Background
The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 sponsored by Senators Nunn, Lugar, and Domenici mandates the enhancement of domestic preparedness and response capability for terrorist attacks involving nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons. The Legislation provided funding to improve the capability of the federal, state and local emergency response agencies to prevent and, if necessary, respond to domestic terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
The Department of Defense was given the lead in the development of the Emergency Response Assistance Program as part of a federal interagency effort. The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) designated the Secretary of the Army (SECARMY) as the Executive Agent for DoD program implementation. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Logistics, and Environment (ASA(ILE)) provides oversight for the Director of Military Support (DOMS) as the Staff Action Agent. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)) provides policy and funding oversight for the DoD Domestic Preparedness Program.
A Senior Interagency Coordinating Group (SICG), chaired by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), provides direction for orchestration of the overall program, ensuring that terrorism-related federal preparedness programs are coordinated nationally to enhance state and local response capabilities. ASD (SO/LIC) and DOMS represent DoD on the SICG. The SICG receives guidance from the National Security Council (NSC).
The Interagency Strategic Plan, developed in concert with our federal interagency partners represented on the SICG, was written to enhance response using a peacetime context addressing incident models such as the World Trade Center and the Tokyo Subway. While many facets of response are included in this program, its overwhelming emphasis is on training first responders in large U.S. cities. Interagency teams coordinate with local city officials including fire, law enforcement and medical responders to tailor training to meet their specific needs and requirements.
As a result of an October 3, 1997 Defense Review Board meeting, the Deputy Secretary of Defense asked the ASD (SO/LIC), ASD (Reserve Affairs), and the ASA (ILE) to provide an assessment for integrating the National Guard and Reserves into ongoing Nunn-Lugar-Domenici sponsored WMD Domestic Preparedness programs. On October 19, 1997 the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) returned the initial Reserve Component (RC) plan seeking a more complete RC integration model.
On November 3, 1997 the DEPSECDEF directed that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness oversee the development of a plan to integrate the Reserve Components into the DoD response to attacks using WMD. During a November 7, 1997 meeting, the Under Secretary of Defense directed the construction of a complete model for integrating the Reserve Components into a consequence management response for domestic terrorism incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. The formation of a core group of experts, with support from agencies throughout the Department, was formed to complete the plan. In a November 14, 1997, memorandum, the Under Secretary of Defense placed the Under Secretary of the Army in charge of the plan development. Subsequently, the Under Secretary of the Army directed this core group "Tiger Team", to incorporate the capabilities of the RC into the plan. The Tiger Team tasking included developing the concept, model, overall direction for the program, and the funding necessary to support the RC integration. The Team’s focus on the appropriate, substantive and integrated DoD support model to local, state, and federal government authorities responding to a WMD attack form the basis for this plan.
In developing this plan, the Tiger Team reviewed existing programs, applied scenario-driven analysis, and sought the opinions of other recognized experts in the Emergency Preparedness field. The Tiger Team recognized statutory restrictions and training limitations as part of their analysis and used the Interagency Strategic Plan and the Federal Response Plan (FRP) as the framework for roles and missions definition.
This plan outlines the evolutionary process to fill existing gaps in consequence management response capabilities. It focuses on improving DoD support for the response to a WMD event. In particular, response options were developed to incorporate and leverage the unique assets and capabilities of the Reserve Component into the overarching WMD strategy.
Methodology
The Tiger Team mission and charter focused on producing a comprehensive plan to incorporate work from many previous efforts and leverage all available assets. The Tiger Team recognized that any response effort must be accomplished within the statutory and regulatory provisions that govern Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA). A questionnaire designed to assess current DoD capabilities was developed. This survey resulted in a response profile outlining DoD capabilities to support the Emergency Support Functions in the FRP.
More specifically, the team used Annex C to the U.S. Government Interagency CONPLAN entitled "Combating Domestic Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Terrorism (Draft- November 10, 1997)". The annex lists the tasks the Interagency Group deemed critical to successfully respond to a WMD incident. The Tiger Team grouped these tasks to correspond with the Emergency Support Functions in the FRP. Next the Team identified vital response tasks and requested the Services assess their capability to perform the tasks that DoD would likely be asked to support. The Team consolidated the Service responses to identify existing gaps in the DoD capability to respond to a WMD event. The results form a snapshot baseline of capabilities and assets.
Following the assessment of current capabilities, the Team developed a model for a prototype National Guard response concept that enhances and supports the existing and planned federal response structure. The model was tested for appropriateness by querying experts in the field representing the first responder community, primary federal agencies tasked to support state and local governments, and knowledgeable representatives from DoD organizations. These experts provided the Team with comments and recommendations. The Tiger Team also reviewed and considered numerous authoritative DoD sanctioned studies. These included the findings of the 1997 Defense Science Board (DSB) Summer Study on Transnational Terrorism, and the Chem-Bio 2010 (Foss-Downing) Report. It is recognized that some interagency partners possess a robust capability, and may already have sufficient resources to deal with small-scale WMD events. This plan capitalizes on these existing resources and provides a basis for modeling, analysis and prototyping for further exercise. As a result, a framework for even more enhanced integration of the Total Force into the WMD program is clearly possible. The existing DoD Directives, policies, and MSCA related statutes were also considered in the development of this plan.
The Tiger Team recognized the federal response concepts identified in the May 1, 1997 Report to Congress and the SICG Strategic Plan. In addition, the Tiger Team reviewed the United States Atlantic Command (USACOM) and Chemical and Biological Defense Command (CBDCOM) response plans which included Response Task Force (RTF) and Chem-Bio Rapid Response Team concepts. Upon review, it was evident that few military elements are currently focused, trained or equipped to respond to WMD events. Hence the purpose of the project -- to increase the DoD response capabilities while developing the potential within the Reserve Component units.
While this project focuses on the RC response to a WMD attack on cities, there are other areas potentially at even greater risk. With our military today primarily CONUS based, the ability to project our Nation’s military power becomes crucial to our military response options. By leveraging the Reserve Component capability, the DoD response model takes on a new and different dimension. Even further as certain RC units qualify for direct deployment, a local WMD response capability becomes all the more important.
The employment of a WMD in the United States against our power projection systems during a Major Theater War could severely degrade our ability to respond during a crisis. Both the Chem-Bio 2010 Study and the 1997 DSB Summer Study on Transnational Terrorist Threats found that no dedicated force structure exists to address potential CB use on military and civilian facilities in CONUS or in theater. At issue – projecting our Nation’s military power at the appropriate time and place.
The concept for an integrated DoD consequence management model recognizes that the same or similar capabilities are required against this asymmetric threat. The response model in this plan includes force protection concepts, research & development, and resource allocations that could be applied to CONUS Major Theater of War enabling facilities. Here again, using the RC integrated response capability would support both the National Military Strategy of Force Projection by providing support to United States bases prior to and during operational deployments and also provides a response capability to WMD attacks on other U.S. targets. In addition to current tactical battlefield CB defense units, the Total Army Analysis (TAA) has documented the need for additional CB structure. As these new units are stationed, the USAR and ARNG leadership will be informed of the gaps in state and regional coverage. These new MTOE units will greatly enhance the capability to respond to WMD emergencies. Again, the existing RC unit capability is being leveraged. Since there is a relationship between the WMD skills and the unit’s wartime mission, a complementary outcome clearly exists.
The methods for the first phase of this project and during the mission analysis were oriented first on the units in the current force and their capabilities to respond to WMD attacks. In the final analysis, the concept outlined here reaches far beyond just local WMD contingencies. Over time, these response elements will develop the skills necessary to be employed at US military bases or at other strategic points of U.S. interest under Title 10 U.S.C. In addition to the current force structure, this plan outlines a requirement for new structure. This proposed structure is not large by any measure but the potential impact is enormous. Further detailed in this plan, the Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) Element provides the core capability for the technical DoD response. Early assessment and detection of a WMD agent, determining the concentration of the release and the areas to evacuate or remain are the likely technical areas the DoD will be asked to support.
These questions form the most significant challenge facing communities and states as they respond to WMD attacks. Here again, National Guard and RC integration will enhance the DoD capability in response to WMD attacks.