One of the primary focuses of the emails was the draft report titled “Evaluation of the Screening of Displaced Persons From Afghanistan.” This report, identified by Project No. D2021-DEV0PD-0161.000, examined the screening processes for Afghans arriving in the U.S. after the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in 2021. Internal emails reveal extensive coordination between various DoD offices to review and comment on the draft.

On January 7, 2022, an email from a DoD OIG auditor reminded recipients to submit their comments on the draft by the end of the day. The draft report titled “DoD Efforts to Address Ideological Extremism in the Armed Forces” was also circulated, requesting factual accuracy reviews and security marking checks.

Subsequent emails, exchanged from January 20 to January 24, 2022, highlight discussions between the DoD OIG and Garry Reid’s office to schedule conference calls addressing feedback on the draft reports. Notably, the emails discussed a policy change requiring Afghan arrivals to complete mandatory medical processing at government facilities before leaving Safe Havens. This policy shift occurred after initial guidance allowed for self-administered vaccines, which led to concerns about individuals “walking off” the bases.

The draft report on ideological extremism within the armed forces, identified by Project No. D2021-DEV0PB-0079.000, was another focal point. This report aimed to evaluate the DoD’s efforts to combat extremism within its ranks and provided recommendations for policy and procedural changes. Recipients were asked to ensure the draft’s factual accuracy and review its security markings.

The 31 pages withheld from the release consisted of a discussion draft of the report “DODIG-2022-095, Evaluation of Department of Defense Efforts to Address Ideological Extremism Within the Armed Forces.” The final report, included in the release, offered a comprehensive evaluation of the DoD’s measures to address extremism and detailed policy recommendations.

These documents shed light on the DoD’s internal review processes and the steps taken to improve both the screening of displaced persons from Afghanistan and efforts to counter ideological extremism within the military.

###

Document Archive

DODOIG-2024-000309 Document Release [134 Pages, 7.5MB]

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The post DoD’s Private Discussions on 2022 Afghan Screening and Extremism IG Reports first appeared on The Black Vault.

The post This is the last soldier to leave Afghanistan in August of 2021 first appeared on The Black Vault.

The following is the “Afghanistan Situation Report” dated 4 June 1985.

Although the CIA had previously released the document in 2010, The Black Vault filed a Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) in April of 2020 to see if additional information could be released.

The below is the result, which did accomplish in getting a few redactions removed.

Document Archive

Afghanistan Situation Report, 4 June 1985 [16 Pages, 5MB]

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The post Afghanistan Situation Report, 4 June 1985 first appeared on The Black Vault.

According to Wikipedia:

The Russian bounty program is an alleged project of Russian military intelligence, specifically Unit 29155 of the GU, to pay bounties to Taliban-linked militants for killing American and other allied service members in Afghanistan. Several US military personnel are alleged to have died as a result of the bounty program, which additionally targeted coalition forces from the United Kingdom.

U.S. intelligence reports from 2019 suggested the existence of the bounty program. A CIA assessment of the intelligence concluded that members of Unit 29155 had placed bounties on United States military personnel and other coalition forces in 2019. The New York Times reported that “Officials said there was disagreement among intelligence officials about the strength of the evidence about the suspected Russian plot.” The Pentagon’s top leaders said that report is not corroborated.

Below, you will find the documents (or lack thereof) relating to the above program. This page will expand as more records come in.

Document Archive

Central Intelligence Agency Documents

Russian Bounty Program Targeting American Troops in Afghanistan [2 Pages, 1MB] – The CIA issued a GLOMAR response when asked for documents on the above mentioned program.

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The post Russian Bounty Program Targeting American Troops in Afghanistan first appeared on The Black Vault.

Ramadan is observed by Muslims worldwide as a month of fasting (Sawm) to commemorate the first revelation of the Quran to Muhammad according to Islamic belief. This annual observance is regarded as one of the Five Pillars of Islam. The month lasts 29–30 days based on the visual sightings of the crescent moon, according to numerous biographical accounts compiled in the hadiths.

With US troops deployed throughout Muslim countries, I requested under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) the rules, regulations and policies that were issued by CENTCOM to U.S. soldiers and personnel on how to act around the time of Ramadan.

I was not expecting it to take more than FOUR YEARS to get the requested documents, many of which were classified SECRET and had never been released to the public before.

Below, you will find the responsive documents. The documents included in the PDF are:

1. FRAGO Ramadan Procedures
2. FRAGO 903 Ramadan
3. Ramadan Letter
4. Ramadan Related Issues
5. Ramadan Restrictions
6. Talking Points to ANNEX P Ramadan
7. General Order No. 1C
8. Ramadan 2014 Do’s and Don’ts

Document Archive

 Ramadan Orders and Procedures Issued by Central Command (CENTCOM), Released September 2018 [29 Pages, 3.8MB]

 Full FOIA Case File for the Above Request [33 Pages, 16MB] – Although I went after the case processing notes for the above — CENTCOM said all of those documents were exempt, and did not release them. They re-released the original documents. Nothing new here, but archived here for reference.

 Ramadan Orders and Procedures Issued by Air Forces Central Command (USAFCENT), Released February 2018 [15 Pages, 0.7MB]

The post Ramadan Orders and Procedures Issued by Central Command (CENTCOM) first appeared on The Black Vault.

This audit was internally generated and endorsed by the Deputy Commanding General for Support, U.S. Forces–Afghanistan. The audit focused on processes and procedures for accountability, security, and disposition of sensitive property during retrograde operations in Afghanistan. Specifically the audit reviewed controlled cryptographic items designated with Controlled Inventory Item Code 9 (CIIC-9). We performed the audit in Army units, retrograde sort yards (RSYs), and redistribution property assistance team (RPAT) yards.

Document Archive

Retrograde of Sensitive Equipment and Materiel, Afghanistan, Army Audit Report, A-2015-0007-IEX, 6 November 2014 [27 Pages, 2MB]

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The post Retrograde of Sensitive Equipment and Materiel, Afghanistan, Army Audit Report, A-2015-0007-IEX, 6 November 2014 first appeared on The Black Vault.

Please note: This work, Aerial Footage of MOAB Bomb Striking Cave, Tunnel System, is free of known copyright restrictions under U.S. copyright law.

The post Aerial Footage of MOAB Bomb Striking Cave, Tunnel System, April 13, 2017 first appeared on The Black Vault.

Over the past 24 months, the Office of Inspector General (OJG) has issued multiple reports assessing U.S. Government efforts to train, equip, and advise the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).1 This is the fifth in a series of periodic reports that address ISAF development of the ANP/Mol and the Afghan National Army (ANA)/Ministry of Defense (MoD).

The metrics reports track ANSF progress toward assuming an independent and sustainable role in security operations. The OTG collects infmmation ft·om recurring briefings, reports, and other data collected and disseminated by ISAF and its subordinate commands-ISAF Joint Command (IJC), and NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A)/Combined Security Transition CommandAfghanistan (CSTC-A)- hereafter referred to as the Command. The OIG carefully reviews and references, but does not independently validate, the data.

The GIG-selected metrics used for this report provide indications of ANP development over the six-month reporting period from October 20 12 through March 20 13. The metrics track ANP/Mol development in three key areas: Sustainment, Professionalization, and ANP/Mol Transition to Afghan security lead.

Declassified Report

 Quarterly Assessment of Afghan National Security Forces Metrics, Ministry of Interior Police Forces, October 2012 – March 2013 [24 Pages, 4.2MB]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/ig/2013-00591.pdf

The post Quarterly Assessment of Afghan National Security Forces Metrics, Ministry of Interior Police Forces, October 2012 – March 2013 first appeared on The Black Vault.

The Taliban were responsible for downing a US Army Blackhawk helicopter in the southern Afghan province of Zabul on Dec. 17, 2013, the International Security Assistance Force has confirmed. The helicopter may have been brought down by an anti-helicopter mine such as one tested by the Islamic Jihad Union, an al Qaeda-linked group known to operate in the province.

When the helicopter crashed on Dec. 17, ISAF said that “initial reporting indicates there was no enemy activity in the area at the time of the crash.”

The Taliban immediately claimed credit for the attack on their website, Voice of Jihad, however, stating that “Mujahideen of Islamic Emirate have shot down the helicopter of foreign troops.”

 AR15-6 Investigation- Helicopter Incident, 17 December 2013 [737 Pages, 68.3MB] – This document was declassified and released by CENTCOM.

The post Taliban downing of US helicopter in Zabul, Afghanistan, December 17, 2013 first appeared on The Black Vault.

MG Harold Greene, DCG, Combined Security Transition Command -Afghanistan (CSTC-A), was killed and 18 other Coalition and Afghan Forces were injured. The shooter  was also killed.

No negligence on the part of event planners or leaders present. This incident could not have been reasonably foreseen or prevented, appearing as an isolated act of a determined shooter without indicators or warnings.

Visits are a daily occurrence to the MFNDU site. The Afghan National Army Officer Academy (ANAOA) alone has hosted over 100 in 9 months. Group sizes often exceed 20 personnel, and multiple VIPs are not uncommon. Planning for this event was conducted as all others have been before and deemed sufficient. Recommendations (below) can help to mitigate future risk.

Actions of Security Team members in neutralizing the shooter, rendering first aid, and evacuating casualties was superb. Despite the lack of coordinated planning, execution was swift and lives were undoubtedly saved as a result.

Below, you will find the complete CENTCOM investigation reports.

 Executive Summary [3 Pages, 1MB]

 AR15-6 Marshal Fahim NDU Incident Part 1 Tab A [53 Pages, 15.6MB]

 AR15-6 Marshal Fahim NDU Incident Part 2 Tab B [318 Pages, 52.1MB]

 AR15-6 Marshal Fahim NDU Incident Part 3 Tab C [74 Pages, 16.9MB]

 AR15-6 Marshal Fahim NDU Incident Part 4 Tab D [88 Pages, 13.6MB]

 AR15-6 Marshal Fahim NDU Incident Part 5 Tab E [26 Pages, 5.15MB]

The post Marshal Fahim National Defense University Shooting, 5 August 2014, Kabul, Afghanistan first appeared on The Black Vault.

Avoiding a Second Bay of Pigs: Lessons Relevant to the Liberation of Iraq [22 Pages]

Lessons Learned: The Iran-Iraq War [134 Pages] – Political, strategic and tactical aspects of the war

Lessons Learned by the Saudi Arabian National Guard [39 Pages] – Suggestions, advice and tips for successful desert tactical operations

Measuring the Security and Stability in Iraq [48 Pages]

Senate Intelligence Report (521 Pages)

Senate Intelligence Report – Conclusions Only (30 Pages)

Soviet Intelligence on Iraq (4 Pages)

Strategic Implications for U.S. Policy in IRAQ: What Now? [39 Pages]

United Nations Sanctions Against Iraq and Iraq’s Current Military Status [66 Pages]

Weapons of Mass Destruction: U.N. Confronts Significant Challenges in Implementing Sanctions against Iraq [47 Pages]

The post Misc Documents on Iraq & Afghanistan first appeared on The Black Vault.

The operation was originally called “Operation Infinite Justice” (often misquoted as “Operation Ultimate Justice”), but as similar phrases have been used by adherents of several religions as an exclusive description of God, it is believed to have been changed to avoid offense to Muslims, who are the majority religion in Afghanistan. U.S. President George W. Bush’s remark that “this crusade, this war on terrorism, is going to take a while”, which prompted widespread criticism from the Islamic world, may also have contributed to the renaming of the operation. (Source: Wikipedia)

Air Power Against Terror: America’s Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom, 2005 [458 Pages, 2.39 MB] – The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, caught the United States and its leaders completely off guard. They also defined the face of early 21st-century conflict by elevating radical Islamist terrorism to the level of a core threat to U.S. security. The attacks were the boldest hostile act to have been committed on U.S. soil since Pearl Harbor. As such, they prompted a feeling of unity throughout United States perhaps unmatched since the nation’s entry into World War II. Although no one immediately claimed responsibility for the attacks, the U.S. government quickly determined that they were the work of the wealthy Saudi Arabian exile, Osama bin Laden, and his al Qaeda terrorist network.

Causes of Nonbattle Injury Fatalities Among U.S. Army Soldiers During Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2001-2006 [37 Pages, 1.78 MB] – As with previous military conflicts, nonbattle injuries (NBIs) are a major cause of mortality in Operations Enduring (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The purpose of this retrospective analysis was to 1) describe the incidence and rate of fatal NBls in OEF and OIF from their beginning through December 2006, 2) describe the causes and circumstances of fatal NBls, and 3) compare two Army data systems that report fatal NBI incidents. This analysis included all U.S. Army Soldiers who died from nonbattle injuries while deployed for OEF (October 2001 – December 2006) or OIF (March 2003 – December 2006). An NBI fatality case was defined as any Soldier (Regular Army, Army Reserve, or Army National Guard) who died due to a nonbattle injury sustained while in a deployed status for OEF or OIF, including while on midtour leave. This investigation included nonbattle injUry fatalities resulting from 1) unintentional injury incidents, 2) intentional incidents (e.g., homicides, suicides), and 3) physical training. NBls were responsible for 21 percent of all deaths in OEF and OIF. The leading causes of fatal injury were land transport vehicle accidents (41 percent), self-inflicted wounds (18 percent), and air transportrelated accidents (18 percent). Measures have been taken to improve the rate of NBI fatalities during these deployments. More prevention strategies must be researched, implemented, and continually taught to Soldiers in theater to reduce these potentially avoidable deaths.

The Changing Face of Disability in the US Army: The Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom Effect, August 2012 [9 Pages, 251 kb] – Orthopaedic disorders account for significant disability among adults in the United States. Previous studies have demonstrated long-term disability in military personnel with musculoskeletal conditions. However, these studies focused primarily on battle field injured service members and did not evaluate the entire population. The goal of this study was to determine and compare the disabling conditions of the entire United States Army during peacetime and war. We identified the conditions leading to separation from military service before and during Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. During war, more soldiers are found to be unfit for duty, and they have more conditions per individual that make them unfit. Orthopaedic conditions account for the greatest number of soldiers separated from military service at both time points studied (ie, January through March 2001, January through March 2009). Back pain and osteoarthritis are the two most common causes of separation from military service; these conditions are responsible for the most disability during peacetime and war.

Global War on Terrorism: DOD Needs to More Accurately Capture and Report the Costs of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, March 2009 [37 Pages, 582 kb] – Since September 11, 2001, Congress has provided about $808 billion to the Department of Defense (DoD) for the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) in addition to funding in DoD’s base budget. Prior GAO reports have found DoD’s reported GWOT cost data unreliable and found problems with transparency over certain costs. In response, DoD has made several changes to its cost-reporting procedures. Congress has shown interest in increasing the transparency of DoD’s cost reporting and funding requests for GWOT. Under the Comptroller General’s authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative, GAO assessed the following: (1) DoD’s progress in improving the accuracy and reliability of its GWOT cost reporting, and (2) DoD’s methodology for reporting GWOT costs by contingency operation. For this engagement, GAO analyzed GWOT cost data and applicable guidance, as well as DoD’s corrective actions. GAO is recommending that DoD do the following: (1) establish a methodology for determining what portion of GWOT costs is attributable to Operation Iraqi Freedom versus Operation Enduring Freedom, and (2) develop a plan and timetable for evaluating whether certain expenses are incremental and should continue to be funded outside of DoD’s base budget. DoD agreed with the first recommendation and partially agreed with the second.

Intertheater Airlift Challenges of Operation Enduring Freedom [12 Pages, 137 kb] – Between Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM in 1990-1991 and ENDURING FREEDOM in 2001-2002, the Air Force modernized its intertheater mobility. It acquired significant numbers of new C-17 aircraft, created Air Mobility Command to centralize control of long-range transports and tankers, launched an expeditionary force deployment system, modernized its materiel handling equipment, and improved its embarkation airlift schedules. Despite all of these strategic airlift improvements, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM faced challenges the Southwest Asia War did not, including lack of theater infrastructure, hostile fire in the theater, shortages of diplomatic clearances, and the absence of a preliminary operations plan that included intertheater airlift to Afghanistan. Strategic airlift problems that persisted through both conflicts included failures in automated planning systems, insufficient in-transit visibility, initial shortages of theater bases, overloaded staging bases, low mission-capability rates for older transports, and unnecessary airlift of cargo that could have gone by alternative means. Future air mobility managers would do well to address the persistence of these problems in their planning.

Operation Enduring Freedom: An Assessment, January 2005 [4 Pages, 193 kb] – The United States conducted Operation Enduring Freedom from land bases and aircraft carriers positioned far away from the landlocked combat zone. Yet, al Qaeda’s infrastructure and the supporting Taliban regime in Afghanistan were destroyed. Global communications connectivity and the common operating picture that was made possible by linking the inputs of unmanned aerial vehicles and other sensors enabled a close partnership between airmen and U.S. Special Operations Forces on the ground. Such networked operations are now the cutting edge of an ongoing shift in American combat style.

Operation Enduring Freedom: Foreign Pledges of Military and Intelligence Support, 17 Oct 2001 [15 Pages, 145 kb] – In response to the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, a number of countries and organizations have pledged military and intelligence support of operations against the Al Qaeda network and the Taliban in Afghanistan. This report summarizes public and media statements made by 76 nations and organizations concerning their military and intelligence support of operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. The report does not track humanitarian or law enforcement assistance, or the freezing or seizure of financial assets controlled by terrorists. It will be updated as necessary. For detailed information on the U.S. response to terrorism, see the CRS Terrorism Electronic Briefing Book. The organizations include the European Union, the Gulf Cooperation Council, NATO, the Organization of American States, and the United Nations.

Operation Enduring Freedom as an Enabling Campaign In the War on Terrorism, 22 May 2003 [55 Pages, 203 kb] – The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon left the American public in a state of anguish and anger. With the debris still smoldering in the streets of New York, Bush stated that the United States and all those who want global peace will stand united to win the war against terrorism. Less than a month later, Bush announced the beginning of Operation Enduring freedom, the first military action in the broad campaign against terrorism. James W. Reed wrote Should Deterrence Fail: War Termination in Campaign Planning focusing on campaign planning and design. In the article, Reed describes the relationship between terminal and enabling campaigns. The terminal campaign seeks war termination as an endstate. James W. Reed defines an enabling campaign as achieving some intermediate strategic objectives short of termination. With this in mind, is Operation Enduring Freedom an effective enabling campaign to create conditions for the defeat of terrorism in the Central Command area of responsibility? The methodology for determining the effectiveness of Operation Enduring Freedom is in two pieces. First, is the campaign adequate, feasible, and acceptable? This three part criteria is how joint doctrine evaluates effectiveness. Second, do the operational objectives nest within the strategic endstate? According to Reed, enabling campaigns help create the conditions for a terminal campaign. Therefore, a linkage between the operational objectives and the terminal campaign that achieves the strategic endstate is imperative. The Italian Campaign offers a historical case study of an enabling campaign. By comparing the Italian Campaign with Operation Enduring Freedom, the strengths and weakness of each generate lessons applicable to the future of the war on terrorism.

Operation Iraqi Freedom 06-08: Iraq. Operation Enduring Freedom 8: Afghanistan, 14 Feb 2008 [224 Pages, 31.15 MB] – The fifth Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) was established by the Office of the U.S. Army Surgeon General. Historically, teams have been formed to support requests from the Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I); however, for MHAT V the request from MNFI-I was augmented by a request from the Service Chief, Army Central Command (ARCENT) to examine Soldiers in Afghanistan and Kuwait. The current MHAT report contains two separate reports – one for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) which includes a section on Soldiers in Kuwait, and one for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).The mission of MHAT V was to: 1. Assess Soldier mental health and well-being 2. Examine the delivery of behavioral health care in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 3. Provide recommendations for sustainment and improvement to command. Both of the reports have executive summaries providing key findings and recommendations specific to OIF and OEF. Partial contents of these reports include the following topics: Morale, Mental Health, Performance and Ethical Behavior; Sustainment of Soldier Resilience; Strengthening Families; Behavioral Health Care in Theater; Increase in the Number of Behavioral Health Personnel; Soldier Behavioral Health and Performance Indices; Soldier Risk Factors; Soldier Protective Factors; Soldier Focus Groups; Behavioral Health Care System Assessment; Primary Care Survey; Unit Ministry Team Survey; Military Transition Teams Mental Health and Welfare; Soldiers Stationed in Kuwait; Theater Suicide and Suicide Prevention.

Special Forces Command and Control in Afghanistan, 18 Jun 2004 [70 Pages, 208 kb] – The purpose of this study is to examine the nature of the command and control relationship between Special Forces and conventional forces. The author examines how Special Forces and conventional forces worked together in the past in Vietnam, Panama, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield. The primary case study presented and discussed is the integration of Special Forces and conventional forces in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom. Operation Enduring Freedom in serves as a case study in practice and doctrinal application. (2 figures, 62 refs.)

Special Operations in Forces in Operation Enduring Freedom: Background and Issues for Congress, 15 Oct 2001[7 Pages, 2.39 MB] – Special Operations Forces (SOF) are elite, specialized military units that can be inserted behind the lines through land, sea, or air to conduct a variety of operations, many of them clandestine. SOF units are expected to play an important role in U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and possibly elsewhere as part of Operation Enduring Freedom, the U.S. military campaign against terrorists. This short report provides background information and issues for Congress on U.S. SOF units and will be updated as events warrant.

Traumatic Brain Injury: Care and Treatment of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom Veterans, 25 Nov 2009 [19 Pages, 330 kb] – Traumatic brain injury (TBI), defined in the medical literature as a disruption in brain function that is caused by a head injury, has become known as one of the “signature wounds” of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan due to its high occurrence in post-deployment service members and veterans of these wars. As service members return home, many need ongoing care for mild, moderate, or severe TBI. The growing number of TBI patients and the nature of their injuries creates the need for increased treatment capacity for veterans, and raises a number of policy issues that Congress may move to consider. Due to the variable nature of TBI injury and recovery, there is not one standard of care or treatment regimen for TBI; patients’ needs are diverse, depending on the severity of illness and the presence of co-conditions. It has been estimated by a recent RAND study that as many as 20% of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OEF/OIF) veterans experience TBI. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has screened almost 250,000 OEF/OIF veterans entering the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) system as of January 2009. As service members return home, these numbers will increase. VA provides a wide range of services to address the needs of veterans with TBI, including outreach, education, and benefits enrollment information. The FY2010 VA Budget included assurances that VA is working to fund programs that improve veterans’ access to mental health services across the country, including those who suffer from TBI as a result of their service in OEF/OIF. In responding to this influx of veterans with TBI and other common OEF/OIF illnesses, policy makers and others have identified areas of concern, including challenges in screening, diagnosis, treatment, and access to care. This report provides a review of TBI as an illness, its prevalence among veterans, current activity to address the issue in the VA, and current policy issues.

United States Military Casualty Statistics: Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, 25 March 2009 [9 Pages, 363 kb] – This report presents difficult-to-find statistics regarding U.S. military casualties in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF, Afghanistan), including those concerning medical evacuations, amputations, and the demographics of casualties. Some of these statistics are publically available at the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) website, whereas others have been obtained through contact with experts at DOD.

Why Won’t You Drop, Damn You!? An Examination of the Targeting Process in Operation Enduring Freedom and its Implications [25 Pages, 265 kb] – As the American way of war is evolving to emphasize maneuver, speed of execution and the extensive use of air power to Support ground schemes of maneuver, the need of effective rapid targeting through decentralized execution is becoming more critical than ever. What are the lessons learned from Operation Enduring Freedom and how effectively have US forces implemented them in Operation Iraqi Freedom?. This paper will examine the decision making process for rapid targeting in OEF from the strike fighter pilot through the watch officer in the Combined Air Operations Center at Prince Sultan Air Base to the operational commander. It will draw some conclusions on the effectiveness on the process in OEF and how lessons learned were applied in OIF. The three virtues of an effective operational commander called for in this paper are: (1) A clarity in communicating his intent, ROE and acceptable risk; (2) Foresight in designing his joint staff to handle crises quickly and correctly; and (3) An understanding of the capabilities and limitations in the new weapons systems at his disposal. The best environment to hone these skills is the training environment, long before actual combat. It is also apparent that the unexpectedness of combat in Afghanistan required a hasty command structure that allowed some confusion at all levels, from the operational commander to the trigger-pullers. At first impression, it appears that US Central Command learned the lessons from OEF and applied them with extreme effectiveness in OIF. One question that will have to be addressed as more data is available is whether CENTCOM over-reacted to challenges in OEF and allowed too much autonomy at the tactical level.

The post Operation Enduring Freedom first appeared on The Black Vault.

U.S. taxpayers have to foot the bill $486 million dollars worth of aircraft the Defense Department decided to destroy, according to interim research conducted by the inspector general.

While all 20 of the G222 military transport planes purchased from Italy were supposed to see combat in Afghanistan, 16 of them are now being sold for scrap to an Afghan construction company for the total sum of $32,000, amounting to 6 cents per pound. The other 4 planes are sitting dormant at the Ramstein Air Base in Germany. The program to purchase planes for the Afghan Air Force ended in 2013 after it was determined that the planes had serious performance and maintenance problems.

Inspector general John Sopko for reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan expressed frustration at the sudden decision to destroy the planes, writing in a letter to Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel that the Secretary must inform him first before similar plans are made to scrap the remaining 4 planes.

Sopko’s investigation is ongoing, but sent the interim letters to try and prevent kneejerk decisions from being made. He additionally requested the Air Force Secretary Deborah James to turn over documentation relevant to the decision-making process involved in scrapping the 16 planes and also asked for proof of whether any alternative plans were considered for the planes, such as pursuing refunds under warranty.

“We value the oversight provided by inspectors general and audit agencies, and incorporate their findings and recommendations into subsequent efforts,” Pentagon spokesman Maj. Brad Avots said in response to the concerns Sopko highlighted. “Working in a wartime environment such as Afghanistan brings with it many challenges, and we continually seek to improve our processes. The point of the destroying the planes, Maj. Avots added, was to minimize impact on drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan.”

The following are documents relating to this Inspector General report, and incident. More FOIA requests have been filed, and will be posted when available.

Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction Records

 October 3, 2014 Letter from SIGAR to the Secretary of the Air Force [ 4 Pages, 0.6MB ]

 October 3, 2014 Letter from SIGAR to the Secretary of Defense [ 9 Pages, 1.2MB ]

The post Half a Billion Dollars Lost After 20 G222 Cargo Planes Scrapped first appeared on The Black Vault.