Intelligence Report

FACTIONALISM IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE:
MAO'S OPPOSITION SINCE 1949

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As the drama of Mao's Cultural Revolution has unfolded, Communist China's leaders have made available a vast amount of new information concerning earlier factional struggles within the Chinese Communist Party. Making use of Red Guard materials and other new information that has been disclosed in the course of the Cultural Revolution, this Intelligence Report re-examines these earlier factional struggles and concludes that Mao's Cultural Revolution is a direct descendent of party conflicts and policy differences of nearly 20 years duration.

This is one of a series of SRS staff studies based on continuing surveillance of the China scene. It was produced solely by the Special Research Staff; the research analyst responsible for its preparation is Philip Bridgham.

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FACTIONALISM IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE: MAO'S OPPOSITION SINCE 1949

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FACTIONALISM IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE:
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Summary

A fascinating by-product of the "great proletarian cultural revolution" has been the disclosure of new information on factional struggles within the Chinese Communist Party since its rise to power in 1949. The recurring nature of these struggles suggests that factionalism, carried on beneath a facade of unity, has been a continuing feature of party life in Communist China. The purpose of this paper is to reappraise the nature and extent of this phenomenon of factionalism in order to better understand the latest and most momentous of these factional struggles--Mao Tse-tung's "great proletarian cultural revolution."

Red Guard disclosures have added a new dimension to our understanding of the first big struggle against factionalism in the Chinese Communist Party since it came to power--that waged against the Kao Kang-Jao Shu-shih "anti-Party alliance" in the years 1953-1955. One aspect of the Kao-Jao affair, it has now been revealed, was an effort to persuade Mao Tse-tung to give up one of his leadership positions, to resign either as Chairman of the Party or the State (almost certainly the latter.) Moreover, two of the main ingredients of the more recent phenomenon of "revisionism"--the stress on expertise and professionalism at the expense of political control, and reliance on the Soviet model and Soviet support to promote China's economic development--appear to have been present in the Kao-Jao affair.

It is ironic that the net effect of this first struggle against incipient "revisionism" was to strengthen the position of Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping who are now
denounced as the two leading "revisionist" villains within the Central Committee. In the reorganization of the party structure at the Eighth Party Congress in September 1956, Mao Tse-tung delegated a substantial amount of political power to Liu (as the senior Vice-Chairman of the newly established Standing Committee of the Politburo) and to Teng (as head of the Secretariat charged with "attending to the daily work of the Central Committee").

A decade hence at an important Central Committee work conference in October 1966 Mao Tse-tung would refer to this delegation of power as a "mistake," the consequences of which had necessitated the "great proletarian cultural revolution." As Mao explained it, he had delegated this power in order to provide for a smooth succession in the leadership--"to foster these people's authority so that no great changes would arise in the country when the time came for me to meet my Heavenly King (God)." Mao's confidence in his principal party lieutenants, however, had been misplaced. They had abused his confidence, had committed a number of "mistakes," and (like Kao and Jao before them) had constructed "independent kingdoms."

Policy issues were at the heart of the second big factional struggle--that waged at Lushan in July and August 1959 against a "right opportunist, or revisionist, anti-party clique" headed by the then Minister of National Defense Peng Te-huai. For the first time since 1935, Mao Tse-tung's personal leadership and programs were openly subjected to attack by a long-time "comrade in arms" who, moreover, had managed to muster considerable support within the Central Committee. Although Mao would triumph at Lushan, the opposition to his radical domestic and foreign policies would persist and finally precipitate the "great proletarian cultural revolution."

In retrospect, it appears that Peng Te-huai was the prototype of all those who would be attacked during the "cultural revolution" as "Khrushchev-type revisionists" within the Chinese Communist party. In criticizing Mao's radical "great leap forward" and commune programs, Peng represented a large group of the more pragmatic and technically minded administrators and professionals within
the party, government and army who had come to see the folly of these programs. In their stead, Peng may be said to have advanced an alternative model of economic and military development, one patterned more closely on Soviet experience and featuring Soviet military, economic and technical assistance. As the symbol both of Soviet "revisionist" influence and of opposition to Mao, the Peng Te-huai affair would cast a long shadow over the years that followed.

Developments in the three year period following the Lushan plenum (1959-1962) demonstrated that in important respects, in the great debate over domestic and foreign policy staged at this historic meeting, Peng Te-huai had been right and Mao Tse-tung had been wrong. The combined effect of irrational economic policy, successive bad harvests and the Soviet withdrawal of technicians in the summer of 1960 dealt Mao's "great leap forward" program of economic development a shattering blow. As a result, by the winter of 1961-1962 opposition to Mao's policies and programs extended into the ranks of the Politburo to include a number of those who were charged with the responsibility for coping with this domestic crisis. As Mao Tse-tung would subsequently point out, this opposition was of two kinds--that carried on "secretly" by "the Peng Chen group" and that carried on "openly" by "the Liu Shao-chi - Teng Hsiao-ping group." The progressive awareness by Mao (and a small coterie of trusted advisers) of the extent of this opposition would culminate in the fall of 1965 in the decision to initiate what would prove to be the most thoroughgoing and one of the most violent party purges in Communist history.

It appears to be true, as Red Guard publications have charged, that Liu Shao-chi at an enlarged Central Committee work conference in January 1962 not only defended Mao's earlier critics but repeated some of the same criticisms of Mao's radical domestic programs which Peng Te-huai had first raised at Lushan. Although he could cite the party constitution as justifying his "open opposition" on this occasion, Liu must have suspected that Mao would treat this criticism as a direct personal attack. It appears in retrospect that Mao Tse-tung did in fact interpret
Liu's criticism at the January 1962 party work conference as a direct attack against both his policies and himself and determined not long thereafter to make new arrangements for a "revolutionary successor."

The consequences of this decision would be momentous. It would mean, instead of the smooth succession which Mao had hoped to achieve by conferring power and prestige on Liu Shao-chi as head of the party apparatus, the start of a succession struggle. It would necessitate a thorough purging of all those in the party apparatus who had staked their careers on the eventual succession to power of Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping and, as a result, had espoused the views and policies of these party machine leaders. It would require enlisting the support of other leaders whose bases of power lay outside the party apparatus, principally Lin Piao (indispensable as Commander in Chief of the People's Liberation Army) and Chou En-lai (also important as an able administrator and representative of the government bureaucracy). It would require the construction of an elaborate trap with which to ensnare Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping and their supporters in the party apparatus, and the creation of such extra-party mass organizations as the Red Guards to supply the element of force needed to spring this trap. In short, this decision to select a new "revolutionary successor" would lead, after the necessary preparations had been made, to the launching of Mao Tse-tung's "great proletarian cultural revolution."
FACTIONALISM IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE: 
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"In the 16 years since the founding of our people's republic, the Marxist-Leninist leadership of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung has waged three big struggles against anti-Party revisionist cliques." -- Jen-min Jih-pao (People's Daily) Editorial, "Long Live Mao Tse-tung's Thought," July 1, 1966.

A fascinating by-product of the "great proletarian cultural revolution" has been the disclosure of new information on factional struggles within the Chinese Communist Party since its rise to power in 1949. One purpose of these disclosures has been to demonstrate the validity of Mao Tse-tung's most recent "creative development" of Marxism-Leninism--"that classes and class struggle exist in society throughout the historical period of the dictatorship of the proletariat." A second purpose has been to discredit and incriminate Mao's high-ranking opponents within the party by charging them with varying degrees of complicity in these earlier "anti-party" struggles.

Because of the questionable nature of this new evidence, it must of course be used with great care. It is necessary, for example, to be extremely wary of allegations of misconduct unless supported by statements of the accused uttered at the time and reproduced in verbatim form. It is also necessary to attempt to place these statements in the proper context, both of the speech or report from which they are drawn and of the policy guidelines prevailing at the time. With these caveats in mind, it is believed that these disclosures do provide new and valuable insights into the process of policy formation and the structure of power in the Chinese Communist Party over the course of the past 19 years.
Reduced to the broadest common denominator, the "three big struggles" that have taken place within the Chinese Communist Party since 1949 have been, as Mao's propagandists assert, "struggles for and against Mao Tse-tung's thought." At the same time, they have necessarily involved considerations of power and in all cases have been regarded by Mao as challenges to his leadership of the party. The recurring nature of these challenges—the "anti-party alliance of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih" in 1953, the "right opportunist, or revisionist, anti-party clique headed by Peng Te-huai" in 1959, and the open-ended "counter-revolutionary clique" (headed initially by Peng Chen and Lo Jui-ching and later by Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping) in 1965-1967—suggests, moreover, that factional strife, carried on beneath a facade of unity, has been a prominent feature of party life in Communist China since 1949.

The purpose of this paper is to reappraise the nature and extent of this phenomenon of factionalism within the Central Committee on the basis of new evidence brought to light during the course of the past two years. Although each of these struggles is unique and possesses an intrinsic interest of its own, an attempt will be made to identify features common to all. The ultimate purpose of this paper, then, is to seek to illuminate the origins, nature and possible future development of the latest and most momentous of these factional struggles—Mao Tse-tung's "great proletarian cultural revolution."
The Kao Kang - Jao Shu-shih Anti-Party Alliance

"The criminal aim of the Kao Kang - Jao Shu-shih anti-Party alliance was to split our Party and to overthrow the leading core --the long tested Central Committee of the Party headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung--with the aim of seizing the supreme power of the Party and the State. Their means to achieve this aim was conspiracy. This was the principal hallmark and program of this anti-Party alliance." --People's Daily Editorial, "Tremendous Victory of the Party in History," April 10, 1955.

Red Guard disclosures have added a new dimension to our understanding of the first big struggle against factionalism in the Chinese Communist Party since it came to power--that waged against the Kao-Jao "anti-Party alliance" in the years 1953-1955. The principals in this affair were, of course, Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih who, in running the regional party organizations in the industrial areas of Northeast and East China, had constructed, it was charged, "independent kingdoms." Although relatively few and fragmentary in character, these new disclosures suggest that this first challenge to Mao Tse-tung's leadership was more broadly-based and formidable than indicated at the time.

One aspect of the Kao-Jao affair, it has now been revealed, was an effort to persuade Mao Tse-tung to give up one of his leadership positions, to resign either as Chairman of the Party or the State (almost certainly the latter). The leading figure in this effort apparently was the revolutionary war hero Chu Teh, charged subsequently by Lin Piao (in the fall of 1959) with having "tried to become the leader himself...advocating the idea at the time of the Kao Kang incident of becoming Chairman in turn." Another prominent figure in this effort was Tan Chen-lin (at the time de facto head of the East China regional bureau) who (it is now disclosed) "in 1953...took the lead
in sending a joint letter asking our great leader Chairman Mao to 'take a rest.' " Although presumably a number of other party officials signed this letter, only one other signatory has been identified—the recently deposed First Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee, Chen Pei-hsien.

Differeniating this effort from the activities of Kao and Jao at this time was the fact that it was carried on openly, utilizing normal channels of communication within the party. It could be justified, moreover, (as Chen Pei-hsien has asserted in his defense) as a move designed to protect "Chairman Mao's health" by removing part of the burden which active leadership of both Party and State entailed. By contrast, the "principal hallmark" of the Kao-Jao "anti-Party alliance" was, as noted above, "conspiracy."

As indicated in the March 31, 1955 Party "Resolution on the Kao Kang-Jao Shu-shih Anti-Party Alliance" (still the best single source of information on the activities of this group), Kao had claimed "that the Central Committee of the Party and the Government should...be reorganized...and that he himself should for the time being be General Secretary or Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee of the Party and the Premier of the State Council." A recent account of the role of Tao Chu (then a Secretary in the South-China Sub-Bureau) illustrates the manner in which Kao sought through "secret talks" in 1953 to recruit support for this endeavor. Holding forth the prospect of "a high position in the Government," Kao allegedly said to Tao: "They (meaning members of the anti-party clique) all agree that I should be Vice Chairman of the Party. What do you think?" Although Tao gave an equivocal answer, he did not report this incident and, only after "exposure" of these scheme in Peking, did he then "hurriedly make a false confession."

A more basic and serious charge in this party resolution was that Kao had attempted to secure support in the army for his conspiracy against the Central Committee by advancing the "utterly absurd 'theory' that our party consisted of two parties—one, the so-called 'party of the
revolutionary bases and the army', the other, the so-called 'party of white areas'--that the Party was created by the army." In terms of this theory, Kao could claim that the first "party" (which he represented) deserved to "hold the major authority" in the new structure of power in Peking since it had acquired greater "revolutionary merit" in defeating the Japanese and winning final victory over the Kuomintang. As leaders who had spent much of this time in the "white areas" (i.e. those areas under the rule of the Nationalist Government), Liu Shao-chi and Chou En-lai would have to settle, under this theory, for a secondary role in the new party and government structure.

It is of considerable interest to note, in the recent revelations of the "cultural revolution," that this proposal elicited varying degrees of support from high level military leaders at the time. As noted above, one of these was the founder of the Red Army, Chu Teh. Another was Peng Te-huai who in 1953 had just returned to Peking in triumph after commanding the Chinese forces in the Korean War. Although some of the current accusations against Peng (e.g. that he actually "headed" the Kao-Jao "anti-party alliance") are obviously untrue, the central charge that he had been involved and that, as a consequence, he had made a "self-criticism" at the time appears credible. Indeed, there is support for this view in the communique which described the March 1955 Party conference as "carried out in a full spirit of criticism and self-criticism" and the speeches delivered there (by Peng Te-huai and many others) as having "brought out the various crimes of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih against the party and the people."

In retrospect, it appears that Kao Kang's claim to a dominant role in the Chinese Communist leadership in the early 1950's was based primarily on his achievements as head of the party, government and military organizations in the strategic and advanced industrial area of Northeast China. The following passage (in an earlier "Resolution on Strengthening Party Unity" adopted by a Central Committee plenum in February 1954) appears clearly to have been directed at this challenge by Kao Kang:

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Since the victory of China's New Democratic Revolution, there has grown up among some of the cadres within the Party a most dangerous kind of conceit. They lose their heads over certain achievements they have made in their work. They exaggerate the role of the individual. They think there is no one equal to them in the wide world. They listen only to other's flattery and praise but cannot accept other's criticism and supervision. They even regard the region or department under their leadership as their individual inheritance or independent kingdom.

Developing this theme, a later People's Daily editorial charged that "they regard the area and department under their leadership as their individual inheritance and vainly attempt to use it as their capital and instrument for fulfilling their individual ambition of undermining and splitting the Party."

The specifics of this charge were spelled out a year later, at which time the campaign against Kao and Jao was in full flood. Now they were attacked by name for having "regarded all work achievements in the Northeast and East China regions as their own 'merits', created the myth that they are 'always correct.' 'men of great ability' and 'well-trained in theory' and with the aim of such fantastic lies, aroused others to blindly worship them." It was also suggested at this time that policy issues had played an important part in this first "big struggle" within the Central Committee, as in the allegation that Kao Kang 'had 'preached absurd ideas of 'special character of the Northeast,' and 'the Northeast has always been more advanced,' set various 'leftist' or rightist policies against the correct policies of the Party center, and even refused to carry out the directives and resolutions of the center."

Since Kao Kang was in close contact with large numbers of Russian economic advisers and military officials throughout this period, these charges suggest that one of the unstated but nevertheless real crimes committed by Kao
was that he had been too zealous in promoting the Soviet model of economic development which featured concentration on heavy industry and relative autonomy for professional management. The latter concept Kao advocated quite openly, as, for example, in his statement in mid-1950 describing the role of a factory manager in China's emerging industrial economy: "If the manager is made answerable not to state authorities or industrial control organs of a higher level but to the party committee or the party branch...then there will no longer be any unified leadership." This presumably was but one instance of a tendency on Kao's part (in the words of the March 1955 Party resolution) "to belittle the role of the Party..." That Kao may have been encouraged by the Russians in this and other programs which challenged the party center in Peking is indicated by the recent charge (without supporting evidence, it is true) that he and his colleagues "maintained illicit relations with foreign countries..." In any case, two of the main ingredients of the more recent phenomenon of "revisionism"--the stress on expertise and professionalism at the expense of political control, and reliance on the Soviet model and Soviet support to promote China's economic development--appear to have been present in the Kao-Jao affair.

It is ironic that the net effect of this first struggle against incipient "revisionism" was to strengthen the position of Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping who are now denounced as the two leading "revisionist" villains within the Central Committee. Teng, who led the attack on the Kao-Jao "anti-party alliance" at the party conference in March 1955, was immediately elevated to the Politburo at a Central Committee plenum the following month. It is interesting to note that Lin Piao was also promoted to membership in the Politburo on the same occasion, possibly reflecting Mao's dissatisfaction with his other two top military leaders Chu Teh and Peng Te-huai for having become involved in the Kao-Jao affair.

It was not until the reorganization of the party structure at the Eighth Party Congress in September 1956, however, that the full extent of the increased power of Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping would be revealed. By
this time, the concept of "collective leadership" (which had emerged in the Soviet Union following the death of Stalin and in China following the Kao-Jao affair) had been further strengthened by the striking disclosures of Stalin's paranoia in Khrushchev's "de-Stalinization" speech. Moreover, as Teng Hsiao-ping stated in his "Report on the Revision of the Constitution of the Communist Party of China" at this congress, it was considered necessary "to set up additional central organs" in the Central Committee "owing to the pressure of party and government work." The combined result of these developments and pressures was a substantial delegation of political power by Mao Tse-tung at the Eighth Party Congress to Liu Shao-chi (as the senior Vice-Chairman of the newly established Standing Committee of the Politburo) and to Teng Hsiao-ping (as head of the Secretariat charged with "attending to the daily work of the Central Committee").

A decade hence at an important Central Committee work conference in October 1966 Mao Tse-tung would refer to this delegation of power as a "mistake," the consequences of which had necessitated the "great proletarian cultural revolution." As Mao would explain on this occasion, it had been his idea to "divide the Standing Committee of the Politburo into first and second line fronts," to "place Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping in the first line" where they would respectively "preside over...important conferences" and "take charge of the daily operations" of the party. This had been done to provide for a smooth succession in the leadership (and thus avoid the errors committed in the Soviet Union)--"to foster these people's authority so that no great changes would arise in the country when the time came for me to meet My Heavenly King (God)." Mao's confidence in his principal party lieutenants, however, had been misplaced. They had abused his confidence ("we overtrusted others"), had committed a number of "mistakes," and (like Kao and Jao before them) had constructed "independent kingdoms."

The end result of the first factional struggle within the Central Committee in the post-1949 period, then, was to augment the power of Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping who would one day be charged with the same crimes of
disaffection and disloyalty for which Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih had been purged. Before that, however, Mao Tse-tung would have to face a challenge more formidable than that which Kao and Jao had posed, when Minister of National Defense Peng Te-huai would lead a spirited attack on Mao's radical "great leap forward" and commune programs at Lushan in the summer of 1959.
The Peng Te-huai Affair

"At the Lushan meeting of the Party in 1959, a handful of ambitious bourgeois careerists and schemers... who had the support of the Khrushchev revisionist clique launched a ferocious attack on the Party's Central Committee headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung."

If differences over policy played a part in the first factional struggle after 1949, policy issues were at the heart of the second big struggle—that waged at Lushan in July and August 1959 against a "right opportunist, or revisionist, anti-Party clique" headed by the then Minister of National Defense Peng Te-huai. For the first time since 1935, Mao Tse-tung's personal leadership and programs were openly subjected to attack by a long-time "comrade in arms" who, moreover, had managed to muster considerable support within the Central Committee. Although Mao would triumph at Lushan, the opposition to his radical domestic and foreign policies would persist and finally precipitate the "great proletarian cultural revolution."

In contrast with the fragmentary nature of new disclosures about the Kao-Jao affair, important documentary evidence has come to light in the past year concerning the intra-Party struggle at Lushan. Thanks to a Red Guard publication, we now have the text of the "Letter of Opinion" (dated July 14, 1959) which Peng Te-huai sent to Mao at an early stage of the Lushan conference. We also have the text (in excerpt form) of the Central Committee resolution condemning the "anti-party clique headed by Peng Te-huai" which was passed on August 16 at the conclusion of this conference. Using these documents and other Red Guard revelations, it is now possible to reconstruct with some confidence the main outlines of the great debate on policy staged at Lushan.
Peng's "Letter" to Mao Tse-tung makes fascinating reading, containing, as it does, one of the most cogent and damning indictments of Mao's radical "great leap forward" and commune programs produced in or outside China. That he received help in the preparation of the "Letter" (probably from another alleged member of the "clique," the then Deputy Foreign Minister Chang Wen-tien) seems clear, lending color to the charge in the Party resolution that activities of the "anti-party clique" at Lushan were "purposive, prepared, planned and organized." That it was an act of courage, motivated at least in part by a sincere conviction that the policies he criticized had brought hardship and suffering to the Chinese people, is equally clear. For despite its "outward pretensions of support for the general line and for Comrade Mao Tse-tung" (in the words of the Party resolution), Peng's "Letter" did amount (as the resolution further asserted) to "a fierce onslaught on the party's general line and the leadership of the Central Committee and Comrade Mao Tse-tung..."

The first charge in Peng's indictment was that capital construction under the "great leap forward" had been "hasty" and "excessive," tying up capital, creating "imbalances" in the economy and, by reducing the supply of commodities on the market, creating a "political" problem in the relationship between "the workers and peasants." This had resulted from lack of familiarity with "the work of socialist construction," in particular with "the socialist law of planned and proportionate development" of the economy.

Next, Peng discussed somewhat gingerly the "shortcomings and errors" which had attended the formation of rural communes. There had been "a period of confusion regarding the question of the system of ownership" and this, in conjunction with unrealistic estimates of grain production, had led to "free supply of food" in violation of the socialist law of "distribution according to work." Peng concluded his brief discussion of the communes by admitting that most of these defects and errors had been recognized and were in the process of correction.
Peng Te-huai reserved his most withering fire, however, for that most distinctive characteristic of Mao Tsetung's "great leap forward" approach to economic development—reliance on mass movements in economic construction, especially the mass movement to make iron and steel. He "like many comrades," had been "bewildered by the achievements of the great leap forward and the passion of the mass movements," by the "habit of exaggeration" which had spread throughout the country and the "unbelievable miracles' which had been reported in the press. Peng's explanation for all of this—which had "done tremendous harm to the prestige of the Party"—was that it had resulted from "petty bourgeois fanaticism." This was a state of mind which rendered one liable to commit such "'Left' mistakes" as "wanting to enter into communism at one step" and "demanding that targets which could be accomplished in several years or more than a decade be fulfilled in one year or even several months."

Peng then attributed these "Leftist" mistakes and tendencies to a misunderstanding and misapplication of the principle of "putting politics in command" over economic construction. Since this was an issue which would figure prominently in the early stages of the "cultural revolution," Peng's formulation of this charge deserves to be quoted at length:

Putting politics in command is no substitute for economic principles, still less for concrete measures in economic work. Equal importance must be attached to putting politics in command and to effective measures in economic work; neither can be overestimated or neglected.

Peng concluded his "Letter" by calling for "a systematic summing up of the achievements and lessons gained in our work" with the objective of "distinguishing right from wrong and raising our understanding" and thus "uniting the whole Party." In keeping with the constructive nature of his proposal and the urgency of the task, Peng then expressed the hope that "on the whole, there should be no investigation of personal responsibility."
Mao Tse-tung's response, as revealed in the 16 August Party resolution, was to launch a bitter attack on Peng Te-huai and his other critics at Lushan, branding them as members of a "right opportunist anti-Party clique" engaged in an unprincipled and unscrupulous struggle "to sabotage the dictatorship of the proletariat and undermine the socialist revolution..." Instead of discussing the merits of the charges raised in Peng's "Letter" (they were dismissed as "exaggerated...out of all proportion"), the Party resolution concentrated on denigrating Peng's character and impugning his motives, characterizing him as "essentially a representative of the bourgeoisie" who had been conducting "anti-party activities" for 30 years. Instead of heeding Peng's recommendation that in the interests of party unity there should be no "investigation of personal responsibility" Mao called for waging a new "inner-party struggle against right opportunism headed by Peng Te-huai" in order to "further strengthen the ranks of the party and the people and heighten their militancy."

The resolution also provides new evidence for assessing the amount of support Peng was able to muster at Lushan. There were, of course, the other members of the "clique" identified by name--Huang Ko-cheng (Chief of Staff of the People's Liberation Army), Chang Wen-tiea (alternate Politburo member and Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs) and Chou Hsiao-chou (First Secretary of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee). That there were a number of others who provided varying degrees of support was revealed in the resolution statement that "because of his tactics of feigning candor and frugality, Peng Te-huai's activities could and did mislead a number of people" and consequently were "fraught with danger for the future of the party and People's Liberation Army."

Other sources indicate that Peng received substantial support from other senior military figures, including the Director of the General Logistics Department Hung Hsueh-chih (who was purged); Director of the General Training Department Hsiao Ko (attacked as a "military dogmatist"); Director of the General Political Department Tan Cheng (criticized in the Kung-tso T'ung-hsun); and a half dozen lesser military leaders who have been out of the news since
1959. What is more, recent Red Guard publications have disclosed that Chu Teh also came to Peng Te-huai's defense at Lushan, an act for which he was roundly condemned by Lin Piao (Peng's successor as Minister of National Defense) at an expanded plenum of the Military Affairs Committee shortly thereafter.

Lin Piao's speech at this plenum suggests an important truth about the Lushan conference. According to Lin, the struggle at Lushan was not unexpected, since it represented the culmination of a process under way for some time. As Lin pointed out, "Chairman Mao stated a number of times that there was a possibility of a split arising in the party. As a matter of fact, he was referring to Peng Te-huai and Chu Teh." It is in this sense that the charge contained in the party resolution denouncing Peng's "clique"—that their "activities represent a continuation and development of the anti-party alliance of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih"—was true. Kao Kang's earlier challenge, which had called for a larger role for military leaders in the determination of party affairs (under the theory that "the party was created by the army"), had been repeated by Peng Te-huai at Lushan.

As recent Red Guard publications have charged, Peng Te-huai personified the threat of "military professionalism" (what the Chinese Communists call the "bourgeois revisionist military line"). Specifically, Peng is charged with having attempted (1) to put "the army before the Party;" (2) to counterpose "regularization and modernization" against "proletarian revolutionization of the army;" (3) to substitute "the system of one-man leadership" for the "collective leadership of the Party committee" in the army; and (4) to "place military technique in the first place" in army building. Finally, and perhaps most important, Peng is charged with having "opposed the policy advanced by Chairman Mao of creating an independent and complete network of modern national defense industries by relying on our own efforts," advocating instead "depending...on the Khrushchev revisionist clique for improvement of our army's equipment and the development of up-to-date military science and technology..." As evidence for the latter, Peng is quoted as having argued for a division
of labor between China and the Soviet Union in the event of war, with "China...contributing troops and the Soviet Union, atom bombs."

It was at this point that Peng's interest in opposing Mao's leadership and policies coincided with that of Khrushchev. The revelations of the "cultural revolution" (appearing in both official and Red Guard publications) confirm what had already been credibly reported in the West—that when Peng Te-huai launched his attack at Lushan he "had the support of the Khrushchev revisionist clique..."

For his part, Peng is alleged to have "made secret deals with Khrushchev," to have "provided Khrushchev with anti-China ammunition," and to have "openly expressed his opposition to the party's general line, the great leap forward and the people's communes and to Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee...in the presence of the Khrushchev revisionists." In return, Khrushchev is said to have shown his support by "launching an open attack against our people's communes" four days after Peng delivered his 14 July "Letter" and by openly praising Peng after the event as "correct and brave" and as his "best friend."

In fact, it is reasonable to assume that Khrushchev's offer of support was more substantial and tangible than this, including perhaps a pledge of increased (or at least undiminished) Soviet military, technological and economic assistance in return for certain Chinese concessions. Following so soon after the sudden Soviet cancelation on 20 June 1959 of its October 1957 agreement to assist the Chinese in the development of advanced weapons, it is possible that Peng recruited support at Lushan on the basis of a pledge to reinstate this agreement once Soviet conditions were met. Whatever Peng may have hoped to gain by approaching (or listening to) Khrushchev, it is clear that his scheme backfired. To the standard epithets used to denounce Peng could now be added the charges of "conspiracy" and "treason."

Another motive prompting Peng to challenge Mao is suggested by the charge in the Lushan party resolution that his "anti-party clique" contained elements who "bear a grudge against the party" (for which read Mao Tse-tung).
Personal animus fueled by the conviction that he had been badly used in the past is revealed in the statement Peng addressed to Mao (as subsequently reported by Mao) at Lushan: "In Yenan, you cussed me for 40 days. Now you will not allow me to cuss you for 20 days." As a member of the "Returned Student Clique" who had been a leading target of the "rectification" campaign in Yenan, Chang Wen-tien also had ample cause to "bear a grudge against the Party." The venerable Chu Teh would also fit into this category if, as Red Guard publications have frequently asserted, he felt that his earlier services in the revolutionary war had not been properly rewarded in the post-war structure of power. At minimum, these disclosures cast serious doubt on the efficacy of Mao's famous "unity-criticism-unity" policy for dealing with erring comrades, the policy of "learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones and curing the illness to save the patient." In these cases, the "illness" of disaffection and opposition to Mao had clearly lingered on.

Despite this evidence of the unreliability of the "rectification" process, Mao decided once again to treat the challenge of Peng Te-huai and his supporters as a "contradiction among the people." Although they were dismissed from positions of authority within the government and party structure, they were permitted, as the party resolution pointed out, to "keep their membership or alternate membership in the Central Committee or the Politburo." In return, they were to "admit and disclose all their mistakes before the party and rectify them in action." According to Red Guard wall posters, Chu Teh was an early casualty of this policy of "leniency," attacked by Lin Piao for making an "extremely inadequate" and "insincere" self-criticism and consequently as being "no longer of any use." The contents of Peng Te-huai's confession, reported as taking the form of a short letter to Mao, are not known, but it was apparently contrite enough to enable him to return to his home province of Hunan (he was reported as being there in 1961) where (according to a later report by his wife) he "passed his time breeding fish and growing vegetables."
In the communique of the Tenth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee issued on 28 September 1962, the Lushan conference would be praised for having "victoriously smashed attacks by right opportunism, i.e. revisionism..." In retrospect, it appears that Peng Te-huai was the prototype of all those who would be attacked during the "cultural revolution" as "Khrushchev-type revisionists" within the Chinese Communist Party. In criticizing Mao's radical "great leap forward" and commune programs, Peng represented a large group of the more pragmatic and technically minded administrators and professionals within the party, government and army who had come to see the folly of these programs. In their stead, Peng may be said to have advanced an alternative model of economic and military development, one patterned more closely on Soviet experience and featuring Soviet military economic and technical assistance. As the symbol both of Soviet "revisionist" influence and of opposition to Mao, the Peng Te-huai affair would cast a long shadow over the years that followed. As is now well documented, it was Wu Han's play "Hai Jui's Dismissal" written in defense of Peng Te-huai which would precipitate the launching of the "great proletarian cultural revolution" in the fall of 1965.
The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution

"Bombard the Headquarters"

"In the last 50 days or more some leading comrades from the Central Committee right down to the local levels...have exercised a bourgeois dictatorship and suppressed the vigorous movement of the great proletarian cultural revolution...This is utterly vicious. Associating this with the erroneous tendencies of the right deviation in 1962 and the apparently 'left' but actually right deviation in 1964, shouldn't this awaken people and make them ponder?" --Mao Tse-tung's First Wall Poster, August 5, 1966.

Developments in the three-year period following the Lushan plenum (1959-1962) demonstrated that in important respects, in the great debate over domestic and foreign policy staged at this historic meeting, Peng Te-huai had been right and Mao Tse-tung had been wrong. The combined effect of irrational economic policy, successive bad harvests and the Soviet withdrawal of technicians in the summer of 1960 dealt Mao's "great leap forward" program of economic development a shattering blow. Confronted with the threat of economic and political collapse, the Chinese Communist regime responded with a series of urgent corrective measures in the winter of 1960-1961 and then, reluctantly and painfully, with even more drastic remedies in a period of further retreat from mid-1961 to mid-1962.

The result, as the voluminous record of the "cultural revolution" has made clear, was the worst outbreak of intellectual dissidence since the founding of the Chinese People's Republic. Disaffected by the widespread suffering caused by the disastrous "great leap forward" program, a number of China's leading intellectuals resorted to the use of historical allegory, of pseudonyms, and of Aesopian language to criticize party policies and even Mao Tse-tung himself. Wu Han's play "Hai Jui's Dismissal"
(published in early 1961) exemplified this criticism of Mao Tse-tung by likening the case of Peng Te-huai to that of a Ming Dynasty official who had been unjustly dismissed by the Emperor.

Far more important is the fact that by the winter of 1961-1962 opposition to Mao's policies and programs extended into the ranks of the Politburo to include a number of those standing in the "first line" of leadership who were charged with the responsibility for coping with this domestic crisis. As Mao Tse-tung would subsequently point out (in a 24 October 1966 speech to a party work conference), this opposition was of two kinds--that carried on "secretly" by "the Peng Chen group" and that carried on "openly" by "the Liu Shao-chi - Teng Hsiao-ping group." The progressive awareness by Mao (and a small coterie of trusted advisers) of the extent of this opposition would culminate in the fall of 1965 in the decision to initiate one of the most extensive and violent party purges in the history of the world Communist movement.

A good example of the first type of opposition was a secret conference convened by the powerful Mayor and First Secretary of Peking Peng Chen in December 1961. The purpose of this conference, it is now charged, was to make a critical review of all documents issued by the Central Committee since 1958, to find "problems" and "mistakes" and thus, by "attacking the general line, the great leap forward, and the people's commune," discredit and "oppose" Chairman Mao. Once this data was collected, the problem remained how to make use of it. One participant allegedly expressed the hope that the conference would lead to "correcting the Central Committee's mistakes and allowing Chairman Mao to calm down and examine himself." A more realistic view was expressed by another participant, however, who first characterized China's predicament as resulting from "mistakes of line" made by "Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee" and then pointed out: "In the history of the Party, no mistakes of line have been corrected by those who made them." For this reason, the findings of this conference--the first act in the "conspiracy" of the "Peng Chen group"--were suppressed.
Of far greater importance for understanding the "great proletarian cultural revolution"--the "third big struggle" inside the Chinese Communist Party since it came to power in 1949--was an enlarged Central Committee work conference held a month later in January 1962. For it was at this conference, attended by some 7,000 party cadres, that Liu Shao-chi for the first time "openly" criticized a number of Mao Tse-tung's policies and programs, and thereby raised serious doubts in the mind of Chairman Mao as to the loyalty and reliability of his chosen successor. Indeed, as Red Guard disclosures and regime propaganda have suggested, it appears in retrospect that this conference may well have been the real point of origin of the "cultural revolution."

The evidence for concluding that Liu Shao-chi criticized, obliquely but unmistakably, Mao's policies at this conference is impressive. Although the recent claim that on this occasion "a vigorous struggle was waged between the proletarian headquarters headed by Chairman Mao and the bourgeois headquarters headed by China's Khrushchev" (i.e. Liu Shao-chi) is exaggerated, it seems clear that Mao and Liu revealed basic differences of opinion in their speeches to this conference concerning the gravity of China's domestic problems and the methods that should be employed to cope with these problems. In a sense, their speeches and those of their supporters represented a continuation of the great debate which had taken place earlier at Lushan. What is more, the policy issues in this debate would figure prominently in the ensuing "cultural revolution."

As portrayed in various Red Guard accounts, Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao stood on one side in this debate breathing "revolutionary optimism," as expressed in Mao's statement: "The situation is very favorable. But there are still many problems. The future is bright." From other excerpts of this speech, it is known that Mao warned of the danger posed by China's intellectuals and by "bourgeois representatives" in the party, and of the consequent need to recognize and carry on a "protracted, complex and at times...very violent class struggle" in China's socialist society.
The solution to China's problems advanced by Lin Piao at this conference was to improve political and ideological work—to study "Mao Tse-tung's thought...the soul and the very life of all work. When one masters it, one becomes proficient in everything." Reflecting this view, key People's Daily and Red Flag editorials earlier in December and January had suddenly revived long dormant concepts of the "revolutionary enthusiasm" and the "subjective initiative and creativity" of the masses and called upon party cadres to "fully mobilize" this enthusiasm for production by carrying out intensive "ideological and political work."

Aligned on the other side of this debate were Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping and other top leaders who stood in the "first line" and thus were charged with devising practical measures for coping with this domestic crisis. Responding to Mao's optimistic assessment, Liu in his speech pointed out: "The very favorable situation the Chairman had discussed refers to the political situation. But the economic situation cannot be said to be very favorable; it is very unfavorable." In discussing the causes of this economic crisis, Liu repeated what he had been told by peasants in Hunan that it had resulted primarily ("70 percent") from "man-made disasters", and went on to criticize a major ingredient of the "great leap forward" program ("This does not pay") and communes ("set up prematurely") for having contributed to the crisis. Moreover, in subsequent speeches in the spring of 1962, Liu depicted China's economy generally as being "on the brink of collapse" and criticized the optimistic view of China's problems (which Mao had presented in January) as "unwillingness to admit our difficulties" and "definitely not the bearing of a revolutionary or a proper Leninist attitude."

Of even greater interest, for the purposes of this paper, was Liu's advocacy at this January party work conference of greater democracy and of the right of dissent in inner-party discussion. Liu's justification was the need to rehabilitate a number of those party officials and technical specialists who had spoken up in opposition to Mao's "great leap forward" and commune programs in 1959, and, like Peng Te-huai, had been labeled "Right opportunists."
In this undertaking to "reverse the verdicts" at Lushan and elsewhere in 1959, Liu made a distinction between Peng Te-huai who had been "guilty of treason" (i.e. "maintained illicit relations with foreign countries") and those who had merely "shared Peng Te-huai's viewpoint." The latter, Liu argued, had been unjustly treated since 1959 (subjected to "ruthless struggle and merciless attack") and deserved to be "vindicated."

Liu Shao-chi's reference to "the mistake of 'ruthless struggle and merciless attack'" was significant, for in party history this mistake had only occurred when a "Leftist" leadership had been in control. As described, for example, in Teng Hsiao-ping's report on the revised party constitution at the Eighth Party Congress in September 1956, this mistake resulted from "pushing inner-Party struggle to the extreme" and resulted in "severe damage" to "party unity, inner-party democracy and the initiative of the rank and file party membership..." It was in keeping with the provisions and spirit of the party constitution, then, that Liu went on to advocate that "Those who speak at party meetings shall not be punished" and to call for "an open opposition...within the party."

Thus, it appears to be true, as Red Guard publications have charged, that Liu Shao-chi at this conference of 7,000 top party cadres in January 1962 not only defended Mao's earlier critics but repeated some of the same criticisms of Mao's radical domestic programs which Peng Te-huai had first raised at Lushan. Liu's basic mistake, as subsequent events would demonstrate, was in thinking that "open opposition" to Mao, no matter how justified in terms of party concepts of "democratic centralism" and "collective leadership," would be tolerated. As Chou En-lai would put it, in a speech delivered in August of 1967, it was "illogical" for Liu Shao-chi to assert at this conference: "Others can say this, but not you Peng Te-huai."

In addition to committing this basic political error, Liu Shao-chi is also charged with advocating (perhaps at subsequent party meetings in the spring of 1962) as emergency measures "any method which is useful to arousing the activism of the peasants in production..." Among the
methods specified by Liu at this time were "fixing output quotas according to the household and individual farming," practices later attacked as "the three freedoms and one contract" or, more simply, as "going it alone" in agriculture.

These, then, comprised the "erroneous tendencies of the right deviation in 1962" which Mao Tse-tung would subsequently attack (in his wall poster of 5 August 1966) as the first of several grave political errors by "leading comrades" which would lead to the "great proletarian cultural revolution." To correct these "erroneous tendencies," Mao apparently decided in the summer of 1962 to reclaim the powers which he had delegated at the Eighth Party Congress to Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping in the interests of efficient administration and an orderly succession. The occasion for reversing his earlier decision to establish a "first line front" and a "second line front" of command in the top leadership of the party was the Tenth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee held in September 1962, at which time (as Mao would put it in a 25 October 1966 speech to a party work conference) "the second-line front was abolished."

Having made this decision, Mao was faced with what might be called the "King Lear problem"--the problem of securing obedience after one has relinquished the instruments of power. In the interim since Mao had given up direct control over the operational and organizational life of the party, "a considerable number of independent kingdoms" (to quote again Mao's 25 October 1966 speech) had grown up, each ruled by leaders exercising considerable authority. The most powerful of these leaders were, of course, Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping who controlled the party apparatus. In the polemical language of the "great proletarian cultural revolution," Mao was faced with a situation in which "a bourgeois headquarters had entrenched itself in the apparatus of the dictatorship of the proletariat."

The immediate problem confronting Mao was to devise a strategy to deal with his high-level opposition within the Party. This strategy, which Mao revealed in an important
speech to the Tenth Plenum in September 1962, was to revive and develop to a new and higher stage the concept of "class struggle" in socialist society. By means of this concept, Mao was able to explain past failures and criticism of his policies as largely the handiwork of "foreign and domestic class enemies," against whose poisonous influence ("revisionism") it was necessary to inoculate all segments of Chinese society by means of a massive "socialist education" campaign. Demonstrating his preoccupation, if not obsession, with this concept, Mao is quoted as saying at another party meeting in June 1963: "We should talk about class struggle every day, every month, every year... Without talking about class struggle, no problem can be explained."

The next step was to demonstrate that Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping and other rulers of "independent kingdoms" were, by virtue of their past and continued opposition to Mao, guilty of "revisionism" and for this reason deserved to be removed. This would prove to be a long and difficult process, however, which would in time necessitate launching the "great proletarian cultural revolution." As noted earlier, one reason it would take so long is that Mao had to move cautiously and circumspectly against his old "comrades in arms" because of their entrenched position in control of the party apparatus. Another reason is that Mao probably hoped, as suggested by his call at the Tenth Plenum on "old leaders" to "study and be educated," that at least some of them would cease to oppose him and thus voluntarily surrender their "independent" powers. Probably the most important reason, however, explaining the delay in Mao's campaign to discredit and remove high-level opponents within the party, at least in the two year period following the Tenth Plenum, was the need for relative order and stability to permit China's economy to recover from its near collapse following the "great leap forward."

As evidence for this last conclusion, it appears in retrospect to be significant that Premier Chou En-lai, in a major work report to the Third National People's Congress in December 1964, first announced that "the task of readjusting the national economy has been basically accomplished" and then went on to attack a number of the
emergency policies and programs instituted following the collapse of the "great leap forward" in 1960-1962 as the handiwork of "class enemies." Although not revealed at the time, it is now known from Red Guard materials that most of the policies which Chou criticized in his report had either been advocated or approved by Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping in this earlier period. Now, after China's economy had revived, a number of the measures which had enabled this recovery were attacked as "bourgeois" and "revisionist" in nature.

The fact that Chou En-lai initiated this new attack (indirect, of course) against Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping is in itself significant and deserves further explanation. On record in October 1960 with a glowing tribute to Mao's thought (an act of obeisance which Liu Shao-chi did not see fit to perform throughout this period), Chou is also credited in a Red Guard publication with having joined Lin Piao at the fateful January 1962 work conference (discussed at length above) in "defending the thought of Mao Tse-tung and the proletarian revolutionary line represented by Mao Tse-tung." Thus, whatever his real views on policy (Chou has been generally regarded as the symbol of relatively moderate forces within the Chinese Communist Party), the record suggests that Chou En-lai defended Mao against his critics during this crucial period and by this act of loyalty demonstrated his fitness to serve as one of the principal leaders in the ensuing "great proletarian cultural revolution."

Far more important than this attack, however, was one which Mao personally launched against Liu Shao-chi at a Central Committee work conference held in January 1965. The purpose of this conference, as recent Red Guard materials have disclosed, was to criticize and rectify mistakes committed by Liu Shao-chi in directing the rural "socialist education" or "four clearance" campaign in 1964. These mistakes are said to have included (1) making too gloomy an assessment of the result of the campaign; (2) advocating stringent measures against basic-level cadres as a whole; (3) denigrating one of Mao's work methods—that of holding "investigation meetings"; and (4) substituting his own views in place of Mao's theoretical formulations concerning
the nature of the "four clearance" movement. As Liu Shao-
chi would admit subsequently in his October 1966 "self-
criticism," these constituted "mistakes which appeared
'Leftist' but were actually Rightist"--the second grave
political error for which Mao would attack Liu Shao-chi
in his 5 August 1966 wall poster.

It must have been clear to those present, moreover,
that Mao was leveling a serious political attack on Liu
at this work conference. Views which Liu had advocated
the preceeding September at another party meeting were
denounced in the document drawn up under Mao's supervision
("Some Current Problems Raised in the Socialist Education
Movement in the Rural Areas" or, more simply, "The 23
Points") as "not Marxist-Leninist"--a serious charge in
a Communist state. In addition, this document revealed
that a new target had been selected for the "socialist
education" campaign in urban and rural areas, the same
target as that which would be selected for the "great
proletarian cultural revolution"--"those within the party
who are in authority and are taking the capitalist road."
And when the document further asserted that these "class
enemies" within the party were being supported and pro-
tected by party officials "at higher levels...even provin-
cial and central levels," it appeared that Mao was intent
upon extending the scope of his latest "rectification"
campaign into the highest echelons of the party leadership.

Together with the Lushan plenum in August 1959,
the January 1962 conference of 7,000 party cadres, and
the Tenth Plenum in September 1962, this party work con-
ference in January 1965 was an important milestone on the
road to the "great proletarian cultural revolution." Re-
counting the events leading up to this "cultural revolu-
tion," Chou En-lai would subsequently underline the im-
portance of this conference as follows:

At that time, Chairman Mao expressed his near
disappointment in Liu Shao-chi. Despite his
help for 20 years, Liu had not lived up to
expectations, and at that time, our deputy
supreme commander Comrade Lin Piao had become
the choice of the masses.
Eighteen months would elapse before Mao Tse-tung would convene the Eleventh Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee to depose Liu Shao-chi and name Lin Piao as his "revolutionary successor." Before he could do this, it was first necessary to solve "the problem of Peking" where, as Mao phrased it in his October 1966 work conference speech, Mayor and First Secretary Peng Chen had constructed an "independent kingdom" so tight that there was not even room to drive in a needle." The story of Mao's entrapment of Peng Chen (i.e. using one of Peng's subordinates, Wu Han, as a stalking horse) is well known and will not be repeated here.

It was also necessary to get rid of the other members of "Peng Chen's group," principally Communist China's second-ranking military leader Lo Jui-ching, who had attempted, it was later charged, "to establish...an independent kingdom in the army." As Chief of Staff, Lo personified continuing resistance within the People's Liberation Army to Mao's views on army-building (featuring political indoctrination and productive labor at the expense of military training). For these and other reasons, as the record of charges makes clear, both Mao and Lin Piao had at least as early as February 1965 come to distrust Lo Jui-ching. Occupying a powerful position in the Chinese Communist hierarchy, it is not surprising that Lo was the first casualty of the "great proletarian cultural revolution," disappearing in late November 1965.

Finally, it was necessary to construct a trap with which to ensnare Liu Shao-chi and all others in the party apparatus who had continued "openly" to oppose Mao Tse-tung. The strategy in this case was to incite "revolutionary teachers and students" (the precursors of the Red Guards) in June and July of 1966 to rise up against the "work teams" sent by Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping and other leaders to reassert the authority of the party over Mao's "cultural revolution" in China's cultural and educational institutions. Once the party apparatus had been challenged and had counterattacked, its leaders could then be indicted for the same crime charged against Peng Chen--that of attempting to suppress "the proletarian Left."
This was the third and by far the most serious charge leveled by Mao Tse-tung in his 5 August 1966 wall poster --that Liu Shao-chi and his supporters in "the Central Committee right down to the local levels" had committed the "utterly vicious" crime of "exercizing a bourgeois dictatorship and suppressing the vigorous movement of the great proletarian cultural revolution...." The time had come to spring the trap on Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping and a large number of other high-ranking party leaders, a trap which it appears in retrospect Mao Tse-tung may well have been preparing since 1962.
Conclusions

As portrayed in the disclosures of the "great proletarian cultural revolution," factionalism in the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee since 1949 has been motivated by considerations of power, policy and personal rivalry. That these factors have been present in each of the "three big struggles" of the past 19 years suggests that they will continue to produce tension and conflict within the Chinese Communist political system.

The first of these, the power factor, reflects the first prerequisite for engaging in factional struggle—the need for an independent power base (or "independent kingdom"). These have been both geographical (e.g. the regional power bases of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih in Northeast and East China and of Peng Chen in Peking) and institutional (e.g. the People's Liberation Army in all three struggles and the party apparatus in the "great proletarian cultural revolution") in nature. The pivotal role of the army, the most powerful institution outside the party, in all three struggles demonstrates the continuing validity of Mao Tse-tung's famous warning in the late 1930's that the party must "direct the gun, and never allow the gun to direct the party." It is pertinent to ask, however, how Mao intends to enforce this principle now that his party apparatus has been largely destroyed and replaced by new "revolutionary" organs of power largely dominated by the military.

The second factor—the policy factor—has been especially prominent in the last two factional struggles within the Central Committee. Although involving foreign policy, the dispute has centered on domestic policy, in particular the proper strategy for promoting China's economic, social, political and military development. The central issue in this debate has been Mao's contention that the same techniques of ideological and political mobilization which worked so well in the early years of revolutionary struggle can be applied to the construction of a modern society. The ultimate expression of this political indoctrination, "mass line" approach to economic and social development was, of course, the "great leap
forward." It was this reliance on mass movements in economic construction on which Peng Te-huai focused his attack at the Lushan plenum.

By repeating this criticism at the January 1962 party work conference, Liu Shao-chi set in motion a series of developments which would lead in time to the "great proletarian cultural revolution." Although he could cite the party constitution as justifying his "open opposition," on this occasion, Liu must have suspected that Mao would treat this criticism as a direct personal attack. Indeed, it is difficult to see how criticism of basic party policy in a totalitarian system can be construed in any other way than an attack upon the party leadership. Liu may have felt that the strength of his argument combined with the strength of his position in control of the party apparatus rendered him immune to counterattack.

The third factor—the factor of personal rivalry—is also indispensable for understanding the "three big struggles" within the Central Committee since 1949. A prominent feature in both the Kao-Jao and Peng Te-huai affairs, this element of personal antagonism and conflict has played an even more important role, it is believed, in the "great proletarian cultural revolution." For it appears in retrospect that Mao Tse-tung did in fact interpret Liu Shao-chi's criticism at the January 1962 party work conference as a direct attack against both his policies and himself and determined not long thereafter to make new arrangements for a "revolutionary successor."

The consequences of this decision would be momentous. It would mean, instead of the smooth succession which Mao had hoped to achieve by conferring power and prestige on Liu Shao-chi as head of the party apparatus, the start of a succession struggle. It would necessitate a thorough purging of all those in the party apparatus who had staked their careers on the eventual succession to power of Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping and, as a result, had espoused the views and policies of these party machine leaders. It would require enlisting the support of other leaders whose bases of power lay outside the party apparatus, principally Lin Piao (indispensable as Commander in Chief
of the People's Liberation Army) and Chou En-lai (also important as an able administrator and representative of the government bureaucracy). It would require the construction of an elaborate trap with which to ensnare Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping and their supporters in the party apparatus, and the creation of such extra-party mass organizations as the Red Guards to supply the element of force needed to spring this trap. In short, this decision to select a new "revolutionary successor" would lead, after the necessary preparations had been made, to the launching of Mao Tse-tung's "great proletarian cultural revolution."