sandra wrote: khanster wrote:
What explains the existence of this isomorphism between thought and reality?
When the description of a thing becomes the thing is when the difference between the description and the reality is zero
The map becomes the territory in a duality of realization.
Zero lag eh?
What do you mean by your last sentence there, can you help me understand that better? Any other words you can express that?
There is a paradoxical aspect that is elusive. I am not really qualified to explain it, just tossing out these ideas here and there
The primacy of paradox:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QzqrdzUxI4w#http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grelling%E ... on_paradox
Suppose one interprets the adjectives "autological" and "heterological" as follows:
1. An adjective is autological (sometimes homological) if and only if it describes itself. For example "short" is autological, since the word "short" is short. "English," "unhyphenated" and "pentasyllabic" are also autological.
2. An adjective is heterological if it does not describe itself. Hence "long" is a heterological word, as are "abbreviated" and "monosyllabic."
All adjectives, it would seem, must be either autological or heterological, for each adjective either describes itself, or it doesn't. The Grelling–Nelson paradox arises when we consider the adjective "heterological". To test if the (imaginary) word "'foo" is autological one can ask: Is "foo" a foo word? If the answer is 'yes', "foo" is autological. If the answer is 'no', "foo" is heterological.
By comparison, one can ask: Is "heterological" a heterological word? If the answer is 'yes', "heterological" is autological (leading to a contradiction). If the answer is 'no', "heterological" is heterological (again leading to a contradiction, because if it describes itself, it is autological).
The paradox can be eliminated, without changing the meaning of "heterological" where it was previously well-defined, by modifying the definition of "heterological" slightly to hold of all nonautological words except "heterological." But "nonautological" is subject to the same paradox, for which this evasion is not applicable because the rules of English uniquely determine its meaning from that of "autological." A similar slight modification to the definition of "autological" (such as declaring it false of "nonautological" and its synonyms) might seem to fix that, but the paradox still obtains for synonyms of "autological" and "heterological" such as "selfdescriptive" and "nonselfdescriptive," whose meanings also would need adjusting, and the consequences of those adjustments would then need to be pursued, and so on. Freeing English of the Grelling–Nelson paradox entails considerably more modification to the language than mere refinements of the definitions of "autological" and "heterological," which need not even be in the language for the paradox to arise. The scope of these obstacles for English is comparable to that of Russell's paradox for mathematics founded on sets, argued as follows.
 Is "autological" autological?
One may also ask if "autological" is autological. It can be chosen consistently to be either:
* if we say that "autological" is autological, and then ask if it applies to itself, then yes, it does, and thus is autological;
* if we say that "autological" is not autological, and then ask if it applies to itself, then no, it does not, and thus is not autological.
This is the opposite of the situation for heterological: while "heterological" logically cannot be autological or heterological, "autological" can be either. (It cannot be both, as the category of autological and heterological cannot overlap.)
In logical terms, the situation for "autological" is:
"autological" is autological if and only if "autological" is autological
A if and only if A, a tautology
while the situation for "heterological" is:
"heterological" is heterological if and only if "heterological" is autological
A if and only if not A, a contradiction.