One FBI report dated June 11, 1984 states:

“At approximately 1:55 a.m., April 20, 1984, an improvised explosive device detonated in the reception area of Building 101, the Officers’ Club, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.”

The same report notes:

“The building was unoccupied at the time, and there were no injuries.”

The investigation was opened under federal jurisdiction due to the use of an explosive device and the possibility of involvement by “terrorist or revolutionary groups.”

Claims of Responsibility

The file documents multiple communications claiming responsibility for the bombing. According to FBI reporting:

“Shortly after the blast, two calls were received; one each at the Washington Post newspaper and the United Press International which claimed responsibility for the bombing.”

One call relayed a recorded message:

“The caller stated that there had been a bombing at the Washington Navy Yard… in support of independence for Puerto Rico… [and]that the FALN was claiming responsibility.”

A separate message referenced a different group:

“The tape recorded message stated something to the effect that the Guerrilla Resistance Movement… bombed the Washington Navy Yard… against United States imperialism in the Caribbean and Central America.”

Mailed Communiqués

The FBI file includes extensive documentation of letters believed to be associated with the group “Red Guerrilla Resistance.” These letters were mailed to various organizations and media outlets and often traced back to the same return address.

An April 30, 1984 interview states:

“She received… pieces of mail, believed to be RED GUERRILLA RESISTANCE communiques, claiming responsibility for the bombing of the WASHINGTON NAVY YARD (WNY) Officers’ Club on April 20, 1984.”

Multiple envelopes were sent to organizations including media outlets and advocacy groups, with a recurring return address:

“840 Barnaby Street, S.E., Apartment #23, Washington, D.C. 20032.”

However, the file notes a key inconsistency:

“There is no apartment #23 at 840 Barnaby Street, S.E., Washington, D.C.”

Additional records show repeated receipt of returned mail bearing the same address, reinforcing its use across multiple communications.

Witness Interviews and Leads

The file contains numerous witness interviews from employees and patrons present at the Officers’ Club prior to the bombing. These include descriptions of unidentified individuals (“Unsubs”) and composite sketches generated during the investigation.

One interview describes a suspicious individual observed the night before the explosion:

“This individual seemed to be deep in thought, gave the appearance of being unfriendly and appeared as though he might be waiting for someone else to arrive.”

Despite these efforts, the investigation encountered significant limitations. A summary states:

“Completed leads to date have met with very limited success and have not identified the perpetrators of the bombing.”

Investigative Scope and Coordination

The case involved coordination between multiple agencies, including:

“The Metropolitan Police Department, United States Secret Service, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, and Naval District of Washington Police.”

The FBI also worked jointly with the Naval Investigative Service (NIS), issuing a unified report to avoid duplication of investigative efforts.

Status Reflected in the File

The documents indicate that, at the time of reporting, the case remained unresolved. The identity of those responsible for the bombing was not determined within the materials released, and investigative leads had not produced definitive results.

Redactions are present throughout the file, particularly in names, identifying details, and portions of investigative analysis, limiting full visibility into certain aspects of the case.

The full release can be seen below.

###

Document Archive

FBI Released Files [190 Pages, 15.1MB]

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The post Newly Released FBI File Details 1984 Washington Navy Yard Bombing Investigation first appeared on The Black Vault.

 Declassified Terrorist FBI Files

Ali Hasan Al-Majid Al-Tikriti (Chemical Ali) – [ 53 Pages, 3.64MB ] – Ali Hassan Abd al-Majid al-Tikriti (November 1941 – 25 January 2010) was a Ba’athist Iraqi Defense Minister, Interior Minister, military commander and chief of the Iraqi Intelligence Service. He was also the governor of annexed Kuwait, during the Persian Gulf War. A first cousin of former Ba’athist Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, he became notorious in the 1980s and 1990s for his role in the Iraqi government’s campaigns against internal opposition forces, namely the ethnic Kurdish rebels of the north, and the Shia religious dissidents of the south. Repressive measures included deportations and mass killings; al-Majid was dubbed “Chemical Ali” by Iraqis for his use of chemical weapons in attacks against the Kurds.

Berg, Nicholas – FBI Release #1-4 – [749 Pages, 119MB] – Nicholas Evan Berg (April 2, 1978 – May 7, 2004) was an American freelance radio-tower repairman and businessman who traveled to Iraq after the U.S.-led invasion to seek work rebuilding communication infrastructure. While in Iraq, he was abducted by militants associated with al-Qaeda and later executed in a widely publicized beheading video, which was released online in May 2004. His death became a focal point of controversy and debate, particularly regarding U.S. foreign policy, the security of American civilians abroad, and the treatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib, which some speculated was a factor in his killing. Berg’s tragic murder highlighted the dangers faced by civilians in conflict zones and the growing influence of terrorist propaganda through digital media.

Bin Laden, Osama – FBI Release #1 – [19 Pages, 1.03MB] Bin Laden, Osama – FBI Release #2 – [107 Pages, 13.1MB]Usama (or Osama) Bin Laden, founder of the al Qaeda terrorist organization, was born in Saudi Arabia in 1957. On March 10, 1984, Bin Laden and others killed two German nationals. On March 16, 1998, authorities in Tripoli issued an arrest warrant for him for murder and illegal possession of firearms. Bin Laden was also wanted for the August 1998 bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. He was killed by U.S. forces in May 2011.  This release consists of material that predates the 9/11 attacks.

Black September – [ 47 Pages, 4.54MB ] – The Black September Organization (BSO) was a Palestinian terrorist organization, founded in 1970. It was responsible for the kidnapping and murder of eleven Israeli athletes and officials, and the fatal shooting of a West German policeman, during the 1972 Summer Olympics in Munich, their most publicized event. These events lead to the creation of permanent, professional, and military-trained counter-terrorism forces of major European countries, like GSG9 or GIGN, or the reorganization and specialization of already standing units to such a group, like the Special Air Service of the UK.

Khalifa, Mohammed – [ 729 Pages, 28.91MB ] – Mohammad Jamal Khalifa Mohammad Jamal Khalifa (1957-2007), brother-in-law of Usama bin Laden, was arrested in the U.S. in December 1994 on immigration charges. Khalifa was deported to Jordan in June 1995 and later released by Jordanian authorities. This release consists of investigative files from the FBI’s San Francisco and New York offices concerning his arrest and ties to terrorist financing investigations between the years 1994 and 2003.

FBI’s Terrorist Photo Album – The Terrorist Photo Album was established in 1973. A request went out to the field offices requesting photos and biographic data on individuals that would be included in the album. The biographic data was to include name, akas, current residence, current employment, date and place of birth, marital status, alien status along with INS number, fingerprints if available, physical description and any other pertinent data. When the album was completed, it was distributed to each office. The field offices were expected to keep the information up to date. In 1989, the Terrorist Photo Album was discontinued.

Guantanamo (GTMO) [244 Pages, 9.1MB] – Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) Special Inquiry In 2004, the FBI initiated a special inquiry investigation into whether Bureau personnel had witnessed “any aggressive mistreatment, interrogations, or interview techniques” of detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba by representatives of the military, law enforcement, or the FBI. This release consists of responses to an FBI Office of General Counsel request to Bureau personnel assigned to Guantanamo Bay between September 11, 2001 and September 2004. There were no documented incidents of mistreatment involving FBI personnel.

Smuggling of Atomic Bombs into the United States –  [2,792 Pages, 153.7MB] – The is a very large file, which I have combined into a single .pdf. Not all sections have been released/obtained from the FBI (yet) but additional FOIA requests are still pending, and I will update this file, when they come available. The original files were obtained via a CD-ROM, in the form of a multi-page .tif file. These are very difficult (and archaic) to use, so I converted them to a .pdf.

The post FBI Files: Terrorism first appeared on The Black Vault.

The report is divided into four parts:

1. ALA-17 Flare Tests: Examines the effectiveness of deploying one to three flares as decoys. The tests demonstrated successful missile decoying under most conditions, with a few exceptions.
2. C-130 Susceptibility: Analyzes the vulnerability of C-130 aircraft to ground-launched infrared-guided missiles during low-level flight. It was feasible to achieve missile lock-on at low offsets from the launch site, though larger offsets posed challenges.
3. QRC-399 Countermeasures: Evaluates the QRC-399 equipment’s ability to disrupt missile guidance systems. A high jamming-to-signal ratio was critical for success, particularly against the more agile ATOLL missile.
4. Infrared Radiometry: Assesses the effectiveness of airborne countermeasures and measures infrared emissions from target aircraft, providing insights into decoy probabilities and radiant intensities.

The findings contribute to understanding infrared countermeasure technologies and air-to-air and ground-to-air missile vulnerabilities.

Document Archive

HAVE CARGO Captive Flight Tests, Phase III, Volume IV [154 Pages, 53MB]

The post HAVE CARGO Captive Flight Tests, Phase III, Volume IV – August 1974 first appeared on The Black Vault.

 FBI documents were obtained from the FBI after their Investigation called “VANITYBOM” [138 Pages, 46.34MB]

 FBI Response To October 2003 Vanity Fair Article (Re: ______ Family Departures After 9/11/2001) [ 40 Pages, 0.95MB ] – This document was obtained by Judicial Watch in 2005. I have requested a Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) of this document, in hopes to get more released.

 FBI documents released to researcher Russ Kick, regarding “Saudi Arabian Elites” and the flights they took to get out of the United States shortly after 9/11 [215 Pages, 52.9MB] – These records were provided by the family of anthologist and transparency activist Russ Kick, from his papers, facilitated by the generous assistance of Dr. Susan Maret.  

The post Unveiling the Departure of Saudi Nationals Post 9/11: A Puzzling Chapter first appeared on The Black Vault.

The First Round: NSA’s Effort against International Terrorism in the 1970s – Cryptologic Almanac, November – December 2002 by Robert J. Hanyok [6 Pages, 1.6MB]

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The post The First Round: NSA’s Effort against International Terrorism in the 1970s – Cryptologic Almanac, November – December 2002 by Robert J. Hanyok first appeared on The Black Vault.

Although it is not a verbatim transcript, it contained numerous quotes from the President and Vice President.

It was released by the The Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP, or “the Panel”) on November 9, 2022, under appeal case number 2012-163. The original case was filed by researcher Erik Larson.

The document was first have been covered by the Wall Street Journal on the same day ISCAP released the records.

Document Archive

  9/11 Commission Interview with President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney [31 Pages, 13.4MB]

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The post 9/11 Commission Interview with President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney Released first appeared on The Black Vault.

That case was filed in December of 2021, and on February 14, 2022, the FBI responded by denying all of the records as being “exempt from disclosure.”

The full FOIA response is below.

The post United 93 Wreckage Photographs and Videos “Exempt from Disclosure” Nearly 21 Years After 9/11 first appeared on The Black Vault.

On September 11, 2012 in Libya, a heavily armed group executed an attack on the U.S. diplomatic mission in Benghazi. The attack began at night in a U.S. diplomatic compound for the consulate, and ended at another diplomatic compound nearby where the U.S. intelligence was posted. Killed were U.S. Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and three other members of his diplomatic mission, U.S. Foreign Service Information Management Officer Sean Smith and U.S. embassy security personnel Glen Doherty and Tyrone Woods. Two other Americans and seven Libyans were also injured. The Benghazi attack was strongly condemned by the governments of Libya, the United States and other countries around the world.

Libyans held demonstrations in Benghazi and Tripoli, condemning the violence and holding signs such as, “Chris Stevens was a friend to all Libyans”, and apologizing to Americans for the actions in their name and in the name of Muslims. On September 21, about 30,000 Libyans protested against armed militias in their country including Ansar al-Sharia, an Islamist militia alleged to have played a role in the attack, and stormed several militia headquarters, forcing the occupants to flee. On September 23, the Libyan president ordered that all unauthorized militias either disband or come under government control. Militias across the country began surrendering to the government and submitting to its authority. Hundreds of Libyans gathered in Tripoli and Benghazi to hand over their weapons to the government.

The attack followed the mobbing of the U.S. embassy in Cairo, Egypt, which was in reaction to the anti-Islamic film Innocence of Muslims. On September 28, U.S. intelligence revised their initial assessment to indicate that it “was a deliberate and organized terrorist attack carried out by extremists”. Questions about whether the White House should have stated or did state this conclusion earlier and whether the site of the assault was adequately secured before and after the attack created political controversy during the US 2012 Presidential election then underway. The United States investigation of the attack is being conducted separately by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the State Department, the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Source: Wikipedia

Note from The Black Vault: I have filed FOIA requests to multiple agencies regarding this attack. I am still awaiting additional records responsive to the attack, but have included the below records from my archives for research.

FOIA Search for Documents on Benghazi

The following are documents received under the FOIA regarding Benghazi. I still have MULTIPLE requests still open and being processed, and they will be made available here when I get them.

Did the U.S. Government receive warnings of a threat on 9/11/12?  

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

DIA Response for Records – Records Released, January 21, 2022- [9 Pages, 0.6MB]

Department of Defense (DoD)

DoD Response for Records – Original Denial, 2013 – [2 Pages, 0.6MB]

DoD Response for Records – Records Released, 2019 – [52 Pages, 0.6MB] Note: The records were obtained electronically, and they were this compressed upon receipt (looking blurry and of poor quality.)

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

 FBI Response to FOIA request for all warnings / threats of terrorism on or around 9/11/12 [5 Pages, 1MB] – The FBI found 72 pages of responsive records to this search, but each of them were classified and exempt from release.  Could these pages potentially show the Obama Administration was negligent and ignored warnings of a terrorist attack on 9/11/12?

 FBI Response to FOIA request for all warnings / threats of terrorism on or around 9/11/12, on documents originating with a “Other Government Agency” [3 Pages, 0.2MB] – The FBI had sent 4 pages to a “Other Government Agency” that was responsible for the documents. They determined that these, as well, were entirely classified and exempt from release.

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

 CIA Response to FOIA request for all warnings / threats of terrorism on or around 9/11/12 [2 Pages, 0.2MB] – The CIA responded on behalf of the Department of State, when they found multiple pages responsive to my request.  The CIA says that each document is classified, and exempt from release.

 CIA Response to Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) request for all warnings / threats of terrorism on or around 9/11/12 [1 Page, 0.2MB] – After four years from the above case, I requested a Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) request of all the files found, but previously exempt, in 2014. Yet again, the CIA denied access to the files.

National Security Agency (NSA)

 NSA Response to FOIA request for all warnings / threats of terrorism on or around 9/11/12 [ 70 Pages, 6.1MB ] – This request took more than 5 years to complete. The keys (to me) to this specific release are, first, I got the official internal messages sent updating on the situation, many sent while Ambassador Stevens was not even found or his whereabouts known. Second, there is a “declassified” Top Secret briefing from April of 2012. This must contain information about the situation in and around Benghazi, but the question about this briefing, is why is it STILL so classified since much of the situation and CIA presence became known when the attack took place? The reasons why are cited as FOIA Exemption (b)(1) having to deal with national security information and (b)(3) information exempted by statute.

Related FOIA Documents

DoD Response for Records [2 Pages, 0.6mb]

 State Department “Rapid Response: Hot Topics” Newsletter for the month of September 2012 [ 37 Pages, 1.6MB ] – These newsletters are issued daily by the State Department, and circulated internally. I requested the entire month of September 2012 to show the days leading up to and following the Benghazi attack.

 FBI Response to FOIA request for all transcripts from interviews with Benghazi survivors [4 Pages, 2.35MB] –

Benghazi “Talking Point” Timeline revisions [8 Pages, 1.7mb] – This document, released by ABC News, shows the different versions of the “talking points” relating to Benghazi. There is a drastic change over the course of 12 revisions.

 Benghazi “Talking Point” Revision — Emails from the White House, released April 2014 [113 Pages, 43.76mb] – These records come from my friends over at Judicial Watch, who do great work obtaining hard to get documents.  To quote FoxNews on their release, “Newly released emails on the Benghazi terror attack suggest a senior White House aide played a central role in preparing former U.N. ambassador Susan Rice for her controversial Sunday show appearances — where she wrongly blamed protests over an Internet video.”

Benghazi “Talking Point” Revision — Emails from the DNI, State Dept. CIA and others [100 Pages, 36.71mb] – These pages were released to The Black Vault from the Director of National Intelligence in a request for all emails pertaining to the “talking points” and how they were revised behind the scenes before Susan Rice and others used them in the days after the attack.  Very interesting to see what went into it, and how they knew from the start the bullet point about it being over a protest would be an issue.  You will also see where the information about the “warnings” given PRIOR to 9/11/12, along with the terrorist ties, were completely cut out of the final version.

Benghazi Attack Scene Photos [8 Pages, 1.6mb] – Thanks to my friends over at Judicial Watch, photos from the scene of the Benghazi attack were released under the FOIA after originally being deemed classified, and exempt from disclosure under FOIA exemption (b)(7). These are the first photos to have been officially released from the scene of the Benghazi attack.

 FBI Response for Benghazi “threats” towards the consulate, or to the US on or around 9/11/12 [3 Pages, 1.02MB] – In a search for records relating to a threat towards either the United States, or the Benghazi consulate, I filed a FOIA request to the FBI for records relating to anything that may indicate we had prior knowledge that an attack was imminent around 9/11/12.  The response? FOIA exemption (b)(7) – law enforcement information, which if released, would interfere with an ongoing proceeding.

White House Releases Emails Regarding Benghazi [100 Pages, 29.12mb] – On 5/15/2013, The White House released 100 pages of emails regarding the ‘talking points’ that would be discussed in the days that followed the attack in Benghazi.  Up until this date, the White House refused to release them to congressional investigators.

 Blue Mountain Group (BMG) Security Firm Repeatedly Abandoned Their Posts in Benghazi due to “fear” for their safety [ 130 Pages, 39.28MB ] – On September 10th, 2014, Judicial Watch announced that it had obtained 130 pages of new State Department documents revealing that local security guards working for Blue Mountain Group (BMG), the firm hired to protect the U.S. Special Mission in Benghazi, repeatedly abandoned their posts “out of fear of their safety” in the months leading up to the deadly terrorist attack on the special mission compound. Source and special thanks: Judicial Watch

Report of the Select Committee on the Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi

Published 6/28/2016

Washington, D.C. – Select Committee on Benghazi Chairman Trey Gowdy (SC-04) released the following statement after the committee’s Majority released a mark of its investigative report:

“Chris Stevens, Sean Smith, Glen Doherty and Tyrone Woods were heroes who gave their lives in service to our country. Their bravery and the courageous actions of so many others on the ground that night should be honored.

“When the Select Committee was formed, I promised to conduct this investigation in a manner worthy of the American people’s respect, and worthy of the memory of those who died. That is exactly what my colleagues and I have done.

“Now, I simply ask the American people to read this report for themselves, look at the evidence we have collected, and reach their own conclusions. You can read this report in less time than our fellow citizens were taking fire and fighting for their lives on the rooftops and in the streets of Benghazi.”

The committee’s proposed report is just over 800 pages long and is comprised of five primary sections and 12 appendices. It details relevant events in 2011 and 2012.

The following facts are among the many new revelations in Part I:

• Despite President Obama and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta’s clear orders to deploy military assets, nothing was sent to Benghazi, and nothing was en route to Libya at the time the last two Americans were killed almost 8 hours after the attacks began. [pg. 141]

• With Ambassador Stevens missing, the White House convened a roughly two-hour meeting at 7:30 PM, which resulted in action items focused on a YouTube video, and others containing the phrases “[i]f any deployment is made,” and “Libya must agree to any deployment,” and “[w]ill not deploy until order comes to go to either Tripoli or Benghazi.” [pg. 115]

• The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff typically would have participated in the White House meeting, but did not attend because he went home to host a dinner party for foreign dignitaries. [pg. 107]

• A Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST) sat on a plane in Rota, Spain, for three hours, and changed in and out of their uniforms four times. [pg. 154]

• None of the relevant military forces met their required deployment timelines. [pg. 150]

• The Libyan forces that evacuated Americans from the CIA Annex to the Benghazi airport was not affiliated with any of the militias the CIA or State Department had developed a relationship with during the prior 18 months. Instead, it was comprised of former Qadhafi loyalists who the U.S. had helped remove from power during the Libyan revolution. [pg. 144]

Rep. Mike Pompeo (KS-04) released the following statement regarding these findings:

“We expect our government to make every effort to save the lives of Americans who serve in harm’s way. That did not happen in Benghazi. Politics were put ahead of the lives of Americans, and while the administration had made excuses and blamed the challenges posed by time and distance, the truth is that they did not try.”

Rep. Martha Roby (AL-02) released the following statement regarding these findings:

“Our committee’s insistence on additional information about the military’s response to the Benghazi attacks was met with strong opposition from the Defense Department, and now we know why. Instead of attempting to hide deficiencies in our posture and performance, it’s my hope our report will help ensure we fix what went wrong so that a tragedy like this never happens again.” 

The following facts are among the many new revelations in Part II:

• Five of the 10 action items from the 7:30 PM White House meeting referenced the video, but no direct link or solid evidence existed connecting the attacks in Benghazi and the video at the time the meeting took place. The State Department senior officials at the meeting had access to eyewitness accounts to the attack in real time. The Diplomatic Security Command Center was in direct contact with the Diplomatic Security Agents on the ground in Benghazi and sent out multiple updates about the situation, including a “Terrorism Event Notification.” The State Department Watch Center had also notified Jake Sullivan and Cheryl Mills that it had set up a direct telephone line to Tripoli. There was no mention of the video from the agents on the ground. Greg Hicks—one of the last people to talk to Chris Stevens before he died—said there was virtually no discussion about the video in Libya leading up to the attacks. [pg. 28]

• The morning after the attacks, the National Security Council’s Deputy Spokesperson sent an email to nearly two dozen people from the White House, Defense Department, State Department, and intelligence community, stating: “Both the President and Secretary Clinton released statements this morning. … Please refer to those for any comments for the time being. To ensure we are all in sync on messaging for the rest of the day, Ben Rhodes will host a conference call for USG communicators on this chain at 9:15 ET today.” [pg. 39]

• Minutes before the President delivered his speech in the Rose Garden, Jake Sullivan wrote in an email to Ben Rhodes and others: “There was not really much violence in Egypt. And we are not saying that the violence in Libya erupted ‘over inflammatory videos.’” [pg. 44]

• According to Susan Rice, both Ben Rhodes and David Plouffe prepared her for her appearances on the Sunday morning talk shows following the attacks. Nobody from the FBI, Department of Defense, or CIA participated in her prep call. While Rhodes testified Plouffe would “normally” appear on the Sunday show prep calls, Rice testified she did not recall Plouffe being on prior calls and did not understand why he was on the call in this instance. [pg.98]

• On the Sunday shows, Susan Rice stated the FBI had “already begun looking at all sorts of evidence” and “FBI has a lead in this investigation.” But on Monday, the Deputy Director, Office of Maghreb Affairs sent an email stating: “McDonough apparently told the SVTS [Secure Video Teleconference] group today that everyone was required to ‘shut their pieholes’ about the Benghazi attack in light of the FBI investigation, due to start tomorrow.” [pg. 135]

• After Susan Rice’s Sunday show appearances, Jake Sullivan assured the Secretary of the State that Rice “wasn’t asked about whether we had any intel. But she did make clear our view that this started spontaneously and then evolved.” [pg. 128]

• Susan Rice’s comments on the Sunday talk shows were met with shock and disbelief by State Department employees in Washington. The Senior Libya Desk Officer, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, State Department, wrote: “I think Rice was off the reservation on this one.” The Deputy Director, Office of Press and Public Diplomacy, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, State Department, responded: “Off the reservation on five networks!” The Senior Advisor for Strategic Communications, Bureau of Near East Affairs, State Department, wrote: “WH [White House] very worried about the politics. This was all their doing.” [pg. 132]

• The CIA’s September 13, 2012, intelligence assessment was rife with errors. On the first page, there is a single mention of “the early stages of the protest” buried in one of the bullet points. The article cited to support the mention of a protest in this instance was actually from September 4. In other words, the analysts used an article from a full week before the attacks to support the premise that a protest had occurred just prior to the attack on September 11. [pg. 47]

• A headline on the following page of the CIA’s September 13 intelligence assessment stated “Extremists Capitalized on Benghazi Protests,” but nothing in the actual text box supports that title. As it turns out, the title of the text box was supposed to be “Extremists Capitalized on Cairo Protests.” That small but vital difference—from Cairo to Benghazi—had major implications in how people in the administration were able to message the attacks. [pg. 52]

Rep. Jim Jordan (OH-04) released the following statement regarding these findings:

“Obama Administration officials, including the Secretary of State, learned almost in real time that the attack in Benghazi was a terrorist attack. Rather than tell the American people the truth, the administration told one story privately and a different story publicly.”

Rep. Peter Roskam (IL-06) released the following statement regarding these findings:

“In the days and weeks after the attacks, the White House worked to pin all of the blame for their misleading and incorrect statements on officials within the intelligence community, but in reality, political operatives like Ben Rhodes and David Plouffe were spinning the false narrative and prepping Susan Rice for her interviews.”

The following facts are among the many new revelations in Part III:

• During deliberations within the State Department about whether and how to intervene in Libya in March 2011, Jake Sullivan listed the first goal as “avoid[ing]a failed state, particularly one in which al-Qaeda and other extremists might take safe haven.” [pg. 9]

• The administration’s policy of no boots on the ground shaped the type of military assistance provided to State Department personnel in Libya. The Executive Secretariats for both the Defense Department and State Department exchanged communications outlining the diplomatic capacity in which the Defense Department SST security team members would serve, which included wearing civilian clothes so as not to offend the Libyans. [pg. 60]

• When the State Department’s presence in Benghazi was extended in December 2012, senior officials from the Bureau of Diplomatic Security were excluded from the discussion. [pg. 74]

• In February 2012, the lead Diplomatic Security Agent at Embassy Tripoli informed his counterpart in Benghazi that more DS agents would not be provided by decision makers, because “substantive reporting” was not Benghazi’s purpose. [pg. 77]

• Emails indicate senior State Department officials, including Cheryl Mills, Jake Sullivan, and Huma Abedin were preparing for a trip by the Secretary of State to Libya in October 2012. According to testimony, Chris Stevens wanted to have a “deliverable” for the Secretary for her trip to Libya, and that “deliverable” would be making the Mission in Benghazi a permanent Consulate. [pg. 96]

• In August 2012—roughly a month before the Benghazi attacks—security on the ground worsened significantly. Ambassador Stevens initially planned to travel to Benghazi in early August, but cancelled the trip “primarily for Ramadan/security reasons.” [pg. 99]

• Former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta bluntly told the committee “an intelligence failure” occurred with respect to Benghazi. Former CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell also acknowledged multiple times an intelligence failure did in fact occur prior to the Benghazi attacks. [pg. 129]

Rep. Susan Brooks (IN-05) released the following statement regarding these findings:

“President Obama has said his worst mistake was ‘failing to plan for the day after … intervening in Libya.’ As a result of this ‘lead from behind’ foreign policy, the Libyan people were forced to make the dismal trade of the tyranny of Qadhafi for the terror of ISIS, Al-Qaeda and others. Although the State Department considered Libya a grave risk to American diplomats in 2011 and 2012, our people remained in a largely unprotected, unofficial facility that one diplomatic security agent the committee interviewed characterized as ‘a suicide mission.’”

Rep. Lynn Westmoreland (GA-03) released the following statement regarding these findings:

“One of the most concerning parts of the State Department’s policy in Libya was its reliance upon the militias of an unstable nation to protect our men and women in Benghazi. These were by no means forces that could adequately protect Americans on the ground, and the State Department knew it. But the appearance of no boots on the ground was more important to the administration.”

Part IV of the report reveals new information about the Select Committee’s requests and subpoenas seeking documents and witnesses regarding Benghazi and Libya, and details what the Obama administration provided to Congress, what it is still withholding, and how its serial delays hindered the committee’s efforts to uncover the truth.

Part V proposes 25 recommendations for the Pentagon, State Department, Intelligence Community, and Congress aimed at strengthening security for American personnel serving abroad and doing everything possible to ensure something like Benghazi never happens again, and if it does, that we are better prepared to respond.

The Select Committee intends to convene a bipartisan markup to discuss and vote on the proposed report on July 8, 2016. All members of the committee will have the opportunity to offer changes in a manner consistent with the rules of the House.

 Read the Report [853 Pages, 10.7MB]

Honoring Courage, Improving Security and Fighting the Exploitation of a Tragedy

Published June 2016

As the report states, “The Democratic Members of the Benghazi Select Committee submit this report in honor of the memories of Ambassador Christopher Stevens, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and Glen Doherty; the other extraordinary heroes in Benghazi and Tripoli who risked life and limb to help their fellow Americans; and the men and women of the Defense Department, State Department, and Intelligence Community who serve the United States every day around the world.”

Why can’t our elected officials work together? Why can’t they do an unbiased investigation into ANY event, including Benghazi?  Regardless of the answers, this report is included here for reference and fairness.

 Read the Report [344 Pages, 4.3MB]

U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

Published 11/21/2014

The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (“HPSCI” or “the Committee”) conducted a comprehensive and exhaustive investigation into the tragic attacks against two U.S. facilities in Benghazi, Libya on September 11-12, 2012. The nearly two-year investigation focused on the activities of the Intelligence Community (“IC”) before, during, and after the attacks. During the course of thousands of hours of detailed investigation, HPSCI reviewed thousands of pages of intelligence assessments, cables, notes, and emails; held 20 Committee events and hearings; and conducted detailed interviews with senior intelligence officials and eyewitnesses to the attacks, including eight security personnel on the ground in Benghazi that night.

 Read the Report [37 Pages, 2.5MB]

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Releases Report on DOD Response to Benghazi

Published 2/11/2014

WASHINGTON – The House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations released a comprehensive report today evaluating the response of the Department of Defense (DOD) to the terrorist attack in Benghazi, Libya on September 11, 2012. Read the Report

To undertake the committee’s review, Chairman Howard P. “Buck” McKeon directed the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations to work alongside the full committee. As a result, this report expresses the views of Chairman McKeon, Vice Chairman Mac Thornberry, Rep. Martha Roby (who was the chairman of the Oversight and Investigations subcommittee until December 2013), and the five majority members of that subcommittee.

To date, committee staff has reviewed thousands of pages of written material (including classified emails and situation reports) made available by DOD. Staff has also held three classified staff briefings, and two classified interviews. Members have participated in two open hearings, and seven additional classified briefings. In undertaking this work, the committee has met with and received information from military personnel in the entire chain of command in connection with Benghazi: from those on the ground at the time of the attack to the nation’s senior-most uniformed leader.

While the committee’s inquiry continues, the majority members believe that information gathered to date reaffirm the relevant findings in the Interim Progress Report for the Members of the Republican Conference on the Events Surrounding the September 11, 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi, Libya issued in April 2013 by the five committees with jurisdiction in the U.S. House of Representatives.

Based on its activities undertaken since the release of that report, majority members make the six findings listed below:

 Read the Report [31 Pages, 0.4MB]

Documents about the Benghazi Aftermath

The following are documents received under the FOIA regarding Benghazi, and the aftermath in the days, weeks and months after the attack.

• Correspondence Between Office of the Director of National Intelligence and Members of Congress, 09/01/2012 – 12/31/2012, Released March 2015 [47 Pages, 17.3MB]
• Director of National Intelligence E-Mails Regarding Benghazi, Released December of 2015 [26 Pages, 3.5MB] – After being told there were no documents relating to my request for correspondence to or from the consulate in Benghazi. After appealing their decision, I was asked to withdraw it, and they would do another search for responsive records. As a result, there were responsive records, and they were redacted and released. This is another example of being told one thing, but after pushing and exercising my appeal rights, there is another picture that unfolds.  FOIA Case Processing Notes, [18 Pages, 6MB]
• A Trainee Demand Analysis for the Expansion of the Marine Corps Embassy Security Group, March 2013, Master’s Thesis [95 Pages, 4.54mb] – On September 11, 2012, the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya, was attacked, resulting in the death of four United States citizens, including Ambassador Christopher Stevens. Prior to Bengazi, the Marine Corps Embassy Security Group (MCESG) held a total strength of about 1,400 Marines, of which 1,196 were Marine Security Guards (MSG). In response to the deadly attack, Congress authorized 1,000 new MSGs through the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act, creating additional protection for U.S. diplomatic facilities worldwide. This thesis examines the growth requirements needed to support MCESG’s expansion demands to produce MSGs at maximum capacity in the coming three to four years. The study analyzes trainee demands, proposing a methodology to assist MCESG operation personnel plans for expansion and future force sustainment. The proposed methodology is founded on an Excel-based analytical approach that relies heavily on simulation and is interfaced through a Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) UserForm. The model is easily manipulated, as operational needs dictate. Once developed, VBA UserForm is a simple and effective tool that can assist planners in standardizing procedures at the operational level. Research-based analysis indicates that the proposed methodology could yield significant savings in terms of manpower and training requirements for MCESG.
• CTC Sentinel – Volume 6, Issue 2, February 2013 [25 Pages, 1.51MB] – Islamist Militant Groups in Post-Qadhafi Libya.

Declassified Transcripts of Benghazi Briefings Released

January 13th, 2014 – The House Armed Services Committee today released a series of recently declassified transcripts of briefings on the September 11th 2012 attack on Americans in Benghazi, Libya. The briefings were conducted by the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations then chaired by Rep. Martha Roby (R-AL), though they were open to all members of the Committee and attended by Members off the Committee. The briefings, which took place over the course of several months, were part of the Committee’s examination of the actions of the military chain of command before, during, and after the attack. A report summarizing the conclusion of the HASC Oversight & Investigations majority Members draw from these briefings is expected to be released later this week.

•  Transcript #1

  1_Briefing transcript (redacted), “DOD’s preparation for the terrorist attacks in Benghazi,” (Part I, Session I, DOD), May 21, 2013.pdf (3.7 MBs)

•  Transcript #2

  2_Briefing transcript (redacted), “DOD’s preparation for the terrorist attacks in Benghazi,” (Part I, Session II DOD), May 21, 2013.pdf (642.4 KBs)

•  Transcript #3

  3_Briefing transcript (redacted), “DOD’s preparation for the terrorist attacks in Benghazi,” (Part II, AFRICOM), June 26, 2013.pdf (9.2 MBs)

•  Transcript #4

  4_Briefing transcript (redacted), “DOD’s preparation for the terrorist attacks in Benghazi,” (Part III, Colonel Bristol), July 31, 2013.pdf (10.8 MBs)

•  Transcript #5

  5_Hearing transcript, “DOD’s posture for September 11, 2013,” (Part IV, Force Posture), September 19, 2013.pdf (691.9 KBs)

•  Transcript #6

  6_Briefing transcript (redacted), “DOD’s force posture in anticipation of September 11, 2012,” (Part V, General Dempsey), October 10, 2013.pdf (2.3 MBs)

Progress Report on Benghazi Terror Attack Investigation

Last year, Speaker John Boehner asked the House committees on Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, Intelligence, Judiciary, and Oversight & Government Reform to investigate the terrorist attack in Benghazi, Libya that killed four Americans. On 4/23/13, these five committees released their progress report, which outlines their findings and the next steps in the investigation.

• Progress Report on Benghazi Terror Attack Investigation [46 Pages, 0.99mb]

Timeline of Documents and Events Relating to the Benghazi Attack

1. 8/27/12 – Travel Warning, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Bureau of Consular Affairs, in regards to Libya [2 Pages, 113kb] – Specifically mentions Benghazi with increased violence.
2. 9/11/12 – Statement on the Attack in Benghazi, Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, Department of State [1 Page, 90kb] – Blames internet video for attack. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”
3. 9/12/12 – Statement by the President on the Attack in Benghazi [1 Page, 96kb] – Written Statement released by the President. No mention of video. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”
4. 9/12/12 – Statement by the President on the Attack in Benghazi, Rose Garden Speech [Video] – No mention of “terror” or “terrorism” in relation to Benghazi. Says “No acts of terror will ever shake the resolve on this great nation…” at the end of the speech, however, he was speaking about the 9/11/01 attacks, and his visits to victims and family members.
5. 9/12/12 – Remarks on the Deaths of American Personnel in Benghazi, Libya, Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, Department of State [3 Pages, 90kb] – The video of this speech, is below in the Video Archive. Blames internet video for attack. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”
6. 9/12/12 – Press Statement on the Deaths of American Personnel in Benghazi, Libya, Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, Department of State [2 Pages, 101kb]-
   Blames internet video for attack. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”
7. 9/12/12 – Remarks on the Deaths of American Personnel in Benghazi, Libya, Susan Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations , U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Department of State [3 Pages, 98kb] –Blames internet video for attack. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”
8. 9/12/12 – Briefing by Senior Administration Officials to Update Recent Events in Libya [3 Pages, 98kb] – Will not answer if internet video was cause of attack. Will not answer if there is a “terrorism” link.
9. 9/13/12 – State Department Daily Press Briefing [21 Pages, 180kb] – Confirms blaming internet video for attack. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”
10. 9/13/12 – Statement on the Deaths of Tyrone S. Woods and Glen A. Doherty in Benghazi, Libya, Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, Department of State [2 Pages, 101kb]- No mention of video. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”
11. 9/14/12 – Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney [17 Pages, 166kb] Blames internet video as attack. Denies any “concrete evidence” of a “terror” link that would show “[the attack]to not being in response to the film.”
12. 9/14/12 – Remarks at the Transfer of Remains Ceremony to Honor Those Lost in Attacks in Benghazi, Libya, Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State [3 Pages, 99kb] Blames internet video as attack. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”
13. 9/14/12 – Remarks at the Transfer of Remains Ceremony to Honor Those Lost in Attacks in Benghazi, Libya, President Barack Obama [2 Pages, 125kb]- No mention of video. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”
14. 10/09/12 – Background Briefing on Libya [13 Pages, 140kb]-
    Said video was not their conclusion for attack..No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”
15. 10/10/12 – On-The-Record Briefing by Under Secretary Kennedy [4 Pages, 110kb] – WATCH VIDEO – No mention of video. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”
16. 10/12/12 – Hearing on Benghazi Security Issues, Testimony Before the House Oversight Subcommittee, Patrick Kennedy, Under Secretary for Management [4 Pages, 108kb]- No mention of video. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”
17. 10/12/12 – Hearing on Benghazi Security Issues, Testimony Before the House Oversight Subcommittee, Charlene Lamb, Deputy Assistant, Secretary of State [8 Pages, 124kb] – No mention of video. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”
18. 10/12/12 – Hearing on Benghazi Security Issues, Prepared Statement Before the House Oversight Subcommittee, Eric Allan Nordstrom, Regional Security Officer, Tripoli, Libya from September 21, 2011-July 26, 2012 [12 Pages, 191kb]-
    No mention of video. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”
19. 10/15/12 – Interview With Margaret Brennan of CBS, Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State [4 Pages, 108kb] -No mention of video. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”
20. 11/09/12 – Daily Press Briefing, Victoria Nuland, Spokesperson [19 Pages, 190kb]- No mention of video. No mention of “terror” or “terrorism”

Flashing Red: A Special Report on the Terrorist Attack At Benghazi (Official Senate Report)

1. Flashing Red: A Special Report on the Terrorist Attack At Benghazi [31 Pages, 0.4mb] – While our country spent September 11, 2012, remembering the terrorist attacks that took place 11 years earlier, brave Americans posted at U.S. government facilities in Benghazi, Libya, were fighting for their lives against a terrorist assault. When the fight ended, U.S. Ambassador to Libya John C. (Chris) Stevens and three other Americans were dead and U.S. facilities in Benghazi were left in ruin. We must remember the sacrifice that these selfless public servants made to support the struggle for freedom in Libya and to improve our own national security. While we mourn their deaths, it is also crucial that we learn from how they died. By examining the circumstances of the attack in Benghazi on September 11th, we hope to gain a better understanding of what went wrong and what we must do now to ensure better protection for American diplomatic personnel who must sometimes operate in dangerous places abroad.

Historical government records, detailing the highly volatile situation in Libya and Benghazi

1.  America Strikes Back, April 1987 [44 Pages, 16.53mb] – After repeated warnings from the United States government, elements of the U.S. Sixth Fleet and the USAF bombed targets in and around the Libyan cities of Benghazi and Tripoli on 14 April 1986. The attack came in retaliation to several Libyan sponsored terrorist attacks on U.S. concerns in the weeks preceding. This paper examines the effects of the bombing as a deterrent of future terrorist attacks and further examines current and projected U.S. counterterrorist policies.
2. Conflict with Libya: Use of Military Force Against Terrorism, 8 Feb 1994 [30 Pages, 1.1mb] – The United States attack on Libya on April 15, 1986 was the culmination of a series of developments in U.S. foreign policy and military strategy intended to combat international terrorism. It was the culmination of the U.S. attempt to use both non- military and military methods to combat terrorism. This paper examines the use of military force as an appropriate means to combat terrorism. In particular, the 1986 conflict with Libya is examined concentrating on the following aspects: whether operational level objectives contributed to achievement of strategic goals; and the use of military force as an effective instrument in the war against terrorism. This paper concludes that the use of military force (along with the European non- military responses) was an effective instrument in the war against terrorism as measured by the decrease in Libyan sponsored attacks from 1986 to 1991. However, the U.S. attack on Libya is still an isolated event and does not provide a sufficient basis for a doctrine of military retaliation against terrorism.
3. Deterring Libya: The Strategic Culture of Muammar Qaddafi, October 2000 [31 Pages, 0.2mb] – In September of 1969, Muammar al-Qaddafi then a virtually unknown army officer in his late twenties rose to the leadership of Libya. Armed with a vision of Arab unity and anti-colonialism, he led a small group of his fellow officers who called themselves the Free Officers Movement. In a virtually bloodless coup, they ousted the aging (and absent) King Idris Al-Sanusi and established Libya as a republic. During the 30 years since, Qaddafi has emerged as a charismatic and complicated leader. Considered by Westerners to be bizarre and irrational, he has been branded a terrorist and a rogue. Among some of his fellow Arabs, he is praised as a virulent anti-Zionist and anti-imperialist, while others condemn him as a plotter and an adventurer whose zealous pursuit of Arab, African, and Islamic unity has only resulted in destabilization. Qaddafi remarked in 1976 that atomic weapons will be like traditional ones, possessed by every state according to its potential. We will have our share of this new weapon. In 1987 Reuters quoted him as saying: The Arabs must possess the atom bomb to defend themselves, until their numbers reach one thousand million and they learn to desalinate water and until they liberate Palestine. 1 Qaddafi places little faith in his armed forces and dreads a repeat of the 1986 U.S. air strikes against Tripoli and Benghazi. Reflecting on the air strikes, Qaddafi has wistfully spoken of possessing a ballistic missile capability that could threaten New York.2 Few state leaders have expressed such single-minded determination to obtain chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. This determination, coupled with Qaddafi s long-term association with terrorism, has caused grave concern among other nations especially the United States and Israel.
4. Libya: A Future Arab Democracy [43 Pages, 0.6mb] – Libya has overthrown its long time dictator Muammar Gadhafi with the aid of both Western and Arab militaries. The United States acted under the authority of U.N. mandate 1973 as part of a broad coalition of both NATO and Arab Nations primarily in a supporting role. In Libya, as in its neighbors Egypt and Tunisia, the successful revolution has now established transitional governments who’s effectiveness is yet to be determined. Unlike other Arab nations, Libya possesses a combination of vast oil reserves, a small and balanced population, and a relatively high education level in its citizens. These factors all bode well for the establishment of a lasting representative government. If successful, Libya can not only secure its borders, and deny safe haven to terrorism as is the declared interest of the United States, but also serve as a positive economic and political influence on the region. Egypt remains the most significant and strategic nation in the region, but the benefits of a successful Libya and the relatively low cost at which it may be achieved should not be overlooked.
5. Libya: Unrest and US Policy [43 Pages, 0.7mb] – Over 40 years ago, Muammar al Qadhafi led a revolt against the Libyan monarchy in the name of nationalism, self-determination, and popular sovereignty. Opposition groups citing the same principles are now revolting against Qadhafi to bring an end to the authoritarian political system he has controlled in Libya for the last four decades. The Libyan government’s use of force against civilians and opposition forces seeking Qadhafi’s overthrow sparked an international outcry and led the United Nations Security Council to adopt Resolution 1973, which authorizes “all necessary measures” to protect Libyan civilians. The United States military is participating in Operation Unified Protector, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military operation to enforce the resolution. Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and other partner governments also are participating. Qadhafi and his supporters have described the uprising as a foreign and Islamist conspiracy and are attempting to outlast their opponents. Qadhafi remains defiant amid continuing coalition air strikes, and his forces continue to attack opposition-held areas. Some opposition figures have formed an Interim Transitional National Council (ITNC), which claims to represent all areas of the country. They seek foreign political recognition and material support.
6. A Nation at the Periphery: Libyan Regionalism Revisited [43 Pages, 0.6mb] – This article places the current Libyan conflict in historical perspective by focusing on the dynamics between the country’s two main regions (Tripolitania and Cyrenaica) during key moments of the 20th century. Particular attention is given to the different way each of the two regions approached the early period of Italian colonialism, from 1911 to 1923. The paper shows that historical relations between the two regions are characterized by both independence and interdependence and that this pattern is reemerging as the country transitions to a new era.
7. Personnel Recovery: Strategic Importance and Impact, December 2012 [31 Pages, 0.6mb] – The breaking news from countless media venues in March 2011 was captivating and compelling: while taking part in coalition operations in Libya, a US Air Force F-15E, call sign Bolar 34 had gone down east of Benghazi. The two crew members had ejected into a chaotic battle between the despotic Libyan regime and opposition forces supported by the coalition. As our nation prayed for the two Airmen, President Barack Obama heard a briefing on the event and monitored the situation as rescue forces from a US Marine task force in the area and opposition ground forces quickly dashed in to recover both men. In many ways, this heartwarming story resembled accounts of other rescues performed in earlier conflicts. The saga of Bolar 34 joined the lore of rescue missions that grace the proud history of our nation.

The post Benghazi Attack, 9/11/2012 first appeared on The Black Vault.

Document Archive

Alleged Misconduct By Senior DoD Officials Concerning The Able Danger Program and Lieutenant Colonel Anthony A. Shaffer, U.S. Army Reserve, September 18, 2006 [73 Pages, 6MB] – (Note: Documents were requested on ABLE DANGER from DIA. They sent this DoD/OIG report link, so I combined their letter with that report.)

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The post Alleged Misconduct By Senior DoD Officials Concerning The Able Danger Program and Lieutenant Colonel Anthony A. Shaffer, U.S. Army Reserve, September 18, 2006 first appeared on The Black Vault.

This material is being released in response to Executive Order 14040, signed September 3, 2021, on the declassification review of certain documents concerning the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

Federal Bureau of Investigation

9/11 Material Released in Response to Executive Order 14040 – Release #1 [17 Pages, 2.5MB]

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The post 9/11 Material Released in Response to Executive Order 14040 first appeared on The Black Vault.

Mohamed Mohamed el-Amir Awad el-Sayed Atta was an Egyptian hijacker and Islamic terrorist and one of the ringleaders of the September 11 attacks who served as the hijacker-pilot of American Airlines Flight 11, crashing the plane into the North Tower of the World Trade Center as part of the coordinated attacks.

Below, you will find various files on Atta, obtained under the Freedom of Information Act.

Document Archive

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)

 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) Regarding Atta, Requested October 2014 [2 Pages, 0.2MB] – More than 13 years after the attacks – the U.S. Government is still classifying material on Atta.

 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) Regarding Atta, Requested January 2016 [12 Pages, 0.7MB] – After waiting a couple more years, I requested records again in January of 2016. To my surprise, USCIS is now claiming they “can not find” Atta’s alien file, but included some prints from their electronic system. What happened to Atta’s alien file, after having it classified for so many years?!

 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) Regarding Atta, Entire FOIA Case File for the above case [28 Pages, 0.7MB]

 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) Regarding Atta, Requested June 2018 [2 Pages, 0.7MB] – This was the result of a “Mandatory Declassification Review” request to declassify records relating to Mohammad Atta. It was forwarded from Department of Homeland Security (DHS) back to USCIS, and they then denied access to the records. Although they denied it, they did forward the request to the FBI for another review. Results will be posted, when they become available.

 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) FOIA Processing Procedures for requests related to Atta [122 Pages, 2.5MB] – I was told there were no records pertaining to my request (ie: no special instructions). I requested the entire case file to see what they discussed about behind the scenes. This was the result.

Department of Justice / Office of Information Policy (DOJ/OIP)

Department of Justice / Office of Information Policy (DOJ/OIP) FOIA Requests Relating to Mohamed Atta [17 Pages, 1MB]  – These records were considered “non-responsive” when forwarded to them from the FBI. I filed a second request to obtain them, and they consist mostly of FOIA request letters and responses.

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Says All Files are Classified, November 2014 [4 Pages, 0.2MB] – Another denial of material on Atta, citing a law enforcement proceeding.

 Department of Justice / INTERPOL – FBI Referral [3 Pages, 0.7MB] – Another denial of material on Atta, citing a law enforcement proceeding.

 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) FOIA Requests Relating to Mohamed Atta [178 Pages, 70.8MB] – This is the first release of FOIA requests received by the FBI, that pertain to Mohamed Atta. Additional records will be added, when released.

The post 9/11 Hijacker: Mohamed Atta first appeared on The Black Vault.

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Inspector General Report on 9/11/01

 OIG Report on CIA Accountability with Respect to the 9/11 Attacks – Executive Summary [19 Pages, 1MB]

 Inspection Report of the DCI Counter-Terrorist Center Directorate of Operations, August 2001  [81 Pages, 1.68MB]

 Joint Response to Draft IG 9/11 Report  [16 Pages, 7.3MB]

 Joint Response to OIG Report – “Accountability Regarding Findings and Conclusions of the Joint” [18 Pages, 1.20MB]

 Memorandum to Inspector General Helgerson from George J. Tenet Regarding Assessment of Performance [19 Pages, 1.44MB]

 Office of Inspector General Report on Central Intelligence Agency Accountability Regarding Findings [490 Pages, 17.9MB]

 Response to Inspector General’s 9/11 Accountability Final Draft Report [10 Pages, 0.8MB]
 Response to Inspector General’s 9/11 Accountability Final Draft Report – MDR Release 23 July 2021 (No new information was released) [11 Pages, 0.8MB]

Interrogation

CIA/OIG Report on Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities, 07 May 2004

The post Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Records on 9/11/01 Terrorist Attacks first appeared on The Black Vault.

The below document was referenced in the 9/11 Commission Report. Prior to the posting of it here, on The Black Vault, it appears it has never been released before to the general public and has never appeared online. It should be noted, other individuals did go after its declassification as well, and The Black Vault’s request was not alone in the effort to see this record declassified, even in part.

Although partially redacted, you can find the document below.

Document Archive

Facilitating Disaster: An Overview of 11 September Finance, 22 August 2002 [14 pages, 1.8MB]

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The post Facilitating Disaster: An Overview of 11 September Finance, 22 August 2002 first appeared on The Black Vault.

This report is from the CIA’s Office of Inspector General. There have been different releases of it throughout the years, based on various security reviews.

The Black Vault first received it in 2013, seeking information on Khalid Sheikh Mohammad. A MDR request was filed in 2018, but the document was involved in litigation, so my request was denied until the litigation was complete. After a while, I filed again in November of 2020. I was informed in March of 2021, that a review was completed the next month, and was asked if I would accept that review as responsive to my request, in which I agreed.

Both releases are below.

Document Archive

OIG Report on Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities, 07 May 2004 [162 Pages, 7.4MB]

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Archived Releases

OIG Report on Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities, 07 May 2004 [159 Pages, 8.83MB] – This is an archived release given to “thetorturedatabase.org” as the responsive record for Salim v. Mitchell. I am adding it here for reference. (Note: External link to thetorturedatabase.org).

OIG Report on Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities, 07 May 2004 [159 Pages, 8.83MB] – This report came in response to my FOIA request to the CIA regarding the treatment of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed while at Guantanamo Bay.

The post Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities, 07 May 2004 first appeared on The Black Vault.

Background

On December 16, 2020, the Department of Justice unsealed the indictment charging Cholo Abdi Abdullah. You can find their announcement archived below, along with the indictment.

Department of Justice Press Release

The Department of Justice announced the unsealing of an indictment charging Cholo Abdi Abdullah with six counts of terrorism-related offenses arising from his activities as an operative of the foreign terrorist organization al Shabaab, including conspiring to hijack aircraft in order to conduct a 9/11-style attack in the United States.  Abdullah was arrested in July 2019 in the Philippines on local charges, and was subsequently transferred on Dec. 15, 2020 in connection with his deportation from the Philippines to the custody of U.S. law enforcement for prosecution on the charges in the indictment.  Abdullah was transported from the Phillippines to the United States yesterday, and is expected to be presented today before Magistrate Judge Robert W. Lehrburger in Manhattan federal court.  The case is assigned to United States District Judge Analisa Torres.

“This case, which involved a plot to use an aircraft to kill innocent victims, reminds us of the deadly threat that radical Islamic terrorists continue to pose to our nation.  And it also highlights our commitment to pursue and hold accountable anybody who seeks to harm our country and our citizens.  No matter where terrorists who plan to target Americans may be located, we will seek to identify them and bring them to justice,” said Assistant Attorney General for National Security John C. Demers.  “We owe a debt of gratitude to the detectives, agents, analysts, and prosecutors who are responsible for this defendant’s arrest.”

“As alleged, Cholo Abdi Abdullah, as part of a terrorist plot directed by senior al Shabaab leaders, obtained pilot training in the Philippines in preparation for seeking to hijack a commercial aircraft and crash it into a building in the United States,” said Acting Manhattan U.S. Attorney Audrey Strauss.  “This chilling callback to the horrific attacks of September 11, 2001, is a stark reminder that terrorist groups like al Shabaab remain committed to killing U.S. citizens and attacking the United States.  But we remain even more resolute in our dedication to investigating, preventing, and prosecuting such lethal plots, and will use every tool in our arsenal to stop those who would commit acts of terrorism at home and abroad.  Thanks to the outstanding investigative work of the New York Joint Terrorism Task Force, and the FBI’s global partnerships with law enforcement agencies around the world, Abdullah’s plot was detected before he could achieve his deadly aspirations, and now he faces federal terrorism charges in a U.S. court.”

“Nearly 20 years after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, there are those who remain determined to conduct terror attacks against United States citizens. Abdullah, we allege, is one of them,” said FBI Assistant Director-in-Charge William F. Sweeney Jr. “He obtained a pilot’s license overseas, learning how to hijack an aircraft for the purpose of causing a mass-casualty incident within our borders. Fortunately, the exceptional work by the men and women assigned to the many agencies that comprise the FBI’s New York JTTF have, once again, disrupted a threat to our communities.”

“As alleged in the federal indictment against him, Cholo Abdi Abdullah had obtained pilot training and begun plotting a terrorist attack against a target in the United States,” said NYPD Commissioner Dermot Shea.  “But the outstanding work of our NYPD detectives and federal agents of the FBI’s New York Joint Terrorism Task Force, along with all of our law enforcement partners, put an end to those plans and ensured that no one would be harmed.”

As alleged in the Indictment,[1] unsealed today in Manhattan federal court:

The charges in the Indictment unsealed today arise out of a coordinated scheme by the terrorist organization Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, commonly known as “al Shabaab,” to target Americans both at home and abroad.  Al Shabaab, which has sworn allegiance to al Qaeda and serves as al Qaeda’s principal wing in East Africa, is responsible for numerous deadly terrorist attacks, including attacks that have claimed American lives.  Recently, al Shabaab has embarked on a string of terrorist attacks as part of an operation purportedly in response to the United States’ decision to move its embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, which the group has dubbed “Operation Jerusalem Will Never be Judaized.”  In particular, these terrorist attacks perpetrated by al Shabaab include an attack on Jan. 15, 2019, at a hotel in Nairobi, Kenya, which resulted in the deaths of approximately 21 people, including a U.S. national and survivor of al Qaeda’s 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center in New York, New York; a Sept. 30, 2019, attack on a U.S. military facility in Somalia; and a Jan. 5, 2020, attack on another U.S. facility in Kenya, in which three Americans were killed.

As alleged in the Indictment, Abdullah was an al Shabaab operative who participated in a plot to hijack commercial aircraft and crash them into a building in the United States.  Beginning in 2016, at the direction of a senior al Shabaab commander who was responsible for, among other things, planning the 2019 Nairobi hotel attack, Abdullah traveled to the Philippines and enrolled in a flight school there (the “Flight School”), for the purpose of obtaining training for carrying out the 9/11-style attack.  Between 2017 and 2019, Abdullah attended the Flight School on various occasions and obtained pilot’s training, ultimately completing the tests necessary to obtain his pilot’s license.

While Abdullah was obtaining pilot training at the Flight School, he also conducted research into the means and methods to hijack a commercial airliner to conduct the planned attack, including security on commercial airliners and how to breach a cockpit door from the outside, information about the tallest building in a major U.S. city, and information about how to obtain a U.S. visa.

Thanks to the extraordinary work of the FBI, law enforcement authorities foiled this plot.  Abdullah has remained in custody since his arrest on the local charges in the Philippines.

Abdullah, 30, of Kenya, is charged with conspiring to provide and providing material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization (al Shabaab), conspiring to murder U.S. nationals, conspiring to commit aircraft piracy, conspiring to destroy aircraft, and conspiring to commit acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries.  Abdullah faces a maximum sentence of life in prison, and a mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years in prison.  The specific penalties for each of the charges is reflected in the chart below.  The maximum potential sentence in this case is prescribed by Congress and is provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendant will be determined by a judge.

Assistant Attorney General Demers and Ms. Strauss praised the outstanding efforts of the FBI’s New York Joint Terrorism Task Force, which principally consists of agents from the FBI and detectives from the NYPD. They also thanked the FBI Hudson Valley office and the New York State Police.  Ms. Strauss also thanked the FBI Legal Attaché Offices in Nairobi, Kenya, and Manila, the Philippines; the Counterterrorism Section of the Department of Justice’s National Security Division; the Office of International Affairs of the Department of Justice’s Criminal Division; the U.S. Department of Defense; “…the Kenyan Directorate of Criminal Investigations, the Kenyan Anti-Terrorism Police Unit, the Joint Terrorism Task Force-Kenya, and the Kenyan Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions; and the Philippine National Police, Philippine Department of Justice, the Joint Terrorism Financial Investigations Group – Philippines, and Philippine Bureau of Immigration, for their assistance.

This prosecution is being handled by the Office’s Terrorism and International Narcotics Unit.  Assistant U.S. Attorneys David W. Denton, Jr., Sidhardha Kamaraju, and Elinor Tarlow are in charge of the prosecution, with assistance from the Counterterrorism Section of the National Security Division.

The charges in the Indictment are merely accusations, and the defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.

---

[1] As the introductory phrase signifies, the entirety of the text of the Indictment and the description of the Indictment set forth herein are only allegations, and every fact described should be treated as an allegation.

Document Archive

Kenyan National Indicted for Conspiring to Hijack Aircraft on Behalf of the Al Qaeda-Affiliated Terrorist Organization Al Shabaab [19 Pages, 1MB]

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The post Kenyan National Indicted for Conspiring to Hijack Aircraft on Behalf of the Al Qaeda-Affiliated Terrorist Organization Al Shabaab first appeared on The Black Vault.

This is the “Terrorism Review” for January 1999, as created by the CIA and released to The Black Vault in June of 2019.

The result was from a Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) request. The record had been released in July of 2011, but had many more redactions. The 2019 release was successful in getting many of them lifted.

I put a ‘clean’ version below, along with a highlighted version showing the new information released (information that was previously redacted.)

Document Archive

Terrorism Review for January 1999, CIA – June 2019 Release – [39 Pages, 10MB]

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Terrorism Review for January 1999, CIA – June 2019 Release – Highlighted Version – [39 Pages, 10MB]

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The post Terrorism Review for January 1999, CIA first appeared on The Black Vault.

According to Wikipedia:

Gul Rahman (died 20 November 2002) was an Afghan man, suspected by the United States of being a militant, who was a victim of torture. He died in a secret CIA prison, or black site, located in northern Kabul, Afghanistan known as the Salt Pit. He had been captured October 29, 2002.

His name was kept secret by the United States for more than seven years although his death was announced. In 2010 the Associated Press reported that before his death he was left half-stripped and chained against a concrete wall on a night when the temperature was close to freezing. The United States government did not notify his family (wife and four daughters) of his death, according to the report.

The CIA conducted an investigation into his death, and the record was first released in 2016. The Black Vault filed a Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) request in June of 2019, and the record was re-released with much less redaction.

Below, you will find the release of the record, and the new information revealed.

Document Archive

The CIA’s Death Investigation of Gul Rahman, 2002 [37 Pages, 16MB] – Released March of 2020 to The Black Vault after an MDR.

The CIA’s Death Investigation of Gul Rahman, 2002 – Highlighted Newly released information – [37 Pages, 16MB] –  This is the document above, with newly released information highlighted.

Previous Releases

The CIA’s Death Investigation of Gul Rahman, 2002 – 2016 CIA Release – [37 Pages, 16MB]

The post The CIA’s Death Investigation of Gul Rahman, 2002 first appeared on The Black Vault.

Operation Vulgar Betrayal was a counterterrorism probe, allegedly targeting Middle Eastern terrorist funds used to finance attacks on U.S. soil. The program also targeted those on U.S. soil planning such attacks.

It was an operation through the late 1990s and possibly into the early 2000s. FBI Agent Robert Wright was the case agent of Operation Vulgar Betrayal, who has spoken out extensively about the cancellation of the program, and the fact the FBI did not adequately pursue the many known U.S.-based Middle Eastern terrorists and their financial supporters identified via Vulgar Betrayal.

Below, I have archived thousands of pages relating to the program which the FBI has released. In a follow up FOIA request, the FBI says the below 9,425 pages is everything they have on the program.

Document Archive

Operation Vulgar Betrayal, Counterterrorism Probe, 1990s-2000s – FBI Release #1 (COMBINED / SEARCHABLE .pdf file of the individual files below) [9,425 Pages, 360MB] – Please note: This is a LARGE file. It is recommended you right click, and press “save as” to download to your hard drive before opening.

Operation Vulgar Betrayal, Counterterrorism Probe, 1990s-2000s – FBI Release #1 (.ZIP FILE OF SEARCHABLE, IDIVIDIAL .pdf FILES) [9,425 Pages, 305MB]

The post Operation Vulgar Betrayal, Counterterrorism Probe, 1990s-2000s first appeared on The Black Vault.

Below you will find documents regarding 9/11/01, from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Document Archive

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Records on 9/11

The following documents have been declassified by the FBI pertaining to 9/11.

The 11 September Hijacker Cell Model, February 2003 [10 Pages, 9MB]
The 11 September Hijacker Cell Model, February 2003 [13 Pages, 6.5MB] – This was an attempt at a Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) of the same document, but appears to be a re-release of the same information as nothing else could be revealed.

A Review of the FBI’s Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks, (November 2004), Released Publicly June 2006 [449 Pages, 9.07mb]

A Review of the FBI’s Handling of Intelligence Information Prior to the September 11 Attacks, (released publicly June 2005) (Redacted and Unclassified), November 2004 [328 Pages, 32.43mb]

The September 11 Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in Connection with the Investigation of the September 11 Attacks, June 2003 [239 Pages, 12.5mb]

The Immigration and Naturalization Service’s Contacts With Two September 11 Terrorists: A Review of the INS’s Admissions of Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi, its Processing of their Change of Status Applications, and its Efforts to Track Foreign Students in the United States, May 2002 [212 Pages, 1.6mb]

The post Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Records first appeared on The Black Vault.

Defense Support to Civil Authorities: WMD/E Consequence Management is a supplemental handbook that presents an appreciation of U.S. military forces and their roles as part of Department of Defense support to Federal emergency response in a terrorist WMD/E incident. This handbook supports a U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence capstone reference guide on terrorism, DCSINT Handbook No. 1, A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century. Both the capstone guide and supplemental handbook are prepared under the direction of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence-Threats. Understanding WMD/E and terrorism spans foreign and domestic threats with specific strategies, tactics, and targets. A central aspect of this handbook comprises is the use of U.S. military capabilities during a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high yield explosive (CBRNE) incident in a contemporary operational environment (COE).

Document Archive

Defense Support of Civil Authorities. Handbook No. 1.04, 15 August 2004 [69 Pages, 0.8MB]

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The post Defense Support of Civil Authorities. Handbook No. 1.04, 15 August 2004 first appeared on The Black Vault.

The USS Liberty incident was an attack on a United States Navy technical research ship, USS Liberty, by Israeli Air Force jet fighter aircraft and Israeli Navy motor torpedo boats, on June 8, 1967, during the Six-Day War. The combined air and sea attack killed 34 crew members (naval officers, seamen, two Marines, and one civilian), wounded 171 crew members, and severely damaged the ship. At the time, the ship was in international waters north of the Sinai Peninsula, about 25.5 nmi (29.3 mi; 47.2 km) northwest from the Egyptian city of Arish.

Israel apologized for the attack, saying that the USS Liberty had been attacked in error after being mistaken for an Egyptian ship. Both the Israeli and U.S. governments conducted inquiries and issued reports that concluded the attack was a mistake due to Israeli confusion about the ship’s identity, though others, including survivors of the attack, have rejected these conclusions and maintain that the attack was deliberate.

In May 1968, the Israeli government paid US$3,323,500 (US$22.2 million in 2013) as full payment to the families of the 34 men killed in the attack. In March 1969, Israel paid a further $3,566,457 in compensation to the men who had been wounded. On 18 December 1980, it agreed to pay $6 million as settlement for the final U.S. bill of $17,132,709 for material damage to the Liberty itself plus 13 years’ interest. (Source: Wikipedia)

Document Archive

National Security Agency Collection

On 02 July 2003, the National Security Agency (NSA) released additional information relative to the 08 June 1967 attack on the U.S.S. Liberty. This release includes three audio recordings, transcripts (in English), three follow-up reports, and a U.S. Cryptologic History Report entitled “Attack on a SIGINT Collector, the U.S.S. Liberty.” The recordings are in Hebrew and contain time counts in English that were added by the intercept operator. The follow-up reports are summaries of the three transcripts with non-substantive chatter omitted and a compiled report that summarizes the activity and contains the text of the transcripts. The U.S. Cryptologic History Report is a less redacted version of the same document originally released in 1999.

How the information was obtained:

Within an hour of learning that the Liberty had been torpedoed the Director, NSA, LTG Marshall S. Carter, USA, sent a message to all intercept sites requesting a special search of all communications that might reflect the attack or reaction. No communications were available. However, one of the airborne platforms, a U.S. Navy EC-121, had collected voice conversations between two Israeli helicopter pilots and the control tower at Hazor Airfield following the attack on the Liberty.

Audio Recording Labeled 104 (.wav)
Transcript

Audio Recording Labeled 105
Transcript

Audio Recording Labeled 130
Transcript

Follow-up Report No. 1, dated 9 June 1967, 0831Z

Follow-up Report No. 2, dated 9 June 1967, 1422Z

Aftermath of Israeli Attack on U.S.S. Liberty, 22 June 1967, 1454Z

U.S.Cryptologic History Report, “Attack on a SIGINT Collector, the U.S.S. Liberty”, dated 1981

A Review of the Technical Research Ship Program 1961-1969 (1989 release – see below link for 2017 release) [138 Pages, 3.84mb]

A Review of the Technical Research Ship Program 1961-1969 (2017 Release) [137 Pages, 25.5MB] – In September of 2016, I requested a Mandatory Declassification Review of this document. Although previously released, it had a lot of redactions. In February of 2017, the NSA released this version of the document, after another review was conducted. (It appears I was not the only one who requested an MDR of the record — not sure who the other requester(s) were.

Office of the Secretary of Defense Collection

Formal Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Attack of the USS Stark in 1987 [46 Pages, 1.6mb]

Messages Concerning U.S. Liberty Attack [5 Pages, 0.3mb]

USS Liberty Incident [194 Pages, 5.3mb]

USS Liberty Incident Chronology of Significant Events relating to the Employment of US Forces in Lebanon [4 Pages, 0.4mb]

USS Pueblo [15 Pages, 0.8mb]

The post USS Liberty Attack, June 8, 1967 first appeared on The Black Vault.

During the war in Iraq that began in March 2003, personnel of the United States Army and the Central Intelligence Agency committed a series of human rights violations against detainees in the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. These violations included physical and sexual abuse, torture, rape, sodomy, and murder.  The abuses came to widespread public attention with the publication of photographs of the abuse by CBS News in April 2004. The incidents received widespread condemnation both within the United States and abroad, although the soldiers received support from some conservative media within the United States.

The administration of George W. Bush asserted that these were isolated incidents, not indicative of general U.S. policy. This was disputed by humanitarian organizations such as the Red Cross, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch. These organizations stated that the abuses at Abu Ghraib were not isolated incidents, but were part of a wider pattern of torture and brutal treatment at American overseas detention centers, including those in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay. Several scholars stated that the abuses constituted state-sanctioned crimes.

The United States Department of Defense removed seventeen soldiers and officers from duty, and eleven soldiers were charged with dereliction of duty, maltreatment, aggravated assault and battery. Between May 2004 and March 2006, these soldiers were convicted in courts-martial, sentenced to military prison, and dishonorably discharged from service. Two soldiers, Specialist Charles Graner and PFC Lynndie England, were sentenced to ten and three years in prison, respectively. Brigadier General Janis Karpinski, the commanding officer of all detention facilities in Iraq, was reprimanded and demoted to the rank of colonel. Several more military personnel who were accused of perpetrating or authorizing the measures, including many of higher rank, were not prosecuted. It is reported that most inmates were innocent of the crimes they were accused of and were simply detained due to them being in the wrong place at the wrong time.

Documents popularly known as the Torture Memos came to light a few years later. These documents, prepared shortly before the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States Department of Justice, authorized certain enhanced interrogation techniques, generally held to involve torture of foreign detainees. The memoranda also argued that international humanitarian laws, such as the Geneva Conventions, did not apply to American interrogators overseas. Several subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decisions, including Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006), have overturned Bush administration policy, and ruled that Geneva Conventions apply.

Many of the torture techniques used were developed at Guantánamo detention centre, including prolonged isolation; the frequent flier program, a sleep deprivation program whereby people were moved from cell to cell every few hours so they couldn’t sleep for days, weeks, even months, short-shackling in painful positions; nudity; extreme use of heat and cold; the use of loud music and noise and preying on phobias.

Document Archive

The Taguba Report

The Taguba Report (May 2004) is the common name of an official Army Regulation 15-6 military inquiry conducted in 2004 into the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse by United States military forces in Iraq.

In his Findings of Fact, Major General Taguba wrote:

“That between October and December 2003, at the Abu Ghraib Confinement Facility (BCCF), numerous incidents of sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses were inflicted on several detainees. This systemic and illegal abuse of detainees was intentionally perpetrated by several members of the military police guard force (372nd Military Police Company, 320th Military Police Battalion, 800th MP Brigade), in Tier (section) 1-A of the Abu Ghraib Prison (BCCF). The allegations of abuse were substantiated by detailed witness statements (ANNEX 26) and the discovery of extremely graphic photographic evidence…In addition to the aforementioned crimes, there were also abuses committed by members of the 325th MI Battalion, 205th MI Brigade, and Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC). Specifically, on 24 November 2003, [name redacted], 205th MI Brigade, sought to degrade a detainee by having him strip and returned to cell naked. (ANNEXES 26 and 53)”.

The Taguba Report [3,367 Pages] – PDF 1 | PDF 2 | PDF 3 | PDF 4 | PDF 5 | PDF 6

The Taguba Report – Annexes (Partial release)

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Documents

 Records pertaining to: FBI’s Abu Ghraib Investigation of its agents and their potential knowledge of what happened inside the prison FBI Release #1 [56 Pages, 20.9MB]

 Records pertaining to: FBI’s Abu Ghraib Investigation of its agents and their potential knowledge of what happened inside the prison FBI Release #2 [4 Pages, 0.6MB]

Donald Rumsfeld Visit to Abu Ghraib

On May 13, 2004, then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld visited Abu Ghraib prison.  He stated during this time that whomever was responsible for the atrocities at the prison, would be brought to justice.

Intrigued by the event, I was interested in documents relating to this. So, on May 18, 2004, I requested all documents from the Department of Defense, related to Rumsfeld’s visit.

I did not know it then, but I would wait more than 11 YEARS for the documents to be reviewed and released.  But, what I also did not realize, was that it would be another 15 MONTHS before I would find out that the DOD sent my response to the wrong address.

I did check in from time to time asking for updates relating to my request. However, I never got any updates. When I finally stopped asking, and requested the FOIA Case Processing notes on September 14, 2016, I was contacted by the DOD with the following note:

Good morning Mr. Greenewald,

We have received your request for the case processing notes for 04-F-1563. I was concerned by your statement that you never received a response, particularly because I recall signing this case. It was one of our ten oldest last year so I remember it fairly well.

We did close you request in June of 2015, however, it appears your final response was mailed to the incorrect address. The AO for the case will send you a copy of the response letter and the responsive documents electronically.

Please accept our apologies and let me know if we can do anything else for you on this matter.

Thankfully, the office at the DOD sent me the responsive documents electronically (now available below). And by looking at their letter — they sent these records to the Associated Press (AP) in June of 2015.  I am glad I kept pushing for answers – or I would’ve been a REALLY old man before I figured out what happened.

Although not the longest I have waited for documents to come, it’s up there. But what is strange, is why would it take so long? There were only 12 pages that required review. That is almost 1 YEAR PER PAGE by the time I got the documents in my hands. In addition, the redactions are all (b)(6) exemptions, which means they are names or it’s information redacted that is an invasion of personal privacy, if released. Those are pretty easy to determine, and should not take a year per page for review.

I also obtained the case processing notes, and once I did, there were excessive (b)(5) redactions. I appealed that, and received a second release two years later. All the records are available below.

Declassified DOD Documents

Donald Rumsfeld Visit to Abu Ghraib Documents [15 Pages, 2.7MB]

FOIA Case 04-F-1563 Processing Notes (Post-Appeal Release) [42 Pages, 5.9MB] – Since the case took 11+ years to process, it’s always interesting to see the progression of how the documents were handled and ultimately declassified. I appealed the release below, based on the fact I got excessive (b)(5) exemptions. They released a bit more of the case processing notes, based on that appeal. This is the post-appeal response.

FOIA Case 04-F-1563 Processing Notes (Original Release) [45 Pages, 12.1MB] – This is the original release of case processing notes. I appealed this released, and two years later, received the above link. This released is archived here for reference.

The post Abu Ghraib Prison Scandal first appeared on The Black Vault.

April 13, 1993: Fourteen men believed to be in the employ of Saddam Hussein smuggled bombs into Kuwait with the intent of planting car bombs to assassinate Bush during his visit to Kuwait University. Two of the suspects Wali Abdelhadi Ghazali and Raad Abdel-Amir al-Assadi retracted their confessions at the trial claiming that they were coerced. The plot was foiled when Kuwaiti officials found the bomb and arrested the suspected assassins. Bush had left office in January 1993. The Iraqi Intelligence Service, particularly Directorate 14, was proven to be behind the plot.

On June 27, 1993 President Bill Clinton responded to the assassination attempt as part of Operation Southern Watch by firing 23 Tomahawk cruise missiles against the Iraqi Intelligence Headquarters. Clinton was convinced to attack by three compelling pieces of evidence. First, suspects in the plot confessed to FBI agents in Kuwait. Second, FBI bomb experts firmly linked the captured car bombs to the same explosives made in Iraq, including a 175-pound car bomb found in Kuwait City on April 14. Third, intelligence reports confirmed that Saddam had been plotting to assassinate the former President for some time. Leaders from both parties supported Clinton’s attack.  (Source: Wikipedia)

Document Archive

Assassination Attempt Records from CENTCOM [11 Pages, 2.46MB]

Assassination Attempt Records from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) [2 Pages, 0.7MB] – Records classified

Assassination Attempt Records from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) [3 Pages, 704KB]

Assassination Attempt Records from INSCOM [13 Pages, 1.84MB]

Requested MDR of these records in January 2018, no difference in release in June 2018 [13 Pages, 1.7MB]

Assassination Attempt Records from the US Air Force Office of Special Investigation (AFOSI) [5 Pages, 261 KB] – Responsive documents from a request I filed from the DIA.

Assassination Attempt Records from the US Department of Defense(DOD) [7 Pages, 221 KB] – Responsive documents from a request I filed from the DIA.

Assassination Attempt Records from the US Department of State [34 Pages, 3.93 MB] – Responsive documents from a request I filed from the DIA.

Initial Edit of 1993 Human Rights Report, November 1993 – 2019 Release (Highlighted newly released information) [10 Pages, 5.8MB] – This was one of the documents in the above release. In 2018, I requested an MDR review of the document, and in April of 2019, I received the record in full.

Assassination Attempt Records from NCIS [8 Pages, 1.6MB]

The post Assassination Attempt: George H. W. Bush – 4/13/1993 first appeared on The Black Vault.

Originally, this record was released on the CIA FOIA Reading Room, wherein each and every page read, “PAGE DENIED”. Page after page, it looked like the page to the right.

In June of 2018, I filed a Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) request for the record to be reviewed, since it was more than two years after the last one that resulted in each page being denied.

In March of 2019, I received the record, still in redacted form, but much was released. From the CIA letter, another requester received a copy released in August of 2018, which I found out was Jason Leopold – so kudos to him for getting this released.

There was no additional review on my request (since the August 2018 release is less than two years), but they gave me a copy of what was released. That is available below.

Document Archive

Summary and Reflection of Chief of Medical Services on the OMS Participation in the Detention and Interrogation Program [90 Pages, 51.8MB]

The post Summary and Reflection of Chief of Medical Services on the OMS Participation in the Detention and Interrogation Program first appeared on The Black Vault.

In support of The Commissions to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack, this paper examines the potential damage to satellites from high altitude nuclear detonations not specifically targeting space assets. We provide and overview of representative classes of satellites, their orbits, and their economic and military importance to the U.S. lessons learned from atmospheric nuclear test of the late 1950’s and early 1960’s are presented. In particular, the STARFISH PRIME test of 1962 injected long-lived trapped energetic electrons into Earth’s magnetic fields, causing the early demise of several satellites.

Document Archive

Collateral Damage to Satellites from an EMP Attack, August 2010 [165 Pages, 33.1MB]

The post Collateral Damage to Satellites from an EMP Attack, August 2010 first appeared on The Black Vault.