security Agency (NSA) Records

 NSA Response – Glomar Response November 2014 [ 2 Pages, 0.2MB ] – In a bit of a surprise, the NSA gave GLOMAR response to this request, meaning, they will neither confirm nor deny anything exists.  Having so much time pass after this alleged incident, and the fact that it apparently didn’t happen, wouldn’t they just say they had “No Records”?

Shortly after receiving this response, I filed a FOIA request for all case processing notes, emails, and other documents generated during the processing of this request. The NSA has released many times in the past, these notes and messages that give an inside look at the process of filing FOIAs. It shows how the FOIA request progressed, and sometimes, offers insight to how the final decision was reached. Frequently, there are redactions, primarily due to FOIA exemption (b)(5), which deals with the “deliberative process” of how agencies work/make decisions. It is noted, that (b)(5) is the most controversial FOIA exemption, because it is widely used and overly broad.

That said, the response came in for these notes on my FOIA request, and 100% were denied as being classified TOP SECRET.  This was a VERY strange result, as I have yet to find a request for case processing notes, on a FOIA request that received a “GLOMAR” response, that were 100% considered TOP SECRET.

I waited a few years, and filed again on March 30, 2018. In short, after a two year period, documents can then be requested to be reviewed again (either by a FOIA or an MDR, which is a lengthy explanation in itself). In this particular case, I filed a FOIA (and not an MDR) because the NSA would not even acknowledge documents existed, so I did not feel my MDR would have any positive results, since I couldn’t cite any documents for review.  Sure enough, I received another GLOMAR response to my 2018 request, and everything could neither be confirmed nor denied.

I appealed on May 2, 2018, and by June 1, 2018, less than a month, the NSA denied my appeal.  However, the story got even more strange.  They split my appeal into two parts in order to respond properly. The first, was the documents I was requesting regarding the unidentified men on the bridge. They said they supported and agreed with the GLOMAR response, and that was it.

The second part of my request was for the FOIA Case Files / Processing Notes that I asked for that were classified TOP SECRET.  They retracted the claim they were classified TOP SECRET, but then still exempted them 100% under FOIA exemptions (b)(3) and (b)(5).  So, therefore, they changed the reason for their answer, but their answer was the same none-the-less.

I believe the reason they did this, was based on the root of my appeal. In my official appeal, I stated the following (in part):

“Given also the fact that ‘item 1’ of my request 103943 (FOIA request for case processing notes) yielded documents that were entirely exempted under the FOIA as being TOP SECRET, this strengthens the belief that responsive documents do, in fact, exist. There would be no reason for (what I assume are case processing notes withheld) to be TOP SECRET on a topic with no responsive records.”

In short, what I was saying, was that if they will “neither confirm nor deny” records exist, but then classify my FOIA Case Processing notes as TOP SECRET across the board, there is something there.  I believe this part of my appeal may have influenced the NSA to say they were “incorrect” in that assessment, but then gave other reasons for a denial which would not allow me to draw that same conclusion.  Was this truly a mistake? Or is this an attempt to cover-up the fact that I pieced together the evidence to prove documents exist in a case where they did not want to admit to that?

The  official denial is here:

Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)

 ODNI Response – No Records November 2014 [ 2 Pages, 0.3MB ] – The ODNI claims that they have no records pertaining to this incident.

The post 9/11/01: Israeli Men Attempted to Explode George Washington Bridge? first appeared on The Black Vault.

This is the final report on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) investigation of the collapse of the World Trade Center (WTC) towers, conducted under the National Construction Safety Team Act. This report describes how the aircraft impacts and subsequent fires led to the collapse of the towers after terrorists flew jet fuel laden commercial airliners into the buildings; whether the fatalities were low or high, including an evaluation of the building evacuation and emergency response procedures; what procedures and practices were used in the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of the towers; and areas in current building and fire codes, standards, and practices that warrant revision.

Extensive details are found in the 42 companion reports. (The final report on the collapse of WTC 7 will appear in a separate report.)  Also in this report is a description of how NIST reached its conclusions. NIST complemented in-house expertise with private sector technical experts; accumulated copious documents, photographs, and videos of the disaster; established baseline performance of the WTC towers; performed computer simulations of the behavior of each tower on September 11, 2001; combined the knowledge gained into a probable collapse sequence for each tower; conducted nearly 1,200 first-person interviews of building occupants and emergency responders; and analyzed the evacuation and emergency response operations in the two high-rise buildings.

The report concludes with a list of 30 recommendations for action in the areas of increased structural integrity, enhanced fire endurance of structures, new methods for fire resistant design of structures, enhanced active fire protection, improved building evacuation, improved emergency response, improved procedures and practices, and education and training.

1. Final Report of the National Construction Safety Team on the Collapses of the World Trade Center Tower

NIST NCSTAR 1-1: Design, Construction, and Maintenance of Structural and Life Safety Systems

The collapse of World Trade Center (WTC) 1, 2, and 7 resulted from structural damage from direct and indirect effects of aircraft impact and the ensuing fires. Thus, for collapse analyses of these buildings, knowledge of the physical state of the structural and fire safety systems prior to the aircraft impact is essential. To obtain information for the collapse analysis of the buildings, National Institute of Standards and Technology reviewed design and construction documents, correspondence, and memoranda related to the building projects; interviewed individuals involved in the design, construction, and maintenance of the buildings; obtained information from regulatory and emergency services agencies of New York City; and reviewed books and published journal and magazine articles related to the WTC building projects.

Information obtained from various sources are synthesized and summarized in this report. Specifically, this report presents (1) provisions used to design and construct the structural, fire protection and egress systems of the buildings; (2) tests performed to support the design of these systems; (3) criteria that governed the design of the structural and fire protection systems; (4) methods used to proportion structural members and other components of the buildings; (5) innovative features, technologies and materials that are incorporated in design and construction of the structural and fire protection systems; (6) details of deviations to the contract documents granted by Port Authority of New York and New Jersey; (7) fabrication and inspection requirements at the fabrication yard; and (8) inspection protocols during construction.

NIST NCSTAR 1-1: Design, Construction, and Maintenance of Structural and Life Safety Systems

NIST NCSTAR 1-1A: Design and Construction of Structural Systems

1-1A appendixes A & B

1-1A appendixes C-G

NIST NCSTAR 1-1B: Comparison of Building Code Structural Requirements

NIST NCSTAR 1-1C: Maintenance and Modifications to Structural Systems

1-1C appendixes

NIST NCSTAR 1-1D: Fire Protection and Life Safety Provisions Applied to the Design and Construction of World Trade Center 1, 2, and 7 and Post-Construction Provisions Applied after Occupancy

NIST NCSTAR 1-1E: Comparison of Codes, Standards, and Practices in Use at the Time of the Design and Construction of World Trade Center 1, 2, and 7

NIST NCSTAR 1-1F: Comparison of the 1968 and Current (2003) New York City Building Code Provisions

NIST NCSTAR 1-1G: Amendments to the Fire Protection and Life Safety Provisions of the New York City Building Code by Local Laws Adopted while World Trade Center 1, 2, and 7 Were in Use

NIST NCSTAR 1-1H: Post-Construction Modification to Fire Protection and Life Safety Systems of the World Trade Center Towers

NIST NCSTAR 1-1I: Post-Construction Modifications to Fire Protection, Life Safety, and Structural Systems of World Trade Center 7

NIST NCSTAR 1-1J: Design, Installation, and Operation of Fuel Systems for Emergency Power in World Trade Center 7

NIST NCSTAR 1-2: Baseline Structural Performance and Aircraft Impact Damage Analysis of the World Trade Center Towers

The baseline structural performance and aircraft impact damage analysis of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Investigation of the World Trade Center (WTC) disaster had two primary tasks: (1) to develop reference structural models of the WTC towers and use these models to establish the baseline performance of each of the towers under gravity and wind loads, and (2) to estimate the damage to the towers due to aircraft impacts and establish the initial conditions for the fire dynamics modeling and the thermal-structural response and collapse initiation analysis. This report provides the technical approach, methodology, and results related to both tasks.

The focus of the analysis was to analyze the aircraft impacts into each of the WTC towers to provide the following: (1) estimates of probable damage to structural systems, including exterior walls, floor systems, and interior core columns; (2) estimates of the aircraft fuel dispersion during the impact; and (3) estimates of debris damage to the building nonstructural contents, including partitions and workstations. The results were to be used to estimate the damage to fireproofing based on the predicted path of the debris field inside the towers. This analysis thus estimated the condition of the two WTC towers immediately following the aircraft impacts and established the initial conditions for the fire dynamics modeling and the thermal-structural response and collapse initiation analysis. The impact analyses were conducted at various levels of complexity including: (1) the component level, (2) the subassembly level, and (3) the global level to estimate the probable damage to the towers due to aircraft impact.

NIST NCSTAR 1-2: Baseline Structural Performance and Aircraft Impact Damage Analysis of the World Trade Center Towers

NIST NCSTAR 1-2A: Reference Structural Models and Baseline Performance Analysis of the World Trade Center Towers

NIST NCSTAR 1-2B: Analysis of Aircraft Impacts into the World Trade Center Towers (Chapters 1-8)

NIST NCSTAR 1-2B: Analysis of Aircraft Impacts into the World Trade Center Towers (Chapters 9-11)

1-2B appendix

NIST NCSTAR 1-3: Mechanical and Metallurgical Analysis of Structural Steel

This report is an overview of the results of the mechanical and metallurgical analysis of structural steel from the World Trade Center (WTC), part of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Investigation of the WTC disaster of September 11, 2001.  The goal of the study was threefold: Determine mechanical properties of WTC structural steel, Determine the quality of the steel and if design requirements were met, and Analyze the recovered steel to provide insight into failure mechanisms to guide and/or validate models of building performance.  Structural steel recovered from the WTC site was analyzed for composition, microstructure, and mechanical properties, including room temperature properties (for modeling baseline building performance), high temperature properties (for modeling structural response of the building to fire), and behavior at high strain rates (for modeling airplane impact). Failure analysis of the recovered steel, complemented by pre-collapse photographs of the damaged building, was used to establish failure modes and temperature excursions experienced by the steel. In addition, documents from the construction era covering issues ranging from steel specifications to engineering design drawings were used to help interpret the results and supplement models of mechanical properties used in the models of building performance.

NIST NCSTAR 1-3: Mechanical and Metallurgical Analysis of Structural Steel

NIST NCSTAR 1-3A: Contemporaneous Structural Steel Specifications

NIST NCSTAR 1-3B: Steel Inventory and Identification

NIST NCSTAR 1-3C: Damage and Failure Modes of Structural Steel Components

1-3C appendixes

NIST NCSTAR 1-3D: Mechanical Properties of Structural Steels

NIST NCSTAR 1-3E: Physical Properties of Structural Steels

NIST NCSTAR 1-4: Active Fire Protection Systems

The National Institute of Standards and Technology investigation of active fire protection systems in World Trade Center (WTC) 1, 2, and 7 included the design, installation, capabilities, and performance on September 11, 2001, of the automatic fire sprinkler, standpipe, standpipe preconnected hoses, fire alarm, and smoke management systems. The purpose and normally expected performance of each active fire protection system in the buildings are described, as well as details about the systems installed in WTC 1, 2, and 7. Using fire protection engineering methods, the capabilities of the installed systems to respond to various fire threats from normal office fires up to and including the extraordinary challenge of the fires ignited by the aircraft impacts on September 11, 2001, were assessed. Information from The Fire Department of the City of New York records was used to document the history of significant fire events in WTC 1, 2, and 7. Findings of the investigation are presented with regard to the fire suppression, fire alarm, and smoke management systems installed on the day the buildings collapsed.

NIST NCSTAR 1-4: Active Fire Protection Systems

NIST NCSTAR 1-4A: Post-Construction Fires prior to September 11, 2001

NIST NCSTAR 1-4B: Fire Suppression Systems

NIST NCSTAR 1-4C: Fire Alarm Systems

NIST NCSTAR 1-4D: Smoke Management Systems

NIST NCSTAR 1-5: Reconstruction of the Fires in the World Trade Center Towers

The collapses of the World Trade Center towers on September 11, 2001, resulted from a combination of aircraft impact damage and the ensuing fires.

NIST NCSTAR 1-5: Reconstruction of the Fires in the World Trade Center Towers

NIST NCSTAR 1-5A: Visual Evidence, Damage Estimates, and Timeline Analysis (Chapters 1-8)

NIST NCSTAR 1-5A: Visual Evidence, Damage Estimates, and Timeline Analysis (Chapters 9-Appendix C)

1-5A appendixes D-G

1-5A  appendixes H-M

NIST NCSTAR 1-5B: Experiments and Modeling of Structural Steel Elements Exposed to Fire

NIST NCSTAR 1-5C: Fire Tests of Single Office Workstations

NIST NCSTAR 1-5D: Reaction of Ceiling Tile Systems to Shocks

NIST NCSTAR 1-5E: Experiments and Modeling of Multiple Workstations Burning in a Compartment

NIST NCSTAR 1-5F: Computer Simulation of the Fires in the World Trade Center Towers

NIST NCSTAR 1-5G: Fire Structure Interface and Thermal Response of the World Trade Center Towers

NIST NCSTAR 1-6: Structural Fire Response and Probable Collapse Sequence of the World Trade Center Towers

One of the four main objectives of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) investigation of the collapse of the World Trade Center (WTC) towers was to determine why and how the two towers collapsed. Events that played a significant role in the structural performance of the towers were the aircraft impact, the rapid ignition of fires on multiple floors, the growth and spread of fires and the structural weakening resulting from effects of high temperatures. The passive fire protection applied to the steel structural components in the WTC towers was investigated to provide information on the in place condition of the fire protection before and after aircraft impact. Standard fire resistance tests were conducted to establish the appropriate classification (fire resistance rating) of the original design of the WTC floor system and to develop insight into the structural performance of the composite steel and concrete floor system under exposure to a standard fire. Results of simulations of the aircraft impacts were used to predict damage to the structure, fire protection, and partition walls in the path of the debris field. Characterization of the temperatures of the structural components, determined from simulated WTC fires, allowed the calculation of the performance of major subsystems constituting the structural system of the towers including the core framing, the exterior wall (columns and spandrels), and full tenant floors. Insights gained from these analyses were used, in turn, to formulate and execute nonlinear, temperature-dependent finite element analyses of global structural systems to predict the collapse sequence of each tower. The structural analyses were guided, and where possible validated, by observations made from the review of thousands of photographs and video recordings. This report covers the characterization of the conditions of the WTC towers before the attacks, their weakening due to the aircraft impacts, the response of the structural systems to the subsequent growth and spread of fires, and the progression of local failures that led ultimately to the total collapse of both towers.

NIST NCSTAR 1-6: Structural Fire Response and Probable Collapse Sequence of the World Trade Center Towers

NIST NCSTAR 1-6A: Passive Fire Protection

NIST NCSTAR 1-6B: Fire Resistance Tests of the Floor Truss Systems

NIST NCSTAR 1-6C: Component, Connection, and Subsystem Structural Analysis

NIST NCSTAR 1-6D: Global Structural Analysis of the Response of the World Trade Center Towers to Impact Damage and Fire

NIST NCSTAR 1-7: Occupant Behavior, Egress, and Emergency Communication

This report describes the occupant evacuation of World Trade Center (WTC) 1 and WTC 2 on September 11, 2001. Multiple sources of information were collected and analyzed: over 1,000 new interviews with survivors (including 803 telephone interviews, 225 face-to-face interviews, and 5 focus groups); over 700 published interviews; 9-1-1 emergency calls; transcripts of emergency communications, historical building design drawings, memoranda, and calculations; formal complaints filed with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration; and other relevant materials. The egress system, including stairwells and elevators, was described and compared to requirement of both contemporary and current code requirements. This report documents the emergency procedures, both as they were designed to be implemented, as well as how they were actually implemented on September 11, 2001.

NIST NCSTAR 1-7: Occupant Behavior, Egress, and Emergency Communication

NIST NCSTAR 1-7A:  Analysis of Published Accounts of the World Trade Center Evacuation

NIST NCSTAR 1-7B: Technical Documentation for Survey Administration: Questionnaires, Interviews, and Focus Groups

NIST NCSTAR 1-8: The Emergency Response Operations

The September 11, 2001, attack on the World Trade Center (WTC) caused the deaths of 2,749 people.  Included in the group were approximately 421 emergency responders from The Fire Department of the City of New York (FDNY), The New York City Police Department (NYPD), the Port Authority Police Department (PAPD), The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ), from WTC security firms, and volunteer emergency responders who were in the WTC area of the city when the attack occurred. This report addresses the operations of these emergency responders, the technologies used during WTC operations, and the guidelines and practices that governed these operations. The objectives of this study were to 1) fully document what happened during the response by the emergency services to the attacks on the WTC, up to the time of collapse of WTC 7; (2) identify issues that need to be addressed in changes to practice, standards, and codes; (3) identify alternative practices and/or technologies that may address these issues; and (4) identify R&D needs that advance the safety of the fire service in responding to massive fires in tall buildings.

NIST NCSTAR 1-8: The Emergency Response Operations

NIST NCSTAR 1-8:  Appendixes A-L

NIST NCSTAR 1A:  Final Report on the Collapse of World Trade Center Building 7

This is the final report on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) investigation of the collapse of World Trade Center Building 7 (WTC 7), conducted under the National Construction Safety Team Act.  This report describes how the fires that followed the impact of debris from the collapse of WTC 1 (the north tower) led to the collapse of WTC 7; an evaluation of the building evacuation and emergency response procedures; what procedures and practices were used in the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of the building; and areas in current building and fire codes, standards, and practices that warrant revision.  Extensive details are found in the companion reports, NIST NCSTAR 1-9 and NIST NCSTAR 1-9A.

Final Report on the Collapse of World Trade Center Building 7 * [130 Pages, 5.8MB]

NIST NCSTAR 1-9: Structural Fire Response and Probable Collapse Sequence of World Trade Center Building 7 (two volumes)

This is the primary technical report on the investigation of the collapse of World Trade Center Building 7 (WTC 7), providing technical details of all aspects of the investigation.  This report also contains five appendices, which provide supporting background information on the Con Edison substation in WTC 7, analysis of the September 11, 2001 seismogram data recorded near the WTC site, video analysis of WTC 7 building vibrations before its collapse, analyses of hypothetical blast scenarios, and plasticity and creep models for WTC 7 steels.

NIST NCSTAR 1-9:  Volumes 1 & 2 [797 Pages, 50.3MB]

NIST NCSTAR 1-9A: Global Structural Analysis of the Response of World Trade Center Building 7 to Fires and Debris Impact Damage *

The post Federal Building and Fire Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster by the National Institute of Standards and Technology first appeared on The Black Vault.

This fictitious plan was created by junior military officers undergoing training related to the Department of Defense’s Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES), the formalized process by which the Department conducts all contingency planning and execution. In an effort to learn the JOPES process, and to do so in a more interesting way, the students were assigned this completely fictitious scenario and directed to use JOPES to develop a written contingency plan. Using this fictitious scenario avoided concerns over the use of classified information, it resolved sensitivity to using real-world nations or scenarios, and it better engaged the students.

The Documents

 Counter Zombie Dominance, CONPLAN 8888, 30 April 2011 [ 16 Pages, 10.87MB ]

After receiving the above document, I filed a FOIA request for all documents in the Intellipedia, regarding CONPLAN 8888. I was successful in getting the National Security Agency (NSA) to declassify not only the plan itself, but all the entries and the “talk” pages outlining some of the responses from users of the Intellipedia system.

 Intellipedia: Counter Zombie Dominance, CONPLAN 8888 [ 76 Pages, 4.2MB ]

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The post Counter-Zombie Dominance, CONPLAN 8888 first appeared on The Black Vault.

 1998 Terrorist Warning on Men Training at Oklahoma Airports [1 Pages]

9/11 Ten Years After: Command, Control, Communications Remain an Issue [36 Pages, 421 KB] – This research paper reviews current emergency management capability to respond to significant incidents, both natural and manmade. In such incidents, multiple agencies must respond, manage forces, and provide critical support as a cohesive team. These organizations span the gamut of local, tribal, state, and federal levels of government and the private sector. They include the broad range of first responders, fire, medical, and police. The unity of effort needed to provide timely, efficient, and integrated responses can only be achieved through effective command, control, and communications (C3) within and among responding forces. A unified response requires interoperable communications among all agencies, at all levels; a mechanism to track all responding forces; and a common operating picture that fuses and displays disparate data. This paper reviews current national policies, procedures, and technologies for managing large-scale emergencies. It identifies challenges and opportunities for improvement. It concludes with recommendations for implementing a nationwide interoperable communications system that, along with an effective tracking system, will facilitate the formulation of a COP for first responders.

Annotated Bibliography of Government Documents Related to the Threat of Terrorism and the Attacks of September 11, 2001 [99 Pages]

Assessing the Effectiveness of Post-9/11 Intelligence Information Sharing [31 Pages, 377 KB] – In the wake of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the 9/11 Commission determined that intelligence related to the attack was not shared across the Intelligence Community (IC), and especially between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI). Specifically the Commission faulted the IC for being parochial, secretive, and delinquent in sharing important intelligence. Despite the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations, including the creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and institutions such as the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the parochialism continues and information sharing across the IC remains a critical problem. As the 2009 Christmas Day failed bombing of the Northwest Flight reminded us, the lack of IC sharing can have tragic consequences and that it still remains a work in progress.

The Authority and Suitability of Military Commissions to Try the September 11th Terrorists [43 Pages]

Bin Laden Preparing to Hijack US Aircraft and Other Attacks 12/4/1998 [2 Pages]

Flashman’s Revenge: Central Asia After September 11 [9 Pages]

Video of Flight 77 and Photographs of Flight 93 – Information is classified as of October 2005. [2 Pages]

Wasted Lessons of 9/11: How the Bush Administration Has Ignored the Law and Squandered its Opportunities to Make Our Country Safer [54 Pages, 1.03 MB] – When President George W. Bush signed H.R. 1, “Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007,” into law on August 3, 2007 without any limiting statement, it seemed that the unfulfilled security recommendations of the 9/11 Commission would finally be implemented. To ensure that they were, over the past year the Majority staffs of the Committees on Homeland Security and Foreign Affairs have conducted extensive oversight to answer the question: How is the Bush Administration doing on fulfilling the requirements of H.R. 1 (P.L. 110-53)? The Majority staffs of the two Committees prepared this report to summarize their findings.

The post Declassified 9/11 Reports & Records first appeared on The Black Vault.