The report is divided into four parts:

1. ALA-17 Flare Tests: Examines the effectiveness of deploying one to three flares as decoys. The tests demonstrated successful missile decoying under most conditions, with a few exceptions.
2. C-130 Susceptibility: Analyzes the vulnerability of C-130 aircraft to ground-launched infrared-guided missiles during low-level flight. It was feasible to achieve missile lock-on at low offsets from the launch site, though larger offsets posed challenges.
3. QRC-399 Countermeasures: Evaluates the QRC-399 equipment’s ability to disrupt missile guidance systems. A high jamming-to-signal ratio was critical for success, particularly against the more agile ATOLL missile.
4. Infrared Radiometry: Assesses the effectiveness of airborne countermeasures and measures infrared emissions from target aircraft, providing insights into decoy probabilities and radiant intensities.

The findings contribute to understanding infrared countermeasure technologies and air-to-air and ground-to-air missile vulnerabilities.

Document Archive

HAVE CARGO Captive Flight Tests, Phase III, Volume IV [154 Pages, 53MB]

The post HAVE CARGO Captive Flight Tests, Phase III, Volume IV – August 1974 first appeared on The Black Vault.

 FBI documents were obtained from the FBI after their Investigation called “VANITYBOM” [138 Pages, 46.34MB]

 FBI Response To October 2003 Vanity Fair Article (Re: ______ Family Departures After 9/11/2001) [ 40 Pages, 0.95MB ] – This document was obtained by Judicial Watch in 2005. I have requested a Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) of this document, in hopes to get more released.

 FBI documents released to researcher Russ Kick, regarding “Saudi Arabian Elites” and the flights they took to get out of the United States shortly after 9/11 [215 Pages, 52.9MB] – These records were provided by the family of anthologist and transparency activist Russ Kick, from his papers, facilitated by the generous assistance of Dr. Susan Maret.  

The post Unveiling the Departure of Saudi Nationals Post 9/11: A Puzzling Chapter first appeared on The Black Vault.

Although it is not a verbatim transcript, it contained numerous quotes from the President and Vice President.

It was released by the The Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP, or “the Panel”) on November 9, 2022, under appeal case number 2012-163. The original case was filed by researcher Erik Larson.

The document was first have been covered by the Wall Street Journal on the same day ISCAP released the records.

Document Archive

  9/11 Commission Interview with President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney [31 Pages, 13.4MB]

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The post 9/11 Commission Interview with President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney Released first appeared on The Black Vault.

That case was filed in December of 2021, and on February 14, 2022, the FBI responded by denying all of the records as being “exempt from disclosure.”

The full FOIA response is below.

The post United 93 Wreckage Photographs and Videos “Exempt from Disclosure” Nearly 21 Years After 9/11 first appeared on The Black Vault.

This material is being released in response to Executive Order 14040, signed September 3, 2021, on the declassification review of certain documents concerning the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

Federal Bureau of Investigation

9/11 Material Released in Response to Executive Order 14040 – Release #1 [17 Pages, 2.5MB]

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The post 9/11 Material Released in Response to Executive Order 14040 first appeared on The Black Vault.

Mohamed Mohamed el-Amir Awad el-Sayed Atta was an Egyptian hijacker and Islamic terrorist and one of the ringleaders of the September 11 attacks who served as the hijacker-pilot of American Airlines Flight 11, crashing the plane into the North Tower of the World Trade Center as part of the coordinated attacks.

Below, you will find various files on Atta, obtained under the Freedom of Information Act.

Document Archive

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)

 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) Regarding Atta, Requested October 2014 [2 Pages, 0.2MB] – More than 13 years after the attacks – the U.S. Government is still classifying material on Atta.

 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) Regarding Atta, Requested January 2016 [12 Pages, 0.7MB] – After waiting a couple more years, I requested records again in January of 2016. To my surprise, USCIS is now claiming they “can not find” Atta’s alien file, but included some prints from their electronic system. What happened to Atta’s alien file, after having it classified for so many years?!

 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) Regarding Atta, Entire FOIA Case File for the above case [28 Pages, 0.7MB]

 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) Regarding Atta, Requested June 2018 [2 Pages, 0.7MB] – This was the result of a “Mandatory Declassification Review” request to declassify records relating to Mohammad Atta. It was forwarded from Department of Homeland Security (DHS) back to USCIS, and they then denied access to the records. Although they denied it, they did forward the request to the FBI for another review. Results will be posted, when they become available.

 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) FOIA Processing Procedures for requests related to Atta [122 Pages, 2.5MB] – I was told there were no records pertaining to my request (ie: no special instructions). I requested the entire case file to see what they discussed about behind the scenes. This was the result.

Department of Justice / Office of Information Policy (DOJ/OIP)

Department of Justice / Office of Information Policy (DOJ/OIP) FOIA Requests Relating to Mohamed Atta [17 Pages, 1MB]  – These records were considered “non-responsive” when forwarded to them from the FBI. I filed a second request to obtain them, and they consist mostly of FOIA request letters and responses.

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Says All Files are Classified, November 2014 [4 Pages, 0.2MB] – Another denial of material on Atta, citing a law enforcement proceeding.

 Department of Justice / INTERPOL – FBI Referral [3 Pages, 0.7MB] – Another denial of material on Atta, citing a law enforcement proceeding.

 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) FOIA Requests Relating to Mohamed Atta [178 Pages, 70.8MB] – This is the first release of FOIA requests received by the FBI, that pertain to Mohamed Atta. Additional records will be added, when released.

The post 9/11 Hijacker: Mohamed Atta first appeared on The Black Vault.

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Inspector General Report on 9/11/01

 OIG Report on CIA Accountability with Respect to the 9/11 Attacks – Executive Summary [19 Pages, 1MB]

 Inspection Report of the DCI Counter-Terrorist Center Directorate of Operations, August 2001  [81 Pages, 1.68MB]

 Joint Response to Draft IG 9/11 Report  [16 Pages, 7.3MB]

 Joint Response to OIG Report – “Accountability Regarding Findings and Conclusions of the Joint” [18 Pages, 1.20MB]

 Memorandum to Inspector General Helgerson from George J. Tenet Regarding Assessment of Performance [19 Pages, 1.44MB]

 Office of Inspector General Report on Central Intelligence Agency Accountability Regarding Findings [490 Pages, 17.9MB]

 Response to Inspector General’s 9/11 Accountability Final Draft Report [10 Pages, 0.8MB]
 Response to Inspector General’s 9/11 Accountability Final Draft Report – MDR Release 23 July 2021 (No new information was released) [11 Pages, 0.8MB]

Interrogation

CIA/OIG Report on Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities, 07 May 2004

The post Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Records on 9/11/01 Terrorist Attacks first appeared on The Black Vault.

The below document was referenced in the 9/11 Commission Report. Prior to the posting of it here, on The Black Vault, it appears it has never been released before to the general public and has never appeared online. It should be noted, other individuals did go after its declassification as well, and The Black Vault’s request was not alone in the effort to see this record declassified, even in part.

Although partially redacted, you can find the document below.

Document Archive

Facilitating Disaster: An Overview of 11 September Finance, 22 August 2002 [14 pages, 1.8MB]

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The post Facilitating Disaster: An Overview of 11 September Finance, 22 August 2002 first appeared on The Black Vault.

Below you will find documents regarding 9/11/01, from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Document Archive

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Records on 9/11

The following documents have been declassified by the FBI pertaining to 9/11.

The 11 September Hijacker Cell Model, February 2003 [10 Pages, 9MB]
The 11 September Hijacker Cell Model, February 2003 [13 Pages, 6.5MB] – This was an attempt at a Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) of the same document, but appears to be a re-release of the same information as nothing else could be revealed.

A Review of the FBI’s Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks, (November 2004), Released Publicly June 2006 [449 Pages, 9.07mb]

A Review of the FBI’s Handling of Intelligence Information Prior to the September 11 Attacks, (released publicly June 2005) (Redacted and Unclassified), November 2004 [328 Pages, 32.43mb]

The September 11 Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in Connection with the Investigation of the September 11 Attacks, June 2003 [239 Pages, 12.5mb]

The Immigration and Naturalization Service’s Contacts With Two September 11 Terrorists: A Review of the INS’s Admissions of Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi, its Processing of their Change of Status Applications, and its Efforts to Track Foreign Students in the United States, May 2002 [212 Pages, 1.6mb]

The post Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Records first appeared on The Black Vault.

Entwined in the many conspiracy theories that state 9/11 was something other than what we were told, there is a story about 5 Israeli men that were arrested on the George Washington Bridge, who had a van full of explosives and were going to detonate it.

Here is one example of the report that ran on the mainstream media, reported by Dan Rather on the night of September 11, 2001:

Admittedly, this story by Rather did not label them as “Israeli,” but many “conspiracy theories” linked these men to Israeli intelligence known as Mossad. None of these claims really had much evidence, and the tie in was linked largely to conspiracy sites and those attempting to advanced the 9/11 “inside job” conspiracy. It is interesting to note, that shortly after many of the stories appeared about these men on the bridge — no follow up reports were ever made.

What does this prove?  Many claim that allegedly, Israel (an ally of the United States) had foreknowledge of the attack, and may have even played a role in the events.  The public story we were told, which led to the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, was that it was Al-Qaeda.  Of course, this all would contradict that narrative.

This story also relates to what has been dubbed the “Five Dancing Israelis” who were found to be videotaping the aftermath of the attack on 9/11, and were shouting joyous praises and dancing in the streets, but that story is also highly controversial on whether or not it ever occurred.

I filed a FOIA request to multiple agencies regarding the above, to see if they may have anything specifically on the explosive found on the George Washington Bridge. To be blatantly honest, I did not expect to find much about this, at all.  Most agencies denied that documents existed, but the NSA produced a very interesting result.

Below, you will find the results.

Document Archive

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Records

 FBI Response – No Records October 2014 [ 2 Pages, 0.3MB ] – The FBI claims that they have no records pertaining to this incident.

National Security Agency (NSA) Records

 NSA Response – Glomar Response November 2014 [ 2 Pages, 0.2MB ] – In a bit of a surprise, the NSA gave GLOMAR response to this request, meaning, they will neither confirm nor deny anything exists.  Having so much time pass after this alleged incident, and the fact that it apparently didn’t happen, wouldn’t they just say they had “No Records”?

Shortly after receiving this response, I filed a FOIA request for all case processing notes, emails, and other documents generated during the processing of this request. The NSA has released many times in the past, these notes and messages that give an inside look at the process of filing FOIAs. It shows how the FOIA request progressed, and sometimes, offers insight to how the final decision was reached. Frequently, there are redactions, primarily due to FOIA exemption (b)(5), which deals with the “deliberative process” of how agencies work/make decisions. It is noted, that (b)(5) is the most controversial FOIA exemption, because it is widely used and overly broad.

That said, the response came in for these notes on my FOIA request, and 100% were denied as being classified TOP SECRET.  This was a VERY strange result, as I have yet to find a request for case processing notes, on a FOIA request that received a “GLOMAR” response, that were 100% considered TOP SECRET.

I waited a few years, and filed again on March 30, 2018. In short, after a two year period, documents can then be requested to be reviewed again (either by a FOIA or an MDR, which is a lengthy explanation in itself). In this particular case, I filed a FOIA (and not an MDR) because the NSA would not even acknowledge documents existed, so I did not feel my MDR would have any positive results, since I couldn’t cite any documents for review.  Sure enough, I received another GLOMAR response to my 2018 request, and everything could neither be confirmed nor denied.

I appealed on May 2, 2018, and by June 1, 2018, less than a month, the NSA denied my appeal.  However, the story got even more strange.  They split my appeal into two parts in order to respond properly. The first, was the documents I was requesting regarding the unidentified men on the bridge. They said they supported and agreed with the GLOMAR response, and that was it.

The second part of my request was for the FOIA Case Files / Processing Notes that I asked for that were classified TOP SECRET.  They retracted the claim they were classified TOP SECRET, but then still exempted them 100% under FOIA exemptions (b)(3) and (b)(5).  So, therefore, they changed the reason for their answer, but their answer was the same none-the-less.

I believe the reason they did this, was based on the root of my appeal. In my official appeal, I stated the following (in part):

“Given also the fact that ‘item 1’ of my request 103943 (FOIA request for case processing notes) yielded documents that were entirely exempted under the FOIA as being TOP SECRET, this strengthens the belief that responsive documents do, in fact, exist. There would be no reason for (what I assume are case processing notes withheld) to be TOP SECRET on a topic with no responsive records.”

In short, what I was saying, was that if they will “neither confirm nor deny” records exist, but then classify my FOIA Case Processing notes as TOP SECRET across the board, there is something there.  I believe this part of my appeal may have influenced the NSA to say they were “incorrect” in that assessment, but then gave other reasons for a denial which would not allow me to draw that same conclusion.  Was this truly a mistake? Or is this an attempt to cover-up the fact that I pieced together the evidence to prove documents exist in a case where they did not want to admit to that?

The  official denial is here:

Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)

 ODNI Response – No Records November 2014 [ 2 Pages, 0.3MB ] – The ODNI claims that they have no records pertaining to this incident.

The post 9/11/01: Israeli Men Attempted to Explode George Washington Bridge? first appeared on The Black Vault.

Although controversial due to the fact it was paid for by tax payers, Attorney General John Ashcroft used to travel by private jet during his tenure as Attorney General.  This began in the beginning of 2001, before the attacks on 9/11.

Conspiracy theorists have long pointed to this fact as further proof that the government had prior knowledge that something bad was about to happen. Prior attorney generals used to travel primarily by commercial airlines, and extra security was simply added to their flights to ensure their safety. But early in 2001, that changed, and Ashcroft traveled by private, chartered jet.   The FBI cited a “threat assessment” for the reason of requesting Attorney General Ashcroft travel in this manner, but never released that actual assessment. It was often cited by media sources.

One such mention, was made in July of 2001, by CBS News:

Fishing rod in hand, Attorney General John Ashcroft left on a weekend trip to Missouri Thursday afternoon aboard a chartered government jet, reports CBS News Correspondent Jim Stewart.

In response to inquiries from CBS News over why Ashcroft was traveling exclusively by leased jet aircraft instead of commercial airlines, the Justice Department cited what it called a “threat assessment” by the FBI, and said Ashcroft has been advised to travel only by private jet for the remainder of his term.

“There was a threat assessment and there are guidelines. He is acting under the guidelines,” an FBI spokesman said. Neither the FBI nor the Justice Department, however, would identify what the threat was, when it was detected or who made it.

A senior official at the CIA said he was unaware of specific threats against any Cabinet member, and Ashcroft himself, in a speech in California, seemed unsure of the nature of the threat.

In July of 2016, I requested a copy of this “threat assessment” from the FBI. In June of 2017, it was declassified at released. As far as I can tell, I do not believe this document has ever been released before.

Introduction

The document’s introduction states:

There is a societal need to preserve the safety and security of the United States Attorney General and his family. In his official position as the head of the Department of Justice and chief law enforcement officer of the federal government, he represents the United States in legal matters generally and gives advice and opinions to the President and to heads of executive departments of government. The Attorney General, through the Department of Justice, plays a pivotal role in ensuring healthy competition of our free-enterprise system, safeguarding the consumer, and in enforcing drug, immigration, and naturalization laws. The Department also has a vital role in protecting citizens against criminals and subversion through effective law enforcement, crime prevention, detection, prosecution, and rehabilitation of offenders.

The Department conducts all suits in the Supreme Court in which the United States is a concern. The Attorney General directs these activities, as well as those of the U.S. Attorneys throughout the United States. As a result, due to the vast responsibilities of the Attorney General, the Attorney General will continue to be in the forefront of many disagreements and controversies. Consequently, the Attorney General will continue to be a target of choice for protest and retaliation by individuals, terrorist fanatics, drug cartels, and organized criminal enterprises seeking revenge or notoriety.

Document Archive

 Threat Assessment and Security Plan for the Attorney General, Undated circa early 2001 [39 Pages, 33.6MB]

The post Threat Assessment and Security Plan for the Attorney General, Undated circa early 2001 first appeared on The Black Vault.

 Download the Missing 28 Pages [34 Pages, 4.3MB] – This has been converted to a searchable .pdf, by The Black Vault.

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Statement by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Statement by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence on the Declassification of Part Four of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence’s 2002 Report on the Committees’ Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001.

Congress has today released additional portions of the Congressional report, Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, that have been declassified.  The ODNI coordinated a declassification review—pursuant to Executive Order 13526—before sending the report back to Congress for their release.  The decision to authorize the release of this information is not an endorsement of, or concurrence in, its accuracy or reliability.

 Additionally, the ODNI today is releasing a declassified executive summary of a 2005 joint CIA–FBI memorandum prepared in response to a congressional directive on the same topic. [2 Pages, 1MB]

The Joint Inquiry report, completed in December 2002, detailed the findings and conclusions of a year-long inquiry by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence into the activities of the U.S. Intelligence Community in connection with the 9/11 attacks.  After a classification review by the Executive Branch, three of the four parts that make up the Joint Inquiry report were publicly released in December 2002.  Part Four, entitled “Finding, Discussion, and Narrative Regarding Certain Sensitive National Security Matters,” was withheld in full, because it contained still-sensitive national security and law enforcement information.  The Committees and the Intelligence Community instead agreed to release a brief unclassified summary of Part Four, which stated in relevant part that “[t]hrough its investigation, the Joint Inquiry developed information suggesting specific sources of foreign support for some of the September 11 hijackers while they were in the United States.”

In response to inquiries about Part Four, and after careful consideration by the relevant Departments and agencies, the Executive Branch determined that the harm to national security by releasing portions of Part Four of the report at this time is outweighed by the public interest in additional transparency concerning the Committees’ findings.  Some information has been redacted because the document includes discussion of properly classified matters the disclosure of which would still cause significant harm to national security.

The newly released portion of Part Four relates to the Joint Inquiry’s finding that “[w]hile in the United States, some of the September 11 hijackers were in contact with, and received support or assistance from, individuals who may be connected to the Saudi Government.” As noted above, the decision to authorize the release of a portion of Part Four does not indicate the Intelligence Community’s agreement with Part Four’s accuracy or concurrence with any information it contains.  The Committee itself highlighted that it “has made no final determinations as to the reliability or sufficiency of the information regarding these issues…[and that it]was not the task of this Joint Inquiry to conduct the kind of extensive investigation that would be required to determine the true significance of such alleged support to the hijackers…”

In that regard, Congress subsequently established the bipartisan 9/11 Commission. The 9/11 Commission built on existing investigations and information, including that of the Joint Inquiry, but had greater access to senior officials and classified information.   Its final report concluded that it “found no evidence that the Saudi government as an institution or senior Saudi officials individually funded [al Qaeda].” Similarly, in 2013, Congress directed the FBI to establish the 9/11 Review Commission to further assess any available evidence; that Review Commission concluded that there was no new evidence that “would change the 9/11 Commission’s findings regarding responsibility for the 9/11 attacks.”

Release of this additional information reflects the Executive Branch’s continued commitment to making information publicly available when appropriate and consistent with the national security of the United States.

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The post Download the Missing 28 Pages from the 9/11 Report first appeared on The Black Vault.

According to the FBI:

Although he escaped from his office in the North Tower after it was struck, he died later helping others evacuate when the tower collapsed. In 25 years as an Agent, O’Neill made a name for himself as a tenacious, hard-charging, and passionate fighter against terrorism.

He led the Counterterrorism Section at FBI Headquarters during some of the FBI’s most high-profile investigations, including the Oklahoma City federal building bombing, the attack on U.S. bases in Saudi Arabia, and the pursuit of the first World Trade Center bomber in 1993. He spent his last four years in the New York Office overseeing national security matters.

His leadership coordinating the investigations into the bombing of the USS Cole and two U.S. embassies in Africa cemented his reputation in the international counterterrorism and law enforcement communities. He had a son and a daughter. His family accepted the FBI Award for Meritorious Achievement in his honor.

Wikipedia describes Agent O’Neill:

John Patrick O’Neill (February 6, 1952 – September 11, 2001) was an American counter-terrorism expert, who worked as a special agent and eventually a Special Agent in Charge in the Federal Bureau of Investigation until late 2001. In 1995, O’Neill began to intensely study the roots of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing after he assisted in the capture of Ramzi Yousef, who was the leader of that plot.

He subsequently learned of al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, and investigated the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia and the 2000 USS Cole bombing in Yemen. Partly due to personal friction he had within the FBI and federal government, O’Neill was pushed out of the Bureau in 2001. He became the head of security at the World Trade Center, where he died at age 49 in the September 11, 2001 attacks. In 2002, O’Neill was the subject of a Frontline documentary The Man Who Knew, and cast as the protagonist in the television miniseries The Path to 9/11 and the 2003 book, The Man Who Warned America.

Below, you will find what has been release, thus far, of Agent O’Neill’s FBI file.

There is still an open request that I have for additional records. If any exist, they will posted, when they become available.

Declassified Documents

The following documents were obtained on CD-ROM, and were in the following order. I preserved their order due to their size, and organization:

 1315356-0 – 67E-HQ-679605 – Section 1 Serial 1 COVER SHEETMediaPage.PDF [417 Pages, 18MB]
 1315356-0 – 67E-HQ-679605 – Section 2 Serial 1 COVER SHEETMediaPage.PDF  [293 Pages, 16MB]
 1315356-0 – 67E-HQ-679605 – Section 3 Serial 1 COVER SHEETMediaPage.PDF  [310 Pages, 15MB]
 1315356-0 – 67E-HQ-679605-S (CG) – Section 1 Serial 1 COVER SHEETMediaPage.PDF  [174 Pages, 7.7MB]
 1315356-0 – 67E-HQ-679605M (CG) – Section 1 Serial 1 COVER SHEETMediaPage.PDF  [182 Pages, 22MB]
 1315356-0 – HQ 263-2169 – Section 1 Serial 1 COVER SHEETMediaPage.PDF [72 Pages, 2.1MB]

According to the original FOIA response, additional records may have existed. So, I requested those, and received a letter that they believed more documents existed, however, they could not find them. Additionally, they believed that these possible additional records, were destroyed.

 John P. O’Neill Additional Documents Destroyed [4 Pages, 1.2MB]

The post FBI File: FBI Agent John P. O’Neill (Counter-terrorist agent who died in World Trade Center on 9/11/01) first appeared on The Black Vault.

The National Archives released a series of memos written by Sept. 11 Commission staff members, a compilation of numerous possible connections between the hijackers and Saudis inside the United States.

The document appears to be a glimpse into what is still contained in the classified 28 pages of the congressional inquiry into the 2001 attacks.

The following documents were obtained through the Freedom of Information Act. Special thanks to the NY Times for their diligence in obtaining their release.

Declassified Documents

 Memos on Alleged Saudi-Affiliated Support of the 9/11 Attacks [47 Pages, 13MB]

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The post Memos on Alleged Saudi-Affiliated Support of the 9/11 Attacks first appeared on The Black Vault.

This is the final report on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) investigation of the collapse of the World Trade Center (WTC) towers, conducted under the National Construction Safety Team Act. This report describes how the aircraft impacts and subsequent fires led to the collapse of the towers after terrorists flew jet fuel laden commercial airliners into the buildings; whether the fatalities were low or high, including an evaluation of the building evacuation and emergency response procedures; what procedures and practices were used in the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of the towers; and areas in current building and fire codes, standards, and practices that warrant revision.

Extensive details are found in the 42 companion reports. (The final report on the collapse of WTC 7 will appear in a separate report.)  Also in this report is a description of how NIST reached its conclusions. NIST complemented in-house expertise with private sector technical experts; accumulated copious documents, photographs, and videos of the disaster; established baseline performance of the WTC towers; performed computer simulations of the behavior of each tower on September 11, 2001; combined the knowledge gained into a probable collapse sequence for each tower; conducted nearly 1,200 first-person interviews of building occupants and emergency responders; and analyzed the evacuation and emergency response operations in the two high-rise buildings.

The report concludes with a list of 30 recommendations for action in the areas of increased structural integrity, enhanced fire endurance of structures, new methods for fire resistant design of structures, enhanced active fire protection, improved building evacuation, improved emergency response, improved procedures and practices, and education and training.

1. Final Report of the National Construction Safety Team on the Collapses of the World Trade Center Tower

NIST NCSTAR 1-1: Design, Construction, and Maintenance of Structural and Life Safety Systems

The collapse of World Trade Center (WTC) 1, 2, and 7 resulted from structural damage from direct and indirect effects of aircraft impact and the ensuing fires. Thus, for collapse analyses of these buildings, knowledge of the physical state of the structural and fire safety systems prior to the aircraft impact is essential. To obtain information for the collapse analysis of the buildings, National Institute of Standards and Technology reviewed design and construction documents, correspondence, and memoranda related to the building projects; interviewed individuals involved in the design, construction, and maintenance of the buildings; obtained information from regulatory and emergency services agencies of New York City; and reviewed books and published journal and magazine articles related to the WTC building projects.

Information obtained from various sources are synthesized and summarized in this report. Specifically, this report presents (1) provisions used to design and construct the structural, fire protection and egress systems of the buildings; (2) tests performed to support the design of these systems; (3) criteria that governed the design of the structural and fire protection systems; (4) methods used to proportion structural members and other components of the buildings; (5) innovative features, technologies and materials that are incorporated in design and construction of the structural and fire protection systems; (6) details of deviations to the contract documents granted by Port Authority of New York and New Jersey; (7) fabrication and inspection requirements at the fabrication yard; and (8) inspection protocols during construction.

NIST NCSTAR 1-1: Design, Construction, and Maintenance of Structural and Life Safety Systems

NIST NCSTAR 1-1A: Design and Construction of Structural Systems

1-1A appendixes A & B

1-1A appendixes C-G

NIST NCSTAR 1-1B: Comparison of Building Code Structural Requirements

NIST NCSTAR 1-1C: Maintenance and Modifications to Structural Systems

1-1C appendixes

NIST NCSTAR 1-1D: Fire Protection and Life Safety Provisions Applied to the Design and Construction of World Trade Center 1, 2, and 7 and Post-Construction Provisions Applied after Occupancy

NIST NCSTAR 1-1E: Comparison of Codes, Standards, and Practices in Use at the Time of the Design and Construction of World Trade Center 1, 2, and 7

NIST NCSTAR 1-1F: Comparison of the 1968 and Current (2003) New York City Building Code Provisions

NIST NCSTAR 1-1G: Amendments to the Fire Protection and Life Safety Provisions of the New York City Building Code by Local Laws Adopted while World Trade Center 1, 2, and 7 Were in Use

NIST NCSTAR 1-1H: Post-Construction Modification to Fire Protection and Life Safety Systems of the World Trade Center Towers

NIST NCSTAR 1-1I: Post-Construction Modifications to Fire Protection, Life Safety, and Structural Systems of World Trade Center 7

NIST NCSTAR 1-1J: Design, Installation, and Operation of Fuel Systems for Emergency Power in World Trade Center 7

NIST NCSTAR 1-2: Baseline Structural Performance and Aircraft Impact Damage Analysis of the World Trade Center Towers

The baseline structural performance and aircraft impact damage analysis of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Investigation of the World Trade Center (WTC) disaster had two primary tasks: (1) to develop reference structural models of the WTC towers and use these models to establish the baseline performance of each of the towers under gravity and wind loads, and (2) to estimate the damage to the towers due to aircraft impacts and establish the initial conditions for the fire dynamics modeling and the thermal-structural response and collapse initiation analysis. This report provides the technical approach, methodology, and results related to both tasks.

The focus of the analysis was to analyze the aircraft impacts into each of the WTC towers to provide the following: (1) estimates of probable damage to structural systems, including exterior walls, floor systems, and interior core columns; (2) estimates of the aircraft fuel dispersion during the impact; and (3) estimates of debris damage to the building nonstructural contents, including partitions and workstations. The results were to be used to estimate the damage to fireproofing based on the predicted path of the debris field inside the towers. This analysis thus estimated the condition of the two WTC towers immediately following the aircraft impacts and established the initial conditions for the fire dynamics modeling and the thermal-structural response and collapse initiation analysis. The impact analyses were conducted at various levels of complexity including: (1) the component level, (2) the subassembly level, and (3) the global level to estimate the probable damage to the towers due to aircraft impact.

NIST NCSTAR 1-2: Baseline Structural Performance and Aircraft Impact Damage Analysis of the World Trade Center Towers

NIST NCSTAR 1-2A: Reference Structural Models and Baseline Performance Analysis of the World Trade Center Towers

NIST NCSTAR 1-2B: Analysis of Aircraft Impacts into the World Trade Center Towers (Chapters 1-8)

NIST NCSTAR 1-2B: Analysis of Aircraft Impacts into the World Trade Center Towers (Chapters 9-11)

1-2B appendix

NIST NCSTAR 1-3: Mechanical and Metallurgical Analysis of Structural Steel

This report is an overview of the results of the mechanical and metallurgical analysis of structural steel from the World Trade Center (WTC), part of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Investigation of the WTC disaster of September 11, 2001.  The goal of the study was threefold: Determine mechanical properties of WTC structural steel, Determine the quality of the steel and if design requirements were met, and Analyze the recovered steel to provide insight into failure mechanisms to guide and/or validate models of building performance.  Structural steel recovered from the WTC site was analyzed for composition, microstructure, and mechanical properties, including room temperature properties (for modeling baseline building performance), high temperature properties (for modeling structural response of the building to fire), and behavior at high strain rates (for modeling airplane impact). Failure analysis of the recovered steel, complemented by pre-collapse photographs of the damaged building, was used to establish failure modes and temperature excursions experienced by the steel. In addition, documents from the construction era covering issues ranging from steel specifications to engineering design drawings were used to help interpret the results and supplement models of mechanical properties used in the models of building performance.

NIST NCSTAR 1-3: Mechanical and Metallurgical Analysis of Structural Steel

NIST NCSTAR 1-3A: Contemporaneous Structural Steel Specifications

NIST NCSTAR 1-3B: Steel Inventory and Identification

NIST NCSTAR 1-3C: Damage and Failure Modes of Structural Steel Components

1-3C appendixes

NIST NCSTAR 1-3D: Mechanical Properties of Structural Steels

NIST NCSTAR 1-3E: Physical Properties of Structural Steels

NIST NCSTAR 1-4: Active Fire Protection Systems

The National Institute of Standards and Technology investigation of active fire protection systems in World Trade Center (WTC) 1, 2, and 7 included the design, installation, capabilities, and performance on September 11, 2001, of the automatic fire sprinkler, standpipe, standpipe preconnected hoses, fire alarm, and smoke management systems. The purpose and normally expected performance of each active fire protection system in the buildings are described, as well as details about the systems installed in WTC 1, 2, and 7. Using fire protection engineering methods, the capabilities of the installed systems to respond to various fire threats from normal office fires up to and including the extraordinary challenge of the fires ignited by the aircraft impacts on September 11, 2001, were assessed. Information from The Fire Department of the City of New York records was used to document the history of significant fire events in WTC 1, 2, and 7. Findings of the investigation are presented with regard to the fire suppression, fire alarm, and smoke management systems installed on the day the buildings collapsed.

NIST NCSTAR 1-4: Active Fire Protection Systems

NIST NCSTAR 1-4A: Post-Construction Fires prior to September 11, 2001

NIST NCSTAR 1-4B: Fire Suppression Systems

NIST NCSTAR 1-4C: Fire Alarm Systems

NIST NCSTAR 1-4D: Smoke Management Systems

NIST NCSTAR 1-5: Reconstruction of the Fires in the World Trade Center Towers

The collapses of the World Trade Center towers on September 11, 2001, resulted from a combination of aircraft impact damage and the ensuing fires.

NIST NCSTAR 1-5: Reconstruction of the Fires in the World Trade Center Towers

NIST NCSTAR 1-5A: Visual Evidence, Damage Estimates, and Timeline Analysis (Chapters 1-8)

NIST NCSTAR 1-5A: Visual Evidence, Damage Estimates, and Timeline Analysis (Chapters 9-Appendix C)

1-5A appendixes D-G

1-5A  appendixes H-M

NIST NCSTAR 1-5B: Experiments and Modeling of Structural Steel Elements Exposed to Fire

NIST NCSTAR 1-5C: Fire Tests of Single Office Workstations

NIST NCSTAR 1-5D: Reaction of Ceiling Tile Systems to Shocks

NIST NCSTAR 1-5E: Experiments and Modeling of Multiple Workstations Burning in a Compartment

NIST NCSTAR 1-5F: Computer Simulation of the Fires in the World Trade Center Towers

NIST NCSTAR 1-5G: Fire Structure Interface and Thermal Response of the World Trade Center Towers

NIST NCSTAR 1-6: Structural Fire Response and Probable Collapse Sequence of the World Trade Center Towers

One of the four main objectives of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) investigation of the collapse of the World Trade Center (WTC) towers was to determine why and how the two towers collapsed. Events that played a significant role in the structural performance of the towers were the aircraft impact, the rapid ignition of fires on multiple floors, the growth and spread of fires and the structural weakening resulting from effects of high temperatures. The passive fire protection applied to the steel structural components in the WTC towers was investigated to provide information on the in place condition of the fire protection before and after aircraft impact. Standard fire resistance tests were conducted to establish the appropriate classification (fire resistance rating) of the original design of the WTC floor system and to develop insight into the structural performance of the composite steel and concrete floor system under exposure to a standard fire. Results of simulations of the aircraft impacts were used to predict damage to the structure, fire protection, and partition walls in the path of the debris field. Characterization of the temperatures of the structural components, determined from simulated WTC fires, allowed the calculation of the performance of major subsystems constituting the structural system of the towers including the core framing, the exterior wall (columns and spandrels), and full tenant floors. Insights gained from these analyses were used, in turn, to formulate and execute nonlinear, temperature-dependent finite element analyses of global structural systems to predict the collapse sequence of each tower. The structural analyses were guided, and where possible validated, by observations made from the review of thousands of photographs and video recordings. This report covers the characterization of the conditions of the WTC towers before the attacks, their weakening due to the aircraft impacts, the response of the structural systems to the subsequent growth and spread of fires, and the progression of local failures that led ultimately to the total collapse of both towers.

NIST NCSTAR 1-6: Structural Fire Response and Probable Collapse Sequence of the World Trade Center Towers

NIST NCSTAR 1-6A: Passive Fire Protection

NIST NCSTAR 1-6B: Fire Resistance Tests of the Floor Truss Systems

NIST NCSTAR 1-6C: Component, Connection, and Subsystem Structural Analysis

NIST NCSTAR 1-6D: Global Structural Analysis of the Response of the World Trade Center Towers to Impact Damage and Fire

NIST NCSTAR 1-7: Occupant Behavior, Egress, and Emergency Communication

This report describes the occupant evacuation of World Trade Center (WTC) 1 and WTC 2 on September 11, 2001. Multiple sources of information were collected and analyzed: over 1,000 new interviews with survivors (including 803 telephone interviews, 225 face-to-face interviews, and 5 focus groups); over 700 published interviews; 9-1-1 emergency calls; transcripts of emergency communications, historical building design drawings, memoranda, and calculations; formal complaints filed with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration; and other relevant materials. The egress system, including stairwells and elevators, was described and compared to requirement of both contemporary and current code requirements. This report documents the emergency procedures, both as they were designed to be implemented, as well as how they were actually implemented on September 11, 2001.

NIST NCSTAR 1-7: Occupant Behavior, Egress, and Emergency Communication

NIST NCSTAR 1-7A:  Analysis of Published Accounts of the World Trade Center Evacuation

NIST NCSTAR 1-7B: Technical Documentation for Survey Administration: Questionnaires, Interviews, and Focus Groups

NIST NCSTAR 1-8: The Emergency Response Operations

The September 11, 2001, attack on the World Trade Center (WTC) caused the deaths of 2,749 people.  Included in the group were approximately 421 emergency responders from The Fire Department of the City of New York (FDNY), The New York City Police Department (NYPD), the Port Authority Police Department (PAPD), The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ), from WTC security firms, and volunteer emergency responders who were in the WTC area of the city when the attack occurred. This report addresses the operations of these emergency responders, the technologies used during WTC operations, and the guidelines and practices that governed these operations. The objectives of this study were to 1) fully document what happened during the response by the emergency services to the attacks on the WTC, up to the time of collapse of WTC 7; (2) identify issues that need to be addressed in changes to practice, standards, and codes; (3) identify alternative practices and/or technologies that may address these issues; and (4) identify R&D needs that advance the safety of the fire service in responding to massive fires in tall buildings.

NIST NCSTAR 1-8: The Emergency Response Operations

NIST NCSTAR 1-8:  Appendixes A-L

NIST NCSTAR 1A:  Final Report on the Collapse of World Trade Center Building 7

This is the final report on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) investigation of the collapse of World Trade Center Building 7 (WTC 7), conducted under the National Construction Safety Team Act.  This report describes how the fires that followed the impact of debris from the collapse of WTC 1 (the north tower) led to the collapse of WTC 7; an evaluation of the building evacuation and emergency response procedures; what procedures and practices were used in the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of the building; and areas in current building and fire codes, standards, and practices that warrant revision.  Extensive details are found in the companion reports, NIST NCSTAR 1-9 and NIST NCSTAR 1-9A.

Final Report on the Collapse of World Trade Center Building 7 * [130 Pages, 5.8MB]

NIST NCSTAR 1-9: Structural Fire Response and Probable Collapse Sequence of World Trade Center Building 7 (two volumes)

This is the primary technical report on the investigation of the collapse of World Trade Center Building 7 (WTC 7), providing technical details of all aspects of the investigation.  This report also contains five appendices, which provide supporting background information on the Con Edison substation in WTC 7, analysis of the September 11, 2001 seismogram data recorded near the WTC site, video analysis of WTC 7 building vibrations before its collapse, analyses of hypothetical blast scenarios, and plasticity and creep models for WTC 7 steels.

NIST NCSTAR 1-9:  Volumes 1 & 2 [797 Pages, 50.3MB]

NIST NCSTAR 1-9A: Global Structural Analysis of the Response of World Trade Center Building 7 to Fires and Debris Impact Damage *

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Below, you will find the documents released to date on the topic.

September 21, 2015 Release

The Department of Justice has released additional information contained within Inspectors General reports on the President’s Surveillance Program (PSP). The additional information concerns the presidential documents that authorized the inception and implementation of the program.

The release today supplements the IC on the Record posting of April 25, 2015, wherein the ODNI posted statutorily mandated, detailed reviews of the PSP by the Inspectors General of five different agencies—DoJ, DoD, NSA, the Central Intelligence Agency, and ODNI—as well as a joint report signed by the IGs of each of these agencies.

Today’s posting was made in response to requests made by the Department of Justice Inspector General to the Department of Justice and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and in response to requests made under the Freedom of Information Act.

Volume I

 PSP Vol IA |    PSP Vol IB |  PSP Vol IC

Volume II

 PSP Vol IIA |  PSP Vol IIB |    PSP Vol IIC |    PSP Vol IID  |  PSP Vol IIE |  PSP Vol IIF  |  PSP Vol IIG

Volume III

Volume III is oddly not available in the press releases by the Director of National Intelligence, though it is referenced and “linked.” However, the “links” are broken.

I have filed a FOIA request for Volume III, and once received, I will add it here.

April 25, 2015 Release

On December 21, 2013, the Director of National Intelligence declassified the existence of surveillance activities originally authorized by President George W. Bush shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, referred to as the President’s Surveillance Program (PSP).  In furtherance of this declassification, and in response to requests made by the Department of Justice Inspector General to the Department of Justice and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, as well as in response to requests under the Freedom of Information Act, DoJ, in coordination with ODNI and other elements of the Intelligence Community, is today releasing several partially redacted Inspectors General reports that detail the PSP.  The Inspectors General reports were completed in July 2009.

On October 4, 2001, President Bush issued the first in a series of classified authorizations under the PSP to the Secretary of Defense directing him to employ the capabilities of the Department of Defense, including the National Security Agency, to collect certain foreign intelligence in order to detect and prevent acts of terrorism within the United States.

The PSP authorized the NSA to collect three “baskets” of information:  (1) the contents of certain international communications, an activity which was later referred to as the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP); (2) telephony metadata; and (3) internet metadata.  President Bush issued authorizations approximately every 30-60 days.  Although the precise terms changed over time, each presidential authorization required the minimization of information collected concerning American citizens to the extent consistent with the mission of detection and prevention of acts of terrorism within the United States.  NSA also applied additional internal constraints on presidentially authorized activities.

The collection of communications content under the TSP ended in 2007 when the U.S. Government transitioned the program to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act  authority.  The internet and telephony metadata components of the PSP were transitioned to FISA authorities in 2004 and 2006, respectively, and the internet metadata component of the program was discontinued in 2011.

The documents released consist of statutorily mandated, detailed reviews of the PSP by the Inspectors General of five different agencies—DoJ, DoD, NSA, the Central Intelligence Agency, and ODNI—as well as a joint report signed by the IGs of each of these agencies.  The reports describe the White House’s initiation of the PSP through presidential authorization; DoJ’s role in analyzing the legality of the PSP; NSA’s implementation of the presidential authorizations through PSP collection, analysis, and reporting processes; CIA’s and FBI’s use of PSP-derived intelligence in their counterterrorism efforts; the ODNI’s support of the program in providing periodic threat assessments; and the Intelligence Community’s assessment of the value of the program in identifying and combating terrorist threats.

The IG reports describe deliberations surrounding the evaluation of the legal basis for certain aspects of the PSP and the transition of the PSP, in stages, from presidential authority to statutory authority under FISA.  The reports describe the utility of the PSP information in counterterrorism investigations, including assessments by a number of senior government officials that the PSP filled gaps in intelligence collection.  The reports also highlight the complexity of evaluating the precise contribution of the PSP to countering specific terrorist threats due to the fact that the PSP was one source among many available analytic and intelligence gathering tools.

The documents released will deepen the historical understanding of the origins of the PSP in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the ensuing need for immediate steps to prevent and detect further attacks, and the transition of the program to FISA authority.  Today’s release is consistent with the efforts of the Department of Justice and the Intelligence Community to provide increased transparency into our surveillance activities.

 2009 Joint IG Report on the PSP Vol. I

Annex Volume 2

 Part 1   |    Part 2   |    Part 3

Annex Volume 3

 Part 1   |    Part 2   |    Part 3   |    Part 4   |    Part 5   |    Part 6

May 6, 2014 Release

Yesterday the Director of National Intelligence released additional documents related to the intelligence-gathering activities authorized by President George W. Bush shortly after the attacks of Sept. 11 and subsequently transitioned to authority of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.

On Dec. 20, 2013, the DNI declassified and acknowledged the presidentially-authorized activities, and his public statement on Dec. 21, 2013, provided the previously classified history of the program, which authorized the National Security Agency to collect: (1) the contents of certain international communications, a program that was later referred to as the Terrorist Surveillance Program, and (2) telephony and Internet non-content information (referred to as “metadata”) in bulk, subject to various conditions.

After President Bush acknowledged the TSP in December 2005, two suits were filed against the United States and U.S. government officials challenging alleged NSA activities authorized by President Bush after 9/11. Those suits are still pending in the Northern District of California. In response, the U.S. government, through classified and unclassified declarations by the DNI and NSA, asserted the state secrets privilege and the DNI’s authority under the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, to protect intelligence sources and methods. Following the unauthorized and unlawful release of classified information about the Section 215 and Section 702 programs in June 2013, the court directed the U.S. government to explain the impact of declassification decisions since June 2013 on the national security issues in the case, as reflected in the U.S. government’s state secrets privilege assertion. The court also ordered the U.S. government to review for declassification prior classified state secrets privilege and intelligence sources and methods declarations in the litigation, and to file redacted, unclassified versions of those documents with the court.

On Dec. 20, 2013, the DNI declassified and publicly released eight previously classified DNI and NSA declarations that were filed in support of the U.S. government’s prior assertions of the state secrets privilege and sources and methods privilege in the above-mentioned litigation. Yesterday the DNI released an additional 10 previously classified DNI, NSA, and attorney general declarations, which are posted on the Office of the Director of National Intelligence website and ICOntheRecord.tumblr.com, the public website dedicated to fostering greater public visibility into the intelligence activities of the U.S. government. Some information has been redacted from the declarations to protect information that remains properly classified for national security reasons and because of the great harm to national security if disclosed.
  DNI Negroponte 2006 Hepting State Secrets Declaration

  DNI Negroponte 2006 Hepting Supplemental State Secrets Declaration

  DNI McConnell 2007 MCI & Hepting State Secrets Declaration

  DNI Clapper 2013 Jewel/Shubert State Secrets Declaration

  NSA Alexander 2006 Hepting Declaration

  NSA Black 2006 Hepting Declaration

  NSA Alexander 2007 MCI & Verizon Declaration

  NSA Fleisch 2013 Jewel/Shubert Declaration

  NSA Shea 2014 Jewel/First Unitarian Declaration

  AG Mukasey 2008 Declaration

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Below you will find the records currently released:

Documents relating to terrorist threats shortly after 9/11 [14 Pages, 2.5mb]

https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/terrorism/NASAIGTERROR.pdf

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Master Theses

CBRN Terrorism Obsession Prior to 9/11 [103 Pages, 620kb]- 9/11 highlighted failures by both the intelligence and policymaking communities, and these failures were identified by the 9/11 Commission. These failures only related to the inability of the intelligence community to imagine how terrorists might use aircraft as a suicide vehicle, and how politicians failed to eliminate the al-Qaeda threat and Osama bin Laden. Completely unnoticed by the 9/11 Commission, but acknowledged by many within the academic community, was a failure of academia to understand the threat by al-Qaeda and focus too much on weapons of mass destruction terrorism. This thesis examines the question: To what extent were the academic, policymaking, and intelligence communities obsessed with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism prior to 9/11? The thesis concludes that CBRN terrorism was a concern, but was not the greatest national security threat prior to 9/11.

The Nation That Cried Lone Wolf: A Data-Driven Analysis of Individual Terrorists in the United States Since 9/11[111 Pages, 560kb]- Lone-wolf terrorist attacks have occurred in the United States throughout the country’s history. Attempted attacks from individual terrorists unaffiliated with terrorist groups may be becoming more prevalent. Both the general public and government officials acknowledge the presence and importance of these attacks; however, relatively little literature exists on the subject compared to group terrorism. Much of the information on lone wolves has been established by case study, inference, and known characteristics of group terrorism. The purpose of this study is to analyze the characteristics of lone-wolf terrorism through formal statistical models. The study synthesizes data with case study research and other literature to formulate a base of knowledge for lone-wolf terrorism. The study demonstrates that no single dispositional profile of a lone-wolf terrorist exists. The individuals who engage in the tactic of lone-wolf terrorism form a unique ideology that combines personal grievances with common terrorist goals. Still, many lone-wolf cases exhibit certain characteristics. This thesis analyzes these characteristics and their relationship to successful attacks. Data on the characteristics, goals, and motivations of lone wolves can form the basis of policies to curb lone-wolf terrorism and its effects. The appendix contains brief descriptions of 53 lone-wolf terrorist cases that occurred in the United States from September 2001 to November 2011. The descriptions include the attacker’s name, month and year of the attack, and a brief description of what happened.

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Declassified Documents

Dragon on Terrorism: Assessing China’s Tactical Gains and Strategic Losses Post-September 11 [70 Pages]

The Impact of the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks on U.S. – China Relations [75 Pages]

The National Missile Defense Debate in the Post 9-11 Context [40 Pages]

Strange Bedfellows: The American Public and Its Military in the Aftermath of September 11th [50 Pages]

The post Post 9/11 Terrorism Reports first appeared on The Black Vault.

 1998 Terrorist Warning on Men Training at Oklahoma Airports [1 Pages]

9/11 Ten Years After: Command, Control, Communications Remain an Issue [36 Pages, 421 KB] – This research paper reviews current emergency management capability to respond to significant incidents, both natural and manmade. In such incidents, multiple agencies must respond, manage forces, and provide critical support as a cohesive team. These organizations span the gamut of local, tribal, state, and federal levels of government and the private sector. They include the broad range of first responders, fire, medical, and police. The unity of effort needed to provide timely, efficient, and integrated responses can only be achieved through effective command, control, and communications (C3) within and among responding forces. A unified response requires interoperable communications among all agencies, at all levels; a mechanism to track all responding forces; and a common operating picture that fuses and displays disparate data. This paper reviews current national policies, procedures, and technologies for managing large-scale emergencies. It identifies challenges and opportunities for improvement. It concludes with recommendations for implementing a nationwide interoperable communications system that, along with an effective tracking system, will facilitate the formulation of a COP for first responders.

Annotated Bibliography of Government Documents Related to the Threat of Terrorism and the Attacks of September 11, 2001 [99 Pages]

Assessing the Effectiveness of Post-9/11 Intelligence Information Sharing [31 Pages, 377 KB] – In the wake of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the 9/11 Commission determined that intelligence related to the attack was not shared across the Intelligence Community (IC), and especially between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI). Specifically the Commission faulted the IC for being parochial, secretive, and delinquent in sharing important intelligence. Despite the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations, including the creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and institutions such as the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the parochialism continues and information sharing across the IC remains a critical problem. As the 2009 Christmas Day failed bombing of the Northwest Flight reminded us, the lack of IC sharing can have tragic consequences and that it still remains a work in progress.

The Authority and Suitability of Military Commissions to Try the September 11th Terrorists [43 Pages]

Bin Laden Preparing to Hijack US Aircraft and Other Attacks 12/4/1998 [2 Pages]

Flashman’s Revenge: Central Asia After September 11 [9 Pages]

Video of Flight 77 and Photographs of Flight 93 – Information is classified as of October 2005. [2 Pages]

Wasted Lessons of 9/11: How the Bush Administration Has Ignored the Law and Squandered its Opportunities to Make Our Country Safer [54 Pages, 1.03 MB] – When President George W. Bush signed H.R. 1, “Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007,” into law on August 3, 2007 without any limiting statement, it seemed that the unfulfilled security recommendations of the 9/11 Commission would finally be implemented. To ensure that they were, over the past year the Majority staffs of the Committees on Homeland Security and Foreign Affairs have conducted extensive oversight to answer the question: How is the Bush Administration doing on fulfilling the requirements of H.R. 1 (P.L. 110-53)? The Majority staffs of the two Committees prepared this report to summarize their findings.

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The 9/11 Commission Report – Executive Summary – June 2005

The 9/11 Commission Report

Aviation Security-Related Findings and Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, March 30, 2005 [21 Pages, 162 KB] – The 9/11 Commission found that al Qaeda operatives exploited known weaknesses in U.S. aviation security to carry out the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. While legislation and administration actions after September 11, 2001 were implemented to strengthen aviation security, the 9/11 Commission concluded that several weaknesses continue to exist. These include perceived vulnerabilities in cargo and general aviation security as well as inadequate screening and access controls at airports. The 9/11 Commission issued several recommendations designed to strengthen aviation security by: enhancing passenger pre-screening; improving measures to detect explosives on passengers; addressing human factors issues at screening checkpoints; expediting deployment of in-line baggage screening systems; intensifying efforts to identify, track, and screen potentially dangerous cargo; and deploying hardened cargo containers on passenger aircraft. In addition to these specific recommendations, an overarching recommendation for transportation security policy asserts that priorities should be set based on risk, and the most practical and cost effective deterrents should be implemented assigning appropriate roles and missions to federal, state, and local authorities, as well as private stakeholders.

Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act: Coast Guard Impact, 15 March 2008 [31 Pages, 352 KB] – The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act) sought to codify the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Report. This essay summarizes the 9/11 Act’s impact on the Coast Guard. Given the cascade of security legislation and other policy guidance subsequent to 9/11 and prior to this law, many of the recommendations of the 9/11 Report have already been initiated. While the 9/11 Act does not require immediate wholesale change of the Coast Guard, in the near-term the Coast Guard should work especially closely with DHS in regards to container security, northern border security, incident command credentialing, and radio interoperability. In a broader context, the 9/11 Act again raises expectations for interagency expertise which calls for more than the current ad hoc professional development initiatives, further justifying proposals for a capstone homeland security institution such as the National Homeland Security University. The greatest long-term impact to the Coast Guard may be the new Quadrennial Homeland Security Review since it carries the potential to become the source of major reorganization, reprioritization, and policy change. Accordingly, it will be critical for the Coast Guard to provide a cohesive document to inform proper budgetary, mission, and force structure decisions.

 U.S. Anti-Terror Strategy and the 9/11 Commission Report, February 4, 2005 [15 Pages, 352 KB] – On July 22, 2004 the 9/11 Commission released its final report. The report calls for changes to be made by the executive branch and Congress to more effectively protect the nation in an age of modern terrorism. The report provides 41 concrete recommendations. Generally, the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission as they relate to strategy content and implementation appear consistent with, and supportive of, the National Strategy. Few question the 9/11 Commission Report’s overarching premise that U.S. counterterrorism structure, strategy, and implementation can be improved. Some, however, see certain Commission recommendations as incomplete, if not flawed. They suggest that the Commission is often focused on the “last war” and not a future one and that it consciously avoids tackling some of the more complex, yet pressing issues. For example, as its first recommendation, the Commission stresses the need for identifying and prioritizing terrorist sanctuaries, with a focus on failed states. Some assert, however, that terrorists are increasingly returning to their politically stable home countries for sanctuary where they blend into local communities, where their training camps are in civilian housing complexes, and where their bomb factories are in private residences. Although a number of the Commission’s recommendations fall within the category of preventing the growth of Islamic extremism, none addresses directly the issue of confronting incitement to terrorism when promoted, countenanced, or facilitated by the action or inaction of nation states. With terrorists able to change targets, tactics, and weapons on short notice, many argue that a successful counterterrorism strategy and institutional structures will need similar flexibility. The degree to which such flexibility will be built into strategy, and into any new institutional structures recommended by the 9/11 Commission, is yet to be determined.

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