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U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
AND
MJTWELVE OPERATIONS
A SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

Prepared
By

NSA Scientific Advisory Board
Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence
Committee
The Guided Missile and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee
The Scientific Intelligence Committee

For

The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

No. 1-61-E

Critical Aspects of Unidentified Flying Objects and the Nuclear Threat to the Defense
of the United States and Allies

Completed
On

5 November 1961

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Basis for Action

In pursuant to Presidential National Security Action Memorandum No. 70 and a separate action item levied against the DCI for the production of a SNIE regarding what information concerning unidentified flying objects has been collected and evaluated in the context of nuclear war possibilities, DCID 5/1 was authorized by the USIB and subsequent action was taken by the Office of National Estimates. DCID 5/1 also identified guidance from NSC Staff for opinions and recommendations of CIA MJTWELVE consultants on a wide variety of issues. Specific TRs were issued to NSASAB, JAEIC, GMAIC, and SIC by appropriate agencies of the USAF to eliminate ambiguity and confusion in the preparation of this SNIE. Based on information collected by authorized contacts within appropriate components of DD/O, O/O, FBIS, and INR, minimal threat warnings are considered classified, and as such, were taken at face value.

Contributions

Summary reports from USAF UFO project files and estimates from OSI were provided as a basis for evaluating technical challenges and COMINT sorting of relevant data. MJTWELVE advisory group cooperated in summarizing the over all situation as it now stands and assisted in the preparation of historical data. What foreign intelligence was available to IACs were submitted for weapons system analysis and useful integration data was supplied by JNEIC and JRDB specialists.

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Critical Aspects of Unidentified Flying Objects and the Nuclear Threat to
the Defense of the United States and Allies

In the current political and military situation in which the United States finds itself in the Cold War effort against the USSR, there is the remote possibility within current understanding of the verifiable UFO phenomena that early warning defense systems could err in the identification of unidentified aircraft and missiles. This probability is estimated to fall within a 20% margin for error and could pose possible early attack warnings to be issued within the 30 minute decision window before a DEFCON 2 alert goes into affect. We concur that 2 per cent of UFO cases studied have caused electrical interference with airborne early detection equipment and have caused a confusion and identification factor which could be attributed to enemy ECM. We believe Soviet capabilities in this area are of such sophistication that it is possible that simulated UFO detection could be regarded as an actual attack. We also believe the Soviets have calculated that U.S. ECM capabilities are on a level similar to theirs and are at parody.

There are only six cases in which nuclear materials were involved in the retrieval of unidentified space vehicles of which U.S. intelligence can vouch for that could present foreseeable problems. The most serious are contamination, exposure, and collateral damage inflicted on unsuspecting elements of the population. The less serious involve panic and false rumors of a Soviet sneak attack. It is almost certain that a crashed nuclear powered UFO on Soviet territory could generate misguided suspicions and trigger a retaliatory attack on the United States or its allies within 30 minutes of detection. It is doubtful that China has a nuclear attack capability at the present time and is not seen as a problem area. Nuclear

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weapons development by the Israelis is not known and is doubtful that they will have one in the next five years.

We estimate that a misguided retaliatory strike against the United States by Soviet land, sea and airborne nuclear forces based on a detectable crashed nuclear powered UFO event could inflict severe damage to major population centers and national military command and control centers. Base on AEC and DoD atmospheric nuclear weapons research data, a full measure of Soviet rocket and bomber forces could deliver enough megaton weapons to kill 20-50 million Americans in the initial attack and post-strike fallout could kill another 20 million within 90 days. Added chaos would result in more deaths straining emergency management resources to their limit. Our retaliatory capability is estimated to be twice as effective resulting in 100 million Soviet dead. Fallout projections indicate that radioactive clouds could circle the earth within nine months causing nuclear sickness in other countries. Projections calculate half the earth's population could die within 18 months. These projections are based on CIA and DoD postmortem studies and estimated Soviet ground tests detected in 1958.

Intelligence provided by MJTWELVE leads us to believe that such a scenario is doubtful but remain cautious due to power plant studies now being conducted at LANL which indicate past incidents in the U.S. were detected through air sampling and ground monitoring stations. We cannot judge with any degree of predictability what future actions we can expect from these devices and can only guess as to what purpose such future incidents may hold. We remain confident that current detection systems are adequate enough and that communications between us, our allies and the Kremlin will function due mutual desire to avoid nuclear war.

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