CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY

SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES

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This is a working paper. It traces chronologically the development of aspects of Soviet policy toward colonial areas and the countries regarded by Moscow as having achieved various degrees of independence from "imperialism." The Sino-Soviet Studies Group would welcome comment on this paper, addressed to Lyman Wilkison, who wrote the paper, or to the acting coordinator of the group, in Room 2549 "M" Building.
SUMMARY

Moscow's preoccupation in the period 1945-55 with the task of reconstructing the Soviet homeland, with the incorporation of Eastern Europe into the bloc, and with developments in Western Europe—the main focus of East-West friction—for a decade precluded a dynamic policy in peripheral areas: non-Communist Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Although on numerous public occasions Lenin and Stalin had expressed great optimism over trends in colonial areas, Communist agitation and Soviet action in these areas—until World War II shattered the existing social structure in large sections of Asia and speeded up the tempo of political, economic, and social change on a world-wide scale—had been singularly unsuccessful.

The USSR's failure in late 1945 to adopt a bold program to capture or guide the anticolonialist movements which had matured during the war reflected not only the Soviet Union's desire not to embitter relations with the West on secondary matters, but also uncertainty as to the reliability of non-Communist leaders and movements and the general lack of a Soviet "presence." Stalin apparently evaluated the new governments as transitory, soon to give way before popular pressures in an inevitable evolution of political power to the left. The worsening of Soviet relations with the West was accompanied by a stiffening of Moscow's line in Asia. With the founding of the Cominform in September 1947, moderation toward non-Communists was repudiated conclusively—a decision which was reflected in 1948 in the widespread outbreak of Communist-led strike violence, terrorism, and armed rebellions not only in remaining colonial areas but also in the newly independent states of Asia. The Kremlin apparently believed that nothing further could be gained by Communist restraint or conciliation, and this view was abetted by Communist successes in China and by a consistent overevaluation of Communist party prospects elsewhere in Asia. Asian Communist parties, following Moscow's lead, began freely to prescribe a "Chinese way" for the anticolonialist movement; in essence this meant the encouragement of peasant and workers' armed revolts as well as intensified political struggle. The subsequent suppression of Communist-inspired revolts—with the notable exception of Indo-China—with heavy losses to Communist assets was a serious setback to Moscow's general line that the time was ripe for revolutionary upheavals in Asia.
The world-wide crisis touched off in June 1950 by the Soviet-sponsored invasion of South Korea prompted the USSR to mobilize world Communist and non-Communist "peace" forces in support of its Korean policy. Moscow, however, was slow in recognizing the extent to which antiwar sentiment and "neutralism" could be turned against the West; even after the war turned into a military and political stalemate and the Soviet Union's general attitude toward Asian non-Communist governments moderated, Stalin continued to rebuff neutralist efforts to bring about a compromise.

At a September 1951 ECAFE meeting in Singapore, Soviet delegates, in an abrupt reversal of their previous tactics, offered to help promote the economic development of Asian countries by exchanging Soviet machinery for local raw materials. At the UN, the Soviet Union's consistent anti-Westernism now was combined with limited overtures to non-Western delegations, a change reflected also in Soviet world-wide diplomatic activity--suggesting that Moscow had upgraded the possibilities for expanding its influence through traditional government-to-government channels. The extensive buildup given the Moscow Economic Conference (sponsored by the World Peace Council) in April 1952 suggested that Stalin also looked to increased economic contacts as a promising avenue for breaking out of the USSR's semi-isolation. The year 1952 also featured a shift toward greater Soviet diplomatic and propaganda support for the Arabs against Israel, to the encouragement of Arab extremists. Stalin's last major theoretical pronouncements pointed toward a greater emphasis on exploiting divergencies of interest between the industrially developed Western powers and the weakly developed or undeveloped "capitalist dependencies," but his continued rejection of a settlement on Korea acted as a powerful brake on Soviet efforts to get a friendship campaign rolling.

Stalin's successors reaffirmed his goals but discarded his methods and attempted to bring about a limited improvement in relations with the non-Communist world. The cumulative effect of minor steps undertaken by Soviet leaders in the six months following Stalin's death made it apparent that a fundamental reorientation of Soviet tactics toward underdeveloped countries was in progress. For the first time the Soviet Union announced its willingness--although qualified--to contribute to the UN's technical assistance program, and
Soviet Premier Malenkov declared a "good neighbor" policy and "a new approach" on economic aid to Asian countries.

The USSR's subsequent economic overtures attempted to play on local popular and governmental concern over export markets and desires for rapid economic development. Moscow's main attention in late 1953 and 1954 was to Asia, although interest in the Arab world increased with the new tempo of political, economic, and social change in the area. The Soviet Union paid little heed to non-Arab Africa or to Latin America—a tacit admission that they were more or less effectively sealed off from its influence.

A Moscow-directed world "peace" campaign, under way since 1950 in an attempt to exploit the universal fear of atomic warfare and generate pressures against military or political cooperation with the West, was intensified in 1954. The USSR extended diplomatic and propaganda support to countries involved in disputes with the West on territorial issues and other matters and stepped up its efforts to introduce detachments of Soviet specialists and technicians into Asian and Arab countries. The Soviet Union's tactical support for nationalist regimes such as those of Nehru, Sukarno, and Nasir was based on the expectation that their greater self-assurance and self-expression would have the net effect of reducing Western influence and, to a degree, discrediting Western leadership.

The USSR's intention to seek a closer working agreement with Asian and Arab nationalist regimes was made clear by its February 1955 agreement to help finance and construct a major steel plant at Bhilai, India, and by the fervor of its efforts to identify itself with the views and objectives of the neutralist-convened conference of Asian and African governments at Bandung in April 1955. Moscow's attempts to accommodate its public posture to neutralist-nationalist sentiment was underlined dramatically in connection with the June visit to the USSR of Indian Prime Minister Nehru; having formerly attacked him for his anti-Communist and "pro-imperialist" policies, Moscow now praised him for his "spiritual" and political leadership of Asia.

On the eve of the 1955 Geneva summit conference, the USSR's "posture of peace" appeared to hold out the promise of an improvement in East-West relations and a general
reduction of international tension, not just in Europe but throughout the world. Concurrent with conciliatory moves, however, the Soviet Union set in motion a chain of secret arms negotiations with a group of Asian and Arab states designed to offset pro-Western alliances in the area, a tactic surfaced with the announcement that September of Cairo's arms deal with the bloc.

The Bulgarian-Khrushchev visit to Asia in November and December 1955 was Moscow's first big chance to bid for support among Asian peoples. The two leaders dropped their Geneva smiles and attempted to give Asian neutralism a more anti-Western slant by identifying the USSR with Asian neutralist aims and "peace" and the West with "colonialism" and intervention. Agreements on increased trade, technical and cultural exchanges, and credits reached during the tour laid the groundwork for a considerable subsequent expansion of Soviet influence in the area.

The Khrushchev-dominated 20th party congress in February 1956 sought to create the impression that a new era was opening, bright with prospects of Communist victories. The new formulations of the congress were intended to add credibility to the Soviet Union's general line of "peaceful coexistence" and to facilitate long-term cooperation between the USSR and non-Communist countries. Khrushchev confirmed that aid to Asian, African, and Latin American countries for their economic, political, and cultural development was an important plank in Soviet foreign policy, designed to provide "a major stumbling block" to imperialism.

In the series of crises touched off by the collapse in July 1956 of Cairo's negotiations for Western economic assistance to build an Aswan high dam and Nasir's swift nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, Moscow encouraged Cairo to resist Western demands. The Soviet Union's diplomatic and propaganda footwork following the attack on Egypt was intended to halt the fighting and embarrass the attacking countries without committing the USSR to all-out support of Nasir. After the cease-fire, Communist propagandists feasted on this "evidence" of imperialist intervention and magnified the Soviet role as protector of Arab interests.

Moscow's efforts in early 1957 to distract world attention from bloc internal troubles centered on a campaign to counter President Eisenhower's "Middle East Proposals"--i.e., to frustrate the extension of pro-Western defense
arrangements and to protect the newly won Soviet influence in some of the Arab countries. The Soviet Union's own growing foreign economic program could point to increased diplomatic and economic contacts both in Asia and in the Arab states, to dozens of new trade agreements with non-Communist countries, and to a generally enhanced impression that the USSR was a serious economic as well as political competitor with the West. Only a handful of countries, however, had agreed to extensive programs of Soviet economic and military aid or of economic aid alone.

Following the frustration in June 1957 of efforts by the "anti-party" group to break his control of the Soviet government and party, Khrushchev led the USSR into bolder foreign moves. Behind a facade of Soviet security interest in Syrian developments and in the context of intense political-psychological pressures following Soviet tests of an intercontinental ballistic missile and claims of a new world balance of power, Moscow set out to test Western reactions and Western resolution. After two months of efforts to intensify and prolong world fears over Syria, the USSR's abrupt reversal reflected apparent disappointment that it was the Arab states—rather than the West—which buckled under East-West pressures.

The USSR's 40th anniversary celebrations and subsequent meetings of world Communist parties in November 1957 reflected an effort to make direct political and propaganda capital out of changes wrought domestically and internationally in the years of Soviet rule. The essence of the new formal policy pronouncements was a call for an intensified struggle by all anti-imperialist elements against Western influence, with top priority to peace forces for a drive against the manufacture, test, or use of nuclear weapons. The practical effect of the party discussions on Soviet policy was slight, with the USSR continuing to profess willingness to enter into reasonable agreements with the West and to assist politically and economically in the development of countries seeking to break away from dependence on the West.

Moscow began 1958 riding the wave of optimism engendered by worldwide reaction to its military and space achievements, and it appeared to count on the cumulative effect over a period of years of the bloc's political, economic, and military aid program—combined with people-to-people contacts, intensive
propaganda, and growing local Communist agitation—to make a growing number of the underdeveloped countries materially dependent on the bloc and politically tractable. However, Nasir's precipitous move toward a merger of Egypt and Syria pointed up the Soviet problem of maintaining good state relations with nationalist governments while supporting the spread of Communist agitation and organization. The Soviet Union ended by grudgingly accepting the formation of the UAR—with its disastrous effects on the Syrian Communist party—and turned its attention to heading off any rapprochement between Nasir and the West, on the one hand by increasing its economic and military support to Cairo and on the other by continuing to fan anti-Western sentiment among the Arab populace.

The USSR's vigorous reaction to the Iraqi revolt on 14 July 1958 and the subsequent American and British landings in Lebanon and Jordan reflected Soviet concern that these moves were a prelude to a general Western counteroffensive against Soviet and UAR interests in the Middle East. As in the earlier Syrian crisis, Moscow attempted to intensify the air of crisis, to discredit Western moves, and to force an immediate big-power conference to bring about a detente. The Soviet Union moved rapidly to develop close relations with the new Iraqi regime, evidently viewing it as an effective instrument for promoting anti-Western sentiment among Arabs. Anti-leftist coups in the fall of 1958 in Pakistan, Burma, and Thailand prompted Moscow to urge on the peoples and governments of the underdeveloped countries a more resolute stand against reactionary influences, both domestic and international.

At the 21st party congress in early 1959 Khrushchev personally spotlighted ideological and political differences which had arisen in Moscow's political, economic, and military support of selected non-Communist countries—support based principally on parallel anti-Western interests rather than on compatible ideologies or common long-term goals. Khrushchev implied Soviet demands in the future for more consistent support of Soviet foreign policy in exchange for Soviet favors. The congress' endorsement of a more active line in underdeveloped countries was reflected in signs of a broadening and deepening of Soviet attention to African affairs and of attempts to step up economic, diplomatic, and cultural contacts with Latin American countries. The general strategy outlined at the congress reflected the USSR's apparent belief
that the stalemate in East-West relations facilitated rather than hampered its policy of driving a wedge between the Western and neutralist camps; support for the latter was justified on the basis that the conduct of the neutralists showed them to be supporters of peace and "well-disposed" toward the bloc.

In mid-1959, under the exigencies of its drive for detente with the West and in reaction to unfavorable developments within key underdeveloped countries, the Soviet Union temporarily set aside its activist line in favor of overtures for strengthening friendly government-to-government relations. Moscow apparently hoped that Khrushchev's trip to the United States would help build irresistible popular pressure for an early summit meeting and pave the way for Western concessions. Khrushchev's disarmament initiative at the General Assembly session in New York, which included the promise of vastly greater economic assistance to Asia, Africa, and Latin America from both the bloc and the West once the arms race was over, was a transparent bid for support for immediate talks on disarmament.

In a different vein, Mikoyan's November 1959 visit to Mexico pointed up the new stage in Soviet efforts to exploit the economic difficulties of Latin American countries in the direction of expanded trade and other ties with the bloc; Mikoyan's visit to Cuba in February 1960 reinforced this tactic; at the same time it called attention to Moscow's appraisal that Castro's anti-Americanism opened an unprecedented opportunity for expanding Soviet influence throughout Latin America. Khrushchev's own highly publicized Asian trip in February and March 1960 probably was intended to halt the erosion of Soviet influence and popularity, which had suffered particularly as a result of friction between Peiping and other Far Eastern capitals, and generally to shore up Soviet positions and prestige.

Khrushchev's disruption of the Paris talks in May 1960 apparently in reaction to the U-2 incident and the dimming of prospects for Western concessions on any of the major outstanding international issues, prompted a major effort by Soviet spokesmen to absolve the USSR of any blame and to convince the world public that the United States alone was responsible. The U-2 incident was used as a pretext for a campaign to frighten America's allies into restricting the use,
and pressing for the evacuation, of American bases from their territory under the threat of a Soviet strike in the event of their use by any future invader of Soviet air space. Released at least temporarily from inhibitions deriving from the desire for negotiations with the US, the Soviet Government adopted a bold line on Cuba which went well beyond any previous Soviet move in Latin America, although Khrushchev's 9 July threat to use rockets against the US in the event of "Pentagon" intervention in Cuba was patently a bluff to impress non-Communist Latin America with the might and daring of the Soviet Union. The stronger line was also evident in Moscow's treatment of the RB-47 incident and its breaking off disarmament talks.

Moscow seized on the crisis in the Congo following its achievement of independence on 30 June as a windfall to discredit the West not only in the Congo but throughout Africa and to establish a Soviet presence through heavy support to Lumumba-controlled elements in the Leopoldville government. Khrushchev's pledge of unilateral aid was implemented dramatically in a fashion to undermine the UN program, which came under heavy Soviet attack for "improperly" supporting colonialist interests. Mobutu's 15 September order expelling all bloc diplomats and technicians brought the USSR's Congo experiment to an abrupt halt and forced the Soviet Union to fall back on diplomatic and propaganda exploitation of the continuing political, economic, and military chaos.

Khrushchev's performance at the 15th General Assembly session in New York in September and October 1960, which managed to keep the idea of a summit meeting at the forefront of world public opinion at the same time that Moscow continued to play up situations making an early meeting of Soviet and American leaders seem imperative, was an effort to influence the countries of non-bloc Asia, Africa, and Latin America--singly and in concert--to a heightened assault on colonialism. Khrushchev's official and unofficial conduct, and Soviet maneuvers generally, added up to a major effort to impress on the leaders of these countries that in the 15 years since World War II there had been a fundamental change in the world balance of power--a fact which had not yet been reflected proportionately either in the policies of their individual governments or in the structure and operations of the UN.
In sum, the assumption underlying Moscow's policy toward
the underdeveloped countries—to which it has clung despite
heavy pressures from both inside and outside the bloc—is
that the world is passing through an interim period of un-
certain but fairly short duration, perhaps a decade, during
which political, economic, and ideological forces now in
motion will bring about a basically new world situation:
the predominance of "socialism." Changes within Asian, Af-
rican, and Latin American countries will reflect the corre-
lation of world forces, resulting in a gradual elimination
of political, economic, and ideological ties with the West.
In this period, growing bloc economic and political support
to underdeveloped countries will help their governments main-
tain a neutrality increasingly friendly to the bloc and in-
creasingly opposed to Western policies and interests.
I. THE STALINIST LEGACY: August 1945 - February 1953

Moscow's preoccupation in the immediate postwar years with the massive task of reconstructing the Soviet homeland, with the incorporation of Eastern Europe into the bloc, and with crucial developments in Western Europe—the principal focus of East-West differences—precluded a dynamic policy in peripheral areas: non-Communist Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Nevertheless, the extreme fluidity of the Asian political scene aroused Moscow's revolutionary optimism and called for an updating and clarification of its views on Communist world prospects. Although Stalin at every party congress since the early 1920s—as Lenin had before him—expressed official optimism over developments in "the colonial areas," Communist agitation and Soviet meddling in the affairs of non-Communist Asia, Africa, and Latin America had in fact been singularly unsuccessful. World War II, by shattering the existing social structure in large areas of Asia and speeding up the tempo of political, economic, and social change throughout most of the world, opened new vistas for the expansion of Soviet influence.

Moscow's failure at the end of the war to step out immediately with a clear-cut strategy to guide or capture anti-colonial, anti-Western movements, reflected the USSR's desire not to embitter relations with the West on matters which it considered secondary to the overriding necessity of arranging a suitable settlement in Europe. It turned also on uncertainty in top Soviet circles whether to cooperate with non-Communist leaders and movements—and on what terms—or to encourage local Communists to attempt to seize power. The scarcity of solid information, the lack of a Soviet "presence," and a record studded with overenthusiastic appraisals of anti-colonial developments all counseled caution. Although Lenin's vaunted thesis that the capitalist chain could be broken at its weakest line—the areas under "imperialist oppression"—and Stalin's formula for overcoming imperialism by revolutionizing its colonial "rear" were considered still valid, neither served as a practical guide for Soviet policy in this period of widespread revolutionary change.

Whatever Soviet intentions concerning exploitation of the chaotic and near-chaotic conditions in South and Southeast Asia, Moscow was stymied by the fact that relations between local
Communist and non-Communist independence movements—seldom, if ever, good—had been embittered in most areas over the issue of wartime support for the Allies. Moscow's 1935 adoption and subsequent concentration on Popular Front tactics in Europe—which viewed fascism as a more pressing danger than colonialism—had contributed to the estrangement of Communists from incipient nationalist movements by committing Moscow to collaboration with the Western colonial powers. Stalin's pact with Hitler removed these inhibitions, but following Germany's attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941, the virulent anticolonial campaign was suddenly moderated by the requirements of the wartime alliance. With the Japanese defeat, the two-front struggle of Communists and nationalists against the colonial powers—and each other—reached a new peak of intensity.

Moscow, in no position to influence local developments by effective material or political aid, directed a steady stream of charges against British, French, and Dutch military actions undertaken in an effort to maintain their colonial positions, but its attitude toward non-Communist movements coming to power in the new Asian states vacillated. Moscow was publicly cool toward their leaders, and Soviet spokesmen questioned the "genuineness" of their anticolonialism, in light of the compromises which had made early independence possible. Well into the postwar period, Moscow continued to discuss Asian developments in terms of ever-deteriorating political and economic conditions and openly predicted that existing governments and their programs would soon give way before the inevitable evolution of political power to the left.

Stalin not only minimized the immediate prospects of Asian nationalist movements, but he apparently also entertained hopes that different views on colonialism, combined with antagonistic economic self-interests, would lead to a serious rift between the United States and its Western colleagues. As a consequence of these views, Soviet propaganda downplayed the American role in attempting to stabilize areas recently freed from Japanese occupation, concentrating its attacks on other Western powers active in Asia.

Moscow's unsure diplomatic hand was reflected in disagreement in top Soviet academic circles as to the meaning of the changes brought about in the colonial world by war. Unanimous only in their appraisals that "tremendous" and "revolutionary" developments had taken and were taking place, Soviet scholars
and publicists, in the absence of firm guidance from the top, arrived at no consensus which would fit the needs of Soviet policy.

Their considerable differences were underlined by the controversy which sprang up over the September 1946 publication of Changes in the Economy of Capitalism Resulting From the Second World War by Moscow's leading politico-economic theoretician, Academician Eugene S. Varga. Varga's monumental survey of the war's effects on world capitalism, including an attempt to assess the "far-reaching changes in the relationships between the colonies and the mother countries," concluded that on the basis of industrial development and lessened financial dependence, the war years irrevocably had reduced the economic dependence of the majority of the colonies on their metropolises. Varga, in company with other Soviet analysts, cited the growth of an industrial proletariat in a whole series of colonies and the supply of arms to colonial peoples during the war—a part of which they were able to retain and use for the creation of revolutionary armies—as factors facilitating the development of Communist influence.

Although Varga's views found considerable support, the implications of his favorable appraisal of economic developments in the capitalist world were increasingly unacceptable as cold war tensions mounted. Public rebuttal of Varga's views was considered necessary. Published discussions at a joint conference of Economics Institute and Moscow University theoreticians in May 1947 reflected Soviet hostility toward both the Western powers and the Asian nationalist movements. Varga's findings on the degree of economic independence attained by certain colonies and "semi-colonies" (imperialist "dependencies" such as the Latin American countries) were challenged, and it was denied that a basis had been laid in some colonies for independent economic development. Although the regime-sponsored counterattack on Varga served notice that the area for individual interpretation of world events had narrowed considerably, both Varga supporters and Varga detractors displayed uncertainty toward developments in Asia, finding as much to condemn as to praise in the current scene.

The founding of the Cominform in September 1947 marked the conclusive repudiation of moderation as a line to be followed toward non-Communists. Zhdanov's keynote speech emphasized the extent to which Moscow was to commit itself to the
doctrine of two antagonistic world systems, completely excluding the possibility of a third, or neutralist, position. Zhdanov's speech and the early Cominform propaganda had little to say about Asia and served to underline the fact that Moscow's primary concern remained with securing a favorable settlement of European issues. Asian Communist parties within a short time began to reflect this harsher line and to adopt a more vigorous assault on remaining Western colonial interests and on non-Communist Asian nationalist parties. The year 1948 was marked by a widespread outbreak of Communist-led strike violence, terrorism, and armed rebellions not only in the remaining colonies, but also in the newly independent states. Moscow's encouragement of such tactics apparently stemmed from the belief that nothing further could be gained by Communist restraint toward the West nor from additional attempts to conciliate non-Communist Asian governments, a view abetted by Communist successes in China and by consistent overevaluation of Communist party prospects elsewhere in Asia.

An obvious effort was made to exploit Chinese prestige which ballooned in Asia on the heels of the 1948 military victories. Asian Communist parties, following Moscow's lead, began freely to prescribe a "Chinese way" as proper anticolonialist strategy for Asia. The content of this "Chinese way" was not spelled out, but in essence it meant the encouragement of armed revolts by peasants and workers, as well as intensified political struggle to draw additional elements of the national bourgeoisie into the "anti-imperialist" struggle. The foundering of this policy--as evidenced by the general suppression of the Communist-inspired revolts with heavy and in some places catastrophic losses to local Communist assets, with the notable exception of Indochina--was a serious setback to Moscow's general line that the time was ripe for revolutionary upheavals in Asia.

Post mortems on failures of the resort to open force--i.e., the editorial in the April 1949 issue of Problems of History--attacked the degree of cooperation "exposed" between area governments and the "colonialists" and freely predicted a general deterioration of the Asian political situation which would give Communist parties another chance under more favorable circumstances. Soviet scholars were charged with concentrating their efforts on the support of Soviet and Communist goals in Asia by greater attention to present-day developments and to combatting the false theses of non-Communists.
In April 1949 a three-day meeting of Pacific and Oriental Institute specialists was held in Moscow to improve the content of Soviet propaganda on Asian developments and in June there was a joint conference of the Pacific and Economics Institutes. The principal report at both meetings was delivered by the director of the Pacific Institute, Academician Eugene M. Zhukov, since 1943 a top spokesman on Soviet Asian policy.

The proceedings of the two conferences point up the considerable doctrinal backing and filling which was going on in the Communist movement at this time. Having just suffered defeats at the hands of the bourgeoisie in many of the new Asian states, Moscow was in no mood to examine dispassionately current opportunities for playing up existing differences between the new states and the West, and instead increased its isolation from Asian nationalist movements by heaping abuse on their leaders and ideologies. Zhukov, however, made it clear that Moscow even then was less concerned with the social role of various capitalist elements in the new Asian states than with the "main question":

the progressiveness of one social movement or another, the revolutionary nature or reactionary nature of one party or another, is...determined by their relations with the Soviet Union, with the camp of democracy and socialism.

The conferees' exposition of an Asian strategy welding anti-imperialist intellectuals, petit-bourgeois, and middle-bourgeois elements with a militant proletariat and peasantry largely ignored recent defeats of Communist-led insurrections and, because of "fundamental changes" caused by the war and the "new alignment of political forces" in Asia resulting from the Communist sweep of the Chinese mainland, considered Communist chances in Asia bright enough for the continued advocacy of violence. The general line continued that authoritatively set by Zhdanov at the founding of the Cominform in September 1947--aggressive Communist leadership of anti-imperialist coalitions and across-the-board attack on all evidence of Western influence. Area Communist parties were slow in coming around to the Moscow-charted course; less caught up in international issues, they preferred to attack local class enemies. The Communist party of India, the most important in non-Communist Asia following the suicidal uprising of the Indonesian party in 1948, was split into factions over the question whether
to continue peasant guerrilla warfare, which had failed in Telengana, or to retreat to more peaceful forms of political agitation in an attempt to win over dissatisfied elements in the Congress party. Cominform efforts to bring Asian Communist parties into line were pointed up by an editorial in its January 1950 journal attacking those Indian Communist party leaders who continued to question the direct applicability of the "Chinese experience" to their own struggle for power, and the Japanese Communist party for advocating "peaceful revolution" for Asia.

On the occasion of Stalin's 70th birthday, Professor I. I. Potekhin, long a principal spokesman on African affairs, summarized the Stalinist position on "Colonial Revolution and the National-Liberation Movement:"

Comrade Stalin warned, and the last quarter of a century fully confirmed, that the complete and final victory of the colonial revolution is possible only under the leadership of the proletariat. Petit-bourgeois nationalist organizations and parties have already proven their incapacity to accomplish national liberation. They limit themselves to constitutional reforms and the achievement of formal, bourgeois democracy which do not and cannot ensure a complete break from the system of imperialism.

In Stalin's name, Potekhin went on to record "bourgeois betrayals" of the independence movement not only by the Chinese bourgeoisie, but also by the big bourgeoisie of India, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Egypt.

The Moscow-created crisis touched off by the invasion of South Korea in June 1950, which quickly became a political confrontation of the major powers, provided a new focus for Soviet Asian policy and pre-empted attention from the other areas. Stalin's Korean gambit showed him at least temporarily willing to use Communist armed forces, at the very considerable risk of a general war, to achieve his political objectives. The move obviously stemmed from a monumental miscalculation of the Western mood.

The war made academic further discussions within the Communist world over hard or soft tactics to be followed in the anticolonial struggle. What counted now was the success of
local supporters in mobilizing Communist and non-Communist "peace" forces in support of official positions. The war also marked the final step in the evolution of Communist propaganda toward singling out the United States as the principal "imperialist" enemy, not only of Communist interests but allegedly of those of the independence movements as well. Presumably, the attack on South Korea was initiated as a result of Moscow's estimate that a military shock bringing down one of the weak Western-oriented states in Asia would trigger a chain reaction of revolts elsewhere. By the summer of 1951 it had become obvious that the fighting would continue deadlocked unless one side or the other was willing to take much greater risks.

With the drawing to a close of the military phase of the war, Moscow began to back away from its previous line. The clash of Korean policies had exposed considerable Asian estrangement from the West. Statements by Indian and Arab leaders in particular, and voting records in the United Nations not hostile to bloc positions, pointed up the considerable estrangement which had developed between the "peace" policies of a number of Asian governments and those of the principal Western powers. In retrospect, Moscow, which had acted promptly to organize world-wide condemnation of the UN effort in Korea, was slow in recognizing the extent to which antiwar sentiment and "neutralist" foreign policies of Asian non-Communist governments could be turned against the West. To the end, Stalin rebuffed neutralist efforts to bring about a compromise on Korea, a problem in which he was too personally and emotionally involved to permit even the tacit admission of error.

The transition to a more peaceful stage in Communist and Soviet relations with the former colonies of Asia was gradual and uneven. The year 1951 was marked by a considerable tailing off of Communist-led guerrilla wars in Asia—except for Indochina—and renewed emphasis on political agitation by the local parties, but the changeover in tactics was not accompanied by unmistakable public signs such as those on their adoption in mid-1947. Bolshevik in June 1951 commented favorably on the newly adopted program of the Indian Communist party which turned its back on further encouragement of peasant revolts and set the party's primary purpose as the creation of a revolutionary bloc comprised not only of the working class and the peasantry, but also progressive elements of the
intelligentsia and of the Indian bourgeoisie. India has consistently been treated as a special problem by Soviet tacticians. If Moscow intended its endorsement of the Indian Communist party's shift as a signal to Asian Communist parties generally, the message was slow in taking effect, for it was late summer 1952 before the last parties fell in line.

At the September 1951 ECAFE meeting in Singapore the Soviet delegates, in an abrupt reversal from their previous harassment of participating Asian governments, offered to promote the economic development of their countries by the exchange of Soviet industrial machinery for local raw materials—a move which had all the earmarks of a propaganda gambit rather than a policy shift. Better evidence that Stalin's inner circle of advisers had concluded there was little likelihood of an early Communist victory in general Asian revolution, thus calling for a major change in strategy, is presented in the reports of discussions at a 12-day conference in November 1951 of Soviet Asian specialists of the Institute of Oriental Studies and of the party Central Committee's Academy of Social Sciences.

Zhukov again fulfilled the role of regime spokesman. The burden of his argumentation was that Asian parties could not count on coming to power everywhere through "revolutionary armies," and that the main significance of the Chinese revolution for other Asian countries was its blending of anti-imperialist and anti-feudal elements into a single anti-imperialist front struggling toward independence. Resort to arms as a political tactic was not specifically disavowed, although it was considerably downgraded by the conference majority. With the pendulum now swinging in the direction of intensified political agitation, the conferees struggled to give more precise content to the concept of a noncapitalist path of development for Asian countries, reopening the debates of the early 1920s over the possibilities of organizing a "socialist" order out of semi-feudal, semi-capitalist societies.

A desire to open a new stage in Soviet relations with non-Communist Asia was apparent in Moscow's behavior in the United Nations, where consistent anti-Westernism was combined with limited overtures to the small-country delegations—an apparent reflection of a worldwide upgrading of possibilities for expanding Communist influence by manipulating traditional methods of diplomacy. Greater Soviet attention to international and
domestic developments having no immediate bearing on Soviet security or on the main arenas of East-West conflict was reflected in the appearance of a symposium prepared by the Institute of Economics on The Peoples of Latin America in the Struggle Against American Imperialism, the first significant monograph devoted to this subject in the postwar period. No tour de force such as Varga’s 1946 work, this book in defining the task at hand as the “unmasking of the economic, political, military, and ideological expansion of American imperialism” is typical of Soviet scholarship of the period: the substitution of quotations from the classics of Marx-Lenin-Stalin for original analysis and heavy dependence on second-hand accounts in the local Communist press. The January 1952 Lenin anniversary speech of party theoretician Petr N. Pospelov, surveying the current “crisis of the entire colonial system of imperialism” in optimistic terms, claimed to see “hundreds of millions of formerly backward and suppressed people” now beginning to play an active political role, in fulfillment of Lenin’s predictions.

That Stalin looked to increased economic contacts as one of the promising avenues for breaking out of the semi-isolation the USSR suffered as a result of its role in Korea is suggested by the Soviet buildup for the April 1952 World Peace Council-sponsored Moscow Economic Conference. Communist parties and peace council groups throughout the world attempted to drum up invitees, individual businessmen who might serve as future trade contacts or might serve as focuses for local agitation against Western trade controls. Moscow sought to stimulate interest in increased trade with the Soviet Union by a few highly selective trade offers, overtures to establish comprehensive economic relations, and limited offers of technical assistance. Although infrequent offers to exchange Soviet industrial equipment and capital goods for raw materials and foodstuffs produced in the former colonial areas had been made previously, they had met with general skepticism in view of Moscow’s general hostility to non-Communist governments.

In seeking to expand trade and technical contacts, Moscow was acting from manifestly economic as well as political objectives. The USSR’s desire to break the West’s trade restrictions and open up Asia and Africa, if not Latin America as well, as sources of materials vital for Soviet strategic reserves and to facilitate its breakneck industrial expansion were undoubtedly contributing factors. Despite heavy propaganda attention
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controls, asserting that the Soviet Union no longer had a need for imports but could compete with the West on the basis of its own resources. Stalin heir-apparent Malenkov's report to the 19th party congress which followed in October 1952 cited the general poverty of the peoples of "colonial and dependent" areas and forecast a period of continued decline in the economy of the underdeveloped countries which, in combination with a general shrinking of world markets for Western manufactured goods, would "drag down the economy of the capitalist world like a dead weight." Stalin's short concluding speech to the congress was devoted exclusively to problems of the world Communist movement, to exhorting more intense effort, and for reassuring the faithful that greater successes were in the offing. Stalin and Malenkov's statements, in combination with Moscow's stepped-up political and economic overtures to the Asian and Arab states, suggested that the period of relative calm--and neglect--had come to an end. For obvious reasons, Moscow did not spell out its role in the intensifying troubles forecast for the capitalist world, but by implication, Communists would step up efforts to exploit political and economic differences whenever and wherever they appeared. In the November 1952 General Assembly session, Moscow moderated its previous stand on several minor measures involving a United Nations economic assistance role. Stalin, in a Christmas "interview" with James Reston, declared himself in favor of increasing economic and political relations, particularly with the smaller countries. Stalin's continued rejection of Indian efforts to bring about an East-West compromise on Korea, however, acted as a powerful brake to Soviet efforts to get its friendship campaign rolling. With the January 1953 discovery of the "doctors' plot," Moscow's foreign countenance, mirroring its domestic one, abruptly became more hostile.

Particularly during his last years, Stalin appeared to exercise a "dead hand" on Soviet policy with his inherent suspiciousness of all forces which were not under his control. Postwar changes in Moscow's line, as also post-Korea changes, were made in the face of radically changed Asian circumstances--which took place with little or no influence from Moscow--which Stalin undertook with reluctance.
II. COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP: March 1953 - January 1955

Stalin's sudden demise shook the whole of Soviet society. Since Stalin dominated all aspects of Soviet policy-making and implementation, and since he had taken only rudimentary steps to prepare for an orderly succession, his abrupt departure left his successors as stunned as was the ordinary Soviet citizen and on the defensive. The unsteady coalition which now assumed command turned first to a reduction of tension with the West in order to provide a breathing spell for consolidating their collective authority as well as their individual positions.

First of all, the new leaders sought to dispel the black clouds, domestic as well as international, generated during the dictator's final two months of rule, and to revitalize the moves made the preceding year toward a limited improvement in relations with the non-Communist world. Molotov's funeral oration attempted to affirm the new regime's dedication to carrying out a "Stalinist peace-loving foreign policy," which he interpreted as a desire for the development of "cooperation" and "business ties" with all countries. Malenkov's speech to the Supreme Soviet on 15 March 1953—just ten days after Stalin's death—sought to reassure the Soviet people and emphasized his intent to pursue peace. By the end of March, Moscow had initiated a series of minor moves and token steps intended to clear the air of the hostility engendered earlier in the year and to support the genuineness of its professed desire for improved relations with the West. A number of Soviet statements culminating in Bulganin's May Day speech emphasized the need for a reduction in the risk of war and called on the West to respond to Soviet peace overtures by abandoning the arms race and dismantling Western military bases close to Soviet territory.

As the new leadership became more confident of its authority, the tempo of reform and improvisation in its foreign relations increased. In succession Moscow succeeded in "normalizing" relations with Greece, Israel, and Canada. Territorial claims against Turkey were abandoned, and new efforts were made to increase diplomatic and trade contacts, especially with Asian and Arab states. The Soviet peace offensive brought diplomacy and propaganda to bear in a combination unknown in Stalin's day. In their handling of various international issues,
the new leaders displayed a considerable flexibility and a marked increase in sophistication as they sought by the very number and variety of their moves, many of which were merely the reversal of Stalin's gratuitous manifestations of ill will, to create the impression of a major shift of Soviet policy in the direction of détente. Soviet diplomats abroad undertook a widespread demonstration of good fellowship for their Western colleagues. The new leaders in Moscow, who stopped short of openly rejecting Stalin's methods in reaffirming his goals, dared privately to deplore "excesses" which had crept into Soviet foreign relations as a result of Stalin's personal direction of day-to-day diplomacy. The new more conciliatory features of Soviet foreign policy were interpreted for the home audience as testimony of the Soviet Union's growing self-assurance and strength. This synthetic official optimism was not accompanied by any appreciable let-up in domestic propaganda hostile to the West, however.

In addition to the peace offensive, which occupied Moscow's primary attention, the regime stepped out in the direction of increased economic contacts with the whole capitalist world. At the Geneva meeting on East-West trade, Soviet officials toned down their propaganda role and showed a marked business-like approach to the discussions. A May 1953 Kommunist review of the major lines of Soviet economic policy placed Moscow squarely on the side of "widening economic cooperation and normal trade relations with all countries" and for an over-all increase in international trade. At the same time, the author, A. Nikonov, a leading Soviet economist, reiterated the principal lines of Moscow's attack on Western trade policies, which he held to be responsible for holding down the volume of trade, and on Western strategic commodity controls, which he wanted dropped in favor of the "re-establishment of a single international market." Stepped-up efforts through diplomatic channels showed that Moscow was looking toward an expanding exchange of goods with the major capitalist countries as well as with the independent countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

In July it became apparent that the new regime was prepared to carry its overtures to the underdeveloped capitalist countries well beyond the limits implied in earlier overtures. At the 15 July meeting of the UN Economic and Social Council, Soviet delegate Arutyunyan announced Moscow's willingness for the first time to contribute to the UN's technical assistance program. While attacking the Western approach to technical
assistance and repeating the standard Soviet position that elimination of Western trade restrictions imposed on the weaker capitalist countries and the development of "normal trade" with all countries would do more to facilitate their economic development than any likely UN program, Arutyunyan nevertheless announced that the Soviet Union had set aside four million rubles--supplemented later by token amounts from the Ukraine and Belorussia--for the UN's technical assistance program.* The impact of Moscow's offer was reduced by Arutyunyan's grudging endorsement--"it is better to let them trade normally with other countries and get the money they need that way that to render them so-called aid"--and by the gradual realization that the "contribution" in effect could be spent only within the USSR or for services of Soviet specialists abroad and did not conform to the requirements of the UN program. The initial four million rubles, as a result, went unused. The statement issued on 25 July 1953, on the occasion of the 50th Anniversary of Bolshevism, reflected the considerable degree to which the regime was willing to link belief in the possibility of a lasting coexistence with the capitalist world to a drive for increased economic ties with all countries.

The "good neighbor" policy which Malenkov advanced in his 8 August 1953 speech to the Supreme Soviet,

The Soviet Union has no territorial claims against any state whatsoever.... Differences in the social and economic system...cannot serve as an obstacle to the strengthening of friendly relations....

was intended to follow up Moscow's earlier overtures--such as its well-publicized surrender of nuisance claims against Turkey and Iran--and to pave the way for a bolder across-the-board approach to the newly independent states of Asia and Africa. Malenkov's remarks were keyed to a reassertion of Soviet strength, which within two weeks were buttressed by public claims to possession of the hydrogen bomb, as part of an effort to reinvigorate the Communist movement, which had become somewhat lethargic

*Always constrained to show its policies as continuous and unchanging, Moscow later attempted to cover up its years of opposition to this program by falsely dating the inception of this program as "1953-1954", instead of 1950, and alleged the participation of the USSR, the Ukraine, and Belorussia from the beginning.
in the absence of strong one-man leadership and under the debilitating influence of the concerted effort to play down outstanding differences between the two world power blocs.

The drive by Stalin's successors for "reducing international tension" had helped reduce the diplomatic semi-isolation Moscow had suffered as a result of the Korean venture and had succeeded in part in reducing pressure on Soviet positions both in Europe and in the Far East, but it had failed to attract Western concessions. Moreover, the peace offensive was not a suitable vehicle for helping to create the impression of a USSR rapidly growing in international prestige and authority—an impression which Communist leaders from the early days of the revolution had recognized as vitally necessary both to Moscow and to the world Communist movement. The new foreign policy course indicated by Malenkov represented not so much a break with Stalinist policies as it did a rejection of Stalinist tactics and the recognition that improved government-to-government relations would place the USSR in a better position to conduct a strong global policy. The cumulative effect of the minor moves undertaken by Moscow over the preceding five months made it apparent that a fundamental reorientation of Soviet tactics toward the underdeveloped countries had been decided on.

The August 1953 appearance of academician Eugene Varga's Basic Problems of the Economics and Politics of Imperialism After the Second World War, which according to the author was prepared in 1948-1951 and elaborated on in 1952-1953 in light of Stalin's Problems of Socialism and the 19th party congress discussions, provided an authoritative summary of the world views inherited by the regime. Varga's analysis harped on the coming disintegration of Western imperialism through failure to overcome internal and external "contradictions" and assigned no great role to built-in antagonism between newly independent Asian-African states and the West. Instead, he dwelled on rivalries among imperialist powers for influence and markets in colonial and formerly colonial areas and alleged that the principal goal of American foreign policy was the economic and territorial redistribution of colonial territories of the world to its own advantage—a process he considered well under way. Varga also repeated the standard charge that "rotten compromises" between local bourgeois parties and Western imperialist states had postponed the successful conclusion of the "national-liberation" struggle over much
of Asia. Varga's work did not reflect the evolution which had begun toward a great accommodation of Moscow's policies toward prevailing moods in the underdeveloped countries nor provide a ratiopale for the new tack. It did, however, provide a focus for a limited re-evaluation of Moscow's views on "colonial" developments in the guise of scholarly criticism of Varga's book carried out over the succeeding six months.

Following the September 1953 plenum of the central committee, which confirmed Khrushchev as party first secretary and set off the offensive on the agricultural front, the decision to step up the foreign economic program was endorsed publicly in unmistakably official tones. Following up Moscow's grant of one billion rubles for North Korean rehabilitation, Premier Malenkov on 19 September called for "a new approach to solve the question of constructive and effective aid" to Asian countries by "many states," implying Soviet willingness to assist the economic development of friendly non-Communist Asian countries. Malenkov's cautious step was followed by diplomatic efforts to spark mutually reinforcing drives for increased trade and for the "exchange" of technical information and training.

Although the principal reason for Moscow's trade drive probably was the need for greater imports of consumer goods entailed in Malenkov's "new course" promises to raise consumption levels in the USSR, Moscow made a major effort to exploit its interest in increased trade as proof of its good will and as a demonstration of Soviet economic progress. Newly expressed desires to import consumer goods were used as a peg for further allegations of the ridiculousness of Western restrictions on trading with the bloc. Mikoyan's 17 October announcement of a new program on retail trade and production of consumer goods underlined Moscow's interest in increased imports. At the same time, Mikoyan's statement was especially noteworthy for the lengths to which he went in attempting to justify the new program--as well as to bid for added international prestige--by referring to the USSR's postwar strides in economic reconstruction and industrial development. Moscow hailed a growing list of new and revised trade agreements as proof of the fruits of its new program.

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moderation of Moscow's Korean stand following the death of Stalin. The agreement, looking toward increased exchange of a wide range of goods, contained in addition a vague clause concerning future Soviet technical aid. At about this time, Moscow apparently made overtures to extend technical assistance to Egypt and pressed similar negotiations with Afghanistan. A handful of Soviet technicians had been sent to Kabul the preceding April in connection with planning for the construction of grain storage facilities, reviving a prewar tactic which had led Stalin to enter into contracts for the construction of several industrial establishments in Turkey and Iran and to "lend" technicians to friendly Afghanistan. The announcement on 21 December of the appointment of five new deputy chairmen of the USSR Council of Ministers--Saburov, Pervukhin, Tevosyan, Malyshev, and Kosygin--foreshadowed a broad increase in foreign as well as domestic economic activities. Malenkov, in replying on 31 December to questions submitted by Kingsbury Smith, renewed bids for expanded East-West trade as both a means of expressing and of promoting peace and international cooperation.

Moscow's economic overtures attempted to play on local popular and governmental concern over export markets and the problems of rapid economic development, accompanied by extensive propaganda efforts to discredit Western economic and political influence and to exacerbate commercial as well as political friction between the little developed Asian, African, and Latin American countries and the major Western powers. Soviet spokesmen continued to reject the possibility of any compromise with capitalist methods of economic development and repeated standard allegations of the inevitable failure of bourgeois efforts to industrialize the "East." The first serious post-Stalin study of the problems of economic growth in the former colonies appeared in the November 1953 Problems of Economics. The author, L. Fitunin, a specialist in nonbloc economic developments, continued Moscow's attacks on Western-oriented economic policies but veered away from past Soviet condemnation of foreign economic assistance per se, conceding without elaborating the point that the extension of economic aid under proper conditions "promotes" international understanding. A December review of the prospects of international trade in the same journal asserted the "great possibilities" bloc countries now had of developing trade "with all capitalist countries desiring to do so under mutually advantageous terms," and linked the Soviet trade drive with Moscow's continuing "peace" offensive and with moves to "aid the economic development of backward countries."
In response to the need for a thoroughgoing reassessment of Soviet views on developments in the formerly colonial areas and to explore the processes of economic change abroad, a special conference of economists and orientalists of the Academy of Sciences and of the party central committee's Academy of Social Sciences was held in February 1954, ostensibly to discuss the theses of Varga's Basic Problems. The conference proceedings and lengthy critiques of the book in both Kommunist and Problems of Economics were intended to present an up-to-date summary of Moscow's current interpretation of such basic problems as the short-run prospects of world capitalism and of relations between the Western powers and their political and economic "dependencies." Untenable, as undermining the very bases of Communist evaluation of capitalist-world developments, were Varga's views "minimizing" the extent and the imminence of the "crisis" in world capitalism. Soviet economists seized on signs of a general economic decline in 1953 as proof that the standard thesis was not overdrawn. Reluctant to give up a theme vital to their proselyting effort, they encouraged the expectation that the troubles of the big powers would lead to economic disaster in the underdeveloped areas.

At the same time, Varga was criticized for underestimating the strengthening of the position of "young capitalism" in the former colonial areas, which was looked on as a favorable development because it increased economic and political antagonisms within world capitalism. A concurrent review of world capitalist developments in 1953 published in Kommunist predicted that the 1953 economic downturn would lead the West to step up its efforts to balance its shaky economies by "intensifying the exploitation of backward countries and colonies"--buying raw materials in these countries at lower prices and selling them industrial products at more exorbitant prices--and foresaw only further reductions in the standards of living of the peoples in the underdeveloped countries most affected.

Party Secretary and theoretician Pospelov's 21 January 1954 Lenin Anniversary speech--echoing his remarks on the same occasion two years earlier--singled out Asia as the "most vulnerable part of imperialism" and justified optimism among his listeners by citing the continued growth of the "popular resistance" movement throughout that continent. Although Moscow's attentions to the Arab world had increased over the past nine months, this to a considerable degree was a measure of the increasing tempo of political, economic, and social change.
there as the Soviet leaders continued to be suspicious of the revolutionary regime in Egypt. Moscow hailed Nasir's struggle for "immediate withdrawal" of English forces as an essential element in attaining "true independence," but attacked the policies of Egypt's "ruling circles" for their repression of Communists and other "progressives," for using force and meager land reform to quiet peasant unrest, and for their pro-German inclinations. The slight attention laid to non-Arab Africa and Latin America was a tacit admission that these areas, part of the "colonial reserve" of imperialism, were more or less effectively sealed off from Soviet influence.

The conclusion on 28 January 1954 of a $3,500,000 credit and technical assistance agreement with Afghanistan set off an unprecedented propaganda campaign to convince underdeveloped countries of the genuineness of Soviet overtures to initiate trade and broad economic relations of a mutually advantageous, apolitical nature. At the 10th ECAFE meeting in Colombo, Soviet delegates again pressed Asian delegates for commercial ties, for initiation of exchanges, and for acceptance of technical assistance. Moscow's numerous specific offers, public and private, were intended to whet local interest which governments would find themselves unable to resist. In March trade agreements were negotiated with both Egypt and Israel.

The increase in economic overtures was more than equaled by the increase in political and propaganda attention to American efforts to form Asian countries into an anti-Soviet coalition. The decision to bring a rearmed Germany into the Western alliance and to extend the anti-Communist defense structure throughout Asia posed a direct challenge to Moscow's year-long effort for a detente on its own terms. Moscow's public reaction to real or rumored negotiations between Western governments and Asian states on defense pacts and possible military aid reflected great sensitivity over these developments which raised the prospect of transforming areas close to the USSR's southern border into centers of pressure on that extended flank. The USSR's series of diplomatic demarches backed up by propaganda pyrotechnics proved ineffective in heading off the projected alliances in the main, but it did succeed in polarizing Asian and Arab government and popular sentiment around this issue and making it the crucial test of Asian and Arab government relations with one another and with both East and West.
First of all, Soviet political countermeasures featured efforts to draw India into a strongly anti-Western, anti-American position. Moscow has always accorded India great interest and predicted Indian developments would play a vital role in the struggle against "imperialism" in the East. The sheer volume of material devoted to India in Soviet publications over the years has been impressive. Both the first edition of the "Bolshaya" encyclopedia, published in 1937, and the second edition, published in 1953, gave almost 200 pages to India, much of it highly propagandistic. If developments flowing out of the Korean war had awakened Moscow to advantages of a friendly Indian neutrality, these views were reinforced by Indian attitudes toward Indochina and concern lest the conflict there become an even more sensitive focus of East-West rivalry and engulf greater areas, possibly all of South and Southeast Asia, in the hot war. Moscow's concern was to encourage India and Nehru into an ever-stronger stand in favor of the bloc's "peace" program. Kommunist in February 1954 could now hail

...the important role of modern India in the world arena, the positive contribution of the Indian people in the matter of peaceful settlement of controversial international problems, and India's attempts to convert the United Nations into a genuine forum for all the peoples of the world.

The principal factor working for Soviet-Indian rapprochement, however, was the deep-seated antipathy between India and Pakistan which prompted New Delhi's violently adverse reaction to the gradual unfolding of an impending American military aid program for Pakistan. In a solid note of approval for the course of Indian foreign policy, Moscow welcomed the "vigilance displayed by the Indian leaders in connection with attempts of forces of aggression in Asia."

The unmistakable build-up of East-West tension as the result of developments in both Western Europe and Asia prompted an intense policy debate in top Soviet circles revolving around how far Moscow could go in antagonizing the West. Malenkov's 12 March 1954 "election speech" warning that atomic war might mean the "destruction of world civilization"—rather than just capitalist society—marked the high point in his efforts to convince his colleagues of the necessity for an accommodation with the West. His retreat the following month to the old
formulation reflected his failure to carry the majority of Soviet leaders along with him on this issue--and with it the defeat of Malenkov's efforts to dominate the ruling coalition.* At the same time, Soviet propaganda reflected concern that public statements of Western intentions in relation to intensification of the fighting in Indochina gave rise to the possibility that the USSR and the United States might be drawn into atomic war without either side really intending it.

Speeches by both Malenkov and Khrushchev at the April 1954 session of the Supreme Soviet tied bids for a reduction of international tension and "coexistence" with assertions of growing strength, implying no weakening of Soviet opposition to the West nor any concession on its part. Moscow's diplomatic and propaganda support to countries involved in disputes with the West intensified. At the United Nations, Moscow heightened its support for Syrian complaints growing out of border clashes with Israel and over Israeli plans to divert Jordan River water, making a play for general Arab favor by demanding that "measures"--unspecified--be taken against Israel. At the Geneva Conference, Molotov's attempt to champion "peoples struggling for independence" was directed toward tying Western hands in Asia. In asserting the "full right of Asian peoples to settle their affairs themselves" and adopting the stand that developments in colonial and formerly colonial areas are "first and foremost their own business," Molotov sought to build up pressure for big-power agreement to a hands-off policy which would protect recent gains in Indochina. Moscow used the Chou-Nehru talks to further the picture of close Indian collaboration with the bloc and extracted the "Five Principles of Coexistence"--the "Panch Shila"--expressed in the preamble to the Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet signed 29 April as a charter for Asian-African neutralism, themes given heavy support at the World Peace Council meeting in Berlin in May.

*Because of the demoralizing effect of such a thesis on Communists at home and abroad, Moscow could not publicly endorse this line even if Soviet leaders themselves believed it. Thus Malenkov's aberration proved a handy club in the hands of his rivals to help oust him, one year later, from the premiership.
The USSR's reaction to the June 1954 overthrow of Guatemalan leftist President Jacobo Arbenz, which it alleged to be the result of "intervention organized by US monopolies from Nicaraguan territory," was loud and bitter and attempted to appeal to world sentiment hostile to outside "interference." Soviet propaganda, besides reflecting Moscow's anger at the turn of events and its impotence to reverse them, sought to cover the Soviet Union's own role with this "living proof" of its charges concerning the nature of American imperialism. Appointment of an ambassador to Indonesia in July culminated a period of intense Soviet interest in developments in that country arising out of Djakarta's unstable domestic political and economic situation and, even more, Indonesia's complex international troubles with the Netherlands and the United States. Heavy propaganda support was afforded Indonesian anti-Western moves, and the first order of business for the newly arrived Soviet staff appeared to be to press Indonesia to accept Soviet industrial equipment on easy-payment terms. Moscow's attitude toward Burma also had become noticeably more friendly. If events in Asia favored rapprochement with India, Indonesia, and Burma, Soviet overtures for stepped-up economic contacts, political demarches, and a succession of increasingly sharp propaganda warnings to other Asian governments--notably Turkey, Pakistan, and Thailand--concerning negotiations on area mutual defense pacts proved to little avail. Moscow pushed two logically contradictory but psychologically complementary courses. On the one hand, its high-powered "peace" campaign was intended to exploit the universal fear of atomic warfare by generating pressures against military preparedness. It seized upon the Geneva Conference results as confirmation of the correctness of its line that peace could be achieved only through negotiations respecting the interests of "both sides." On the other hand, a Moscow-produced or Moscow-maintained climate of great East-West tension was essential to its policies toward the underdeveloped countries. Moscow aimed at persuading people that Western policies had brought the world--and kept it at--the brink of devastating war, and played on apprehensions arising out of the security pact negotiations which allegedly put Asia-Africa on the "front line" in any future conflict. The ineffectiveness of Moscow's efforts to turn its sporadic diplomatic and propaganda support and a modest expansion of economic relations to direct political advantage was pointed up in October by Nasir's signature--despite months of fervent Soviet efforts to dissuade him--of
an agreement with Britain concerning the evacuation of troops from the Suez Canal zone on terms permitting their return in the event of a "third power" attack on the Middle East.

On the economic front, Moscow stepped up its efforts to capitalize on local desire for rapid economic development to introduce pioneering detachments of Soviet specialists and technicians under UN auspices and through direct bilateral agreements. By ostensibly participating in UN-sponsored programs which enjoyed considerable popularity and esteem in the underdeveloped countries, Moscow sought to broaden the impact of its own as yet modest efforts and to introduce Soviet technicians and scientists into countries and fields otherwise closed to it. Further, this contributed to the Soviet effort to play up the growing stature of the USSR as an advanced industrial power and opened the way for undercutting Western--and especially US--economic assistance programs on yet another front. Moscow cited the lack of political stipulations on UN aid and the "willingness of dozens of countries to go along with the UN program," but alleged the United States alone holds aloof for its own political and military motives. Soviet publicists, still obliged to present developments in the capitalist world in terms of an imminent general economic crisis, stressed increasingly more unfavorable terms of trade for the underdeveloped countries. Varga, writing in the first (August 1954) issue of the new semi-scholarly monthly journal International Affairs (International Life), pointed to two years of depressed prices for raw materials and food exports and to repercussions of impending American economic crisis as compelling reasons why underdeveloped as well as Western European countries should turn to expanded trade with the bloc as a solution to pressing economic problems.

The long-awaited Soviet textbook Political Economy, the product of a group of writers including leading ideologists Dmitry Shepilov and Pavel Yudin, signed to the press on 26 August 1954, followed Stalin's two-camp approach to the interpretation of world developments. The authors crudely assailed economic relations of the Western powers with the former colonies, alleging that foreign trade was "one of the sources of economic enslavement of backward countries by developed bourgeois countries and (that it) widened the sphere of capitalist countries." Political Economy claimed advances for the "national-liberation movements" in Indonesia and India but spoke in terms of greater political roles allegedly being
played by the "proletariat" and Communist parties, and the "national bourgeoisie" continued to be attacked as "weak and indecisive"—even in the struggle against imperialism. The hostility shown to nationalist "conciliatory" policies marked even independent India as a bourgeois entity and thus an enemy. In this and other formulations, the authors showed themselves hesitant to amend fundamental Communist theses to bring them in line with tactics Moscow currently followed in its relations with a number of Asian governments.

In the fall, important works were published on the two areas of the world which to date had been generally beyond the scope of Soviet influence and at best on the periphery of Soviet interest. An imposing Institute of Ethnography symposium, The Peoples of Africa, under the joint editorship of philologist D. A. Oderogge and ethnographer-political scientist I. I. Potekhin attempted a thorough analysis of African cultural achievements and political and economic developments area by area. Their general thesis, and that of Soviet Africanists generally, was that racial discrimination and economic exploitation are the twin bases of Western policy and views on Africa. To combat the West's views and to champion African peoples, Soviet Africanists advanced an interpretation of African developments based on a "long and original path of historic development," of a past golden age which was destroyed by Western political and economic intrusion, and in general attributing to Western influence all negative features of African life. Potekhin's summary views on the progress of "national liberation" acknowledged the absence of Communist activity in most of Africa, cited trade unions as the centers of anti-imperialist agitation where there are no Communist parties, and paid tribute to growing African participation in world "peace" and other fronts. A less substantial survey of the Institute of Economics by M. Grechev, The Imperialist Expansion of the US in Latin America After World War II, was devoted principally to attacking postwar US Latin American policies and to reiterating a strategy for local Communist parties based on attracting all antiforeign elements around "the working class and its ally the peasantry," a united front on Communist terms to put an end to the yoke of foreign monopolies, to give land to the peasants, to facilitate industrial development, to improve living conditions of all workers, and to carry Latin American countries on the broad road of progress and independence.
By the close of 1954, the "good neighbor" policy which the Malenkov regime had followed—if at times halfheartedly—was no great success. The increase in Moscow's influence among extremist nationalist elements had been in direct proportion to the prevalence of virulent anti-Western sentiment arising out of unresolved territorial and other political disputes with the West and to a lesser extent to local frustrations over the failure of political independence to solve pressing political, economic, and social problems overnight. Soviet attitudes toward nationalist movements and their leaders—for example, Nehru, Sukarno, and Nasir—reflected only a step in the direction of tactical cooperation. Moscow's dilemma was that as nationalists these leaders had to be praised to the extent they were "anti-imperialist" but as bourgeois they had to be attacked for their commitment to capitalist methods and ideology and for their opposition or suppression of "progressive" elements. By the end of 1954 Moscow had come to the point of supporting nationalist governments obviously not in the Western camp, in the expectation that their greater self-assurance and self-expression would have the net effect of reducing Western influence and, to a degree, discrediting Western leadership. Any further concessions would have led to a deterioration of the morale of local Communist parties.

Moscow scored an impressive propaganda breakthrough with the signing on 2 February 1955, after five months of negotiations, of the agreement to help finance and construct a major steel plant at Bhilai, India. This announcement foreshadowed a Soviet economic assistance program of new dimensions and gave a measure of concreteness to the image of two world economic systems in competition for influence and favor in uncommitted areas.
The demotion of Malenkov in February 1955 prompted Moscow to step out with a bolder policy both in regard to the Western powers and the politically uncommitted, economically underdeveloped countries. This was done in part to shore up domestic confidence, following the personnel shake-up, with harsher assertions of an increased international authority. Molotov's speech on 8 February to the Supreme Soviet appraised relations with the West wholly in cold war terms and presented an unusually clear rationale for Soviet cooperation with Asian and African governments. Acknowledging that the newly independent governments of Asia and Africa were still economically dependent on the West, the Soviet foreign minister nevertheless found a basis for optimism in the fact that in questions of international relations, "they show concern for the maintenance of peace and the reduction of international tension" and so were worthy of Soviet support. As had other Soviet leaders over the past year, Molotov singled out for particular praise the "international authority" of India. The Supreme Soviet resolution on foreign policy, which set forth the principal guide lines of the subsequent Bulganin-Khrushchev period, also called for the exchange of parliamentary delegations, a tactic Moscow had introduced the previous year by hosting several semiofficial parliamentary groups.

The acceleration of Soviet moves in Asia and the Middle East reflected a recognition of the increased international status of Asian and African states and of the likelihood that their international role would continue to increase in importance. At the same time, it was intended as a partial answer to Western initiatives building up military and anti-Communist political pressures along the USSR's southern borders. The regime's efforts to underscore Soviet military and economic might furthered the impression that the new leaders were less disposed than Malenkov to seek accommodation with the West; in any event, the West's firmness in Europe held out the prospect that any Soviet probing there might lead to a nuclear war.

Moscow's intention to seek a closer working agreement with Asian and Arab countries was made clear in its diplomatic and propaganda reaction to Middle East developments and in the fervor of its efforts to identify itself with the views and
objectives of the conference of 29 Asian and African countries—including Communist China but not the Soviet Union—at Bandung, Indonesia. A statement by the Soviet Foreign Ministry on 16 April 1955 presented detailed charges of "considerable deterioration" of the Middle East situation, alleged that this was the direct result of Western efforts to form anti-Communist military blocs there, and offered, in terms more specific than ever before, official Soviet support to area governments opposing Western policies. At the same time, Soviet propaganda hailed the prospects of Asian-African cooperation, and Pravda threw Soviet support behind any agreement which might be reached by the Bandung powers in the direction of a common effort against "pressure and threat" from outside powers or in implementing individually or collectively the Chou-Nehru declaration on the "five principles of coexistence." Moscow's current appraisal apparently stemmed from optimism that "parallel" short-term interests of Asian-African states and the USSR, in combination with the inherently weak political and economic positions of area countries, opened the way for a rapid increase in Soviet influence.

Further indications that a fundamental reorientation of tactics was involved was the initiation of a wholesale shake-up of Soviet interpretation of developments in non-Soviet Asia and Africa. In late April 1955 there appeared the first issue of Soviet Oriental Studies, the functions and responsibilities of which were to tie research and Marxist-Leninist interpretation to the immediate needs of Soviet diplomacy and propaganda. Kommunist in May kicked off a campaign to bring ideological formulations more in line with the Soviet posture of friendship toward the non-Communist countries represented at Bandung. Kommunist admitted that erroneous interpretations had crept into past Soviet assessments of anticolonial movements, and it criticized Soviet scholars, and by implication Stalin and those responsible for Moscow's foreign policy in the early post-Stalin period, for underevaluating the anti-imperialist significance of the nationalist movements. Foreshadowed in these programatic statements were stepped-up efforts to interpret the present and even the fairly remote past in anti-Western terms and to dissociate the current Soviet regime in the minds of the peoples of the neutralist countries from those past Soviet words or deeds which impeded closer relations. Without providing clear new guidelines, Kommunist nevertheless indicated that a more optimistic appraisal of Asian-African developments was in order and that prosaic,
mechanical applications of Communist theorems were to give way to a flexibility which owed more to cold war requirements than to the Communist classics.

Moscow's new accommodation to neutralist-nationalist sentiment was underlined dramatically in connection with the June 1955 visit to the USSR of Indian Prime Minister Nehru. Nehru, who had been described by Stalin's Asian spokesman Zhukov as "a cunning servant of Britain and the United States and a bloody strangler of progressive forces in India," now was praised on all counts for his spiritual and political leadership of Asia and for championing progressive views on such major issues as Korea, Indochina, military blocs, and the banning of atomic weapons. A Russian translation of Nehru's Discovery of India was published in connection with the visit--despite passages scathingly attacking Communist tactics in India--and long "reviews" of the book in Communist and Soviet Oriental Studies used it as a point of departure in setting forth the new Soviet line on Asian and African developments. Apparently encouraged by the prospects of this initial venture into the realm of "personal diplomacy"--Nehru's visit having been interpreted publicly as a "brilliant manifestation" of growing friendly relations between the two countries--Moscow extended invitations to the Shah of Iran and to Nasir. Efforts were initiated on an unprecedented scale to flatter neutralist leaders, the cultures of friendly countries, and Asian-African self-importance. Synthetic Soviet commemorations of Asian and African national holidays became a prominent feature of the new program. Pravda editor Shepilov--newly named a party secretary--was sent to Egypt in connection with Cairo's Liberation Day celebrations as a personal emissary of Moscow's top leadership to impress on Nasir the potentials of closer Soviet-Egyptian cooperation.

Moscow's moves to exploit the "Bandung spirit" as the inception of a coordinated Asian-African opposition to the West was accompanied by a series of diplomatic and economic steps--with appropriate propaganda orchestration--intended to build up a "posture of peace" to improve its prospects at the upcoming summit conference. Moscow's attitude appeared to hold out the promise of a major improvement in East-West relations and a general reduction of international tension, not just in Europe but throughout the world. The Soviet people themselves were encouraged by the regime's propaganda to expect a growing "businesslike atmosphere" in international relations.
Bulganin's 4 August report on the Geneva talks to a special session of the Supreme Soviet balanced "Geneva spirit" gains—a lessening of tension, increase in "mutual confidence," and the initiation of personal contact among top world leaders—with a rundown of major substantive international problems outstanding.

Concurrent with Moscow's pre-Geneva conciliatory posture to the West and Bulganin's sober appraisal of the results of the conference, the Soviet Union set in motion a chain of secret negotiations designed not to further the possibility of any mutual "hands off" policy in Asia-Africa, but to offset the consolidating pro-Western coalitions with a group of Arab states under its influence. Although Molotov's February 1955 foreign policy survey had been pessimistic on the Middle East,

We cannot say that the national-liberation movement in the countries of the Arab East has attained the strength and momentum which this movement achieved in a number of other Asian countries....

intensified Soviet overtures to Syria and Egypt in the months following reflected a more hopeful view. Reports of various credibility that Moscow had made offers to sell arms to Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, India, and Afghanistan were confirmed in essence by Nasir's 27 September announcement of his arms deal with Czechoslovakia—obviously a dodge for a direct agreement between Moscow and Cairo.

The supply of arms to a non-Communist government marked a sharp departure in Soviet practice and was a challenge to Western influence of a more intense and immediate nature than Soviet economic overtures. Discussions with Nasir were well advanced by the time of the Geneva talks, suggesting that Moscow early had hedged its bet that a conciliatory posture and such reasonableness as agreeing to the Austrian state treaty would encourage significant Western concessions. Moscow's immediate reaction to the surfacing of Nasir's agreement to purchase bloc arms was predictably defensive, attributing the Western uproar to a false interpretation of developments based on the West's own "exploitative practices." It went on, however, to assert the "legitimate right" of all states to buy weapons for their defense without outside interference. Moscow's public and private follow-up was subdued, although the "Geneva spirit" in its relations with the West had already
largely dissipated. Kaganovich's October Revolution speech, concurrent with the visit of Burmese Premier U Nu to Moscow and a definite coolness at the foreign ministers' meeting in Geneva, omitted any reference to a major shift in Soviet policy implicit in the offers and deliveries of trade and technical, economic, and now military assistance to Asian and Arab countries.

Moscow continued the process of reappraising world developments in terms justifying the development of closer government-to-government relations with Asian and Arab neutralists. Kommunist in August had made a pioneering attempt to cite "objective consequences" of policies in the direction of peace, reduction of international tension, and opposition to colonialism as a basis for singling out a category of politically independent though economically dependent states which were worthy of support. Kommunist author Mikheyev's effort to formalize propositions raised by Soviet leaders early in the year did not fully account for the scope and variety of Moscow's tactics, as economic and political blandishments were being offered not only to friendly neutrals but also to countries clearly non-neutral, such as Turkey. The new line on Asia and Africa was reflected in the fall of 1955 with the appearance of the second edition of the textbook Political Economy, which contained drastic revisions of passages offensive to India and other uncommitted countries. By making a neutral foreign policy in effect the sole criterion of Soviet support, Moscow indicated a strategy for local Communist parties which was restrictive and to a considerable degree demoralizing. In adopting such a course Moscow tacitly admitted the relative permanence of the nationalist governments, and in offering these governments many-sided support without extracting any commitment in protection of local Communist elements, Moscow in effect downgraded the latter and left them to shift on their own meager resources.

Moscow's first big chance to bid for Asian popular support was the Bulganin-Khrushchev "visit of friendship" to India, Burma, and Afghanistan from mid-November to mid-December 1955. The two Soviet leaders dropped their Geneva smiles and attempted to give Asian neutralism a more anti-Western slant by identifying the USSR with Asian nationalist aims and "peace," and they attempted to equate the West with "colonialism" and "intervention." Using local sensitivity to the colonial past as a point of departure, the two--especially Khrushchev--launched
bitter attacks on the West and sought to focus Asian and world attention on Soviet economic, political, and cultural initiatives. Khrushchev and Bulganin, by adopting brazen stands on the Asian intramural disputes over Kashmir and "Pushtoonistan," served notice that Moscow intended to step up its diplomatic and propaganda support for friendly neutrals and to increase pressure on pro-Western area governments.

The touring Soviet leaders dramatized to millions of Asian neutralists and to the world in general the USSR's apparent readiness to offer political and material support to new states attempting to establish or secure political and economic independence. Agreements reached on the tour for the extension of Soviet technical assistance, for increased trade, and for greater technical and cultural exchanges laid the groundwork for a considerable subsequent expansion of Soviet influence in the area. Khrushchev's announcement in India that

If you want help, and you ask us for it, we shall give it. If you want to develop your technology and ask us to help you, we shall help you. If you want to train technicians, send them to us....

appeared to raise Moscow's budding economic aid offensive to new heights--an impression made more concrete by the announcement in Kabul of a $100,000,000 credit to Afghanistan.

The reports of both Bulganin and Khrushchev to the Supreme Soviet on 29 December as to the results of their trip served to underline Moscow's optimism over its new thrusts for favor in Asia. For the home audience, Khrushchev made the same impassioned attack on Western economic activities in the underdeveloped countries as he had in Asia, and he implied that one of the aims of the Soviet foreign economic program was to force Western concessions to the underdeveloped countries. Riding the crest of optimism raised by the tour, Khrushchev interpreted Soviet offers of economic and technical help as signs of "our honorable intentions," and, although he cited "mutual advantages" in the program, he nevertheless was encouraged to sound a utopian note, "We consider it our duty to share with our friends and to help them as brothers." Especially since this South Asian tour, Khrushchev has taken great pains to be identified publicly with Moscow's friendship overtures, with the Soviet economic aid program, and with the necessity to increase "person-to-person" contacts, a vital factor in each.
Further steps were taken in Soviet publications in late 1955 to bring Soviet versions of certain standard Marxist-Leninist formulations more in harmony with current policies. One such reappraisal, on the vital and touchy question of the role of the "national bourgeoisie" in the struggle for independence, was undertaken slowly and cautiously. A few passages in Soviet Oriental Studies, which has served primarily as an outlet for official views rather than as a clearing house for scholarly papers, allotted a greater role to non-Communists in bringing about the anticolonial revolutions in Asia. In view of the complexity and sensitivity of the reinterpretation of postwar developments and the need to satisfy conflicting demands—to be convincing to Asian-African leaders and intellectuals, to leave undisturbed the dynamic features of the international Communist movement, and to maintain the fiction of the immutability of Communist doctrine, for example—it remained for the Soviet leadership to undertake a "creative" interpretation of Leninism in light of the new situation.

The Khrushchev-dominated 20th party congress in February 1956 marked a supreme effort by the regime to turn world Communist and non-Communist attention away from the past—and away from any need to account for or explain away elements of the Stalinist heritage which now were to be discarded—and to create the impression that with the congress a new era, one bright with prospects of new Communist victories, was opening. A major part of the congress' effort was devoted to attempts to shore up the theoretical bases for the regime's current foreign policy, to justify coexistence with the West, and to give verisimilitude to Soviet overtures to Asian-African countries. All who spoke at the congress attempted to contribute to the aura of optimism, of unprecedented assurance vis-à-vis the physical and ideological challenges of the capitalist world, and of unanimity.

Khrushchev reserved to himself the starring role, but Suslov, Mikoyan, and Kuusinen contributed to the public re-examination of Soviet attitudes to non-Communist governments. Khrushchev's 14 February keynote speech spotlighted a new global view characterized as the "breaking out" of socialism from the bounds of a single state into a world system rivaling capitalism in scope and power. His abandonment of the thesis of the "fatalistic" inevitability of war between capitalist and socialist camps was a necessary, and tardy, step
to add credibility to its "peaceful coexistence" line and to facilitate long-term cooperation between the USSR and non-Communist countries. Khrushchev's admission, under pressure to improve relations with Tito, that there are many possible forms of transition from capitalism to socialism—that no single pattern would be applicable "to Denmark in the same way as to Brazil; to Sweden in the same way as to Malaya"—opened up the whole delicate and complex problem of intrabloc relations. Moreover, by appearing to support social development according to "concrete circumstances" in each country, Khrushchev made an extraordinary concession to the nationalist governments. Khrushchev's third major "modification" at the congress, that the changeover from capitalism to "socialism" need not be violent but could be attained through "the winning of a stable parliamentary majority," had special significance for neutralist countries such as India and Indonesia which had large Communist parties.

At the congress, Mikoyan, as always closely associated with Soviet trade policies, launched Moscow's strongest plea to date for the development of economic relations with non-Communist countries as a means for both reducing international tension and obtaining economic advantages. Malenkov, who had initiated many of the lines of Moscow's revised policy toward the former colonies, was now reduced to a role of seconding currently accepted formulations. He justified the regime's policy toward Asia and the Middle East as "substantially narrowing" Western potentialities for attacking the bloc. Molotov acknowledged that in Stalin's days the USSR had underestimated the importance of the colonial struggle against the West and admitted the correctness of party central committee criticism of his Foreign Ministry for "underestimating the new possibilities."

Khrushchev's survey of Moscow's developing foreign economic offensive left little doubt that this program was to enjoy a high priority. The January 1956 credit to Belgrade of $110,000,000—on top of the theatrical offer of $100,000,000 to Kabul in December 1955—had removed any doubts about the vigor with which Moscow intended to push this program. Khrushchev's revelation that the USSR had granted long-term credits within the bloc totaling 21 billion rubles was intended to contribute to the prestige of the Soviet Union as a world economic power, and possibly to sidetrack bloc criticism of Soviet offers to nonbloc countries. Promising aid
in the economic, political, and cultural development of non-Communist Asia, Africa, and Latin America,
in order to create an independent national economy and a higher standard of living for their people...
without making it necessary for them to bow down to their former overlords.

Khrushchev left little doubt as to the political character of this program, or that his intent was to impair their relations with the West, to place "a major stumbling block" in the way of colonial policy.

A month prior to the congress, Bulganin in a 16 January "interview" published in Vision, a news magazine circulated in Latin America, for the first time extended to Latin American governments the same type of diplomatic and trade overtures that Moscow had been making regularly to friendly and not so friendly Asian countries. It was reported that Soviet party leaders at the congress sought out representatives of the Latin American Communist parties present in an effort to improve their morale and to stimulate their activities especially in the direction of attracting broader segments of the population into the front organizations. Party organizational tactics outlined at the congress by Suslov and Kuusinen envisaged sharply increased emphasis on united action with non-Communists, but the Stalinist debate touched off by Khrushchev's secret speech destroyed some of the idealized notions about Communism and the USSR held by party members and sympathizers abroad. For a number of months the controversy over de-Stalinization nullified any gains for the world Communist movement which Moscow may have expected from its moderate formulations at the 20th congress.

The congress provoked a flood of publications to reflect the new views and to attempt to apply them currently and retrospectively in support of Soviet policy. Mikoyan at the congress had provided a strong goad for a thorough-going shake-up in the field of Soviet oriental studies, charging that

while the whole East has awakened in our time, the Oriental Institute happily dozes away...at a time when our relations with the East are growing in scope and strength, when, with the extension of economic, political, and cultural relations with Eastern

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countries, the interest of the Soviet public has grown to such an extent, as has the need for people who know the languages, economy, and culture of the Eastern countries.

An unsigned lead article of the journal Soviet Oriental Studies which appeared immediately following the congress admitted to organizational and theoretical shortcomings in Soviet studies of the non-Communist East and attempted to translate congress theses into a program of action for Soviet scholars and publicists. Past evaluations were attacked for having failed to give proper attention to the new correlation of social forces in Asia and Africa, and Soviet historians were criticized for approaching their problems from too rigid and dogmatic a viewpoint. A new version of the contradictions between nationalist movements and the West admitted that at the present stage of the "anti-imperialist struggle," the interests of the national bourgeoisie "basically correspond with the interests of the majority of the people." The revised theorem was intended to reduce ideological tension between Moscow and nationalist elements, and was not accompanied by acknowledgement of the role played by bourgeois leaders in winning independence for their countries.

Other public discussion of developments in Asia, Africa, and Latin America following the congress reflected Moscow's concession that considerable economic development was possible—at least in the neutral countries—within existing political, economic, and social frameworks. A Problems of Economics article by V. Kollontay, a specialist in free world economic trends, applied the congress' views to economic development of the former colonies and showed Moscow willing to go to considerable lengths to court favor with government parties, including support for efforts to protect local capitalists from the pressures of "foreign monopolistic" capital. Kollontay reiterated the position that economic development is primarily a problem of mobilization and correct organization of domestic resources, and he played up to strong non-Communist sympathies in the area for state planning and regulation of a nation's economic life. "Industrialization" was presented as the only sure path to economic independence, and the securing of political freedom and economic relations with the bloc were offered as the means for bringing it about. Past ridicule of national attempts to solve pressing economic problems and to bring about a rise in living standards was shunted aside in favor of efforts
to stimulate new and expanded political and economic relations with half a dozen states—friendly or at least temporarily cool to the West—ranging territorially from Indonesia to Egypt and economically from primitive Yemen to India, where capitalist development admittedly was "well under way."

Post-congress Soviet overtures were mainly in the direction of further expansion of economic and political ties with Egypt, Syria, and India and in a general increase in the USSR's voice in Middle East affairs. Following a steady stream of arms deliveries to Egypt and heavy diplomatic and propaganda attention to area developments, Moscow issued on 17 April 1956—coincident with the arrival of Bulganin and Khrushchev in Britain—a Foreign Ministry statement which attempted to pass off Soviet area policy as concerned primarily with protecting Soviet and friendly Arab interests until a basis could be found for top-level East-West talks on Middle East problems. In acknowledging privately the legitimacy of British concern over uninterrupted oil deliveries and publicly expressing willingness to talk about halting arms deliveries to the area if discussions concerned all Middle East countries and not merely the Arab states, the two Soviet leaders attempted to play up the moderation of their position in order to facilitate negotiations and to gain at least a tacit admission of "legitimate" Soviet interests in Middle East affairs.

The 1 June replacement of Molotov as foreign minister by party secretary Shepilov, whose visit to Cairo the previous summer had paved the way for the conclusion of the arms deal with Nasir, augured for an even more daring Soviet foreign policy. Shepilov's trip in June to Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Greece, however, was principally a propaganda tour de force, with Shepilov publicly and privately attempting to exploit Soviet "friendship" and "sympathy" for local positions—to build up hopes of extensive economic aid at the same time as he dodged detailed discussion of political questions and avoided all Arab attempts to firm up Soviet commitments on the questions of Israel and Algeria. The USSR on 26 June voted for Security Council consideration of the Algerian question over French objections, but Moscow's subdued propaganda tended to confirm reports that Shepilov had urged a "go slow" policy toward the Arabs. Visits to the USSR that month by the Shah of Iran and Yemeni Crown Prince Badr pointed up the expanding territorial scope of Soviet initiatives.
The series of crises touched off by the collapse of Cairo's negotiations for Western economic assistance to build an Aswan high dam and Nasir's angry nationalization of the Suez Canal Company on 26 July 1956 was a major test both of Soviet intentions in the Middle East and of East-West relations. Shepilov's second trip to the Middle East in June had left the impression that friendly states could expect practically unlimited economic aid from Moscow on generous terms. Nasir apparently had been all but assured that large-scale Soviet aid for his pet project would be forthcoming immediately if negotiations with the West broke down. Moscow's strong propaganda support for Nasir's move was tempered by Khrushchev on 31 July on his return from a two-week swing through the "virgin land" areas. At that time he minimized the "excitement" and called on the West for moderation.

Shepilov's subsequent tactics involved an attempt to keep negotiations going, as he was apparently convinced of an eventual settlement largely on Egypt's terms. Moscow's strong diplomatic support for Nasir's position--reinforced by such tangibles as the release of bloc canal pilots for duty at Suez--stopped short of any commitment of Soviet military support in the event of an attack on Egypt. Soviet propaganda attempted to portray the crisis as a vivid illustration of "imperialist" reaction to nationalist efforts to remove the vestiges of colonial rule. Khrushchev's 23 August statement at the Rumanian Embassy reception--that bloc volunteers, including his own son, might be sent to aid Egypt in the event of an attack--foreshadowed Moscow's propaganda footwork in the November crisis.

Preoccupation with Suez developments was not so complete, however, as to rule out efforts to extend the Soviet diplomatic and economic offensive elsewhere along now well-established lines. Moscow's year-long effort to woo Indonesia's Sukarno led to a well-exploited two-week visit to the USSR in August-September 1956 and was capped by the announcement in Djakarta on 15 September that agreement had been reached on a $100,000,000 credit for industrial development. In August the USSR set up the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, and in September Moscow announced that the Oriental Institute, of the USSR Academy of Sciences, would be reorganized and expanded in an effort to bring its product more in line with the needs of Soviet policy. "Doctor of Historical Sciences" B. G. Gafurov, long-time Tadzhik party secretary and a Soviet party central committee member who was assigned in
May to direct the shake-up said the priority tasks of the institute included the political and economic formation and development of the new states of the East and especially of their experience and problems in relation to the general crisis and disintegration of the colonial system in Asia and Africa.

A landmark of the new school in oriental studies was the publication in two issues of the foreign affairs weekly New Times of an article on "A Non-Capitalist Path for Underdeveloped Countries" by Modeste Rubinstein, chief of the US section of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, which wholeheartedly supported state planning and the development of state-capitalist enterprises in India, Burma, Indonesia, Egypt, and elsewhere as the only way for underdeveloped countries to industrialize. Further, Rubinstein elicited the backing of local Communists and Communist-influenced elements for the successful fulfillment of these state plans as long as the benefits "go to promote the welfare of the people."

The second stage of Soviet diplomacy in the Suez crisis was touched off by the London Conference of the "Suez Canal Users' Association." The Soviet Foreign Ministry statement of 15 September, issued on the eve of the conference, for the first time linked the USSR's security to current Middle East developments and made a general call for UN action, though it did not specify what this action should be. Moscow kept up its strong diplomatic and propaganda support of Cairo's opposition to any form of international control over the canal and encouraged Nasir to keep talks going as a means to forestall action by the West. By mid-October, Moscow apparently felt that the likelihood of a Western military response had lessened and indicated informally its willingness to participate in international negotiations to seek a way out of the diplomatic impasse.

Moscow's immediate reaction to news of the attack was a government statement condemning the action and calling for the Security Council to "take immediate steps" to halt the fighting and to force withdrawal of the attacking forces. Soviet efforts to get, and to keep, the issue before the Security Council were intended to embarrass the attacking powers and give Moscow a chance to foment pro-Nasir sentiment while it decided on a counterstrategy. Over the past months Soviet officials informally had left the impression of thorough support, amounting almost to protection, for Cairo; the attack,
however, exposed the ambiguity of the USSR's position. Only after the Soviet leaders became convinced of the serious split between the attacking powers and the United States did Moscow take the initiative, first in a letter to President Eisenhower proposing joint military action under UN authority against the "interventionists," and then in blistering notes to Britain, France, and Israel—exaggerated in the Soviet press—which gave the impression that the USSR would take unilateral action against these powers unless they called off their assault on Egypt.

Four days after the 6 November cease-fire, Moscow made a thinly veiled threat of "Soviet citizen volunteers"--a threat which, in conjunction with demonstrations before the British, French, and Israeli embassies in Moscow and "angry protest meetings" throughout the USSR, was intended to build up psychological pressure against the West. Before settling on this gambit, however, Bulganin on 1 November sent letters to Nehru and Sukarno proposing that they convene a second conference of Asian-African countries to condemn the attack on Egypt and to promote common action against the West.

This first major test of the genuineness of Soviet pretensions to be the "protector" of the peoples of the East was a qualified victory for Moscow's activist policies. Communist propagandists feasted on the "evidence" that imperialism had not changed its willingness to use armed force to keep or recapture key colonial positions, and Moscow's role in bringing about the military cease-fire was magnified after the fact to contribute to the image of the Soviet Union as having a major voice in Middle East developments. At the same time, Moscow was constrained to keep alive world fears that continued tension in the area might lead to further fighting both to forestall additional Western moves against pro-Soviet Arabs and to draw world attention away from the recent Soviet military intervention in Hungary and its aftermath.

Moscow's disappointment over the failure of Asian neutrals to respond to its call for a solid front against "imperialism" was reflected in diplomatic channels. Kommunist in December lectured both party and nonparty elements for underestimating the seriousness of the obstacles remaining in the path of the anticolonial struggle and the "desperate energy" with which imperialists would continue to defend their positions, predicting
a whole series of sharp conflicts, a multitude of battles on all economic and political problems between the newly arising states of the East and the imperialists.

A late 1956 conference of Soviet Asian specialists on "the economic and political positions of the national bourgeoisie in the countries of the East" cited India, Indonesia, Burma, and Egypt for fulfilling "progressive" functions and attempted to quiet doubts of the 20th congress line for "ignoring facts" and "failing to notice new phenomena." The discussions showed Moscow now willing to endorse national capitalism in whatever form as a "progressive historical phenomenon in colonial and underdeveloped countries" and denying that its support was based on temporarily parallel interests. The papers as published showed a considerable disparity of views, but they indicated that those reflecting the orthodox suspicion to lasting commitments to non-Communist governments now were out of favor.

Although political questions entangled with Suez temporarily shifted the spotlight off Moscow's foreign economic program, by the end of 1956 Moscow could point to increased diplomatic and economic contacts in Asia and Africa, dozens of new trade agreements with non-Communist countries—a great many of which either provided for or looked toward the exchange of technical experience—and a generally enhanced impression that the USSR was an economic as well as political competitor for influence in the underdeveloped countries. Shepilov boasted at the United Nations on 22 November that since the war the USSR had granted more than 25 billion rubles in foreign credits; he failed to mention that these loans were principally intra-bloc. However, the momentum of Moscow's campaign cowed more to promises of aid and prospective economic benefits than it did to solid performance. Furthermore, developments within the bloc in late 1956, especially the Hungarian uprising, and the sharp rise in East-West tensions flowing from both Middle East and Central European crises interrupted the course of Soviet policy, domestically as well as internationally. The December 1956 Soviet party central committee plenum was followed by the most extensive reshuffling of top governmental posts since Stalin's death, by extensive changes in Moscow-satellite economic relations, and by upward revisions of domestic housing and consumer goods goals. There is some evidence that higher political priorities of economic aid to the
bloc—including China—and to Yugoslavia prompted a slowdown in new commitments for aid to non-Communist countries and encouraged those in the Soviet leadership opposed to this program to challenge Khrushchev on the issue.* A slowing up of the tempo of Moscow's economic program was suggested by long drawn-out negotiations with India over a new $126,000,000 credit. Completed in November, the agreement, despite India's critical need for immediate help, carried the restriction that it not be drawn upon until 1959.

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*Our best evidence of this split is Saburov's "statement" at the 21st congress charging that the Antiparty group, blinded by "ultranationalist narrow-mindedness" had opposed both trade expansion and economic aid to bloc countries as well as to non-Communist underdeveloped countries. The upsurge in Soviet offers following the June 1957 dismissal of the antiparty group tends to confirm this.
At the beginning of 1957, Moscow was concerned primarily with distracting world attention from intrabloc troubles and with forestalling further Western moves in the Middle East and elsewhere while bloc unity was being restored and strengthened. The series of bloc government and party conferences indicated that a high priority was being given to working out a new program for intrabloc cooperation and to restoring the public image of Communist "solidarity." Domestically, the lessons of Hungary and Suez were exploited to reinstate a vigilance campaign as a means for enlisting greater enthusiasm for official programs and for diverting popular dissatisfaction over the slowness of domestic economic gains.

A continued high level of diplomatic activity, accompanied by appropriately strident propaganda, attempted to keep alive the allegation that Hungary and Suez were merely the prelude to concerted Western efforts designed to re-establish their former world position in all key areas, especially the Middle East. President Eisenhower's 5 January "Middle East proposals" were immediately made the center of Soviet attempts to split the Arab world into pro-Western and anti-Western factions. TASS on 12 January undertook a point-by-point rebuttal of the "proposals" leading up to the assertion that although the program was formulated in terms of opposing Soviet and Communist pretensions in the area, its primary purpose was to halt and reverse the course of the Arab movement toward independence. The ominous, if ambiguous, Sino-Soviet communique of 18 January pledged that the bloc would "continue rendering the necessary support to the peoples of the Near and Middle East in order to prevent aggression and interference" by the Western powers in the affairs of area governments.

Moscow welcomed the 18-19 January discussions in Cairo by Egyptian, Syrian, Jordanian, and Saudi Arabian leaders as evidence of closer cooperation among the anti-Western Arab faction and of strengthening the hand of pro-Nasir Arabs willing to accept closer diplomatic and economic ties with the bloc. Acceptance or rejection of American economic aid under the new Middle East program was seized upon by Moscow as the chief criterion of genuine independence.
Soviet moves in the Middle East appeared motivated both by fears that Western moves in the area impinged on the USSR's security and by concern that its newly won influence in the Arab world would erode under combined Western diplomatic, military, and economic pressures. A TASS statement on 23 January alleging that the United States intended to establish atomic bases in Turkey and Iran touched off direct propaganda charges that the "Eisenhower-Dulles" Middle East doctrine was intended to prepare the way for aggression against the Soviet Union.

Moscow's generally hostile tone toward the West was backed up by veiled boasts concerning new Soviet scientific-military developments. Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Zhukov, touring India as part of the increasing stream of top-level Soviet visitors to South and Southeast Asia, asserted a hard anti-imperialist line and focused Asian and world attention on recent more optimistic Soviet public affirmations of comparative military strength vis-a-vis the West, claiming an ability to strike a "crushing blow" against targets anywhere on earth.

Soviet notes to the United States, Britain, and France on 11 February calling for a multilateral big-power approach to Middle East problems, over the heads of local governments, represented a sharp departure from the USSR's efforts to build up Soviet influence in the area through offers and deliveries of both political and material support to Arab anti-Western extremists. Although the notes were framed along lines long used to court these Arabs—noninterference in the internal affairs of Middle East countries, rejection of military blocs, withdrawal of foreign troops, and the encouragement of economic development—the direction of the overture of partial détente to the West, backed by the suggestion of a mutual ban on arms shipments to the area, showed the Soviet Union at this time willing to jeopardize Arab good will in the interest of at least a partial settlement with the West. Subsequently, Moscow has not been able completely to put to rest Arab suspicion that overriding cold war interests may lead the Soviet Union to agreements or a settlement with the West which would be detrimental to Arab interests or aspirations. Moscow may have had in mind a big power conference on the Middle East similar to the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina. Its immediate intent was to stall the implementation of the new US Middle East program.

Foreign Minister Shepilov's survey of international relations in an address to the Supreme Soviet on 12 February, on
the eve of his return to the party secretariat and his replacement by foreign affairs "professional" Andrey Gromyko, went to considerable lengths to defend Moscow's policy of "coexistence" with the West as the "cornerstone" of Soviet foreign policy rather than a political maneuver or tactic of the moment. Shepilov promised that the USSR would continue to follow the "greatest self-control, patience, and persistence" in seeking a solution with the West through negotiations. Following a second round of notes to the Western powers on 19 April, Khru- shchev, in an interview with New York Times editor Cateledge on 10 May, pointed up the analogy of the Geneva settlement on Indochina and said, "It would be wise if the leaders of the great countries met more often." At the same time Moscow sought to limit the negative effects of this tack by attempting to reassure the Arabs that its 11 February and 19 April proposals were designed to strengthen Arab security and promote the rapid economic development of the area.

The general outlines of Soviet views on developments in the Arab world were presented in two monographs, released in late April and early May, by scholars of the Institutes of Law and Oriental Studies respectively. In The State Structure of the Countries of the Arab East, I. Levin and V. Mamayev of the Institute of Law surveyed economic and social forces at work in the area and offered an explanation for Soviet support. An even more impressive attempt to interpret recent area history in such a way as to justify current Soviet support for Arab anti-Western movements was a symposium, Arabs in the Struggle for Independence, prepared by the Middle East experts of the Institute of Oriental Studies, under the editorship of Egyptian specialist L. N. Vatolina and Ye. A. Belyayev. The two works devoted little space to Arab history or political claims, although Egypt's July 1952 revolution was hailed for its successful measures against imperialism and for its start in the direction of antifeudal, democratic reforms. The Soviet authors, citing the predominantly rural character of all Arab states, held out little hope of real economic development until the agrarian problem had been solved along "progressive" lines and large-scale irrigation, electrification, improved transport, and extensive industrialization had been carried out. The subject of joint development of the area was avoided in favor of individual Arab agreements with bloc countries. Making no disavowal of area Communists, admitting that in most Arab countries weak Communist elements are forced to work underground, the symposium stated that Moscow's aim is not the
dictatorship of the Arab proletariat, but the "strengthening of national independence through democracy, land reform, and the building of socialism in line with the national characteristics of the Arab countries." Hardly a blueprint of Soviet intentions, the two works' essential points presented solid testimony to Moscow's efforts to woo Arab leaders and intellectuals and to accommodate its major propaganda lines to their interests.

The victory of the Communist party in general elections in the Indian state of Kerala pointed up the contradictions inherent in Moscow's attempts to preserve a policy of official good will and exploit an ostensible community of international interests with neutralist countries, while at the same time remaining committed ideologically to assisting the inevitable and historical communization of the world. The installation on 5 April of the Communist-led ministry in Kerala, the first concrete proof of Khrushchev's 20th party formulation on the possibility of the parliamentary path to power by Communist parties, was greeted as testimony to the popularity of Communist ideas in India, but, out of an obvious desire to maintain good relations with the Indian Government and with Nehru, little comment was devoted to Kerala. Considering the magnitude of the victory, the volume of straight publicity was small, although tourist accounts on Kerala subsequently became a feature in Soviet publications. Commentators scrupulously avoided the subject of Indian internal affairs, and until late 1958 there was no indication of Moscow's willingness to champion the Kerala ministry.

In the continuing search for a stronger rationale for its policy toward Asian and African neutralist states, Soviet publicists turned to Lenin's works to cull out applicable views. In this instance the "return to Leninism" represented an effort to legitimize the new course and give it the stamp of greater authority as well as to inject some of the early revolutionary enthusiasm into the new Communist theses. Lenin was cited particularly to justify the temporary alliance with bourgeois-controlled Asian national movements; however, his stipulation that cooperation with non-Communist groups was possible only if Communists were left free to organize and agitate was not cited, in view of the domestic anti-Communist policies of some of the Asian and Arab governments with which Moscow was now willing to overlook. Moscow's modernized version of Leninism played down ideological differences in favor of bringing about the
unity of all national elements in a joint struggle for political independence, which in turn was identified with an anti-Western foreign policy.

The USSR's initial impact on Asian-African neutralism had come about through direct contacts with nationalist leaders such as Nehru, Sukarno, and Nasir. Now, Moscow sought to increase its influence with the general public through brightening and broadening the appeal of the traditional labor, women's, student, and other Communist-front groups and by multiplying direct contacts of Asian and African peoples with the bloc. Special attention was given to the trade union movement in an attempt to exploit the historically close emotional relationship between the labor and nationalist movements. Moscow's greatest initiative along this line was directed toward propagating a "Bandung spirit," which it interpreted as general Asian-African neutralist endorsement of bloc policies and attempted to expand to include not only the Bandung Conference discussions and their aftermath but also the parallel "Afro-Asian Solidarity" movement which had been developing along nongovernmental lines since late 1954. Moscow recognized the potential of a movement based on popular enthusiasm for Asian and African cooperation as a fountain of anti-Western propaganda as well as a convenient mechanism for collaborating with and influencing Asian-African nationalist-neutralists.

The participation of Soviet officials in leading organizational roles both in cooperation with and in competition with Egyptian and Indian elements was intended to bring the "Afro-Asian Solidarity Movement" as close as possible to the bloc's peace movement and to further the image of the USSR as an Asian nation. Overtures to Asians and Africans, however, were but part of a general Soviet effort to expand contacts with foreign groups and individuals, in line with the formation on 21 May of a State Committee for Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries, under the USSR Council of Ministers. Tactical flexibility in dealing with non-Communists, in person-to-person contacts no less than in government-to-government relations, was to be the order of the day.

The First All-Union Conference of Orientalists, convened in Tashkent from 4 to 11 June, brought together specialists from all over the bloc in an effort to back up current Soviet foreign policy lines with more skillful and convincing interpretations of area developments and to strengthen the appeal
to Asian-African intellectuals. B. G. Gafurov, a Tadzhik who since the 20th party congress had authored the principal programmatic statements on the new line for Asia-Africa, chaired the conference and shared the spotlight with another Asian, N. A. Mukhitdinov, then first secretary in Uzbekistan and candidate member of the Soviet party presidium. The locus of the conference (the heart of Soviet Central Asia), the content of the major speeches, and the leading role of Soviet Asians underlined the shift to efforts to utilize to the maximum the experiences of Soviet rule in the Central Asian republics as a pattern for the economic development of non-Soviet countries. Gafurov cited the "marvelous experience" of the peoples of these republics,

which with the active assistance of the Russian people and of other peoples of the USSR, in the shortest historical period, overcame their former backwardness and created a highly developed industry and agriculture.

Mukhitdinov, now tabbed as a leading regime spokesman on national movements, likewise emphasized the political, economic, and cultural achievements of the peoples of the Soviet East in the years of Communist rule as a promising vehicle for making more vivid and concrete the Communist program for Asia and Africa. In the year following this meeting, Soviet scholars expanded their output of analyses of the social and economic development of Central Asia as the path for a noncapitalist path of development from feudalism to socialism. The state universities at Tashkent and Frunze were developed as centers of scholarly and cultural contact with non-Soviet Asia.

The practical applications of these views to pressing Middle East problems showed Moscow engaged in a careful assessment of areas of conflicting interests in which Soviet theoretical prejudices played a limited role. Having scored its advanced in the Middle East on the basis first of giving all-out support for Arab governments against Israel and second of encouraging Arab estrangement from the West, Moscow revised somewhat its earlier views on the shape of the dangers to its position and that of its Arab allies. Months after the fact Moscow revised its version of the Suez crisis to admit that the attack on Egypt came without prior agreement with the United States. At the same time, while tacitly admitting considerable American successes in shoring up the economic and military strength of area countries opposed to the extension of Soviet influence,
Moscow appeared less concerned that major American intervention was imminent and turned its principal attention to firming the anti-Western stand of Egypt and Syria and to winning broader Arab popular support. In the face of the ouster of the Nabulsi government of Jordan in April and the signature of Saudi-US agreements, Moscow blamed reactionary leaders rather than the two kings for these pro-Western moves, apparently feeling that in time these governments would be forced by intra-Arab pressures to follow the lead of Cairo and Damascus.

Moscow continued its offers of economic assistance to almost all area countries and speeded the re-equipping of the Egyptian Army to replace its losses of material. Arms also flowed to Syria at cut-rate prices in exchange for Syrian exports of cotton and wheat, necessitating the diversion to the bloc of an important part of Syria's traditional agricultural exports to West European markets and resulting in a dramatic increase in the bloc's share of Syrian foreign trade. Despite Moscow's blanket offers of increased trade, of economic development loans, and technical assistance, by mid-1957 only a handful of countries—notably India, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Egypt, and Syria—had agreed to extensive programs of economic or economic and military aid. Burma, Cambodia, Nepal, Ceylon, and Yemen had agreed to terms with Moscow, but African (other than Egypt) and Latin American countries failed to respond to tentative Soviet overtures.

Moscow's intentions to follow an activist line in the underdeveloped countries—based on a more objective understanding of concrete developments on the one hand and intensified ideological-propaganda attacks on Western policies on the other—were reflected in important publication moves at mid-year. In early June, Moscow issued in 125,000 copies a reference handbook of almost 1,000 pages entitled Foreign Countries. The publication, which gave a run-down of major developments since World War II for all countries except the USSR, presented short geographic and economic surveys, descriptions of organs of state power, leading political parties, the press, etc. An aid to Soviet educators and propagandists, it was notable for its dissimilarity to an agitator's notebook.

Of more lasting impact, Moscow brought to life after a decade Varga's journal, a new World Economics and International Relations, the stated purpose of which was to examine economic developments both in the developed and underdeveloped
capitalist countries and relations among and between them. The renowned economist was listed as an editor and has been a frequent contributor, but the selection of Ya. S. Khavinson,* long head of TASS and former chief of the foreign section of Pravda, as chief editor pointed up the unmistakable political bent of the journal. A second new journal, The Contemporary East, introduced at the same time was intended to serve as a popular voice of the Institute of Oriental Studies both at home and abroad. To date it has not lived up to its initial promise to appear "soon" in the major languages of Asia and Africa, but under Gafurov's editorship it has been used to disseminate official views on pressing international problems especially touching on the interests of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, to publish the parallel views of neutralist leaders, and to point up the significance of cultural contacts, exchanges, friendship societies, and front groups in bringing together non-Communist and avowed Communist activities in these areas.

The step-by-step disclosure in early July of the "anti-party" group conspiracy which had come to a head the previous month opened a new era in Soviet relations with the uncommitted world, as Khrushchev used this opportunity to attribute to the group: policies which were unpopular or had failed and to associate himself personally with those initiatives which had proved a success or were now to be undertaken. The dismissal of Shepilov, the Soviet leader most closely associated with Moscow's strong pro-Nasir stand, obliged the regime to explain to the Arabs that no change in Soviet Middle East policy was in prospect. The indictment of Molotov, probably correctly, for broad opposition to many of Khrushchev's foreign policy moves cleared the way for a purely Khrushchevian style in foreign affairs. Accusing the whole antiparty group with having opposed such features of current Soviet foreign policy as moves in the direction of peace and coexistence with the West and

*Khavinson, in authoring important articles on international relations in his own and such other Soviet publications as International Affairs and Life Abroad, has used the literary pseudonym W. Marinin.
"personal diplomacy" were apparently intended to underline these features' sanctity and the importance with which Moscow continued to view reaching a long-range accommodation with the West. No mention was made at this time of opposition by at least part of the ousted presidium members to Khrushchev's policies for intrabloc as well as foreign aid.

The first test of the regime's intentions following the purge was provided almost immediately as a result of the growing intimacy of Soviet-Syrian relations and Moscow's general embroilment in Middle East developments. On 6 August a joint Soviet-Syrian communique issued on the conclusion of a visit to Moscow of a high-ranking delegation of Syrian political and military figures pledged the USSR to further extensive economic and technical assistance for Syria and sought to strengthen the anti-Western hand of the Syrian Government. Following the alleged discovery a week later of an American plot, the Syrian regime ousted the last dissenters to its pro-Soviet policies and set off an area-wide alarm over the spread of overt Communist activities in the Middle East and on the possibilities of pro-Western intervention in Syria. Soviet propaganda seized on the Syrian charges and subsequent Arab alarms not only to intensify the air of crisis in order to increase pressures on pro-Western Arab governments, but also, as indicated by a third round of notes to Britain, France, and the United States on 3 September, to bring about big power negotiations on the Middle East on the same terms as proposed in its notes of 11 February and 19 April 1957.

Behind a facade of exaggerated interest in Soviet security in the Middle East, and in the context of intense political-psychological pressures, Moscow set out to test Western reactions and Western resolution over Syrian developments. TASS' 26 August announcement of the successful testing of an intercontinental ballistic missile touched off a campaign by Moscow to exploit claims of a new balance of power and thereby establish a stronger international authority for itself. This campaign was made more explicit by the publication on 8 September in Pravda of a long "interview" with head of the Soviet air force, Air Marshal Vershinin, depicting overwhelming Soviet military superiority vis-a-vis the West. The 18 September announcement by Moscow that two warships from the Baltic Fleet which were on a good-will visit to Albania and Yugoslavia would also make a ten-day visit to Syria dramatized the USSR's self-appointed role as "protector" of the Arabs at the same
time as it was intended to serve as a concrete reminder of Soviet Middle East interests. A party brochure published on 25 September, The Soviet Union and the Countries of the Near and Middle East, by Kh. N. Grigoryan, claimed that:

- tens of millions of people in the Near and Middle East see in the face of the Soviet Union a true friend and supporter of the peace and independence of peoples...

In explaining to wide domestic circles Soviet diplomatic support for Syria and Egypt, the brochure did not intimate that Moscow's backing would be other than diplomatic and economic. Khrushchev's attempts to build up the impression abroad of irresistible Soviet power were intended to inhibit Western moves in the area and to encourage Arab governments to take a stronger line against the West, secure in the belief that Soviet arms would protect them from any Western military reprisal and that bloc economic ties would foil attempted economic retaliation.

Moscow's handling of the second phase of the crisis was more clearly directed over Arab heads at the West. Moscow's 24 September announcement--without comment--that atomic and hydrogen weapons of various kinds had been exploded in connection with military training exercises was a prelude to the recapitulation of Soviet military, scientific, and economic advances which followed the 4 October launching of Sputnik I. Moscow kept the spotlight on military technology with the announcement on 7 October that on the preceding day it had tested a "powerful hydrogen device of new design." Then Khrushchev personally took the lead in magnifying the war scare over Syria with his statement to New York Times correspondent James Reston that Turkey would not last "a single day" in a Middle East war. Again on the evening of the 7th the premier hit at Turkish and Western intentions regarding Syria, adding that it would be too late to reconsider policies when "cannons begin to shoot and rockets to fly." The subsequent transfer of Marshal Rokossovsky to command of the Transcaucasus Military District bordering on Turkey and Iran, followed by an unprecedented press statement that military exercises had been carried out there under simulated atomic warfare conditions, was intended to convince both the Arabs and the West--but principally the latter--that tensions were so great as to require an immediate settlement.
Although both public and private statements of Soviet willingness to undertake, if necessary, military action in support of Syria fell short of committing the USSR to unilateral action, they served to cloak Soviet intentions and to maintain for Moscow as wide an area as possible for propaganda exploitation and political maneuver. When even the Nasir-oriented Arab states moved in the direction of détente, Khrushchev, at a reception on 29 October in the Turkish Embassy, made a theatrical, self-styled "gesture of peace" and attempted to resume the pose of peacemaker. Perhaps in recognition that the very crudeness of its tactics had boomeranged among some of the Arabs and had failed to shake the West, Moscow later made a halfhearted attempt to blame the military pressures to the "adventurism" of then Defense Minister Marshal Zhukov. Zhukov may have favored such tactics and contributed to the atmosphere of crisis by repeating the harsher tones of the Moscow press in his speeches in Albania at the height of the tension, but in view of his three-week absence and Khrushchev's earlier personal identification with this probe, he was an unsuitable scapegoat.

Moscow's subsequent attempts to depict its efforts to intensify, prolong, and manipulate tensions between Syria and its neighbors as another major trial of its role as protector of the Arabs have centered around the undisputed fact that no intervention took place. Although at the time the central press reflected disappointment that the Arab states proved irresolute in the face of East-West pressures, Soviet historians have preferred to skim over the diplomatic and political maneuvering which led to the impasse, to present a caricature of the crisis based on the Western plot thesis, to repeat the "we saved Syria" allegation without specifying the Soviet psychological pressures employed. Although paled by the recent Soviet support for Syria, the signature on 28 October of a $170,000,000 long-term development assistance credit emphasized the close cooperation between the two governments at the same time as it underlined the interplay of Soviet economic aid with both broad and immediate policy aims. Concurrent with the Syrian developments, a major review of the politics of economic aid to the underdeveloped countries by Modeste Rubinstein emphasized the indirect "financial-economic and military-political" methods used by colonialists in enforcing their will on nominally independent states and asserted that Moscow's unselfish aid "truly threatens colonialist policies" in opening the way for the underdeveloped countries to choose freely the course and pace of their economic development.
In 1957, for the first time, economic aid was included as one of the Theses for the October Revolution Anniversary.

Having become a mighty industrial power, the socialist state not only extends to the countries of Asia and Africa moral and political support in their struggle for attaining, preserving, and strengthening their independence, but also helps them in the creation of the economic basis of independence in building up industry and in developing agriculture.

The 40th anniversary provided a convenient peg for a flood of Soviet publications to attempt to influence the peoples of the former colonies. The effort was keyed to the interpretation of recent world history in terms of a revolutionary struggle against imperialism in which all of these peoples had participated in one degree or another and was couched in localized terms in order to increase its plausibility. Symptomatic of Moscow's more optimistic appraisal of prospects for still greater influence in Asia and Africa was the publication in the journal Soviet Oriental Studies of an article on the First Congress of the Peoples of the East, held in September 1920 at Baku, which outlined a long discarded program of revolutionary struggle of all peasants and workers of the world.

One of the frankest evaluations of East-West rivalry for the tactical allegiance of the underdeveloped and neutralist countries was given by Eugene Varga on the eve of the November celebration. Writing in "his" journal World Economics and International Relations--hereinafter cited as WEIR--the noted Soviet economist singled out "the three mighty pillars" of colonial rule: monopoly on the supply of industrial equipment and machinery, monopoly on the sources of international credit, and monopoly on the supply of arms. Varga claimed all three were crumbling as a consequence of Soviet policies. He bragged that the economic achievements of the USSR and the bloc permitted them to furnish whole industrial combines to underdeveloped countries and that sound Soviet finances permitted the USSR to make loans on more advantageous terms than those offered by either the United States or Britain. In one of Moscow's rare references to its nonbloc military assistance programs, Varga cited the high stage of bloc industrial development as making possible the sale of arms to former colonies and dependent countries threatened by imperialist aggression, thus eliminating the West's third and last "monopoly" standing
in the way of complete political and economic independence. The near-term implication was that Moscow's call for peaceful competition with the West would feature greatly expanded Soviet efforts along all three of these lines. As for the policies Moscow was urging on the underdeveloped countries, the most important was a pro-Soviet, or at least neutral, foreign policy, plus domestic measures combining land reforms and the elimination of feudal holdovers; the liquidation of the economic positions of imperialism in industry, finance, and trade; the creation of a powerful state economy on the basis of an increase of the relative weight and directive role of the state sector in the country's economy; the introduction of elements of state planning of the economy; the establishment of a definite control over the activity of private capital; and the nationalization of foreign property. (From the unsigned lead article in Soviet Oriental Studies, No. 5, 1957, signed to the press on 1 November.)

The 40th anniversary celebration in Moscow, led and dominated by Khrushchev, was keyed to efforts to make direct political and propaganda capital out of the changes wrought domestically during the 40 years of Communist rule. Khrushchev's jubilee speech paraded a list of recent domestic and international achievements—topped off by recent ICBM claims and world-wide acclaim of Sputnik I and, on the eve of the holiday, Sputnik II—to give the impression that the successes of the past year were but the prelude for further Communist advances, and he reiterated standard claims for the ideological and cultural superiority of Communism as a world system. His remarks on the disintegration of colonialism were brief and notable only for the optimistic formulation that the "twilight of imperial rule in the East has arrived," as distinct from the usual equivocation as to timing. Khrushchev's speech did not even imply that up until less than two weeks previously the Middle East, specifically Syria, had been the locus of a major East-West crisis. The following day, however, newly named Minister of Defense Marshal Malinovsky kept alive the Soviet charge that Western "adventures" such as Syria threatened mankind with the calamities of nuclear warfare.

The meetings and discussions of Communist party leaders who were in Moscow ostensibly to help celebrate the anniversary
comprised a major effort to resolve intrabloc differences and to establish a greater semblance of doctrinal and organizational unity to the world Communist movement. The "Declaration" issued at the 14-16 November conference of bloc parties -- a document Yugoslavia refused to sign -- apparently was intended by its formulators as a sort of bloc charter, and was so treated by Soviet propaganda for about a year following the meeting. The "Declaration" reaffirmed the theses of the Soviet party 20th party congress and in effect validated Soviet leadership of the world Communist movement in the interim period. At the same time, however, provisos were added which justified harder lines in both the ideological and political struggle with the class enemy (capitalism) and the bloc enemy (the West).

The meeting from 16 to 19 November of 64 Communist parties, claiming more than 33,000,000 members, was concerned with broadening and invigorating Communist tactics and, in particular, enlivening the languishing "peace" movement. The 64-party "Peace Manifesto" called for an intensified struggle by all anti-imperialist elements against Western influence and policies and directed peace organizations to make a passionate drive against the manufacture, testing, and use of nuclear weapons.

The party conferences and the two programmatic documents were intended to close the gap between the correct line being followed by Moscow in government-to-government relations -- which accepted differences in social: and economic institutions as secondary to the country's stance vis-a-vis the West -- and the ideological priorities in local party programs. A survey, The Disintegration of the Colonial System by V. Ya. Avarin, which appeared in November 1957 under the auspices of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, reflected Moscow's willingness to advance a step toward reclaiming class struggle and agitation as motivating forces for progressive world developments, points left unsettled by the concessionary 20th party congress formulations. Avarin cited the position of the working class as "usually the basis and point of departure of the anti-imperialist and antifeudal movement" and hailed the role of labor unrest and strife as an "integral part" of the national liberation movement. Subsequent to the November meetings, Soviet commentators were more cautious in their appraisal of nationalist parties and governments than they had been the previous year. The principal impact of the party get-togethers, however, was not on Soviet policies, nor even on Soviet public attitudes, but on bringing the tactics of local Communist parties into line: to focus the resentment and hatred of all national elements on the capitalist and foreign enemy, principally the United States.
V. THE INTERIM BETWEEN PARTY CONCLAVES: December 1957 - January 1959

The party discussions had little if any immediate effect on the course of Soviet foreign policy. Moscow's public attitude continued to be comprised of a professed willingness to enter into reasonable agreements with the West and of an extensive commitment to assist those countries wishing to break free of dependence on the West, politically and economically. On 9 November 1957, after drawn-out negotiations, Moscow finally signed a $125,000,000 credit to aid India in developing a domestic heavy machine-building industry. Later in the month, following discussions in Moscow with Nasir's top aide Marshal Amir, the Soviet Union announced its willingness to extend long-term credits to Cairo for projects under Egypt's economic development plan. Concurrently, efforts were made to increase trade not only with the underdeveloped countries, but with the Western great powers as well—to "promote trust," as Khrushchev told visiting American newspaper magnate Hearst on 22 November. One sign that the Kremlin had not forgotten the interplay of Western defense moves and Arab developments on Soviet strategic and political interests in the Middle East was Moscow's continuation of its serious warnings and general diplomatic pressure on Turkey. In December, Moscow issued a first call in a new program for bringing about a summit conference which could lead to a general settlement of outstanding East-West issues and a lessening of international tension.

Khrushchev personally took the lead in extending Moscow's economic assistance and friendship campaign to Latin America, still relatively unaffected by post-Stalin changes in Soviet policy. In an interview with two Brazilian journalists on 21 November 1957, published subsequently in International Affairs, Khrushchev began a new stage of Soviet efforts to break down the resistance of Latin American government and business circles to increased contacts with the bloc. Calling his visitors "the first swallows heralding a new era in Soviet-Brazilian relations," Khrushchev pitched his discussion to the desirability of re-establishing diplomatic relations—the absence of which allegedly was depriving Brazil and other Latin American countries of the advantages of economic and cultural cooperation with Moscow—and to Soviet willingness to expand commercial transactions, extend industrial assistance, and increase cultural contacts. According to local Communist press accounts,
Soviet leaders had met separately with Latin American delegates at the November meetings in Moscow, 17 of the 21 Latin American Communist parties, many illegal, had representatives at the Moscow talks—and worked out with them regional policies and tactics.

Two articles in the December issue of International Affairs attempted to apply to Latin American conditions the lessons of the 20th party congress and the developments up to and including the November Moscow meetings. It was asserted that the main purpose of the national liberation movement in Latin America was the attainment of genuine economic independence and national economic development in which the national bourgeoisie would be "almost as interested in economic progress and economic independence as the working class." Moscow's transparent intention in seeking friendly contacts with Latin American businessmen and government figures was to lay the groundwork for long-term political gains similar to those scored earlier with similar groups in Asia and the Arab countries by exploiting their current economic difficulties—foreign exchange, export market, and investment capital shortages—in the direction of reduced economic and thus political dependence on the United States and increased political, economic, and cultural relations with the bloc.

Although Moscow often promoted increased economic contacts between the underdeveloped countries and the bloc—and even between the major capitalist countries and the bloc—as a means of reducing international tension and as an antidote for war psychosis, it pressed a program of undermining Western economic influence in Asia, Africa, and Latin America in unmistakably cold-war terms. At the same time as the Soviet economic assistance program was still restricted primarily to a half-dozen countries of considerable political and strategic importance in the East-West rivalry, Moscow carried out a systematic and widespread campaign to counter Western and particularly American aid programs. A special conference on "American 'Assistance' to Asian Countries," bringing together leading Soviet economists and orientalists of the Institutes of World Economics and International Relations, Chinese Studies, International Relations, and other establishments, was held in December. The condensed texts of the statements presented, as published in the January 1958 issue of WEIR, reflected Moscow's evaluation that Western economic aid programs were a formidable barrier to the extension of Soviet influence throughout the under-
developed world. Also reflected was the desire to center local attention on political and military "strings" allegedly attached to all Western aid so as to undermine the psychological and political impact of aid programs, with the further effect of diverting public attention in the underdeveloped areas from a consideration of concrete economic measures to political and propaganda side issues which could be manipulated by Moscow and local anti-Western elements to discredit all relations with "imperialists." The core of the argument was not new: Western "assistance" is in fact part of a complex scheme to assure the continued political-economic domination of Western countries over the former colonies. The implication of the conference was that there would be an intensification of Soviet and Communist efforts not only to harass Western economic programs in these areas, but to step up efforts to disrupt all forms of intercourse between the developed and underdeveloped parts of the capitalist world.

The first impressive public exercise of Communist strategy toward the underdeveloped countries and of tactics to be used to intensify area frictions with the West was the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference held in Cairo from 26 December 1957 to 1 January 1958. Although billed as a successor to the Bandung Conference, only the Chinese and Soviet delegations, plus a few Arab participants, were officially sanctioned by their governments, and a number of the approximately 500 "peoples' representatives" from 45 countries were expatriates or exiles of the countries represented. Moscow's impressive team was headed by Sh. R. Rashidov, "President" of the Uzbek Republic, and A. A. Arzumanyan, director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations. At the conference Arzumanyan made a bald assault on Western economic positions in the underdeveloped world—an assault framed in terms of a direct challenge to established positions as well as to shifting economic relationships. Simply expressed, Arzumanyan's thesis was that in order to safeguard their political independence and to secure economic independence as well, underdeveloped countries must develop their own heavy as well as light manufacturing industries. To get the capital necessary for industrialization these countries should nationalize the property of "foreign monopolies" and thus gain control for national purposes of their own resources and of the profits which Westerners had been sending out of the country. Underdeveloped countries would then find it possible to mobilize all internal resources and plan their utilization. Increased commercial trade with the
bloc and bloc technical and development assistance extended on favorable terms could supplement domestic resources with no limiting political conditions. Although this was not a new concept, the fact that Moscow chose a hybrid conference at Cairo to spotlight not only its willingness to extend credits to friendly governments but also its ideological antagonism to one of the pillars of the area's economy, foreign investment, pointed up one of the purposes of Soviet political and economic support to nationalist governments—the encouragement of political and economic forays against Western positions.

Besides the forum for attacks on the West, Moscow valued the Cairo conference and the "solidarity" movement behind it as a promising mechanism for maintaining liaison with and influencing neutralist and nationalist sentiment in nonbloc Asia, the Arab countries, and also Black Africa. Having originated principally in Indian and Egyptian neutralist circles, the Afro-Asian solidarity movement, though Soviet influenced, had a respectability and home-grown flavor Moscow could not claim in Asia and Africa for its peace movement. Although Moscow vies with Cairo—as on occasion also with New Delhi and Peiping—for organizational and ideological influence in this movement, the resolutions adopted at Cairo reflected the bond of anti-imperialism in demanding immediate independence of colonial territories, and generally paralleled lines of Soviet foreign policy. The permanent organizational structure which emerged from the conference also provided Moscow with a valuable new channel for direct contacts with African nationalist groups of many hues.

Soviet interests in African events had noticeably quickened during 1957 with Soviet representation at the independence celebrations of Ghana and Tunisia and a broadening and intensification of attempts to initiate diplomatic and trade relations with the independent African states. Soviet publications on Africa, still primarily the responsibility of the Institute of Ethnography, were pointed at winning the confidence of politically conscious African elements by asserting a friendly interest in their coming of political age, and by discrediting on all counts the West's past and present role in Africa. In Moscow's negotiations for the exchange of diplomatic missions and the establishment of regular economic and cultural ties, long-time Soviet Africanist Professor I. I. Potekhin played a pioneering role as scholar, semi-official spokesman, and proto-diplomat.
Moscow began 1958 still riding the wave of optimism engendered by world-wide reaction to its Sputnik launchings, although doubts concerning Moscow's extravagant claims to world scientific and technical leadership began to be more prevalent in non-Communist circles and portended a rapid decline in the political mileage Moscow could expect in this direction. Public expressions of Soviet leaders and Moscow commentary gave the appearance that the Soviet Union was confident that changes taking place in non-Communist Asia, Africa, and Latin America, both in the field of international relations and in their domestic social and economic developments, were favorable to the increase of Communist influence and moreover were irreversible.

Moscow gave every indication that it was counting on the cumulative effect over a period of years of bloc political, economic, and, though more restricted, military aid program—in combination with people-to-people contacts, intensive propaganda, and growing local Communist agitation—to make at least a considerable number of the underdeveloped countries materially dependent and politically tractable.

The lines developed publicly at the November party conferences and of the Cairo Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference were picked up and extended in Soviet publications over the first half of 1958. Pravda on 17 January published an article by Mexican Communist party leader Lombardo Toledano, who enjoys considerable prestige throughout left-wing circles in Latin America, in which Toledano indicated that the principal strategy for Latin American Communists was to discredit the United States and its "colonialist" policies. More detailed statements of revised local strategy and of organizational and propaganda tactics were carried in local party organs following the return of party leaders from Moscow—some visited Peking as well. The report of the head of the Uruguayan Communist party, Rodney Arismendi, to his party congress was reprinted in Moscow's agitprop organ Party Affairs in May—an indication that it was considered both exemplary and programmatic. The kernel of the new strategy as outlined by Arismendi was to infiltrate all parties and organizations which favored parochial national interests and a reduction of ties with the West, and to encourage the initiation of increase of diplomatic, economic and cultural relations with bloc countries. Implicit in the new program, local Communist parties were to play down class antagonisms and attacks on capitalism per se in favor of propagandizing national programs of "economic progress and economic independence."

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The establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Ghana on 14 January 1958 marked an important extension of Soviet contacts with African national movements and was hailed by Moscow as acceptance by the Black African "community of Soviet support and respectability. Moscow's primary concern, however, continued to be that of disrupting Western ties with African territories and frustrating Western plans to fashion a new framework of political and economic mutual relations. Besides spotlighting and exaggerating racial discrimination in Africa and the United States as evidence of innate Western hostility to Africans, Moscow sought to fan fears of colonialist cooperation under American leadership to extend the network of Western military bases throughout Africa and to tie African territories permanently in a dependent economic and political role through a variety of schemes and slogans; e.g., "Eurafrika." In a monograph entitled African Peoples, released under the auspices of the Institute of Ethnography in February, A. S. Orlova attempted to apply the lessons of the Bandung and Cairo conferences to Africa and claimed progressive forces and their post-Bandung slogan of "Independence in this generation!" as part of the global movement for peace and democracy. Moscow's support for the African struggle for independence was more theoretical than real, however. The April conference of independent African states at Accra—attended by the UAR, Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, the Sudan, Tunisia, and Ghana plus representatives of several African resistance groups—was solely an African affair, though Moscow sent messages of support and reported favorably on the results of the conference; conference documents were reprinted in International Affairs.

Although Soviet and Egyptian delegates had worked closely at the Cairo Conference on a general anti-imperialist line for Asia and Africa, Nasir's precipitous response to Syrian overtures for a federation of Egypt and Syria posed a serious challenge to the bases of Moscow's support for non-Communist nationalist governments. Moscow supported the view as long as the talk was still of "federation," but when the outlines of Nasir's planned merger became clearer, Moscow's praise ceased. Not only had Damascus proved a more pliant ally, but diplomatic, economic, and military aid which had built up excellent inter-governmental relations had fostered the rise of left-wing Arab elements which threatened to be the first victims of the union. More than point up the deficiencies of Moscow's simple framework of attempting to evaluate political, economic, and social
changes in Arab and other underdeveloped countries in terms of pro- or anti-imperialism, the move toward merger underlined the differences in long-term aims between Cairo and Moscow and between Nasir-led Arab nationalists and Middle East Communists.

Moscow's pro-forma acceptance of the accomplished fact did not conceal its lack of enthusiasm. Its first cautious appraisal of the new Arab state, presented by K. Ivanov in International Affairs, represented a grudging adjustment to the new circumstances but did not refrain from restrained criticism, citing problems and differences in Syria "which cannot be surmounted at once by decree or government order." Subsequently Moscow was more openly critical of the antiprogressive prospects of the extension to Syria of Nasir's restrictions on labor and political organizations. Although he conceded that the merger played an anticolonial role in strengthening Nasir's hand, Soviet commentator I. Belyayev, writing in Contemporary East, expressed reservations as to the domestic effects of the union.

Moscow's dilemma in facing up to the implications of Nasir's move without surrendering completely its Communist assets in Syria to the demands of continued good state relations with Nasir was pointed up by the fate of the Syrian Communist party. Khalid Bakdash, top Syrian Communist leader, refused to dissolve the Syrian party, publicly denounced Nasir's merger policies, and on 5 February fled with his family and other Syrian Communist leaders to the bloc. From a variety of bloc forums, Bakdash kept alive the thread of an uncompromising Communist program for the eventual communization of the Middle East, in marked contrast to Moscow's official policy of good relations with anti-Western Arab governments.* Both Moscow and Cairo skirted a showdown on ideological issues, but the undertones of the Soviet reaction was that of a retreat rather than a surrender.

* A.Y. Kaznacheyev, the Soviet diplomat in Rangoon whose defection has thrown added light on Moscow's efforts simultaneously to promote good relations with existing governments and to undermine their popular support, reported that in January 1958 the head of the Institute of Oriental Studies, B. G. Gafurov, while on a visit to Burma as a member of the Soviet parliamentary delegation, met secretly with the leader of the Communist underground, U Ba Nyein, and promised Soviet support, advising him not to pay too much attention to Moscow's "official policy."

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Nasir's acceptance of a renewed invitation to visit the Soviet Union—originally scheduled for August 1956 but postponed because of the crisis over Suez—capped an unprecedented number of high-level Soviet-UAR exchanges, featuring the parade to Cairo of Soviet ministers to negotiate or implement economic, agricultural, and cultural agreements. For reasons of their own, both Moscow and Cairo sought to limit the areas of their political disagreement so as not to disturb tactical cooperation, which had brought major gains to both parties at the expense of the West. Nasir's arrival in Moscow on 29 April 1958 touched off a major Soviet propaganda effort to portray USSR-UAR political views as identical. Nasir's speeches and his conduct during an extensive tour of the USSR indicated that despite continued Soviet economic and military assistance, he intended to proceed with his recently announced policy of seeking improved relations with the West. He avoided seconding Moscow's anti-Western attacks at the same time as he accepted closer Soviet-UAR economic ties.

Moscow attempted to identify itself in the minds of the Arab peoples with purely Arab goals, but it would not formally endorse Nasir as spokesman for all Arabs, nor was Nasir able to get a stronger Soviet stand on the Arab's war of liberation in Algeria. For their part, Soviet leaders seemed intent on heading off any rapprochement of Nasir with the West by increasing their economic and military backing of Cairo and continuing to fan anti-Western sentiment among the Arab people.

At the same time, the Soviet economic assistance program, as an integral part of Moscow's relations with all the underdeveloped countries, was undergoing continued re-examination and in turn was being diffused into Soviet analyses of the dynamics of social growth in these areas. A special conference on 24 February sponsored by the journal International Affairs, bringing together propagandists such as Ilyichev, the military strategist-theoretician Talensky, and a handful of academicians, discussed the latest achievements of Soviet science and technology and their significance for and influence on international relations. The abbreviated version of the proceedings, as published in the journal, reflected Moscow's determination to push forward an interpretation emphasizing enhanced Soviet prestige, to put new vigor behind its perennial "wave of the future" propaganda line, but also to claim greater international authority as a result of "important changes in the balance of forces between socialism and
capitalism," Propaganda to the underdeveloped countries, in order to keep alive interest in Soviet developments and to pave the way for closer government-to-government relations, featured the sputniks and other "peaceful" embodiments of Soviet scientific advances.

Moscow's general economic aid offensive was pointed up early in March by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Firyubin at the ECAFE conference in Kuala Lumpur. At the same time, G. Ye. Skorov, one of the editors of WEIR, attempted a point-by-point justification of Soviet economic assistance to non-Communist governments within the general framework of anti-imperialism. He claimed for bloc trade a "stabilizing" and "favorable influence on the economy" of the underdeveloped countries, with the implication that they stood with Moscow on important international issues and so should be strengthened. He also reiterated current Soviet support for development of the "state sector" but in stronger terms, asserting that

under certain conditions, the state sector of the economy may become the material-technical basis of a peaceful transition to socialism.

Skorov's most important contribution, however, was an attempt to shore up the ideological basis for Moscow's economic offensive with the admission that although the immediate effect of Soviet aid often was to aid capitalist development, the state independence of the underdeveloped countries involved them in the world struggle against the West and on the long term opened the prospect of social change. Then, in more traditional terms, he asserted,

Despite the fact that the majority of the nationally independent states remain a part of the capitalist system, the dialectics of world social growth are such that their movement forward along the path of independent political and economic development does not strengthen, but, on the other hand, weakens world capitalism, depriving it of its most important reserve.

Mikoyan's 11 March Yerevan "election" speech, which contained a brief attack on "economist comrades" for taking an incorrect position on certain foreign economic matters, left vague the focus of their opposition. It is not clear whether the erring "economist comrades" were opposed on ideological
or political grounds, or whether they differed on economic interest and priority—the program appeared vulnerable on a number of accounts. Whatever the case, Mikoyan's defense was along political rather than economic lines:

In this connection, we must not overlook such an important factor in international life as the role of countries that are liberated from colonial dependence and have earned political independence and which are proceeding on the path of establishing economic independence.

On the occasion of his visit to Hungary in April 1958, Khrushchev gave considerable personal attention to justifying the present Soviet economic program, with emphasis on long-range objectives. At Tatabanya on 8 April he emphasized the role of the working class in each country, the "inspirational example" of economic developments within the bloc, and asserted—without limiting it to the bloc—that the "only correct route to victory is the growth of productive forces in all possible ways." At the Hungarian Academy of Sciences the following day, Khrushchev reiterated the thesis central to the program, relying on the example of Soviet economic advances: "We attack capitalism on its flanks from economic positions, from positions of the superiority of our system." Expressing Soviet intentions shortly to overtake and surpass the West, and particularly the United States, in per capita production of socially necessary goods, Khrushchev boasted:

Then the ideas of Communism will be understood by many people, not only by means of the study of Marxism-Leninism, but also by the force of example.... People who today cannot utter the word 'communism' without irony will then also be with us. They will take our road without their being aware of it.

The flexibility of the Soviet approach and Moscow's willingness to adapt and modify its tactics to appeal not only to political extremists but also to moderates in the underdeveloped countries was exemplified by a line introduced in March which implied that Moscow might be induced to compete alongside the West for influence in the economic development of the former colonies rather than to keep up a struggle to exclude Western interests. In an interview with a correspondent of Le Figaro on 19 March, Khrushchev picked up a proposal advanced
by the French at the Geneva Summit Conference in 1955—that a real easing of international tension and disarmament "would make it possible to deduct sufficient sums to render real and tangible aid" to the underdeveloped countries. Then in a 24 March interview with an Italian newsman, Khrushchev agreed there was merit in Italian Foreign Minister Pella's suggestion of a joint Western Europe -USSR fund to aid Middle East development, provided such a fund should be set up not by a "narrow grouping" of countries, but by all European countries, including the satellites.

Moscow's "six principles" for Middle East peace, set forth in its February and April 1957 notes to the Western powers, had tied vague "promotion" of area economic development to an arms embargo but had not been followed up. Soviet willingness to participate in regional aid now reappeared in the 5 May memorandum setting forth agenda items for the expected summit conference,

The necessity arises of also considering the question of economic cooperation with the countries of the Near and Middle East, particularly in respect to assistance in creating their own national industries... without laying down any political, military, or other conditions incompatible with the principles of their independence and sovereignty.

Without committing itself in any way, not even to calling off or toning down its propaganda harassment of Western economic positions in the area, Moscow apparently wanted to put itself on the right side of an issue of much interest to the underdeveloped countries.*

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*Subsequently, in his travels to the United States in the summer of 1959 and to France in March 1960, Khrushchev tied prospects of a major increase in economic assistance to progress on disarmament, implying, though carefully not stating, that programs to be paid for by funds released by a reduction of military expenditures could be used for programs carried on jointly with the West.
Soviet emphasis during the period, however, was overwhelmingly on the side of undercutting Western economic activity in the underdeveloped areas. G. Martysheva, writing in the semipopular monthly Contemporary East, echoed Arzumanyan's Cairo thrust for the nationalization of Western-owned enterprises in the underdeveloped countries:

The task of liquidating ages-old backwardness cannot be decided without seizing the positions held by foreign capital in the economy; ... nationalization is an integral part of the national liberation struggle; its realization will shrink the sphere of imperialist exploitation in the underdeveloped countries and will allow the governments of these countries to turn the profits from nationalized enterprises to the needs of economic construction, and above all to industrialization.

Nationalization, however, was only the logical conclusion of a simple assertion that private capital investment was exploitation rather than assistance toward economic development, and that in effect it is not the countries exporting capital which finance economic development, but underdeveloped countries which provide excessive profits for Western concerns, a fraction of which returns to the same or another underdeveloped country, where the same chain of investment-exploitation takes place. The author also used an artifice of a "balance sheet" purporting to demonstrate that profits American concerns have received from their postwar operations exceed by several times all American capital investments in the underdeveloped countries; this stratagem was repeated with ingenious variations by Soviet economists.

The failure of Khrushchev's ideological concessions and continued political and economic overtures to halt Yugoslavia's drift away from the bloc, leading to the second Soviet-Yugoslav crisis, provoked a reassessment of Soviet views on development processes and the relations of bloc countries to non-Communist countries as well as to Communist but revisionist Yugoslavia. In the lead article of Problems of Philosophy, G. M. Gak, leading up to a refutation of Tito's "national communism," sought to establish the essential difference between Communist programs of revolutionary reform and the various stages of the bourgeois-democratic revolution which Moscow for governmental reasons supported in non-Communist Asia. He made it clear that
support for the national bourgeoisie in its struggle against imperialism should not lead to the conclusion that the nationalists are capable or interested in carrying the struggle forward to Communism. Citing the increasing numbers and influence of Communist parties in India and Indonesia, the author re-emphasized the importance of independent Communist organization and struggle:

In these countries the Communist parties, supporting general democratic activity for which the national bourgeoisie is capable, at the same time is carrying out a struggle for the extension of its influence for the increase in the role of the working class and the strengthening of its ties with all popular masses in order to carry the country along the path of the construction of socialism...

A two-volume roundup of bloc and nonbloc Communist party leaders entitled The Great October Revolution and the World Liberation Movement, attacked revisionist versions of Marxism-Leninism and underlined the importance of the party's role at the present stage. This work, signed to the press on 19 May for wide public distribution—a press run of 75,000—was attuned to the 40th Anniversary celebrations.

In the vehemence of their attacks on Tito and in the justifications given for cancelling Soviet-Yugoslav aid agreements, Soviet leaders revealed more than was politic about their expectations that political gains should follow economic aid. Khrushchev's assertion on 3 June to the Bulgarian party congress —"everyone knows that the imperialists never give money to anyone for no purpose, just for having beautiful eyes"—was directed at both the Yugoslavs and the Asian-African nations who showed an interest in accepting American aid. In the hastily improvised justifications for unilaterally cancelling—"postponing"—Soviet credits to Yugoslavia, Khrushchev revealed a number of points about the Soviet aid program which hitherto had been hidden or denied but which probably had been the subject of discussion and disagreement among top Communist leaders. On 12 July, in a speech at a Soviet-Czech friendship meeting in Moscow, Khrushchev admitted that speaking in general, from the commercial viewpoint, our economic and technical aid to the underdeveloped countries is unprofitable for us. However, we consider
that aid to the underdeveloped countries is a necessary matter from the viewpoint of humanity and general human solidarity....

This belied past protestations by the Soviets that their economic aid program was based on mutual economic self-interest. Khrushchev's follow-up definition of the special "profit" to Moscow was straightforward:

by rendering economic, technical, and other aid, we by these means create in these countries conditions so that they, having been freed from colonial slavery, do not enter into any one-sided deal with colonizers, do not go begging to them, do not subordinate their economy to them, and in this way we make it possible for them to oppose attempts to bind them in old colonial relationships, however changed in form.

Moscow's vigorous reaction to the 14 July revolt in Iraq and the subsequent American and British landings in Lebanon and Jordan reflected Soviet concern that these moves were a prelude to a general Western counteroffensive against Soviet and UAR interests in the Middle East. Nasir's hurried flight to Moscow suggested that the UAR leader shared these views and sought reassurances as to the nature and extent of Soviet support. Soviet intervention was confined principally to a virulent propaganda campaign directed primarily against the United States and secondarily against Britain and pro-Western states of the eastern Mediterranean and to immediate diplomatic and propaganda support for the new Iraqi regime. Contending that the United States and Britain had committed aggression, and that a military conflict was in progress which the West planned to extend to Iraq and possibly the UAR as well, Moscow attempted to apply many of the same psychological pressures which it had brought to bear during the crisis over Syria the preceding summer and fall, including the announcement of military maneuvers in areas adjacent to the Middle East. Soviet efforts to use the crisis to force an immediate conference of the major powers, plus India and the UN Secretary General, showed a considerable public concern for Arab sensitivities over the possibility of East-West agreement on the Middle East to the detriment of Arab prestige and interests, but subsequent exchanges, in which Khrushchev accepted a summit meeting under UN auspices and then backed away in the face of pressures from Peiping, indicated the Soviet Union's apprehensions had quickly
faded. As in the earlier Suez and Syrian crises, after the peak of tension had passed, Moscow continued its concerted propaganda and diplomatic effort to claim that only Soviet protection had prevented a damaging blow to Arab interests.

The Soviet Union's rapid strides in developing friendly relations with Qasim, the flowering of pro-Communist forces in Iraq following the coup, and Qasim's strenuous and successful efforts to keep from being drawn under Nasir's control greatly complicated the lines of Soviet Middle East policy. Hitherto Moscow had relied on its economic and arms aid to Nasir to reinforce the anti-Western, anti-Zionist emotional core of the pan-Arab movement and speed the erosion of Western influence. At an early date Moscow apparently realized the advantages of a second, more radical, anti-Western Arab center as a check on Nasir and as a more effective instrument for the furtherance of its long-range goals of ensuring the anti-Western orientation of Arab governments and of transforming the political, economic, and social structure of the area.

Contemporary East in early July had published a lengthy article--by Ali Ya'a, head of the Communist party of Morocco--which was one of the strongest efforts to justify, in terms of an ascending scale of unities of interests between Communist and nationalist forces, Communist support for strengthened bloc government-to-government relations with Cairo and Communist acquiescence in Nasir's efforts to be the sole leader of the anti-imperialist Arabs. In sharp contrast, the first issue of the new bloc journal Problems of Peace and Socialism (the English edition of which appears under the title World Marxist Review), released in late August, contained a reassertion by Syrian Communist exile Khalid Bakdash of the need for an independent role for the Communist party in the Arab struggle for independence and unity. Bakdash's article was a summary of views he had expressed at several bloc meetings since his February flight from Damascus: criticism of Arab governments willing to carry on friendly day-to-day relations with the West; scorn for the willingness or ability of the Arab national bourgeoisie to carry out progressive domestic reforms; and flat rejection of Nasir's demand for the liquidation of Arab Communist parties.

The visit to Cairo in September of N. Mukhitdinov, Soviet party presidium and secretariat member charged with Middle East and Asian affairs, was apparently intended by Moscow to smooth
out the whole range of political differences which had become more acute in the two months since the Khrushchev-Nasir discussions on Lebanon. Mukhitdinov, whose government post is chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the USSR Soviet of Nationalities, a pale shadow of his party responsibilities, reportedly made a spirited defense of Moscow's support for Qasim and against Iraqi amalgamation with the UAR, and in support of Middle East Communists as the most reliable anti-imperialist force. A further point of contention was the extent of Soviet support for the Algerian war. With Nasir's encouragement, an "Algerian Republic" was proclaimed in Cairo on 19 September. Although Mukhitdinov's meeting with representatives of the government-in-exile was publicized in the Moscow press and New Times hailed the step as "a logical and natural sequel to the Algerians' long years of liberation struggle," the Soviet Union avoided a stronger line.

For tactical reasons, Moscow apparently felt impelled to attempt to buy off Nasir's displeasure over Soviet policy and over Arab Communist opposition to his pretensions to all-Arab leadership. Having kept Nasir dangling for more than three years after the withdrawal of Western pledges of economic assistance for his pet project, the Aswan High Dam, Khrushchev on 23 October, at a Kremlin banquet for Marshal Amir, Nasir's top aide, pledged Soviet support and offered a Soviet credit of $100,000,000 toward the construction costs of the dam's first stage. Moscow previously had been reluctant to become so deeply involved in Nasir's industrialization program while keeping alive Egyptian hopes for more Soviet credits. A rundown of the USSR's economic assistance to Arab countries in the July issue of International Affairs had concluded on a defensive note,

...the positive results of Soviet-Arab relations in recent years and increasing economic and technical cooperation, as well as the existing cultural exchanges between the USSR and the Arab countries, cannot as yet fill all the needs of strengthening the economic independence of the Arab states.... (emphasis added).

A reported disagreement among Soviet leaders as to intrabloc and nonbloc economic programs and priorities led to the ouster in August of Minister of Foreign Trade Kabanov and his replacement by a deputy foreign minister, N. S. Patolichev. Apparently
a decision was made for a considerable increase in Moscow's economic investment in support of long-term foreign policy objectives. Within a matter of days after Khrushchev's Aswan Dam commitment, Moscow agreed to extend a $100,000,000 credit to Argentina for the development of its petroleum industry and concluded its first major economic agreement with Iraq.

Moscow's efforts to give a plausible explanation for its policies and to find patterns in the growing complexity of its relations with the underdeveloped countries, as well as to support current moves, were reflected in the growing volume of Soviet commentary on developments in Asia, Africa, and Latin America directed at all levels of sophistication and for domestic as well as foreign audiences. At mid-year a symposium, Africa South of the Sahara, prepared by the new generation of Soviet Africanists, attempted to update Soviet documentation on the decline of Western influence in British, French, and Belgian Africa. Their mentor, I. I. Potekhin, admitted in an introduction to the work that Soviet Africanists were still ill-equipped to explain specific peculiarities of Western colonial policies in Africa or to interpret many of the phenomena of contemporary African life. In a broad study entitled The Colonial System of Imperialism and Its Decay, S. Tyulp'anov, vice rector of Leningrad University, criticized those who attempted to explain the rise of nationalism and the successes of the independence movements in Asia and Africa in terms of a worsening of economic conditions there in the postwar period; he asserted instead the importance of a "wide circle" of political questions in determining the speed and direction of their development.

In August a monograph On the Historical Experience of Building Socialism in Formerly Backward Countries, by M. S. Dzhunusov, head of the philosophy department of the Kirgiz State University, attempted on the basis of the experience of the Soviet Central Asian Republics, China and Mongolia to explain how far social laws are universal and to what extent special historical, economic, and socio-political circumstances determined steps in their development—all this in the direction of offering guidance to non-Communist former colonies. Dzhunusov emphasized political struggles which go on within national liberation movements over the direction of their course of future development, and in admitting that social revolution may take many forms, he also cited the basic Leninist formulation that "there are not and there cannot be 'purely' peaceful and purely 'forceful'
forms of social revolution"—a point considerably soft-pedaled by Moscow following the 20th party congress.

The major task of interpreting developments in the underdeveloped areas in the face of changing circumstances—"renewed imperialist assaults" and the insidious influence of "revisionism"—was entrusted to Boris Ponomarev, a leading ideologist who was head of the party central committee section dealing with nonbloc parties. Ponomarev's long review of "The International Movement at a New Stage" in Kommunist, released on the eve of the 41st Anniversary, admitted recent losses in Pakistan, Burma, and Thailand as a result of "imperialist-backed plots." Ponomarev attempted to overbalance these reverses with general claims of successes, which he said included the Iraqi coup, the independence of Ghana and Guinea, and the general development of the progressive struggle in Africa and Latin America. Ponomarev's status report at least implicitly charted a more unyielding line for local Communist parties. It alleged there was a changing ideological content of the national liberation movement, a growing recognition by nationalist leaders that "it is impossible to stop half way...or to re-travel the tortuous path which capitalist countries follow." Further, it contained an obvious slap at Nehru, defending the Communist government of Kerala against the "desperate attempts of reactionary forces" to discredit the "Communist experiment," A follow-up survey of the international movement by old Bolshevik Kuusinen in Pravda for 22 November, on the occasion of the first anniversary of the Moscow "Charter of Unity," was, like the Ponomarev article directed against revisionist influences, against going too far in conciliating non-Communist elements in the common struggle against the West. In the face of a growing estrangement between key Asian-African leaders and Moscow, Kuusinen, as had Ponomarev, recited a long list of Communist parties which he claimed had increased in power and influence, and he urged "ideological-political unanimity" among Communists.

Ponomarev's attack on Nehru—Moscow's first serious propaganda backing for the Kerala ministry since it took office in April 1957—was followed up in the December issue of the new bloc journal by Pavel Yudin, a leading Soviet ideologist who at that time was ambassador to China. Yudin presented a 13-page rejoinder to a Nehru article criticizing Communist encouragement of class conflict and the use of violence against opposition elements. The critical tone of Yudin's article
was tempered only by a continuation of the personal flattery Moscow long had lavished on Nehru. Soviet leaders previously had made no move to take issue with Nehru, despite the Indian leader's frequent public statements at variance with Moscow's international line.

Public and private rebuffs at the hands of its principal Asian-African "neutralist" friends—at the Afro-Asian Economic Conference held in Cairo in December the head of the Indonesian delegation challenged Moscow's right to be present, and Arab and Asian delegations combined to limit Moscow's attempt to turn the conference into an anti-Western circus and kept the USSR off the organizing committee—led Soviet spokesmen to devote greater attention to African and Latin American developments in an effort to maintain an aura of optimism around the national liberation movement. It both Africa and Latin America, however, Soviet investment in terms of political, economic, and cultural overtures had so far been insignificant in comparison with its support for such Asian nationalists as Nehru and Sukarno, or of Arab leaders Nasir and Qasim.

Moscow's prompt political, economic, and cultural overtures to the new state of Guinea, following the rupture of that state's political and economic relations with France, were an open encouragement to other members of the French African community to press for more rapid economic and political development. The USSR also was quick to recognize that much of Africa was looking to Accra rather than to Cairo for leadership, and it accordingly lavished great attention on the Nkrumah-sponsored All-African People's Conference, held in Accra concurrent with the Cairo Economic Conference. Moscow's advice to the conferees at Accra—where the Soviet had heavy "observer" and press representation at an African conference for the first time—was repeated in a New Times editorial which was simplicity itself, "Unity—unity within each country fighting the colonialists, and unity of action of all African countries." Soviet propaganda sought to depict this conference as the direct outcome of Bandung, Cairo, and the Accra Conference of Independent African States, intentionally blurring distinctions between governmental and nongovernmental conclaves in line with the USSR's efforts to upgrade the force and validity of international front and similar Communist-influenced or -sponsored popular meetings.
Moscow also probably valued Accra's ties with dissident and exiled nationalist leaders in the remaining colonies. Red Star on 7 December praised the independence movements in a number of the colonies—including Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, the Cameroons, Mauretania, and the Belgian Congo—acknowledged the struggle as having assumed a wide diversity of form, and admitted "varied" success to date. For the moment, Moscow ignored the controversy which surfaced at the conference over the use or repudiation of violence in order to attain nationalist goals.

It remained for the upcoming Soviet party congress to formulate more precisely the limits within which Moscow's attitude toward developments in the nonbloc "East" would evolve. Just prior to the congress, however, a joint conference ostensibly of the "Editorial Boards" of the Soviet journal International Affairs and its Chinese counterpart on the main tendencies of the progressive disintegration of the colonial system of imperialism and on the special features and perspectives of the national-liberation movement of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America summarized prevailing views. Leading Soviet spokesmen—Academician Eugene Zhukov and Professors A. A. Guber and V. Ya. Avarin—reflected Moscow's less optimistic appraisal of trends in nonbloc Asia and Arab states and greater emphasis on the clash of progressive and reactionary social forces within individual countries requiring a more resolute stand against imperialist influences, whatever form they might take. As summarized subsequently in International Affairs, any serious exchange of views at the conference was subordinated to a re-emphasis of common interest and a unity of purpose and program.
VI: THE 21st PARTY CONGRESS AND ITS AFTERMATH: February 1959 - April 1960

The 21st congress of the CPSU, convened in late January and early February in "irregular" or special session to discuss a Seven-Year Plan for the Soviet economy, provided a focus for Moscow's efforts to use the growing economic and military—but primarily economic—development of the USSR for an across-the-board assault on Western positions throughout the world. Second only to the Khrushchev-led strategy of attempting to exploit recent and prospective economic gains for immediate political advantage, especially in the underdeveloped countries, Soviet leaders at the congress continued the process of public re-examination and re-evaluation of Soviet economic and political support for neutralist governments.

The major political thesis of the congress—that in the competition of two world systems the relative decline of the West would soon result in the shift of economic superiority to the bloc, proving not only the greater efficiency of Communist society but also greatly magnifying the Communist voice in world affairs—was underlined by the simple technique of treating medium- and long-range goals on a par with actual achievements. The political aspect of the economic doctrine unfolded by Khrushchev at the congress was tied to two predictions: first, that by the end of the seven-year period more than one half of the world's industrial output would come from the bloc; and second, that within an additional five years the USSR would "occupy first place in the world both in over-all and per capita" production. Both Khrushchev and his principal lieutenants tied the projected economic development of the USSR with an expansion of Moscow's foreign economic activities. Khrushchev reiterated the Soviet commitment to aid the rapid economic development of Asian, African, and Latin American countries on "fair commercial principles," adding the defense "we are not engaged in benevolence." Old Bolshevik Kuusinen, however, relying more heavily on the prospects of the Seven-Year Plan, gave a more liberal formulation harking back in spirit to the utopian internationalism of the early revolutionary period;

It is true that in the history of socialism there was a time when with all good intentions there
simply was nothing to divide. Now this time is past. Having become richer, we have not become misers.... In seven years we will become even richer. This means that not only we ourselves will live better, but our friends too will be better off.

Khrushchev himself spotlighted the difficulties that had arisen in Moscow's political, economic, and military support to selected neutral countries on the basis of a parallelism in certain short-range goals--anti-Westernism--rather than of long-range objectives, by unprecedented public criticism of Nasir, in whose government Moscow had made its greatest material and psychological investment. Taking issue with Nasir's recent jailing of Egyptian and Syrian Communists and with the UAR leader's condemnation of Communist policies in the Middle East as anti-Arab, Khrushchev not only refused to repudiate Arab Communist agitation but avowed Moscow's continued support for "progressive elements." The Soviet leader's open challenge to Nasir was continued and developed by Mukhitdinov, now well established as Khrushchev's top aide on relations with Asian and Arab countries; and by Arab Communist leaders Khalid Bakdash and Ali Yata, whose 21st congress views reflected Moscow's turn away from Nasir. Calling on Nasir not to let differences of "ideological views" interfere with friendly relations, Khrushchev reasserted the primacy of the "common struggle against imperialism," praising Nasir's arch-foe Qasim in the same breath as the UAR leader for their "triumphs over imperialism."

The implication of the Soviet premier's stand was that local Communists were to be encouraged to adopt more dynamic programs, in part to prod nationalist movements into adopting radical or at least bolder reforms and sharpening public opposition to Western economic, political, and cultural influence. At the congress, party secretary and top theoretician Suslov specifically admonished Communists on the need to raise the ideological level of the national-liberation struggle of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. On the other hand, neither Khrushchev nor any other Soviet leader showed any disposition to continue the polemics with Nehru which were initiated the preceding fall, but on the contrary resumed their studied efforts to win his tactical support, glossing over or denying differences of view. At the same time, the Soviet leaders prepared the way for new
attempts to arouse world opinion against what Mukhitdinov labeled "collective colonialism" by asserting the might and unity of the socialist camp on the side of peace and attempting to extend the prospect of "zones of peace" to Asian and Pacific areas. In the general lines of Soviet strategy outlined at the congress, Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders showed Moscow very much aware that the stalemate of Soviet relations with the Western powers facilitated rather than hampered its efforts to exacerbate ideological and political tension between the neutralist and Western camps.

Soviet evaluations of the "historic importance" of the congress stressed the theme of Soviet economic development, which "speeds up the process of the decay of imperialism and facilitates the transition of the peoples of the underdeveloped countries on the path of genuine progress" and of the competition with the West for influencing the course of economic development in the former colonies. A. Arzumanyan, head of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, writing in Kommunist, gave the international significance of the economic proposals discussed at the congress:

The achievement in the USSR of such a volume of production and of such a level of material well-being of the population will immeasurably increase the attraction of the great ideas of Marxism-Leninism. This will conquer millions of new followers for world socialism and will have a great revolutionary influence on the widest popular masses in the industrial but especially in the underdeveloped countries of the capitalist world.

At the congress itself, Mukhitdinov, drawing on both Lenin and prospective Seven-Year Plan achievements, gave greater weight to the real possibilities for underdeveloped countries to move directly from feudalism to socialism--without an intermediate period of "bourgeois capitalist development"--on the model of the transition of the USSR's Central Asian territories, arguing the thesis that material assistance from more economically developed areas made this possible and practicable. It is noteworthy, however, that Khrushchev's concluding speech to the congress made no such claim for Soviet policy and justified Moscow's economic and political support to non-Communist Asian and African governments on the basis of the fact that their conduct showed them "well disposed"
toward the bloc and supporters of peace. The congress resolution specifically endorsed increased trade and "contacts" with the underdeveloped countries, but it was silent on future political or economic investment in neutralist governments.

Developments in the Middle East concurrent with and immediately subsequent to the congress helped to dispel any illusions world Communist leaders might have had that political gains would flow all but automatically from their exaggerated claims of economic and scientific accomplishment. Virulent Arab reaction to Khrushchev's blunt criticism of Nasir apparently exceeded Soviet expectations, and an effort was made to persuade Nasir that the attack was "only" political and not personal.

A sharper setback to Moscow's Middle East pretensions came from Tehran. Encouraged by signs of a changed attitude on the part of the Shah, Moscow increased its economic and political overtures to him and in late January and early February apparently had high hopes of prying Iran at least part way out of the anti-Soviet coalition in the Middle East. The sudden collapse of the negotiations in Tehran and the empty-handed return home on 10 February of the USSR's special mission touched off pained and bitter Soviet public reaction. A Pravda "Observer" article on 14 February and Khrushchev in a 17 February speech at Tula slashed at the Shah's sudden reversal. Khrushchev's further attacks on the "faithlessness" of the Shah and the Iranian Government in a 24 February "electioneering" speech to the voters of the Kalinin District in Moscow carried the polemics with the Shah to extremes, making it obvious that Moscow had given up any near prospects of improving relations with Tehran.

The apparent lesson of this episode was that Moscow's psychological-political pressures on pro-Western states could be switched off, given the prospect of a tactical opening or intensified in frustration. In the violence of its new attacks on the Shah, on his regime, and on the socio-political bases of the Iranian Government, Moscow pointed up the shallowness and tenuousness of the ideological roots of its tactical cooperation with non-Communist governments.

The content and tone of Soviet publications of the period tend to confirm reports from a variety of sources that at private meetings with Asian, African, and Latin American party
representatives, Soviet leaders urged upon local Communist parties a sharper line toward nationalist elements than Khrushchev chose to adopt publicly at the congress. Communist claimed to see the countries of Asia and Africa as entering a new stage, in which progress depended on the "alignment of internal forces" and on the character and direction of domestic programs. A summation of the congress' views on Communist strategy in the underdeveloped areas was presented by party theorist Boris Ponomarev on 6 March in Pravda. Ponomarev presented essentially an activist line hewing closely to Communist orthodoxy, emphasizing that it is incorrect to think that social changes are going to occur automatically in the underdeveloped countries without a class struggle and stressing that in this struggle an ever-greater role is marked out for local Communist parties. Stressing the point advanced by top Soviet spokesman six months earlier—that the young governments of Asia and Africa were at a historic "crossroad"—Ponomarev advised local parties that in the current processes of economic, political, and social change new party and class interests had arisen, and that shifts in class and party strengths within nationalist movements were taking place which called for aligning Communist support for those local elements adopting progressive domestic and foreign programs, namely

full liquidation of the remains of colonialism, growth of national industry, elimination of feudalism, the carrying out of wide-scale agrarian reform, the growth of democracy, a peace-loving foreign policy, and an active struggle against imperialist blocs.

None of these ideas is new, but the current emphasis on Communist support for progressive elements rather than the broader "anti-imperialist" forces represented a further cooling of Moscow's attitude toward non-Communist movements and a marked departure from the synthetic friendliness of the 20th party congress.

Khrushchev's airing of his differences with Nasir at the 21st party congress had resulted in an intensification of press and radio polemics, but it was the revolt on 8 March of a pro-Nasir Iraqi Army Colonel at Mosul which brought to a head political and ideological differences between Moscow and Cairo. Nasir took the lead in public speeches on 11 and 15 March.

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denouncing Communists in the Middle East as agents of a foreign power and as enemies of Arab nationalism. This was too direct a challenge for Moscow to ignore. Khrushchev on 16 March, at a reception for a visiting Soviet economic delegation, surveyed the whole field of Soviet relations with the UAR and with Iraq and the Cairo-Baghdad rivalry, throwing his wholehearted support behind Qasim. Moscow apparently was confident that its considerable economic and military aid to Nasir would work to keep the dispute from seriously harming state-to-state relations; it probably reflected in addition an appraisal that over the past year Nasir's position in the Arab world had deteriorated as the result of the rise of Baghdad and Qasim as a rival center of Arab nationalism, of increasing troubles in Syria, and of setbacks in Tunisia and Sudan to Nasir's efforts to dominate Arab affairs.

On 19 March at a Moscow press conference, Khrushchev expressed the belief that Moscow could continue to have good relations with both the UAR and Iraq, patronizingly referring to Nasir as inexperienced and "hot-headed" and urging Nasir to have patience and end UAR interference in Iraqi affairs. Nasir struck back on 22 March in Damascus with the assertion that in the 1956 attack on Egypt, his country had fought alone against Israel, Britain, and France without "any sign of assistance from any foreign state, including the Soviet Union." Pravda "Observer" attempted to refute this claim, and Khrushchev in a letter to Nasir in April suggested that both sides should tone down their public recriminations. The basic points at issue were left unresolved, however--including the vital question of Soviet and Communist agitation for faster "social progress" in Iraq and the UAR. Moscow appeared content to leave any further move toward conciliation up to Cairo, and Khrushchev on 7 May told the publisher and editor of Indian leftist weekly Blitz, who subsequently talked with Nasir, that "it is up to them to decide--we shall live through it somehow."

The endorsement at the 21st congress of a more active line in the underdeveloped countries was reflected also in signs of a broadening and deepening of Soviet attention to African affairs. The signature on 13 February in Conakry of a Soviet-Guinean trade and payments agreement pointed up the new stage of broad government-to-government relations with individual independent African states, following the general pattern of Soviet overtures to neutralist Asia in the
The immediate post-Bandung era. The March issue of the Institute of Oriental Studies' semipopular journal Contemporary East was devoted almost entirely to African developments, with coverage running the gamut from the cultural accomplishments of African peoples and the mutual advantages of greater contacts between Africans and the bloc to an appraisal of the African movements for immediate independence by top Soviet Africanist I. I. Potekhin. Potekhin's survey brought to a close the period of Soviet public ambiguity on tactics recommended for the African nationalists, attacking those African leaders who would limit the struggle to seeking gradual constitutional reform within the framework and on the basis of the laws created by the colonizers, the path of negotiations, and agreements with the imperialists.

and asserted that African experience had proved the necessity of the use of violence against "imperialists." In March there also appeared in important Institute of Oriental Studies monograph, A. Yu. Shpirt's Africa in the Second World War, which emphasized World War II as a "good political school" for giving character and drive to the struggle of the African peoples for political and economic independence. A greatly expanded coverage of African developments in Soviet journals and the press reflected Soviet aims to harass Western economic relations with Africa, to deny the West military bases throughout Africa and squeeze out those already established, and to build up neutralist, pro-Soviet, and intensely anti-Western sentiment among the African peoples.

Soviet views were not so sanguine on Latin American developments, which since the Soviet-Argentine economic agreements were signed had failed to develop in the direction of increased diplomatic, economic, and cultural contacts with the bloc. Despite heavy propaganda attention to the overthrow of Batista, which it interpreted as popular repudiation of US policy in the area, Moscow adopted a cautious attitude toward the Castro government, while hailing the revolution for freeing democratic forces making possible the rapid transformation of the country along progressive lines. Following Castro's visit to the United States in April, Moscow seemed reassured of the anti-US position of the Cuban Government and the intensity of Castro's antipathy to American economic and political interests. A mid-year survey of liberation
forces in Latin America cited substantial achievements in Venezuela and Chile as well as in Cuba and considered prospects, "despite all the barriers and difficulties," favorable also in Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and Bolivia. Although the claim had been advanced before, there now appeared more substance to Moscow's assertion that Latin America was entering a new stage of its development as an important sector of the world national-liberation struggle.

Moscow-led discussion of Communist strategy in the underdeveloped world continued with the special conference, held in East Germany in May 1959, of bloc theoreticians on the subject of "the national bourgeoisie and the liberation movement". As usual, a major portion of the speakers' remarks, as presented in the bloc journal, represented a concerted attempt to stress the advantages of aid to national bourgeoisie in the struggle against imperialism and the disruption of political and economic ties of the underdeveloped countries with the West. At the same time, emphasis on the instability and indecisiveness of non-Communist leadership and on the divisions of aims and interests of elements comprising the anti-imperialist front suggested greater local Communist attention to the limits of such tactical cooperation and to independent political activity so as not to lose influence over the popular masses and to preserve and improve the chances for its own leadership of the liberation struggle.

A similar view on the prospects of Communism in the underdeveloped countries and of the role of Communists in nationalist movements was reflected in the long-awaited textbook History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which appeared the latter part of June. Prepared collectively by a group of top-level historians headed by Ponomarev, the new party history devoted considerable attention to the problems of Communist organization and agitation under conditions of a capitalist society. The general thesis deducible from the treatment of the Soviet past and of Lenin's classical formulations was on constant struggle which combines legal, semi-legal, and illegal activity and makes use of even the "most reactionary" elements in exploiting nationalist aspirations for self-rule. In summarizing the textbook's import for the Communist world in the bloc journal, Ponomarev justified joint action with non-Communists:

though their understanding of the ways and methods
of struggle differs from that of Communists...the overwhelming majority stand solidly for peace and social progress.

He called for greater vigilance and stepped-up efforts because, as he put it, never before had the forces of reaction waged such an intense and varied struggle against Marxism-Leninism and against Communism.

However, despite the intimations of the fall of 1958, of the 21st party congress and its follow-up, that Communist movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America might withdraw their support for "bourgeois nationalist" movements and move into a new stage--a drive for Communist control against those nationalists who refused Moscow's lead as well as against pro-imperialist and pro-feudal elements--Moscow in mid-1959, under the exigencies of the drive for detente with the West and of unfavorable crosscurrents within the underdeveloped world, again sacrificed an activist line in favor of maintaining friendly government-to-government relations. Events in Iraq touched off by Communist-led riots in Kirkuk and other Iraqi cities in connection with the celebration of the first anniversary of the Iraqi revolution brought about stern countermeasures by Qasim and resulted in a sharp decrease in Iraqi Communist influence both in the government and among the masses. Iraqi Communists, who had been engaged in a bitter intraparty debate on how far to press Qasim for a strong Communist presence in the cabinet and influence in domestic and foreign affairs, found Moscow after the fact supporting their party's minority, which favored continued cooperation with Qasim, and taking to task the militant wing of the party for "irresponsibility."

Friction between the Indian Government and the Communist government of the State of Kerala reached a peak in June and July and posed another serious test of Communist intentions. Although the Communist party of India attempted to rally support for the Kerala government against "acts of hooliganism and violence" inspired by the Congress party and threatened to meet violence in kind, Moscow kept itself apart. When Nehru's central government on 31 July dissolved the Communist ministry and legislature of Kerala on the grounds that it had proven itself unable to maintain public order, Moscow remained passive. In backing away from any stand in support of the Kerala Communist government, Moscow made it obvious that
it valued the friendship and good will of the Indian Government and of Nehru more than it did the prospects of either the Kerala government or the Communist party of India. Moscow sought to minimize the dispiriting effect of such desertion on other Communist parties throughout the world by maintaining silence on the question.

Moscow's greater interest in preparing for high-level negotiations to bring about a relaxation of East-West tensions reinforced the trend toward downgrading party militancy, and Soviet leaders moderated the tones if not the substance of their political and ideological hostility to the West. In singling out Berlin, West German rearmament, disarmament, and detente with the United States as the pressing problems of the day, Moscow did not intend in any way to detract from its long-term program of undermining Western strength and influence in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, but the inescapable result was to reinforce the impression that over the short run Moscow was willing to limit the scope of its assault on Western interests in the hope of gains at the conference table. A world-wide survey of Soviet international relations for the first half of 1959 prepared by six junior editors of the journal NEIR reflected an unusually realistic view of developments at the same time as it toned down the political arrogance and anti-Westernism of Moscow's line without surrendering a point. This and other public commentary in preparation for "another, more realistic Geneva Conference," which Moscow hoped would come out of the exchange of visits with the President, centered on purported changes in the correlation of world forces which had brought about a need to review outstanding international questions in consonance with the new situation.

Assessing current trends from a reasonably detached viewpoint, the authors acknowledged setbacks in Moscow's relations with Arab states and differences within the Arab independence movement. Continued Soviet economic and political support for key Asian states was pledged in order to help them maintain their friendly political neutrality and to stiffen their opposition to the West's anti-Soviet, anti-Communist "penetration" in South and Southeast Asia. The attitude reflected on Latin America was that increased trade and improved economic relations with the bloc offered the most promising road to the erosion of American influence in the area. On Africa, the impression was that Moscow viewed
sub-Saharan developments as subject to unpredictable vicissitudes, but that the general struggle for political and economic independence would multiply the more or less permanent trouble spots for the West and bog down Western assets and prestige. Implicit in this evaluation was reliance on long-term political, economic, and social processes in the underdeveloped countries at least as much as on an expanded bloc-economic, political, and ideological programs for determining the future course of their governments and peoples. Its picture is that of a long drawn-out competition between two social systems for predominance—a situation in which many complex and countervailing influences would be at play, with no simple solution to be expected.

Moscow's considerable tactical flexibility and its ability to seize openings presented was reflected in its cultivation of Ethiopia and its Emperor. The $100,000,000 Soviet loan "for development of industry and agriculture" announced at the close of the Emperor's visit in July was an investment in Soviet respectability and was accompanied by the usual assertions of disinterested motives. Moscow's intention to press on with its economic aid program was pointed up by increased public discussion of the scope and implications of Soviet aid; e.g., an article in International Affairs giving the first comprehensive listing of major Soviet credits to eight underdeveloped countries—totaling over 4.5 billion rubles.

Soviet propaganda and diplomatic preparation for Khrushchev's trip to the United States, epitomized in his article in the American journal Foreign Affairs, prepared for release coincident with his arrival, reflected an optimism and an ill-concealed expectation of concessions from the West. The visit took place amid signs that, in spite of Soviet reaffirmations of opposition to imperialism and colonialism, some pro-Moscow neutrals were concerned that Khrushchev would enter into discussions with the US which might prejudice their interests. Khrushchev's disarmament initiative at the General Assembly was designed to build fires under the alleged Western unwillingness to negotiate seriously on the Soviet proposals. The promise, however illusory, of the release of vastly greater resources by both the bloc and the West for economic assistance to Asia, Africa, and Latin America once the arms race is halted was a transparent bid for the support by the governments and peoples...
of all underdeveloped countries for immediate talks and agreement on disarmament. Although at the previous session of the General Assembly—in the fall of 1958—Moscow had had little success with its proposals for immediate cuts of 10 to 15 percent of arms expenditures, with part of the savings to be used to step up aid to the underdeveloped countries, Khrushchev apparently counted on the prevailing mood for East-West detente; personal emphasis, and the world spotlight he commanded in New York to give great impact to his Declaration of General and Complete Disarmament. The point as to whether Moscow envisaged parallel or joint aid programs was purposely left obscure in an effort to curry support in the broadest possible circles. Kommunist's follow-up of Khrushchev's New York proposal asserted that the Soviet Union "stood and stands for broad international cooperation in the matter of rendering aid to the underdeveloped countries" and held the door open for cooperation, particularly through the UN.

Khrushchev's interim report of 28 September to the Soviet people on the results of his US trip was little more than a folksy account and reassurance as to its success. Following his trip to Peiping for Communist China's tenth anniversary celebrations, Khrushchev, in speeches at Vladivostok and Novosibirsk on 6 and 10 October respectively, emphasized his commitment to securing a high-level settlement with the West at the same time as he showed concern that tactics used to facilitate the negotiations might have a deleterious effect on Communist China. At Vladivostok he attempted to make clear that he was searching for a common ground with Americans only on the question of a firm and lasting peace, and that as far as other questions were concerned, "We do not find common language with American businessmen." At Novosibirsk he again sought to emphasize that he had not gone soft on capitalism and, in terms reminiscent of Shepilov's speech of 12 February 1957, defined peaceful coexistence as "economic, political, and ideological--but not military--struggle."

Khrushchev's report on 31 October to the Supreme Soviet, in addition to being an authoritative review of the international situation, was intended to justify the various moves taken in preparation for and anticipation of an East-West summit meeting and to reassure comrades that he had in mind no concessions to the West on matters of principle. In asserting the wisdom of the course adopted, he emphasized that both sides had taken steps toward a "radical improvement in relations
between the USSR and the US*. Although he cautioned against overoptimism and cited the continued influence of reactionary elements, he conceded that the West had given proof of its conciliatory intentions. His central thesis was that "realism" demands a closer attention to changes which have been brought about not only by the growing might and international influence of the Soviet Union and of the bloc, but also by the greater role now played by former colonies, by non-Communist governments everywhere which are vitally concerned with the preservation of peace and the prevention of war, and by peace-loving forces within the major capitalist countries themselves who want the cold war liquidated and oppose measures leading up to a new war.

At the same time, Khrushchev's speech reflected Moscow's marked willingness to moderate its tactics in the struggle with the West for influence in the underdeveloped world in order to promote great power settlement. Soviet interest in not ruffling the surface calm in East-West relations—the "new international atmosphere" claimed as a result of Khrushchev's American trip—was reflected in his deliberately playing down the problem of Laos, which had attracted heavy and vitriolic Soviet comment since Communist-led elements in that country had reverted to guerrilla warfare in mid-July after a year and a half of legal political action. Asserting that the fault was SEATO's and that "a wise approach and observance of international agreements" would lead to the normalization of the situation, he concluded that more noise had been raised in the world about Laos than the situation justified.

Khrushchev's overriding concern with an early-East-West summit meeting was pointed up even more clearly in his moderation of the Soviet line on Algeria. Despite a public commitment to independence for Algeria, regular and occasionally intense propaganda support for the Algerian rebels, and token material aid for Algerian refugees and casualties—not to mention sporadic clandestine shipments of arms by East European countries—Moscow's Algerian policy long had toughened or softened in line with prospects of closer relations with Paris. Soviet efforts to exploit public differences between President de Gaulle and other Western leaders on NATO policy and on such other top issues as disarmament and the desirability of top-level talks with Moscow reflected a higher priority for direct East-West issues than for intensifying
the anticolonial struggle. Citing the "close historic ties between France and Algeria," Khrushchev, drawing the French Communist party along behind him, asserted that de Gaulle's proposals of 16 September for a plebiscite on the future status of Algeria, if followed up, offered the possibility of ending hostilities there.

Kommunist in a feature article in November took up the matter of defining the limits of peaceful coexistence for the benefit of world parties. Asserting that no matter how vital intergovernmental relations are, they do not exhaust the field, the article restricted compromise to a narrow diplomatic field. In defending the permanence and unchangeability of Communist doctrine, Kommunist also reiterated the position that no middle ground exists or can exist between bourgeois and proletarian world outlooks.

The newly released textbook The Foundations of Marxism-Leninism, prepared by a group of party theorists headed by presidium member Kuusinen, was being discussed in the Soviet press and party study groups. It too, reflected Moscow's persistent problem of harnessing revolutionary enthusiasm to the current requirements of Soviet foreign policy. Kommunist's December review of this new guidebook emphasized the complexity and variability of contemporary circumstances leading to a necessary flexibility in Communist tactics and stated that

the task of the revolutionary proletariat and its Marxist parties consists in mastering all forms and means of struggle and knowing how to apply them correctly, in accord with the concrete situation.

Moscow's efforts to press forward with a program of large-scale economic assistance to selected countries was pointed up by the announcement in July of its willingness to extend an additional credit of $375,000,000 to India—confirmed in September—to help finance New Delhi's Third Five-Year Plan. This commitment moved India well ahead of the UAR as the principal recipient of Soviet aid and was intended to protect Moscow's political and economic interest and investment in a friendly neutralist India, to keep New Delhi from backsliding as a result of its desperate requirement for large-scale economic assistance, and to dissociate itself from Chinese
attacks on the Indian Government. Moscow's offer in August of a $35,000,000 long-term, low-interest economic development credit to Guinea indicated the USSR's intention to follow up the flood of economic and cultural contacts it had initiated with Conakry following the latter's October 1958 independence with economic aid out of all proportion to Guinea's size but in line with its new importance as a focus of extremist anti-Western African nationalist sentiment. The lavish reception Moscow gave visiting Guinean President Toure in November underlined the Soviet Union's interest in making Soviet-Guinean relations a model for the newly arising African states.

In a somewhat different vein, the visit of First Deputy Premier Mikoyan to Mexico City in November in connection with the opening of the Soviet industrial exhibition highlighted a new stage in Soviet efforts to exploit Latin American economic difficulties in the interest of expanding trade and other ties with the bloc. Although Mikoyan had long figured as Moscow's top trade expert, his public and private remarks in Mexico were directed as much against political as economic aspects of "colonialism"—US influence in Latin America. His attacks on the policies and activities of the United States and of US firms in Latin America were combined with the reiteration of Soviet interest in increased trade and willingness to extend—"without strings"—development credits to Mexico and other Latin American countries.

Although Mikoyan's visit had little apparent effect on Mexico's economic policies and his attempts to interest Mexican government and business circles in Soviet development credits were turned aside, he nevertheless succeeded in focusing Latin American attention on increased economic relations with the bloc as a way out of the Latin American economic impasse and as a licit means of reducing the predominant role of US economic interests. A more positive response to Soviet overtures was the visit to the USSR of a Brazilian trade mission—for which Moscow had been angling for two years—which resulted in the signing on 9 December of a trade agreement, the first between the two countries, calling for greatly stepped-up exchanges of goods.

Moscow's changing line on Latin America was reflected in an outburst of publications appearing in the latter part of 1959. The general line presented by V. Levin in International Affairs was of a new stage arising in Latin America's
liberation struggle as the result of the overthrow of dictatorships in Cuba, Colombia, and Venezuela and of proletarian-led antifeudal and anti-imperialist agitation in other countries. On 1 December a semipopular treatment of the Cuban revolution by K. M. Obyden appeared—a press run of 35,000 copies indicated that it was intended for a wide Soviet audience—which not only claimed an important role for Cuban Communists in the overthrow of Batista but also warmly supported the domestic and international program of Castro's government and hailed his revolt as the first in Latin America to drive the "capitalist classes, allied with the United States," from power. Soviet historian N. N. Bolkhovitinov presented, under the pretext of a scholarly study of the Monroe Doctrine for the Institute of International Relations, an attack on US policies past and present in Latin America.

The most impressive survey of Latin American political and economic developments in the post-Stalin period appeared in early December in the form of a symposium, The Problems of Contemporary Latin America, under the auspices of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations. The gist of the argument was that the immediate goal of the Latin American independence movement was the attainment of economic independence from US domination—to be achieved through the development of national industry, the nationalization of local holdings of US "monopolies," legislation protecting local industry from deleterious practices of foreign capitalist trading companies, the development of trade with the bloc, and radical and thorough-going land reform to eliminate the last vestiges of feudalism. At the same time, Latin American efforts at economic and political cooperation were derided. Communist parties were urged to work for these goals through common action with non-Communist groups and particularly through labor agitation. Although it was admitted that the independence struggle in Latin America was at varying stages in the different countries and that it was being carried out in a variety of forms, the conclusion was drawn that Latin America had entered the "final period" in its long struggle for full and complete independence.

Mikoyan's visit to Cuba in February 1960 pointed up Moscow's optimistic appraisal of Castro's anti-Americanism (allied with the growing strength of local Communists) as a means for expanding Soviet influence throughout Latin America. The $100,000,000 Soviet loan announced on 12 February and the associated
economic agreements have catapulted Moscow into the role of a principal trading partner and close cooperator in the economic development of Cuba over the next decade and more. At the same time they showed the Soviet Union willing to risk a deterioration of relations with the United States in order to take advantage of an opportunity to improve its relations with Cuba—only weeks before the scheduled summit meeting.

On 11 February, just after a conference in Moscow of the eight Warsaw Pact powers had approved his stewardship of bloc interests and endorsed in advance his position in the expected summit conference with Western leaders Khrushchev began a three-week tour of India, Burma, Indonesia, and Afghanistan. This visit, on the heels of high Soviet officials, suggests that he felt that the weight of his own personal diplomacy was necessary, in the "Leninist style in diplomacy...addressing himself to broad popular masses in other countries," in order to offset the sharp decline in bloc and local Communist popularity resulting from the Tibetan troubles, Sino-Indian border friction, Peiping's attacks on measures taken by the Indonesian Government against resident Chinese, and the popular enthusiasm for the US made evident on President Eisenhower's recent visit to India and Afghanistan. Khrushchev's less than triumphal tour featured a heavy stress on bloc economic competition with the West in aiding Asian nations along the path to economic independence. Offering Soviet material and moral support, which he backed up by a rundown of Soviet assistance already rendered Asian governments, he kept up a heavyhanded attack on Western motives and Western economic practices in dealing with the peoples of the area. In a speech to the Indian Parliament on 11 February, Khrushchev cited "UN experts" as having calculated the annual investment needs of the underdeveloped countries as $14 billion and

*Soviet concern lest it be identified publicly with Castro's blatant anti-Americanism may have slowed Moscow's overtures to Havana. The review of international relations for the second half of 1959, prepared by a group of editors of the journal WEIR, omitted a section on Latin America—and tropical Africa—although both the preceding and subsequent semiannual roundups contained lengthy sections extremely critical of Western, and especially US, policy in these areas.
asserted that if full and general disarmament were achieved, it would be an easy matter for the great powers to set aside fifteen and even twenty billion dollars from the hundred billion dollars saved in order to solve the universal historic task of preserving hundreds of millions of people from hunger and poverty.

In Calcutta on 15 February he reiterated Soviet reluctance to participate jointly with the West in economic assistance programs, insisting that "if aid is to be rendered, we will render it ourselves." No new Soviet economic aid was announced during the Indian portion of the trip, although announcement was made of agreement specifying the uses to which India would put part of the $375,000,000 credit for its Third Five-Year Plan announced some months earlier.

The principal economic highlight of the Khrushchev junket was Indonesia's acceptance of a $250,000,000 loan for development purposes which apparently included provision for additional arms and equipment for the Indonesian armed forces. Khrushchev's heavy homage to Sukarno followed along the lines of Soviet commentary, which not only supported his anti-Western international and domestic measures but also ostentatiously supported the Sukarno-proclaimed "guided democracy." Strong public support for Djakarta's military struggle against rebel forces on Sumatra and Celebes and continued backing for Indonesian claims to West Irian more than offset any losses Moscow may have suffered as a result of Indonesia's quarrel with Communist China over restrictions Djakarta imposed on the Chinese business community in Indonesia. Khrushchev's 22 February announcement that Moscow had decided to establish a "Peoples' Friendship University" was intended to impress on Asians the importance with which Moscow viewed cultural and technical exchanges, and it foreshadowed greatly stepped-up efforts to expand people-to-people contacts. Khrushchev's repeated assertion that China, India, and Indonesia should take part in future great power conferences repeated a hoary Soviet tactic which nevertheless received a heavy favorable response in Asia. His reiteration at Kabul of Soviet support for Afghanistan's claims to "Pushtoonistan," like his earlier backing of Indonesia's claims to West Irian, openly encouraged parochial Asian nationalist sentiment.
Khrushchev's own summary of the significance of his trip again centered on the growing importance of the new countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. He emphasized that it was in the Soviet interest to help these countries become stronger both politically and economically, not only by the continued and increased extension of credits to friendly governments but also by limited grants of material and technical aid, as announced on his visit to Burma and Afghanistan. Khrushchev made it clear that what he had in mind was political and economic assistance to friendly underdeveloped countries so as to stiffen their resistance to Western policies—to colonialism "however disguised." Although Khrushchev again lauded Nehru and Moscow's official line continued to avoid criticism of neutralist leaders and governments, a public lecture on 16 March in Moscow, attended by a Western observer, was more candid in general disapproval of all bourgeois nationalist leaders with the signal exception of Guinea's Sekou Toure. Moscow's endorsement of Guinea's policies was made clear in the publicity it directed at the Second Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference held in Conakry from 11 to 17 April. A Pravda editorial on 15 April cited Guinea as a "brilliant example" and a model for the peoples of Africa in how to attain and use their independence.

Khrushchev's trip to France from 23 March to 3 April took place in a pre-summit atmosphere, with the Soviet leader's remarks attuned to the suggestion that cooperation between the Soviet Union and France was possible on terms which would result in a greatly enhanced French role in European affairs. Khrushchev's remarks at the Diplomatic Press Association luncheon on 25 March that Moscow stood wholeheartedly behind de Gaulle's proposals for self-determination—an attitude not overwhelmingly reflected in the Soviet press over the preceding months—typified his efforts to allege a harmony of Soviet and French interests. At a press conference on 31 March, Khrushchev refused to discuss the question of Algeria. He also was noncommittal concerning an arms ban to Africa and joint economic aid to the underdeveloped countries known to be favored by de Gaulle. He asserted Soviet willingness to cooperate in rendering economic assistance, but he linked such a possibility to "agreement on disarmament" and rejected the suggestion that all such aid should be under UN auspices, alleging that "such a restriction would inflict great harm to those countries needing assistance." There was no mention of Soviet-French agreement on events in
the underdeveloped areas in the communique issued at the close of the visit, in Khrushchev's speech on his return to Moscow, or in the 6 April Pravda editorial summing up the results of the "historic visit." On the other hand, points of open disagreement were carefully skirted.

Unlike Khrushchev's visit to France, Mikoyan's visit to Iraq in April was keyed to more modest limits—an assessment of Qasim and of the prospects of Moscow's heavy political and economic investment in the Iraqi regime. Mikoyan's 15 April press conference statement that Moscow's failure to recognize the Algerian government-in-exile was done in the latter's interest pointed up the Soviet Union's predicament in attempting to maintain a moderate stand vis-a-vis Paris and at the same time assure the Arabs, and Asian-Africans in general, of the genuineness of support for the most active of the current national liberation struggles. The visit also called attention to growing coolness between Soviet officials and Qasim and Baghdad's increasingly hostile attitude toward Iraqi Communists. No communique was issued at the conclusion of Mikoyan's "unofficial" visit, and both country's press accounts were merely polite. Shortly afterward, however, it was announced that Iraq had accepted a new Soviet credit for modernization of the Basra-Baghdad railroad.

The USSR's further investment in Iraq—in the face of signs of a limited rapprochement of Qasim with the West and of stiffer measures by the Baghdad Government against local leftists—pointed up Moscow's apparent belief that close economic relations with the new Asian and African nations—especially in the case of Iraq, the UAR, and a select few other countries—in combination with its considerable military assistance program would prove decisive over the long term in determining the direction of their policies. The January announcement that the UAR had accepted a long-term Soviet credit for completing the Aswan High Dam, for which construction had just begun, can be viewed as a major propaganda triumph for Moscow.

Despite a willingness to tone down its general hostility to the West, as demonstrated on Khrushchev's American tour and in Moscow's assertion of the importance of the "spirit of Camp David," the Soviet Union's version of "peaceful competitive coexistence" with Western economic interests in the
underdeveloped countries revealed a willingness to employ harsher tactics on an official level. Mikoyan's speeches in Mexico, Cuba, and Iraq exemplified the tenor of Moscow's attacks on "foreign" capitalist influences, as did his recommendation that Latin Americans---presented in an address to Mexican businessmen---expropriate foreign holdings without compensation as a means of recovering some of the value looted from their economy by foreign "monopolies." In his speech to the Supreme Soviet on 14 January, Khrushchev also asserted that the West had an obligation to repay to the colonies and former colonies a part of the riches stolen from them; he repeated this line in his 25 January message to the All-African People's Conference at Tunis. Similarly, Mikoyan's Cuban and Iraqi speeches featured sharp attacks on Western trade and investment policy in the underdeveloped countries.

By this time it had become a standard feature for Moscow to emphasize in general terms the magnitude of Soviet foreign assistance and its role as a prime motive force in international relations. Soviet First Deputy Premier Kosygin, in his 26 October report to the Supreme Soviet on the state development plan for 1960, had stated that in the coming year Moscow would render technical assistance---and in some cases financing---in building 288 industrial projects in bloc countries and 95 in underdeveloped countries. A widely circulated survey of Soviet foreign economic operations and their political significance, The Competition of the Two Systems and the Underdeveloped Countries by A. S. Kodachenko, signed to the press on 29 February, emphasized the broad dimensions of Soviet aid in unusually concrete terms. The 1.5 billion ruble credit to India for financing the Third Five Year Plan was highlighted as the largest credit ever extended by the Soviet Union to a nonbloc country, and the influential role of Soviet assistance in certain of the underdeveloped countries was pointed up by the assertion that Soviet financial assistance to the OAR covered 50 percent of total OAR expenditures for development projects and by the allegation that Soviet credits to Afghanistan comprised 70 percent of that country's total foreign developmental assistance.

Kommunist's pre-summit surveys of developments in the non-Soviet "East," as well as the flood of publications on Lenin as a prophet on oriental developments in connection with Lenin 90th anniversary celebrations, gave heavy emphasis on the scope and intensity of political and social ferment...
in Asia, Africa, and Latin America and to the direction of their future development. Soviet publicist K. Ivanov, emphasizing the zigzag nature of events in these areas and characterizing the current path of the liberation struggle as "an extremely complex and confused labyrinth," evaluated developments as effectively anticapitalist, though admittedly not socialist. Kommunist editor in chief F. Konstantinov minimized the importance of the "will and desires of the various peoples and governments" of the underdeveloped countries in determining their future, asserting as more important a standard reference to objective economic laws and "the course of the competition of the two world systems"—the interplay of Soviet and Western policies and programs in the area.

A collection of articles on Lenin as the precursor of Moscow's current line—Lenin and the East, edited by Gafurov and released in mid-April under the joint auspices of the Institutes of Oriental Studies and of Sinology—was attuned to the struggle of Asian peoples to avoid the burdensome path of capitalist evolution and to proceed more directly to building a higher social order with the advice and assistance of the Soviet Union. The interim and transitional nature of the present political and social structures of the Asian, African, and Latin American states depicted in Soviet literature was not, however, reflected by any diminution in Moscow's willingness to commit itself to short- and medium-term cooperation with existing non-Communist governments; given the current stage in relations between the two camps.
VII. POST-SUMMIT PROSPECTS OF STIFFER ANTICOLONIAL LINE: May - October 1960

Khrushchev's disruption of the Paris talks, apparently in reaction to the U-2 incident and the dimming of prospects for Western concessions on any of the major outstanding international issues, prompted a major effort by Soviet spokesmen to absolve the USSR of any blame and to convince the world public that the United States alone was responsible. Claiming that the talks failed because aggressive militarists in the West feared the consequences of serious East-West talks, Moscow alleged that while the Soviet Union had prepared for the conference by adopting concrete measures to improve the international atmosphere and by working out "important proposals" for presentation at Paris, the United States had taken steps intended to make negotiations impossible. Moscow's vociferous attacks on the U-2 overflights as "outrageous" international behavior were designed in part to minimize adverse world reaction to Khrushchev's tactics at Paris and to divert attention from the collapse of its pre-Paris line. Despite the publicized vituperation over the U-2, Soviet officials publicly and privately asserted that if the West did not engage in further "provocations," Moscow would do nothing to disturb the international situation. Nevertheless, with East-West talks not expected soon, Moscow's international posture noticeably stiffened.

The USSR's initial utilization of the U-2 incident to press the US' allies to remove American bases from their territories was unsubtle and violent, in the apparent belief that now as never before the allies were vulnerable to popular neutralist sentiment. Khrushchev warned that "we shall hit at those bases" from which any future flight comes. This warning was repeated in less precise language in the Soviet protest notes of 13 May to Norway, Pakistan, and Turkey threatening "proper retaliatory measures" in the event of a future intrusion of Soviet air space. Moscow's month-long effort to scare peoples in the affected countries to demand that their governments take measures to prevent future flights and that American troops be withdrawn reached a peak with Marshal Malinovsky's statement on 30 May of his order to the commander of Soviet rocket forces that in the event of a future violation of bloc air space, he should strike at the base from which the intruder came; further Khrushchev.
asserted in a press conference on 3 June that Malinovsky's warning should be understood "literally." In the absence of any apparent success, this campaign was allowed to taper off but was later revived briefly. In a letter to British Prime Minister Macmillan in early August, Khrushchev reaffirmed the validity of Malinovsky's instructions, but by this time the gambit had taken on a pro forma aspect.

On 28 May, at a labor conference in Moscow Khrushchev reported on the summit breakdown. He assured the assembled "leading workers" from all over the Soviet Union that Soviet policy, as before, would be directed toward reaching an accommodation with the West. At the same time, however, he predicted that "more surprises were in store for American imperialists" in colonial and formerly colonial areas. The mission of Soviet First Deputy Premier Kosygin to Buenos Aires in late May in connection with the 150th anniversary of Argentina's "May Revolution" attempted to duplicate Mikoyan's anti-US feats in Mexico and Cuba. Kosygin apparently had less success, as the Frondizi government was cool toward his delegation. Nevertheless, a protocol broadening the uses Argentina could make of the Soviet-Argentine economic agreement of October 1958--originally for petroleum equipment--was signed at this time.

Soviet publicists initiated a campaign to acclaim the 1810 Argentine revolution and subsequent Latin American revolutions as part of the world national-liberation movement. The journal Modern and Contemporary History featured articles on these "progressive forces" of 150 years ago, "the direct antecedents of today's patriots," and included a comprehensive bibliography of Soviet monographs, pamphlets, and articles on Latin America published in the Soviet Union since 1945--a scant 70 items, including translations and essays published in Soviet provincial journals over the 15-year period. While these developments implied only a broader Soviet interest, Khrushchev's 28 May acclaim of Fidel Castro as a "fiery patriot" was the public signal of a newly initiated phase of Soviet-Cuban relations.

Since Mikoyan's visit to Havana in February 1960, the Castro government had shown itself willing to expand economic relations with Moscow and the bloc as a whole and, if anything, appeared to be forcing the pace of closer economic and political cooperation. With the breakdown of the Paris
talks, Moscow apparently decided that the advantages of a Moscow-oriented Cuba in intensifying the anti-US line throughout Latin America were worth considerable political and economic risks. Released, at least for a short period, from inhibitions stemming from its efforts to prepare the way for negotiations with the US, Moscow adopted an unprecedented activist line with respect to a Latin American country. In taking this step, Moscow apparently was encouraged both by the steady drift to the left in Castro's domestic and international policies and by the increase in influence and respectability of the Cuban Communist party. Increasing cooperation between the two countries was reflected in the announcement in Moscow on 17 June by Nunez Jimenez, director of the Cuban Institute of Agrarian Reform, that oil-sugar exchanges were being stepped up "at the request of the Cuban Government" and that Khrushchev had agreed to an early exchange of visits with Castro. Moscow's unannounced decision--apparently made in late May--to accede to Havana's request to purchase arms no longer available to it from Western sources sealed the rapprochement. Moscow and Havana tested US reaction first with a commercial transaction involving a handful of helicopters and then, in a rapid series of steps, concluded an agreement for and began the implementation of a major program of Soviet military aid and training.

In a speech to a teachers' conference in Moscow on 9 July, Khrushchev threatened to use rockets against the US if the "Pentagon" intervened in Cuba. This was a crude and synthetic attempt to create for himself the role of "protector" of the Cuban revolution. It also went well beyond the bounds of Moscow's standard tactical exploitation of ready-made opportunities to widen the breach between the US and governments of the underdeveloped countries and, as it was patently a bluff, reflected the USSR's conviction that there was little likelihood of US intervention. Moscow's diplomatic and propaganda follow-up was in much less direct terms, suggesting that the principal purpose of the gambit was to impress on the non-Communist Latin American public the daring and might of the USSR without committing the Soviet Government to any particular line of action in defense of Castro. Khrushchev's press conference statement of 12 July supporting Havana reflected a rapid transition back to generalized political and economic support and away from his rocket threat, although he maintained his activist role with
a thinly veiled suggestion that the Cuban people sometime "will muster enough courage" to ask return of the Guantanamo base.

Khrushchev's denial that Communists controlled the Castro government or the Cuban revolution and his assertion that if they had, "the Cuban revolution would have proceeded differently" in no way detracted from the public image of close harmony between the two governments. Subsequent heavy Soviet attention to Cuba centered on allegations of US economic and political aggression not only against Cuba but throughout Latin America. The joint communiqué marking Raul Castro's visit to Moscow in mid-July not only publicly affirmed but also gave an added solemn note to the new relationship of the two governments.

Elements of a stronger tone in Soviet policy were also present in East-West relations--Moscow's harsh line in breaking up the disarmament conference and its treatment of the RB-47 incident--and in its exploitation of the Congo situation. The Kremlin's early exploitation of the Congo disorders pointed up the heavy propaganda attention and more restrained official exploitation of anticolonialism which had become standard Soviet practice. Moscow had followed the progress of Belgian-Congolese independence talks from their beginning and endorsed the upsurge of agitation and sentiment for freedom. Moscow's general views on the Congo as it approached independence were summarized in a monograph by V. A. Martynov, one of the younger generation of Soviet experts on Africa, in "The Congo Under the Yoke of Imperialism," signed to the press on 26 November 1959, and in an authoritative essay by senior Soviet Africanist I. I. Potekhin, "Characteristic Features of the Disintegration of the Colonial System of Imperialism in Africa," published in Problems of Oriental Studies in February 1960. The gist of their analyses was that the transition of the African peoples to political independence would be fairly rapid, though not uniform. Further, varied transitional political and social forms would appear which, although differing from those Moscow would propose if its voice were decisive, would nevertheless lead to the rapid disintegration of Western political, economic, and ideological influence, and so should be encouraged. A three-man Soviet delegation arrived in Leopoldville for the Congolese independence festivities on 30 June and negotiated agreements leading to the establishment of diplomatic and cultural relations. Such promptness had long since become routine.
Moscow quickly seized on the riots and mutinies and the Belgian reaction they precipitated as a windfall which could be exploited against the major Western powers not only in the Congo but throughout all Africa. Khrushchev's charge, in a press conference on 12 July, that the NATO powers were using the "pretext of alleged disorder" to reimpose their colonial domination—a charge seconded by a strongly worded government statement on the next day—took off a many-sided propaganda campaign to harass Western interests and intensify tensions between Africans and the West. On 15 July Khrushchev pledged, in response to a message from Kasavubu and Lumumba, to support the Congolese leaders and hinted at unilateral Soviet aid. His promise of "resolute measures to suppress the aggression" was put into action within a matter of days when a dramatic shipment of relief supplies and technicians was airlifted to the Congo. At the same time, Moscow encouraged the Congo Government to appeal to the UN and voted in favor of the resolution calling for the withdrawal of Belgian troops and the authorization of a UN force for the Congo. As the crisis worsened, Moscow's attitude toward the UN stiffened, and Soviet spokesmen moved from criticism of UN officers for not moving more promptly to enforce Belgian and Katangan compliance with the Security Council resolution of 14 July to open attacks on the UN for having improperly gone over to support of the colonialists.

A third feature of Soviet exploitation of the crisis was its effort to establish its own presence in the Congo through political and economic support of the Lumumba-controlled elements in the Congolese Government. Taking advantage of the political isolation and lack of finances and of the administrative chaos in the Leopoldville government, Soviet officials began a freewheeling effort to build up pro-Moscow sentiment in government and public circles by rushing in relief supplies, technicians, and advisers, and promising almost unlimited economic aid. The unrestrained efforts of the newly arrived Soviet diplomatic mission to discredit the UN's role in the crisis and encourage the Leopoldville government to open resistance to the UN's demands were typical of Moscow's unsubtle tactics. The forceful role of the Soviet ambassador, Mikhail Yakovlev, was confirmed by documents released by the Congolese Government after the fall of Lumumba. This phase of Moscow's attempt to implant its influence came to an abrupt end on 15 September when Mobutu ordered all Soviet and bloc diplomats and technicians out of the Congo.
Soviet spokesmen failed to comment on the collapse of the USSR's Congo gambit on the heels of the decline of Lumumba's influence. Moscow found that it had insufficient resources to go it alone, and anti-Western African governments, respecting the considerable strength and prestige of the UN, proved not as resolute in following Moscow's lead as the Soviet Union might have wished. Among other things, Moscow's aborted experiment showed up its poor understanding and lack of skill in dealing with African sensibilities.

Parallel to the development of Moscow's anti-imperialism campaign in Cuba and the Congo, greater attention was devoted after the breakup of the Paris summit meeting to the question of the correct Communist attitude toward efforts by underdeveloped capitalist countries to solve political and economic problems and of tactics and ideological lines to follow in winning over their governments and peoples to close cooperation with the bloc. (Communist strategy toward the underdeveloped countries has become a focus of Moscow-Beiping rivalry, thus taking on a new urgency. As this aspect is discussed in detail in current KSAU series studies, the present paper makes no attempt to relate Soviet policies and attitudes and guidance to local Communist parties to the Sino-Soviet polemics.) Although Moscow adopted a harsher line against Western governments and against capitalism, it took pains to reassure Western powers that the way to negotiation was still open on its former terms. Moreover, its guidelines for Communist parties in the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, insofar as they can be approximated, emphasized that there should be no relaxation of efforts to cooperate locally with as many non-Communist elements as possible in a general effort to reduce Western influence and to reinforce tendencies toward parochial nationalism.

Moscow's post-summit attitude was appropriately summarized in a long article in Sovetskaya Rossiya on 10 June reviewing the expanding role of local Communist parties in the underdeveloped countries. The survey specifically warned against "rushing ahead, putting forward premature slogans of Socialist reforms where conditions are not ripe." It emphasized the "instructive example" for parties of "the East and Latin America" of the Iraqi party's serious miscalculation in mid-1959 when its demands for participation in the Qasim government led to a split with Qasim's nationalist
Arab forces and repressive measures against the party by the government. Moscow apparently was concerned over signs of dissatisfaction in some parties with its subordination of the struggle against class enemies to the tactical dictates of carrying out a world-wide anti-imperialist policy, and by the possibility that under urging from Peiping, some local parties would again resort to their inherent propensity for heating up the attack on class enemies, thus interfering with the delicate skein of Soviet diplomacy. Even those Communists not drawn into the intra- and inter-party polemics could not fail to be impressed by Moscow’s unequivocal reiteration of its position on 12 August, in a Pravda article by party ideologist Boris Ponomarev, and on 26 August by the dean of Soviet specialists on national-liberation movements, Academician Eugene Zhukov. Other Soviet programmatic statements likewise spotlighted the cold war aspects of these movements. Soviet African specialist S. Datlin, writing in Kommunist in August, hailed the struggle between colonialism and the national-liberation movement in Africa as "a great historical battle...which has far transcended the boundaries of the African continent, with now almost the entire world taking part in it either directly or indirectly."

Moscow's "peace" line was eclipsed in May by the first phase of its strident attacks on the West for making the summit talks impossible and its allegations that Western "provocations" undermined the very basis of international relations. With the new Soviet disarmament proposals of 2 June, Moscow began a new campaign to enlist support in the underdeveloped countries for its position on disarmament. Again Moscow linked disarmament to prospects of vastly increased outside aid for economic development in Asia, Africa, and Latin America; in the authoritative Journal International Affairs, A. Kodachenko presented a "tentative" figure of $50 billion a year which,

...it can confidently be said, general and complete disarmament [would release] for financing the economic progress of the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

The figure mentioned by Kodachenko does not bear up under analysis, but it is interesting as a reflection of the lengths to which Moscow has gone to build illusory and unrealistic expectations of rapid economic development, to assert that
not economic but political factors stand in the way of a five-fold increase in foreign assistance, and to point to sources of added capital—the elimination of military expenditures on the part of underdeveloped countries, the use of current foreign military aid for peaceful constructive purposes, greater trade receipts, and profits of $15 billion annually—which Kodachenko alleges flow out of the underdeveloped countries—in addition to increased foreign assistance made possible by disarmament of the major powers. Soviet propagandists also used the line that "unequal exchange is a weapon of colonialism," citing spurious figures of Soviet economist A. A. Santalov as evidence that colonies and former colonies lose approximately $9 billion a year from "unequivalent" exchange—unfavorable terms of trade—with Western powers.

Moscow did not rely on these suspicious statistics alone. A joint session of the editors of International Affairs and the "Scientific Council" of the party's Academy of Social Sciences which was devoted to "The Two Socio-Economic Systems in the World Arena" emphasized Soviet and bloc production achievements in the race to overtake the US economically as having the greatest significance for determining the course of world affairs. With his usual flare, Khrushchev asserted in Bucharest on 21 June that bloc economic advances, "like a multistage rocket, will certainly lead the people of the whole world into the orbit of communism."

The eight-day XXVth International Congress of Orientalists, held in Moscow in August, brought together almost 2,000 delegates from 60 countries—with the conspicuous absence of a single delegate from China, although the Soviet press some months earlier had predicted a Chinese delegation in the hundreds. This meeting was a prime example of Soviet manipulation of a respected, scholarly, international organization to support its current policies and to discredit the West politically, economically, and ideologically in the underdeveloped "East." Soviet First Deputy Premier Mikoyan's official greeting to the congress, and the opening and closing speeches of Moscow's top orientalist-administrator, Gafurov, reiterated Moscow's dedication to liquidating "as soon as possible" the remains of colonialism. Moscow's "unselfish" economic and moral support and the "priceless" Soviet experience in developing its Central Asian republics—some Asian and African participants were escorted through these areas after

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the congress—were, emphasized in support of efforts to impress visitors from the underdeveloped countries with the validity of Marxist-Leninist interpretation of current developments and with the practical aim of Soviet policy—to help backward peoples become politically, economically, and ideologically free from Western influence. Although the congress revealed no new tack in Soviet policy in Asia and Africa, it underscored Moscow's preoccupation with increasing the political and psychological gap between the Western powers and their colonies and former colonies, as well as the scope of Soviet interest and the resources behind Moscow's anticolonial campaign.

Khrushchev's performance at the 15th General Assembly session in New York, where he gained for himself an unprecedented audience of world leaders and held the world spotlight for weeks, was to a great extent pointed toward impressing on the world public—especially the peoples and governments of the underdeveloped countries—the high priority of the task of putting an end to colonialism. While Khrushchev managed to keep the idea of a summit meeting at the forefront of world public opinion, and while Soviet policy continued to create conditions making an early meeting between Soviet and American leaders imperative, the weight of the Soviet premier's official and personal diplomacy was in the direction of influencing the countries of non-bloc Asia, Africa, and Latin America, singly and in concert, to a heightened assault on colonialism. Khrushchev's demands for an immediate end to the remaining vestiges of imperial rule over alien peoples dramatized a stand long implicit in Moscow's foreign relations and, of course, explicit in world Communist agitation. He managed to give the appeal to popular opinion an unusual degree of vividness and of urgency, reinforcing it by gestures of personal and political friendship to neutralist and nationalist leaders.

Radiating from Khrushchev's official and unofficial conduct and the Soviet delegation's maneuvers at the assembly was a fundamental effort to impress on the leaders of the governments of Asia, Africa, and Latin America that in the 15 years since the end of the war there had been a major change in the balance of world power which had not yet been reflected proportionately in either the policies of these governments themselves nor in international organizations—specifically the UN. This involved both a restatement of

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MOSCOW's long-standard claim to have risen to a position of parity with the United States and the assertion that the disintegration of the colonial system, which had resulted in the creation of dozens of new states, freed those states from having to submit to political and economic domination, either domestically or internationally, and thus opened the way for the former colonies to play a new and decisive international role. Khrushchev's bizarre public behavior and characteristic mingling of friendly and belligerent postures may have stemmed in part from a desire to emphasize that Soviet strength and confidence was such that he could ignore Western norms and sensitivities.

Khrushchev's initiative in seeking a fundamental reorganization of the UN which would reflect his views on the current correlation of forces was intended to stimulate Asian and African demands for a greater voice in UN affairs, as well as to lay the groundwork for future major changes in the UN structure and staffing which would assure Moscow that the UN could no longer be used effectively to oppose Soviet policy anywhere in the world. His demand for the immediate abolition of all military bases on foreign territory—a demand he linked with the move for immediate liberation of all areas still under colonial rule—showed that he recognized that this was another issue capable of arousing the masses and that even a partial victory where Western bases were most vulnerable to popular pressures would be an important gain for Moscow.

Khrushchev's report on 20 October to the Soviet people on the results of his New York stay, which he defended as not only worthwhile but necessary, gave prime emphasis to his proposals for reorganizing the structure of the UN to reflect three major blocs, and to a reiteration of Moscow's disarmament position rather than to its more aggressive anticolonial line. Khrushchev did, however, confirm Moscow's stronger stand on Algeria when on 3 October in New York he embraced Algerian Deputy Premier Krim Belkacem and said at a luncheon on 7 October that recent Soviet-Algerian contacts meant in effect de facto recognition of the provisional Algerian government. Khrushchev's assertion on 20 October that "we have rendered and will continue to render them all the assistance we can"—accompanied by an increase of material aid to Algerian refugees by Soviet "public organizations"—confirmed the view that, at least for the time
being, Moscow had given up hope of wooing France and French President de Gaulle away from close cooperation with NATO, West Germany, and the United States in particular.

The assumption underlying Moscow's policy toward the underdeveloped countries, an assumption to which the Soviet Union has clung despite heavy pressures from both inside and outside the bloc, is that the world is passing through an interim period--of uncertain but short duration--during which forces now in motion will bring about a basically new world situation. Changes within the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America will reflect a shift in the correlation of forces of the two world power blocs. This in turn, centers on the successful completion of Moscow's short- and medium-range economic plans, achievements which will allegedly convince everyone of Communist economic--and by extension also military--superiority over the West in terms which will make Moscow's international voice decisive. Within this framework, Soviet leaders continue to display an interest in keeping crucial issues with the West, such as Berlin and disarmament, from coming to an early showdown, and the new forms and novel lines followed in the Soviet Union's broadened and intensified foreign activities, "to answer fully contemporary demands," have been directed toward making this interim period as short and as politically profitable as possible.

Moscow's "modernized Marxist-Leninist" approach has been designed to bring about a rapid transition of the political and economic policies of the underdeveloped countries toward joint or parallel opposition to the West--including voting with the bloc in the UN, acceptance of close economic ties and cultural relations with Communist countries, and, in the guise of "solidarity" and common interest of the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, closer alignment of these countries behind the leadership of anti-Western extremist leaders. More and more, Moscow has committed its prestige to a small but growing number of focuses of anti-Western sentiment such as Indonesia, Guinea, Cuba. In a greater number of the new states, Soviet policy is based on the diplomatic and economic encouragement of narrow nationalistic sentiment, in the expectation that tensions between anti-Western extremists and pro-Western elements for leadership of these governments will lead to a gradual elimination of political, economic, and ideological ties with the West. In this respect,
Moscow's political and economic support for non-Communist neutralist and nationalistic governments of Asia, Africa, and Latin America has not been a pure gain for local Communists, whose major role, as the most dedicated anti-Western element, has been reduced to propagandizing Moscow's current international line. Flexibility of tactics, with traditional big-power politics playing a more serious role than classical Marxist formulas, and a generally pragmatic diplomacy since the advent of Khrushchev to top Soviet leadership—spiced by an element of experimentation—probably will last as long as Khrushchev has the decisive voice. The increasingly daring note in Moscow's post-Paris policy toward "imperialism" apparently reflects a conviction that world public opinion, backed by the vaunted might of the "socialist camp," can be manipulated to deter effective Western counteraction.

The world-wide expansion of Soviet political and economic activity, which has led to a Soviet "presence" in the remotest areas of the world and made the Soviet Union a bargaining factor, either directly or indirectly, in every political and economic transaction of an underdeveloped country with the outside world, has yielded political and economic gains of no mean order. Moscow's selective use of its resources to achieve maximum effect on key countries—with a consequent relatively modest drain on its own resources—does not suggest that economic criteria will force any curtailment of this program, even allowing for a considerable intensification of domestic demands for a higher standard of living and real or anticipated intrabloc requirements. Granted the overriding influence of the temperature of East-West relations on the tactics—though not the direction—of Soviet policy, the prospects are overwhelmingly on the side of an even greater Soviet effort to influence the course of developments in the underdeveloped areas.